Emergency Operating Centre Response to Media Blame Assignation: A Case Study of an Emergent EOC

Henry W. Fischer, III and Valerie J. Harr

Millersville University, Pennsylvania, USA
The Event While Friday, 26 April 1991, began as a normal day for the 4,047 residents of Andover, Kansas, it would end with the unexpected deaths of 13 residents, with injury to 175, and with 840 individuals losing their homes. At approximately 6.39 p.m., the Golden Spur Mobile Home Park was destroyed by a large, powerful tornado. The destruction was so massive that the Andover site was certified a federal disaster area. By 6.00 p.m., a tornado watch had become a warning. Local radio and television stations broadcast this warning for the Wichita/Andover area. Some residents were not home from work, others had gone out for dinner, many, however, were at home. While 200-300 residents had heard the warning and evacuated to an underground shelter in the centre of the park, such warnings are so common in this tornado prone area, that many residents essentially ignore them. Such warnings have usually resulted in no danger to the listener. Many people, however, had no idea that a tornado was approaching their community, as they were not even listening to a radio or television. Furthermore, the neighbourhood civil defence siren which was supposed to sound the warning, apparently did not work when it was activated. And, when a local police officer tried to give one last warning to the park residents by driving through the park sounding his siren just minutes before impact, many residents did not remember, or know, that such police action is a warning to take shelter. Research Focus A three-person field team from Millersville University of Pennsylvania (USA) sought to assess the extent to which media reporting, particularly blame assignation, affected the subsequent disaster response decisions of the emergency operating centre (EOC) personnel. Andover did not have a disaster
This research was supported by a Quick Response Grant from the Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, The University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, USA. Special thanks to Susan Schaeffer Ross and Marna L. Trowbridge who served as valuable research assistants in the field.

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Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 3 No. 3, 1994, pp. 7-17. MCB University Press, 0965-3562

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co-ordinator; their disaster response organization constituted what Dynes and Quarantelli[1] characterize as an emergent organization. The research literature has established the role the media plays in enhancing mitigation against death and injury by warning the public of an impending disaster and in disseminating helpful recovery information (for example, see[2] for a discussion of the radio as a warning source, and[3]). This literature does not address the role of the media in influencing the behind-the- scenes EOC decision-making process. We wanted to examine the norms and roles which directed this EOC disaster response, i.e. to what extent did they develop new, emergent roles as a way to cope with the disaster versus revert-to-normal time roles which they perceive to be appropriate to the task at hand. The Data Gathering Process Participant Observers The field team was on-site within 48 hours of impact and remained in the field for four days, functioning primarily as participant observers in the temporary EOC. The team informally interviewed the EOC personnel, e.g. the mayor who served as the emergency response co-ordinator, a county commissioner, city councilmen, various city workers, police personnel, and so forth. We also observed and interviewed print and broadcast media personnel who were working on news stories of the event and volunteer organization personnel, e.g. the Mennonite Disaster Services. Most of our interviews became conversations which helped us to piece together the decisions made by the different emergency organizations. We completed a total of 32 interviews while in the field. The field team sought to gain an understanding of what the EOC was attempting to coordinate and how they prioritized their actions pursuant to meeting the needs and desires of their various constituencies, e.g. victims, volunteers, city workers, and the larger public. We were free to enter and leave the EOC as we wished. We observed virtually all EOC meetings during the four days of our field work and completed informal, one-on-one interviews, during non-busy periods. The principal EOC personnel were very candid about their situation, i.e. the problems they were facing in trying to co-ordinate a response, their perceived failures, their irritation at the media and so forth. They were very frank during their EOC meetings in discussing the details of how they should respond to the media and various community constituencies. The completeness of our entre became readily apparent to us during our second and third days in the field when they were openly discussing how they should react to the medias blame-fixing local officials were coming under increasing criticism in the broadcast and print media for allegedly not adequately warning the Golden Spur residents. Content Analysis The field team obtained copies of the local newspapers published during the first month of the post-impact and recovery periods in order to determine the types of stories and the slant of the stories being published about the EOCs

disaster response. While in the field, the team also videotaped news broadcasts Emergency of two of the five local television stations for the same purpose. Operating Centre Did Media Reporting Influence EOC Decisions? What We Found on Our Arrival The field team found a hastily constructed EOC located in an empty store front in a small strip-mall adjacent to the destroyed mobile home park. The community did not have a written disaster plan. Since there was no full or parttime local emergency co-ordinator, the mayor began to function as the coordinator during the immediate post-impact period. Various other local elected officials emerged to function as a committee of advisers to assist the mayor. Community, church and volunteer organizations converged to assist the elected officials in co-ordinating the clean-up. The EOC contained a conference table which could seat approximately 15 people. A writing board was mounted on a wall on which information was written as it became available, e.g., problems needing attention, names and phone numbers of key personnel, the mayors next scheduled press conference. A typewriter, telephones, and eventually a television and a photo-copying machine were installed. Almost everything in the EOC, including the store it was housed in, were donated by local businesses during the first hours after impact. EOC security was maintained by the local police department which numbered five uniformed officers. Within 36 hours of impact, a security badge system was in place. No one was allowed into the EOC area without a security badge. A communications bus was positioned directly in front of the store (EOC location). A Red Cross canteen was located in the parking lot near the communications bus. Various additional volunteer organizations, e.g. Ham Radio Operators Club, were working out of empty stores or vehicles in the mall parking lot. The National Guard was on-site to provide security for the mobile home park. They were called to Andover to prevent looting and to assist in traffic control. There was a problem with converging sightseers clogging the roads. Search and rescue activities were slowed due to this convergence. Residents who were not at home during impact, as well as the relatives of victims or survivors, found it difficult to reach the site. Volunteers who were trying to assist sorting the debris for valuables were also hindered by the convergence. The trucks carrying the removed debris had a difficult time getting to and from the site. Emergent Issues Reported in the Media: Debris Clearance When we arrived, we found the EOC personnel divided and heatedly debating when debris clearance should begin (some debris had been immediately removed from several streets in the park to facilitate search and rescue operations). There were those who wanted to allow the city engineer, his crew, and the crews donated by area businesses, to initiate debris clearance immediately. They argued that the businesses which had donated the crews and

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equipment would not be able to do without them indefinitely, especially if they were idle. A second reason, provided by the owner of the park, was that the victims would not be able to obtain, install and move into new mobile homes until the park was cleared. Hence, the park owner and debris clearance personnel lobbied the EOC to keep the survivors out of the park so that their work could be completed immediately. Those opposing immediate action argued that the survivors needed more time to locate their valuables, e.g., family photos and mementos. These EOC officials, who made frequent visits to the park to speak to the survivors, would return to relate the citizens pleas for a couple more days to find their irreplaceable keepsakes. Some reporters publicized the survivors plight, to the consternation of those who wanted to complete the clean-up imediately. Most local print and broadcast media focused on reporting the extent of damage, the death and injuries, the sources of help for victims, the types of aid needed, where to send it and the locations for volunteers to meet to help victims. One local television reporter and one local newspaper reporter focused on blame-fixing (blame assignation occurs more commonly after technological disasters, but has been known to occur after natural disasters such as tornadoes[4]). These two reporters repeatedly interviewed victims who were very vocal about their frustration with the citys initial decision not to allow them to return to their damaged or destroyed homes and with the citys initial announcement that debris clearance would begin immediately. The slant of the news stories of these reporters essentially portrayed the EOC as being inconsiderate of the needs of those they were supposed to serve. The blamefixing reporters argued that they were doing the victims a service by taking up their cause which did, in fact, result in delaying the citys debris clearance and provided the victims with more time to search for their valuables. The media-EOC conflict consumed a great deal of the EOC personnels time as they continually discussed, debated and then planned how to respond to the mounting criticism whenever it appeared in the media. The EOC was, of course, attempting to co-ordinate the communitys response to the disaster; at the same time decisions were delayed as a result of the time devoted to their response to the medias blame assignation. We estimated that at least 20 per cent of their time was directed to what they perceived as media damage control. The debate over when to complete the debris clearance continued throughout our four days in the field. Deadlines for victims to finish their salvage efforts were set daily, then pushed back as a result of complaints by the victims and the medias portrayal of such complaints. The clearance was finally set to begin the day the field team was leaving town. The Mennonite Disaster Services (MDS) also contributed to the continual EOC mind changing. Early each morning, the MDS would send a large crew to the park to sift through the debris for victims who were not present. The MDS operated separately from the EOC and resisted virtually all efforts to bring them within the co-ordination sphere of the EOC. The MDS essentially ignored any decision by the EOC when it would indicate that search activities

would be discontinued to begin clearing the park. Between the medias criticism Emergency and the MDSs ignoring of EOC decisions, it became impossible to begin Operating Centre clearing the park. EOC personnel realized any strong arm tactics to stop the Response MDS would only further exacerbate the EOCs emerging public relations problem. The field team concluded that it was obvious that the medias involvement 11 had a definite impact on the decision making of the EOC personnel. It influenced how the EOC utilized its time. It also influenced the EOCs decision as to when to begin the final phase of the debris clearance. Virtually every EOC decision increasingly became hostage to the desire to limit media damage, as the need to consider how the media might perceive (or misperceive) their actions was of increasingly greater concern to them with each negative press story. Warnings We also discovered, shortly after arriving, that the EOC personnel were bristling at the emerging media reports which suggested that the city did not adequately warn park residents about the tornados impending impact. Even though there was a difference of opinion over when to initiate debris clearance, there was total unanimity in resenting those who sought to criticize their preimpact efforts. All of the EOC personnel had had very little sleep since impact. They felt that they had been totally devoted to doing the best job they could in co-ordinating the communitys disaster response. In private conversations with the research team, some EOC personnel suggested that maybe everything they had done may not have been perfect, but we are only human...had no prior experience, no written (disaster) plan, no prior training, and are doing the best we can making this up as we go along. They indicated that they were in frequent contact with a neighbouring community that had recently experienced an emergency event and had taken steps to be better prepared should they be a target of a disaster again. The Andover EOC personnel were using their neighbouring communitys emergency co-ordinator as a consultant in developing their own emergent response. The first criticism was of the police departments attempt to warn the residents by sending a patrol car through the park neighbourhoods sounding its siren. The city stated that this procedure is standard operating procedure during a tornado warning, a procedure that the community had previously been taught, through public information announcements. They felt the citizens should have known what the siren meant. From the citys perspective, they risked the life of an officer to give the warning just minutes before impact. From the point of view of those who criticized the police, it was a meaningless effort. In the view of one survivor,why not at least use a bull horn to warn those who were walking on the street? To us a siren means theyre after the bad guys. The EOC decided to release a video tape they had of the police officers effort. The Andover police had recently mounted a video camera on each cruiser in order to provide evidence for drunk driving offences and to protect the police officer from false charges of police brutality. By chance, the officer who sounded

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the alarm in the park, had inadvertently activated the camera. The EOC decided to call a press conference in order to play the video tape for the press as a strategy for reducing the criticism. Many in the media saw it differently, however, recoiling when they watched the police officer drive past a resident who was walking her dog apparently unaware or unconcerned about the impending disaster. They thought the officer should have stopped to inform the resident of what the siren meant and tell her to seek shelter. It was seen as quite possible that she could have had time to get to the shelter if he had stopped. It is also quite possible that (a) she would have decided not to go to the shelter, (b) she may not have had enough time anyway, and/or (c) the police officer may have run out of time to save himself ... and died. A second criticism raged around the question as to whether or not the community (civil defence) siren was actually activated during the pre-impact period. Many residents were quoted in the press as stating that they had not heard a siren, some said they had. An examination of the siren reportedly found it to be non-functional. EOC personnel had indicated that it had recently been found to be in good working order. The firm that had been employed to maintain the siren was quoted as indicating that the siren had recently been repaired with used parts as a cost-saving favour to the city. While the EOC was busy responding to post-impact needs, it was also devoting an ever-increasing amount of time trying to respond to the medias investigation into the sirens status and to attempt to limit the media-driven illwill emerging within the community. To counter the increasing negative feelings, the EOC decided to hold another press conference at which they would answer questions and release information which, they felt, would refute the perception that the city had been irresponsible. The strategy did not appear to work, however, as a feeding frenzy ensued. The field team concluded that it was obvious that the medias reporting had an impact on the actions taken by the EOC in response to each of the three issues which emerged during the immediate post-impact period. Increasingly larger segments of EOC meetings were devoted to developing strategies for countering the blame assignation. The EOC personnel were almost entirely comprised of elected and appointed officials, who had no prior disaster training or experience. As we moved further away from impact towards the recovery phase, these personnel increasingly retreated to the familiar political roles of normal time. Altruism was still very evident, however, normal time role prescriptions emerged to guide their response. Content of Medias Reporting While the EOC felt stung by the medias blame assignation, we found the print and broadcast reporting to have been quite supportive of their efforts. Table I contains the results of our content analysis of print and broadcast news reports on the disaster. Please note that in the case of both the print and broadcast media the ratio of negative reporting was less than one in ten. Most television news stories (91 per cent) were either positive or neutral in reporting on disaster

events and most newspaper accounts (93 per cent) were also either neutral or Emergency supportive of the efforts of the EOC. Most of the reporting dealt with damage Operating Centre estimates, death and injury, human interest stories about survivors, and so Response forth. The media was a real asset as the primary or only source of disaster information for the community (as observed, for example, by Wenger[5] while 13 Wengers focus was quite different, the point is applicable here). Only two reporters focused on blame-fixing. While most of the reporting was supportive of the EOC effort, some EOC personnel became increasingly antagonistic towards anyone from the offending television station or newspaper. They also became increasingly distrustful of the media generally. It must be noted, that while the Wichita area has five television stations and a cable news channel, the field team was able to obtain video tapes of television news broadcasts only while we were in the field. Furthermore, these taped broadcasts came from only two of the television stations. It is possible that the broadcasts of the other stations were substantively different from those we recorded. Our field interviews, however, did suggest that the broadcasts we recorded included the only blame-fixing taking place. Does the Literature Help Explain the Andover EOC Response? Researchers have long argued that disaster warnings must be conceptualized as a social process (see, for example, [6-11]). The initial response to a disaster warning is disbelief[11-14]. If the disaster event was unexpected, e.g. the case of a rapid onset disaster agent such as a tornado, and if the level of emergency preparedness is low, most people tend to continue in their normal routine when first warned of an impending disaster, as they disbelieve the warning whether it comes from an authority or not[3,15]. If the warning message appears to the listener as vague, their tendency to disbelieve it is increased[8,11,15,16]. Several variables appear to increase the likelihood of a warning being taken seriously and appropriately acted upon. These variables include the clarity of the warning message, i.e. specificity of the nature of the hazard and what the listener is directed to do in response to it[17]; the consistency of the warning message with other warning messages, i.e. media, weather services, local authorities, family members seem to all be giving the same message[8,11,16,18];

Media form (per cent) Reporting Broadcast Supportive/Neutral Critical 91 9 100 (120) (12) (132) Print 93 7 100 (141) (10) (151) Table I. Type of Reporting

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the frequency of the warnings[7,11,12,15,19,20]; the type of authority who is giving the message, e.g. the media is believed more than the police or fire personnel, yet the police/fire personnel are believed more than friends or family [7,11,12,21]; the accuracy of past warnings, i.e. if they accurately forecast the disaster agents direction and impact[8,11,22,23]; and the frequency of the disaster agent, e.g. if tornadoes frequently strike the area[11,24]. During the pre-impact period, an attempt was made to warn the residents of Andover of the impending tornados impact. First, the community officials attempted to activate the civil-defence siren system. It apparently failed to operate in the normal fashion. Even if it had, it should be noted that Hodler[25] studied the response of the residents of a community to a tornado warning and found that less than half of the affected residents who heard the sirens warning sought a location of safety, even though they were tested briefly on the first Saturday of each month. Dependence on a siren system to move the population to respond effectively to the warning of an impending impact is thereby rendered suspect as an effective means of warning the population. The community utilized two additional media to warn the residents. First, radio and television stations broadcast a tornado watch, then a warning for the Wichita-Andover area. Because a tornado is a rapid-onset disaster agent, it is difficult to expect the warning to provide sufficient time for the total population to complete the social process of digesting, confirming, and acting upon the warning prior to impact. As noted above, the media has previously been seen to be the most believed source of disaster warning information and Wenger et al.[26] found that most citizens tend to obtain their information about disasters from the media. Furthermore, not all residents are listening to a radio or television when such warnings are given. This appeared to be the case for many Andover residents. And, there remain the issues of clarity, consistency, frequency, previous accuracy and frequency of tornadoes in the area. The broadcast messages were clear to the extent that they indicated the nature of the threat, a tornado, and the response the listener was directed to follow: seek appropriate shelter. As is the nature of the state of the art of tornado forecasting, the path of the tornado and subsequent impact area is vague enough to enable many listeners to assume that they will not be the actual target. Previous experience, even in an area prone to tornadoes, tends to reinforce this perception of the validity of the warning to many listeners. And, the opportunity to broadcast frequent warnings is reduced by the rapid-onset nature of a tornado, unlike the slow-onset generated opportunities a hurricane provides for giving frequent warnings. The police departments attempt to warn the area was initiated when it became apparent that the city was in the direct path of the tornado. The literature, as noted, has observed the tendency for those who even hear the warning to disregard it, unless the message is very clear, frequently given, resulting in a consistent message over time, which is not undermined by previous experience where the warnings appeared, to the listener, to be unnecessary. In the Andover experience, the community is one which is

generally exposed to the threat of tornadoes, the appropriate authorities were Emergency sounding the alarm (media and police personnel), and the message was clear. Operating Centre We can account for the response of at least 388, and perhaps as many as 488, Response of the park residents. Between 200 and 300 residents heeded the warning and went to the shelter in the park. They were safe. Thirteen people died and 175 were injured. Presumably these 188 individuals either did not hear the warnings 15 or did not heed them. We do not know the location of the remaining residents, between 512 and 612 individuals. Most, if not all, were apparently not at home at the time. Some of them heeded the warning and left for safer locations out of the area, many had not yet returned from work, others had gone out for the evening. Apparently, few who stayed in their mobile homes walked away unharmed. Hence, it appears that more than half of the residents that we can account for, did respond to the warning. This is better than Hodlers[25] observation. It appears that the citizens of Andover responded in a very typical fashion. It also appears that the response of the relevant community organizations, e.g. the media and local government, was very typical in their attempts to warn the residents. Using civil-defence sirens, media warnings and police warnings are not unusual ways to attempt to alert the citizenry and move them to act on behalf of their own safety. If the Andover experience is not atypical of the research literature, then why did we observe the media blame assignation process? Drabek[27] notes that searches for the guilty do follow some disaster events. Chandessais[4] discovered that citizens do sometimes use the town administration as the scapegoat during the aftermath of a tornado. Singer[28], similarly, observed a tendency to direct blame toward civic officials. Wolensky and Miller[29] noted the generalized belief that formal authorities in local government were [seen as] unresponsive to the needs of specific citizens ... there existed a gap between what was expected and what was delivered. In response to this, certain constituencies felt unprotected and forced to mobilize. Drabek and Quarantelli[30] suggest that such blame assignation may help give the illusion that corrective action of some sort is being taken. While blame assignation is more likely to occur in conjunction with a technological disaster than with one that is caused naturally[30], the scapegoating experienced by the EOC officials during the post-impact period was not unprecedented. Normal Time Role Found to Guide Response to Blame Assignation Why, then, did the EOC personnel respond to the blame assignation by diverting many of their precious hours from disaster response needs to political damage control strategies? As an untrained EOC team, in a community lacking a written disaster plan and professional emergency response personnel, these public servants were continually searching for roles to guide their behaviour. They established an emergent EOC and responded very altruistically and showed repeated examples of altruism throughout the post-impact period as they tried to help their community. In time, they sought a familiar compass to guide them as they responded to every new crisis, including the blame-fixing

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crisis. As their normal time behaviour was often guided by the role behaviour of politician, it was perhaps inevitable that they would fall back upon what they knew during the normal time as a guide through this unknown disaster experience during the latter post-impact and early recovery stages. They increasingly viewed the medias blame-fixing much the way they would view media criticism of their policies during normal time ... and, responded accordingly, i.e. following the perceived appropriate role behaviour. Concluding Observations Under what circumstances is a community likely to become more effective in responding to such disaster events? A trained emergency response professional knows that a written disaster plan, an ongoing community education programme, disaster training seminars and disaster drills, an affordable EOC, mutual assistance agreements, and the development of a relationship with the media (during normal time) contribute to enhancing the communitys emergency response when disaster does impact upon the community. Communities that find resources to facilitate the above, should be better able also to effectively respond to blame assignation, i.e. adjust when the blame is justified and neutralize the process when the blame is not justified. Instead of following the role behaviour of the politician, we are describing the role behaviour of the professional emergency response co-ordinator.
References 1. Dynes, R.R. and Quarantelli, E.L., Organizational Communications and Decision Making in Crises, The Disaster Research Center, The University of Delaware, Newark, DE, 1977. 2. Drabek, T.E. and Stephensen, II, J.S., When Disaster Strikes, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 1 No. 2, 1971, pp. 187-203. 3. Quarantelli, E.L., Evacuation Behavior and Problems: Findings and Implications from the Research Literature, The Disaster Research Center, The University of Delaware, Newark, DE, 1980. 4. Chandessais, C.A., La Catastrophe de Feyzin (The Feyzin Catastrophe), Centre dEtudes Psychosociologiques des Sinistres et de Leur Prevention, Paris, 1966; in Drabek, T.E., Human System Responses to Disaster, Springer-Verlag, New York, NY, 1986. 5. Wenger, D.E., A Few Empirical Observations Concerning the Relationship Between the Mass Media and Disaster Knowledge, Disasters and the Mass Media: Proceedings of the Committee on Disasters and the Mass Media Workshop , February 1979, Committee on Disasters and the Mass Media, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, WA, 1980, pp. 241-53. 6. Williams, H.B., Communications in Community Disasters, Dissertation, The University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, 1956. 7. Mileti, D.S., Natural Hazard Warning Systems in the United States: A Research Assessment, The Institute of Behavioral Science, The University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, 1975. 8. Mileti, D.S., Drabek, T.E. and Haas, J.E., Human Systems in Extreme Environments, The Institute of Behavioral Science, The University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, 1975. 9. Janis, I.L. and Mann, L., Emergency Decision Making: A Theoretical Analysis of Responses to Disaster Warnings, Journal of Human Stress, Vol. 3, June 1977, pp. 35-48.

10. Perry, R.W., Comprehensive Emergency Management: Evacuating Threatened Populations, JAI Press, Greenwich, CI, 1985. 11. Drabek, T.E., Human System Responses to Disaster, Springer-Verlag, New York, NY, 1986. 12. Drabek, T.E., Social Processes in Disaster: Family Evacuation, Social Problems, Vol. 16, Winter 1969, pp. 336-49. 13. Moore, H.E., Bates, F.L., Layman, M. and Parenton, V., Before the Wind: A Study of Response to Hurricane Carla, National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council Disaster Study No. 19, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, WA, 1963. 14. Fritz, C.E. and Mathewson, J.H., Convergence Behavior in Disasters, National Research Council Disaster Study No. 9, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, WA, 1957. 15. Perry, R.W., Lindell, M. and Greene, M., Evacuation Planning in Emergency Management, Lexington Books, Lexington, MA, 1981. 16. Fritz, C.E., Disasters Compared in Six American Communities, Human Organization, Vol. 16, Summer 1957, pp. 6-9. 17. Perry, R.W., Lindell, M. and Greene, M., Crisis Communications: Ethnic Differentials in Interpreting and Acting on Disaster Warnings, Social Behavior and Personality, Vol. 10 No. 1, 1982, pp. 97-104. 18. Demerath, N., Some General Propositions: An Interpretive Summary, Human Organization, Vol. 16, Summer 1957, pp. 28-9. 19. Fritz, C.E., Disasters, in Merton, R.K. and Nisbet, R.A. (Eds), Contemporary Social Problems, Harcourt, New York, NY, 1961, pp. 651-94. 20. Drabek, T.E. and Boggs, K., Families in Disaster: Reactions and Relatives, Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 30, August 1968, pp. 443-51. 21. Perry, R.W. and Greene, M., Citizen Response to Volcanic Eruptions: The Case of Mount St. Helens, Irvington Publishers, New York, NY, 1983. 22. Haas, J.E., Cochrane, H. and Eddy, D., The Consequences of Large-Scale Evacuation Following Disaster: The Darwin Australia Cyclone Disaster of December 25, 1974, Natural Hazards Research Working Paper No. 27, The Institute of Behavioral Science, The University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, 1976. 23. Foster, H.D., Disaster Planning: The Preservation of Life and Property, Springer-Verlag, New York, NY, 1980. 24. Anderson, W.A., Disaster Warning and Communication Processes in Two Communities, The Journal of Communication, Vol. 19, June 1969, pp. 92-104. 25. Hodler, T.W., Residents Preparedness and Response to the Kalamazoo Tornado, Disaster, Vol. 6 No. 1, 1982, pp. 44-9. 26. Wenger, D.E., James, T. and Faupel, C., Disaster Beliefs and Emergency Planning, The Disaster Research Center, The University of Delaware, Newark, DE, 1980. 27. Drabek, T.E., Disaster in Aisle 13, College of Administrative Science, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, 1968. 28. Singer, T.J., An Introduction to Disaster: Some Considerations of a Psychological Nature, Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, Vol. 53, March 1982, pp. 245-50. 29. Wolensky, R. and Miller, E., The Everyday versus the Disaster Role of Local Officials Citizen and Official Definitions, Urban Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 14 No. 4, 1981, pp. 483-504. 30. Drabek, T.E. and Quarantelli, E.L., Scapegoats, Villains, and Disasters, Transaction, Vol. 4, March 1967, pp. 12-17.

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