OUTPOSTS AND pRICE TAG VIOLENCE A Blow upon a Bruise September 2012

the unesco chair on human rights and democracy at an-najah national university co-published by the alternative information center 1

Outposts and Price Tag Violence

A Blow Upon a Bruise

September 2012

The UNESCO Chair on Human Rights & Democracy at An-Najah University www.najah.edu/centers/uchrd Alternative Information Center (AIC) www.alternativenews.org Published by: UNESCO Chair/AIC. Copyright 2012. All rights reserved. Researcher: Philip Bato Editorial team: Alice Arnold, Paul Edleman Abed Qusini and ActiveStills.org contributed the following photographs: Cover, p. 29,33,34,37,38,42,45 - Abed Qusini p.15,21,27 - Keren Manor/Activestills.org p.11,14 - Oren Ziv/Activestills.org

Acknowledgements
We would love to extend a special thanks to all that were involved in the realization of this report. The UNESCO Chair would especially like to thank Yesh Din, Peace Now, EAPPI, Tom Palmer, Al-Haq, Abed Qusini, and ActiveStills for their valuable contributions and advice. Moreover, we are grateful for the time and effort spent by all village councils, mayors and village residents who aided us in our research. We also want to thank the UNESCO Chair legal interns and staff for their contributions, especially Ruba Khuffash, Sana Ibrahim and Behnoud Irantalab. Last of all, we appreciate the information, statistics and feedback we received from all committed individuals and organizations involved in human rights advocacy in the West Bank.

Table of Contents

Introduction 8 1. SECTION I. The Settlements, Outposts and International Law 10 11 12 13

Israeli Settlements and Outposts under International Law 1.1. Legal Framework: Land Acquisition and Civilian Transfer under International Law 1.2. Licensed Colonization: The High Court and Israeli Settlement Expansion since 1967

2. The Outposts: A New Settlement Frontier 15 2.1. Outposts and the Israeli State: Continuing the settlement enterprise post-1995 16 2.2. Israeli government support for outpost construction and expansion 18 2.3. Establish an Outpost 101 19 2.4. Outpost Demolition Orders: Institutionalized Lawlessness 19 2.5. From Demolition Order to New Settlement: The Outpost Showdown 21 2.6. Conclusion 26 SECTION II. Price Tag Violence and International Law 28

3. The Anatomy of Price Tag Violence 29 3.1. Racism, Violence and Religion: The Radical History of Price Tag Violence 30 3.2. Defining Price Tag Violence 31 3.3. Result: Less Outpost Demolitions, More Settlements 38 Case Study: The Mitzpe Yitzhar and Ramat Gilad Demolitions 40 Case Study: Migron 40 4. Price Tag Violence and the International Legal Duty of Law Enforcement 42 4.1. Occupying powers are bound by international law to protect the 42 population of the occupied territories from attack and investigate, prevent and punish any offenses that occur. 4.2. Price Tag attacks constitute violations to Palestinian rights 43 4.3. Israel has failed in its legal duties under IHL and IHRL to prevent, investigate and 43 prosecute price tag attacks against Palestinians. 4.4. State Responsibility 47 Conclusion 48 Appendix A: The Price Tag Incident Database (June 2008 - July 2012) Appendix B: Overview Price Tag Attacks 2008-2012 Appendix C: Map of Price Tag Attacks in the Northern West Bank 66 68 79

INTRODUCTION
A new era has come to Judea and Samaria. For every evacuation, for every demolition and destruction, for every stone moved, [the Israeli government] will get war. We call this mutual responsibility,[...] For every act of destruction in the southern Hebron hills we will set fire to Samaria, and for a container destroyed near Har Bracha we will exact a price in the southern Hebron hills. 1 - Israeli settler on price tag violence

This report takes two concepts related to the Israeli occupation unauthorized outposts and price tag violence and places them within the larger framework of Israeli settler violence and the settlements, while defining their relation to the Israeli government. It clarifies why current outpost-related events, including price tag violence, should be seen as both the logical continuation of the Israeli settlement enterprise and an important weathervane of current Israeli policy in the occupied Palestinian territory. To clarify the dynamic between the two inherently interwoven concepts of outposts and price tag violence, this report attempts to place both phenomena in their respective historical contexts and examines the shared power structures and underlying forces that continue to shape them. Outposts are embryonic settlements that are illegal under international and Israeli law. Since the Oslo Accords in 1993, outposts have served an essential tool of Israeli acquisition of Palestinian land and thrived in the culture of impunity surrounding Israeli settler activities in the West Bank. Because outposts are officially unauthorized and hence illegal under Israeli law, the Israeli government is able to claim it has no ties to their construction. The reality, however, is that in violation of their own and international law, Israeli government authorities have covertly funneled public funds to settlers for the construction of outposts, sometimes even cooperated in planning the outposts, and generally failed to demolish or punish illegal settler construction. While the Israeli Civilian Administration does issue demolition orders against settler structures in the outposts, Israeli Ministers of Defense have continuously refused to execute these orders, effectively allowing outposts to entrench their hold on stolen land. The Israeli government knows to what extent its Ministries and officials are involved in the establishment and expansion of outposts, it even commissioned and adopted a well-known report on the matter in 2005. Nonetheless, nothing has been done and the number of outposts has increased. Over the last decade, Palestinian landowners and Israeli NGOs have petitioned the Israeli High Court to challenge the chain of illegal government-settler behavior that surrounds the outposts. By 2005, the petitions and other political pressures succesfully forced the Israeli government to implement several pending demolition orders against outposts. Radical settlers, disillusioned by the 2005 Gaza Disengagement, saw the demolition of outposts as a continuation of the Disengagement and an existentialist threat to the settlement enterprise. To halt this perceived government menace, the settlers responded to the demolitions with price tag, a violent strategy of deterrence. First used in 2008, the price tag strategy aims to deter Israeli government actions against all outposts and other settler interests through coordinated settler attacks against Palestinians villages and any Israeli organization that is perceived as work against the settlement enterprise. The attacks happen especially when outpost structures have been demolished or are under threat of demolition; the message being that the government will receive a price tag for every action it takes against the settlers. The principal idea is that provocative settler attacks on Palestinian civilian and religious targets might trigger possible Palestinian counter-attacks and threaten the current status quo in the West Bank, which could destabilize the Israeli government. Subsequent government fears of further price tag attacks, the logic goes, will coerce the Israeli government into changing its policies concerning the settlements enterprise in favor of the settlers political goals. Israeli NGO Peace Now described the strategy as a major success and a rather unique form of terrorism in Western experience: Politically-motivated violence, directed against innocent civilian members of an adversarial society (Palestinians), with a primary purpose of deterring the terrorists own government (Israels) from taking actions against their community. The Israeli government has generally failed to crack down on price tag criminals, which has enhanced the climate of impunity in which settlers thrive. It is true that price tag attacks are physically no different from the other forms of settler violence that Palestinian communities endure on a daily basise.g. arson, beatings, shootings and property theftand that price tag attacks make up only a small percentage of the overall settler violence that occurs in the occupied Palestinian territories. The particular relevance of the price tag phenomenon, however, lies in its strategic use of violence to communicate the power settlers wield to destabilize the already fragile security situation in the West Bank in order to shift Israeli government policy towards settler demands. Although small in scope, price tag violence signifies new trends

amongst Israels most radical settlement communities concerning their relationship with the State of Israel and the wide-spread acceptance of violence as a legitimate form of resistance by a new settler generation. Moreover, due to the Israeli governments placement of radical ideological settlers communities into the oPt, its expansionism through use of outposts, and the different legal standards it employs for Israelis and Palestinians, price tag attacks must be understood as the undeniable product of Israeli government policy instead of fringe acts of violence. Both outpost demolitions and price tag attacks have increasingly made media headlines over the last year and the rise of settler attacks has sparked renewed concerns about the violence and lawlessness with which settlers regularly operate in the occupied West Bank. Price tag attacks are particularly attention grabbing in their use of viscerally racist methodsincluding the burning and vandalism of Palestinian mosques and churches to make innocent Palestinians civilians pay the price of any decision taken by the Israeli government that is seen as hostile to the settler enterprise. This report aims to channel that renewed interest into the correct historical and legal context, so that the nuance and severity of the situation will not be overlooked. To do so, it follows the causal chain of events by starting with the emergence of outposts and ending at price tag violence as it exists today. The report starts off with a legal analysis of settlements and outposts under international law. It emphasizes that no legal distinction should be made between settlements and outposts under international law as both are considered illegal. The second chapter deals with the outposts, traces their beginnings and gives a historical analysis of the outpost boom in the post-Oslo Accord era. What becomes apparent is the way in which outposts are a new frontier of unfettered settlement construction and expansion in the occupied Palestinian territories. In the third chapter, we highlight the connections between the current outpost demolitions and price tag violence. We define and describe the contours of price tag violence with reference to its specific objectives vis--vis changing government policy on outpost demolitions and position it within a context of tension between the Israeli settlers and State. The section similarly concludes with a factual and legal analysis of Israels failure to adequately carry out its law enforcement duties as required under international and domestic Israeli law.

SECTION I. THE SETTLEMENTS, OUTPOSTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

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1. ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS and outposts under INTERNATIONAL LAW

Chapter Summary The presence of Israeli settlements and outposts are serious violations of international law. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is closely tied to one of the foundational principles of modern international order, enshrined in the UN Charter: that land cannot be acquired as a result of the use of force. The transfer of Israeli civilians into the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) as well as the unjustified and unlawful confiscation and use of Palestinian land constitute grave violations of the UN Charter and IHL. Therefore, there can be no legal distinction between settlements and outposts under international law as both are considered illegal. Although IHL makes distinctions regarding the Occupying Powers ability to use privately owned v. state lands during occupation, the construction of civilian settlements on either private or state land is unsupported under international law. The construction of any civilian settlements outpost or settlement in occupied territory by an occupying power for its own population is forbidden under international law. The Israeli High Court has played a crucial historical role in domestically legitimizing the illegal seizure of occupied Palestinian land by the Israeli State. A 1979 High Court ruling essentially legalized confiscation of Palestinian land for the settlement construction, as long as that land had been declared by the Israeli government as being Palestinian state land. The ruling also cleared the way for a widely-used Israeli land-seizure mechanism: the registration of contested private Palestinian land as state land for the construction of Israeli civilian settlements. The result is that approximately 900,000 dunams (900 km2) in the West Bank have been flipped to state land and at least 90 settlements are built on declared state lands. Virtually all of the land that Israel has designated as Palestinian state land (27% of the West Bank) has been placed off limits to Palestinians, and is instead reserved for settlements, outposts and their future expansion. Immediately after the 1967 War, the Israeli state established a military and administrative regime through which Palestinian lands were seized by the state and turned over to national-religious Israeli settler movements for the purpose of civilian settlement construction. The de facto annexation of Palestinian land has subsequently become a staple of the Israeli administration and is based on a complex system of administrative mechanisms and military orders that aim to legitimize and regulate the acquisition of Palestinian land in the occupied territory and the construction of civilian Israeli settlements. Although Israel as an occupying power is subject to the rules and regulations of international law, it has consistently violated core principles and provisions of the international legal system and treaties to which it is party. In addition to blatant disregard for many of its obligations under international law, the Israeli governmentwith the seal of approval from the states High Court, has turned the protections offered by international legal standards on their head to instead legitimize the institutionalized theft of Palestinian land. In particular interest to this report, is how the Israeli government has exploited and reinterpreted the distinction under international humanitarian law between state and private land of an occupied territory to justify massive confiscation and settlement of the former while quietly tolerating and even assisting settlement of the latter. At the heart of price tag violence is the settlers desire for even that distinction and small restraint to be obliterated so that all Palestinian land can be legally confiscated and settled with Israeli civilians. Through a legal and historical analysis of that Israeli settlement enterprise, this chapter aims to contextualize the emergence of settlements called unauthorized outposts after 1996. The first section provides a brief discussion of the international law prohibitions against an occupying power establishing settlements for the benefit of its own civilians into the territory it occupies, and the regulated use of occupied territorys land by the Occupying Power. The second section examines the methods through which the Israeli state, under cover of its own administrative pro-

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cedures and domestic interpretation of international legal duties, acquires Palestinian land for establishing and expanding Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory. 1.1. Legal Framework: Land Acquisition and Civilian Transfer under International Law One of the core principles of modern international legal order is the outright prohibition on the acquisition of territory as the result of the use of force. This principle is enshrined in article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and its applicability to the case of Israels occupation in the Palestinian territories has been affirmed in numerous UN Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions,2 as well as by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the Wall.3 This principle is furthermore expressed through various provisions in International Humanitarian Law governing the use of force and the administration of occupied territory. An occupying power is bound by international law to refrain from moving its civilian population into the occupied territory. The Statute of the International Criminal Court has specified that transfer, whether directly or indirectly by the occupying state of its own civilians constitutes a war crime.4 Additionally, paragraph 6 of article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states: The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies. The official commentary on the drafters rationale behind this article explains that the prohibition was directed at thwarting the Occupying Powers desire to colonize the territory it controlled by transferring portions of its own population.5 Inherent in the articles purpose is the assumption that once the occupying states civilians settle in the occupied territory, the future withdrawal of the Occupying Power is rendered much more difficult because of the emotional and financial ties to the land its citizens will undoubtedly develop. The need to thwart colonization attempts must thus be seen as not merely a humanitarian provision for the benefit of the protected persons under occupation, but also as a safeguard against pretensions at annexation of occupied territory in violation of the UN Charter, article 2(4). Although Israel disputes the applicability of article 49 to settlements in the oPt, arguing that it does not transfer its citizens to the oPt, but rather they voluntarily move there, this claim has been firmly rejected by the international community. The ICJ6 and UN Security Council7 have found the State of Israel has conducted a conscious policy of settling the oPt with its own civilians in violation of International Law. Indeed, the Israeli government has not simply failed to take sufficient measures to halt the migration of its nationals to the occupied territories, but has actively promoted migration of its civilian population to the oPt,8 by offering significant benefits in education, welfare, housing, and transportation to Israeli citizens for settling in the West Bank; benefits settlers would not receive if they resided within the Green Line.9 The extent of recent Israeli state practices supporting the settlement project including unauthorized outposts is elaborated upon in section 2.2. While the illegality of Israeli settlements is often discussed within the framework of the prohibition on transferring its civilians to the oPt, settlement construction as well as the general confiscation and use of Palestinian land by the Israeli government represent violations of interna-

tional legal norms. The principle of non-acquisition of territory by the Occupying Power necessitates that occupation is by definition a temporary state of affairs and no changes shall be introduced by the occupying force that could affect the eventual return of sovereignty over the entirety of the occupied territory. Because the Occupying Power acts as the de facto administrator of the occupied territory, it does, however, assume some rights to use state property, including real estate. The use of private property by the Occupying State, on the other hand, is much more restricted. Land and other property of the occupied state and its residents are protected under the two primary IHL treaties, the 1907 Hague Regulations and 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, and the principles enshrined in these instruments are part of International Customary Law. IHL differentiates between use, destruction and confiscation of property by the Occupying Power and makes a further distinction based on whether such property is owned by private individuals or by the occupied state. In keeping with the UN Charters principle on nonacquisition of occupied land, the Occupying Power may not confiscate or seize private or state property. The Hague Regulations unambiguously state the rule that private property cannot be confiscated.10 The Hague Regulations further clarify that seizure of state property by the Occupying Power is limited to movable property, i.e., not lands, which may have a military purpose.11 In sum, while some limited use of state and private land is allowed (and explained in more detail below), legal title does not pass to the Occupying Power and it may not be regarded as the lawful owner of either state or private land. Similar to the rules on confiscation, the general rule on destruction of property by the Occupying Power is that such acts are prohibited with regards to both state and privately owned lands. However, IHL allows for a narrow exception to this rule in the case of absolute military necessity. Both The Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention provide that private and state property in the occupied territory cannot be destroyed unless such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.12 While the ICJ has stated that military necessity may exist within occupied territory even after the close of major military operations, 13 the military necessity requirement cannot be loosely interpreted, but rather must applied in the context of an active ongoing military conflict where the destruction of private and public property is a crucial military necessity.14 Perhaps the largest divergence in terms of IHLs differentiation of private and state land is in the Occupying Powers ability to use such property. Article 52 of the Hague Regulations allows the Occupying Power to requisition private property in the occupied territory. The provision has been interpreted by legal scholars to allow for the temporary use of private immovable property if the Occupying Power does so for military necessity.15 With regard to state land, the Occupying Power has greater margin to use such property, albeit within limits. Article 55 of the Hague Regulations provides that the occupying power shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of all immovable state property, and that [the Occupying Power] must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct. As a legal concept, the usufructuary is the entity that has the right to enjoy and take the fruits of anothers property, but may not destroy it or

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fundamentally alter its character. According to the most common interpretation, article 55 specifically prohibits the wanton destruction and the indefinite, non-temporary estrangement of public property by the Occupying Power in line with the principle of non-acquisition.16 In addition, international criminal jurisprudence has determined that article 55 restricts the Occupying Powers use of state land to the needs of the army of occupation. 17 The construction of Israeli civilian settlements on Palestinian land, whether privately owned or state property constitute serious violations under international law. In the case of private land, neither the destruction nor use of the land for civilian settlements is justifiable under the military necessity doctrine. Similarly, the construction of homes and entire cities and communities for the benefit of Israeli civilians cannot be regarded as temporary in nature. Although a different analysis applies, the establishment of settlements on state land is also illegal under international law. Like with private land, destruction of Palestinian state land for the purpose of building Israeli civilian communities has no grounding as an absolute military necessity. Settlement construction is not a lawful use of Palestinian state land, as it constitutes a violation of the duties of the usufruct by fundamentally altering the value and use of the land. Furthermore, settlements on state land are not for the benefit of the Israeli army but rather its civilians, and represent de facto seizure of land as demonstrated by repeated Israeli government statement that they will not give up the bulk of the settlements.18 Israeli governments, with the help of the High Court, have for years twisted the meaning and purpose of international legal norms to the point of rendering the law meaningless. While not entirely disregarding international law, the Court has exploited the distinctions made between private and state land to carve out pockets of protection for massive settlement growth across the oPt. Today, the Israeli government and judiciary will often refer to illegal outposts to describe the civilian settlements that are constructed in the oPt without Israeli government authorization. However, it must be made clear that this term is in fact quite misleading as all settlements, authorized or not by Israel, are illegal under international law. 1.2. Licensed Colonization: The High Court and Israeli Settlement Expansion since 1967 As part of the legal justifications for the seizure and use Palestinian land for settlements, Israeli law makes a categorical distinction between Palestinian private and state land in the oPt. To demonstrate that the use of this distinction by an occupying power to seize occupied land is explicitly illegal under international law, this section applies the legal outline above to a short chronology of Israeli land acquisition in the oPt since 1967. In addition, it examines what role the Israeli High Court played in that process. 1.2.1 1967 to 1979: Requisitioning Occupied Private Land

conditions were met when instead of officially requisitioning land19 the Israeli government illegally seized around 47,000 dunams20 (47 km2) of private Palestinian land for permanent civilian settlement construction between 1968 and 1979. 21 The distorted interpretation of the ability to requisition Palestinian land became a key Israeli landseizure mechanism in the oPt during the first decade of occupation. At first, the state would leave the Palestinian title of the seized land intact and claim to have temporarily requisitioned the land against payment.22 The Israeli government would then destroy Palestinian property to construct infrastructure and housing units specifically intended to accommodate Israeli citizens.23 The reality was that these lands, instead of being temporarily requisitioned, were actually permanently confiscated to construct civilian settlements.24 By 1979, 43 settlements had been establishments in the West Bank alone, many of these through the requisition land-seizure mechanism.25 The practice was fully supported, and domestically legitimized, by the Israeli High Court. The Courts approval of the requisition mechanism lasted until the pivotal Israeli High Court case of Elon Moreh in 1979. Elon Moreh was an illegal Israeli civilian settlement constructed on private Palestinian land near Nablus which had supposedly been requisitioned for security needs. Residents of the Rujeib village, on whose land the settlement had been built, brought suit against the Israeli government. The governments contention that the settlement was for military necessity was undermined by the former Israeli Chief of Staff s affirmation that it did not contribute to military security. 26 Perhaps the bigger blow to the governments arguments came from leaders in the settlement movement who rejected outright the governments claim that Elon Moreh was temporary and replaceable and implicated government ministers and the prime minister himself in promising that Elon Moreh was a permanent Jewish settlement no less than Deganya or Netanya. [emphasis added] 27Faced with the undeniable fact that the settlement was not temporary,28 nor guided by military consideration, the Court ruled that Elon Moreh was illegally constructed under Israeli law.29 Nonetheless, the ruling delivered a major blow to Palestinian landowners and paved the way for the mass acquisition of state lands by the Israeli State. The Elon Moreh ruling imposed serious limitations on future possible recourse to the High Court in cases of land requisition or seizure by military authorities and stated that, from then onwards only seizures of privately owned land could be prevented or reversed by recourse to the High Court. The ruling went on to state that the High Court would not be prepared to intervene in any disputes over ownership of land, which instead must be resolved in military appeals committees.30 The consequence was that while the Court ruled it illegal to build civilian settlements on private Palestinian land, it accepted the legality of settlements built on state land.31 Moreover, if contested private Palestinian land would be administratively registered as state land (i.e., flipped) by Israel, Palestinian landowners would no longer be able to challenge the order in the High Court. Hence, with a wink and a nod, the Court cleared the way for a new Israeli land-seizure mechanism: the registration of contested private Palestinian land as state land for the construction of Israeli civilian settlements.

In an attempt to circumvent the illegality of confiscating private occupied land, Israel operated under the guise of temporarily requisitioning private property during the first decade of the occupation. As explained above, use of private property by the Occupying Power may be allowed under international law, but any such use must be temporary and for military necessity. Neither of these

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1.2.2 1979 2012: High Court-Approved Settlement Construction on Occupied State Land After the 1979 Elon Moreh case, the declaration and registration of contested private Palestinian land as state land became the primary Israeli mechanism to construct and expand civilian settlements in the oPt.32 Two important caveats concerning the terms private and state land in the oPt must be made in order to explain the vulnerable position of Palestinian landowners after 1967. First of all, land registration processes in the West Bank under Ottoman, British and Jordanian rule were slow and ineffective because authorities were not interested in seizing private land.33 As a result, landowners in the West Bank often did not register their lands, convinced that their tax records and community knowledge of the land would suffice to establish ownership34. Secondly, Israeli authorities actually closed the land registration process for Palestinians in 1968, which means it has been impossible for landowners to register land in the West Bank in the Registry until present day.35 The lack of registered private land left Palestinian landowners particularly vulnerable to Israeli land surveys which employed a draconian interpretation of the

Ottoman Land Law,36 and provided no meaningful judicial review or oversight.37 Once land that was privately owned but not registered with the Israeli authorities was reclassified or flipped to state land, the Elon Moreh High Court ruling ensured subsequent settlement construction on the land was legal under Israeli law. The result was the Israeli registration of vast amounts of contested private Palestinian land as state land.38 Between 1979 and 1992, Israel declared 90,800 hectares of Palestinian land as government property, in addition to the 70,000 hectares that had already been classified as state land during Jordanian rule.39 Through the same mechanism, around 90 percent of all existing pre-1979 Israeli settlements were also declared to be located on state land.40 Today, virtually all of the land that Israel has designated as Palestinian state land (approximately 27% of the West Bank, or 900,000 dunams/900 km2) has been placed off limits to Palestinians, and is instead used for close to 100 settlements as well as land reserved for future settlement establishment and expansion.41 The same procedure of flipping unregistered Palestinian so called survey land to land classified as state land has been the core mechanism of current retroactive legalization procedures used to launder outposts into official settlements, as described in section 2.5.2.

Construction in the Har Homa Settlement. (photo: Oren Ziv/ActiveStills)

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2. THE OUTPOSTS: a new settlement frontier

Chapter Summary Outposts are illegal under international and Israeli law. Outposts are essentially embryonic settlements; their construction and current legalization is a fundamental tool of the Israeli acquisition of Palestinian land and constitutes a continuation of the general settlement enterprise. Over 100 unauthorized outposts have been established since Israel pledged to stop the construction of new settlements in the early 1990s. Outposts receive administrative and financial support from Israeli government institutions. Public officials and government institutions are involved in planning and constructing the outposts, to which millions of dollars in public funds are channeled. The problem is systemic and not confined to several rogue actors. The official Israeli government policy since March 2011 is to legalize the outposts. Outposts under threat by High Court rulings are converted into legal settlements by the Israeli government through retroactive legalization. Approved retroactive building plans often include additional land and housing units, thus expanding the illegal outposts and legalizing them at the same time. Outpost demolitions only convey the semblance of law enforcement. Between 1997 and 2007, the Israeli Civil Administration only executed 3 per cent of the outstanding demolition orders against illegal Israeli construction in the oPt; usually only dummy outposts are targeted which are rebuilt the next day. The Israeli High Court allows outpost-related court cases to drag on for years, enabling settlers to entrench an outpost on the ground, while the government finds ways to legalize it. To deter future High Court petitions initiated by Israeli NGOs and Palestinian landowners, the Israeli government has responded to petitions by constructing new settlements, increasing construction inside existing settlements, and financially rewarding outpost inhabitants. The 1993 Oslo Accords, without specifically mentioning settlements, placed diplomatic pressure on the Israeli government to halt open settlement construction. Oslo created an international political climate averse to open settlement construction, causing Israel to re-brand its settlement policies in order to semantically distance itself from the action while continuing settlement expansion. Two semantic loopholes have been widely used since Oslo. First of all, instead of building new settlements, Israel built new settlement neighborhoods. Secondly, settlements illegally built by settlers were no longer called settlements, but unauthorized outposts instead, even though their construction was often funded with public funds. Outposts are thus basically settlements, semantically redefined and covertly supported by the government to serve increased settlement construction and land acquisition after the Oslo peace process. The involvement of Israeli government bodies and officials in the establishment of what are supposed to be unauthorized outposts is systemic and well documented. A 2005 report commissioned by the Israeli government itself, details how Israeli public officials are involved in planning the outposts, Ministries slush money to the settlers through financial back-alleys, and Ministers of Defense simply refuse to implement Israeli law. The pervasive lack of law enforcement, wide-spread corruption and obvious abuse of public funds led Israeli Attorney Talia Sasson the reports author to describe the outpost-government dynamic as follows: It seems that law violation became institutionalized. We face not a felon, or a group of felons, violating the law. The big picture is a bold violation of laws done by certain State authorities, public authorities, regional councils in Judea, Samaria and Gaza and settlers, while false presenting [sic] an organized legal system.[emphasis added]42 Little has been done since 2005 to remedy the problem, partially due to a lack of pressure on the Israeli government to change its ways. In 2012, as it did in 1979, the Israeli High Court continues to legitimize and facilitate settlement expansion; this time by enabling outpost con-

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struction. The Court does so by appearing to crack down on illegal settler construction, while in fact allowing the Israeli government to launder previously illegal outposts into legal settlements. All the while, Palestinian rights are systematically violated, international law is blatantly disregarded, and the colonization of the West Bank continues. 2.1. Outposts and the Israeli State: Continuing the settlement enterprise post-1995 [T]here seems to be an actual system that has prevailed in the last years: on the one hand the State of Israel commits not to build new settlements and not to develop the existing ones and that is what it does on paper; but actually, construction proceeds apace, but now it is defined as illegal and it continues to exist undisturbed. -Peace Now43 The construction of purportedly unauthorized settlements, i.e. outposts, is a deliberate strategy by the Israeli government to circumvent political commitments to halt settlement construction and complicate Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. The 1995 Oslo II agreement included the following text: Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.44 The Oslo Accords proved stillborn from day one and despite an international post-Oslo climate unfavorable to open settlement construction, the Israeli settler population in the West Bank rose from 110,900 in 1993 to over 300,000 settlers in 2012 (excluding East Jerusalem).45 To allow for this injection and increase of its population into the oPt without attracting excessive international attention, the government constructed a new vocabulary to re-brand the construction of new settlements in order to distance itself from any wrongdoing and started to employ two semantic loopholes to rephrase and continue new settlement construction:46 1. Labeling new settlements as neighborhoods that constitute the natural growth of older settlements. The Israeli government has approved and built new settlements, placed them within the jurisdiction of older, adjacent settlements, and has introduced the new settlements as neighborhoods to accommodate the natural growth of the old settlements. Under the guise of neighborhoods and natural growth, settlement construction has subsequently been framed by Israeli politicians as a basic human right of settlers living in the West Bank. After Colin Powell suggested a freeze on settlement construction in 2003, then Israeli Prime Minister (PM) Ariel Sharon famously asked: what do you want, for a pregnant woman to have an abortion just because she is a settler?47 2. Labeling new settlements as unauthorized outposts, while giving them financial and administrative support. These outposts are inhabited by hard line national-religious settlers and have been strategically placed to undermine the prospect of Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank in any future peace settlement. As is extensively documented below, the Israeli government has been a key player in the construction of new outposts, and their current legalization into new settlements or settlement neighborhoods, completing the settlement circle.

2.1.1 Outposts and Settlements In the wake of the Oslo Accords, the construction of outposts became a key strategy to circumvent the political commitments Israel made to stop settlement growth.48 The first unauthorized outposts started to appear in the summer of 1996, especially in the middle of the West Bank and what could potentially become a Palestinian state.
The first outposts were built on the hills [near settlements in the West Bank]. Those were the first months of the government of Netanyahu, who had made it his goal to dissipate the Oslo Accord signed less than three years earlier. One of the ways Netanyahu did so was through the settlers. The settlers understood that the political reigns were loosened and now was the opportunity to get out and spread into wide areas outside of the settlements in order to settle most of the C areas (which include 60% of all West Bank land). Peace Now, First petitions against the outposts

In 2012, there are almost as many outposts as there are settlements, with outpost sizes ranging from several shacks to fully developed towns. According to an Israeli government report, a minimum of 105 outposts existed in 2005, at least 54 of which were partially or fully built on private Palestinian land.49 This is in addition to the approximately 150 settlements built officially by Israel since 1967.50 In 2011, Israeli NGO Peace Now reported 70 outposts are currently built partially or completely on private Palestinian land, of which 16 fully on private land and 54 partially on private land.51 Outposts share the same goals as the settlement enterprise overall. Their construction aims to continue the expansion of Israeli settler presence in the West Bank, expand existing settlements and complicate any future Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. In addition, outposts specifically aim to disrupt local Palestinian population centers by occupying key strategic points in the West Bank. The key difference between outposts and official settlements, however, is that outposts are illegal under Israeli law, while settlements are supposed to have been built according to the rules [i.e. The Sasson Criteria]. In a landmark 2005 report, commissioned by the Israeli government, Israeli attorney Talia Sasson defines an outpost as a settlement which does not fulfill at least one of the [legal settlement] conditions.52 The legal conditions for a new Israeli civilian colony in the oPt to become an official settlement under Israeli law, labeled the Sasson Criteria are as follows: 53 a) The Israeli government has to issue a decision to establish the settlement b) The settlement has to have a defined jurisdictional area c) The settlement has to have a detailed, approved plan d) The settlement has to be located on state land or on land purchased by Israelis and registered under their name in the Land Registry [i.e. not built on private Palestinian land] Outposts can lack any of these criteria, but have often been built on private land and typically lack a building permit or official government decision on their establishment.54 What has to be kept in mind is that the Israeli distinction between outpost and settlement serves Israeli State interests and was meant to create a distinction between legal settlements and illegal outposts. However, not only are both illegal under international

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law, but the distinction between outposts and settlements might instill the perception that legal settlements do adhere to the Israeli legal criteria. The reality is that the scope of illegal construction under Israeli law in outposts is dwarfed by illegal construction in official settlements. In 2009, the Israeli government-commissioned Spiegel Database55 revealed that around 75 percent of construction in the settlements was completed without the appropriate permits or contrary to permits that were issued; i.e. was illegal under Israeli law.56 Most official settlement construction is thus illegal under Israeli law and therefore similar to the unlicensed construction of outposts.57 The semantic Israeli distinction between illegal outposts and legal settlements is therefore not related to the reality on the ground,58 but serves to shift international and domestic attention away from the settlement enterprise by focusing on the legal status of outposts under Israeli law instead. Nonetheless, the flawed distinction of outpost versus settlement remains at the heart of Israeli legal proceedings, outpost demolitions and subsequent settler violence, and is therefore employed in this report. 2.1.2 Political Commitments Since the Oslo Accords, the Israeli government has made several political commitments to freeze settlement construction, in which both natural growth and outposts were addressed. In April 2003, then Israeli PM Ariel Sharon and his Palestinian counterpart Mahmoud Abbas agreed to adhere to A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict [or Roadmap], which was brokered by the Quartet, endorsed by the Security Council through UNSC Resolution 1515,59 and approved by the Israeli Knesset. In its wording, the Roadmap specifically calls for an end to settlement construction and the demolition of all outposts built after 2001:60 Consistent with the

Mitchell Report, GOI [Government of Israel] freezes all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements) [] GOI immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001 [] GOI takes no actions undermining trust, including deportations, attacks on civilians; confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and property, as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli construction.[emphasis added] Tellingly, both natural growth and the outposts were specifically targeted as key mechanisms of continuing settlement expansion. In November 2007, during the Annapolis Conference, PM Abbas and Israeli PM Ehud Olmert signed a Joint Declaration read out by American president George W. Bush which reaffirmed the parties political commitment to their obligations under the 2003 Roadmap, including the outposts.61 These commitments, however, were never translated into a political reality. While claiming not to construct new settlements, statistics reveal the massive Israeli expansion of settlements between 1993 and today. As mentioned above, over 100 outposts have been established while the Israeli settler population in the West Bank rose to over 300,000 settlers in 2012 (excluding East Jerusalem), 62 their rate of growth standing at a yearly average of 5.3% (excluding East Jerusalem) for the last ten years, compared to 1.8% by the Israeli population as a whole effectively debunking the natural growth argument.63 To accommodate this settler population growth, 43% of the West Bank has been allotted to administrative settler bodies and is off limits to Palestinian residents.64 Concerning the outposts, despite promises made under the 2003 Roadmap to demolish all outposts constructed after 2001, the Israeli government has gone great lengths to halt outpost demolitions and has continued to support outpost construction and development.

The Palestinian village of Yanoun and an outpost (photo: EAPPI)

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2.2 Israeli Government Support Construction and Expansion

for

Outpost

Outposts that are supposedly unauthorized have received administrative and financial support by Israeli government ministries, the Army and Civil Administration.65 While outposts are partially planned, funded and protected by the government, the unauthorized status of outposts allows the Israeli State to claim it is not accountable for settlements it did not officially authorize. An Israeli attorney summarized the strategy in a 2002 petition to the Israeli High Court of Justice:
The current situation, in which the act of settlement in the area is done supposedly without a government decision and against the law, might even be convenient for the respondents, because in this way the government can shirk its responsibility for the action, but actually by looking the other way and failing to enforce the law the government is encouraging illegal activity which is meant to place obstacles on the path of any diplomatic negotiations.66

areas. In the report, Israeli Attorney Sasson describes how outposts were planned by regional Israeli councils in the oPt with the help of the World Zionist Organization and the Ministry of Construction and Housing, and how Ministers of Housing were directly involved, with additional support from other Ministries, initiated either by officials or by the political echelon of each Ministry.71 Although some evidence of direct government support for outpost construction can actually be found in the open, the true extent of its involvement remains concealed because of the use of administrative loopholes to fund outposts. One case of officially documented government aid to the outposts can be found in the yearly Israeli state budget of 2009-2010 in which the Agriculture Ministry is noted as handling 134 settlements and two outposts in the West Bank. Since only 120 official settlements existed in 2009, at least 16 outposts were receiving documented funds by the Agriculture Ministry alone that year.72 A second example can be found in the 2005 Sasson Report, which uses government figures to establish that between 2000 and 2004 alone NIS 71,870,000 ($18,05 mil) of public funds were allegedly spent on developing unauthorized outposts, according to the Ministry of Construction and Housing.73 The official numbers, however, only paint half the picture. Sasson describes how major expenses related to outposts are not included in the yearly budget for example, the NIS 33,749,180 ($8,5 mil) spent by the Ministry of Construction & Housing in 2003 to finance the acquisition of caravans used for outpost construction by the regional councils in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.74 Perhaps even more damningly, Sasson revealed how Ministries were hiding their involvement in outpost construction through the use of local contractors and by disguising financial aid to unauthorized outposts as funds to build new neighbor-

Consecutive Israeli governments have employed this strategy and claimed they did not approve new settlement construction outside of the approved designated lines.67 Ariel Sharon reiterated the point in 2001,68 Ehud Olmert in 200769 and Benjamin Netanyahu in 2009.70 In 2005, the denial of Israeli government involvement in unauthorized outposts was completely undermined by the Sasson Report commissioned and later adopted by the Israeli government itself which meticulously deconstructed how Israeli government bodies were assisting in the construction of outposts, usually built without any building plans or outside of designated

israeli government aid for the establishment of the migron outpost

The story of Migron, a large outpost near Ramallah currently up for demolition, serves as an exemplary case of how large outposts are meticulously planned, serve a distinct strategic purpose, and receive significant amounts of public Israeli funds.83 The location of Migron was chosen by Pinchas Wallerstein, head of the Benjamin Regional Council [an Israeli government entity], due to the sites proximity to a Palestinian by-pass road connecting the northern and southern West Bank,84 as well as its strategic location between two settlements.85 The site on which Migron was to be constructed was almost completely located on private Palestinian land.86 In order to find a legal pretext to settle the site, settlers first tried to declare the hilltop an archeological site and when the plan failed Wallerstein unsuccessfully advocated the construction of an ambulance depot on the land.87 In 2001, however, the settlers finally succeeded in establishing an emergency cellular antenna on the hilltop with the first settler containers soon following in its wake.88 In 2002, Migron residents dropped the antenna-pretext when telecommunications company Orange wanted to install a second mast to improve reception. The settlers resisted, claiming the antennas radiation was hazardous to their health.89 Israeli journalist Chaim Levinson describes how, instead of being chastised, the settlers were rewarded for their dissent with public funds: [] the best was yet to come. Massive funding for the community was on its way from the Housing and Construction Ministry. [] Between November 2002 and October 2004, a plan was drawn up for 180 housing units, landscaping, infrastructure and roads. Less than a year later, the plan was expanded to 500 housing units. Road and infrastructure work in the area began. All told, a million shekels was spent on the access road to the outpost, and another NIS 1.8 million on infrastructure.90 Migron eventually expanded into one of the largest outposts in the West Bank, enveloping 360 dunams (360,000 m2), 60 housing structures and around 250 inhabitants, all of it illegally built on private Palestinian land.91 In 2006, Palestinian landowners and Israeli NGO Peace Now petitioned the Israeli High Court of Justice for the implementation of outstanding State demolition orders that were issued against all structures in Migron. The petition led to an unprecedented absolute ruling by the Israeli High Court to demolish the outpost in its entirety. At the time of writing (July 2012), the demolition date was scheduled for the 1st of August 2012. To read about how the High Court ruling led to the establishment of two new settlements and the financial gain of Migron settlers, see page 40. For an in-depth overview of the legal problems surrounding the establishment of Migron, read The Migron File by Peace Now.

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hoods within existing settlements.75 The public funds were then channeled through Israels regional settler councils, where the money was used for outpost construction.76 Through these loopholes, Israeli public funds have paid for the transportation of settler-caravans to the West Bank for outpost construction, land preparation, road works, connecting outposts to water and electricity networks, and the establishment of public buildings in the outposts.77 Due to a lack of transparency it is unknown how much governmental financial support the outposts have received in total. What remains undisputed, however, is that the Israeli government has been systematically involved in the establishment of unauthorized outposts after more transparent modes of settlement construction went out of vogue after the 1993 Oslo Accords. 2.3. Establish an Outpost 101 The establishment of an unauthorized, yet government-funded, outpost by settler movements is an intricate administrative balancing act which an Israeli State Attorney described as displaying false pretense towards some of the State authorities, and enjoying the cooperation of other authorities in harsh violation of [Israeli] law.78 First, a strategic location is chosen according to a wide array of considerations, including inter alia the proximity of Palestinian cities, settler bypass roads, natural resources, or adjoining settlements. The decision where and whether to establish an outpost is taken at a regional level by regional councils in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, settlers and activists, imbued with ideology and motivation to increase Israeli settlement in the Judea, Samaria and Gaza territories, which are aided in their efforts by Israeli Ministries and government institutions.79 The next step is to find an administrative pretext to settle the land. Proven methods have included requests to build an agricultural farm, establish an educational institution, and archeological claims to the site.80 Once the land is claimed by the State under whatever pretext, settlers find a way to move containers to the location. At this moment, the outpost is born and takes on its typical appearance of several caravans on a hilltop. To add emotional value to the location and complicate government intervention, outposts are often strategically named after settlers murdered by Palestinians [e.g. Shvut Rachel, Mitzpe Dani, Havat Gilad]. Outposts are subsequently thickened.81 Often with the use of public and privately donated funds, settlers transfer more containers to the site, connect the outpost to the electricity and water grid, and build the necessary infrastructure connecting the outpost to other settlements.82 As the years go by, the original pretext (farm, archeological site, antenna station) is dropped and the outpost becomes an established settler community connected to its mother settlement, which can be miles away. At the same time, by connecting another hilltop to existing settlements with settler-only roads, the spatially contiguous network of neighboring settlements is expanded. The establishment of these outposts eventually meant to become official settlements is not to be confused with the construction of dummy outposts by young settlers, which are meant to draw attention away from the larger outposts and serve as fake outposts for the government to destroy. (See section 2.4.1. below.)

2.4. Outpost Demolition Orders: Institutionalized lawlessness collaboration with the settlers has become part of the Israel Defense Forces and Civil Administrations DNA. ... Due to this collaboration these bodies dont learn any lessons from their past failures, and continue to neglect their duty to protect Palestinians private property.92 Dror Etkes Peace Now In general, outposts consist of structures built illegally under Israeli law, which should therefore be demolished by the State of Israel. Moreover, whoever was involved in planning and constructing structures built in outposts broke the law and should therefore be punished accordingly. Instead, the refusal to implement its own laws by the Israeli government has caused a near complete lack of outpost demolitions and allowed for the unfettered expansion of outposts throughout the West Bank. The Israeli governing body in the West Bank, the Civil Administration, operates a Supervising Unit which is supposed to inspect settlements for illegal construction and issue stop-work and demolition orders to unauthorized structures, including those built in outposts.93 Stop-work and demolition orders are issued to individual structures, and their violation is a criminal offense under Israeli law. Once a demolition order is filed by the Civil Administration, the order has to be approved by the Minister of Defense after which it is executed, at least in theory.94 The reality is very different. The Supervising Unit is an impotent department, which Talia Sasson described as insignificant and almost worthless as a law enforcing instrument.95 The reason why its demolition orders were not implemented is that the orders can only be executed at the instruction of the Israeli Minister of Defense, and Ministers of Defense have systematically avoided ordering the execution of demolition orders for years. To compound the problem, demolition orders have an administrative lifespan of two years, which means they are simply left to expire due to governmental inaction.96 This seems to be a conscious strategy by the Ministry of Defense. In a 2012 testimony, attorney for the Defense Ministry Ahaz Ben Ari was asked by a judicial committee, How it is possible that the government builds a road or provides services to a settlement, while at the same time declaring the construction illegal?97 Ben Ari responded that due to the apparent contradiction between the fiscal policy and the legal policy, it was decided to issue the evacuation orders but not carry them out.98 A significant discrepancy therefore exists between official demolition orders on paper by the Civil Administration and their actual execution. According to a file released by the Israeli Civilian Administration in 2007, it ordered at least 3449 demolition orders99 against illegal structures in the settlements and outposts between 1997 and 2007, including 1541 demolition orders against structures built in outposts.100 Of the 3449 demolition orders, the Civil Administration only executed 107 evacuations, or 3 per cent; the report did not mention how many of these evacuations took place in outposts.101 The numbers were reflected by the Israeli State Comptroller in 2005, who reported that between 77% and 92% of incidents of illegal construction by Israelis in the West Bank which were known to the Civil Administration between 2000 and 2004 were not dealt with. 102

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The conflicting roles of various Israeli government bodies towards outpost construction and demolition orders, which a Haaretz journalist described as totally bipolar,103 can hence loosely be summarized as follows: 1. The Construction and Housing Ministry and other government organizations finance the establishment and expansion of outposts that are illegal under Israeli law with public funds, while Regional Councils and public officials are involved in planning the outposts position and legal pretext. 2. The Civil Administrations Supervising Unit inspects the oPt for illegal construction and issues stop-work orders and demolition orders for the removal of illegal construction in the outposts (or official settlements). 3. The Minister of Defense blocks almost all demolition orders and allows them to expire. 4. In violation of Israeli law, stop-work and demolition orders are violated; the outposts thrive and often receive further funds from government ministries to cement their presence. The effect is a state of institutionalized illegal behavior with various state authorities engaged in active and passive support of illegal settler construction in both outposts and official settlements.104 2.4.1. Dummy Outposts Demolitions The Defense Ministrys legal adviser, Ahaz Ben-Ari, on Tuesday notified the state attorney that progress had been made in talks with the settler leadership toward an agreed-upon solution to the issue of unauthorized West Bank outposts. As a sign of that progress, Ben-Ari said in the letter that five outposts would be voluntarily evacuated. The letter [] did not specify which outposts would be shut down. But settler sources told the Post they would likely be empty outposts or small ones.105 In the odd event that demolition orders are actually enforced, the government either targets dummy outposts that are uninhabited or limits the demolition to several structures, leaving the rest of the outpost intact.106 While permanent outposts like Ofra or Migron are basically developed settlements without the necessary Israeli legal papers, dummy outposts are expendable, makeshift settlements constructed by young settlers in order to draw attention away from the larger outposts by serving as fake outposts for the Israeli government to destroy. Both the government and settlers know that the demolished dummy outposts are disposable to the settlers while serious outposts are left untouched, but both sides gain from the media show that ensues. Described by Peace Now as political gimmicks,107 dummy outposts serve an important PR role to both the State and the settlers. First, their selective destruction is used by the Israeli government as a tool to show its resolve to the public in dealing with the outposts, especially after settlers have crossed a red line in the eyes of the mainstream Israeli voter. The demolition of the dummy Mitzpe Yitzhar outpost on the 15th of December 2011 exemplifies a typical outpost demolition by the Israeli government in reaction to combined public and judicial pressure. Two days after a large-scale attack on the Israeli Ephraim military base by dozens of settlers in which Army property was destroyed and an Army officer hurt, the Israeli government decided to show its resolve to punish the settlers by

dismantling two illegal structures in the Mitzpe Yitzhar outpost; a house and a goat pen. To implement the order, hundreds of Israeli soldiers and police officers gathered at the outpost in a media-covered show of force, but did not meet any resistance, after which the structures were promptly destroyed. Immediately afterwards, a Mitzpe Yitzhar resident warned Israeli media outlet Ynet that the settlers were getting ready to rebuild everything here. Two homes for every one that is razed. Were not afraid.108 By February 2012, not only had settlers rebuilt the house and constructed an additional synagogue, but its opening was attended by public Israeli official and Shomron Regional Council head Gershon Mesika who was given the honor of affixing the mezuzah at the entrance to the synagogue.109 Commenting on the situation Peace Now Director Yariv Oppenheimer said that the demolitions were nothing but symbolic steps. The government is reluctant to evacuate any of the significant outposts in the territories and continues its focus on lone structure to maintain the appearance of enforcing the law. [emphasis added]110 Settlers also benefit from the demolitions. While the government uses dummy demolitions to show its determination to deal with the settlers, settlers dramatize the meaningless demolitions in order to emphasize their victimhood in the media and justify the use of violence to deter larger outpost demolitions. In fact, settlers sometimes establish dummy outposts in order for them to be destroyed and gain media attention, as described by Peace Now:
Establishing new outposts has become a favored political gimmick of settler activists, designed to embarrass and pressure the government of Israel, mobilize demonstrators, and attract media attention. [] In some cases the settlers and activists, especially the youth, are playing a kind of cat and mouse game with Israeli police and the army. [...] settlers and their supporters gather at a site, in defiance of the IDF, and then run away when the IDF and police arrive, only to return to the site again, over and over. In this manner they force the Israeli authorities to simultaneously protect them (the IDFs job) and chase them (the job of the police), until at last they are physically dragged away from the site, ideally with as many TV cameras as possible recording the event. [emphasis added]111

The result is a series of hollow media-spectacles in which outposts are removed and rebuilt the same day. 112 Some outposts have been demolished over a dozen times, with settlers simply returning to the same spot after every eviction. In 2008, Israeli human rights lawyer Michael Sfard wrote the following letter to the serving Israeli Army and Police commanders after the Israeli army and police had failed to secure the tenth eviction of Shvut Ami, an outpost erected on land belonging to Sfards Palestinian client:113
I am writing to you on behalf of my clients in reference following the disgraceful failure of the tenth eviction of the trespassers on to my clients land. [] yesterdays events showed that the security forces had no real intention of succeeding in the eviction in such a way that would really put an end to the abuse of my clients rights. [] More than one hundred soldiers and border police with buses arrived for the eviction yesterday morning, all in order to confront the four invading girls who were at the outpost at the time. [] about three hours after the eviction the settlers returned and conquered my clients land. [] The IDF and

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Settlers constructing a dummy outpost in the South Hebron Hills (photo: Keren Manor/ActiveStills) the Israel Police failed -- and unfortunately I must assert that they apparently did so deliberately -- to perform their job and defend the private property of a protected civilian. I can only conclude that the purpose of yesterdays operation from your point of view was not to protect the interests of a law-abiding civilian against criminals who have been harassing her for months but again to manufacture a false headline about the supposed evacuation of an outpost. [emphasis added]

system to exert pressure on the Israeli government and their ability to force the Israeli High Court into the uncomfortable position of challenging the State on its appalling record of law enforcement in the West Bank. Since 2005, new petitions have been strengthened by the publication of the Sasson Report, a government document that meticulously detailed the illegal nature of outposts under Israeli law. Aided by the Israeli High Courts inaction, the government reaction to the petitions has been to establish more facts on the grounds and to legalize illegal structures and whole outposts under petition. Several petitioned cases targeting outposts built on private land, however, have complicated the traditionally symbiotic Court-government relations concerning the settlement enterprise. The root cause is that the construction of Israeli civilian settlements on registered private Palestinian land was deemed illegal by the High Court in 1979. The government therefore knows it cannot legalize outposts on registered private land, while the High Court must uphold its prior ruling. The result is a dead-lock between the rule of law on one side, and unchecked settler expansion promoted by settlers and the ruling right-wing Israeli coalition on the opposite end. Within this dichotomy, the Israeli government has worked to de facto annul the rulings of its highest judicial authority and, in a mockery of justice and its own legal system, tried to deter future petitions by grabbing more land, build more settler housing units, and strengthen the settlement enterprise overall. 2.5.1. Petitions As mentioned above, thousands of outstanding demolition orders are issued by the Israeli Civil Administration, but almost none are implemented due to the refusal of the Israeli government to approve them. Between 1997 and 2007, 1541 demolition orders were issued against structures built in outposts, yet almost none were executed.115 Well-versed in the Israeli judicial system, the Israel NGO Peace Now was instrumental in petitioning the High Court to force the Israeli government to execute these outstanding orders. In 1998, the first petition was submitted on behalf of the then-Peace Now director and

Outpost demolitions therefore only convey a semblance of law enforcement, while demolished outposts continue to exist and illegal construction continues with impunity. More disturbingly, the media attention given to a handful of small encampments that are continuously re-established after their supposed demolition only serves to distract from the continued presence of larger outposts, the massive amount of illegal construction inside official settlements under Israeli law, and eventually, the utter illegality of the entire settlement enterprise under international law. The only body able to authoritatively halt the construction of illegal outposts is the High Court of Justice, the highest judicial authority in Israel. However, when the chain of illegal conduct by government authorities and settlers is brought before it, the High Courts legal procedures are systematically undermined or blatantly violated by Israeli authorities and settlers alike. Moreover, when landowners petition the Court to demand the implementation of demolition orders, their efforts ironically lead to the establishment of more settlements. 2.5. From Demolition Order to New Settlement: The Outpost Showdown In 1996, Palestinian landowners and Israeli NGOs discovered that the first outposts had been built by settlers.114 To order the execution of outstanding demolition orders against illegal structures in the outposts, landowners and NGO Peace Now petitioned the Israeli High Court of Justice for the first time in 1998. The supposed strength of petitions is their use of the internal Israeli judicial

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an Israeli Member of Knesset, in which the petitioners petitioned against the defense minister, the commander of the civil administration and the attorney general, demanding all outposts built from 1996 on be dismantled immediately. 116 From 1998 onwards, Palestinian landowners and Israeli NGOs have filed numerous petitions requesting the Israeli High Court to: call on the Israeli government to enforce stopwork and demolition orders issued by the Civil Administration against illegal construction in the West Bank.117 order the Minister of Defense and the commander of the Central Command to explain why standing demolition orders have not been implemented.118 Instead of welcoming petitions that aimed to force the Israeli government to enforce its own laws, the Israeli High Court has helped settlers and the Israeli government to secure the maximum amount of outposts possible instead. In an often convoluted blend of mediatized narratives, it is crucial to remember that while the current government has labeled the petitions as a political tool of Israeli leftwing organizations to weaken the settlements,119 the petitions ask for the implementation of demolition orders already issued by the government itself, i.e. for the implementation of Israeli law. a. Reaction of the Israeli High Court to the Petitions You issue orders and nobody pays any attention to them. Neither do you.120 High Court Judge Hanan Meltzer

mental misconduct surrounding Court petitions against illegal construction, Israeli NGO Yesh Din, documented a pattern of conduct in which the High Court grants numerous postponements requested by the State that were clearly meant to stall the case. 123 In one of the most extreme cases, a Peace Now petition, the Court granted 25 delays to the State to formulate its position on the matter. In other petitions, 7 or 8 delays have been granted.124 As court cases drag on for years, the rightful Palestinian landowners even when their ownership is validated in court cannot access or make use of their land. Settlers and pro-settler elements in the Israeli government thrive in the lawless space created by the Courts inaction and both abuse the continual delays in petitioned Court cases. While Palestinian landowners cannot access their land, settlers use the stalled situation to establish more facts on the ground with the goal of obstructing the provision of the remedy requested by the petitioners.125 This often happens in violation of specific interim orders issued by the High Court to halt construction. In 2011, Yesh Din reported that out of 11 interim orders it had recently observed, five orders were violated; in four cases, settlers had managed to complete the illegal construction of houses that were under petition despite explicit High Court orders to stop work.126 The government, on the other hand, uses the bought time to find solutions that do not entail the removal of the outpost. These different solutions thought up by the Israeli government, including retroactive legalization, are outlined in the next section and reveal a non-confrontational High Court that allows the Israeli State to reward settlers for their illegal behavior while denying the rightful Palestinian owners access to their land. b. Reaction of the Israeli Government: Rewarding Theft By a series of blatant violations of the law beginning with construction without a permit, continuing with the violation of Civil Administration orders and ending with the violation of a High Court of Justice order, the lawbreakers got what they wanted and even obtained a stamp of approval from the State127 Through the use of Israeli law to exert pressure on the Israeli government, petitions have increasingly revealed the degree to which the government is committed to maintaining outposts in the West Bank. This is evident from the reaction of the Israeli government to the petitions, which has mainly been to undermine legal procedure and legalize outposts before their demolition dates are due. The government has resisted the execution of outpost demolition orders on several levels in- and outside the courthouse. In court, the State continuously delays cases by avoiding to present its positions concerning the petitions to the High Court.128 According to Yesh Din, [in] a large number of petitions the State asks the court for repeated postponements in presenting its position. According to the State, it needs these delays in order to consult with the political echelon and formulate its position on the questions that arise from the petitions. The court tends to approve these requests even when they amount to numerous delays that add up to many weeks and months in which no progress is made in the case.129 The long delays are exacerbated by the States failure to enforce High Court interim orders that aim to halt illegal construction. As noted above, these orders are continuously violated by settlers with impunity. The most far-reaching reaction by the Israeli government however, has been the

The role of the Israeli High Court regarding petitions filed against the outposts has been typified by a symbiotic relationship between the Court and the Israeli government since 1998, when the first petition was filed by Peace Now. Two distinct patterns have emerged in the Courts handling of outpost petitions over the last 14 years: 1) The High Court issues interim orders, ordering the halt of continued construction work and prohibiting the buildings connection to infrastructures and inhabitation until a decision was rendered in the petition. Interim orders are continuously violated by settlers who continue the illegal construction. These violations are subsequently not followed up on by contempt of court orders.121 2) The Court continuously grants generous delays to the Israeli government, allowing a) settlers to expand the petitioned outposts and b) the government to find a solution to the problem, often the legalization of the petitioned outpost into a settlement a process called retroactive legalization. In the Courts response to the first petition in 1998, Israeli Chief Justice Aharon Barak set a striking precedent for future petitions. The judge delayed the case in the Israeli High Court, allowing then-PM Ehud Barak and the Yesha Council (the largest representative settler body) to agree on a deal in October 1999 to legalize the then 42 existing outposts, while others were relocated, frozen or demolished.122 The pattern of collaboration between the Court and a government going to great lengths to save Israeli civilian settlements constructed illegally under Israeli law is a familiar reality today. In a 2011 report on the govern-

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legalization of outposts into settlements, effectively ensuring the survival of outposts under threat through an administrative loophole. To make matters worse, in cases where the retroactive legalization of an outpost is impossible, the government has simply constructed new settlements to replace the old outposts. 2.5.2. Retroactive legalization The idea of retroactive legalization is to, if necessary and possible, flip the status of the land on which outposts are built to state land and subsequently initiate retroactive registration procedures years after the actual construction of the outpost. These procedures aim to make outposts meet four criteria, also know as the Sasson Criteria (see section 2.1.1. above) that determine the legality of a settlement under Israeli law.130 However, because Israeli civilian construction on land that is registered as private land in the Israeli Land Registry is forbidden due to the High Courts 1979 Elon Moreh ruling (described in section 1.2.1), the applicability of retroactive legalization depends on to what degree the outpost has been built on private or state land. Approved retroactive building plans often include additional land and housing units, thus expanding the illegal outposts and legalizing them at the same time. The issue of retroactive legalization has been covered steadily by domestic Israeli media over the last year, but has been given little attention internationally. Even so, the procedure has been used since the late 90s. As stated before, in 1999 retroactive legalization was already used by the Barak government to launder 42 outposts into settlement neighborhoods.131 The big difference today, however, is that retroactive legalization has become the main administrative mechanism used by the Netanyahu government to deal with the outpost crisis. In fact, in 2011 retroactive legalization became a stated government policy, which was later amended to save more outposts. i. Retroactive Legalization Policy 1: Legalize outposts on State Land, Destroy those on Private Land [For the distinction between state and private land under international law and the general illegality of civilian construction in the oPt, refer back to section 1.1] In March 2011, a comprehensive Peace Now petition targeting 6 outposts partially built on private Palestinian land led the far-right Netanyahu government to officially formulate a new policy, which it submitted to the High Court in response to the petition.132 The document read:133
At the conclusion of the meeting the groundwork was laid out for a combined policy concerning the demolition of illegal construction on private land and settling the status of construction on state land, so that, as a rule, illegal construction located on private land would be removed, and simultaneously, the appropriate professional echelons were instructed to act to settle the planning status of buildings located on state land, in the places where it is decided to settle the status. [] As for the construction that is the subject of this petition, the professional echelon was instructed to act to remove illegal construction located on private land by the end of this year. [emphasis added]

while the planning status of construction on state land would be settled. Outposts on state land would be retroactive legalized, those on private land would be demolished. At the time, Americans for Peace Now director Lara Friedman wrote that the policy was only likely to be implemented in cases where construction has been challenged in court, of which there at least 8, out of a total of at least 70 outposts located fully or partially on privately-owned Palestinian land (along with many official settlements).134 For an overview of the outposts under petitions, see Table 1 below. The policy specifically aimed at legalizing outpost construction on state land, which did not meet one or more of the four criteria laid out in the Sasson Report; e.g. the proper building permits or government approval.135 In these cases, the Israeli government initiated retroactive registration procedures to fulfill all the criteria [e.g. approving a building permit after the outpost has already been built], effectively legalizing construction built on state land under Israeli law. The policy also affected outposts built on contested private Palestinian [or survey] land. Here, the first step taken by the Israeli government has been to subject the contested land to a survey that examines whether it can be flipped to state land.136 After the land is declared state land, the same measures are taken to legalize the outpost as described above. In June 2012, the government announced it planned to legalize 13 of the 18 settlement outposts under High Court petition, which would make the petitions against them moot.137 In painful irony, the petitions that strived for the implementation of outpost demolitions have thus led to the possible legalization of all outposts, particularly those that were petitioned. In some cases, the Israeli government has added extra units to be built or land to be taken in the retroactively approved building plans. In the case of Shvut Rachel, the Defense Minister announced the outpost would be legalized, its 93 existing units approved, and that 500 new housing units would be approved in addition.138 Other examples of this practice are the Haresha and Hayovel outposts. In September 2005, Peace Now appealed to the High Court against the illegal construction of 12 buildings in the Hayovel outpost and an additional six buildings in the Haresha outpost.139 On August 24th, 2011, after 6 years of administrative foot-dragging by the Israeli government it asked the court 26 times for a delay the State announced140 it had declared 189 dunams (189,000 m2) of land on which the Hayovel outpost was built as state land,141 as well as 815 dunams (815,000 m2) , similar in size to the Old City of Jerusalem, for the legalization of the Haresha outpost.142 Hareshas actual built- up area is only 70 dunams (70,000 m2).143 Not only were the outposts legalized, but the government had used the situation to grab a major slab of land in addition. In almost all cases, outposts are administratively legalized into new neighborhoods of existing settlements. The neighborhood procedure is used because the establishment of new settlements needs the approval of the government plenary due to prior political commitments, i.e. the peace process:
[] all matters of overall policy regarding settlements, road paving and proposals for establishment of new settlements will be brought to the discussion and resolution of the government. (Government Decision No. 150, 2/8/1996) 144

The combined policy meant that outpost construction on private land would be demolished,

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By filing outposts as new neighborhoods, the Israeli cabinet does not have to discuss the legalization of the outpost on the Knesset floor, which would attract negative international attention. Moreover, by turning the outposts into new settlement neighborhoods instead of new settlements, the Israeli government can maintain the claim it is not building new settlements and therefore not changing the status quo in the West Bank. In February 2012, the Israeli cabinet demonstrated how far it would go to keep the issue of retroactive legalization and the de facto official establishment of dozens of new settlements in the West Bank removed from any democratic debate in Israel. The issue started when the government tried to legalize the Sansana outpost into a neighborhood of a settlement located 3 kilometers away from the outpost and separated from it by the Separation Wall. The attempt to declare the outpost as a neighborhood failed due to a petition initiated by Peace Now, Bimkom and Palestinian residents of a nearby village. This meant the outposts could only be legalized into a new settlement, which had to be brought to the discussion and resolution of the government as determined by Government Decision No. 150. However, instead of bringing the issue to the government plenary as prescribed by Israeli law, PM Netanyahu circumvented Government Decision No.150 by establishing a ministerial committee whose members included government heavyweights like PM Netanyahu himself, Defense Minister Ehud Barak, and Vice Premier Moshe Yaalon. The committee immediately approved three new settlements including Sansana in the name of the government without having to face public criticism or a plenary session. 145 The current Israeli Prime Minister and Defense Minister were therefore directly involved in a ministerial committee whose only purpose was to retroactively establish new settlements.146 The move was condemned by U.S and E.U. governments as affront to any future peace agreement, while U.K. Foreign

Secretary William Hague called the decision of the ministerial committee a dangerous precedent and an attempt to entrench illegal settlements in the West Bank. 147 ii. Retroactive Legalization Policy II: Legalize Outposts on State Land, Try To Legalize Outposts on Private Land Pro-settler interests were still not satisfied with the March 2011 policy, which had included the governments promise to demolish outposts built entirely on private Palestinian land.148 When the High Court delivered the final verdict in August 2011 that Migron should be demolished entirely, settlers demanded action from the government to halt the destruction of all outposts in the West Bank, not just those on state land. PM Netanyahu responded in October 2011 by announcing that the government was going to explore a potential second policy: in addition to legalizing outposts built on state land, the government would also try to legalize outposts that were built on registered private Palestinian land.149 The State thus completely reneged on its March 2011 promise to dismantle outpost construction on private Palestinian land, in favor of the legalization of all petitioned outposts.150 Currently it is impossible for any Israeli government to legalize outposts built on private Palestinian land whose ownership has been registered in the Israeli Land Registry. Construction of civilian Israeli settlements on registered private Palestinian land has been ruled illegal by the Israeli High Court in the 1979 Elon Moreh case, a principle that is translated into one of the necessary criteria to establish a settlement. In order to legalize the outpost and the private land on which it sits, the government must therefore legally redefine what Palestinian landownership means, i.e. it must find a legal pretext to void the Palestinians already established and recognized claims to the land.151 If all else fails, the government simply builds a new settlement for the settlers to relocate to.

chronology of petitions and the retroactive legalization of outposts

The evolution of the current Israeli government policy towards outposts and retroactive legalization can be summarized as follows: 1. Settlers started the construction of officially unauthorized outposts in reaction to the 1993/1995 Oslo Accords. The Israeli government denies involvement, but Ministries and public officials are involved in planning and funding the construction of outposts. 2. The Israeli Civil Administration, a government body, issued demolition orders against illegal Israeli construction in the outposts. Practically none of these are executed by the government. 3. Palestinian landowners and Israeli NGOs petitioned the Israeli High Court to force the government to execute its own outstanding demolition orders against the outposts. 4. The Israeli government significantly delays High Court legal proceedings, often for years, by systematically demanding the extension of deadlines on which it is meant to present its position on the petitioned issue.166 The High Court has systematically granted these continual delays to the Israeli government. 5. In case the High Court issues interim orders to halt construction during legal proceedings, the Israeli government simply does not enforce the orders issued, allowing settlers and regional Israeli authorities to establish new facts on the ground [i.e. illegal construction] with the purpose of undermining the possibility of providing the requested remedies in the petitions.167 The longer a case is successfully delayed, the more illegal construction is finished during its proceedings, while the government finds other solutions. 6. If the outpost under petition is built on state land the Israeli government will retroactively legalize the outpost. The outpost stays and often more land is grabbed in the final settlement outlines. 7. Concerning petitioned outposts built on private land, the government has started the construction of new settlements to relocate the settlers, it has also paid the settlers to relocate. To find long-term solutions, the government initiated a judicial committee to redefine private Palestinian land in order to save the outposts, and approved the construction of over 800 new housing units in existing settlements to deter future petitions.

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Table 1: Outposts under Court Hearings in April 2012 According to Peace Now there were 17 outposts under court hearings in April 2012. Of these, the Israeli government has promised the High Court it will demolish 4: Migron, Givat Assaf, Amona, Jabel Artis [i.e. Ulpana]. All others, it is seeking to retroactively legalize.152 None have, as of yet (July 2012), been demolished. No. of No. of Outpost Proceeding mobile permanent Residents State response homes homes Intention to legalize, State Haresha HCJ9051/05 60 8 200 expropriates land area ten times the size of outpost Intention to legalize, State Hayovel HCJ9051/05 27 16 150 expropriates 87 dunams. Sansana HCJ3091/11 58 21 240 Legalized Legalized , additional 500 Shvut Rachel HCJ1813/11 47 93 400 housing units approved Rechelim HCJ2295/09 41 24 240 Legalized Bruchin 53 52 350 Legalized Maale HCJ7891/07 28 60 Intention to legalize Rehavam Mitzpe Lachish HCJ7891/07 12 50 Intention to legalize Agreement with the settlers to move several Ramat Gilad HCJ7891/07 12 30 mobile homes off private land in exchange for legalizing the outpost Haroe HCJ7891/07 26 80 Intention to legalize Two buildings that were on private land were Mitzpe Yitzhar HCJ7891/07 7 20 demolished, implying that the other five buildings are slated to be legalized Derech Haavot HCJ8255/08 18 18 150 Intention to legalize Givat Habrecha HCJ8171/09 74 300 Legalized The Gov. promised to evict by May 1st, 2012; Jabel Artis (the HCJ9080/08 Verdict Given: evacuation 5 20 50 Ulpana Hill) by 1st of July 2012; deadline extended to November 2012 Evacuation delayed to end Amona HCJ9949/08 50 200 of 2012 Evacuation delayed until Givat Assaf HCJ7891/07 25 80 July 1, 2012 Verdict given: evacuation by March 31, 2012 postMigron HCJ8887/06 50 3 200 poned until 1st of August, 2012
Source: Peace Now 2012153

2.5.3

Saving all outposts: other government solutions when retroactive legalization fails

The response of the Israeli government to the issue of outposts built on land the government itself has recognized as private Palestinian land and where retroactive legalization is not an option has been to try to find self-serving solutions to the problem, instead of upholding the law and punishing those responsible for illegal construction.

These solutions have three clear goals; they aim to a) satisfy the settlers that broke the law, b) serve the settlement enterprise as a whole, and c) deter future petitions through increased settlement construction. To achieve these goals, the government has disobeyed High Court rulings while parliamentary efforts are made to legislatively annul High Court orders through new laws specifically designed to save outposts built on private land.

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Solution 1: Legally redefine private Palestinian property The first government solution was to legally redefine private Palestinian property. The strategy was confirmed on the 30th of January 2012, when PM Netanyahu appointed a judicial panel unofficially coined the outpost committee that aims to find legal solutions to outposts built on private Palestinian land.154 Headed by ex-High Court Judge Edmund Levy, the controversial panel was composed of known pro-settlement individuals and was expected to re-evaluate the Sasson Report and the classification of private Palestinian property.155 The panels findings were published in July 2012. It concluded that no ongoing occupation exists in the West Bank a flawed legal argument already rejected by the ICJ and UN Security Council and its recommendations concerning outposts were summarized by Haaretz as follows: The committee recommends legalizing all the outposts even without a retroactive government decision, and to do so as follows: To issue an order delineating the settlement and designating the adjacent areas as needed to accommodate natural growth; to cancel the need to get permission from the political echelons for every single stage in the planning process, and to not implement demolition orders that have already been issued.[emphasis added]156 Solution 2: Disobey High Court orders The government is delaying all court cases concerning outposts built on private land. In some cases, when demolition dates are due the government has simply refused to fulfill its pledged commitments to the Court. In 2011, the government made a verbal commitment to the High Court that it would demolish the Ulpana outpost by May 1st 2012, a promise on which the Court dismissed the case. On the 27th of April, instead of demolishing the outpost as promised, the State requested a further 90-day delay, calling its prior commitment an edict that the public will not be able to tolerate.157 Yesh Din attorney Michael Sfard, called the government request for further delay an act of contempt of court, which since Israel was founded, no prime minister, no minister and no attorney general have ever dared [to] do.158 The Court also blasted the request and ruled that the government must destroy the Ulpana outpost by the 1st of July, 2012.159 In the ruling, High Court Asher remarked that it is in the States proceedings vis-vis the High Court that its commitment to upholding the principles of law, is measured.160 The Court has since extended the deadline to the 15th of November 2012. Solution 3: Propose new laws that annul High Court rulings At the same time, Israeli legislators have worked to erase High Court rulings through legislative action, despite conflicting judicial orders. Proposals include the legislation to circumvent the Ulpana ruling, as well as the Migron law, which tries to legalize settlements built on privately owned Palestinian land in order to circumvent the High Courts verdict on the upcoming demolition of the Migron outpost.161 While these laws are not likely to pass, it is troubling that a large number of MKs are supportive of, and publicly discuss, initiatives whose sole aim is to bypass High Court rulings. PM Netanyahu has positioned himself as a man upholding the law by striking these proposals down in parliamentary votes.162 In return, however, Netanyahu has appeased the far-right and settlers by approving a new wave of settlement construction in legal settlements.

Solution 4: Build new settlements and pay the settlers to relocate In case the demolition of an outpost is unavoidable due to its location on registered private Palestinian land, the Israeli government has started constructing new settlements and increased construction inside existing settlements which aims to satisfy settlers and the Israeli Right, strengthen the settlement enterprise, and deter future petitions. The government rewards those that illegally constructed structures under Israeli law by building new official settlements for outpost inhabitants on state land or military zones nearby the old outpost, and then donating the new settlement to the settlers while paying for their relocation. In the case of Migron, the government agreed to build two new settlements near the old outpost up for demolition at the cost of NIS 50 million [12.5 mil US dollar]. It then allocated NIS 17 million as compensation for the Migron evacuees.163 Since Migron is inhabited by 45 families, this financial compensation comes down to 95,000 US dollar per family for living illegally in the West Bank. In the case of Ulpana, the Netanyahu government promised to physically relocate five houses i.e. use engineers to lift and move the houses built on private Palestinian land to an old army base nearby. The government then approved the additional construction of 851 new housing units inside existing settlements as part of the relocation and promised to create a mechanism to deal with future Palestinian claims to land in petitions to the High Court.164 Netanyahu declared the extra units were approved to punish those that initiated petitions against outposts in the following statement:
I am obliged to protect democracy, and I am obliged to protect the settlements. And I say to you now that there is no contradiction between the two. The law that was rejected in the Knesset would have harmed the settlements. By contrast, the framework I have I decided upon, expanding the settlement, relocating the buildings, legal defense of settlements against a precedent this plan strengthens settlements.At the same time, Beit El will be expanded, the 30 families will remain and 300 families will join themThose who think they can use the legal system to harm settlements are mistaken. In fact, the exact opposite is happening instead of decreasing Beit El, the expansion Beit El. Instead of harming settlements, strengthening them.165 [emphasis added]

2.6. Conclusion This government only now reaches the crossroads, the dilemma: it has to choose between the rule of law and ideology.168 Michael Sfard, Israeli human rights attorney Despite Israeli political commitments under the Oslo Agreements, the 2003 Roadmap or the 2007 Annapolis conference, settlement construction has continued unhindered since Oslo through the establishment of new settlement neighborhoods and outposts. Especially the current retroactive legalization of outposts into settlements or settlement neighborhoods, makes blatantly evident that outposts are an essential tool of Israeli land acquisition. The fact that outposts are labeled by the Israeli government as unauthorized is therefore nonsensical: the government has been involved in the early stages of planning the outposts, the construction of outposts, and finally, the legalization of outposts into official settlements.

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It should therefore be no surprise that the Israeli government has resolved to save every outpost despite conflicting High Court orders. Rule of law, already greatly lacking in the West Bank towards Israeli citizens, is further eroded by these government attacks on its highest judicial authority. Moreover, it is exactly this unbridled government support for outposts, combined with an impotent High Court and the subsequent lack of law enforcement in the oPt that has created a dangerous legal vacuum in the oPt, which encourages further illegal behavior by settlers and Israeli government institutions while financially and morally rewarding contempt towards the legal foundations of the Israeli State.169 The next chapter discusses how within the same framework of unchecked settler behavior, disregard for Palestinian rights, and government incompetence in the West Bank, settlers have employed a violent strategy to halt all outpost demolitions and any governmental threat to the settlement enterprise.

Outpost overlooking the South Hebron Hills (photo: Keren Manor/ActiveStills)

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II. PRICE TAG VIOLENCE and law enforcement

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3. the anatomy of PRICE TAG VIOLENCE

Chapter Summary Settlers react to increased outpost demolitions with price tag attacks, a new form of settler violence. Price tag violence is a product of racist national-religious settler narratives and emerged in 2008 as a tactical settler response to swift outpost demolitions by the Israeli government. The objectives of price tag attacks are to prevent and deter outpost demolitions or other threats to the settlement enterprise by the Israeli government through militant settler attacks on Palestinian civilians or their property and, to a lesser degree, Israeli military and civilian targets. The vast majority of price tag attacks target Palestinian civilians and their property, but attacks have also occurred against Israeli peace activists and the Israeli Army. The financial burden of the attacks on Palestinian communities adds to damages caused by general settler violence, the loss of valuable land for the benefit of settlement construction and growth, and the general economic obstacles imposed by the occupation. On June 19, 2008, settlers carried out the first known price tag attack. In response to the executed demolition of one settler caravan in Givat Shaked near Nablus, settlers committed crimes of arson, vandalism, and personal assault against Palestinian civilians and their property. Hilltop Youth, the main perpetrators of price tag attacks, receive financial, logistical and rabbinical support from a wide range of actors, including the Israeli government. Israeli MKs and parliamentary aides have been linked to price tag protests and militants, while the outposts in which settler militants reside and the radical yeshivas they attend are funded by the State. In combination with pro-settler lobbying in the Israeli government, price tag violence has been successful in saving certain outposts and in spurring the construction of new settlements. Although the lines of cooperation and dissent between violent and political factions of the settler movement are blurred, price tag attacks occur in tandem with intense settler lobbying inside state institutions to change government policy on outpost evictions and other settler interests. This chapter connects the establishment and destruction of outposts to the development of a relatively new violent settler strategy. At its core lies the idea that settler violence and the continuous expansion of Israeli colonies into the oPt are intricately linked and that the evolution of violent settler strategies can therefore only be explained through the larger lens of the settlement enterprise and their common denominator: the pervasive culture of impunity towards illegal behavior by Israeli citizens and government officials in the oPt. The previous chapter described the culture of impunity in which outposts have thrived. Settlers built outposts illegally under Israeli law, while government officials and Ministries funneled public funds contrary the law and Ministers of Defense refused to implement demolition orders issued by their own Supervision Unit. Moreover, illegal behavior is rewarded. Settlers living in outposts under petition that were built entirely on registered private Palestinian have received monetary compensation to move to newly built settlements, also free of charge. The same culture of impunity applies to settler violence. Since 1967, thousands of heavily armed, religious extremist settlers have settled in small colonies throughout the West Bank, often in close proximity to large Palestinian urban areas. While the majority of settlers are non-violent, settler extremists have committed hundreds of violent acts that intimidate, displace and terrorize the local Palestinian population on a yearly basis. In 2011 alone, 411 settler attacks were recorded, resulting in Palestinian casualties and property damage.170 To these settlers, the demolition of outposts represents the continuation of efforts by the government to destroy the expansionist dream of a Greater Israel that includes the West Bank. The fact that outpost demolitions only concern a marginal amount of outposts, let alone the settlements in

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general, is ignored. In fact, to counter the perceived threat to the outposts, young settlers, who have become increasingly radicalized by events surrounding the 2005 Gaza Disengagement, have developed a violent strategy that aims to prevent and deter outpost demolitions or other threats to the settlement enterprise by the Israeli government through militant settler attacks on Palestinian civilians or their property and, to a lesser degree, Israeli military and civilian targets. The strategy has been labeled price tag violence due to the price it exacted for every demolished outpost or threat to the settlement enterprise. Under the price tag moniker, settler militants have burned Palestinian mosques, cars, olive orchards, launched a rocket at a Palestinian village, thrown stones and Molotov cocktails at Palestinian motorists, beaten Israeli soldiers, and called in bomb threats to the Peace Now office in Jerusalem. Like settler violence in general, Israeli law enforcement towards the punishment of price tag violence or the construction of illegal outposts has been largely absent, creating a policy of impunity for Israeli civilians which has encouraged further attacks. 171 Although the numerical volume of price tag attacks might pale in comparison to other forms of settler violence, they are not insignificant acts of fringe violence. Instead, the attacks, the impunity with which they are committed, and their systematic contempt of Israeli law are symbolic of a worrying historical trend that reveals the radicalized dynamic between the Israeli State and some of its settler communities.172 To analyze price tag violence, this chapter is divided into a historical overview of price tag violence within the larger context of settler violence, and an examination of price tag violence as a strategy and the results it has yielded. 3.1 Racism, Violence and Religion: The Radical History of Price Tag Violence Price tag violence is the outgrowth of racist nationalreligious settler narratives and the acceptance of violence as a mode of resistance by elements of the Israeli settler community. As such, the idea of price tag violence is similar to settler violence in general: it is enacted by the same perpetrators, inspired by the same ideology and employs the same violent means. Nonetheless, price tag violence constitutes an evolution in settler violence, borne out of the Gaza Disengagement in 2005 and the increased discrepancy between settler interests and those of the State of Israel. 3.1.1. The Gaza Disengagement 2005: Settler Shock and Disillusion Gaza taught lessons to all sides, the government but also the [Israeli] militants. Since then, the latter have been preparing for the next round.173 Price tag violence was born out of a new generation of settlers left disillusioned after their leadership failed to halt the evacuation of 7,500 settlers, almost all nationalreligious, during the 2005 Gaza Disengagement. As part of a larger Israeli withdrawal from Gaza led by Sharon, all Israeli civilian settlements in Gaza were destroyed and their residents relocated to trailer parks inside the Green Line. The experience and fear of further large-scale demolitions in the West Bank profoundly shocked and divided the settler community for several reasons.

Settler attacks farmers in Suseya (photo: EAPPI)

a. Lack of mainstream Israeli support for resistance to the Gaza withdrawal To rally public Israeli support, settler leaders, rabbis and activists led a 10-month non-violent campaign inside Israel, including demonstrations,174 mass prayers and a conscientious objection campaign among Israeli soldiers.175 Despite their all-out attempts, polls depicted an Israeli public largely supportive of the Disengagement.176 Public Israeli approval was affirmed several months later by the election victory of Kadima Sharons new party, which ran on a platform to unilaterally disengage from several parts of the West Bank.177 After Gaza, the non-violent approach of their traditional leadership to win public support for the settler cause was rejected by many settlers, especially the younger generation.178 As one settler described: In Gaza our leaders favored non-violent, symbolic acts in a futile attempt to win public support. Had we resisted, the army could not have stopped us.179 b. Skepticism towards the State as a vehicle towards redemption The Gaza demolitions and looming prospect of more large-scale demolitions in the West Bank shook the statist ideological beliefs of the national-religious community.180 Especially among settler youths, the statist conception of the State of Israel as an instrument towards divine land acquisition no longer held true. In the words of a former Gaza settler, we used to think the government was our salvation. No longer.181 c. Failed leadership The traditional settler leadership was delegitimized by its defeat, creating a power vacuum filled by more radical leaders. Protests led by the Yesha Councilan umbrella organization of settlement governing bodies in the West Bankalong with key settler rabbis had proven no match for Sharons bulldozer politics. The result was their perceived irrelevance in the eyes of the younger settler constituency, which accused the traditional leadership and its moderate methods of paving the way for further Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank.182 In August 2005, determined to throw a wrench in the works of Sharons planned Gaza Disengagement, Eden Natan-Zada, a 19-year old settler and Army soldier, walked into an Israeli Arab neighborhood, killed 4 civilians with his service weapon, and injured 12 others before being killed himself.183 Two weeks later, a second nationalreligious settler, 38-year old Asher Weisgan, also shot and murdered 4 Palestinians in the hope of triggering Palestin-

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ian retaliations that would derail the upcoming Gaza Disengagement.184 Nadan-Zada and Weisgan had committed what could be seen as the first proto-price tag attacks: the murder of innocent Israeli Arab and Palestinian civilians in order to halt their own governments removal of settlements and infringement upon the dream of Greater Israel. They embodied the increased disconnect between the State of Israel and its radical settler community while taking inspiration from the same racist ideologies as other settler gunmen before them. Responding to the attack, thenAmericans for Peace Now director Debra DeLee wrote: Eden Natan-Zada [] represented a religious fringe element that has disassociated itself from a state that it holds responsible for abandoning the dream of clinging to every inch of the land. []Natan-Zada was not alone. In his embrace of violence, he followed in the footsteps of other religious extremists, Baruch Goldstein, Yigal Amir, and the hilltop youth, all of whom were nurtured in similar ideological environments. [emphasis added].185 While the Natan-Zada and Weisgan murders exemplified ideological rifts that appeared after the Gaza Disengagement especially the growing belief amongst young radical settlers that non-statist strategies were needed to ensure the threatened existence of the settlements clashes at the Amona outpost several months later confirmed the widespread acceptance amongst settler youths of the use of violence to oppose and alter State policies. 3.1.2. The Amona Clashes: Violent Deterrence and Competing Strategies After Amona, he who tries to evict us will tear Israeli society apart.186 In February 2006, the Israeli government announced it would demolish nine houses at Amona, one of the largest outposts in the West Bank. Approximately 3,000 settlers gathered to resist the demolitions, with the perception that peaceful protests to gain public Israeli support had proven utterly unsuccessful in Gaza. For a generation of young settlers, the formative anti-State and pro-violent lessons of the Gaza Disengagement were put to practice in Amona. Clashes broke out between the settlers and thousands of Israeli security forces, during which 200 people sustained injuries, including 80 security personnel and several settler MKs.187 In the end, even though settler homes were demolished and hundreds were hurt, the settlers had won: deterred by the clashes, the Olmert Administration froze planned outpost demolitions for a full year. The fierce Amona clashes had made Israeli politicians fully aware of the potential maelstrom of interIsraeli violence that could be unleashed if outpost demolitions continued. The national-religious settler movement also understood the deterrent effect of violence. The fact that since Amona not even one outpost has been uprooted [] stems directly from the fact that the form of the battle in Amona has presented the military and the police with an intolerable price-tag, national-religious MK Uri Ariel wrote.188 Settler youths were also enthused by the success of violence as a strategy at Amona and started to gather in large groups at every outpost scheduled for demolition, using and threatening violent confrontation to deter further removals. While the 2005 Gaza Disengagement taught young settlers to be wary of the State and their traditional leadership, the Amona clashes verified that the strategic use of violence worked as means to resist the State, a concept central to price tag violence several years later.

3.1.3. The Birth of Price Tag Violence Israeli forces had also learned from Amona. Eager to avoid clashes with settlers, they adopted a new strategy: security forces would rapidly demolish outpost without prior warning and often at night. Swift demolitions rendered settlers incapable of organizing large crowds on a short notice.189 In reaction, settler leaders responded with a strategy shift of their own, a violent policy initially called mutual responsibility, but eventually coined price tag by press and settlers alike.190 Price tag violence enacted by settlers in response to the government removal of outposts is the direct continuation of settler resistance, violent and non-violent, against any decision by the Israeli government to limit or halt settlement construction in the oPt. The following overview of price tag violence as a settler strategy to attain distinct political goals should therefore be seen as a form of political settler resistance aimed at the coercion of the Israeli government through racist attacks on an occupied civilian population.

The first Price tag attack

On June 19, 2008, settlers carried out the first known Price Tag attack in response to the demolition of one caravan in Givat Shaked near Nablus. Having heard of the executed demolition order, settlers strategically initiated scattered attacks in the Nablus area, committing crimes of arson (850 km2 of olive orchards), vandalism, and personal assault against Palestinian civilians and their property; all in response to the Israeli demolition of one illegal caravan. Several days later, an ad was taken out in a local settler newspaper by the Samaria Settlers Committee.191 In the announcement, the Committee promoted the mutual responsibility method by referring in detail to the scattered acts of violence, describing the enormous load the attacks had placed on the Israeli army; a feat which the organization claimed was a true example showing that the settlers set the boundaries of the battle.192

3.2 Defining Price Tag Violence Price tag violence emerged in 2008 as a tactical settler response to swift outpost demolitions by the Israeli government. Through violent attacks on predominantly Palestinian civilian targets, settlers aim to deter outpost demolitions and other threats to the settlement enterprise by placing a price tag on every threat to the settlement enterprise by the Israeli government. The principal idea is that the settler attacks might trigger possible Palestinian counter-attacks, which could destabilize the Israeli government. Subsequent government fears of further price tag attacks, the logic goes, will coerce the Israeli government into changing its policies concerning the settlements enterprise in favor of the settlers political goals. The main deterrent of price tag attacks is thus the implicit threat from settler to their government that the acts of violence can trigger a cycle of violence between a) Israeli armed forces and Israeli settlers, and b) Israeli armed forces, settlers, and the occupied Palestinian population. In short, price tag violence entails: (a) attacks carried out by settlers or groups and individuals associated with the settler cause (b) against Palestinian property and persons, Israeli organizations and individuals that work against the settlement enterprise, or the Israeli military

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(c) in response to real or threatened outpost demolitions, Israeli governmental policy statements, developments that threaten settlement expansion or outposts, arrests of settlers, or legal advocacy actions taken by Israeli organizations against settlement expansion and outposts. Israeli NGO Peace Now described the strategy as a major success and a rather unique form of terrorism in Western experience: Politically-motivated violence, directed against innocent civilian members of an adversarial society (Palestinians), with a primary purpose of deterring the terrorists own government (Israels) from taking actions against their community.193 The number of price tag attacks pales in comparison with general settler violence, but is distinctly on the rise. There have been over 60 verified194 price tag attacks that have targeted 110 communities since June 2008: 50 attacks (including large-scale attacks that targeted multiple communities) on Palestinian property, of which 25 featured religious slurs or desecration (including nine cases of mosque arson); 10 attacks on Israeli Army personnel and property; and 5 attacks on Israeli peace activists. Price tag attacks have tripled in 2011, going from 7-8 attacks for each year of 2008-2010 to 24 attacks in 2011. So far, as of the month of July, there have been 10 price tag attacks in 2012, including attacks on Christian places of worship and a mixed-religious elementary school in Jerusalem. This report relies on a database of price tag attacks created by the UNESCO Chair. The database has several criteria for an attack to be classified as price tag, namely that it is self-identified as such by grafitti left at the scene, its temporal and/or geographic proximity to a threatened outpost that settlers seek to protect or highlight, and it has been claimed as a price tag attack based on statements made by settler movements and their members. It should be noted that there have undoubtedly been many more price tag attacks than appear in the database. However, because of the general climnate of settler violence, it is often difficult to differentiate the motivation behind attacks. In those cases where we were not sure, we omitted them from our list.
For the UNESCO Chair spreadsheet and narrative database of price tag attacks, see Appendices A & B

the ground by diverting Israeli security resources to other locations where settlers are attacking, and b) generating the possibility of violent Palestinian counter-attacks, which could destabilize the region and lead to a massive diversion of Army resources to the control of the occupied Palestinian population.

THE PRACTICAL PLAN TO SAVE THE OUTPOSTS AND HILLS IN THE LAND OF ISRAEL.
In June 2012, settlers distributed a price tag manual called The Practical Plan to Save the Outposts and Hills in The Land of Israel 203 in the Beit El settlement to generate more attacks ahead of the upcoming Ulpana outpost eviction. The document details how those willing to risk being detained for one or two days should block roads and attack Israeli Army bases and Palestinian villages. It further outlines how settlers should attack Army bases to divert resources away from the outpost demolition: [settlers should attack] while the evacuation forces are training, and later, during the evacuation itself, in order to destabilize the system. Especially revealing is the motive given behind attacking and infiltrating Palestinian villages. The guide states the attacks are meant to turn the area into one of the most turbulent in the West Bank. Eventually, it says, the heroes who fight year-round for the Land of Israel [commit price tag attacks] to send the message that the regimes daily harassments force us to commit inciting acts that may lead to the establishments destabilization.

3.2.1. Objectives While price tag attacks certainly fit in within the general trend of settler violence against Palestinians, it must also be distinguished from such violence as its objectives are not only or even primarily linked to its Palestinian victims. Rather, price tag violence, in addition to being a terror tactic against Palestinian and even Israeli civilians, is primarily oriented towards Israeli society and in particular aimed at changing short-term and long-term government policies regarding the settlement enterprise. These objectives can be subdivided into three separate categories. a. Deterrence against threats to the outposts and settlement enterprise in general First and foremost, price tag violence functions as a political and military deterrent to stop or prevent outpost demolitions and serve settler interests. Settlers create this deterrent, i.e. the increased cost of actions against the settlement enterprise by the Israeli government, by a) physically preventing or halting outpost demolitions on

In the short term, acts of price tag violence aim to deter the Israeli Army and government from initiating outpost demolitions due to the high cost of containing or responding to related price tag attacks.195 In the longterm, price tag attacks aim to a) change the overall Israeli government policy in favor of the retroactive legalization of outposts, a freeze on all outpost demolitions and other pro-settlement policies;196 and b) prevent any Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement that involves the territorial and demographic Israel withdrawal from the oPt by making such an agreement too politically and militarily costly.197 b. The intimidation and displacement of Palestinian civilians Secondly, the violence practiced against Palestinians cannot be dismissed as merely incidental to the political and military objectives. By choosing to attack Palestinian civilians to achieve their goals, settlers aim to increase the volume of overall settler violence in the oPt in order to displace and intimidate Palestinians living in the occupied territories.198 Furthermore, the kind of violence that is specific to price tag attacksnighttime raids into Palestinian villages and religious insults and vandalismare purposefully provocative acts meant to inflame religious sentiment and at the same time sow fear among Palestinian communities about the ease with which fanatical settlers can infiltrate their villages.199 Price tag attacks therefore constitute the continuation of the intimidation and harassment of the Palestinian population in the West Bank in line with general settler violence.

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c. The intimidation and silencing of Israelis critical of settlers and the settlement enterprise Several price tag attacks have meant to intimidate those within Israeli society critical of the settler enterprise. In one of the first price tag attacks, a pipe bomb was detonated in front of the house of Zeev Sternhell, an antisettlement professor at Hebrew University, and price tag was written on the side of his house.200 The Israeli NGO Peace Now, which does extensive monitoring of outpost growth and represents Palestinian residents whose land has been lost to settlement/outpost construction in suits filed before the Israeli High Court, has been the subject of price tag graffiti threats, and its staff have been directly targeted with death threats including scrawled on the walls of their homes.201 Even an Israeli Shin Bet officer in charge of investigating Jewish extremism was the subject of a threatening graffiti left after a price tag attack against a Palestinian mosque.202 3.2.2. Method of Operation Behind price tag violence is the novel idea that traditional methods of settler violence [i.e. arson, vandalism, intimidation, assault and road blocks] can be used strategically against Palestinian and Israeli targets to pressure the State of Israel into implementing specific settler demands, a concept some, including high-ranking Israeli military officials have labeled as a form of political terrorism.204 Although these methods were initially used in large-scale, organized settler attacks throughout the West Bank, price tag attacks have since shifted to include smaller and more covert nighttime attacks against Palestinian villages.205 2008 2010: Large Coordinated Public Attacks Large-scale attacks were most common from 2008 until 2010. Large-scale price tag attacks are distinguishable from other forms settler violence by the more sophisticated levels of coordination used by the perpetrators and organizers. A ground rule is the use of vastly disproportionate acts of settler violence and vandalism in response to any type of demolition in the outposts, even when only one goat pen or caravan is destroyed. The violence can take the shape of a long wave of small-scale attacks, or one massive assault to prevent the demolitions or punish the government on the same day. The intent of these attacks is usually expressed by settler militants themselves by leaving price tag graffiti on site. While much of Israeli settler violence against Palestinians is opportunistic (e.g., setting fire to agricultural fields on days where there is a strong wind) and attacks are carried out by settlers on neighboring Palestinian villages, as the concept of mutual responsibility implies, price tag violence is often carried out by settlers and their supporters who travel to the area, sometimes arriving in busloads, prompted by mass texting campaigns or announcements on settlers social media sites in order to participate in pre-planned attacks. The attacks are well-organized and can involve coordination between hundreds of settlers, who simultaneously assault as many as 16 targets and sometimes last for days, in order to tie up Israeli military resources in multiple locations. (For more on the coordinated nature of attacks, see section 4.6.1) The direct aim is to divert resources away from the outpost demolition or a post-demolition price tag attack on Palestinian civilians.206 Roadblocks are placed on key roads that connect different locations of settler assault, limiting the response time of Israeli security while settlers stone Palestinian cars

at the roadblocks. (For a descriptive example, see Case Study 1: The Mitzpe Yitzhar and Ramat Gilad Demolitions in section 3.3. See also Appendix C, which maps price tag attacks and shows how these attacks follow the route of major roadways in the oPt.) 2008 2012: Small Covert Attacks Recently, there has been a noticeable shift towards night-time stealth attacks carried out by only a handful of perpetrators.207 In around two-thirds of the overall price tag attacks, the perpetrators target private Palestinian property through means of vandalism and arson. Other attacks have targeted Israeli Army vehicles, checkpoints and private property of Israeli organization Peace Now. When targeting Palestinians, the small-scale price tag methodology is marked by three distinct practices that are either new to settler violence or radicalized version of tried-and-true methods of settler violence. Their core purpose is to communicate settler demands to the Israeli government and provoke Palestinian communities into acts of violence by attacking religious sites deep inside Palestinian villages. a. The infiltration of Palestinian villages One of the most noticeable differences with settler violence overall, is that price tag attacks often include nightly raids on Palestinian villages, preferably targeting mosques that are at the heart of the community.208 Village leaders and residents interviewed by the UNESCO Chair and volunteers with EAPPI have explained that while settler attacks usually take place outside of the populated areas of the village, in the fields, price tag attacks have literally hit close to home. The fact that settlers infiltrate and destroy property in the very heart of villages at night, combined with a near total lack of law enforcement by the Israeli government towards the settlers, have instilled a constant state of fear in affected villages. 209 b. Mosque arson and the targeted use of religious and racial slurs To increase their effect, settlers have specifically targeted religious sites and routinely spray-painted religious slurs that insult Palestines two major religions: Islam and Christianity. Arson attacks on churches and mosques have come to be one of the hallmarks of price tag violence. Since 2008, there have been at least nine price tag arson attacks against Palestinian mosques, with a significant uptick in 2011, when six mosques were torched in a sixmonth period.210 In 2012, Greek-Orthodox and Baptist churches have been targeted.

Israeli soldier stands in a burned mosque (photo: Abed Qusini)

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In addition, settlers use graffiti to leave racist and religious slurs on mosques and Palestinian property. In 18 price tag attacks, graffiti was used to desecrate mosques, churches and burial grounds. In nine attacks, slurs against Islam and Christianity, such as Mohammad is a pig and Jesus is a son of a whore were left behind, and in 10 cases, racists insults were used against Palestinians as a whole such as death to Arabs and Kahane [the ultra-rightwing Israeli religious leader who advocated violence against Palestinians in order to drive them from the region] was right. (See Appendix A for a complete list of graffiti content.) c. The use of graffiti to communicate with the Israeli government The use of graffiti is one of the calling cards of price tag attacks and is used in approximately two thirds of all recorded price tag attacks. Attacks are marked with graffiti, which characteristically includes in Hebrew a) the words Price Tag, b) the particular demolished or threatened outpost that is serves as the trigger, and c) racial or religious slurs. Price tag graffiti serves a dual function: on the one hand, it literally defines the attack as part of the price tag policythe words price tag were left at 26 attack sitesand on the other hand the graffiti is used to communicate specific messages such as the name of the outpost the attack is meant to highlight or insults and slurs directed at the Palestinian community. In 15 price tag attacks the name of the threatened outpost was included in the graffiti, stating the perpetrators camaraderie with the outpost under demolition threat211 or messages of imminent war for outpost demolitions.212 Additionally, as mentioned above, graffiti has been a means of religious and ethnic insult. In line with the objectives of price tag violence, although price tag graffiti is left primarily in Palestinian communities, it is often with the exception of racial and religious slurs not meant for the community itself. The graffiti is always written in Hebrew, a language most Palestinians cannot read, and often references people and places Palestinians have no knowledge of. In one price tag attack against the village of Bruqin in December 2011, graffiti was scrawled on the burned out village mosque implying a threat against Avi Arieli, the Shin Bet officer in charge of

investigation of Jewish Extremism. The meaning of this message, however, was completely lost on the community itself as Arielis identity is a little known fact within Israeli let alone in the oPt, and in fact the village council leaders were convinced that the graffiti was referencing the nearby settlement of Ariel.213 The example is symbolic of the way settlers use Palestinian communities as message boards to communicate threats to the Israeli military and political leadership. 3.2.3. Triggers Price tag attacks usually have an identifiable trigger, an event which the settlers use as a pretext to exact a price through acts of violence. The most common triggers are as follows: a. Outpost Removal The deterrence and immediate prevention of executed outpost demolition orders is at the core of price tag violence. Fifty per cent of all attacks are reactions to demolitions of illegal structures in outposts that are actually executed, often in dummy outposts. (See section 2.4.1 for more on dummy outposts.) A price tag attack on the July 26, 2010, is an example of a large-scale organized response to extremely limited demolitions. In response to the razing by Israeli security forces of 2 caravans and a goat pen in the Givat Ronen outpost, approximately 100 settlers coordinated a wave of attacks. One group of Givat Ronen settlers attacked the Burin village, committed arson, threw Molotov cocktails and physically assaulted villagers. Other settlers simultaneously clashed with Israeli security forces at 15 different road junctions to limit the Israeli security response to the attack in Burin. Settlers later claimed the attacks were part of mutual responsibility.214 b. Threatened Outpost Removal The UNESCO Chair has ten documented cases when settlers reacted to rumors of upcoming demolition orders with the similar ferocity as during executed outpost demolitions.

Graffiti on mosque insulting the prophet Mohammed after a price tag attack in Qusra, September 2011. (photo: Abed Qusini)

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On the 1st of June, 2009, settlers responded to a rumored upcoming outpost demolition by blocking the Qalqilya-Nablus road near the Qedumim settlement, after which they stoned and assaulted Palestinian drivers who tried to remove the debris; six Palestinians were injured. Simultaneously, around 1,300 olive trees and 280 dunams (280,000 m2) of crops belonging to residents of Palestinian villages were set on fire by settlers. The price tag attack came in response to a rumor circulated by a text message to hundreds of settler activists, warning that the Israeli army was about to evacuate the Ramat Gilad outpost. No actual evacuation at Ramat Gilad was carried out, perhaps as a result of the attacks. In a statement sent to reporters, settlers said the attacks were the price for harming our sacred land.215 c. Settlement/Outpost-Related Political Developments At least nine price tag attacks have been carried out on in response to political developments, including policy change, public statements by Israeli officials, and court petitions by Peace Now. After the Netanyahu government declared a limited settlement freeze in November 2009, settlers initiated a wave of small-scale attacks. In one week, three attacks occurred in which cars, a tractor, and two warehouses were burned or vandalized, after which settlers set fire to the Hasan Khadr mosque in the village of Yasuf, leaving Price Tag sprayed in graffiti on the floor. d. Non-Policy Related Issues On other occasions, price tag graffiti was left behind during settler attacks that did not react to outpost-related issues. These include so-called revenge attacks for the killing of Israeli settlers216 and racist attacks and the Gilad Shalit-Hamas prisoner deal.217 One explanation can be that the price tag slogan has become a general slogan used by perpetrators of racist attacks, without a direct link to the original, outpost-related meaning of price tag. These attacks do not follow the general price tag pattern and are not counted as price tag attacks by the UNESCO Chair in our statistics. (For some examples of some of these kinds of attacks, see the last section of Appendix A.) 3.2.4. Perpetrators and Supporters The margins [in the settler community] are expanding, because they are enjoying a tailwind and the backing of part of the leadership, both rabbinical and public, whether in explicit statements or tacitly. - Ex-GOC Central Command Major General, Gadi Shadmi218 Radical settler youths, part of what is often referred to as Hilltop Youth, are the main perpetrators of price tag attacks. A report by the International Crisis Group describes their particular sub-culture:
They are mostly young Torah students and third-generation settlers who distance themselves from Israel proper. Many have dropped out of school. []While original outpost founders are now entering middle age, this younger generation is often armed and fuelled by a sense of grievance against a host of actors perceived as traitors, including the Yesha [traditional settler] leadership. 219

more can be called upon in case of emergency.220 Disenchanted settler youths came of age in an environment where lawlessness, anti-Palestinian racism and fervent religiosity are rife. Combined with the acceptance of violence as a legitimate tool of resistance and anti-state sentiments, the West Bank hilltops form incubators for religious militancy. In 2009, Yosef Elitzur, Rabbi at the radical Yitzhar settlement, released a statement advocating the strategic use of price tag attacks (initially called mutual agreement attacks) to deter a government-imposed settlement freeze. The Rabbis constant binary distinction between Jews and Arabs, exaggerated sense of settler victimhood, use of anti-Statist undertones and celebration of violence, reveals the radical environment in which young hilltop settlers are raised.
Mutual guarantee [Arvut Hadadit] acts of mutual guarantee coordinated between members of all the settlements take the air out of the governments dreams. First of all we are all together and there is no divide and conquer. Second of all, we decide on the timing and dont wait for a large police force and inspectors to bash us in the head and arrest and beat us. We have power too and we will use it at the time and place of our choice. Thirdly, we remember that the war is over Judaism, and the main enemies are the Gentiles in our country who are trying to conquer it and confusing the minds of crooked Jews who are far from the Torah. We do not discriminate: if the Jews dont have quiet, the Arabs wont have quiet. If the Arabs win because of violence against Jews, the Jews will win by violence against Arabs. Of course all of that leads to graceful activities with lots of joy: we can use the power of the women, children and older people to block a certain access road, and at the same time take firmer action against hostile elements further down the same road; we can carry out quiet and deep operations simultaneously with widespread acts of disorder in the sector, and so on. [emphasis added] 221

The previously loosely organized networks of radical settler youths that commit price tag attacks are becoming increasingly well organized. In September 2011, Shin Bet sources stated that settler extremists had moved from spontaneous acts against Arabs [] to organized planning that includes use of a database of potential targets.222 The Israeli security establishment acknowledged extremist settler groups were difficult to infiltrate, that the militants collected information on Palestinian villages, IDF forces, and left-wing Israeli activists, and that

While no exact number is known, the Israeli internal security service Shin Bet estimates that several dozen militants are directly involved in the attacks, while hundreds

Armed settlers in fields belonging to Yanoun village (photo: EAPPI)

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settler apartments are used as operation rooms in which attacks are planned and prepared.223 As mentioned above, settlers communicate through group text messages to coordinate attacks and rally supporters. 224 Text messaging is also used to receive confidential information on Israeli Army movements from Israeli soldiers, MKs and Yesha Council members as shown below. Price tag strategy and the militants themselves are integral components of the settler movement with direct links to serving Israeli officials. Despite the Israeli government discourse that tries to paint price tag as being committed by hooligans225 or an isolated fringe that is disconnected from the larger settlement movement, these groups receive financial, logistical and rabbinical support from a wide range of actors, including the Israeli government. a. Financial Support The Israeli government has made significant monetary contributions to the education, housing, and organization of Hilltop Youths. The Sasson Report revealed how the construction and expansion of outposts, often inhabited by radical settler youths, has received structural financial support by the Israeli government ministries through several channels and back alleys.226 In addition, radical settler yeshivas (Jewish religious schools) where settler youths are taught national-religious ideology, have received millions of shekels over the last years. Haaretz reported that in 2009, the notorious Yitzhar yeshivas alone received NIS 2,178,000 ($580,000) from the Israeli Education Ministry and Social Affairs Ministry. The same yeshivas also receive funds from private American donors. Between 2007 and 2008, the Yitzhar yeshivas received NIS 102,547 ($27,300) from the Central Fund of Israel, a tax-exempt American foundation.227 As detailed above, Yitzhars Rabbi Elitzur has openly called for price tag attacks.228 Last of all, In 2011, an Israeli newspaper uncovered that Yesha Council members Benny Katzover and Gershon Mesika, who were pivotal in developing the price tag strategy, were using government funds to finance a price tag-related non-profit organization headed by Katzover.229 The same two men were also involved in spreading confidential information on Israeli army movements to price tag militants. (See point 4 below). b. Political Support There are no politicians that have openly advocated price tag violence, but political support has been manifested in other ways. One of the most striking examples is Israeli lawmaker MK Michael Ben-Ari230 (National Union Party) who was arrested during a large-scale price tag attack on June 1, 2009. Ben-Ari climbed onto a van in which police had locked settlers who were arrested during the attack, and subsequently refused to get off, claiming parliamentary immunity.231 Additionally, MK Ben-Aris two parliamentary aides are well-known right-wing settler activists who have refused to condemn price tag attacks,232 and one of them dubbed PM Netanyahu dangerous and a pyromaniac for ordering the demolition of an outpost and actually helped coordinate a large-scale price tag attack dubbed the Day of Rage in response.233 c. Rabbinical Approval Although price tag violence has generally been denounced by settler rabbis, the attacks, including violence against Jewish Israeli soldiers, were granted crucial religious endorsements by radical rabbis like Dov Wolpo,234

Yitzhak Shapira235 and Yosef Elitzur from Yitzhar.236 As mentioned before, Yitzhar Rabbi Elitzar promoted price tag violence as a valid mode of settler resistance and described the attacks as graceful activities with lots of joy. In 2011, the Israeli Shin Bet said it had accumulated a lot of information about the involvement of students at Od Yosef Hai and Dorshei Yehudcha [state-funded religious schools in the Yitzhar settlement] in illegal, subversive and violent activities against Arabs and the security forces. The information indicates that the yeshivas rabbis and leaders are aware of at least some of these activities, but do not prevent them, and even enable students to take part in them.237 In November 2011, after a series of price tag attacks perpetrated by Yitzhar residents, its high school was closed by the Israeli government and yeshiva funding withheld. Commenting on the affair, the Israeli Education Ministry Director-General stated: The students are involved in many violent acts against Palestinian residents and security forces, including during yeshiva study hours. Prominent rabbis in the yeshiva support and/or are involved in this violent activity and go as far as to incite the students to this sort of activity.238 d. Logistical Support for Attacks Price tag militants receive logistical support and confidential information on Israeli Army movements from soldiers in the Israeli Army, Members of Knesset and Yesha Council members. An indictment against five settlers for price tag attacks in January 2012, revealed how their modus operandi [] is based on a communications system that streamed information via text messages from the defense forces, politicians and those in the know to the people in the field.239 In addition, Israeli Army soldiers leaking outpost demolition plans to settlers were considered to be such a serious problem that the Israeli Army has instituted regulations which exclude soldiers and officers who serve in the West Bank from outpost evacuations, and ensure no soldiers who live in West Bank settlements are informed of upcoming demolitions.240 Last of all, Israeli public officials have also directly leaked sensitive information to price tag perpetrators. During a Knesset committee meeting, MK Uri Ariel (National Union Party) revealed he had transferred sensitive information on Israeli Army movements to settlers on numerous occasions.241 In 2011, Coalition Chairman Zeev Elkin (Likud Party) confessed to leaking similar information during a price tag attack by sending a text message to settler leader Gershon Mesika.242 3.2.5. Targets: Palestinians, Israeli peace activists, Israeli Army Perhaps the most perverse and patently unjust characteristic of price tag violence is that it targets Palestinian communities for Israeli government acts or policies for which Palestinians are not responsible and in which they have no say due to their political disenfranchisement. As a UN OCHA publication aptly described the situation, after paying the price of Israels settlement policy for decades, Palestinian from all walks of life are now paying the price for the limited efforts undertaken to remove settlement outposts.243 In this section, we provide a snapshot of the targets and victims of price tag violence, which are predominantly Palestinian, but also include the Israeli NGOs, the Israeli Army and individuals who are perceived as hostile to settler interests.

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a. Palestinian civilians and their property If there is no quiet for the Jews - there shall be no quiet for the Arabs [] If Arabs are victorious due to violence against the Jews - the Jews shall also be victorious due to violence against Arabs.244 Of the 62 price tag attacks, 55 have been directed against Palestinians at over 100 location and communities. Ten of these have been within Israel proper and the illegally annexed East Jerusalem: seven in Palestinian communities in both East and West Jerusalem, two in the Palestinian town of Jaffa (next to Tel Aviv), and one in the community of Neve Shalom. The vast majority45 price tag attackshave taken place in the West Bank. Of the dozens of Palestinian villages in the oPt targeted by price tag violence, every single one of them has been in Area B or C, meaning that the Israeli military has full security control over the area. Left unprotected by Israeli security forces, disarmed, and prohibited from forming their own neighborhood watch groups, vulnerable Palestinian villages serve as human billboards for settlers to communicate to their own government. These are often the same villages that are located nearby settlements and already bear a disproportionately high amount of intimidation, legal action and violence by both the Israeli State and settlers against their property and families.245 Most of the price tag attacks against Palestinians involve property damage. Palestinian vehicles have been vandalized (smashed windows, slashed tires and spray painting of insulting graffiti) and in some cases completely destroyed (arson) in more than half of the documented cases. In one instance, as many as 40 cars were vandalized or destroyed at one time.246 Price tag violence has been responsible for dozens of attacks on homes and other structures, including private homes, warehouses, restaurants, offices and schools, mosques, churches and cemeteries. Price tag attacks have taken a special toll on poor farming villages in the West Bank, where the perpetrators have torched at least two farming tractors247 and 12 documented incidents in which settlers set fire to vast tracts of agricultural land, including an arson attack that led to the complete destruction of around 1300 olive trees followed by another price tag attack less than two months later that resulted in the burning of an additional 1000 olive trees.248 There have been eleven large-scale price tag attacks that had as their aim the disruption of movement in areas of the West Bank. These have included improvised roadblocks that completely halt Palestinian traffic on major West Bank roadways as well as incidents of throwing stones and Molotov cocktails. For example, in December 2008, following the armys removal of a group of Israeli settlers who had illegally taken over the Al Rajabi house in Hebron, settler staged massive attacks across the West Bank including stoning passing cars. In response to the settler violence, the Israeli army closed all of the checkpoints around Nablus, Qalqilya and Tulkarm and ordered local residents along one of the roadways targeted by the settlers to stay indoors and for shops to be closed.249 Price tag violence has targeted two schools so far. In the first attack in October 2010, settlers set a part of a girls school in the village of Sawiya ablaze and tagged the school walls with the graffiti Greetings from the Hills.250 The second attack, in February 2012, was directed against a bilingual (Arabic and Hebrew) school in Jerusalem. Vandals spray painted, Death to Arabs and Kahane was

2 cases on the impact of Car vandalism

Rafiq Abdul-Aziz Hanouns family car was burned in a price tag attack in Nabi Elias on the February 16, 2012. Rafiq, who is employed as a gas station attendant, bought the car for 34,000 NIS [$ 8,500] after taking out a loan from the bank. He reported that repairs for the car will be close to 25,000 NIS [$2,695], which he is unable to afford. Rafiq continues to be liable for repaying the loan on the car he now cannot use. On December 14, 2011, Rajeh Yousef Taleebs car was set ablaze and tagged with graffiti that read price tag in the Palestinian village of Haris. He had recently sold his car to his nephew for 18,000 NIS [$4,533], who had not yet paid him. Although neither Rajeh nor his nephew are from Haris, Rajehs nephew would regularly park his car in Haris which is next to the Israeli settlement of Ariel, where he worked but was prohibited from entering with his car because of its Palestinians license plate. Rajehs nephew is now without transportation to and from his work at the settlement, and there is little chance he will be able to repay his uncle for a car that is now in ruins.

right on the school walls.251 Classes for the more than 500 students were cancelled for a day following the attack,252 as the school prepared to discuss the event with the students. The Executive Director of the school explained that Our children absorb the shock waves of the Price Tag operationshere in the heart of Jerusalem.253 At least eight price tag attacks have resulted in injury to Palestinians. In two different large-scale price tag attacks on Palestinian roadways in 2009, a total of eight Palestinians were injured by rioting settlers who hurled stones at passing cars and attacked motorists who tried to clear the roadway of debris set by the settlers.254 During a wave of price tag attacks in Hebron October 2008 following the removal of an outpost in the Hebron district, at least seven Palestinians were injured including a journalist and a 95-year-old woman.255 A few months later, in another large-scale price tag attack following the evacuation of a different settler outpost in Hebron, settler attacks resulted in the injury of at least 27 people, including 13 children.256 Village residents impacted by price tag attacks have reported that they have received no compensation from the Israeli government for any of the harm done by these attacks. While many if not all of the mosques have been restored with the aid of the Palestinian Authority, private financial loss caused by the attacks has been completely absorbed by the residents with no outside assis-

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tance. The psychological impact of constant threat of violence, vandalism and the arson of mosques, which are often the geographical and spiritual heart of the community, cannot be overemphasized. Indeed, most Palestinians residents interviewed from villages that had been attacked stated that they believed the attacks were meant to cause emotional anguish and provoke a response. b. Israeli Army soldiers and property Israeli Army soldiers and property have been targeted 11 times since 2008. Settlers have also repeatedly verbally threatened Israeli forces since the 2005 Gaza Disengagement. During an outpost evacuation in 2008, for example, settlers openly called for revenge attacks on the Israeli Army,

declaring you should all be defeated by your enemies, you should all become [then-kidnapped soldier] Gilad Shalit, you should all be killed, you should all be slaughtered, because thats what you deserve.257 Similar anti-Army sentiments culminated in a large-scale settler attack on the Israeli Ephraim army base in December 2011. The events shocked the Israeli public and led PM Netanyahu to pledge a crack-down on radical settler violence. Particularly revealing is that only a large-scale settler attack on Israeli soldiers was able to prompt government action and spark wide-spread national condemnation of settler violence. Similar acts of assault and intimidation against Palestinian civilians and Israeli peace activists have consistently failed to trigger the same reaction. c. Israeli peace activists
Settler extremists are attacking Peace Now because they know it is the chief watchdog challenging their belligerent agenda. While the settlers work to establish facts on the ground in the shadows, Peace Nows Settlement Watch reports on their activities, including their stealing private Palestinians land. Recent Peace Now legal actions have led the Supreme Court to order the government to remove illegal outposts. -Ori Nir, Peace Now258

Mosque arson

This is not about the damages. This is about disrespect of the Mosque. This is about the threat that they will come back. -Resident from Qusra after local mosque was burned and vandalized with graffiti. (EAPPI report, Dec. 14, 2011.) 1. December 11, 2009: The inside of Hasan Khadr Mosque was partially burned and price tag graffiti was spray painted inside the mosques main prayer hall. (Appendices A & B, incident 17) 2. October 4, 2010: A mosque in Al Fajjar village was set ablaze, Qurans were defaced and price tag was spray painted inside on the walls. (Appendices A & B, incident 23) 3. June 7, 2011: Settlers set fire to the Al Mugheyer village mosque, and left price tag graffiti in the interior walls with the name of the recently dismantled Alei Ayin outpost and the ominous message This is only the beginning. (Appendices A & B, incident 31) 4. September 5, 2011: In response to demolished structures that had been rebuilt in the same outpost of Alei Ayin, settlers torched a mosque in Qusra and wrote on the external wall Alei Ayin and Migron = Social Justicepresumably in reference to the J-14 tent protests from that summer in Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities demanding social justice from the government. (Appendices A & B, incident 33) 5. December 7, 2011: Settlers rolled burning tires into the mosque in the village of Bruquin and spray painted a message addressed to the Shin Bet commander in charge of the Jewish Extremism Unit. (Appendices A & B, incident 47) 6. December 15, 2011: Settlers set fire to a mosque in Burqa village, leaving behind price tag graffiti referencing an outpost where two structures had been recently demolished and the warning, War. (Appendices A & B, incident 51) 7. June 12, 2012: A mosque in the village of Juba was set alight and price tag graffiti was spray painted on the wall, warning The War has Begun and You will Pay the Price. (Appendices A & B, incident 62)

Israeli pro-peace organization Peace Now has been targeted by settlers for its prominent role in documenting illegal settler activities and countering pro-settler legislation. Over the last years, petitions to the High Court of Justice to demand the execution of outpost demolition orders have left Peace Now deeply unpopular amongst radical setters. The organization has been targeted three time by price tag attacks, including graffiti vandalism of its office, a bomb threat, death threats, and an attack on the apartment of Peace Now Settlement Watch Officer Hagit Ofran, whose front porch was sprayed with the words Rabin [the Israeli PM assassinated by a national-religious gunman] is waiting for you. In 2008, Professor Zeev Sternhell, an outspoken academic against the settlements was targeted by a price tag pipe-bomb, but survived. Pamphlets were left at the scene, putting a price on the heads of dead Peace Now activists.259 3.3. Result: Less Settlements Outpost Demolitions, More

In terms of results, the price tag policy has yielded noticeable results in key Israeli institutions, including the military, the courts, and the Israeli political system itself. The strategy has been particularly successful at achieving direct deterrence against outpost demolitions and producing positive outcomes for the settler movement as a whole by shifting government policies concerning the outposts.260 Result 1: The Israeli Military and Courts are more reluctant to act against the outposts The Israeli military has acknowledged its concern about price tag attacks and their capacity to trigger a renewed cycle of violence in the oPt. Then-commander of the Israel Armys West Bank division, Brig. Gen. Nitzan Alon, publicly warned that even today, an extremist minority, small in number but not in influence, could bring about a major escalation via acts that are dubbed price tag, but amount to terrorism.261 In 2011, then-Head of Israeli Central Command Avi Mizrahi told Israels Channel 2 that whats happening in the field is terrorism [that] needs to

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be dealt with, and feared terrorism against Palestinians is likely to ignite the territories.262 In addition, high-ranking Israeli officials have lamented the significant diversion of Army resources towards controlling price tag violence263 and how the attacks are harming its ability to carry out security missions in the territories.264 As a result, the Israeli security establishment is eager to postpone outpost demolitions out of security concerns.265 Interestingly, the same reasoning has also worked its way to the courts. Michael Sfard, founder of Israeli human rights organization Yesh Din, stated that Israeli courts have become more reluctant to approve petitions for the evacuation of illegal outposts, due to the threat of violent settler clashes.266 Result 2: The retroactive legalization of outposts and the establishment of new settlements Especially in combination with pro-settler lobbying in the Israeli government, price tag violence has been successful in saving certain outposts and in spurring the construction of new settlements. Within the Israeli domestic political system pro-settler politicians are working to

achieve the same political objectives as price tag militants through different means. (See section 2.4.2. on retroactive legalization of outposts.) Although the lines of cooperation and dissent between the violent and political factions of the settler movement are blurred, International Crisis Group stated that settler militants are banking on their support within state institutions to discourage the government from taking action and on their own rank and file to ensure that every attempt to evict an outpost or destroy a structure comes at a heavy price.267 Indeed, ahead of major outpost demolitions, pro-settler politicians while publicly condemning violence ally with settler militants by exerting intense pressure on the Israeli government to stop the demolitions, while simultaneously referring to the threat of settler violence in case their demands are not met.268 Where, during these events, the influence of price tag attacks ends and that of political lobbying begins, is hard to tell. A quick glimpse at several large outpost demolitions, however, reveals a visible pattern of settler politicians and militants acting in chorus to the same events and the concrete results reaped by their efforts.

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price tag success stories: 2 case studies

1. THE MITZPE YITZHAR AND RAMAT GILAD DEMOLITIONS DEC. 2011
On December 11, 2011, due to a petition by Peace Now to the Israeli High Court,269 Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak ordered the eviction of two outposts: Mitzpe Yitzhar and Ramat Gilad. In reaction to the upcoming destruction of structures illegal under Israeli law, both settler youths and pro-settler Israeli officials initiated a series of anti-democratic, violent and illegal acts under international and Israeli law. A series of price tag attacks 12 December 2011: Having heard of the demolition order, 150 Hilltop Youths arrived at Mitzpe Yitzhar to defend the outpost. On the same day, Rabbis for Human Rights reports that dozens of settlers from Yitzhar enter a nearby village and throw rocks at the residents houses. (Appendices A & B, incident 48) 13 December 2011: Around 300 settlers hurled stones at Palestinian vehicles on the main road near the Ramat Gilad outpost. The settlers were not arrested and later boarded a bus to the Israeli Army Ephraim base. Upon arrival, 50 settlers attacked the base, torched tires, and hurled Molotov cocktails and stones at Israeli soldiers and vehicles.270 (Appendices A & B, incident 49) 14 December 2011: Settlers commit mosque arson and leave price tag graffiti in Jerusalem, which reads Price Tag, Mohammed is a Pig and Mohammed is dead. No arrests are made. During the same day, 4 Palestinian vehicles were torched near Nablus and the Ariel settlement, with the inscriptions camaraderie Mitzpe Yitzhar, pay the price, friends of Yitzhar, and Price Tag. (Appendices A & B, incident 50) 15 December 2011: Following the demolition of two non-residential structures in Mitzpe Yitzhar, settlers set ablaze a mosque in Burqa, leaving behind graffiti on the mosque walls of the outpost and the warning War. The same day an Israeli military checkpoint in the oPt was vandalized with the words Nazi and price tag, (Appendices A & B, incident 51) 19 December 2011: Settlers burn cars in the village of Beitin and vandalize a mosque in the village of Bani Naim with graffiti that reads price tag, Yitzhar and insults of the Prophet Mohammad. (Appendices A & B, incident 52) Political Pressure While the attacks were taking place, settler politicians were also working to save the outposts. On December 12, the Jerusalem Post reported that heads of the settlement movement held intense talks on the issue with various government representatives throughout the day. Simultaneously, MK Yaakov Katz (National Union Party) appealed to 20 Knesset members from the Right to pressure Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the matter, and according to Katz, Netanyahu decided to intervene and ordered to suspend the eviction of Ramat Gilad.271 Result: One outpost retroactively legalized into neighborhood of existing settlement On December 13, PM Netanyahu ordered the suspension of the eviction of Ramat Gilad. The partial demolition of Mitzpe Yitzhar, entailing one goat pen and a wooden shack, was executed on December 15. Settlers responded with more price tag attacks, including mosque arson, racist graffiti on a second mosque, burned cars in the Ramallah district and Nazi and Price Tag graffiti on an Israeli army checkpoint. One week later, despite a High Court order to demolish the Ramat Gilad outpost, settler leaders and the Israeli government made a deal. Ramat Gilad would become part of the Karnei Shomron settlement, to which it is not directly connected, on the condition that five of its caravans built on private Palestinian land would be relocated. In short, in response to a wave of violence in which two mosques were burned, Palestinian civilians were wounded and an Israeli army base was attacked, the Israeli State retroactively legalized the Ramat Gilad outpost.272 Upon sealing the deal, settler leader Danny Dayan stated that the agreement prevented unnecessary clashes and will strengthen Ramat Gilad and the settlement enterprise in general.[emphasis added]273

2.

the MIGRON saga - 2012 [For the illegal establishment of the Migron outpost, see section 2.3]

In 2015, people will no longer talk about outposts. There will be no Migron and no Ulpana Hill, no Givat Assaf and no Amona. In 2015, nobody will care. After Migron and Ramat Migron, they will build Neve Migron, Palgei Migron, Nofei Migron, Maale Migron and Tzidei Migron, along with Upper Migron and Lower Migron, and places with all the other generic names for new residential communities. Chaim Levinson in Haaretz274 Migron is a large outpost built entirely on private land owned by Palestinian citizens of two villages, Burqa and Deir Dibwan. All relevant documents to prove private ownership have been presented in court and have been validated.275 The settlement is home to key settler leaders and has received, in violation of Israeli law, at least NIS 4.3 million from the Construction and Housing Ministry.276 Migron is a weathervane of the current state of affairs due to its complete construction of private land and the well-documented chain of illegal practices supported by a multitude of Israeli government bodies. As such, it can set a precedent for future outstanding demolition orders against outposts built on private Palestinian land. Due to a Peace Now petition, and after years of legal battles and government foot-dragging, Migron will be the first outpost in which the High Court has unequivocally ordered the evacuation of the outpost, with the evacuation date set

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for August 1, 2012, after a delay was granted from the original evacuation date five months earlier.277 The proceedings have triggered waves of price tag attacks and political lobbying by pro-settler politicians. A series of price tag attacks The mother-outpost of Migron has spawned several smaller, dummy outposts around it. In one of these satellite outposts, Ramat Migron, structures have been demolished several times. In a deterrent show of force by settler militants, the demolition of these dummy structures has triggered the following price tag attacks: 6 February 2011: Israeli forces destroy 5 structures in Ramat Migron. In response, 4 Settlers are arrested trying to set fire to a vineyard owned by Palestinians, 2 settlers detained for stone throwing at Israeli soldiers. The outpost was immediately rebuilt after the demolitions. (Appendices A & B, incident 29) 5 September 2011: Israeli forces destroy 3 structures in Ramat Migron. 1000 Israeli soldiers hold back 200 settlers protesting the demolition, six are arrested. In response to the demolition, settlers orchestrate a week of violence including 2 mosque burnings, sabotage of 12 military vehicles at an Israeli Army Base, graffiti death threats at the apartment of a Peace Now employee, anti-Muslim graffiti at BirZeit University, as well as the arson of several Palestinian vehicles. (Appendices A & B, incidents 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38) 17/18 May 2012: In anticipation of the demolition date of Migron schedule for March 1, 2012, the village of al Janiya is targeted for attack, which included vandalism and price tag graffiti that said Ramat Migron. (Appendices A & B, incident 55) Political Pressure The price tag violence was mirrored by a successful political campaign by settlers and pro-settler politicians to pressure the Israeli government. Their successes have not only undermined the Courts order, but also successfully used the situation to establish more settlements than before. Several parties have threatened to withdraw from the coalition if Migron would be demolished, which would have meant the end of the Netanyahu government. In November 2011, key ruling coalition partner Avigdor Lieberman threatened to dismantle the government over Migron. Dismantling Migron and Givat Assaf would be grounds for dismantling the government, Lieberman said. We wouldnt be able to stay in the government, and some members of the Likud party also wont be able to live with it. Some 30% of the residents of these two outposts are standing army personnel.278 In March 2012, the national-religious settler party Jewish Home threatened to withdraw its 3 MKs and support for the coalition if Migron was torn down.279 At the same time, settlers and pro-settler politicians have mentioned the possibility of future clashes with settlers in case their demands were not met. In January 2012, online newspaper Israel Hayom quoted a statement from the Mateh Binyamin Regional Council, which includes Migron, that spoke of clashes similar to those in the 2006 Amona evacuation. Netanyahu apparently has not learned anything since the disengagement [from Gaza], the statement said. The public will not tolerate another Amona.280 In March 2012, after the Israeli High Court rejected an agreement between Migron settlers and the Israeli government that undermined its earlier ruling, national-religious politician Aryeh Eldad [National Union] stated the High Court will be responsible for any blood spilled in Migron.281 Results: 2 new settlements and a NIS 17 million bonus In response to the demolition order, Prime Minister Netanyahu has generously offered a government-financed move of all Migron settlers to a new location.282 The settlers initially rejected the proposal, just as they rejected a similar proposal three years earlier and threatened to set the territories ablaze.283 On March 11, 2012, however, the Israeli government signed an initial agreement with the settlers to use public funds to move Migron to a different location on state land two kilometers away, also located inside the West Bank. Meant to avoid the implementation of the Israeli Supreme Court order, the proposal stated that while a new outpost is being built for the settlers, they may remain at the old location, possibly for years. On March 25, 2012, the Israeli High Court rejected the deal, and stressed Migron must be demolished. In response, rising Likud star MK Danny Danon stated: The High Court is trying to prevent the government from doing its job, so we will regularize Migron though a law and make it clear to the court that the government is the sovereign in the State of Israel.284 On the April 29, 2012, in a unanimous decision the Israeli cabinet announced it would finance the construction of two temporary settlements for the Migron settlers, each of which will cost at least NIS 25 million, which amounts to NIS 1 million per family (over $250,000). In short, the Israeli government is establishing two new settlements for the possible destruction of one in a major settler victory against the Israeli High Court. Widely considered to be a weathervane case, the Migron deal does not bode well for the future. In addition to the government-settler agreement, on May 15, 2012, the far-right dominated Knessets Finance Committee approved the supplementary allocation NIS 17 million as compensation for the Migron evacuees.285 This means that on top of the NIS 50 million spent on new settlements, Migron settlers received an additional NIS 17 million in taxpayer funds for the establishment of an outpost illegal under Israeli law. Hence, NIS 67 million ($16.8 million) has been allocated so far, excluding evacuation and future security costs.

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4. prICE TAG VIOLENCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DUTY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
Chapter Summary Israel, as the occupying force is bound by international law to establish and maintain public order and to protect and ensure respect for human rights of all residents in the oPt. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law continue to apply during an occupation. As such, Israel must meet its duty to protect Palestinian residents under its control by preventing violence directed at protected persons, and where such attacks occur, to adequately investigate and prosecute perpetrators. Israel has failed to prevent, investigate or prosecute price tag attacks in an effective and professional manner. Despite characteristics of price tag violence that should make it especially easy to prevent, Israeli authorities have made only sub-standard attempts at thwarting attacks. The investigation and prosecution of price tag attacks display not only mere sloppiness but often intentional negligence. Israel is legally responsible for price tag attacks under the State Responsibility doctrine. Under this legal norm, states may incur legal liability for acts of individuals when the state fails to exercise due diligence, i.e., a minimal standard of care. In such cases the state becomes something of an accomplice of the violation because of its inexcusable lack of action. Since the start of the price tag violence phenomenon, settlers who attack Palestinians and their communities have acted with almost total impunity. In the last year, with increased media attention thanks to a series of price tag mosque arsons and a general uptick in the amount and brazenness of price tag attacks, Israeli officials have begun to condemn the violence. However, these public statements of outrage have yet to translate into accountability for the hundreds of Palestinians who have been terrorized by these attacks. It goes without saying that the individual settlers responsible for these acts of violence must be brought charged for their criminal conduct. The State of Israel, however, has also failed in its legal duties to respect and protect the rights of Palestinians and to carry out professional and effective investigations and prosecutions for these attacks. In this section, we provide an overview of the international law instruments and norms that oblige Israel, as the occupying power, to respect and protect the rights of Palestinians under their control, and then briefly describe how price tag attacks violate specific and general human rights. We outline how Israeli authorities have failed to prevent and investigate price tag attacks, despite characteristics that should facilitate investigators in their work, and the ineffective prosecution and punishment of Israeli price tag aggressors. The section concludes with a discussion on the legal liability Israel has for its failure to exercise due diligence in the protection of Palestinian rights, omissions which have essentially facilitated the continued commission of these criminal attacks. 4.1. Occupying powers are bound by international law to protect the population of the occupied territories from attack and investigate, prevent and punish any offenses that occur. The duty of the occupying state to ensure public safety and provide law enforcement to protect against and investigate unlawful attacks on person and property is firmly rooted in both International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. The occupying power has additional obligations to ensure and protect the enjoyment of fundamental human rights within the occupied territory. While it is true that in general international law is oriented primarily towards regulating state behavior, under IHL and IHRL, the state is also under an obligation to prevent violations and abuse of these rights by private actors. The rights of persons living under occupation are codified under both International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. IHL contains general provisions stating that persons living under occupation as well as their property and religious beliefs must be pro-

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tected from harm.286 International Human Rights Law, as codified in numerous treaties, remains in force during situations of occupation and the occupying state is bound by these laws, which articulate a wide range of substantive fundamental human rights. Among these rights are the right of freedom of movement287, the right to own property288, the right to education289, the right to work290, freedom of speech291, freedom of religion including protection of right to worship and practice ones chosen religion292, and the right of the child to be protected from all forms of physical and mental violence. Under International Humanitarian Law, the Occupying Power is responsible for administering the territory being held and is bound by laws specific to situations of occupation, chief among them, the duty to ensure and restore public order and safety.293 This positive legal obligation means that the Occupying Power is not only expected, but is required to carry out law enforcement activities for the security and protection of the protected persons in the occupied territory. This duty is especially incumbent on the Occupying Power in periods of calm, i.e., when there is no armed attacks and the Occupying Power has effective control over the territory in such a way that they can enforce the rule of law.294 State parties to International Human Rights treaties are under an obligation not only to respect the rights in question, but also to protect these rights from interference and abuse from third parties and to take affirmative acts to fulfill the enjoyment of the rights. In addition, there are specific provisions regarding the principle of non-discrimination with regard to respect and enforcement of these laws. The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racism requires state parties to protect the enumerated fundamental human rights without distinction, restriction or preference based on race, a term that encompasses national or ethnic origin. The Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, which applies to traditional law enforcement officers as well as military authorities who exercise police functions, states that these officers must fulfill the duties imposed on them by law by serving the community and protecting all persons against illegal acts [emphasis added] and in carrying out their duties law enforcement officers must respect and protect human dignity and maintain and uphold the human rights of all persons.295 In the case of Israel and the oPt, Israels legal duty under IHL to ensure and restore public order and safety has been interpreted to include preventing acts of violence by settlers against Palestinians and their properties, and cases where such violence occurs, to ensure that [these incidents] are promptly, impartially and thoroughly investigated and that perpetrators are held accountable.296 In relation to Israels obligations under both International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, numerous United Nations reports have highlighted Israels duty to implement these same three prongs of effective law enforcement: prevention, investigation and accountability.297 4.2. Price Tag attacks constitute violations to Palestinian rights Since 2008, there have been at least 60 price tag attacks, each of them implicating serious violations against Palestinians and their property under international humanitarian and human rights law. While many of the attacks have been directly aimed at harming or destroying property and causing injury, in clear violations of the

most fundamental human rights norms, the immediate as well as long-term effects of the attacks also impede the exercise of other basic rights such as the right to freedom of movement, right to work, and right to education. In this section, we provide a brief summary of the ways in which price tag attacks violate Palestinians rights under international law. The vast majority of price tag attacks have involved serious harm and destruction of Palestinian property, usually at great financial cost to the owners. The vast majority of damage has been done to private Palestinian cars, which were left disabled of completely destroyed, as described in section 3.2.5. Damage and destruction to Palestinian property has also impacted the residents right to work. As described in section 3.2.5, at least three agricultural tractors have been targeted by price tag attacks as well as the torching of thousands of dunams of agricultural land, including ancient olive grows. These targeted attacks on Palestinian property constitute violations of the IHL provision that protected persons private property must be respected as well as human rights norms guaranteeing the right to own property and the right to work. There have been eleven price tag attacks that targeted Palestinians right to freedom of movement since 2008. As detailed in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.5, these attacks consisted of Israeli settlers setting up improvised roadblocks and hurling stones and Molotov cocktails at Palestinian motorists. Many of these incidents lasted for hours on end and effectively shut down all Palestinian movement in and out of major cities or across the West Bank. There have been two price tag attacks on schools in violation of the right to education. The first attack was on a girls school in the West Bank village of Sawiya in which part of the school was set ablaze and the school walls tagged with settler slogans. The second attack was on an Arabic-Hebrew bilingual school in Jerusalem, in which the perpetrators left behind racist graffiti including Death to Arabs. 298 The class cancellations, damage to school facilities and trauma caused to the students and teachers caused by these attacks have impacted hundreds of childrens right to education. Finally, price tag attacks have resulted in dozens of injuries to Palestinians, including children, journalists and the elderly. At least eight price tag attacks have resulted in injury to Palestinians. In two different large-scale price tag attacks on Palestinian roadways in 2009, a total of eight Palestinians were injured by rioting settlers who hurled stones at passing cars and attacked motorists who tried to clear the roadway of debris set by the settlers.299 During a wave of price tag attacks in Hebron October 2008 following the removal of an outpost in the Hebron district, at least seven Palestinians were injured including a journalist and a 95 year-old woman.300 A few months later, in another large-scale price tag attack following the evacuation of a different settler outpost in Hebron, settler attacks resulted in the injury of at least 27 people, including 13 children.301 4.3. Israel has failed in its legal duties under IHL and IHRL to prevent, investigate and prosecute price tag attacks against Palestinians. The general lack of accountability for settler violence against Palestinians has been an established characteristic of the occupation for decades, well known and tolerated by

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successive Israeli governments. The failure to adequately police settlers living in the oPt and effectively enforce the law against them is symptomatic of the inherent discrimination of the law enforcement system in place in the oPt. The resulting impunity with which Israeli settlers attack and terrorize Palestinians creates a lawless territory in which Palestinians become sitting ducks for further and escalating violence by the Israeli settlers. The oPt operates under a two-tiered legal system in which Israeli citizens in the oPt fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Israeli criminal and judicial system. Israelis accused of committing a crime in the oPt are judged under Israeli domestic law (unlike Palestinians who are subject to much stricter law based on military orders302), and are brought before courts within Israel that afford them the full spectrum of due process rights (unlike Palestinians who are tried before Israeli military courts which fail to meet the minimum standards set out under international law).303 Importantly, Israeli citizens can only be investigated or arrested by the Israeli authorities, even if the crime occurred in a Palestinian area under Palestinian security control. Whats more, in the areas where both Israeli military security and Palestinian police operate (i.e., Area B), Palestinian police are barred from investigating or in any other way becoming involved where the suspect is Israeli.304 Thus, under these jurisdictional arrangements, Israeli authorities have complete monopoly on law enforcement and prosecution of settler violence against Palestinians. Effective law enforcement by Israeli authorities against settlers living in the West Bank has been a well-documented failure and even recognized by the Israeli government itself. In 1981, a commission was formed by the Israeli government to look into the deterioration of law enforcement against settlers who commit acts or violence or other abuses against Palestinians in the OPT. The report found that Israeli settlers viewed themselves as above the law and refused to cooperate in police investigations.305 It further identified serious shortcoming in investigations where Palestinians were the victims of Israeli violence and called for wide ranging reform of the law enforcement system in the OPT. Despite these recommendations, another government report commissioned almost 25 years later found similar failures in the law enforcement and stated that the attitude towards law breaking settlers is mostly forgiving, which has resulted in an increase in settler offenses.306 According to the Israeli organization Yesh Din, 90% of the investigations of settler violence against Palestinians that they monitored were closed on grounds that reflected a failure on the part of the police to conduct an adequate investigation into the allegations.307 Price tag attacks are investigated within the same dysfunctional and permissive policing system as general settler violence. Despite recent increased media attention on the phenomenon of price tag violence and even public statements by Israeli government and military leaders vowing to take new measures to combat such attacks, Israeli authorities continue to fail in their duty to prevent, investigate and prosecute these crimes. 4.3.1. Prevention The failure of the Israeli authorities to prevent price tag attacks is even more egregious given the often flagrant nature of large-scale attacks and the announcement of upcoming attacks. Many price tag attacks are preceded by an announcement on settler social media sites or by mass

text message sent out to settlers to rally them to the site of a possible demolition. Once gathered, whether or not a demolition has occurred, settlers often go on rampages in nearby Palestinian communities.308 These announcements are often sent to hundreds of people by text and are posted on websites, allowing individuals and organizations not aligned with settler movementsand indeed actors expressly working against settler violence309to monitor such coordination efforts. Israeli organizations and individuals monitoring these activities often contact Israeli authorities in charge of the area to warn them of the planned settler gatherings and potential for violence. However, as one Israeli organizer noted, the general sense is that these warnings are not taken seriously by Israeli authorities.310 On at least one occasion, the mayor of the village of Burin was alerted by an Israeli human rights organizations that settlers appeared to be planning an assault on Burin and other nearby villages based on messages sent out on their social media sites.311 Despite these open threats of violence, the Israeli military and police did nothing to prevent an attack, which did in fact occur and resulted in the destruction of around 2000 dunams (2 km2) of agricultural land and olive trees and the serious injury of a resident from Burin.312 Even when the military is well aware of the risk of a price tag attack, their efforts to stop it are insufficient, as was the case of the price tag attack on the village of Beit Ilu on January 27, 2010. According to Haaretz newspaper, text messages were sent out en masse that morning rallying settler youth to stop the demolition of an illegal structure in the Givat Menachem outpost.313 When the settlers arrived to see the structure already demolished the mood turned angry. In response to the likelihood of an attack on surrounding Palestinian villages, Haaretz reported that the army had stationed a military vehicle in front of the entrance of surrounding villages. However, the military efforts proved far from sufficient as settler youth, many of them masked, poured from the outpost to the nearest village using a foot path with the rallying cry of mayhem! When the settlers reached the first home in the village, they pelted the house with stones, set fire to one of the familys cars, surrounded and stoned other members of the family trying to escape the attack, injuring two people from the home.314 The settlers then escaped back to the outpost, with the Israeli police not arriving until much later.315 Price tag attacks are often carried out on a large scale, involving dozens and sometimes hundreds of settlers and lasting hours or days. Even in these large-scale attacks, the Israeli militarys response is invariably weak, arriving late to the scene and often protecting rather than arresting the marauding settlers.316 There have been at least eight largescale price tag attacks in which settlers have blocked off major Palestinian roadways with makeshift roadblocks, hurled stones and Molotov cocktails at passing Palestinian motorists, and rampaged through various villages burning and vandalizing homes, cars and agricultural land.317 The first-ever price tag attack in June 2008 was carried out as a seemingly large-scale coordinated attack, involving over 100 settlers who arrived in buses, in response to the military demolition of a caravan in the Yitzhar settlement, within plain view of Israeli soldiers who stood by and did little to stop the attacks. During this first price tag attack that was launched from two different settlements in the Nablus area, a major roadway was blocked by settlers and fires were set in both areas causing extensive damage to over around 850 dunams (850,000 m2) of land.318 According to reports, over 200 settlers arrived in the

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Yitzhar area, presumably from other settlements, and proceeded to hurl stones at Palestinian cars and attack Palestinian houses near Yitzhar settlement.319 Although Israeli soldiers were present during the attacks, residents and witnesses reported that they did little or nothing to stop them, and in fact prevented Palestinians from putting out fires set by the settlers, arrested Palestinians who tried to access the burning lands, and fired tear gas at village residents causing at least two injuries to an elderly woman and an infant.320 In one of the more well publicized large-scale price tag attacks following the demolition of several structures in an outpost near Nablus, for which settlers called for a Day of Rage several days later,321 settlers threw a Molotov cocktail into a Palestinians home in the nearby town of Huwwara and slashed car tires in Hebron.322 Settlers also managed to block the main entrance to the city of Nablus, which is located next to an Israeli army base, for close to an hour. The Israeli online newspaper Ynet describes how, Police and IDF forces slowly arrived on scene, but appeared to prefer allowing protesters to vent and only intervened to prevent clashes between Palestinian drivers and activists.323 4.3.2. Investigation Once an attack has been committed, Israeli police are supposed to conduct a thorough investigation. However, studies have shown that the vast majority of Israeli investigations into settler violence against Palestinians are substandard and often display a willful failure to investigate in a professional manner.324 In the case of price tag attacks, Israeli investigators have continued to conduct insufficient and at times unscrupulous investigations into serious and violent offenses. In a meeting with a Knesset committee last January 2012, the Israeli head of the investigations and intelligence wing for the West Bank was asked to justify the lack of indictments for soaring settler violence in the West Bank. He stated that the police have a problem with gathering evidence due to the location of where the crimes are committed.325 This response is especially baffling considering that without exception, every single price tag attack has occurred either in Israel proper or in Area B or C of the West Bank,326 where Israeli authorities have full jurisdiction over security and indeed are the only authorities allowed to investigate crimes committed by Israeli citizens.327 Residents and municipal representatives from several of the villages targeted by price tag attacks have reported investigatory misfeasance that offers an alternative reason for why so many of these investigations are closed for lack of evidence. Villagers have reported police or military

officials arriving hours after the attack occurred, including in cases of arson and physical assault. When they do arrive on the scene, they often refuse to take declarations from Palestinian eye witnesses to the attacks.328 There are reports that Israeli officials investigating price tag attacks, not only fail to take proper evidence, but have also tried to conceal or cover up price tag graffiti, which has become one of the most visible calling card of price tag attacks and is increasingly featured in media coverage. At least six villages have reported that one of the first things that the Israeli investigators who arrived on the scene did was to attempt to remove the price tag graffiti left behind, including in the investigations of desecrated mosques. 329 Two village council heads reported that the Israeli investigators explicitly asked the village to remove the graffiti before the press arrived.330 In one incident included in a U.N. report for the General Assembly, a resident from the village of Einabus whose car and other property had been vandalized in an apparent price tag attack, spotted Israeli soldiers attempting to destroy evidence of the crime by erasing the writings on the outer walls of his house as he was giving a statement to nearby Israeli police officers.331 As a consequence of deficient on-the-ground investigations, securing enough evidence for conviction of suspected price tag perpetrators appears to rely heavily on cooperation on the part of the very individuals being investigated. Part of the nature of price tag attacks is that they are coordinated within a tight-knit community of settler activists, who shun any cooperation with police investigations. As such, even in cases where suspects are identified and arrested, investigations often sputter out when questioning of suspects fails to yield confessions or incriminating evidence. In one noteworthy case from December 2009, a mosque in the Palestinian village of Yasuf was vandalized with graffiti bearing the call sign of price tag and set alight. A month later in January 2010, Israeli police arrested 10 yeshiva students from the Yitzhar settlement for questioning on the mosque arson and vandalism, six of whom were released soon after.332 Almost two weeks later, the infamous Yitzhar rabbi Yitzhak Shapira was also arrested on suspicion that he knew of his students involvement in the arson but failed to report it.333 All of the detainees openly refused to cooperate with the police investigation,334 and by March 2010, everyone identified by the police as possible suspects had been released from detention or house arrest. 335 In November 2011, the Israeli Education Minister cut funding to the Yitzhar yeshiva citing information from the defense establishment that indicate[s] extensive involvement by students and rabbis in violent acts.336 Nonetheless, to this day, no indictments have ever been issued for the burning of the Yasuf mosque. Soon after a mosque was set ablaze in June 2012, Dan Halutz, former chief of staff of the Israeli Army criticized the Israeli authorities handling of price tag attacks and their seeming inability to stop the aggressors. Halutz plainly stated, If we wanted, we could catch them and when we want to, we will.337 4.3.3. Prosecution While complete information on arrests or indictments of Israelis suspected of price tag attacks is not publicly available, there is little doubt that there is a significant gap of accountability.338 During the first three years of price tag attacks, there were few if any reports of arrests or indictments of perpetrators. In 2011, however, as price

Israeli investigator after a settler attack in Jeet (photo: Abed Qusini)

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tag attacks increased at an alarming rate and international media attention began to regularly cover the issue, announcements of arrests for the attacks began to become more common. The Israeli head of investigations and intelligence in the West Bank recently reported to the Knesset that in the year 2011, there were 228 incidents of settler violence mostly against Palestinians and 65 indictments had been issued.339 Despite an increase in arrests and even indictments, meaningful individual accountability for the dozens of price tag attacks remains elusive, as identified perpetrators are given light or ineffectual penalties for serious offenses and to date there has not been one known conviction for a single price tag attack. The Jerusalem Post reported that the first price tag indictment issued by prosecutors in the Jerusalem Magistrate Court was not until November 2011.340 In this case, the indictment charged three defendants with conspiracy to commit arson after they were pulled over in a stolen car on March 13, 2011 near a Palestinian village in the West Bank and the two plastic bottles of gasoline and three pairs of black gloves were found inside the vehicle. One of the three defendants was additionally charged with premeditated vandalism for slashing the tires of Palestinians car in Jerusalem earlier that same day.341 However, despite the seriousness of the charges, after only two days, the suspects were released from detention on the courts order after the judge explained that The law enforcement agencies attested by their own conduct that they didnt attribute any particular danger to the defendants and admonished the Israeli police for conducting a lackadaisical investigation.342 In another example of the lax treatment afforded price tag suspects, for months Israeli prosecutors did not issue an indictment or take into custody an Israeli man suspected in several price tag attacks including death threats against Israeli organization Peace Now leaders and violating a house arrest order.343 The man, whose identity could not be revealed in the Israeli media because his parents are Shin Bet officers, first phoned the director of Peace Now in September 2011 and told the Peace Now director that he would put a bullet in [his] head. The next month he produced and posted posters that read: Price tagto kill, to murder and to slaughter all the Arabs and Death to Arabs. More than a month later, on October 31, the police finally brought him in for questioning and then released him on condition that he remain in his home until November 4. However, on November 3 he defied the house arrest orders and spray painted graffiti on Peace Nows Jerusalem office and Death to Arabs in the Jerusalem Palestinian neighborhood of Beit Hanina. Two days later he again spray-painted threatening graffiti at the Peace Now office and called in a bomb threat. On November 17, the suspect was indicted for the above offenses, to which he had previously admitted authorship, stating that he hates Arabs and leftists. However, he was still not taken into custody, and a few weeks later he sent two emailswith his name plainly displayedto Peace Now directors, stating, Today you die and The end is near, I will kill you and all who are close to you. On November 27, he was arrested again. Israeli law enforcement operations were strengthened in 2011, but only after a much publicized large-scale price tag attack against the Israeli army made the news. A day after the settler attack on the Israeli Ephraim Military Base near Tulkarm on December 13, 2011, PM Netanyahu authorized Israeli police and military to use an array of law enforcement tactics, many of which were already allowed to them under Israeli law,344 including trying

Israelis accused of violence in the West Bank in Israeli military courts, holding Israelis under administrative detention orders, issuing administrative stay-away orders for the occupied territories, and an increase in resources for the Shin Bet, police and prosecutors.345 However, both Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak were clear that the teeth law enforcement was finally being authorized and encouraged to use was for the protection of the Israeli army, and if anything, only secondarily for the protection of the Palestinian population.346 Part of the supposed new arsenal of law enforcement tools PM Netanyahu has encouraged police to use to stem settler violence, are administrative stay-away orders. Issuance of these orders does not require a trial and has the effect of barring the named individuals from entering the occupied West Bank for the period specified in the order. Besides the fact that stay-away orders attempt to paper over a deficient investigation and policing system with a military administrative regime long criticized by human rights organizations for its lack of basic due process guarantees, the stay-away orders still fail to provide an appropriate penalty for those involved in violent attacks against Palestinians and their property. In a recent case which has received significant media attention, 12 settlers, who were involved in planning, directing and participating in violent attacks against Palestinian property, escaped jail time and instead were given stay away orders from the West Bank ranging from 3-9 months.347 Although the Israeli military qualified these orders as a preventive measure to remove the threat by the activists in the area,348 the stay away orders, besides being difficult to enforce in the West Bank where settlers move about with little inspection from the military, fall far short of criminal proceedings that such dangerous offenses warrant. In another example of the continued shortcomings of the Israeli criminal justice system to hold its citizens liable for price tag attacks, only one minor has been charged for a recent vandalism and arson attack in the village of Nabi Elias, despite a quick response from the Israeli police and seemingly abundant evidence to implicate others. In the February 16, 2012 attack on the village, perpetrators spray painted price tag on the side of a house and a local residents car was set on fire and completely destroyed. Israeli police arrived on the scene almost immediately and gave chase to the Israeli settler vehicle leaving the village after being advised by village residents of the attack. According to the prosecution involved in the case, Israeli police took off on a high speed chase after the car refused to pull over.349 During the chase, rubber gloves, a box of matches, stones and a can of spray paint were thrown from the car being pursued. After driving over metal spikes at a police checkpoint, the car came to a stop and the driver and passengers fled on foot. 350 Based on the license plate and registration information of the car, police were able to track the owner of the vehicle to the infamously violent settlement of Yitzhar.351 In the end, four individuals were arrested in relation to the attack. However, after three weeks, each one has been released and only one indictment was filed.352 Finally, in addition to the absence of justice for the Palestinian victims in the form of criminal penalties for price tag attackers, impacted communities are also left without any way to claim compensation for damages suffered. Individual victims of price tag attacks have reported that financial losses they have suffered were considerable. In

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many cases, the ripple effect of losing a car, for example, meant lost work and a significant decrease in the familys income in addition to the cost of replacing the destroyed vehicle. The Palestinian victims of these attacks are almost always unable on their own to verify the identity of the aggressors so as to name them in any potential lawsuit, and are almost never informed of any developments in the Israeli criminal investigations or the names of the aggressors in the rare case that suspects are identified. Even if the aggressor is known to the resident, without a criminal conviction in the Israeli courts, the chance of a civil lawsuit succeeding becomes much more remote.353 4.4. State Responsibility State Responsibility refers to the legal liability a state incurs for breach of an obligation under international law. Although the concept of state responsibility is usually applied to remedying injuries that results from the acts or omissions directly attributable to the state, under the due diligence doctrine states may also incur liability for acts carried out by private individuals. Because states are the primary guarantors of human rights, they can properly be held legally responsible if they fail to exercise due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence even when these are committed by private individuals. The obligation that states act with due diligence is firmly rooted in international human rights treaties354 and jurisprudence from treaty bodies and human rights courts.355 Due diligence requires that states act to the best of their ability to conform to their obligations under international law, including treaties to which they are party. Under International Human Rights Law, states are the guarantors of the rights enshrined in the various human rights instruments. In addition to positive obligations the state has under human rights treaties, it also must protect against violations of these norms by private individuals. While a state is not automatically responsible for violations committed by private individuals within the states jurisdiction, it may incur liability in cases in which there is a serious breach of its duty to protect against such violations. As one legal scholar has put it, due diligence results from more than mere negligence on the part of state officials it consists of the reasonable measures of prevention that a well-administered government could be expected to exercise under similar circumstances.356 In this way, where a state fails to act in a reasonable way to prevent or investigate private individuals from infringing on the human rights of others, the state in effect aids such violations and therefore incurs responsibility.357 With regards to of settler violence generally and price tag violence specifically, Israel has not acted with the requisite due diligence in preventing, investigating or punishing these serious violations of Palestinians human rights. Indeed, various U.N. Human Rights agencies have repeatedly highlighted Israels failure to act with due diligence in repressing violent acts of private Israeli citizens against the Palestinian population. In a 2011 report submitted to the UN General Assembly, the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights highlighted price tag attacks as part of the ongoing problem of settler violence against Palestinians, 358 describing several price tag attacks,359 and explained that During the reporting period for the present report, impunity for settlers perpetrating violent attacks continued, and went on to describe several price tag attacks which occurred in the year 2010.360 In the reports concluding recommendations, it urged Is-

rael to take all necessary measures to prevent attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinian civilians and their property in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and to ensure that all serious allegations concerning criminal acts committed by settlers or the Israel Defense Forces are subject to independent, impartial, effective, thorough and prompt investigations, in accordance with international standards.361 In fact, each annual report prepared by the UN High Commissioners office since 2008, the year price tag attacks first started, have reiterated these same concerns and recommendations, and even attributed the continued violence by settlers on Israels refusal to hold these individuals accountable.362 In its most recent 2012 report, the Committee on the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, to which Israel is party, stated it was particularly alarmed by reports of impunity of terrorist groups such as Price Tag, which reportedly enjoy political and legal support from certain sections of the Israeli political establishment.363 The UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories described in his most recent report to the General Assembly the pattern of passive support for settler activities exhibited by Israeli security forces and border police, and concluded that Overall, the failure by Israel to prevent and punish settler violence remains a serious and ongoing violation of its most fundamental obligation under international humanitarian law to protect a civilian population living under occupation.364 In light of Israels obligations under international law, and its well documented failure to exercise a minimum standard of care and due diligence in its law enforcement operations to protect Palestinians from settler violence in the form of price tag attacks and prosecute Israeli civilians who commit these acts, the state of Israel has failed to conform its conduct to the law and must be held liable.

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 CONCLUSION
This report aimed to investigate the power relations and structures that underlie and connect outposts and price tag violence - two weathervanes of current Israeli government policies in the West Bank - and to contextualize both concepts within their larger categories; outposts as part of the settlement enterprise, price tag violence as a variety of settler violence. It leaves a deeply troubling picture in which the Israeli State uses its total military dominance and legaladministrative control of the West Bank to allow radical religious agents, i.e. settlers, to expand its territory through the legalized theft of occupied land and the routine use of violence. The Israeli government has used outposts to continue settlement construction after the Oslo peace process and, in doing so, has nurtured and empowered a group of radical national-religious settlers whose ideology revolves around racist beliefs of Jewish supremacy. Within this framework, outposts constitute a state-supported continuation of the settlement enterprise, while price tag violence is a radical current of settler violence that aims to maintain and maximize that expansion. Outposts and price tag are more than just causally connected. Both phenomena are rooted in a blatant disrespect for international and Israeli law by Israeli government authorities and settlers alike. In violation of international law, the Israeli State has systematically and consciously failed to protect Palestinian civilians, halt settlement construction and bring settlers to justice. Instead, it has institutionalized the violation of its own laws to strengthen the settlement enterprise and entrench its territorial hold on the West Bank. The culture of impunity settlers enjoy - especially egregious due to its ethnic nature - and the States complicity in breeding further illegal settler behavior is exemplified by the current retroactive legalization of previously illegal outposts and the use of public funds to financially reward notoriously violent settler communities that are known to have committed acts of settler violence and illegal construction. Petitions by Palestinian landowners and Israeli NGOs have increasingly pushed this reality into the public sphere, but at a high cost. In collaboration with the High Court, the Israeli government is turning all petitioned outposts into legal settlements, while settlers have responded to outpost demolitions with violent attacks on Palestinian civilian communities. To make matters worse, the government is constructing new settlements for outpost evacuees, partially in order to deter human rights organizations from initiating more petitions against outposts at the Israeli High Court. In an inverted approach to the law, the State is punishing those that ask for it to be upheld, while handsomely rewarding the lawbreakers. The petitions have, however, successfully forced the State to put its cards on the table and openly acknowledge its involvement in the outposts. The construction of outposts, their limited demolition, and the anti-Palestinian violence that they trigger also make blatantly clear how disempowered the occupied Palestinian people have become. To the Palestinians, price tag violence is merely another blow upon a bruise. The Occupation, settlements and outposts have systematically breached the most basic Palestinian humanitarian and human rights for decades. When after years of legal and financial struggle, Palestinian landowners are finally able to successfully petition their case to a non-cooperative judicial system, and when parts of the outposts on their land are finally destroyed by the Israeli government, settlers have ensured that Palestinians are the ones to pay the price. Last of all, the outposts and price tag violence should not distract from the larger issues at hand. Although the Israeli government might be debating the legality of outposts or how it will deal with price tag violence, it must be remembered that all settlements including outposts are utterly illegal under international law and must be removed. The fact that the Israeli Knesset is trying to legalize even the most ludicrous Israeli claims to private Palestinian land is a sobering symbol of the current political reality and can only be interpreted as a total Israeli claim to Palestinian land and the rejection of a just resolution between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. To know that Palestinian civilians are attacked with impunity because of this inherently flawed debate can only cause the gravest concern.

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REFERENCES
Roi Sharon, Amir Rappaport & Amit Cohen, The Wild West Bank, No Mans Land, Maariv, 8 August 2008, quoted in Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Special Focus - Unprotected: Israeli Settler Violence against Palestinian Civilians and Their Property (2008). 2 S.C. Res. 242, U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (Nov. 22, 1967); S.C. Res. 298, U.N. Doc. S/RES/298 (Sept. 25, 1971); S.C. Res. 497, U.N. Doc S/RES/497 (Dec. 17, 1981); S.C. Res. 662, U.N. Doc S/RES/662 (Aug. 9, 1990); S.C. Res. 664, U.N. Doc S/RES/664 (Aug. 18, 1990); UN. Doc A/RES/ES-10/13 (Oct. 27, 2003). 3 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 2004 ICJ 136, 171 at 87. 4 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended January 2002), 17 July 1998, A/CONF. 183/9, Article 8(2)(b)(viii). 5 Pictet, Jean S. (ed.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Commentary, Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva: ICRC, 1958), Art. 46. 6 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 2004 ICJ 136, 183 at 129. 7 In Resolution 446, the UNSC determined that the policy and practices of Israel in establishing settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 have no legal validity and called upon Israel as the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, []to desist from taking any action which would result in changing the legal status and geographical nature and materially affecting the demographic composition of the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and, in particular, not to transfer parts of its own civilian population into the occupied Arab territories The Council reaffirmed this position in Resolutions 452, U.N. Doc.S/RES/452 (July 20, 1979) and 465, U.N. Doc. S/RES/465 (Mar. 1, 1980). All Security Council members voted for the resolution, there were no abstentions. 8 For an extensive overview of Israeli settlement policy including the benefits it offers to individual settlers as well as industries, read the authoritative report by BTselem, By Hook and By Crook, Israeli Settlement Policy in the West Bank (July 2010); available at <http://www.btselem.org/download/201007_by_hook_and_by_crook_eng.pdf> (accessed 22 November 2011) 9 For instance, Israelis intent on purchasing or constructing an apartment in the West Bank are offered several incentives, as long as it concerns their first Israeli apartment. Any Israeli citizen willing to buy an apartment in an approved settlement will receive mortgage supplements in form of a loan at comfortable terms (4.5% interest rate), regardless of their income or financial class. Moreover, those who want to construct their own home receive government funding for 50% of the development costs of the construction project. The Israeli government also provides the settlers with an exemption from tender for the land and a 69% discount on the price of the land. It is important to keep in mind that these perks would, in the vast majority of cases, not be granted to the same citizen if he or she would buy or construct real estate inside the Green Line. See Peace Now, Peace Now Special Report: The Price of the Settlements in the 2009-2010 Budget Proposal (June 2010) 10 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land [hereinafter "1907 Hague Regulations"] (1907), Art. 46. 11 1907 Hague Regulations, Art. 53. 12 Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War [hereinafter "Fourth Geneva Convention"] (1949), Art. 53; 1907 Hague Regulations, Art. 23(g) (In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbiddenTo destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.). 13 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 2004 ICJ 135, 171 at 192. 14 Concerning the Israeli security Wall, the ICJ ruled that the destructi on carried out by Israel in order to construct the Wall were not absolutely necessary by military operations and therefore reiterated the Walls illegality under international law, ibid; Iain Scobbie, The Wall and international humanitarian law (paper delivered at the United Nations International Meeting on the Impact of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory held in Geneva on 15-16 April 2004), 11. 15 David Kretzmer, The Advisory Opinion: the Light Treatment of International Humanitarian Law, The American Journal of International Law 99, no. 1 (January 2005): 97. 16 Mara Tignino, Water, International Peace, and Security, International Review of the Red Cross 92, no. 879 (September 2010): 664.
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Michael Ottolenghi, The Stars and Stripes in Al-Fardos Square: The`Implications for the International Law of Belligerent Occupation, Fordham Law Review 72, no. 5 (January 2004): 2185. 18 Barak Ravid, Netanyahu's border proposal: Israel to annex settlement blocs, but not Jordan Valley, Ha'aretz, 19 February 2012. 19 UN General Assembly, Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan : report of the Secretary-General (5 November 2008) A/63/519. 20 BTselem, Land Grab Israels Settlement Policy in the West Bank (May 2002), 48. 21 Ibid., 48 22 Kretzmer, 98. 23 BTselem succinctly dismantled the argument that these settlements were in any way temporary: it is hard to imagine a more profound or more permanent change than turning an open landscape (agricultural land, grazing land, or virgin hills) into a populated civilian community. The permanence of such change results not only from the enormous investment in buildings, infrastructure, and roads, but also from the ties of the lives of entire families to a particular place; see BTselem, Land Grab, 40. 24 Though orders are sometimes temporary in nature, often the land is not returned even upon expiration of the orders. The GOI State Comptrollers Office found that although many of the requisition orders made on the basis of military necessity had expired, de facto they remained in effect as the land was not returned to its original state; The World Bank, The Economic Effects of Restricted Access to Land in the West Bank (October 2008), 12. 25 BTselem reports the following settlements were built on this land: Matitiyahu, Neve Zuf, Rimoni m, Bet El, Kokhav Hashahar, Alon Shvut, El'azar, Efrat, Har Gilo, Migdal Oz, Gittit, Yitav and Qiryat Arba; BTselem, Land Grab, 48. 26 Uri Blau, Secret Israeli Database Reveals Full Extent of Illegal Settlement, Ha'aretz, 30 January 2009 27 BTselem, Land Grab, 49. 28 The Court also ruled that not changing the title of the land while de facto confiscating the property cannot change the situation which is the permanent denial of possession, the main content of ownership; Anis F. Kassim, The Palestine Yearbook of International Law 1984, 1 (1984): 135. 29 After the site was dismantled the Elon Moreh settlers, aided by the Israeli government, moved to a new permanent location in 1980 on state land. The illegal settlement still exists today; BTselem, By Hook and By Crook, 22. 30 This meant that the Israeli government could effectively block future Palestinian resort to the Israeli High Court by building settlements on property which the government could claim was not private property; i.e. by building on state land; Raja Shehadeh, Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1985), 21. 31 Michael Sfard, The Price of Internal Legal Opposition to Human Rights Abuses, Journal of Human Rights Practice 1, no.1 (2009): 47. 32 In conjunction with the declaration of state land, three other methods are currently used by the Israeli state to annex Palestinian lands: a) the requisition of land for military needs, b) the declaration of land as abandoned property and c) the expropriation of land for public needs, see BTselem, Land Grab, 48. 33 Hagit Ofran and Lara Friedman, At least 70 outposts are located on private Palestinian land, Peace Now, 2 March 2011; available on <http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/least-70-outposts-are-located-private-palestinianland> (accessed 13 July 2012). 34 Ibid. 35 Israel justified this delay by arguing that it was necessary to prevent injury to the rights of people who left the area during the war, and were therefore unable to oppose the registration of their land under another person's name. Paradoxically, it would later exempt the same law for its own seizure of Palestinian land; see BTselem, Land Grab, 54. 36 The Land Law allowed Israel to claim lands that a) were not farmed for at least three consecutive years (even if this was due to Israeli army or settler restrictions) b) had been farmed for less than ten years (the period of limitation), so that the farmer had not yet secured ownership; c) were defined as dead land due to their dista nce from the nearest village; Ibid., 53. 37 Ibid., 55. 38 For an exceptionally thorough and informative analysis of the complexities surrounding land-seizure mechanisms, including flipping private land to state land, read BTselem, Land Grab, 47 65. 39 BTselem, Ofra: An Unauthorized Outpost (2008), 16. 40 BTselem, Land Grab, 51.

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The state-land mechanism is supplemented by other methods of land confiscation: seizure for military purposes, seizure of absentee property and the confiscation for public needs; Peace Now, Methods of Confiscation - How does Israel justify and legalize confiscation of lands?, <http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/methods -confiscationhow-does-israel-justify-and-legalize-confiscation-lands> (accessed 13July 2012); United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), The Humanitarian Impact of Israeli Settlement Policies, (January 2012). 42 Talia Sasson, Summary of the Opinion Concerning Unauthorized Outposts (The Sasson Report), (March 2005), 60-61. 43 Peace Now, Illegal Construction in the Settlements - The List of Demolition Orders (December 2007), 1. 44 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (1995) [hereinafter "Oslo Accords II"], Art XXXI (7). 45 Chaim Levinson, IDF: More than 300,000 settlers live in West Bank, Ha'aretz, 27 July 2009; BTselem, By Hook and by Crook, 10. 46 BTselem, Land Grab, 16. 47 Paul Reynolds, Powell visit highlights problems, BBC News, 12 May 2003. 48 Sasson Report, 10. 49 Ibid., 10. 50 UN OCHA, The Humanitarian Impact of Israeli Settlement Policies (January 2012). 51 Hagit Ofran and Lara Friedman, At least 70 outposts are located on private Palestinian land, Peace Now, 2 March 2011. 52 Sasson Report, 13. 53 Ibid., 13. 54 Ibid., 14. 55 The Spiegel Database was commissioned in 2004 by then -Minister of Defense Shaul Mofaz. Using concise satellite imagery, Brigadier General (Res.) Baruch Spiegel compiled a database concerning all statutory aspects of settlements and outposts in the West Bank. Publicly released in 2009, the Spiegel Database revealed the vast extent of illegal Israeli construction in the West Bank, as well as the culpability of the Israeli government, which is fully aware of the exact scope of the problem. See Yesh Din, Spiegel Database of the West Bank Settlements and Outposts (February 2009). 56 Illegal construction included public buildings in over 30 settlements, including police stations, fire departments, municipal buildings and the Ariel College; Uri Blau, We came, we saw, we conquered, Ha'aretz, 2 February 2009. 57 Israeli public officials have openly acknowledged their systematic involvement in the vast scale of illegal construction within official settlements. The director-general of the Settlement Division in the World Zionist Organization, a publicly funded settlement body, stated that it is common WZO practice to build Israeli communities, entrench them, and only several years later, legalize the construction by approved plans. [] This is the mode of operation. Are we supposed to first plan for five years and then establish the community?! Compounding the problem is that some of the Israeli local councils in the oPt have their own local planning committees which are officially charged with the enforcement of planning and building laws within the settlements boundaries. That means settlers are put in charge of reporting on unauthorized construction amongst their own community to initiate demolition orders; BTselem, By Hook and By Crook, 31; Yesh Din, Tailwind (October 2011), 9. 58 Settlement spotter Dror Etkes wrote: [the] distinction between the outposts and settlements is anachronistic does not help to understand the statutory reality that the State of Israel has created in the West Bank. [] Spiegel's database shows that the outposts are only the tip of the iceberg, and illegal activity is mostly taking place within official settlements making the distinction null and void for all intents and purposes; Dror Etkes, The Spiegel Database: An Analysis (January 2009) , 3; available at <mondoweiss.net/files/dror-analysis.doc>. 59 S.C. Res. 1515, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1515 (19 Nov. 2003). 60 Press Statement, "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict" (The Road Map), Office of the Spokesman, The United States Government (Washington DC, April 30, 2003). 61 President George W. Bush, Memorial Hall, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, Nov. 27, 2007 62 BTselem, By Hook and by Crook, 10. 63 UN OCHA, The Humanitarian Impact of Israeli Settlement Policies (January 2012). 64 Ibid. 65 BTselem, By Hook and by Crook, 13.

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Peace Now, First Petitions Against the Outposts, see <http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/first-petitions-againstoutposts> (accessed 13 July 2012). 67 Hagit Ofran and Dror Etkes, And Thou Shalt Spread - Construction and Development of Settlements Beyond the Official Limits of Jurisdiction (June 2007), 2. 68 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Basic Guidelines of the Government of Israel (7 March 2001), last accessed July 15, 2012, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Previous+governments/Guidelines+of+the+Government+of+Israel++March+200.htm?WBCMODE=PrAerial+Photographs+of+Jenin 69 Hagit Ofran and Dror Etkes, And Thou Shalt Spread, 2. 70 Full text of Netanyahu's foreign policy speech at Bar Ilan, Ha'aretz, 14 June 2009. 71 The Sasson Report, 28. 72 Peace Now, Special Report: The Price of the Settlements in the 2009-2010 Budget Proposal (June 2009), 5. 73 The Sasson Report, 33. 74 Ibid., 35. 75 Ibid., 32. 76 Ibid., 32. 77 BTselem, By Hook and By Crook, 32, 50. 78 The Sasson Report, 20. 79 Sasson explicitly names the official institutes and Ministries involved: Some of the officials working in the Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organization, and in the Ministry of Construction & Housing, cooperated with them to promote the unauthorized outposts phenomenon. After the mid-nineties, these actions were apparently inspired by different Ministers of Housing, either by overlooking or by actual encouragement and support, with additional support from other Ministries, initiated either by officials or by the polit ical echelon of each Ministry; The Sasson Report, 27-28. 80 Ibid., 20-22. 81 Ibid., 10. 82 Chaim Levinson, Ha'aretz exclusive / Anatomy of an outpost that put Netanyahu in a bind, Ha'aretz, 25 November 2011 83 For a factual overview of the Migron outpost and its case in the Israeli High Court, see The Migron File prepared by Peace Now (December 2012); available at <http://settlementwatcheastjerusalem.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/migron_file_eng.pdf>. 84 Chaim Levinson, Ha'aretz exclusive / Anatomy of an outpost that put Netanyahu in a bind, Ha'aretz, 25 November 2011. 85 Peace Now, The Migron Petition (October 2006); available at <http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/migronpetition> (accessed 25 January 2012). 86 Peace Now, Peace Now Database of Settlements, Outposts and IZs (2005). 87 Chaim Levinson, Ha'aretz exclusive / Anatomy of an outpost that put Netanyahu in a bind, Ha'aretz, 25 November 2011. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. 91 Peace Now, The Migron Petition. 92 Jonathan Lis, Barak Ravid, Amos Harel and Chaim Levinson, Settlers in West Bank outpost build new homes on private Palestinian land, Ha'aretz, 19 April 2012. 93 After detecting a building violation, the Supervising Unit is supposed to initiate the illegal construction procedure which goes as follows: issuing a stop work order and summoning the owner to appear before the inspection subcommittee (of the higher building council); a hearing in the committee allowing the owner to bring claims against the stop work order; if the owners arguments are rejected , the committee issues a demolition order and gives the owners a 30-day extension to submit an appeal. If the appeal is rejected, or if no appeal was submitted, the inspection subcommittee is permitted to take action (through inspection personnel) to demolish the illegal building. According to the law, violation of the stop work or demolition order is a criminal offense punishable by a fine; Yesh Din, Tailwind, 7. 94 The Sasson Report, 48. 95 Ibid., 49. 96 Peace Now, Delimitation Injunctions Petition (April 2006).

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Noam Sheizaf, Defense Min. admits it never intended to carry out settler evacuation, 972 Magazine, 22 April 2012. 98 Ibid. 99 The actual number of demolition orders during this time span is in fact much higher as one illegal construction file can contain several different demolition orders; Peace Now, Illegal Construction in the Settlements - The List of Demolition Orders (December 2007), 1. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. 102 Yesh Din Tailwind, 6. 103 Chaim Levinson, Ha'aretz exclusive / Anatomy of an outpost that put Netanyahu in a bind, Ha'aretz, 25 November 2011. 104 Peace Now, Delimitation Injunctions Petition (April 2006). 105 Tovah Lazaroff and Yaakov Lappin, Defense Ministry: Voluntary evacuation of 5 outposts in near future, The Jerusalem Post, 2 April 2008. 106 From 2002 to 2008, the authorities evacuated 31 outposts or encampments, of which about half were unpopulated; see International Crisis Group (ICG), Israel's Religious Right and the Question of Settlements - Middle East Report N89 (July 2009), 32. 107 Americans for Peace Now, Settlements in Focus: Outposts, Post-Annapolis (Vol. 4, Issue 2). 108 Omri Efraim, IDF razes 2 structures in Mitzpe Yitzhar, Ynetnews.com, 15 December 2011. 109 Elad Benari, New Synagogue Dedicated in Demolished Community, Arutz Sheva, 6 Febuary 2012. 110 Omri Efraim, IDF razes 2 structures in Mitzpe Yitzhar, Ynetnews.com, 15 December 2011. 111 Americans for Peace Now, Settlements in Focus: Outposts, Post-Annapolis (Vol. 4, Issue 2) (14 April 2008) 112 [The] security forces destr oyed our five huts, but within an hour of their departure, we had brought trucks full of materials to construct them better than before, an outpost settler told the International Crisis Group; ICG, Israel's Religious Right, 8. 113 Michael Sfard, Re: Failure To Evacuate Shvut Ami Outpost, Yesh Din, April 2008. 114 Peace Now, First Petitions Against the Outposts. 115 Peace Now, Illegal Construction in the Settlements - The List of Demolition Orders (December 2007), 1. 116 Peace Now, First Petitions Against the Outposts. 117 Yesh Din, Tailwind, 5. 118 Peace Now, Delimitations Petition Part II (The Six Outposts), September 2007. 119 Dahlia Scheindlin, NYT got it wrong: PM opposed bill in order to expand settlements, 972 Magazine, 7 June 2012. 120 Akiva Eldar, Document: state authorities serially violate their commitment s to the HCJ, Ha'aretz, April 1, 2011 121 The constant violation of interim High Court orders is well-documented by Israeli NGO Yesh Din in Tailwind (2011), its report on the non-enforcement of judicial orders and the retroactive legalization of illegal construction in the West Bank. 122 In a statement that could have been published today, the Council of the EU reported in 2000 that "the [Israeli] government has made several attempts to set up new outposts.[...] Of the 42 settlement outposts established since 1996 the government qualifies 8 as legal and 7 as illegal according to Israeli law. [...] The fate of the remaining 27 sites is officially pending examination in the light of a variety of parameters taking into account state, security and public factors. [...] The authorization of the newly extended master plan allows the Itamar settlement near Nablus to maintain 5 disputed outposts;" General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, 'Middle East EU Settlement Watch 1 September - 31 December 1999' (17 April 2000); Peace Now, First Petitions Against the Outposts. 123 Yesh Din, Tailwind, 28. 124 Ibid., 27. 125 Ibid., 28. 126 Ibid., 12. 127 Ibid., 17. 128 Ibid., 5. 129 Ibid., 27. 130 The Sasson Report, 13. 131 General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, 'Middle East EU Settlement Watch 1 September - 31 December 1999' (17 April 2000); Peace Now, First Petitions Against the Outposts.

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Peace Now petitioned the High Court to demand that the State enforce its own orders and evacuate 6 illegal outposts that received evacuation orders in 2004; Peace Now, Delimitations Petition Part II (The Six Outposts). 133 Israeli High Court, Peace Now v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 7891/07. 134 Lara Friedman, "Settlements in Focus (Nov. 1, 2011): Settlements Back on the Agenda," Americans for Peace Now, 1 November 2011. 135 The Sasson Report, 13. 136 Peace Now, The Government Announces the Intention to Legalize Outposts (11 October 2011). 137 Jonathan Lis, Israel Plans to Legalize 13 Contentious West Bank Outposts, Ha'aretz, 7 June 2012. 138 Peace Now, 695 Units Approved in Shilo and the Outpost of Shvut Rachel (22 February 2012). 139 Peace Now, Hayovel and Haresha - Illegal Construction (September 2005). 140 Ibid. 141 Most of the land belonged to Palestinian landowners living in the Qaryut village. Even though the Israeli state admitted in court that the construction of the outpost was illegal and partly built on privately-owned Palestinian land, BTselem reported that [] on 1 May 2011, the High Court ordered the state to present a practical time schedule for handling the building offenses in the outpost. In response, the Civil Administration announced that it intended to declare as state land some of the land on which the out post was built; see BTselem, Yovel outpost: Israel retroactively approves theft of private land (14 July 2011). 142 Ibid. 143 According to Peace Now, the land appropriated from Haresha was taken from owners from the Palestinian villages of Mizraa Al-Qibliya and Al-Janiya, west of Ramallah; Peace Now, In Order to Legalize Illegal Outpost Government Expropriates Area Ten Times Its Size (15 September 2011). 144 Peace Now, For the First Time Since 1990 the Government is to Approve the Establishment of New Settlements (19 April 2012). 145 Peace Now, The Trick of Netanyahu Establishing New Settlements and Deceiving the Public (24 April 2012). 146 Peace Now commented: Netanyahus tricks cannot hide the fact that [] the government is announcing the establishment of three new settlements, for the first time since 1990; Ibid. 147 BBC News, US voices concern at Israel outpost authorization (25April 2012). 148 In fact, after the government declared its policy, it had sent affidavits to the High Court in which it detailed the timetables for several demolitions of outposts built on private land. Outposts scheduled for demolition included Migron and Givat Assaf in their entirety, while only parts of Givat Haro'eh, Ramat Gilad, Bnei Adam and Ulpana (Jabal Artis) would be demolished; Chaim Levinson, Netanyahu seeks to legalize outposts built on private Palestinian land, Ha'aretz, 11 October 2011 149 Peace Now, The Government Announces the Intention to Legalize Outposts (11October 2011). 150 Chaim Levinson, Netanyahu seeks to legalize outposts built on private Palestinian land, Ha'aretz, 11 October 2011 151 Hagit Ofran and Lara Friedman, Settlements in Focus, Peace Now. 152 Peace Now, For the First Time Since 1990 the Government is to Approve the Establishment of New Settlements 153 Ibid. 154 Concerning the Ulpana outpost, the Attorney General has, however, agreed to ask the High Court to delay the demolition order for another 3 months, allowing the government to find other ways to legalize the outpost; Yesh Din, Re: The Position of Yesh Din on the Issues Addressed by the Committee (5 April 2012); Harriet Sherwood, Israel backtracks on demolition of illegal West Bank settlement , The Guardian, 15 April 2012. 155 Tovah Lazaroff, Netanyahu names c'tee to examine outpost issue, The Jerusalem Post, 30 January 2012. 156 Chaim Levinson and Tomer Zarchin, Netanyahu-appointed panel: Israel isn't an occupying force in West Bank, Ha'aretz, 09 July 2012. 157 Tovah Lazaroff, State asks High Court to delay Ulpana demolition, The Jerusalem Post, 27 April 2012; Arutz Sheva, Ministers to Meet on Givat Ha'Ulpana, 22 April 2012; Joanna Paraszczuk, Court slams gov't request to rethink Ulpana razing, The Jerusalem Post, 6 May 2012. 158 Yesh Din, The Petitioners' response to the "Statement and Motion by Respondents 1-4 to Renew Deliberation of the Petition (May 2012). 159 Peace Now, Court order the eviction of Ulpana by the 1st of July (7 May 2012). 160 Attila Somfalvi, Prosecutor's Office: Don't bypass court ruling on Ulpana, Ynetnews.com, 11 May 2012. 161 Jonathan Lis, Law to legalize Migron considered unlikely, Ha'aretz, 27 March 2012.

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Attila Somfalvi, Settlements to get 850 new housing units, Ynetnews.com, 6 June 2012. Zvi Lavi, Settlers to get 44m, Ynetnews.com, 15 May 2012. 164 Barak Ravid, Israel's AG approves Netanyahu's plan to relocate Ulpana neighborhood, Ha'aretz, June 6 2012. 165 Dahlia Scheindlin, NYT got it wrong: PM opposed bill in order to expand settlements, 972 Magazine, 7 June 2012. 166 During the Peace Now petition against the Hayovel and Habresha outpost, the Israeli State requested a delay 26 times, stalling the case for six years during which the outposts were retroactively legalized. For more information see Chapter 2. Yesh Din reports on another 5 High Court cases where the Israeli State made between 7 and 14 motions to extend the deadline, all of which were granted by the Court; see Yesh Din, Tailwind. 167 Ibid., 5. 168 Jodi Rudoren, Israel Retroactively Legalizes 3 West Bank Settlements, The New York Times, 24 April 2012. 169 Israeli NGO Yesh Din summarized the problem as follows: The policy of turning a blind eye by the State in the face of the severity of the actions and its unwillingness to take determined action to prevent the violations and punish the offenders is another expression of the weakness of the rule of law in the West Bank territories.[] The combination of the absence of effective enforcement, which also serves as deterrence, and retroactive legalization feeding the ideological motives that are at the basis of the actions, creates a situation in which the extent of agricultural infiltrations and illegal construction can only be expected to grow. [emphasis added]; Yesh Din, Tailwind, 34. 170 UN OCHA, West Bank - Settler Violence Incidents in 2011 (April 2012) 171 UN OCHA, Israeli Settler Violence in the West Bank (November 2011) 172 Relations between the State of Israel and its national-religious settler community have been troubled before. Examples are the notorious national-religious Jewish Underground who planned to blow up the Dome of the Rock, the assassination of then-PM Yitzhak Rabin by a national-religious Israeli in 1995, or the 1994 massacre in Hebron by Baruch Goldstein, a national-religious medic in the Israeli army. 173 ICG, Israel's Religious Right, p. i. 174 These mass demonstrations, though large, were still mostly attended by national-religious adherents and shunned by the larger Israeli public. Israeli historian Idith Zertal wrote: Even in the mass demonstrations that they had managed to organize [...] the large majority of male participants wore crocheted skullcaps and most women wore long dresses, marking them as settlers or direct adherents. The Israeli public at large stayed at home, went to the beach, or vacationed abroad; Idith Zertal, The Settlers and the State of Israel, the Pullout from Gaza, and the Day After, Friedrich -Ebert-Stiftung Israel (2005); 5. 175 ICG, Israel's Religious Right, 4. 176 One month before the Disengagement, after months of settler protests, two polls held by Ynet and Ma'ariv show over 50% of their readers supported the pull-out (Ma'ariv at 54%, Ynet 68%), with around 35% of those polled opposed; Reuters, Israeli poll shows rising support for Gaza plan (1 July 2005) 177 ICG, Israel's Religious Right, 4. 178 Ibid., 9. 179 Ibid., 30. 180 Ori Nir, Price Tag Terrorism Crosses the Green Line, Americans for Peace Now (4 October 2011). 181 ICG, Israel's Religious Right, 5. 182 Ori Nir, Price Tag Terrorism Crosses the Green Line; Yair Altman, Rioting settler: We were pushed into a corner, Ynetnews.com, 14 December 2011. 183 Jack Khoury and Gideon Alon, Mofaz visits Shfaram to meet families of Israeli Arab terror victims, Ha'aretz, 10 August 2005 184 Amos Harel, Roni Singer-Heruti and Amiram Barkat, Man who killed 4 Palestinians: I hope someone kills Sharon, Ha'aretz, 17 August 2005. 185 Debra DeLee, Disengaging From Extremism, Americans for Peace Now (12 August, 2005). 186 ICG, Israel's Religious Right, 11. 187 Efrat Weiss, Amona evacuated; hundreds hurt, Ynetnews.com, 2 January 2006. 188 Ori Nir, Price Tag Terrorism Crosses the Green Line. 189 UN OCHA, The Price of a Law Enforcement Failure: Israeli Settler Violence and the Evacuation of Outposts (November 2009). 190 One evening, about three years ago, a few people sat in a small settlement in Samaria and looked for a solution. The IDF would demolish settlement outposts without a response, because people simply weren't able to reach the [sites slated for] evacuation, [] so for these people, who did not have the privilege to oppose the demolition, the
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concept of 'mutual responsibility' was born that evening, and later on, the media decided to call it the 'Price Tag. [emphasis added]; Ori Nir, Price Tag Terrorism Crosses the Green Line. 191 In the Hebrew weekend-version of Yedioth Ahronoth, , Israeli journalist Shahar Ginosar using documents and testimonies that reached Yedith Ahronoth, exposes direct links between price tag policy and government -funded regional settler councils. If Ginosar is correct, Samaria Regional Council Chairman Gershon Mesika (Likud) and settler leader Benny Katzover 191 (National Union) are directly involved in funding and conceptualizing the attacks. According to Ginossar, Gershon Mesika transferred hundreds of thousands of shekels to a tax-exempt NPO established by Katzover called the Samaria Settlers Committee, the same organization that promoted the first price tag attack in a newspaper ad. The NPO in turn advocated the mutual responsibility strategy among settlers as the best reaction to the swift demolition method by Israeli security forces. Ginosar reports that the Samaria Settlers Committee has since continued to receive public funds from the Samaria Regional Council, which increased from NIS 580,000 a year in 2008 to NIS 1.35 mi llion in 2011; Shahar Ginosar, Th e Hand Behind the Destruction, Yedioth Ahronoth, 6 January 2012. 192 Ibid. 193 Ori Nir, Price Tag Terrorism Crosses the Green Line. 194 For a detailed description of verified attacks, see Appendix B. 195 Itamar Fleishman, Extremists' guide to 'struggle against Ulpana evacuation, Ynetnnews.com, 18 June 2012. 196 Ori Nir, Price Tag Terrorism Crosses the Green Line. 197 Israelis, including senior officials, often express some version of the following: If removing a handful of buildings from an illegal outpost sets the settlers off on an uncontrollable rampage, just imagine how bad it'll be if the government signs a peace agreement and commits to removing tens of thousands of settlers from scores of settlements; Ori Nir, Price Tag Terrorism Crosses the Green Line. 198 While the stated goal of the strategy is to prevent the removal of settlement outposts, attacks in this context may be tailored in ways that contribute to ongoing efforts by Israeli settlers to depopulate certain areas from their Palestinian residents. In a number of cases in recent years, systematic attacks carried out by Israeli settlers have directly contributed to the massive displacement, either temporarily or permanently, of entire Palestinian communities [emphasis added]; UN OCHA, The Price of a Law Enforcement Failure.; UNESCO Chair interview with a Yesh Din research officer, Jan. 10, 2012. 199 Itamar Fleishman, Extremists' guide to 'struggle against Ulpana evacuation, Ynetnnews.com, 18 June 2012; in interviews with village residents taken by UNESCO Chair researchers and EAPPI volunteers, many residents settler attacks. expressed fear of and . 200 See Appendix A & B, incident 4. 201 See Appendix A & B, incidents 4, 37, 43, 44. 202 See Appendix A & B, incident 47. 203 Itamar Fleishman, Extremists' guide to 'struggle against Ulpana evacuation, Ynetnnews.com, 18 June 2012. 204 Maj.-Gen. Mizrahi: Price-tag attacks constitute terror, The Jerusalem Post, 16 July 2011. 205 UN OCHA, The Price of a Law Enforcement Failure. 206 In the immediate term, the price tag strategy aims at diverting Israeli forces and troops from the scene of an outpost evacuation into other areas requiring the intervention of those forces to contain violent incidents; UN OCHA, The Price of a Law Enforcement Failure. 207 According to UNESCO Chair research and interviews, of 'price tag' attacks where the time of day of the attack has been verified, there are more than four times more nighttime attacks than day time attacks. This is striking compared to general settler violence, which commonly takes place during the day. 208 Based on UNESCO Chair research and interviews with affected communities. 209 Interviews conducted by UNESCO Chair staff in Qusra, Qabalan, Deit Istiya, Bruqin and Yatma, December EAs concern. 2011-March 2012; Incident sheet prepared by EAPPI volunteers for 'price tag' attack in Yatma. Several villagers that were interviewed by UNESCO Chair staff also explained that they had tried to establish a village watch that would guard the village at night, but were prohibited from doing so by the Palestinian Authority. 210 See Appendices A & B. Please note that the arson attacks against the mosques in Lubban Ash-Sharqiyya on May 4, 2010 and Tuba Zanghariyye on October 3, 2011 are not included, as the former cannot be confirmed as a price tag attack, and the latter, though accompanied by price tag graffiti, was a so-called revenge attack for the killing of an Israeli settler by Palestinians, and not related to Israeli government action on outposts. 211 See, e.g., 'price tag' attack on Dec. 14, 2011 in Duma, where Camaraderie Mitzpe Yitzhar was spray painted near two burnt out cars. Dec. 14, 2011, Friends of Yitzhar left in Haris. Appendices A & B, incident 50.

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See, e.g., 'price tag' attack in Beit Ummar on Nov. 9, 2011: there will be war over Givat Assaf; June 7, 2011 in Al Mugheyyer: "Ali Ayin", "This is only the beginning"; Dec 8, 2009, East Jerusalem: notes left on vandalized cars that read 'If we are frozen, we will freeze your lives as well." Appendices A & B, incidents 45, 31, 16. 213 UNESCO Chair interview with village leaders in Deir Istiya, Jan. 17, 2012. 214 See Appendices A & B, incident 22 (July 25, 2010); Aviel Magnezi, West Bank demolitions prompt riots, arrests, price tag missions, Ynet, July 26, 2010. 215 Nadav Shragai and Anshel Pfeffer, Settlers respond to outpost decision with rocks, fires and blocking the J'lem Tel Aviv highway, Ha'aretz, 2 June 2009. 216 Following the killing of the Fogel family in their home in Itamar settlement, there were several attacks against Palestinian communities, including at least two that involved graffiti and referenced the attack as part of price tag. Similarly, following the killing of an Israeli settler and his infant son in the Hebron District, two attacks took place that both included price tag graffiti, one involving the burning of a mosque. See Appendix A. 217 Immediately after the announcement of the prisoner exchange deal, the Yitzhak Rabin Memorial in Tel Aviv was tagged with graffiti reading, "Price Tag"; "Release Yigal Amir [Rabin assassin]". See Appendix A. 218 Amos Harel, IDF West Bank commander: Rightist violence encouraged by settler leaders, Ha'aretz, 10 February 2008 219 ICG, Israel's Religious Right, 10. 220 Amos Harel, Shin Bet: Threat of settler violence against Israeli officials rising in West Bank, Ha'aretz, 3 October 2011. 221 Didi Remez, Settlers prep to terrorize West Bank, Coteret Blog, 6 December 2009. 222 Chaim Levinson and Oz Rosenberg, Shin Bet: Israel's extreme rightists organizing into terror groups, Ha'aretz, 13 September 2011. 223 Yair Altman, Police: Rightists worked as spy cell, Ynetnnews.com, 28 December 2011. 224 See, e.g., Ha'aretz reporter Chaim Levinsion describing the organization of a price tag attack, using text messaging: The text messages were sent out en masse at about 9:43 A.M. "Buses full of Special Forces Police with flak jackets and nightsticks at the Rantis Junction," they warned. At 10:08 A.M., an update: "A large convoy that includes a D9 [bulldozer] is making its way to Gush Talmonim." At 10:15 A.M., the signal was given: "Demolition forces have taken over the gates. Everyone move in." Several dozen teens from the area responded to the call and rushed to the Givat Menachem outpost, hoping to prevent the razing of the outpost's synagogue; Chaim Levinson, Settlers attack Palestinians to avenge West Bank outpost demolition, Ha'aretz, January 27, 2010. 225 Ha'aretz Editorial, Defeat settler terror, Ha'aretz, 27 October 2008. 226 The Sasson Report, 10; see also, section 2.2. 227 Akiva Eldar, U.S. tax dollars fund rabbi who excused killing gentile babies, Ha'aretz, 15 December 2009. 228 Didi Remez, Settlers prep to terrorize West Bank. 229 Shahar Ginossar, The Hand behind the Destruction . 230 In January 2012, MK Michael Ben-Ari told Arutz Sheva that the time has come for the national religious public to understand that the government of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is bad for the Jews. The obsessive and ongoing demolition of Jewish homes has reached the levels of the eviction of Jews from their homes in Gush Katif and northern Samaria. Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak are persecuting residents, evicting children from their homes, and injuring protesters and afterwards they wonder why there are 'price tag' actions; David Lev, Police Brutally Evict 5 Families from Yissa Beracha Outpost , Arutz Sheva, 19 January 2012. 231 Anshel Pfeffer and Nadav Shragai, Settlers respond to outpost decision with rocks, fires and blocking the J'lem Tel Aviv highway, Ha'aretz, 2 June 2009. 232 MK Ben Aris aide, Itamar Ben-Gvir from the Kiryat Arba settlement in Hebron, has been arrested over 300 times and has openly supported price tag attacks. After a price tag mosque arson in 2011, Ben -Gvir stated the writing was on the wall, because a population that feels that they are being abandoned, harmed and kicked over and over again, it is only natural that individuals from within that population will come out and commit incidents; Allyn Fisher-Ilan, Settlers' mosque-burning campaign expands into Israel, Reuters, 6 October 201); After a price tag attack on Peace Now in 2011, Baruch Marzel, one of MK Ben-Aris aides, noted that even though we don't deal with 'price tag' acts, I won't condemn it. [] I can understand the anger that is directed at the extreme Left, which cooperates with the haters of Israel, and mercenarily hurts the pioneers of Judea and Samaria; Yair Altman, Price tag: Peace Now activist's entryway vandalized, Ynetnews.com, 12 September 2011. 233 Yair Altman, A peek into settlers' war room, Ynetnews.com, 3 March 2011. 234 After the Havat Gilad demolitions, Rabbi Shalom Dov Wolpo talked of the use of violence against Jewish soldier. So when Jews or Arabs come to destroy houses and shoot rubber bullets, like what happened in Hava t

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Gilad, we need to fire rubber bullets back at them. [] It will probably come down to a war between Jews, to our great dismay and it's not the settlers who are initiating it its the army that is fighting them and wants to inflict on them the same fate as was inflicted on the residents of Gush Katif. We will not let this happen; Kobi Nahshoni, Rabbi Wolpo: Fire r ubber bullets back at soldiers, Ynetnews.com, 8 March 2011. 235 not just in Judea and Samaria (sic) there should be mutual debt also in Jerusalem, in the Galilee and the Negev [] when someone is hurt in one place there needs to be a response everywhere. Rabbi Itzhak Shapira; Guy Varon, Head of Yitzhar settlement openly support revenge against Palestinians, GalGalaz (Israeli Army Radio News), 17 May 2010. 236 Shapira and Elitzur have received attention for writing a book which outlines the religious context in which the killing of non-Jews is permissible. 237 Chaim Levinson and Amos Harel, Shin Bet urges Israeli government to halt funding of West Bank yeshiva, Ha'aretz, 27 September 2011. 238 Yair Altman, Government closes down Yitzhar Yeshiva, Ynetnews.com, 1 November 2011. 239 Aviad Glickman, Indictment: Right wing activists got info from insider sources, Ynetnews.com, 8 January 2012. 240 Anshel Pfeffer, IDF keeps raids of West Bank outposts under wraps fearing leaks to settlers, Ha'aretz, 9 October 2011. 241 Jonathan Lis, Second Israeli MK admits to having given settlers information on IDF movements, Ha'aretz, 8 January 2012. 242 Ibid. 243 UN OCHA, Unprotected: Israeli Settler Violence Against Palestinian Civilians and Their Property, (December 2008). 244 Ori Nir, Price Tag Terrorism Crosses the Green Line. 245 UN OCHA, Palestinian Communities Vulnerable to Settler Violence (November 2009). 246 UN OCHA, Protection of Civilians Weekly Report 289 (December 2008). 247 Settlers torch Palestinian property, uproot trees, Ma'an News, 6 December 2009; Yair Altman, Palestinians accuse settlers of torching vehicle, Ynetnews.com, 27 January 2011; BTselem, 29 Dec. '11: Settler violence against Palestinians and Palestinian property, (December 2011), <http://www.btselem.org/settler_violence/20111229_settler_violence_in_dec_2012> (accessed 13 July 2012). 248 UN OCHA, Israeli Settler Violence and The Evacuation Of Outposts. 249 UN OCHA, Weekly Report, Dec. 3-16, 2008 (December 2008). 250 Palestinians: Settlers vandalize school near Nablus, The Jerusalem Post, 20 October 2010. 251 Melanie Lidman, Price tag vandals attack Jlem monastery, school, The Jerusalem Post, 7 February 2012. 252 Jerusalem School Targeted by Extremist Vandals, Hand-in-Hand School. 253 Hand in Hand responds to Racist Vandalism with Peace Rally, Hand-in-Hand School. 254 Attacks are from June 1, 2009 and July 20, 2009; UN OCHA, Israeli Settler Violence and the Evacuation Of Outposts. 255 UN OCHA, Weekly Report No. 284, Oct. 29-Nov. 4, 2008 (November 2008). 256 UN OCHA, Weekly Report No. 288, Nov. 26-Dec. 2, 2008 (December 2008). 257 Ha'aretz Editorial, Defeat Settler Terror, Ha'aretz, 27 October 2008. 258 Portion of an email sent out by Ori Nir of Peace Now after a price tag attack on his office; Philip Weiss, Attack on Peace Now is latest in long series, Mondoweiss, 8 November 2011. 259 Efrat Weiss, Jerusalem: Professor Ze'ev Sternhell lightly wounded by pipe bomb, Ynetnews.com, 25 September 2008. 260 Itamar Fleishman, Extremists' guide to 'struggle against Ulpana evacuation, Ynetnews.com, 18 June 2012. 261 Ha'aretz Editorial, In praise of Nitzan Alon, Ha'aretz, 27 October 2011. 262 Catrina Stewart, Jewish settlers are terrorising Palestinians, says Israeli general, The Independent, 18 July 2011. 263 The extent to which Israeli forces have been tied up in price tag prevention was revealed by Jpost in 2011, which reported that the Israeli Armys Central Command allocated 30 percent of its forces deployed in the West Bank towards price tag related missions. It reports that the missions range from being stations along roads in the West Bank to prevent the stoning of Palestinians, to preventin g settler infiltration of Palestinian villages; Yaakov Katz, W.Bank: 3rd of IDF used against price-tag attacks, The Jerusalem Post, 16 December 2011. 264 Amos Harel, IDF West Bank commander: Rightist violence encouraged by settler leaders, Ha'aretz, 2 October 2008.

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Ophir Bar-Zohar and Chaim Levinson, Senior IDF officer: Migron outpost demolition would harm stability, Ha'aretz, 18 January 2012. 266 Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, Evicted Israeli Settlers Attack Palestinian Land, National Public Radio, 16 October 2009 267 ICG, Israel's Religious Right, i. 268 Straight-forward threats have been issued that refer to the threat of civil war, avoiding violence or the threat of setting the territories ablaze; Tovah Lazaroff, Migron Settlers to Sign Relocation Agreement, The Jerusalem Post, 11 March 2012; Ha'aretz Editorial, Time to evacuate Migron outpost, Ha'aretz, 24 January 2012. 269 Peace Now, Delimitations Petition Part II (The Six Outposts). 270 Tovah Lazaroff and Yaakov Katz, Right-wing extremists attack IDF base in West Bank, The Jerusalem Post, 14 December 2011. 271 Yair Altman, Settlers gear for outposts eviction, Ynetnews.com, 13 December 2011. 272 In response, Peace Now Secretary-General Yariv Oppenheimer stated, The Ramat Gilad agreement is a deal in which the government surrendered to the Hilltop Youth. [..] The settlers are proving that violence pays off and that the outpost method works. First they build illegally, and then they authorize it and basically establish a new settlement; Yair Altman, State, settlers reach a deal, Ynetnews.com, 28 December 2011. 273 Ibid. 274 Chaim Levinson, 2015: A farewell to West Bank outposts?, Ha'aretz, 27 April 2012. 275 Peace Now, The Migron File (December 2012). 276 Peace Now, The Migron Petition (October 2006). 277 The Court normally deliberately waits for the State to evacuate the illegal outposts, without issuing a ruling; Peace Now, The Migron Petition (October 2006). 278 Attilla Somfalvi, Dismantling Migron would dismantle coalition, Ynetnews.com, 21 November 2011. 279 Gil Ronen, MK Orlev: We will Leave Gov't if Migron is Razed, Arutz Sheva, 25 March 2012. 280 Yori Yalon and Shlomo Cesana, Migron residents reject Netanyahu's compromise, Israel Hayom, 23 January 2012. 281 Yair Altman, Rightist MKs blast court over Migron ruling, Ynetnews.com, 25 March 2012. 282 Ha'aretz Editorial, Time to evacuate Migron outpost, Ha'aretz, 24 January 2012. 283 Ibid. 284 Lahav Harkov and Tovah Lazaroff, Danon garners support for emergency Migron meeting, The Jerusalem Post, 6 March 2012. 285 Zvi Lavi, Settlers to get 44m, Ynetnews.com, 15 May 2012. 286 the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected. (Hague Regulations. Art. 46) 287 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (entry into force 1976) [hereinafter "ICCPR"], Art. 12(1): Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence. 288 International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racism (entry into force 1969) [hereinafter "ICERD"], Art. 5(d)(v). 289 Convention on the Rights of the Child (entry into force 1990), Art. 28; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (entry into force 1976) [hereinafter "ICESCR"], Art. 13. 290 ICESR, Art. 6, ICERD, Art. 5. 291 ICCPR, Art. 19. 292 ICCPR, Art. 18, ICERD. Art. 5(d)(vii) 293 Hague Regulations, Art. 43. 294 Cordula Droege, The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, Israel Law Review 40, no.2 (2007): 310, 347. 295 Resolution 34/169, General Assembly (December 17, 1979), U.N. Doc. A/34/169 (1979), Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, Arts. 1 and 2. 296 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the implementation of Human Rights Council resolutions S-9/1 and S-12/1, Human Rights Council, 16th Session (March 3, 2011), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/71 , 59(i). 297 Report of the Secretary-General: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, General Assembly, 63rd session (Nov. 5, 2008), U.N. Doc. A/63/519, 48; Report of the Secretary-General: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and the

265

60

occupied Syrian Golan, General Assembly, 64th session (Nov. 6, 2009), U.N. Doc. A /64/516, 50; Report of the Secretary-General: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, General Assembly, 66th session (Sept. 16, 2011), U.N. Doc. A/ 66/364, 37-39; Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967 report, General Assembly, 66th session (Sept. 13, 2011), U.N. Doc. A/66/358, 27. 298 Oct. 19, 2010: Girls school in Sawiya: warehouse of school is set ablaze; Bilingual school in Jerusalem was vandalized with graffiti Death to Arabs and Kahane was right on Feb. 8, 2012. 299 Attacks are from June 1, 2009 and July 20, 2009; UN OCHA, Israeli Settler Violence and the Evacuation Of Outposts, November 2009. 300 UN OCHA, Weekly Report No. 284, Oct. 29-Nov. 4, 2008 (November 2008). 301 UN OCHA, Weekly Report No. 288, Nov. 26-Dec. 2, 2008 (December 2008). 302 Data from the annual report of the Israeli military courts revealed that 99.7% of all cases heard by the court involving a Palestinian defendant end in conviction; Chaim Levinson, Virtually all military court cases in West Bank end in conviction, Ha'aretz, 29 December 2011. 303 See e.g., Emily Schaeffer, Separate Legal Systems for Jewish-Israeli Settlers and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, Badil, Autumn 2011. 304 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements ("Oslo Agreement"), 13 September 1993, Annex I: Protocol Concerning Redeployment and Security Arrangement, Article XI: Rules of Conduct in Mutual Security Matters, Para. 4 (d). 305 The Karp Report: An Israeli Government Inquiry into Settler Violence against Palestinians on the West Bank. Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984. 306 The Sasson Report, 64. 307 Yesh Din, Yesh Din monitoring Update: Law Enforcement Upon Israeli Civilians in the West Bank , (February 2011). 308 For example in one of the first price tag attacks in October 2008, SMS and emails were sent out to settlers about the demolition of a home at the Shvut Ami outpost. In only a matter of hours, settlers who had converged on the area in response to the call, had burned 100 olive trees in the neighboring Palestinian village of Immatin and stoned passing Palestinian cars on the main roadway near the outpost. [UN OCHA, Weekly Reports, October 1-7, 2008 (October 2008); Nadav Shragai, The New Settler Policy: Price tag for each military evacuation, Ha'aretz, 3 October 2008.] In response to hundreds of text messages sent out by settlers warning of the possible demolition of structures in the illegal outpost of Ramat Gilad, which in fact never happened, settlers created impromptu road blocks on the main road between Nablus and Qalqilya, hurling stones at Palestinian drivers who got out of their car to move the debris in the road, resulting in at least six injuries to motorists. [UN OCHA, The Price of a Law Enforcement Failure: Israeli Settler Violence and the Evacuation of Outposts (November 2009)] According to the Jerusalem Post, price tag attacks on December 13, 2011 that resulted in damage to several cars and injury to a Palestinian woman, were preceded by SMS messages and telephone calls alerting settler supporters to possible demolitions at outposts in the Northern West Bank, Tovah Lazaroff and Yaakov Katz, Right-wing extremists attack IDF base in West Bank, The Jerusalem Post, 14 December 2011. 309 In interviews, several Israeli organizations or individuals, who wish not to be named, have stated that they have been included in mass testing campaigns by settlers urging people to converge on a certain site in the West Bank in response to an actual or threatened demolition. 310 UNESCO Chair interview, April 1, 2012. Interviewee wishes to remain anonymous in order not to jeopardize continued access to the settler network. 311 UNESCO Chair interview with Ali Rit, the mayor of Burin, on July 15, 2011. 312 UN OCHA, Weekly Report, July 21-27, 2010, (July 2010). 313 Chaim Levinson, Settlers attack Palestinians to avenge West Bank outpost demolition, Ha'aretz, 26 January 2010. 314 UN OCHA, Protection of Civilians, 20-26 January 2010 (January 2010). 315 Saed Bannoura, Settler attack Beit Ilu village, Ramallah, International Middle East Media Center, 27 January 2010. 316 See, e.g., Yair Altman, Price tag: Palestinian cars vandalized in Hebron, Ynet, 1 March 2011. Residents and EAs local council leaders of villages targeted by settler violence reported to UNESCO Chair staff and EAPPI volunteers how Israeli investigating officers often arrive several hours after the incident is reported. 317 See Appendices A & B, incidents 1, 3, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 30. 318 UN OCHA, Protection of Civilians Weekly Report, June 18-June 14, 2008 (June 2008)

61

Amos Gvirtz, Don't say we didn't know, Gush Shalom (6 July 2008); International Womens Peace Service Report "Report on settler(IWPS), Human Rights Reports 2008 - Report No. 360, 14 April 2008; EAPPI Incident narrative, attack in Burin village 19.06.08", 2008. 320 Ibid. 321 Harriet Sherwood, Israeli settlers hit back after army demolishes their West Bank homes, The Guardian, 1 March 2011. 322 Yair Altman, Day of rage': Rightists block Jerusalem-TA highway, Ynetnews.org, March 3, 2011. 323 Yair Altman, Price tag: Palestinian cars vandalized in Hebron, Ynet, 1 March 2011. 324 Yesh Din, Law Enforcement upon Israeli Civilians in the West Bank , March 2012; Btslem, Human Rights in the Occupied Territories: 2011 Annual Report , 2011, 38-43. 325 Jonathan Lis and Chaim Levinson, Israel Police struggling to suppress Jewish extremists in West Bank, says senior officer, Ha'aretz, 5 January 2012. 326 See Appendices A & B generally. For information on mapping trends of settler violence, see, The Palestine Center, When Settlers Attack, pp. 10-22, 2012. See also Appendix C, featuring a map of 'price tag' attacks. 327 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements ("Oslo Agreement"), 13 September 1993, Annex I: Protocol Concerning Redeployment and Security Arrangement, Article XI: Rules of Conduct in Mutual Security Matters, Para. 4 (d). 328 Based on UNESCO Chair interviews conducted with mayors and village leaders in the Northern West Bank. 329 This occurred in Sawiya, Kfar Qaddum, Al Janiya, Qusra, Deir Iistiya, Al Mugheryer. Information gathered through in person and phone interviews with the village council leaders of each of these villages by UNESCO Chair staff, Dec. 2011-June 2012. 330 Village council leaders from Deir Istiya and Al Janiya reported these incidents in interviews with UNESCO Chair staff. 331 Report of the Secretary General to the General Assembly, 66th session (Sept. 16, 2011), U.N. Doc. A/66/364, Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan Report of the Secretary-General, 27. 332 Efrat Weiss, Mosque arson suspects' remand extended,Ynetnews.org, 18 January 2010. 333 Efrat Weiss, Yeshiva rabbi arrested over mosque arson, Ynetnews.org, 26 January 2010. 334 Ibid; Efrat Weiss, Mosque arson suspects' remand extended, Ynetnews.org, 18 January 2010. 335 Shmulik Grossman, Court lifts limitations on mosque arson suspects, Ynetnews.org, 23 March 2010. 336 Yair Altman, Government closes down Yitzhar yeshiva, Ynetnews.org, 1 November 2011. 337 Jodi Rudoren and Khaled Abu Aker, West Bank Mosque Is Set Ablaze and Vandalized, The New York Times, 19 June 2012. 338 Jonathan Lis and Chaim Levinson, Israel Police struggling to suppress Jewish extremists in West Bank, says senior officer, Ha'aretz, 5 January 2012. 339 Ibid. 340 Ben Hartman, Jerusalem Court Issues first-ever Price Tag Indictment, The Jerusalem Post, 7 November 2011. 341 Ibid. 342 Chaim Levinson and Oz Rosenberg, Demobilized Soldier Arrested on Suspicion of Committing Multiple Price Tag Attacks, Ha'aretz, 10 November 2011. 343 Jeremey Sharon, Price-Tag Militant Rearrested for Making Death Threats, The Jerusalem Post, 29 November 2011. 344 See Israeli Military Order 378; Yesh Din, Backyard Proceedings: The Implementation of Due Process Rights in the Military Courts in the Occupied Territories, December 2007, p. 46. 345 Barak Ravid, Netanyahu: Jewish extremists not a 'terror group' but will be given military trial, Ha'aretz, 14 December 2011. 346 In announcing the reforms for law enforcement in the West Bank, Netanyahu declared, Whoever lays a hand on IDF soldiers or Israeli policemen will be harshly punished; [Ibid.] Similarly, Barak ordered the Israeli army and defense establishment to act resolutely, purposefully and to use all the means at their disposal. He continued on that such acts prevent the IDF from carrying out its primary missions, including the basic protection of the region's residents. Chana Ya'ar, Barak Condemns 'Price Tag' Vandalism in Deir Istia, Arutz Sheva, 11 January 2012. 347 Chaim Levinson, IDF expels Jewish extremists from West Bank for allegedly attacking Palestinians, Ha'aretz, 5 April 2012. 348 No jail for Jewish extremists in "price tag" attacks, Al Akhbar, 5 January 2012.

319

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Joanna Paraszcuk, West Bank teen charged with price tag attack, The Jerusalem Post, 22 March 2012. Ibid. 351 See, e.g., UN OCHA, "Map: Palestinian Villages Affected by Violence from Yitzhar Settlement and Outposts," February 2012. 352 According to the website of Honenu, a legal defense organization that regularly represents settlers accused of violence against Palestinians, one minor suspect was released on 1000 NIS bail and subject to house arrest for three days, and another minor subject was released on 10,000 NIS bail and subject to house arrest as well. Honenu, Arrestee released in the Nabi Elias case, charge sheet to be filed, March 20, 2012; Suspect in Nabi Elias vehicular arson case released to house arrest, Honenu, 4 April 2012; The owner of the car was arrested and taken in for questioning and released to five days of house arrest, according to his lawyer, who indicated that the release was based in large part on the suspects own affirmation that he was at home on the night of the attack ; Arrestee suspected of burning vehicle in Nabi Elias released,Honenu, 19 February 2012. 353 The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group, Know Your Rights; available at <http://www.phrmg.org/hotline/your_right.htm> (accessed July 10, 2012). 354 See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, 80th session (2004), general comment No. 31, 8, UN. Doc. CCPR/C/74/CRP.4/Rev.6; Committee on the Rights of the Child, 34th session (2003), general comment No. 5, CRC/GC/2003/5, 1; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 22 nd session (2000), general comment No. 14, 33, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 11 th session (1991), General Recommendation 19, 9, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 at 1 (1993). 355 E.g., the Committee against Torture, in Hajrizi Dzemajl et al. v. Yugoslavia (161/2000), U.N. Doc. CAT/C/29/D/161/2000, . 9.2 (reiterating concerns about inaction by police and law-enforcement officials who fail to provide adequate protection against racially motivated attacks when such groups have been threatened); The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. A/48/18, 539 (expressing deep concern that the State party had not ensured that public security and law enforcement officials took steps effectively to p rohibit such criminal activities, punish the perpetrators and compensate the victims, as required under article 6 of the Convention); Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. A/53/40, vol. I, 354 (considering the second periodic report of Algeria, expressed concern at the lack of timely or preventive measures of protection to the victims from police or military officials in the vicinity and urged that the State party adopt effective measures of prevention, inquiry and sanctions); L.K. v. Netherlands, Communication No. 4/1991, 16 March 1993, 6.6: (When threats of racial violence are made, and especially when they are made in public and by a group, it is incumbent upon the State to investigate with due diligence and expedition. In the instant case, the State party failed to do this.); Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Israel, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.45. (Concluding Observations/Comments) 14(The Committee recommends that the State party extend its legislat ion against the promotion of racial hatred by completing its implementation of the requirements of article 4 of the Convention. The Committee has earlier held that when anyone makes threats in public against the security of persons of another ethnic origin, criminal proceedings must be initiated with due diligence and expedition. The State party should give this priority attention.); Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velsquez-Rodrguez case, Judgement of 21 July 1989, Series C, No. 7, para. 172); United States v. Islamic Republic of Iran, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 3. Provisional Measures, I.C.J. Reports, 1980, pp. 3, 31-32, 63, 67; Case of X and Y v. the Netherlands, Application No. 8978/80, 23, Strasbourg 27 February 1985; Case of Plattform rtze fr das Leben, Application No. 10126/82, 32, Strasbourg 25 May 1988; Case of McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 18984/91, 161, Strasbourg, 5 September 1995; Case of Tanrikulu v. Turkey, Application No. 23763/94, 101, Strasbourg, 8 July 1999; Case of Akko v. Turkey, Application Nos. 22947/93 and 22948/93, 97, Strasbourg, 10 October 2000; Case of Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 24746/94, 102, Strasbourg, 4 May 2001. 356 Dinah L. Shelton, Private Violence, Public Wrongs, and the Responsibility of States, Fordham International Law Journal 17, no.1 (1990): 21-2. 357 See, e.g., Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velsquez-Rodrguez case, Judgement of 29 July 1988, 172. 358 Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, Report of the Secretary-General, Sept. 16, 2011, UN Doc. A/66/364, 23, 27-28. 359 Ibid, 22. 360 Ibid. 361 Ibid 37-38 362 Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, Report of the Secretary-General, Nov. 5, 2008, UN Doc. A/63/519, 39 (describing the first large-scale
350

349

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price tag attack in June 2008), 41 (It appears that the Israeli authorities have failed to adequately ensure public order to protect Palestinians from criminal attacks by settlers. Some incidents of settler violence were allegedly not investigated promptly or at all by the Israeli authorities), 48; Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, Report of the Secretary-General, Nov. 6, 2009, UN Doc. A/64/516, 33-36 (discussing the impunity with which settler violence is treated), 50; Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, Report of the Secretary-General, Sept. 14, 2010, UN Doc. A/65/365, 27, 31 (The Israeli security forces have repeatedly failed to intervene and stop settler attacks on Palestinian civilians or arrest suspected settlers on the spot. While some efforts have been made to enforce the law on settlers involved in high-profile attacks on Palestinians and their property, generally the absence of accountability of Israeli settlers who perpetrate attacks against Palestinians further contributes to the continued cycle of violence), 37; Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the implementation of Human Rights Council resolutions S-9/1 and S-12/1, March 3, 2011. U.N.Doc. A/HRC/16/71, 59(i). 363 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Eightieth session, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 9 of the convention, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial DiscriminationIsrael, March 2012, UN Doc. CERD/C/ISR/CO/14-16, 28. 364 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Sept. 13, 2011, UN Doc. A/66/358, 27.

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APPENDIX A: The Price Tag Incident Database 2012 / Compiled by the UNESCO Chair)
# of locations attacked Location(s) of attack Settler Violence Property Damage Religious Insult Graffiti Content

(June 2008 - July

Incident Date

Trigger

Threatened Outpost

OR=outpost removal, OT=outpost threat, P=policy change, R= revenge attacks Burin, Asira Al Qabliya, Urif, Yasuf, Jit, 7 Road 60 near Huwwara, Road near Jit no n/a no 1 Burin 2 Burin, farmland near Havat Gilad 1 Jerusalem 1 Immatim 3 Hebron area AR, PA S, PA (gunfire), AR AR, PA, R, S H, A, V (15 cars) A, H ST, P V (22 cars' tires slashed), H C PA (pipe bomb) AR, PA, R H V (army); A (olive grove) AR, PA, Rocket fired AR, PA (knife threat) A A, V, (electricity wires) V=vehicles, A=agricultural land/animals, H=houses V, H, A (at least 850 dunums)

001 6/19/2008 OR Yitzhar outpost OR (1 caravan and 002 7/13/2008 storage container) Yitzhar outpost 003 7/23/2008 OR (clearance of bus) Adei Ad

S = stone throwing, R = road blocks, PA = physical assault, AR=arson AR, PA, S, R (on Road

MB=mosque burning, MG=mosque graffiti, CG=church graffiti, G=graffiti, C=cemetery

004 9/25/2008 unknown 005 10/2/2008 OT

G-"Price Tag";pamphlets: "anyone who kills someone from Peace Now will get a 1.1 mill NIS award--signed by Army of Liberators." no

006 10/26/2008 OR

n/a Shvut Ami "Federman Farm"--near Kharsina (Hebron)

007 12/1/2008 OT 3 Yatma, Qabalan, Asawiya Azun, An Nabi, Elias, Kfar Laqif, 7 Yinsafut, Immatim, Al Fendoq 1 Turmusa'ya 1 Qalqilya/Nablus road 4 Tel Madama, Burin, Asira Qabliya, Jit 1 Asira Al Qabliya 1 Suseya 1 Kfar Qadum 1 Einabus AR unknown H A (250 trees V (2 cars, tractor), H (2 warehouses) V (tires slashed on approx. 20 cars) H (1), V (2) V (3), A (300 olive trees) H (vandalized park) A, H S (and molotov cocktails), AR, PA, R (15 diff. junctions) AR AR AR no AR no S, AR V (see video by B'Tselem) H (school room and warehouse burnt) V (tractor) V A (vineyard) A, V (at least 10--but most likely many more)

Beit Ha shalom/Al Rajabi (Hebron H2)

none G-content unknown but OCHA reports insults to the Pr. Mohammad

008 12/4/2008 OR 009 12/13/2008 OR

Beit Ha shalom/Al Rajabi (Hebron H2) Beit Ha shalom/Al Rajabi (Hebron H2)

MG (Asawiya) MB (location unknown), MG (Sinjil) G-content unknown MG G-content unknown

010

6/1/2009

OT

Ramat Gilad

no no no no

011 7/20/2009 OR AR, PA, R, S S (20 armed settlers enter village) S, PA AR

Mitzpe Dani; Novel Yarden; Adel Ad

V, A (1300 trees, 280 dunums of crops) A (1000-1500 o.trees), V (6), H

66
1 1 1 1 1 Huwwara 1 Beit Ummar Hebron Burin, 15 different junctions (specific 16 locations unknown) 1 Al Fajr/Beit Fajjar (Bethlehem) 1 Qusra 1 1 1 1 1 Asawiya Kfar Qadum Urif Einabus Palestinian vineyard near Migron French Hill (Jerusalem) Yasuf Beit Ilu (Ramallah) Huwwara no AR S, AR, PA AR (cars) no S (and bottles), AR (attempted) Jerusalem, Huwwara, Burin, Einabus, 5 Hebron R (cars on Route 1 & train near Modi'in), AR, S (molotov cocktail) V, H (molotov)

012 7/23/2009 OR 013 9/9/2009 OR 014 10/11/2009 OR

Mitzpe Dani; Novel Yarden; Adel Ad Givat HaDegel Mitzpe Ami

P--late Nov. gov't announces settlement 015 12/6/2009 construction freeze n/a

no

016 017 018 019

12/8/2009 12/11/2009 1/26/2010 4/14/2010

P--settlement freeze P--settlement freeze OR P-settlement freeze

n/a n/a Givat Menachem n/a

MB, MG MG

G-"Price Tag", "Danger, construction site" and on vandalized cars graffiti said "'If we are frozen, we will freeze your lives as well' G-"Price Tag" on mosque floor n/a G-"Muhammad" and stars of David no no no MB, MG, G (defaced Quran) G-"Price Tag", "revenge", religious slurs G-"Price Tag" G-"Greetings from the hills" G- "Price Tag", "Shvut Ami", "Revenge" G-"Price Tag Bat Ayin" "revenge for Arabs" G-"Eye for an eye - We won't forget" no

response to arrest of several settlers from 020 4/29/2010 Yitzhar

n/a

021 6/23/2010 OR

Bat Ayin

OR (2 caravans and a 022 7/26/2010 goat pen) Givat Ronen

P-possible negotiations on 023 10/4/2010 settlements

n/a

024 14-Oct-10 OR

Maoz Esther

025 026 027 028 029

10/20/2010 10/22/2010 1/26/2011 1/27/2011 2/15/2011

OR OR OR OR OR

Bat Ayin; Mitzpe Eretz Shvut Ami Bat Ayin, Alei Avin Bat Ayin, Alei Avin Migron

030 2/28/2011 OR

Havat Gilad

no

031 1 Beit Ilu (Ramallah) 2 Qusra & road near Yitzhar 1 Benyamin Israeli Army Base (Ramallah) no 3 Yatma, Kfar Tapuah, Qabalan AR MG (Yatma) G H (stairwell apartment) H, V (2) G (in 2 cemeteriesone Christian, one Muslim) G-"Revenge on Arabs" no 1 BirZeit University 1 Jerusalem 1 Burqa 1 against Israeli Armed Forces 1 Jaffa 1 Beit Safafa (Jer) 1 Jaffa-Palestinian restaurant A (20 trees) H (restaurant) no AR AR no R no no V (smashed windows) V (slashed tires and cut cables on 12 army V) V (near Qabalan) no AR, S G MB; MG

6/7/2011 1 Al Mugheyyir (Ramallah) AR MB; MG G-"Price Tag", "Ali Ayin", "This is only the beginning" G- "Moh'd is a pig", "Moh'd is dead", "Revenge"and "Settlement 18" G-"Alei Ayin and Migron is social justice"

OR

Alei Ayin

032 6/28/2011 OR 033 9/5/2011 OR

Mitzpe Avihai, aka "Hill 18" Migron, Alei Ayin

034 035

9/7/2011 9/8/2011

OR OR

Migron Migron

036

9/9/2011

OR

Migron

037 9/11/2011 OR

Migron

G-"Ramat Migron" G-"Price Tag Migron" (on mosque) G-"Mohammad is a pig"; "Ramat Migron"; "revenge"; Jewish underground; "Price Tag" G-"Migron Forever, Death to the traitors," "Price Tag Migron", "Peace Now, the end is near"

038 9/12/2011 OR 039 10/6/2011 OT

Migron Givat Gal Yosef (near Shilo)

040 10/7/2011 unknown 041 10/25/2011 unknown 042 10/31/2011 unknown

n/a n/a n/a

G- "Price Tag", "Death to Arabs", "Kahane was Right" G- "Price Tag" on sign posted nearby G- "Price Tag", "Kahane was Right"

Peace Now petitions for outpost removal & High Court told govt to update its policy on outpost removal on 043 11/6/2011 private land) n/a 1 Jerusalem no H (office) G-"price tag"

Peace Now petitions for outpost removal & High Court told govt to update its policy on outpost removal on 044 11/8/2011 private land) related to Givat Assaf 045 11/9/2011 OT Givat Assaf 1 Jerusalem 1 Beit Omar 1 West Jerusalem--Mamiya Cem 1 Bruqin AR V (2) no no no H V (3), H G (in a Muslim cemetery) MB, MG

G-"Rabin is waiting for you"; "Hagit Ofran-Z'L [RIP]"; "price tag"; revenge for Givat Assaf G-"Price tag"; "there will be war over Givat Assaf" G-"Death to Arabs"; "Givat Assaf"; also graffiti on military monument in Bnei Brak--"Oslo criminal to justice"; "price tag" G-"Avi Arieli, the man" [reference to Shin Bet officer]

046 11/11/2011 OT

Givat Assaf

P (against SB head of Jewish Extremism Unit 047 12/7/2011 in WB) n/a

67
2 Road near Ramat Gilad; Jordan Valley R, S V Jerusalem, Duma, Yasuf, Haris, 5 Tapuah/Rachelim junction S, AR AR AR AR AR no no AR no S 1 Neve Shalom 1 Shuafat 1 Jab'a 114 no no AR V (5 in Beitin) V (arson) V 2 Burqa, Tapuah Junction Bani Na'im (Hebron), Beitin (Ramallah 2 govt) 1 Sharafat (E. Jer) 1 Deir Istiya 1 Al Janiya 2 Jerusalem 1 Nabi Elias 1 Jerusalem 1 Hebron V (graffiti), H V (14 cars), H V (7) H

OT/P- Barak announces OR at Ramat Gilad, Mitzpe Yitzhar; Jordan and other Arab countries protest closure of 048 12/12/2011 bridge near Al Aqsa

Ramat Gilad, Mitzpe Yitzhar

CG (Vandalism of Orthodox Church/St. John the Baptist) unknown

OT/P- Barak announces OR at Ramat Gilad, Mitzpe 049 12/13/2011 Yitzhar

Ramat Gilad/Yitzhar

Ephraim Military base, Qasr al Yahud S (at military base and 3 (Jordan River), Joseph's Tomb in Nablus at Pal vehicles) V (Israeli Army base)

no

050 12/14/2011 OT and P

Mitzpe Yitzhar

MG/MB (Jerusalem) MB, MG MG (Bani Na'im) MG G H (school & monastery) V (2) CG H, V H, V (slashed tires several cars)

051 12/15/2011 OR [2 structures]

Mitzpe Yitzhar

052 12/19/2011 OR 053 1/4/2012 unknown 054 1/11/2012 OR

Mitzpe Yitzhar n/a Gal Yosef Hill (Shilo)

G-"Mohammad is a pig"; "Mohammad is dead"; "Price Tag" all on Jerusalem mosque; "Camaraderie Mitzpe Yitzhar"-in Duma; pay the price; "friends of Yitzhar"--Yasuf; "price tag" --Haris G-"Mitzpe Yitzhar", "war" (on mosque); Nazi and "Price Tag" (on Israeli Army post) G-"Price tag", "Yitzhar", insults of prophet Moh'd, (mosque in Bani Na'im) G-"Price Tag", "revenge" G-Price Tag and Gal Arye Yossef G-"Death to Arabs, revenge, closed military zone, Muhammad is a pig, and outposts: Ramat Migron, Mitzpe Yitzhar, and Greetings from Gal Yosef G-"Price Tag","Death to Christians", "Greeks out", "Death to Arabs," and "Kahane was right". Called themselves The Maccabees of Migron. G-"Price Tag"

055

2/2/2012

OR

Gal Yosef Hill, Migron, Mitzpe Yitzhar

056 2/8/2012 OR 057 2/16/2012 unknown

n/a n/a

058 2/19/2012 unknown 059 4/5/2012 OR-eviction

n/a Hebron

060 6/8/2012 OT 061 6/11/2012 OT

Ulpana (Jabal Artis) Ulpana (Jabal Artis)

062 6/19/2012 OT

Ulpana (Jabal Artis)

CG (Baptist Narkis G-"Price Tag", "Jesus is a son of a whore", "Death to Street Congregation) Christianity", "We will crucify you" no G-"death to arabs, revenge, Kahana was right, regards from Havat Gilad, and Ulpana neighborhood." G-"Ulpana" G-"Ulpana War," "The war has begun," "You will pay the MB, MG price"

APPENDIX B: Overview Price Tag Attacks 2008-2012

1. 19 June 2008 This large-scale attack constitutes the first price tag attack. Following the demolition of a caravan near Yitzhar settlement by Israeli police, reports indicate that settlers from Yitzhar, Tappuah, as well as settlers bussed in from the outside, attacked the villages of Burin, Asira al Qabliya, Yasuf, Huwara, Jit and Urif by stoning cars and homes, setting fire to agricultural land, and shutting down local roads. ________________________________________ 2. 13 July 2008 Israeli army demolishes a caravan and storage container outpost near the settlement of Yitzhar. Settlers respond by setting fire to local agricultural land, assaulting farmers, and firing a rocket at the village of Burin. ________________________________________ 3. 23 July 2008 Israeli Civil Administration clears a bus/outpost at Adei Ad. Settlers from the Havat Gilat outpost respond by smashing cars and windows and cutting electricity wires in Burin, burning olive groves, closing a local road for four hours, and threatening an Israeli soldier with a knife. ________________________________________ 4. 25 September 2008 Hebrew University professor Zeev Sternhell, an outspoken critic of settlements, is injured after a pipe bomb explodes on the front porch of his home. Additionally, price tag graffiti is spray painted on the side of his house and pamphlets are left in his neighborhood signed by the Army of Liberation offering 1.1 million shekels (roughly $320,000) to anyone who kills a member of Peace Now, a leftwing Israeli group. ________________________________________ 5. 02 October 2008 Israeli government attempts to evacuate the outpost of Shvut Ami. Settlers respond by unleashing a dog on an Israeli company commander, breaking the hand of a deputy battalion commander, puncturing the tires of a reserve soldiers vehicle, burning olive groves near the village of Immatim, and blocking Palestinian traffic on a nearby roadway. The attacks were coordinated through text message. ________________________________________ 6. 26 October 2008 The IDF and Border Police remove the Federman Farm outpost south of the Kharsina settlement in Hebron. Settlers from the Al Rajabi outpost respond to the removal by slashing tires of 22 Palestinian cars and removing 20 grave stones from the nearby Al Ras cemetery. Settlers from the Kharsina settlement respond by tearing down approximately one kilometer of fence surrounding the settlement in an effort to reach a Palestinian home. Failing to reach the home, settlers attack the home by hurling rocks at it for a period of two hour. The attacks continue the following week. Seven Palestinians are injured by settler violence, including three journalists and a 95-year-old woman. Additionally, eight Israeli policemen are injured during outpost removal and seven settlers are arrested. The outposts are rebuilt. ________________________________________ 7. 01 December 2008 Civil Administration decision to evacuate settlers from the outposts of Beit HaShalomalso known as al-Rajabi Housein Hebron H2. Settlers respond by attacking the villages of Yatma, Qabalan and As-Sawiya with several days of violence including arson, attacks on civilians, vandalism, and defacing a mosque with graffiti offensive to the Prophet Mohammad. The house was eventually cleared on the December 4.

________________________________________ 8. 04 December 2008 Large scale attacks by settlers in Hebron including setting fire to a mosque, houses, cars, and agricultural land, attacks on civilians, and attacks on Israeli armed forces. There are additionally reports of settlers involved in stone-throwing, arson, and destruction in at least 12 other locations. Three Palestinians wounded by gunfire, 12 others injured, and 15 cars torched. ________________________________________ 9. 13 December 2008 The mosque in the Palestinian village of Turmusya is vandalized with graffiti. ________________________________________ 10. 01 June 2009 Settler cell phone alerts spread of a rumored demotion threat for the Ramat Gilad outpost near the Qarnei Shomron settlement. The Israeli army had recently dismantled the outposts of Nahalat Yosef and Shvut Ami. Settlers respond by blocking Road 55 near the Qedumim settlement, stoning and assaulting Palestinian drivers removing debris, setting fire to approximately 1,300 olive trees and 280 dunums of Palestinian crops between the Qedumim and Yitzhar settlements. Six Palestinians are injured. ________________________________________ 11. 20 July 2009 Israeli Civil Administration clears several structures at three outposts: Mizpe Danny near the Maale Michmash settlement, Novel Yarden, and Adel Ad near the Shilo settlement. Settlers respond with several days of attacks around and inside the Palestinian villages of Tell, Madama, Burin, Asira al-Qibliya and Jit by destroying between 1,000 1,500 olive trees, engaging in arson, vandalism, and personal assault against Palestinians, and blocking several road junctions. Two Palestinians injured and six vehicles damaged. ________________________________________ 12. 23 July 2009 Continuation of the July 20, 2009 attacks. Twenty settlers from an outpost near Yitzhar enter the Palestinian village of Asira al-Qibliya and throw stones at villagers. Israeli army protects settlers from villagers throwing stones. Palestinian boy injured. ________________________________________ 13. 09 September 2009 Israeli army removes a trailer from the Givat HaDegal outpost. Settlers from the nearby Susiya settlement respond by entering the Palestinian village of Suseya, throwing stones and physically assaulting villagers. Fifteen members of one family, including 10 children, are injured. The outpost was reconstructed that night. ________________________________________ 14. 11 October 2009 Israeli army dismantles the Mitzpe Ami outpost. Settlers from the outpost respond by entering the Palestinian village of Kfar Qaddum and burning 250 olive trees. Thirteen settlers were arrested for refusing to leave the outpost. ________________________________________ 15. 06 December 2009 The Israeli government announces a 10-month settlement construction freeze in late November. An ad in a settler newspaper promoting violence against Palestinians announces a meeting to be held in Yitzhar on December 6. On this day the nearby Palestinian village of Einabus is targeted for attack, during which two cars, a tractor, and two warehouses are set ablaze. ________________________________________ 16. 08 December 2009 Settlers puncture tires, vandalize cars, and spray paint price tag graffiti near the French Hill area of Jerusalem. The Israeli paper Ynet reports the violence is in response to the announced settlement construction freeze. ________________________________________

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17. 11 December 2009 Settlers, likely from the Yitzhar settlement, set fire to the Hasan Khadr Mosque in the Palestinian village of Yasuf and spray paint graffiti on the mosque floor reading Price Tag. Several settlers from the Yitzhar settlement are arrested in January 2010 as suspects. The violence is reportedly in response to the announced settlement construction freeze. ________________________________________ 18. 26 January 2010 Israeli forces demolish the Givat Menachem outpost. Settler youth respond by attacking the Palestinian village of Beit Ilu. Two Palestinians are injured. ________________________________________ 19. 14 April 2010 Settlers torch three Palestinian vehicles in the Palestinian village Huwwara near Nablus and spray graffiti on a mosque that include religious insults. An Israeli military official reported that the arson was likely a price tag attack in response to the partial settlement construction moratorium initiated in December 2009. ________________________________________ 20. 29 April 2010 Israel arrests several settlers from the Yitzhar settlement. Settlers from Yitzhar respond by vandalizing a park, attacking houses, and spray painting price tag graffiti in the Palestinian village of Huwara near Nablus. ________________________________________ 21. 23 June 2010 Israeli forces demolish two structures at Bat Ayin outpost. Later that day settlers respond by attempting to burn Palestinian agricultural land and throwing stones and bottles at homes in the Saffa neighborhood of the Palestinian village of Beit Ummar. ________________________________________ 22. 26 July 2010 Israeli authorities demolish two caravans and a goat pen in the Givat Ronen outpost. Approximately 100 settlers coordinate wide-spread attacks under banner of mutual responsibility, including arson and assault against the Palestinian village of Burin, and road closures and assaults on Palestinian motorists at 15 different junctions in the West Bank. Several major roadways are shut down for hours on end including Huwwara checkpoint--the principal point to Nablus city. One Burin villager is injured. ________________________________________ 23. 04 October 2010 Settlers from the Gush Etzion settlement enter the Palestine village of Al Fajjar/Beit Fajar set fire to the mosque, deface Qurans, and spray paint price tag graffiti on the walls of the mosque. Three settlers are arrested for this attack in November 2011. The attack is in response to the Israeli government negotiating a possible extension of the 10 month settlement construction freeze on new housing that had just expired. ________________________________________ 24. 14 October 2010 Two Palestinian vehicles are set on fire and spray painted with price tag graffiti in the Palestinian village of Qusra. ________________________________________ 25. 20 October 2010 Israel demolishes structures in the outposts of Bat Ayin and Mitzpe Eretz. Unknown settlers break into the girls school in the Palestinian village of As-Sawiya and set fire to and vandalize with graffiti a schoolroom/warehouse, Greetings from the Hills. ________________________________________ 26. 22 October 2010 Israeli Civil Administration action in the outpost of Shvut Ami. Settlers respond by spray painting graffiti on houses and the cemetery in the Palestinian village of Kafr Qaddum, Price Tag and Revenge.

________________________________________ 27. 26 January 2011 The Israeli Civil Administration issues demolition orders for several structures on the BatAyin/ Alei Avin outpost. Settlers from the Bat Ayin/Alei Avin outpost respond by setting fire to a Palestinian tractor and spray painting Price Tag Bat Ayin and Revenge for Arabs within the Palestinian village of Urif. ________________________________________ 28. 27 January 2011 Israeli Civil Administration hand out razing orders for several buildings in the outpost of Alei Avin. Unknown settlers respond by burning a car and spray painting price tag graffiti in the Palestinian village of Ein Abus, Eye for an Eye We Wont Forget and We Will Not Forget Alei Ayin. ________________________________________ 29. 15 February 2011 Israeli forces demolish Ramat Migron outpost. In response settlers attempt to set fire to a Palestinian vineyard and throw stones at Israeli security forces. Two settlers are detained. ________________________________________ 30. 28 February 2011 On February 28 Israeli authorities demolishes houses in the Havat Gilad outpost, which sparks immediate settler attacks on nearby Palestinian villages and a highly coordinated settler Day of Rage. In the evening of February 28/March 1, settlers threw Molotov cocktails at houses in Huwwara village setting one home on fire, rolled burning tires from Yitzhar settlement into the villages of Einabus and Burin, and smashed car windows in Hebron. In the following days there were at least three other attacks on Palestinian villages. On March 3, settlers carried out the Day of Rage in which they blocked major roadways in Jerusalem, closed down the entrance to Nablus and threw stones at passing cars. The demolished structures were rebuilt a week later and there were plans to build four more homes in defiance of the previous demolitions. ________________________________________ 31. 07 June 2011 Israel dismantles the Alei Ayin outpost near the settlement of Shilo. Settlers respond by setting fire a mosque in the Ramallah-area village of Al Mughayyir mosque and spray painting price tag graffiti, Price Tag Alei Ayin and This is only the beginning. ________________________________________ 32. 28 June 2011 The village of Beit Illu was targeted by graffiti espousing religious slurs Mohammed is a pig, Mohammed is dead as well as Revenge and Settlement 18. The latter is believed to be a reference to the outpost of Mitzpe Avichai, also known as Hill 18. ________________________________________ 33. 05 September 2011 Israeli Civil Administration demolishes homes in the Migron outpost and demolishes structures in the Alei Ayin outpost. Settlers respond by setting fire to a mosque in the Palestinian village of Qusra and spray painting price tag graffiti, Aley Ayin and Migron = Social Justice. ________________________________________ 34. 07 September 2011 Israeli Civil Administration demolishes three houses on the Migron outpost. Settlers respond by infiltrating the Israeli army base near Ramallah and slash the tires and cut the cables of 12 army vehicles. Six girls and one adult arrested for brawling to distract soldiers. Soldiers from the base are also arrested for aiding the attack. ________________________________________ 35. 08 September 2011 In a continuation of violence following the September 5 clearing of structures in Migron, Israel clears structures in the outpost of Migron. Settlers respond by

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attempting to vandalize the mosque in the Palestinian village of Yatma and burning cars near the Palestinian village of Qabalan as the settlers return home. ________________________________________ 36. 09 September 2011 Continuation of price tag violence related to the demolition of houses on the Migron outpost. Settlers respond by defacing a mosque near Ramallah and spray painting price tag graffiti onto the buildings of Birzeit University including, Price Tag and Mohammed is a Pig. ________________________________________ 37. 11 September 2011 Continuation of price tag violence related to the demolition of houses in the Migron outpost. Settlers respond by spray painting price tag graffiti onto the house of a Peace Now left-wing activist in Jerusalem, Death to the Traitors and Price Tag Migron. ________________________________________ 38. 12 September 2011 Settlers set fire to two cars and spray paint price tag graffiti, Revenge on Arabs, onto the side of a house in the Palestinian village of Burqa, near the Migron outpost. This attack is believed to be a continuation of the price tag violence related to the demolition of houses at the Migron outpost. ________________________________________ 39. 06 October 2011 After settlers spotted the Israeli army erecting roadblocks along the main road from Jerusalem to Nablus, a rumor was sparked that the Givat Gal Yosef outpost near the Shiloh settlement was about to be evacuated. Within minutes settlers respond by blocking the road to the outpost with vehicles and a series of rock barricades and surrounding an Israeli army vehicle, punching one of the soldiers in the vehicle, which then leads to a free-for-all fight between soldiers and settlers. No settlers are arrested. ________________________________________ 40. 07 October 2011 Unknown settlers desecrate two cemeteries one Christian and one Muslim in Jaffa with price tag graffiti, Price Tag, Death to Arabs, and Kahane was Right. Shin Bet official comments that is seems settlers no longer need an Israeli government trigger to initiate attacks. No motives are known for the violence. ________________________________________ 41. 25 October 2011 Unknown settlers uproot 20 olive trees and spray paint price tag graffiti, Price Tag, in the Palestinian village of Beit Safafa. Trigger unknown. ________________________________________ 42. 31 October 2011 Unknown individuals set fire to a Palestinian restaurant in Jaffa and spray paint price tag graffiti, Price Tag and Kahane was Right. Trigger unknown. ________________________________________ 43. 06 November 2011 On November 1, PM Netanyahu is supposed to submit an update to the High Court on its plans to evacuate outposts built on Palestinian land. Instead, the government asks for a delay and is given a week. Several days later and two days before the next update is due to be submitted to the court, the Jerusalem offices or Peace Now, which provide legal representation for most of the Palestinian land owners involved in the High Court case, are evacuated after a bomb threat and Price Tag graffiti spray painted on the building. ________________________________________ 44. 08 November 2011 On November 8, the government asks the High Court for another delay in submitting its plans to evacuate illegal outposts built on Palestinian land. That day death threats and graffiti are spray painted on the Jerusalem home of a Peace Now Settlement Watch official, Price Tag, Rabin is Waiting for You, Revenge for Givat Assaf, and

Hagit Ofran zl (the Hebrew acronym for, Rest in Peace). ________________________________________ 45. 09 November 2011 Presumably in response to the governments required submission to the High Court on its plan to implement evacuation orders for several outposts including Givat Assaf, settlers set fire to three cars and spray paint price tag graffiti on a house in the Palestinian village of Beit Ummar, Price Tage and There Will be War Over Givat Asaf. ________________________________________ 46. 11 November 2011 In response to the High Courts previous decision and the governments plan to dismantle outposts built on private Palestinian land, settlers respond by spray painting Death to Arabs and Givat Asaf on gravestones in the historic Muslim cemetery of Mamilla in West Jerusalem and spray painting Oslo Criminals to Justice and Price Tag on a monument for Israeli soldiers in the Israeli town of Bnei Brak. ________________________________________ 47. 07 December 2011 Settlers set fire to two vehicles and throw a burning tire into the mosque in the Palestinian village of Salfit and spray paint price tag graffiti on the wall, Avi Arieli, The Man, in reference to Avigdor Arieli, the Shin Bet officer in charge of the investigation of Jewish Extremism in the West Bank. ________________________________________ 48. 12 December 2011 Israeli Defense Minister, Ehud Barak orders the eviction of the Mitzpe Yizhar and Ramat Gilad outposts. Prime Minister Netanyahu suspends the eviction of Ramat Gilad. It is reported that 150 Hilltop Youth arrive at Mitzpe Yitzhar on the December 12 to defend the outpost, although in the end no outposts were cleared. Settlers from the Yitzhar settlement subsequently raid a nearby Palestinian village, throwing stones at the residents homes and reportedly trying to set buildings on fire. On the same day settlers attacked an Israeli military base and Israeli soldiers and breached the security barrier between Israel and Jordan and occupied a church in the area to protest Jordan policy on Mughrabi Gate in Jerusalem. ________________________________________ 49. 13 December 2011 The Ramat Gilad outpost is scheduled to be evicted. In response, approximately 50 settlers and right wing activists attack an Israeli army base near Tulkarm, commit arson and throw stones and paint at soldiers. One settler is arrested. Another 300 settlers from Ramat Gilad and Karnei Shomron, throw stones at Palestinian drivers and hurt an Israeli Army officer near the Ramat Gilad outpost. ________________________________________ 50. 14 December 2011 Unusual movement by Israeli army convoy triggers fears of an upcoming dismantling of the Mitzpe Yitzhar outpost. In response settlers set fire to and spray paint price tag graffiti on the wall of a Jerusalem mosque, including Price Tag, Mohammed is a Pig, and Mohammed is Dead. Settler additionally set two trucks and a car on fire and price tag graffiti is spray painted in the Palestinian village of Duma, reading Camaraderie Mitzpe Yitzhar. In Yasuf, settlers set two cars on fire, and Haris another vehicle is burned. Price tag graffiti spray painted in Yasuf reads Pay the Price and Friends of Yitzhar. Price tag graffiti spray painted in Haris reads Price Tag. Additionally, settlers throw Stones at Palestinian vehicles passing through the Tapuah (Zatara) and Rechalim Junctions. One settler is arrested. ________________________________________ 51. 15 December 2011 Israeli military demolish two housing units on the Mitzpe Yitzhar outpost. Settlers respond by setting fire to a mosque in the Palestinian village of Burqa

70

and spray painting price tag graffiti, reading Mitzpe Yitzhar and War. Settlers spray paint price tag graffiti on an Israeli army post in Tapuah Junction, reading Nazi and Price Tag. One settler arrested. ________________________________________ 52. 19 December 2011 Settlers spray paint price tag graffiti on a mosque in the Palestinian village of Bani Naim, reading Price tag, Yitzhar, and insults of Mohammad, and burn vehicles in the Palestinian village of Beitin. ________________________________________ 53. 04 January 2012 Settlers set fire to two vehicles in the Sharafat village of East Jerusalem and spray paint price tag graffiti, reading Price Tag and Revenge. ________________________________________ 54. 11 January 2012 On January 8, the Israeli authorities clear structures in the outposts of Givat Arye and Gal Yosef Hill, including four structures that had been erected that week and a tent. Settlers respond by setting fire to three cars and spray painting price tag graffiti onto a mosque in the Palestinian village of Deir Istiya, reading Price Tag Gal Yosef. ________________________________________ 55. 02 February 2012 Settlers attack the Palestinian village of Al-Janiya, vandalizing a taxi and building, and spray paint price tag graffiti reading Death to Arabs, Revenge, Closed Military Zone, Muhammad is a Pig, Ramat Migron, Mitzpe Yitzhar, and Gal Yosef. Attacks in responds to the Mitzpe Yitzhar, Migron, and Gal Yosef Hill demolitions. ________________________________________ 56. 08 February 2012 Bilingual Arabic-Hebrew school is spray painted with price tag graffiti, reading Death to Arabs and Kahane was Right. Additionally, a Greek Monastery is spray painted with price tag graffiti, reading Death to Christians, Price Tag, and Maccabees of Migron. ________________________________________ 57. 16 February 2012 Settlers set fire to a car and spray paint price tag graffiti on a house in the Palestinian village of Nabi Elias, reading Price Tag. One person is arrested, then released and given four days of house arrest. ________________________________________ 58. 19 February 2012 Settlers slash the tires of several cars parked in the church compound of the Baptist Narkis Street Congregation Church in Jerusalem and spray paint graffiti on the walls of the church, Price Tag, Jesus Son of Mary the Whore, We Will Crucify You, and Death to Christians. ________________________________________ 59. 05 April 2012 Israel evicts settlers from downtown Hebron. Settlers respond by throwing stones in the old city of Hebron and setting fire to chairs in the Tel Romeida protest tent. Prior to the eviction settlers attack Palestinian farmers working land in the Palestinian village of Bani Naem. ________________________________________ 60. 08 June 2012 In light of the ordered evacuation of the Ulpana outpost, settlers respond by slashing the tires of 14 vehicles and spray painting price tag graffiti on cars and a school in Neve Shalom (a cooperation village between Palestinians and Israelis), reading Death to Arabs, Revenge, Kahana was Right, Regards from Havat Gilad, and Ulpana Neighborhood. ________________________________________ 61. 11 June 2012 Settlers vandalize seven cars and spray paint price tag graffiti in the Palestinian neighborhood of Shuafat near Jerusalem, reading simply Ulpana. ________________________________________ 62. 19 June 2012 In light of the ordered evacuation of the

Ulpana outpost, settlers respond by setting fire to the mosque and spray painting price tag graffiti on its walls in the Palestinian village of Jaba, reading The War has Begun and You will Pay the Price. ________________________________________ For references, see page 72.

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Gvirtz, Amos. Don't Say we Didn't Know. Gush-Shalom.org. June 6, 2008. http://zope.gushshalom.org/home/en/channels/archive/1208009105; Human Rights Report 360. International Women's Peace Service. June 19, 2008. http://iwps.info/?page_id=1025; Israeli Settlers Attack and Burn Agricultural Lands of Four Villages South of Nablus. Palestine Video. June 21, 2008. http://palestinevideo.blogspot.com/2008/06/youtube.html; IWPS: Settlers attack Asira al Qabiliya and Burin. International Solidarity Movement. June 19, 2008. http://palsolidarity.org/2008/06/iwps-settlers-attack-asira-alqabiliya-and-burin/ 2 Associated Press. Settler Arrested in Failed Rocket Attack on Palestinian Town. Associated Press. July 13, 2008.; Protection of Civilians Weekly Report: 9-15 July 2008. UN OCHA oPt. July 15, 2008. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/Weekly_Briefing_Notes_268.pdf 3 Associated Press and Yuval Azoulay. Settler Holds Knife to IDF Soldier's Throat in West Bank Riot. Haaretz, July, 24, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/news/settler-holds-knife-to-idf-soldier-s-throat-in-west-bank-riot-1.250335; Protection of Civilians Weekly Report - 270: 23-29 July 2008. UN OCHA oPt. July 29, 2008. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_protection_of_civilians_weekly_report_270_2008_07_29_english.pdf 4 Brinkley, Joel. Israeli Extremists Spread Violent Mayhem. SFGate.com, December 25, 2011, http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Israeli-extremists-spread-violent-mayhem-2424252.php; Kershner, Isabel. Radical Settlers Take On Israel. New York Times, September 25, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/26/world/middleeast/26settlers.html?_r=4&oref=slogin&ref=middleeast&pagewa nted=all; Weiss, Efrat. Jerusalem: Professor Ze'ev Sternhell Lightly Wounded by Pipe Bomb. Ynetnews.com, September 25, 2008, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3601841,00.html 5 Israeli Settler Violence and the Evacuation of Outposts. UN OCHA oPt. November 2009. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_settler_violence_fact_sheet_2009_11_15_english.pdf ; Protection of Civilians Weekly Report - 280: 1-7 October 2008. UN OCHA oPt. October 7, 2008. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_protection_of_civilians_weekly_2008_10_07_english.pdf; Shragai, Nadav and Haaretz Correspondent. After Outpost Evacuation, Settler Youth Say Don't Mess with Us. Haaretz, October 3, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/after-outpost-evacuation-settler-youth-say-don-t-messwith-us-1.254907 6 7 Dec. 08: Security Forces Stand idly by During Settler Rioting in Hebron. BTselem.org. June 4, 2009. http://www.btselem.org/settler_violence/20090604_settler_violence_following_evacuation_of_outposts ; Protection of Civilians Weekly Report - 283: 22-28 October 2008. UN OCHA oPt. October 28, 2008. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_protection_of_civilians_weekly_2008_10_28_english.pdf; Protection of Civilians Weekly Report - 284: 29 October 04 November 2008. UN OCHA oPt. November 8, 2008. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_protection_of_civilians_weekly_2008_11_08_english.pdf; Wilder, David. An Appetite to Destroy. Israel Resource Review. October 26, 2008, http://israelbehindthenews.com/bin/content.cgi?ID=3234&q=1 7 Israeli Settlers Rampage Through West Bank Villages, Vandalize Mosques. MaanNews.net. December 2, 2008. http://maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=206699; Protection of Civilians Weekly Report - 288: 26 November 02 December 2008. UN OCHA oPt. December 04, 2008. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20Final_POC.pdf 8 Israeli Settler Violence and the Evacuation of Outposts. UN OCHA oPt. November 2009. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_settler_violence_fact_sheet_2009_11_15_english.pdf ; Protection of Civilians Weekly Report - 289: 03-16 December 2008. UN OCHA oPt. December 16, 2008. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_protection_of_civilians_weekly_2008_12_16_english.pdf 9 Protection of Civilians Weekly Report - 289: 03-16 December 2008. UN OCHA oPt. December 16, 2008. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_protection_of_civilians_weekly_2008_12_16_english.pdf 10 Ben Gedalyahu, Tzvi. Police Deploy for New Demolition; Rock Throwers Attack Arabs. Arutz Sheba 7, June 1, 2009, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/131643#.T_BE05HueSp ; Israeli Settler Violence and the Evacuation of Outposts. UN OCHA oPt. November 2009. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_settler_violence_fact_sheet_2009_11_15_english.pdf; Weiss, Efrat. Illegal Outpost Shvut Ami Evacuated. Ynetnews.com, May 31, 2009, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3723625,00.html 11 Israeli Settler Violence and the Evacuation of Outposts. UN OCHA oPt. November 2009. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_settler_violence_fact_sheet_2009_11_15_english.pdf; Pfeffer, Anshel and Jack Khoury. Following the Evacuation of Outposts: Settlers Set Fire to Fields of Palestinians. Haaretz (translated from the Hebrew edition using Google Translate), July 20, 2009,

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http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=iw&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.haaretz.co.il%2Fhasite%2Fsp ages%2F1101545.html 12 Israeli Settler Violence and the Evacuation of Outposts. UN OCHA oPt. November 2009. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_settler_violence_fact_sheet_2009_11_15_english.pdf 13 Israeli Settler Violence and the Evacuation of Outposts. UN OCHA oPt. November 2009. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_settler_violence_fact_sheet_2009_11_15_english.pdf; The Price of Justice: Settler Violence Against Palestinians. AAPER.org. Accessed June 30, 2012. http://www.aaper.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=quIXL8MPJpE&b=5492573&content_id={ED57D3E8A491-4B8C-832E-716AAD9028AB}&notoc=1 14 Israeli Settlers Burn Fields After Illegal Outpost Dismantled. CNN.com. October 11, 2009. http://articles.cnn.com/2009-10-11/world/israel.settlers_1_illegal-outpost-west-bank-settlers?_s=PM:WORLD; Protection of Civilians: 7-13 January 2009. UN OCHA oPt. October 13, 2009. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_protection_of_civilians_weekly_report_2009_10_13_english.pdf 15 Document: Settlers Prep to Terrorize West Bank. Coteret.com. December 7, 2009. http://coteret.com/2009/12/06/primary-document-settlers-prep-to-terrorize-west-bank/; Karmi, Omar. West Bank Settlers Block Freeze-Order Officials. The National, December 8, 2009, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/west-bank-settlers-block-freeze-order-officials; Settlers Torch Palestinian Property, Uproot Trees. MaanNews.net. July 12, 2009. http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=244578 16 Israeli Settlers Arrested in Mosque Arson Investigation. BBC.co.uk. January 18, 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8465006.stm; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Occupied Palestinian Territories (UN OCHA oPt). OCHA: Settler Violence Since 2007. Unpublished OCHA Database, 2011.; Waked, Ali. Settlers Suspected of Torching Palestinian Mosque. Ynetnews.com, December 12, 2009, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3818465,00.html; Weiss, Efrat. J'lem: Tires Slashed in Protest of Freeze. Ynetnews.com, December 8, 2009, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L3816797,00.html 17 Israeli Settlers Arrested in Mosque Arson Investigation. BBC.co.uk. January 18, 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8465006.stm; Protection of Civilians: 9-15 December 2009. UN OCHA oPt. December 17, 2009. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_protection_of_civilians_weekly_report_2009_12_17_english.pdf; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Occupied Palestinian Territories (UN OCHA oPt). OCHA: Settler Violence Since 2007. Unpublished OCHA Database, 2011.; Waked, Ali. Settlers Suspected of Torching Palestinian Mosque. Ynetnews.com, December 11, 2009, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3818465,00.html 18 Levinson, Chaim. Settlers Attack Palestinians to Avenge West Bank Outpost Demolition. Haaretz, January 27, 2010, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/settlers-attack-palestinians-to-avenge-west-bank-outpostdemolition-1.262160; Protection of Civilians: 20-26 January 2010. UN OCHA oPt. January 28, 2010. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_protection_of_civilians_2010_01_28_english.pdf 19 Israel: Extend Settlement Freeze. Human Rights Watch. September 26, 2010. http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/09/26/israel-extend-settlement-freeze; Levinson, Chaim. Mosque Vandalized as Settlers Attack Palestinian Village. Haaretz, April 14, 2010, http://www.haaretz.com/news/mosque-vandalized-assettlers-attack-palestinian-village-1.284247; Protection of Civilians: 14-20 April 2010. UN OCHA oPt. April 22, 2010. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_protection_of_civilians_2010_04_22_english.pdf; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Occupied Palestinian Territories (UN OCHA oPt). OCHA: Settler Violence Since 2007. Unpublished OCHA Database, 2011. 20 Protection of Civilians: 28 April-4 May 2010. UN OCHA oPt. May 6, 2010. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_protection_of_civilians_2010_05_06_english.pdf; Settlers Attack Palestinian Village to Protest Police Crackdown. Haaretz. April 29, 2010. http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/settlers-attack-palestinian-village-to-protest-police-crackdown-1.287409; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Occupied Palestinian Territories (UN OCHA oPt). OCHA: Settler Violence Since 2007. Unpublished OCHA Database, 2011. 21 Ben-Yaakov, Naama. Authorities Destroy 2 Homes in Bat Ayin. Indy News Israel, June 23, 2010, http://www.indynewsisrael.com/authorities-destroy-2-homes-in-bat-ayin; Settlers Attack Saffa in Price Tag Campaign. PalestineSolidarityProject.org. June 24, 2010. http://palestinesolidarityproject.org/2010/06/24/settlersattack-saffa-in-price-tag-campaign/

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Magnezi, Aviel. Settlers Block Roads, Clash with Police. Ynetnews.com, July 26, 2010, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3925522,00.html; Magnezi, Aviel. West Bank Demolitions Prompt Riots, Arrests, 'Price Tag' Missions. Ynetnews.com, July 26, 2010, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L3925135,00.html; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Occupied Palestinian Territories (UN OCHA oPt). OCHA: Settler Violence Since 2007. Unpublished OCHA Database, 2011. 23 Bronner, Ethan. Arsonists Damage a Mosque in the West Bank. New York Times, October 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/05/world/middleeast/05mideast.html?_r=1 ; Franzen, Carl. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak: Mosque-Burners Are 'Terrorists'. aolnews.com, October 4, 2010, http://www.aolnews.com/2010/10/04/israeli-defence-minister-ehud-barak-mosque-burners-are-terrori/; Issacharoff, Avi and DPA. Palestinian Mosque Torched in Suspected 'Price Tag' Operation by Settlers. Haaretz, October 4, 2010, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/palestinian-mosque-torched-in-suspected-price-tagoperation-by-settlers-1.317090; Korans Burnt in West Bank Mosque Attack. Reuters. October 4, 2010. http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/04/us-palestinians-israel-mosque-idUSTRE6933BG20101004; Lazaroff, Tovah, Yaakov Lappin, and Yaakov Katz. Palestinians Blame 'Hilltop Youth' for School Arson. Jerusalem Post, October 10, 2010, http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=192192; Levinson, Chaim. Israel Police Scrambles to Stop Mosque Arsonists from Striking Again. Haaretz, December 14, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/printedition/news/israel-police-scrambles-to-stop-mosque-arsonists-from-striking-again-1.401261; Settlers Blamed for Mosque Blaze. Al Jazeera.com. October 4, 2010. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/10/201010481935553584.html; The Price Tag Policy A Surge in Settler Violence against Palestinians. Al -Haq.org. June 11, 2011. http://www.alhaq.org/advocacy/topics/settlements-and-settler-violence/406-the-price-tag-policy-a-surge-in-settlerviolence-against-palestinians 24 3 Nov. 2010, Serious Suspicion that Settlers Torched Two Vehicles in the Village of Qusra, in the Northern West Bank. BTselem.org. November 3, 2010. http://www.btselem.org/settler_violence/20101103_settlers_torch_vehicles_in_qusra_14_oct_2010 25 Operation Price Tag. Rabbis for Human Rights. October 25, 2010. http://www.rhr-na.org/blog/?p=106; Palestinians: Settlers Vandalize School Near Nablus. JPost.com. October 20, 2010. http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=192098; Protection of Civilians: 20-26 October 2010. UN OCHA oPt. October 29, 2010. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_protection_of_civilians_2010_10_29_english.pdf 26 Operation Price Tag. Rabbis for Human Rights. October 25, 2010. http://www.rhr-na.org/blog/?p=106; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Occupied Palestinian Territories (UN OCHA oPt). OCHA: Settler Violence Since 2007. Unpublished OCHA Database, 2011. 27 Altman, Yair. Palestinians Accuse Settlers of Torching Vehicle. Ynetnews.com, January 27, 2011. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4019900,00.html; Friedman, Lara. Price Tag Escalation Timeline: Jan 1, 2011 Present. Peacenow.org. February 20, 2012. http://peacenow.org/entries/price_tag_timeline#.UAB2D5HfKSp 28 Altman, Yair. Palestinians Accuse Settlers of Torching Vehicle. Ynetnews.com, January 27, 2011. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4019900,00.html; Friedman, Lara. Price Tag Escalation Timeline: Jan 1, 2011 Present. Peacenow.org. February 20, 2012. http://peacenow.org/entries/price_tag_timeline#.UAB55ZHfKSp ; The Price Tag Policy A Surge in Settler Violence against Palestinians. Al-Haq.org. June 11, 2011. http://www.alhaq.org/advocacy/topics/settlements-andsettler-violence/406-the-price-tag-policy-a-surge-in-settler-violence-against-palestinians 29 Altman, Yair. Army Razes Illegal Settler Outpost. Ynetnews.com, February, 15 2011. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4029234,00.html; Friedman, Lara. Price Tag Escalation Timeline: Jan 1, 2011 Present. Peacenow.org. February 20, 2012. http://peacenow.org/entries/price_tag_timeline#.UAB6_5HfKSq 30 3 March 2011: B'Tselem to Authorities: Deploy to Protect Palestinians from Expected Settler Violence. BTseleml.org. March 2, 2011. http://www.btselem.org/settler_violence/20110302_defend_palestinian_civilians_from_settler_violence; Altman, Yair. Price tag: Palestinian cars vandalized in Hebron. Ynetnews.com, March 1, 2011, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4035962,00.html; Altman, Yair. Day of rage: Rightists block Jerusalem-TA highway. Ynetnews.com, March 3, 2011, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L4037094,00.html; Efraim, Omri and Yair Altman. Clashes in J'lem, West Bank Follow Havat Gilad Razing. Ynetnews.com, February 28, 2011, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4035747,00.html; Havat Gilad

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Rebuilds Destroyed Homes. Arutz Sheba 7. March 8, 2011. http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/Flash.aspx/205688.#.UAFMQZHfKSp; Jaradat, Ahmad. Israeli Settler Violence Report: March and April 2011. Alternative Information Center, June 12, 2011, http://www.alternativenews.org/english/index.php/component/content/article/2-hebron/3656-israeli-settler-violencereport-march-and-april-2011; Levinson, Chaim, Nir Hasson, and Haaretz Service. Rightists Launch Day of Rage Over West Bank Outpost Demolition. Haaretz, March 3, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/rightistslaunch-day-of-rage-over-west-bank-outpost-demolition-1.346849; Protection of Civilians: 2-15 March 2011. UN OCHA oPt. March 18, 2011. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_protection_of_civilians_weekly_report_2011_03_18_english.pdf; Sherwood, Harriet. Israeli Settlers Hit Back After Army Demolishes Their West Bank Homes. The Guardian, March 1, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/01/israeli-settlement-west-bank-demolished 31 Altman, Yair. Mosque Torched Near Ramallah. Ynetnews.com, June 7, 2011, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4079369,00.html; The Price Tag Policy A Surge in Settler Violence against Palestinians. Al-Haq.org. June 11, 2011. http://www.alhaq.org/advocacy/topics/settlements-and-settlerviolence/406-the-price-tag-policy-a-surge-in-settler-violence-against-palestinians 32 Altman, Yair. Mohammed is Dead Sprayed on Home. Ynetnews.com, June 28, 2011, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4088476,00.html; Protection of Civilians: 22-28 June 2011. UN OCHA oPt. July 1, 2011. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_protection_of_civilians_weekly_report_2011_07_01_english.pdf 5 Sept. '11: Suspected Price Tag Attack in Qusra Following Demolition of Houses in Migron Outpost. BTseleml.org. September 5, 2011. http://www.btselem.org/violence-settlers/5-sept-2011-suspected-price-tagattack-qusra-following-demolition-of-houses-migron; Friedman, Lara. Price Tag Escalation Timeline: Jan 1, 2011 Present. Peacenow.org. February 20, 2012. http://peacenow.org/entries/price_tag_timeline#.UAFUTpHfKSq; Levinson, Chaim and Avi Issacharoff. Settlers Set Fire to West Bank Mosque After Israel Demolishes Illegal Structures in Migron. Haaretz, September 5, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/settlers-setfire-to-west-bank-mosque-after-israel-demolishes-illegal-structures-in-migron-1.382617 34 Friedman, Lara. Price Tag Escalation Timeline: Jan 1, 2011 Present. Peacenow.org. February 20, 2012. http://peacenow.org/entries/price_tag_timeline#.UAB2D5HfKSp ; Levinson, Chaim. Israel Police Scrambles to Stop Mosque Arsonists from Striking Again. Haaretz, December 14, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/printedition/news/israel-police-scrambles-to-stop-mosque-arsonists-from-striking-again-1.401261; Pfeffer, Anshel and Chaim Levinson. Israeli Settlers Vandalize IDF Base in First Price Tag Act Against Army. Haaretz, September 7, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israeli-settlers-vandalize-idf-base-in-first-price-tag-actagainst-army-1.383068 35 Friedman, Lara. Price Tag Escalation Timeline: Jan 1, 2011 Present. Peacenow.org. February 20, 2012. http://peacenow.org/entries/price_tag_timeline#.UAFr-pHfKSp; High Price Tag in the Mosque of the Village. Rabbis for Human Rights. September 13, 2011. http://rhr.org.il/eng/index.php/2011/09/high-price-tag-in-themosque-of-the-village-yatma/; Lazaroff, Tovah and Yaakov Lappin. Price-Tag Vandals Target Second Mosque This Week. JPost.com, September 9, 2011, http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?id=237276 36 Friedman, Lara. Price Tag Escalation Timeline: Jan 1, 2011 Present. Peacenow.org. February 20, 2012. http://peacenow.org/entries/price_tag_timeline#.UAB2D5HfKSp ; Lappin, Yaakov. US Condemns Price-Tag Attacks on W. Bank Mosques. JPost.com, September 10, 2011, http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?id=237391; Protection of Civilians Weekly Report: 7-13 September 2011. UN OCHA oPt. September 16, 20 11. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_protection_of_civilians_weekly_report_2011_09_16_english.pdf; Suspicion: Price Tag Graffiti in Birzeit University. Ynetnews.com. September 9, 2011. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4120126,00.html 37 Altman, Yair. Price Tag: Peace Now Activist's Entryway Vandalized. Ynetnews.com, September 12, 2011, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4121138,00.html; Friedman, Lara. Price Tag Escalation Timeline: Jan 1, 2011 Present. Peacenow.org. February 20, 2012. http://peacenow.org/entries/price_tag_timeline#.UAB2D5HfKSp; Roseenberg, Oz and Ofir Bar-Zohar. Jerusalem Police Arrest Suspect in Price Tag Attacks on Peace Now Offices. Haaretz, November 9, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/jerusalem-police-arrest-suspect-in-price-tag-attacks-on-peace-now-offices1.394598
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Altman, Yair. Price Tag: Peace Now Activist's Entryway Vandalized. Ynetnews.com, September 12, 2011, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4121138,00.html 39 International Christian Embassy Jerusalem News (ICEJ News). Palestinians Clash with Settlers in West Bank. ICEJ News. October 7, 2011. http://int.icej.org/news/headlines/palestinians-clash-settlers-west-bank; Levinson, Chaim and Anshel Pfeffer. Settlers Surround, Assault IDF Troops During West Bank Patrol. Haaretz, October 7, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/settlers-surround-assault-idf-troops-during-west-bank-patrol1.388614; Ronen, Gil. Police, IDF Destroy Jewish Outpost, Access Denied. Arutz Sheba 7, October 5, 2011, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/148525#.UAF7E5HfKSp 40 Friedman, Lara. Price Tag Escalation Timeline: Jan 1, 2011 Present. Peacenow.org. February 20, 2012. http://peacenow.org/entries/price_tag_timeline#.UAF9cpHfKSp; Haarets, Barak Ravid, Avi Issacharoff, and Chaim Levinson. Palestinians Clash with Settlers in West Bank Muslim, Christian Graves in Jaffa Defaced with Racist Slogans in Suspected Price Tag Attack. Haaretz, October 8, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacydefense/muslim-christian-graves-in-jaffa-defaced-with-racist-slogans-in-suspected-price-tag-attack-1.388822 41 Altman, Yair. Price Tag: 20 Olive Trees Cut Down in J'lem. Ynetnews.com, October 27, 2011, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4140492,00.html; Rosenberg, Oz. Suspected Right-Wing Extremists Uproot 20 Olive Trees Belonging to Jerusalem Arab Family. Haaretz, October 27, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/suspected-right-wing-extremists-uproot-20-olive-trees-belongingto-jerusalem-arab-family-1.392341 Khoury, Jack. Vandals Set Fire to Arab Restaurant in Jaffa in Suspected Price Tag Attack. Haaretz, October 31, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/vandals-set-fire-to-arab-restaurant-in-jaffa-in-suspected-price-tagattack-1.392931 43 Friedman, Lara. Price Tag Escalation Timeline: Jan 1, 2011 Present. Peacenow.org. February 20, 2012. http://peacenow.org/entries/price_tag_timeline#.UAGEVJHfKSp; Rosenberg, Oz. Jerusalem Offices of Peace Now Evacuated After Bomb Threat. Haaretz, November 6, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/jerusalem-offices-of-peace-now-evacuated-after-bomb-threat-1.394063; Suspected Price Tag Attack on Peace Now Offices in J'lem. JPost.com. November 6, 2011. http://www.jpost.com/Headlines/Article.aspx?id=244597 44 Altman, Yair. Rabin is Waiting for You Spra y-Painted on Leftist's Building. Ynetnews.com, November 8, 2011, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4145329,00.html; Friedman, Lara. Price Tag Escalation Timeline: Jan 1, 2011 Present. Peacenow.org. February 20, 2012. http://peacenow.org/entries/price_tag_timeline#.UAGHjpHfKSp 45 Associated Press Foreign. Israel Police: New Attack on Palestinian Property. The Guardian, November 9, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9938290; Friedman, Lara. Price Tag Escalation Timeline: Jan 1, 2011 Present. Peacenow.org. February 20, 2012. http://peacenow.org/entries/price_tag_timeline#.UAGJZZHfKSp ; Naylor, Hugh. Israel Postpones Demolition of Outpost on Palestinian Land. The National, November 11, 2011. http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middleeast/israel-postpones-demolition-of-outpost-on-palestinian-land 46 Friedman, Lara. Price Tag Escalation Timeline: Jan 1, 2011 Present. Peacenow.org. February 20, 2012. http://peacenow.org/entries/price_tag_timeline#.UAGMPJHfKSq; Rosenberg, Oz. Death to Arabs Scrawled Across Muslim Gravestones in Jerusalem. Haaretz, November 10, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/death-to-arabs-scrawled-across-muslim-gravestones-in-jerusalem-1.394804 47 29 Dec. '11: Settler Violence Against Palestinians and Palestinian Property, December 2011. BTseleml.org. December 29, 2011. http://www.btselem.org/settler_violence/20111229_settler_violence_in_dec_2012; Levinson, Chaim. West Bank Mosque Set Alight in Suspected Price Tag Attack. Haaretz, December 7, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/west-bank-mosque-set-alight-in-suspected-price-tag-attack1.400129; Silverstein, Richard. New Price Tag Mosque Burning Exposes Identity of Shin Bets Jewish Anti -Terror Chief. RichardSilverstein.com, December 7, 2011, http://www.richardsilverstein.com/tikun_olam/2011/12/07/new-price-tag-mosque-burning-exposes-identity-of-shinbet-jewish-anti-terror-chief/ 48 Friedman, Lara. Price Tag Escalation Timeline: Jan 1, 2011 Present. Peacenow.org. February 20, 2012. http://peacenow.org/entries/price_tag_timeline#.UAB2D5HfKSp ; Lazaroff, Tovah. IDF Clears Activists from Border; 17 Arrested. JPost.com. December 13, 2011. http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=249200 ; Lazaroff, Tovah and Yaakov Katz. Right Wing Extremists Attack IDF Base in West Bank. JPost.com. December 14, 2011.
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http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?id=249345; Levinson, Chaim. Fears of Outpost Demolition Trigger Spurt of West Bank Violence. Haaretz, December 14, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacydefense/fears-of-outpost-demolition-trigger-spurt-of-west-bank-violence-1.401354; Palestinians: Settlers Riot in Village Near Yitzhar. Ynetnews.com, December 12, 2011, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L4160248,00.html;Settlers Breach Closed Israeli Military Zone Near Jordan. Orthodoxy Cognate Page. December 18, 2011. http://theorthodoxchurch.info/blog/news/2011/12/settlers-breach-closed-israeli-military-zone-near-jordan/ 49 Altman, Yair. Settlers Raid IDF Base, Injure Commander. Ynetnews.com, December 13, 2011, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4160823,00.html; Bronner, Ethan. Settlers Riot, Attacking Israeli Base and Post. New York Times, December 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/world/middleeast/radical-jewish-settlers-clash-with-israeli-troops.html?_r=1; Lazaroff, Tovah and Yaakov Katz. Right -Wing Extremists Attack IDF Base in West Bank. JPost.com, December 14, 2011, http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?id=249345; Pfeffer, Anshel. Dozens of Rightists Break into IDF Base in West Bank, Wound Officer. Haaretz, December 13, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/dozens-of-rightists-break-into-idf-base-in-west-bank-wound-officer1.401138 50 Arson, Price Tag Suspected at J'lem Mosque. JPost.com. December 14, 2011. http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=249365 ; Levinson, Chaim. Fears of Outpost Demolition Trigger Spurt of West Bank Violence. Haaretz, December 14, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/fears-of-outpost-demolition-trigger-spurt-of-west-bank-violence1.401354; Rosenberg, Oz and Nir Hasson. Jerusalem Mosque Set Alight in Suspected Price Tag Attack. Haaretz, December 14, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/jerusalem-mosque-set-alight-in-suspectedprice-tag-attack-1.401330 51 Associated Press. Palestinians: West Bank Mosque Torched, Defaced by Hebrew Graffiti. Haaretz, December 15, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/palestinians-west-bank-mosque-torched-defaced-byhebrew-graffiti-1.401557 52 Price Tag Slogans Painted on Hebron Mosque. MaanNews.net. December 19, 2011. http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=446385 ; Vandals Insult Muhammad in Price-Tag Attack. JPost.com. December 19, 2011. http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=250087 53 Altman, Yair. 2 Arab-Owned Vehicles Torched in Jerusalem. Ynetnews.com, January 4, 2012, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4171013,00.html; Palestinians Warn of New Measures Against Israel if Talks Fail. The Telegraph. January 3, 2012. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/palestinianauthority/8989906/Palestinians-warn-of-newmeasures-against-Israel-if-talks-fail.html; Rosenberg, Oz. Israel Police Suspect Rightist Extremists Set Fire to Palestinian Car Wash. Haaretz, January 5, 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israel-police-suspectrightist-extremists-set-fire-to-palestinian-car-wash-1.405513 54 Bannoura, Saed. Settlers Protest Removal of Illegal Outpost. International Middle East Media Center, January 10, 2012, http://www.imemc.org/article/62802; Lappin, Yaakov. Vandals Deface Mosque, Spray Price Tag Graffiti. JPost.com, January 11, 2012, http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?ID=253119&R=R1; Palestinian Cars, Mosque Vandalized in Another Price Tag Settler Terror Attack in Pictures. occupiedpalestine.wordpress.com. January 11, 2012. http://occupiedpalestine.wordpress.com/2012/01/11/palestinian-cars-mosque-vandalized-in-another-price-tagsettler-terror-attack-in-pictures/ 55 Lappin, Yaakov. Police Investigating New W. Bank Price Tag Attack. JPost.com, February 6, 2012, http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=256622&R=R9&utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medi um=twitter&utm_campaign=DTN+Israel; Price Tag Attack in Al-Jenia; Rabbis to Plant Trees in Spiritual Solidarity. February 6, 2012, Video clip. Accessed July 15, 2012. YouTube, www.Youtube.com. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XwmBbqK83BQ 56 Lidman, Melanie. Price Tag Vandals Attack J'lem Monastery, School. JPost.com. February 7, 2012, http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?id=256790 ; Lidman, Melanie. Peace Now Office Site of Latest Extremist Attack. JPost.com. February 9, 2012, http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?id=257189 57 Car, Residence Vandalized in Price Tag Attack. JPost.com. February 16, 2012. http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?ID=258056&R=R1 ; Nabi Elias Car Arson Suspect Released. Arutz Sheba 7. February 19, 2012. http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/Flash.aspx/232521#.UAKUYZHfKSp 58 Lewis, Ori and Jeffrey Heller. Vandals Scrawl Graffiti on Jerusalem Baptist Church. Reuters, February 20, 2012, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/02/20/uk-israel-church-vandals-idUKTRE81J0D920120220; Lidman,

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Melanie. Latest Price Tag Attack Against J'lem Church. JPost.com, February 20, 2012, http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?id=258625 59 Price Tag Actions Follow Israeli Eviction of Hebron Settlers. Alternative Information Center. April 5, 2011. http://www.alternativenews.org/english/index.php/component/content/article/2-hebron/4280-price-tag-actionsfollow-israeli-eviction-of-hebron-settlers60 Ben Zion, Ilan. Police Chief Says Neve Shalom Vandalism is Especially Severe. The Times of Israel, June 8, 2012, http://www.timesofisrael.com/police-chief-says-neve-shalom-vandalism-is-especially-severe/; Efraim, Omri. Jerusalem: Palestinian Cars Vandalized. Ynetnews.com, June 11, 2012, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4240745,00.html; Lidman, Melanie. Price Tag Vandals Attack Jewish-Arab Village. JPost.com, June 8, 2012, http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?id=273165 61 Efraim, Omri. Jerusalem: Palestinian Cars Vandalized. Ynetnews.com, June 11, 2012, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4240745,00.html 62 Hewari, Said, Ismail Khader, and Diana Abdallah. Settlers Suspected in West Bank Mosque Vandalism. Reuters, June 19, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/19/us-palestinians-israel-violenceidUSBRE85I09W20120619; Levinson, Chaim and Gili Cohen. Mosque in West Bank Village Set Alight in Suspected Price Tag Attack. Haaretz, June 19, 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/mosquein-west-bank-village-set-alight-in-suspected-price-tag-attack-1.437267

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APPENDIX C: Map of Price Tag Attacks in the Northern West Bank (Source: Al-Haq 2012)

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