NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

PERONIST BELIEFS AND INTERVENTIONIST POLICIES

Rafael Di Tella
Juan Dubra
Working Paper 16621
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16621
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
December 2010
We thank Esteban Aranda for suggestions and exceptional research assistance and Andres Velasco
for introducing us to Acario Cotapos. We also thank Juan Carlos Torre, Torcuato Di Tella, Lucas Llach,
Juan Carlos de Pablo as well as participants at the Argentine Exceptionalism seminar in Cambridge
2009, for helpful comments and discussions. For support, Di Tella thanks the Canadian Institute for
Advance Research. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
2010 by Rafael Di Tella and Juan Dubra. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including notice,
is given to the source.
Peronist Beliefs and Interventionist Policies
Rafael Di Tella and Juan Dubra
NBER Working Paper No. 16621
December 2010
JEL No. D64,J42,L40
ABSTRACT
We study the logic of Peronist interventionist polices and the beliefs that support them. Instead of
a comprehensive approach, we focus on three elements. First, we study beliefs and values about the
economic system present in Perons speeches during the period 1943-55. Second, we study survey
data for the 1990s on the beliefs of Peronist and Non Peronist voters in Argentina and Democrat and
Republican voters in the US. While income and education suggest that Peronists (in relative terms)
look like the American Democrats, their beliefs and values suggest that Peronists are the Argentine
equivalent of the Republicans. Third, given that these beliefs are non-standard (for economists) we
present a model formalizing some of their key aspects (for example, the idea that there is something
more than a material exchange in labor relations).
Rafael Di Tella
Harvard Business School
Soldiers Field Rd
Boston, MA 02163
and CIFAR
and also NBER
rditella@hbs.edu
Juan Dubra
Universidad de Montevideo
Montevideo, Uruguay
dubraj@um.edu.uy
2

I. Introduction
Inaseminalstudy,DiazAlejandro(1970)blamedArgentinasrelativedeclinetothelowratesofcapital
accumulationwhichfollowedthereplacementoftheexportoriented,marketfriendlypoliciesby
populist,interventionistpoliciesaroundthetimeofthegreatdepression(seealsoTaylor,1994).Inthis
account,broadly,Argentinasrelativedeclineduringthe20
th
centurycanbeattributedtothe
prevalenceofpopulistpoliciessuppliedbyleaderswhooftenexploitamassofuneducated,poorvoters.
PeronandhisfollowersplayaprominentroleinsuchnarrativesofArgentinasexceptional
underperformance.Therearevariationsinthisbasicaccount.Forexample,itisoftenclaimedthat
policymaking,evenduringrelativelycentristadministrations,wascomplicatedenormouslybythe
presenceofapopulistpartydemandinggovernmentintervention.Andthatpoliticalinstabilityarising
fromattemptsatsuppressingthePeronists,particularlysincethe1960sanduntilthe1980s,hasbeen
responsibleforthelowlevelsofprivateinvestmentandweakoveralleconomicperformanceofthe
country.Inotherwords,inthisaccounttheproblemhasbeenArgentinaspopulisttraditionwhichhas
fueledbadpoliciesandpoliticalinstability.
Atroublingaspectofthisaccount,however,isthatitdoesnotexplainwhyvotersfindpopulistpolicies
appealing.Asstated,thisnarrativesoonhastoconcludethatdemocracyisnotareasonablewayto
electthecountrysleaders.Paradoxically,itshouldsomehowalsoquestionthebenefitsofmarkets.
Indeed,humansinthisaccountmusthavesometypeofdualtypeofrationality:ontheonehandthey
areabletomakereasonableuseofinformationsothatmarketsareinfactquiteefficient,butonthe
otherhandtheyareunabletoseethattheleaderstheyelectarebadforthem.Rationalityinthis
accountofdemocraticcapitalismisabitliketheCheshirecatofAliceinWonderland:nowyouseeit,
nowyoudont.Inbrief,whileitisclearthatpopulistpoliciesplayabigroleinArgentineexceptionalism
byinterferingwithcapitalaccumulation,itislessclearinthisnarrativeiswhatthelogicofpopulist
policiesandwhatexplainstheirpopularity.Ourstudyisconcernedwiththesequestions.
EconomistshavenotmadesignificantprogressinunderstandingLatinAmericanpopulismbecausethey
tendtofindtheinterestgrouptheoryofpolicyquitecompelling.Inthestandardaccount,badpolicies
areputinplacebyspecialinterestsandvoterswouldgetridofthemifonlytheycaredtovote.
Interestingly,however,votersdovoteinlargenumbers,sotheempiricalappealoftheinterestgroup
theoryofpolicyformation,atleastinitssimplestform,islow.Amorepromisingapproachacceptsthat
populistpoliciesareinfactappealingto(atleastsomegroupof)votersandtriestoexplainthisappeal
withinarationalmodel(bywhichwemeanamodelwhereagentstrytodothebesttheypossiblycan,
giventheirobjectiveswhichmaybebroaderthanmaterialpayoffs).Thatis,broadly,thestrategywe
adopthere.ThedemandforpopulismiscentraltothepoliticalandeconomiclegacyofPeronismwhich
hasmarkedtheperiodgoingfromPeronsascenttothesecretaryofLaborin1943untilthepresent.
Indeed,partofthepoliticalinstabilitythatcharacterizesArgentinaafter1943originatesintheintense
appealofPeronistpoliciestoalargegroupofvotersandthedifficultyingeneratingconsensusarounda
setofbasicpoliciesthatwouldhaveallowedthecountrytoavoidmacroeconomicinstability.
3

Ouranalysishasthreemainparts,whichfollowabriefsectiononthehistoricalandpoliticalbackground
ofPeronistpolicies(sectionII).Inthefirstsubstantivepart(sectionIII),weusequalitativedatafrom
Peronsearlyspeeches(194455)toprovidesomeevidenceonPeronsbeliefs(i.e.,positivedescriptions
ofhowtheworldworks)andpreferences(i.e.,normativevaluesdescribinghowtheworldshouldwork).
Thesespeechessuggesttousthreesimplebutimportantpoints.First,Peronspolicieswereknownto
hisvoters(incontrasttolaterPeronistpresidents,suchasCarlosMeneminthe1990s,whowaselected
onaplatformbutchangedituponbeingelected).Second,whatPeronisdoinginthespeeches,atleast
inpart,isprovidingmeaningbyinterpretingtheevidenceavailableinthelightof(whatwewouldcall)
acoherentmodeloftheworld.Althoughsuchinterpretationisunusualineconomicmodels,itisoften
discussedbyscholarswhostudybeliefs(andindiscourseanalysis).Thethirdandfinalelementinhis
speechesthatwethinkisworthemphasizingisthathegivesaprominentroletotheforcesthat
determineincome.Incontrasttowhattheliteratureonvarietiesofcapitalismhasemphasizedinterms
oftheoriginsofincome(distinguishingbetweeneffortversusluck),Peronemphasizestheroleofothers
indetermining(reducing)ourincomethroughexploitation.Thisemphasisresultsinafocusonactors
(foreigncountriesandrichlocalelites,whowouldratherbelivinginEuropethaninArgentina).
1
Andin
afocusondistinguishingthecomponentsofwelfare:thereareutilitylossesfrombeingexploited,
whichgobeyondthemateriallosses(losingonesdignity).
Inthesecondpart(sectionIV),westudyPeronistbeliefsafterPeronsdeathandplacethemin
comparativeperspectivebylookingatdatafromtheWorldValuesSurveyinthe1990s.Respondents
thatdeclareanintentiontovoteforPeronismarealsothoseonrelativelylowincomeandeducation.
ThisisconsistentwithouranalysisofPeronsspeechesofthe194455period,whichappeartobeonthe
leftsideofthepoliticalspectrum,andwithspecificeventsofthatperiod(theburningoftheJockeyClub,
theantiAmericanslogans,etc).Indeed,asmallliteratureonthesubjecthasclaimedthatPeronismis
thelocalversionoftheAmericanDemocratsortheBritishLabourParty.However,wecaninvestigate
thebeliefsofthesePeronistvoterswithrespecttotheoriginsofincome(e.g.,luckvseffort)and
comparethemwiththoseofAmericanvoters.OurresultssuggestthatPeronistbeliefstendtobemore
ontherightofthepoliticalspectrumthantheopposition(althoughallArgentinevotersarequitelefty).
Inrelativeterms,Peronistbeliefsinthe1990sappeartobesimilartoRepublicanbeliefs.Inother
words,theoppositiontoPeronseemstohavecomefromtheconservativeswhiletheoppositiontothe
Peronistsinthe1990sseemstohavecomefromtheideologicalleft(althoughinbothperiodsthe
oppositionseemstohavebeenonhigherincomethanthePeronists).
Inthethirdandfinalsection(SectionV)wedevelopamodeltoexplainthislowdemandfor
capitalism.Ifvotersmaximizesomethingelsethanjusttheirmaterialpayoff,thenevenwithcorrect
beliefsabouthowtheworldworks,theymaydemandbadpolicies(fromthenarrowpointofviewof

1
OneoftheSpanishwordsfortraitorisvendepatrias(literallysellerofthemotherland).AcarioCotapos,a
Chileanartist,oncecommentedonthepossibilityofsellingthemotherland,addingyes,andletsbuysomething
smaller,butclosertoParis.BetrayalbytheoligarchyduringthedecadepriortoPeronsfirstgovernmentis
emphasizedforexample,inTorres,(1973)andHernandezArregui(1973).
4

maximizingincome).Avoterconcernedwiththefairnessofoutcomesisacaseinpoint.Specifically,we
assumethatvotersdemandthatfirmsbehavekindly(andthismustbetrueinsomescenarios).When
theydonot,votersexperienceangerwhichdecreaseswhensuchfirmsarepunished.InArgentinafirms
aremorelikelytomisbehavethaninrichcountries(perhapsbecauseoflowcompetitionorbecauseof
lowproductivity)sotheStatemustintervene(regulatetohumanizeCapital).SectionVIconcludes.

II. Peron,InterventionistPoliciesandArgentinePolitics:Background
Beyondtheobviousinterestinabetterunderstandingofthedemandforpopulism,workonPeronismis
importantbecauseofthecrucialroleofpoliticalinstabilityinArgentinasrelativedecline.In1930,as
theWorldeconomiccrisisaffectedArgentina,amilitarycoupbyagroupwithneofascistinclinations
resultedinthefirstmilitarygovernmentofthecountry.Thesuccessionofnondemocraticgovernments
(seven)whichfollowedincludedepisodesofseriousviolence,andendedinthepresidencyofJuanPeron
in1946.Since1930,anduntiltheMenemadministrationofthe1990s,nodemocraticpresidentwas
abletocompleteitsterm,withtheexceptionofthefirstPerongovernment.Thiscoincidedwith
Argentinaseconomicwoes.Indeed,Argentinascomparativeeconomicperformance(seeFigure1in
Llach,2010)revealstwoperiodswheredivergenceappearstobepresent:the1930s,whentheseries
appearstobegintofall(withtheexceptionofthePeronadministration),andthe1970s,anotherperiod
ofheavypoliticalinstability,whenthedeclineappearstoaccelerate.
Thissuggests,atleastatthisbroadlevelofgenerality,thatthereissomemeritinthehypothesisthat
politicalinstabilityandrelativeeconomicdeclinearepositivelycorrelated.Interestingly,therateof
investmentduring193040(theinfamousdecade)appearslow(9.1%),particularlywhencompared
withthatoftheXXthcentury(14.4%),orwiththerateofinvestmentprevailingduringthedecadeprior
tothestartoftheFirstWorldWar(19.3%),oneoftheperiodswherethegovernmentwasinthehands
ofelitistgovernmentsandtheeconomywasrelativelyopentointernationaltrade.Figure1reveals
thatinvestmentoverGDPriseswithPeronism,withanincreasinglylargerroletakenbypublic
investment(whereasintheearlyyearsitismainlyprivateinvestment)untilthefiscalcrisisoftheearly
1980s.
2
Asimplehypothesissuggestedbythedataisthatpoliticalinstabilitycauseslowerprivate
investment,andthatthisisthemaincauseforArgentinasrelativedecline.Thisisanaturalcomplement
totheoriesofArgentinasrelativedeclineemphasizinginvestment.DiazAlejandro(1970,1988),for
example,hasemphasizedthedifficultiesinmaintaininghighlevelsofinvestmentoncetheexport
oriented,marketfriendlyregimewasreplacedbythemoreinterventionistregimesthatfollowthegreat
depression.Taylor(1994)alsoemphasizestheroleoftheextremelyhighratesofcapitalaccumulation
pre1913,explainingthatlowsavingsrateconstrainedcapitalaccumulationuntilthe1930swhilethe
subsequentprotectionistpoliciesresultedinahighrelativepriceofimportedcapitalgoodsalso
contributedtoretardcapitalaccumulation(forevidenceontheroleofmachineryinvestmentingrowth,
seeDeLongandSummers,1991).Anaturalextensionofthislineofresearchisthatpoliticalinstability

2
ForanalternativeviewoftheInvestmentperformance,seeTaylor(1998).
5

playsasimilarroleinterferingwithprivateinvestmentandcontributingtoArgentinasdecline.Ofcourse
then,akeyiswhydotheseinterventionistpoliciesgetimplementedandwhydoespoliticalinstability
persist.

Figure1:TotalInvestmentoverGDP.SourceGerchunoffandLlach(1998).

SeveralauthorshaveemphasizedtheroleofPeronisminArgentinasdevelopment.
3
SinceGeneral
PeronsascenttotheLaborSecretariatin1943(withtheMilitaryGovernmentofGeneralRamirez)he
wasthepreeminentpoliticalfigureofArgentina.Evenafterhisdeathpolicieshavebeendefinedwith
relationtothePeronistpoliticallegacy(see,forexample,ODonnell,1977andPortantiero,1973).
SeveralhypotheseshavebeenadvancedtoexplainthecausesofPeronistsupport.Germani(1962),for
example,hasemphasizedtheemotionalfragilityofinternalmigrants(fromtheprovinces)andthe
charismatic,paternalnatureofPeronsleadership.Heprovidesanestimateof83,000migrantsperyear
tothegreaterBuenosAiresareafortheperiod193647,increasingthereafter.By1957,Germani
estimatesadoublingofthepopulationintheBuenosAiresmetropolitanarea(form3.4to6.3million).
Thus,laborbecameacentraleconomicandpoliticalforceinthecountry.Duringthisperiod,theshareof
outputaccountedforbyindustryincreased,sothatthePeronistprolaborpoliciesgoalongwayin
explainingitspopularsupport,evenifvotersonlyhadmaterialconcerns.Someauthorsestimatethe

3
Thereis,ofcourse,alargeliteratureonArgentinaseconomicperformanceandontheroleplayedbyPeronism
whichisinnowaysummarizedorreviewedintheshortparagraphsofferedhereascontextfortherelatively
narrowsetofpointswetrytoemphasize.Foradescriptionofeconomicpoliciesunderthe194655Peron
government,seeGerchunoff(1989).SeealsoDiazAlejandro(1970),CortesConde(1998),Waisman(1987),
HalperinDonghi(1994),LlachandGerchunoff(1989),interalia.
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
Investment/GDP
I/GDP
6

increaseintherealwageofunskilledlaborintheBuenosAiresareaat17%.
4
Itisunclearhowmuchof
thisincreasewassustainable,althoughtherewerepresumablysomeeconomiesofscaleastheinternal
marketexpandedandhigherprofitsfromthecontinuingprogramofimportsubstitution(seeGalianiand
Somaini,2010).Itisworthpointingoutthatantiexportpoliciesalsocontributedtotheincreaseinreal
wagesthroughlowerpricesoffood(seeBrambilla,GalianiandPorto,2010).Besidespoliciesthat
directlysupportedlabor,avarietyofsocialprogramsindifferentareaswereputinplace,rangingfrom
increasedaccesstothefreehealthcare,tothecreationofacomprehensivehousingprogramtothe
establishmentofageneroussystemofsocialsecurity(foragooddescriptionsee,forexample,Gaggero
andGarro,2009).TherewasalsothepublicprivatepartnershipsymbolizedbytheEvaPeron
Foundation,aprivateentityrunbyPeronswife,fundedthroughcontributionsfromtheprivateand
publicentitiesandwhichdistributedconsiderableamountsofsocialassistance(see,Stawski,2005).
Atthesametime,institutionalweaknessesplayedanincreasingroleinlimitingtheabilitytogenerate
politicalanswerstothecountryseconomicproblems.Somehavearguedthatspecificaspectsplayeda
keyrole,suchaselectoralinstitutionsgivingpreeminencetothepartyinthedecisiontoreelect
politicians(seeJones,Saiegh,SpillerandTommasi,2000).Othershavepointedoutthattherehavebeen
manypoliticalinstitutions,particularlysince1946,thatdirectlyledtounexpectedchangesineconomic
policy(see,forexample,SpillerandTommasi,2004),althoughelectoralfraudprecededPeronandmay
havelentsomelegitimacytosomeoftheabusesofthePeronistregime(see,forexample,Alstonand
Gallo,2009).Naturally,theabilitytoprotecttherightstopropertyunderweakinstitutionswaslimited
andthereisthepossibilitythatthisiswhatledtoweakerinvestmentperformance(see,forexample,
Adelman,1999,CortesConde,1998andAlstonandGallo,2009).
5
Itisworthnotingthattherewasless
accesstoexternalcapitalafterthegreatdepression(seeTaylor,1994).Foreigndirectinvestmentfell
somewhatinimportance,albeitfromveryhighlevels(DiazAlejandro,1970reportsthatforeigners
shareofthestockofcapitalin1927was34%,downfrom48%priortotheFirstWorldWar).
AsomewhatdifferentpictureemergesfromtheperiodleadingtothePeronistadministrationofthe
1970s.Therelativelyclosedeconomyofthe1960sexperienceddifficultiesadjustingtoeconomic
expansionsasincreasedimportsoftenledtoperiodicbalanceofpaymentscrisesandinflation.Against
thisbackground,andwiththepoliticalproscriptionofPeronism,attemptsatusingwageandincome
policiestostabilizetheeconomywereunsuccessful.Moreoftenthemilitarygovernmentsfocusedon
reducingwagepressure,typicallybyrestrictingtradeunions(forexampletheOnganiagovernment

4
SeeMurmisandPortantiero(1971).Ontheroleofthesupportofsocialisttradeunions,seeTorre(1989).See
alsoHorowitz(1990),DiTella(2003)andTorre(1990),aswellasODonnell(1977),andthecontributionscollected
inBrennan(1998)andMiguensandTurner(1988).
5
Saiegh(2007)emphasizesthat,evenduringtheearlymarketfriendlyphasefollowingthepassingoftheliberal
constitutionin1853/60,thesecurityofsomerightstoproperty(forexampleonpublicdebt)dependedonpolitical
considerationssuchastheextentofpartisancontroloverthelegislature.

imposedawagefreeze,attemptedtoincreaseworkinghours,limitedlabourstrikesandsuspendedthe
legalstatusofseveraltradeunions).Tensionssoonfuelledthepresenceofleftwingelements,and
fightingcommunismbecameaseriousgovernmentconcern.AsriotseruptedinCordoba,leftwing
terrorismbecameapoliticalforce,withsomelegitimacy(giventhelackofdemocracy)andaclaimto
centralityinthePeronistmovement.ThereissomeevidencethatPeronhimselfencouragedthis
identificationwiththeleft.
6
Duringthe1970skidnappingsandassassinationsreachedtheirpeak,asthe
terroristorganizations(theMarxistPeoplesRevolutionaryArmyandtheMontonerosofPeronist
extraction)clashedwiththepoliceandarmedforces(seethedataontheassassinationofpolicemenin
theprovinceofBuenosAiresinBoruchowiczandWagner,2010).Eventually,inthe1970s,withthe
terroristorganizationsstillactiveafterhisreturntothecountryspresidency,Peronbrokewiththemin
adramaticspeech,ejectingthemfromthePlazadeMayo.Thus,incontrasttotheearlyyears,when
PeronismarrivedandlaunchedatrueworkersmovementopposedtotheConservatives,duringthe
1970stheoppositiontoPeronseemstohavecomefromtheleft.Thesurveydatareportedlateris
consistentwiththisdescription.
Inbrief,itseemsclearthatPeronsarrivalonthepoliticalsceneinthe1940scoincidedwiththe
increasedimportanceoflaborinArgentinaseconomy,andareducedimportanceofopennessto
foreigncapitalandtradeastheglobaleconomywasaffectedbythewarandtheGreatDepression.
Accordingly,Peronsideologyreflectedadegreeofnationalismandfaithingovernmentintervention
thatwouldpersistovertime.Theopposition,however,seemstohaveevolvedfromatraditional
conservativepositiontoapositionthatismuchmoreontheleftofthepoliticalspectrum.

III. Peroninhisownwords
ThereissomedifficultyindefiningexactlywhatPeronspoliticallegacyis.Somehavearguedthat
becausehewasafascistsympathizer,hisideologicallegacymustsimplybefascism.Thiswouldanswer
thequestionofhowbadpoliciescometobeimplemented:Peronsauthoritarianruleimposedsuch
polices.Forourpurposes,thebiggestproblemisthatsuchpoliciesappeartobepopularwiththe
electorateandtheycontinuedtobesoevenafterPeronwasdeposedandthemostegregiousaspectsof
hisauthoritarianrule(suchasindoctrination)werenolongeractive.
7
Furthermore,Peronismseemsto

6
Forexample,whileinexileinMadrid,PeronappearstohavedesignatedJohnWilliamCooke,amanwhoargued
forarmedstrugglebasedontheCubanmodel,ashismainrepresentativeinthecountry.Thereisample
evidenceofthearmedgroupsidentificationwithPeron(seeBaschetti,2004).
7
One(ofseveral)possibledifferenceswithfascism,forexample,isthattradeunionleaderswerecloser(more
loyal)tomembersoftheunionthantothegovernment(perhapsinspiteofPeronswishes).Also,therewere
attemptsatconstructingPeronismwithoutPeronandinstancesoftradeunionleaderswhowereperceivedto
bequiteindependentofPeron(leadingtotheextremeviewthatPeronhimselfwasinvolvedinthekillingoftrade
unionleaderVandor).And,mostimportantly,largeincreasesintheLaborshareofGDPtookplaceunderPeronist
administrations(forhistoricalevidenceandacomparisonwithAustralia,seeGerchunoffandFajgelbaum,2006).
8

involveopinionsabouteconomicindependencethatarecentralandeasilycompatiblewithless
authoritarianpoliticalforms.ItisofsomesignificancethatPeronspoliticalideologywasdevelopingin
theimmediateaftermathoftheFirstWorldWar.Bornin1895,hewas28yearsoldastheWeimar
republicwasstrugglingwiththewarreparations,whichbecameaconvenientscapegoat,togetherwith
bankers,Jewsandforeignspeculators,soitisperhapsunsurprisingthatattribution(particularlyto
externalforces)playsabigroleinhisspeeches.Andhewas35astheGreatDepressionaffectedthe
worldeconomyandrichcountrieswerestartingtocopethroughpublicworksprogramsand
governmentspending(inpartlinkedtorearmament).Perhapsevenmoresignificant,in1935oneofthe
firstactionsofthenewlycreatedcentralwasabailoutofthebankingsystematalargesocialcost(della
PaoleraandTaylor,2002).Thus,itmusthavebeencleartohimthatlargeshockscoulddisruptthe
macroeconomytoaverylargeextent,makingindividualeffortoftenirrelevantinthedeterminationof
income.
ThePeronistregimeofthe1940sand50saccompaniedtheeconomicchangesthatwereimplemented,
firstfromtheLaborSecretariatandthenfromthePresidency,withapowerfulnewrhetoricthatgave
workersapreeminentroleintheformationofpolicy.Keynesianideaswerebecomingknown,atleast
throughRooseveltsactionsandsomeofthemainideasweremakingtheirwaytoArgentina.
8
Rhetoric,
ofcourse,wasonlyoneelementinabroadattempttocreatesupportforthesocialandpolitical
changesthatwouldsustaintheredistributionofincomeatthecoreofPeronistpolicies.Otherelements
includedasetofpoliticalritualslinkedtomassmobilization,theemotionalappealofEvitaandaclear
attempttoinfluencepeoplesperceptionsandbeliefsthroughpropaganda.AlthoughwestudyPerons
speeches,wenotethatthismightbearelativelynarrowfocus,particularlygiventhediscussionofthese
elementsappearingforexampleinPlotkin(2003).Ofcourseapotentiallyimportantdeterminantof
beliefsistheeducationsystemandthePeronistregimeheavilyintervenedinthedesignofthenational
curriculumandthepublicschoolssystem(see,forexample,BernettiandPuiggros,1993,Bianchi,1992,
andEscude,1990).
ThereisimportantpreviousworkinthefieldofdiscourseanalysisfocusedonPeronsspeechesbySigal
andVeron(2003).
9
Theyanalyzeseveralaspectsofhisspeechesandputspecialemphasisontheir

Howevermuchweightonegivestotheseconsiderations,itseemsthedistancebetweenfascismandPeronism,at
leastintheirauthoritarianstylesandrhetoric,isnotlarge.SeeGermani(1962)andLewis(1980),forinteresting
discussions.
8
FedericoPinedoandLuisDuhau,togetherwithRaulPrebisch,putinplacethePlandeAccinEconmicaNacional
in1933.TheywereinfluentialinaffectingforeigntradeandinthecreationoftheArgentineCentralBankin1935.
DellaPaoleraandTaylor(1999)describeheterodoxmonetarypolicyafter1929,thechangeinbeliefsand
expectationsfollowingtheshiftinmonetaryregimeandtherelativelymildeconomicdepression.
9
ThereareseveralinterestingculturalaspectsofPeronismthatwedonotdiscuss,includingthefocusononedate
(October17
th
),whenPeronismstarts.Foradiscussionandseveralofthekeydetailsofthemassmobilization
thattookplaceduringOctober17
th
,1945,seeJames(1988).
9

politicaldimension.Forexample,SigalandVeronputforwardtheinterestinghypothesisthatPeron
activelyconstructsthenotionthathearrivestotheStatefromtheoutside(alifededicatedtothe
military)toprovideunity/harmonytoadividedcountry(during19734,themainfocusoftheiranalysis),
whichissignificantgivensomeoftheelectoraldecisionsmadeatthetime.Incontrastwefocusonthe
economicdimensionofhisspeeches.Thematerialwestudiedwascontainedin62speeches,delivered
betweenOctober15
th
1944andMay1
st
,1953.Theyincludeafewspeechesduringrallies(asreportedin
themedia),somespeechesduringparticularcelebrations,aswellasmessagestocongressandother
legislativebodies.

PeronsSpeeches
Thefirststrikingpoint(toaneconomist)ofhisspeechesistheirlowinformationalcontent.Incontrastto
whatmightbeexpected,theyarenotoftheform:IaminformingthepeopleofArgentinathatweare
facingashockwiththefollowingcharacteristics,andhereiswhatwearegoingtodoaboutit.Inother
words,theyarenotpredominantlyexercisesinthetransmissionofinformation.Rather,theyareheavily
interpretednarrativesofwhathashappenedinthepast,andhowtheconclusionsthatwedrawfrom
lookingathistorycanhelpusshapepolicyinthepresent.Inbrief,akeyelementofthespeechesisthat
theyareprimarilycenteredonthereinterpretationofalreadyavailableinformation.Also,scholars
workingonanalysisofdiscoursewouldsayheisengagedintheproductionofmeaning.Inparticular,
suchresearchisconcernedwithestablishingthesourcesrelationshiptothecontent(relatedinthis
casetothesourcesstatus).Undertheassumptionthatmindsandmemoryaremalleableinthisway,an
economistwouldhavenoproblemmodelingitasa(selfinterested)activityofthepolitician.Anexample
isGlaeser(2004),wherepoliticianssupplystoriesandvotersfailtoinvestigatetheiraccuracy.Finally,
thespeechescanalsobeinterpretedastryingtoinfluencethesystemofvaluesofthepopulation.Inthis
regard,Rokeach(1973)isaninfluentialstudyofvaluesystemsandtheirimpactonbehavior(also
focusing,inpart,onthewritingsofmajorpoliticalfigures).SeealsoConverse(1964)andforarecent
review,Kinder(1998).
Thesecond,andperhapskeypartofthisinterpretationexerciseisthatPeronassumestheroleofa
heroicwhistleblower,denouncingacorruptstateofaffairswherepoliticiansareboughtbyone
particulargroupinsociety(theeconomicandculturalelite,whoareseducedbyallthingsforeign)in
ordertoenactpoliciesagainstworkersandthepoor.ItisavariationofthethemeofPeronsarrivalas
anexternalplayer(asemphasizedbySigalandVeronbutwithspecialsignificanceforthebeliefsabout
thegenerationofincome).Oneexampleis:
Itcanbeseenthat,notknowledgeableoftheartofpretending,Ihaveexposedtheanguishing
situationsthatburdenedmyfeelingsasIabsorbedtheDaedalusoflawsanddecrees()which
inalargenumberofcasesrestrictedtherightsofworkers,or,iftheyrecognizedthem,itwould
betokillthelasttraceofthehopeofjustice.May1
st
1945
10

Ihavebeenaccusedofhavingagitatedtheconscienceofthecountrysworkers.Ofhaving
createdasocialproblemwherenoneexistedbeforeinsteadofsilencingtheinequalitiesand
socialinjustices,Ihaveuncoveredthemsothatweallcouldknowwhereevilwasandwecould
findthemoreconvenientmedicines....Theprevioustacticconsistedinfakingasocialwelfare
withtheexclusiveaimofnotdisturbingthegooddigestionofthegoldenBourgeoisie.May1
st

1945.
Anothercharacteristicofhisspeechesisthecontinuousattempttoreassuresupportersthathehasa
coherentviewoftheworld.Examplestakeplaceinseveralspeeches,buttheoneonMay24
th
,1950is
centeredonexplainingPeronstheories.Hebeginsbyreactingtoaccusationsthathisisnotacoherent
economicplanstating,
IthasbeensaidthattheJusticialistamovementlacksaneconomictheory.Nothingmore
untrue.Wehaveaperfecteconomictheory.Whathappensisthatwehavenotyetspelleditout
becausewedidnotwantthattheoligarchs,orthecapitalistconsortiathatexploitedthecountry
throughconsciencelessandavariciousbosses,could,knowingourplan,stopouractionWhen
wehavebeenabletodominatetheseinternationalmonopoliesortheforcesoftheanti
motherland,thenwewillexplainourtheorytotheworld.May24
th
,1950.
Andheexplains(inthesamespeech)somedetails
oldeconomictheorywasbasedonaprinciplecalledhedonic.whatdoesitrepresent?
ThecapitalistsaysmycapitalisthebasisoftheeconomybecauseIamtheonewhopromotes,
paysandmakes.AsaconsequenceIproduce10,anddontproducelessormoreasinboth
casesIlose.Butme,thesociologist,Itellhim:Yessir,youproduce10,butherethismanhas
toeatandhetellsmethat10isnotenough,heneeds20.ThenthecapitalistrepliestomeAh,
lethimexplode,lethimeatwith10becauseifIproducemoreofthatIlosemoney.Thatis
whenthehedonicprinciplestopsbeingsonaturallyrational,leastofallfromthepointofview
ofwelfare,whichisthebasisofallorganizedcommunities.wedonotwantaneconomy
subordinatedtocapital,wewantcapitalsubordinatedtotheeconomyIf,afterthat,the
capitalistisabletofillitscofferwithgold,lethimdoit;wedontcare;evenbetterifhedoes.
Butwecantdothatuntilthepeopleissatisfiedandhappyandhasthepurchasingpower
neededtoachieveaminimumofhappiness,withoutwhichlifeisnotworthliving.May24
th
,
1950.

TypesofBusinesspeople
TheconspiracythatPeroncomestouncoverisrelevanttoworkersbecauseitidentifiesan
influenceontheirincome.Thisrepresentationrequiresthatcapitalists,atleastuntilPerons
arrival,wereunkind(inconsiderateorwhomadetheirmoneythroughcorruptmeans).The
speechesincludeconstantreferencestosuchbadtypesamongstbusinesspeople.
11

Peoplehavebeenfacedwiththeideathatafatefullodgeofdemagogueswastherulingclassof
thecountry,itselite,andassuchwasmadeupbywise,richandkindpeople.Ithastobe
pointedoutthatthewisehaverarelybeenrichandtherichhaverarelybeenkind.October15
th
,
1944.
Inotherwords,thoseprivilegedbythecapitalistregimearefinished;thosethathadeverything,
thattookthecowintheshipwhentheywenttoEuropetohavecoffeewithmilk.No,letshave
themhavecoffeewithmilk,butwithpowdermilk.Itisnotthatbadforthem.May12
th
,1950.
Itusedtobeeasyforcapitalists:whentherewasastrikeworkerswereputinjail,theywere
processedandtheydidntriseagain.RememberVasena.Workersconfrontedthesituation
buttheresultwasseveralthousandmendead.Theoligarchswereallhomedoingthefiveo
clocktea.Itusedtohappenthatacapitalistwhowasalmostbankruptwasmadetoearn,
withjustasignature,twoorthreemillionpesoswithouthimhavingtheneedtodomorethan
wakeupinthemorningandaskoverthephoneifthematterwasready.Inthiswayfavorswere
beinggranteduponsomeonewhoperhapswasashamelessone.August9
th
,1950.

Othersdetermineourincome
Withbadtypesamongstthecapitalists,itwaseasierforPerontopressforwardwiththeideathat
theprocesswhereincomewasgeneratedwasundertheirinfluence.Thismatcheswellwiththe
widespreadbeliefthatArgentinaisarichcountryandonehastofindanexplanationforwhythere
iswantamidstplenty(foradiscussionofbeliefformationwhennaturalresourcesareimportant,see
DiTella,DubraandMacCulloch,2010).Indeed,onepartofhisspeechescanbereducedto
argumentsinsupportoftheideathatinsteadofindividualeffort(internaltotheindividual)orluck
(externalbutwithoutintention),therelevantinfluenceonincomeisanexternalforcewithhuman
intention.ItisotherswhoareactivelytakingactionswhichlowerArgentiniansincome.Itisnota
questionofmakingabiggereffortattheindividuallevel;noraquestionoftakingacollectivestand
toreducetheinfluenceofnaturalelements(throughinsuranceorabetterselectionofactivitiesand
crops).ItisaquestionofactivelyopposingotheractorsthattrytoexploitArgentines(ontheroleof
corruptionperceptionsinexplainingtheappealofcapitalism,seeDiTellaandMacCulloch,2009).
Therearenumerousexamplesofthisconceptionoftheincomegeneratingprocess,andthesupport
oftheStateinenforcingit,inPeronsspeeches.Oneexampleis
Theeconomicdestinyofworkerswasexclusivelyinthehandsofthebosses...andifworkers
organizedaprotestmovementoradoptedanattitudedefensiveoftheirrights,theywereleft
outofthelawandexposedtothebossesresponseandthepolicerepression.Agroupof
capitalists,characterizedthemostbyitscontinued,bloodyoppositiontoworkersvindications,
hasplottedanunthinkablemaneuvertoneutralizethestepsthathadbeenadoptedtostopthe
riseinthecostoflivingandcounteracttheeffectsofinflation.May1
st
1945
12

weneedarms,brains,capital.Butcapitalthatishumanizedinitsfunction,whichputsthe
publicswelfarebeforeagreedyinterestinindividualprofit.Iexpressmystrongestrejectionto
theGodofunproductiveandstaticgold,tothecoldandcalculatingsupercapitalismthatharbors
initsmetallicguttersShylocksinfamoussentiments.May1
st
,1947.
Intheyear1943oureconomywasinthehandsofforeigncapitalistconsortiabecause,until
1943,thoseconsortiawerethosethatpaidavilepricetoproducers,gathered,exported,
transportedandsoldtoforeignconsumerstheproduceofArgentinework.Itcannotbedoubted
thatinsuchintermediationwentmostoftheprofits.March5
th
,1950
Theremightremainsomeformerexploiterofhumanlabor,whocannotconceiveanArgentine
nationsociallyfair,orsomeoldlawyerofforeigncompanieswhomightyearnforthetimesof
theBembergs,whentreasonwasalsoprofitableMay1
st
,1950.
300families,inourcountryforexample,puttogethertheircapitalandenslaved17million
Argentines.August9
th
,1950.
Weareinfavorthatamanmightenrichhimselfworking,butweopposethathemightdoso
defraudingortakingadvantageofotherpeoplesweaknesses.Wewant()thateachArgentine
hasprosperityandgoodfortunewithinreach,butwedonotacceptthatinordertoobtainthem
hewouldcommitcrimesagainstotherArgentinesoragainstthecommunitythatweallarea
partof.March5
th
,1952.
Onsomeoccasions,asinthereferencetoBembergabove,Peronnamesspecificmembersofthe
elite,althoughlessthanonemightimagineifhewasstirringuphatredagainsttherich.Inonecase
theyaredescribedasguiltyofexploitingcapitaliststhemselves.Oneexampleis
Themonopoly,beitcalledBungeyBorn,Dreyfus,etc.wastheonedoingthegathering
thepoorproducerreceivedsixpesosandthisintermediaryoctopusreceivedthirtyorfortyfor
whatsomebodyelsehadproducedWhenthisisorganizedproperly,thesmallfarmerwill
produce,transport,gather,sell;andtheproductwillgoexclusivelytohimandnotforthe
smartone,whoconstituteatumorthatwasplacedinthemiddle.August9
th
,1950
Yetinsomeofthesesamespeecheshedistinguishesbetweenlocalandforeigncapitalistsand
justifiesthebehavioroftheformer.Thisisoftenmentionedinthecontextofspeecheswithastrong
nationalistcomponent.
WhenIhavesaidthattherewasexcessiveexploitation,Ihavenotblamedourbosses,becauseI
knowfullwellthatourbosseswerethemselvesexploitedfromtheotherside()Thatiswhywe
haveboughttherailroadsandeverythingelseconcerningpublicservices()May12
th
,1950

AppropriateGovernmentPolicy
13

ThesedescriptionsofthestateofaffairsinArgentinaatthetimenaturallyleadtothejustificationof
asetofinterventionistpoliciesadoptedtoaddressthemainproblems.Interestingly,inthese
portionsofhisspeeches,theannouncedpoliciesarenotonlylinkedtothesolutionofthesetof
economicproblemsuncovered,butalsotothetypeofpeopleArgentines(whoimplementthese
policies)are.Thereisaconnectiontoidentityinthatthereare(apparentlydiscreet)categoriesof
peoplethattakecertainactions,sothatwhentheseactionschange,identityalsochanges,which
appearsinherentlydesirable(foramodelofidentity,seeAkerlofandKranton,2003).Itisasif
peoplewhoareabletodefytheirexploitersandstandupfortheirrightsandcannotbefooledinto
acceptingcompromisesolutionsaretrueArgentines.
Thespeechesprovideseveralexamplesoftheinterventionistpoliciesthatmatchtheneedscreated
byPeronsdescriptionofthemainproblemsfacedbyArgentina.Theseinclude,
Weimplement,inaloyalandsincerefashion,asocialpolicydesignedtogiveworkersahuman
placeinsociety,wetreathimasabrotherandasanArgentine.October15
th
,1944.
Nomanshouldearnlessthanwhatheneedstolive.Wesaidthatthereisalineforlife
determinedbytheminimumessentialwage,andthosebelowthatlinewerethesubmerged;
andthatinourcountrytherecouldnotbesubmerged;everyonehadtobeemerged.
October21
st
,1946.
Ifwehaveintervenedinsome(enterprises)ithasbeenbecausewehadtosomehow(avoid)the
constantoutflowofnationalwealth.()notonlywerespectprivateactivity,butwealsohelp
andprotectit.Theonlythingwedontwantisareturntotheoldageofmonopolisticconsortia
ofexploitation.Wewantthatmenwork()astheyseefitbutwedonotwantthatittakes
placeattheexpenseoftheconsumerortheproducer.Wewantthathewhoproduceswealth
mayplaceitwithoutpressureorexploitationofanytype.February7
th
,1950.
TheEstatutodelPen,mightnotbetothelikingofsomeexploiterswithoutconscience,()
whohavebeenupsetatthepossibilitythatImightdefendwithmoreenthusiasmtheperfecting
ofthehumanracethanthatofArgentinebullsordogs.March5
th
,1950.
Oneofthebarrierstonationalunitywasundoubtedlytheinjusticescommittedbythecapitalist
oligarchyexploitingworkerswiththecomplicityoftheauthoritiesinchargeofdistributive
justice....Apeoplewithanimmensemajorityofslavescannotbefree,justasafreepeoplecan
neverbesubjugated.IamnotexaggeratingwhenIsaythatin1943therewereslavesinthe
ArgentineRepublic.May1
st
,1950.
Today,May1
st
,theLaPrensanewspaperwillbehandedovertotheworkersThis
newspaper,whichexploiteditsworkersandthepoorduringyears,whichwasrefined
instrumentofallforeignandnationalexploitation,whichrepresentedthecrudestformof
treasontothemotherland,willhavetopurgeitssinsservingtheworkingpeople.May1
st
,1951.
14

Thegovernmentiscommittedtoenforcingpricecontrols,evenifthatmeanshangingthemall.
Theyhavearighttoearn,buttheydonthavearighttosteal.May1
st
,1952.

ThissimpleoverviewofPeronsspeechessuggeststousthatakeycomponentofPeronistbeliefsisthe
ideathatwelfarecanbeaffectedbyothers.Thissuggeststwochangestothestandardformulationin
economics,whereagentsareassumedtoderiveincomefromindividualeffortorfromluck(whichis
beyondanyonescontrol).Thefirstisthatotherplayerscanaffectanindividualsincome(localelites,
foreigncountries).Thesecondisthatlaborrelationshaveanonmonetarydimension,whichwe
interpretasaninfluenceoffairnessinpeopleswelfare(andnotjustincome).Giventhesebeliefs,there
isaroleforgovernmentinensuringthatworkersaretreatedwithdignity(humanizecapital),which
weinterpretassomereassurancethatfirmsarebehavingwithsomereasonableamountofconcernfor
workerswellbeing.

IV. PeronismandtheAmericanDemocrats:DifferencesinSurveydataonBeliefsandValues
GivenPeronscontinuedinfluenceonpoliticalandeconomiceventsevenafterthe1955coup,itisof
interesttoprovideatleastsomeevidenceonthelaterevolutionofPeronistbeliefsandvaluesandto
placethemincomparativeperspective(forexample,bycomparingthemtoAmericanbeliefsasa
benchmark).TheapproachwefollowistofocusinasnapshotofthepublicsinterpretationofPeronism
atalaterdate.Unfortunately,continuedsurveydatafromdifferentperiodsisunavailable.However,we
havedataonbeliefsandvotingpertainingtothe1990sfromacomparativesurveythatcontainsdata
fortheUSandArgentina(andothercountries).Ofcourse,the1990swasaperiodwhereboththeUS
andArgentinaareruledbytwopoliticians,MenemandClinton,thatareelectedonaplatformthatison
theleftofthepoliticalspectrumbutwhoendupimplementingreformsthataremoreconsistentwith
centrist/conservativevalues.InthecaseoftheUSthishappensonlyaftertherearemidtermelectoral
lossesandmainlyinvolvewelfarereformsandthedroppingofsomeofthelesspopularinitiativessuch
ashealthcarereform,whereasinthecaseofMenemtheywerelargerandmadefromthestartofthe
term,andtheyinvolvedacomplexrelationshipwiththelabourmovementwhichwasanimportant
supporter(seeMurillo,2001,Levitsky,2003andEtchemendyandPalermo,1998,fordiscussions;on
policyreversalsinLatinAmericaduringthisperiod,seeStokes,2001).
OurinterestincomparisonswiththeUScomesfromahypothesisexplainingPeronism,namelythatit
istheArgentineversionoftheAmericanDemocrats(giventhattheyaresupportedbysimilar
demographicandsocioeconomicgroups).AsimilarpointisalsomadewithrespecttoPeronisms
associationwiththeBritishLabourParty.Crosscountrysurveydataonpeoplesopinionaboutelements
ofcapitalismisavailablefromtheWorldValuesSurvey.CoordinatedbyRonaldInglehart,the199597
waveasksadults(olderthan18)inover50countriesseveralquestionsofinterest.IntheUS,thedatais
obtainedfromarepresentativesampleofindividualsage18andolderthroughfacetofaceinterviews.
15

InArgentina,samplingwaslimitedtotheurbanizedcentralportionofthecountry,whereabout70per
centofthepopulationisconcentrated.
10

Importantlyforourpurposes,thesurveycontainsdataon(selfreported)voting,allowingustoderive
measuresofvoteintention,oratleastsympathy,towardsthemainpartiesinthecountry,including
Peronists.Thus,wefirstdividethesampleinArgentinaintwogroups:betweenthosethatdeclareto
voteforPeronistsandthosethatdeclaretowanttovoteforothergroups.Theprecisequestionasked
is:Iftherewereanationalelectiontomorrow,forwhichpartyonthislistwouldyouvote?Justcallout
thenumberonthiscard.Thenacardwith1.PartidoJusticialista,2.UnionCivicaRadical,3.Frepaso,4.
Modinand7.Blankballotisshown.Peronistsarethoseanswering1,whileNonPeronistsarethose
answering2,3and4.IntheUS,asimilarprocedureallowsustodeterminetwosubsamples:
RepublicansandDemocrats.
Wethenusedameasureofincometodividethesampleintotwocategories(richandpoor).The
questionaskedwasHereisascaleofincomes.Wewouldliketoknowinwhatgroupyourhousehold
is,countingallwages,salaries,pensionsandotherincomesthatcomein.Justgivetheletterofthe
groupyourhouseholdfallsinto,beforetaxesandotherdeductions.Thenascalewith10groups,
correspondingtotheincomedecilesinthecountryisshown(thisscaleisdifferentineachcountry).We
classifyaspoorthoseinthelowest5categories.TableIshowsthat69percentofPeronists,whereas59
percentonNonPeronists,reportincomesthatareinthelowest5categories.IntheUS,withinthose
admittingapreferenceforvotingaparticulargroup,wenotethatwithinthosethatpreferthe
Democrats,42percentdeclaretobeinthelowest5decileswhileonly29percentorRepublicans.This
broadlycorrespondstotheideathatPeronistsandDemocratsshareasimilarbaseofsupport(atleastin
thelimitedsensethattheyhavemoresupportamongstthepoorthantheopposition).TableI,also
showsresultsusingeducationalattainmentandreachesasimilarconclusion.
11
Theseresultsechothe
conclusionofaPeronistpoliticianwhodeclareduponlookingatanelectoralmap,progresscomplicates
us,educationkillsus.Inauxiliarytests(notreported)wetriedselfreportedsocialclassandreached
similarresults:PeronistsandDemocratsseemtorepresentsimilargroupsintheirsocieties(thepoor
andthosewithloweducationalattainment).
12

10
Withinthisregion,200samplingpointswereselected,withapproximatelyfiveindividualsbeinginterviewedin
eachsamplingpointthroughmultistageprobabilitysampling.Regionsincludethenationscapital,thegreater
BuenosAiresarea,Cordoba,Rosario,MendozaandTucuman.
11
The question asks What is the highest educational level that you have attained? and it provides as possible
answersthe(functionalequivalentforeachsociety)of1.Noformaleducation,2.Incompleteprimaryschool,3.
Complete primary school, 4. Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type, 5. Complete secondary
school: technical/vocational type, 6. Incomplete secondary: universitypreparatory type, 7. Complete secondary:
universitypreparatorytype,8.Someuniversityleveleducation,withoutdegree,9.Universityleveleducation,with
degree.
12
ThequestionusedreadsPeoplesometimesdescribethemselvesasbelongingtotheworkingclass,themiddle
class,ortheupperorlowerclass.Wouldyoudescribeyourselfasbelongingtothe:1.Upperclass,2.Uppermiddle
class,3.Lowermiddleclass,4.Workingclass,5.Lowerclass
16

Givenourinterestintheroleofbeliefs,itisofinteresttoseeifthesesimilaritiesextendtobeliefsabout
theroleofluckandothereconomicissues.Theclassicbeliefconcernstheroleofluck(versuseffort)in
thegenerationofincome.ThequestionusuallyusedtocapturethisbeliefisWhy,inyouropinion,are
therepeopleinthiscountrywholiveinneed?Herearetwoopinions:Whichcomesclosesttoyour
view?1.Theyarepoorbecauseoflazinessandlackofwillpower,2.Theyarepoorbecausesociety
treatsthemunfairly.TheresultsaresummarizedinTableII.Themainpatternisthatthewhole
electorateinArgentinaseemstobeontheleftofthepoliticalspectrum,asmostpeopleseemtobelieve
thatpovertyistheresultofluck(orthatsocietytreatsthemunfairly)ratherthanlaziness.However,in
relativetermsthePeronistsseemtoexhibitapatternclosertotheoneoftheRepublicansinsteadofthe
Democrats.Indeed,thebiggestproportionofbelieversinlazinessasasourceofpovertytakesplace
amongstPeronistsandtheRepublicans.ThePeronistratioofbelieversinLaziness(39%)tobelieversin
anunfairsociety(61%)is0.64,whereasamongstNonPeronistsitis20%to80%,foraratioof0.25.On
theotherhandthepercentageofbelieversinlaziness(unfairsociety)amongsttheDemocratsis49%
(51%),whereasamongsttheRepublicansismuchhigher75%to25%.Focusingontheratiosoflaziness
tounfairness,theDemocratshavearatioof0.96,whereasthatfortheRepublicansis3.
Asanotherillustration,TableIIconsidersthequestionGenerallyspeaking,wouldyousaythatthis
countryisrunbyafewbiginterestslookingoutforthemselves,orthatitisrunforthebenefitofallthe
people?withanswers1.Runbyafewbiginterests,and2.Runforallthepeople.Againwefindthat
thetwogroupsinArgentina(PeronistsandNonPeronists)tendtogivetheanswerthatispresumablyon
theleftofthepoliticalspectrum(RunbyafewbigInterests),buttherelativepositionofPeronistsin
ArgentinaismoreliketherelativepositionofRepublicansthanofDemocrats.

TableIIIconsidersseveralbeliefsthatarerelevanttounderstandingPeronistsbeliefsandvalues.They
allpointoutinasimilardirectioninrelativeterms:thePeronists(relativetotheopposition)tendtolook
liketherepublicans(relativetotheDemocrats).InallcasestheratioinArgentinaandintheUSareon
thesamesideof1.Takeforexampletheideathatworkersshouldfollowinstructionsatwork.Wesplit
answersintotwogroups,thoseansweringtheyshouldontheonehandandthosethatanswereither
itdependsortheyshouldbeconvincedfirst.Themajorityofrepublicanvoters(77%ofthem,orina
proportion3.35to1),perhapsnotsurprisingly,tendtoanswerthatworkersshouldfollowinstructions.
Democratshaveasimilarpositionbutlessintense(theproportionisunder1.4to1).So,inrelative
terms,Republicansaresomewhatmorelikelytoagreewiththisstatement.InArgentinawehavethe
oppositeabsolutetendency:mostpeopledisagreewiththisstatement,asreflectedbybothPeronists
andNonPeronistshavingratiosthatarelowerthanone.However,theratioforPeronistsissomewhat
higherthanthatforNonPeronists,suggestingthatinrelativeterms,Peronistsaremorelikelytoagree
withtheideathatworkersshouldfollowordersthanNonPeronists,whichissomewhatsurprisinggiven
Peronistsaffinitywithlaborcauses,atleastasdetectedinPeronsspeeches.

17

TherestofTableIIIinvestigatesanumberofotherbeliefsandvaluesappearinginPeronsspeeches.For
example,hediscussescompetitiononhisspeechofMarch5,1952Progressandindividualprosperity
cannotbebasedrationallyintheharmingofothersbecausethatunleashesanegoistandmerciless
struggle,whichcancelsallcooperation,destroyssolidarityandendsindissociation.Thebeliefscovered
intheTableincludethoserelatedtotheroleofluckversuseffortinthedeterminationofincomeand
theroleofothersinaffectingindividualfates(alreadydiscussed),aswellasthoserelatedtofeminism
(JobsforMen),authoritarianviews(RespectforAuthority),materialism(LessEmphasisonMoney),
honesty(AcceptabletoCheat),competition(CompetitionisHarmful)andeconomicorganization
(OwnershipofBusiness).Inallcases,theanswersgivenbyPeronistvoters(relativetothosegivenbythe
opposition)aresimilartotheanswersgivenbyRepublicans(relativetotheDemocrats).
Inbrief,theevidencefromthe1990ssuggeststhattheoppositiontoPeronismisontheideologicalleft,
eventhoughtheyareonhigherincomeandeducationalachievementthanthePeronists.Ifitistruethat
theoppositiontoPeroncamefromtheconservatives,thenitisplausibletoconcludethatPeronismhas
experiencedlessideologicalchangethantherestofthecountry.

V. AModelofLaborMarketExploitationbasedonAltruisticPreferences

Theprevioussectionshighlighttheroleofseveralelementsthatarenonstandardineconomicmodels.
Twothatareofparticularinteresttousaretheideathatthereissomethingmoretomarket
transactionsinthelabormarketthanjusttheexchangeofworkformoney.Thereisalsothepossibility
ofexploitation,connectedtofirmsownerswhodonotcareaboutthewelfareoftheirworkers.The
speechofAugust9,1950istypical.NotethatthepartwherePeronstatesWorkersconfrontedthe
situationbuttheresultwasseveralthousandmendead.Theoligarchswereallhomedoingthefiveo
clocktea.hesaysfiveoclockteainEnglish,whichservestostressthecontrastthefateofworkers
whoselifeisindangerwhiletheemployersareoblivioustotheirpredicamentandmorepreoccupied
withengaginginasocialpracticethatisthenorminEngland.Accordingly,themodelwedevelopisone
wherethereisthepossibilityofworkerexploitationbyunkindelites,andPeronspunishmentofthese
elitesprovidesincreasesinworkertotalutilitythroughanemotional(nonmaterial)channel.
ThemodelinthissectionisanadaptationofthemodelinDiTellaandDubra(2009)tolabormarkets.It
stressestheideathatapolicythatmaynotbeoptimalunderstandardmodels(thatignoreemotions),
maybecomeoptimalifworkersexperienceangerwhentheyareexploited,andthegovernmentknows
it.Inordertomakeourpoint,weintroduceemotionsintheformofworkerangeratperceptionsof
insufficientfirmaltruism(asinLevine,1998andRotemberg,2008)inatextbookversionofSalop(1979).

Therearenworkers,eachcharacterizedbyaparameterxinterpreted,aseithera
1) "preferredvariety;preferredworkplace"thiscanrepresent
a. Atasteforworkinginoneindustryoveranother
b. Acostofreconvertingtheworkershumancapitaltoanotherindustry.
18

2) locationparameter;howfarawaydoIlivefrommyworkplace".
Foreachworker,hislocationisdrawnfromauniformdistributiononthecircleofcircumference1.
Therearemevenlydistributedfirmsalongthecircle(therearemfirms,butweuseb=1/masthe
relevantparametermeasuringconcentration);firmsareofoneoftwotypes,altruisticorselfish.
Workerscansupplyeitheroneunitoflabor,or0;thisbinarychoiceisasimplification,whichisinline
withtheindivisibilitiespostulatedinHansen(1985).Individualsgrossutilityofnotworkingiss;when
theywork,iftheyhavetotraveladistancex(ortheyarexawayfromtheirpreferredjob)andthey
receiveapayofw,theirnetsurplusiswtxs(i.e.theyhaveatransportcostoftperunitofdistance
traveled).

Inadditiontothesematerialcosts,theworkermaybecomeangrywiththefirmforwhichheworks.
Thereareseveralreasonswhyincorporatingemotionsinthissetupmakessense.First,simple
introspectiontellsusthatwedontalwaysdowhatisbestfromanarrowlydefinedeconomic
perspective.Second,alargebodyofliteraturehasshowninthelaboratorythatindividualsdontalways
maximizetheamountofmoneytheyreceive(evenwhenthechoicesdontinvolveeffort),andthat
emotionsplayasignificantrole.Thisreactionhasbeenmodeledasapreferenceforfairoutcomes(see,
forexample,FehrandSchmidt,1999),orintheabovecitedpapersbyLevine(1998)andRotemberg
(2008)whoshowhowtheintroductionofareciprocalaltruismtermintheutilityfunctioncanexplain
quitewelltheseeminglyparadoxicalevidencefromultimatumgames.Finally,athirdmotivationto
includeemotionsinourmodelofthelabormarketisthatPeronsspeechescontainseveraldirect
referencestotheeffectofPeronistpoliciesonemotions.Forexample,hestates:

Whatisthesocialeconomy?Itisachangeintheoldsystemofexploitation,notlikethe
communistswant,butinagentlerform.Thecapitalistregimeisanabuseofproperty.The
communistsolutionisthesuppressionofproperty.Webelievethesolutionisnotthe
suppressionofpropertybutratherthesuppressionoftheabuseofproperty.Wearenot
involvedinsocialorderingthatwilltakethecountryintoafightbutrathertocalmness.June
24
th
,1948.
Ifaworkerisangry,wemustsubtracttohisutility,aterm(+pw)wherepistheproductivityofthe
workerinthefirmandistheprofitthefirmobtainsfromtheotherworkers.Thistermisjusta"spite"
term:whenangry,theworkerdislikesthefirmsmakingaprofit,andheisangrierwhenhecontributes
tothoseprofits.Whattriggersangeristhattheindividualrejectsthehypothesisthatthefirmis
altruistic.

Inthismarket,firmschoosewagelevels(i.e.itisnotacompetitivemarket)wandgetinexchangea
productofpperworker,sowhentotalemploymentisEitsprofitsare(pw)E.Ifthefirmisnotaltruistic,
thatisallthereisinthefirms'utility(utility=profits).Ifthefirmisaltruistic,itsutilityisprofitsplusa
termthatdependsontheutilityoftheworker.Thealtruisticfirmhasacostofifworkerutilityislower
thanacertainlevel(thislevelisexogenousforthismodel,butcancomefromlearning,adaptation,
19

history,etc).Wecallthethreshold;wewillsetittobetheutilitytheworkerwouldobtaininafairly
competitivelabormarket(seebelow).

Inwhatfollows,andwithoutlossofgenerality,wenormalizet=1andallotherparametersarejust
normalizedbyt.Thisnormalizationiscompletelygeneral.Wealsoassume(withoutlossofgenerality)
thatthenumberofworkersisn=1.

Equilibrium

Wewillanalyzeasignalinggame,inwhichfirms,whenchoosingawagelevel,signaltheirtype.An
equilibriuminthissettingisatriplet[e(w,x;),w();(w)]where:

- e()isan"employment"decisionstrategy(thesameforallworkers;wearelookingatsymmetric
equilibria)asafunctionofwage,tastesx(ordistance)andbeliefs(ofwhetherthefirmisaltruistic
ornot)into{0,1},wherea=1means"work"anda=0means"don'twork";
- w()isafunctionthatmapstypesintowages(onewageforeachtype;thesamefunctionforall
firms);
- ()isafunctionthatmapswagesinto[0,1],suchthat(w)isanumberthatrepresentsthe
probabilitythattheworkerassignstothefirmbeingaltruistic.
- eisoptimalgivenx,wand;wisoptimalgivene(andotherfirmsplayingw);isconsistent(itis
derivedfromBayes'rulewheneverpossible).

WewillfocusonequilibriawherebeliefsareofthesortIrejectthefirmisaltruisticiffitswagewissuch
thatw<w*forsomew*(itmaybeatargetwage).Wearerulingout(forexample)equilibriainwhich
theworkerrejectsthatthefirmisaltruisticifthefirmpaysawagew>w*(i.e.theworkercomesto
believethefirmisselfishevenifitispayingawageabovethetargetwage;whichwouldbeofcourse
unnatural);instandardsignalingmodels,beliefslikethesemaystillbepartofanequilibrium,becausein
equilibriumonedoesnotobservewagesw>w*andsotheconsistencycondition(thatbeliefsbe
derivedfromBayesrule)placesnoconstraintonbeliefs.

Oligopoly

Inthissectionwecharacterizethepoolingequilibriainanoligopoly.Ofcourse,theremaybeseparating
equilibriatoo.Butwefocustheanalysisofpoolingequilibriaforfourreasons.

1.Thefirstis"analytic":wewanttoknowwhetherthesetofparametersforwhichthereexistsapooling
equilibriumshrinksasthenumberoffirmsdecreases;sincethereisnoangerinpoolingequilibria,this
wouldestablishthatthe"chances"ofangerappearingarelargerwhenthereislesscompetition.
2.Thesecondreasonforfocusingonpoolingequilibriaishistoric:inPeronsspeechesthereisa
referencetothepossibilitythatcapitalismworkswellinsomecircumstances(forexample,thereisa
20

referencetothiscalmnessinthespeechofMay1
st
1945).Thisbenchmarkcase,formwhichthe
localeliteshavedeparted,isrepresentedasapoolingequilibrium.
3.Thethirdistoavoidmakingchoicesthatwouldneedtobemade,andthathoweverweresolved
them,wouldleavesomereadersunsatisfied.Takeforexamplethefollowing.Inaseparating
equilibrium,workersareangryatsomefirms;whentheyare,theoptimalwagebythefirmsishigher
(thaniftheyarenot);thisleadstoalargermaterialutilityforworkers.Thisleavesuswiththe
conundrumthatselfishfirmsaregivingtotheiremployeesahighermaterialutility,andyettheyare
angry.Thisbegsthequestion:areworkers(inreality,notinthemodel)angrybecausethefirmisselfish,
orbecausethefirmactsinwaysthatharmsitsemployees?Putdifferently,wouldyoubeangryat
somebodyyouknowisnasty,butistemporarilypretendingtobenice(notbecauseheistryingto
change,butjusttoavoidsomepunishment)?Psychologicalresearchhasnotansweredthisquestionina
satisfactorymanneryet.
4.Thefinalreasonistractability:inaseparatingequilibriumwhentherearemanyfirmsthepatternsof
combinationsoffirmsbecomescomplicated(aselfishfirmsurroundedbytwoselfishfirms,orbyone
selfishandonealtruistic,orbytwoaltruistic,etc;similarlyforanaltruisticfirmanditsneighbors).Inex
anteterms,though,eachfirmdoesnotknowwhetheritsneighborswillbeofonekindortheother.

PoolingEquilibria

Ourfirststepistofindnecessaryconditionsunderwhichawagew
o
ispartofapoolingequilibriumin
whichworkersattaintheirtargetlevelofutility.Considerafirmwhomaximizesprofitsinadeviation
fromapoolingequilibriumwithwagew
o
(wearenotincludingautilitycostofthedeviatingfirm,since
weassumeforthetimebeingthattheequilibriumissuchthatworkersattaintheirtargetutilitylevel).
Ifthefirmincreasesitswage,workerswon'tbeangry.Inthatcase,laborsupplyisgivenbythesumofall
(unit)suppliesofworkerswhoareclosertothedeviatingfirmthanthetwoworkers(onetoeachside)
whoareindifferentbetweenworkingforthefirmweareanalyzingandworkingforitsneighbor:

wsx=w
o
s(bx)S=2x=b+ww
o

Profitsarethen

(pw)(b+ww
o
).

Whenthefirmmaximizesthisexpression,weobtainanoptimalwageof

2
b w p
w
o
+
=

21

Forthefirmnottowanttodeviatefromw
o
,itmustbethecasethatthisoptimalwageislowerthanw
o
,
orequivalently
o
w b p s (1)

Inwords,iftheoligopolywageistoolow,thefirmsarebetteroffincreasingtheirwage,andworkerswill
notpunishthem(bygettingangry).Ifthefirmlowersitswage,consumersbecomeangry,andlabor
supplyisgivenbytheconditionthat

( ) ( ) ( )
o o
w p w b S x b s w w p x s w + + = = 1

Inthatcase,profitsare

(pw)(b+(1+)wpw
o
).

Forthefirmnottowanttodeviateandoffertheoptimalwageinthisdeviation,
( )
( )
( )
( )
t

+
+
=
+
+ +
=
1 4 1 2
2 1
2
p w b p b w
w
o o

itmustbethecasethatprofitsintheequilibriumarelargerthanthesedeviationprofits.Formally,
( )
( )
( )
( ) | |

+ + s
+
+
> 1 2 2 1
1 4
2
b p w
p w b
b w p
o
o
o
(2)

Noticethatwhen=0(thestandardSalopcase),weobtain

w
o
=pb

Anadditionalrestrictionisthatforagiven,aswedecreasethenumberoffirmsthewagemustalso
increasetoachievethetargetutility.Workerutility(inapoolingequilibriumwithwagew
o
)isthe
numberoffirms,1/b,timesthetotalutilityofworkershiredbyeachfirm(the2isbecauseeachfirms
hiresworkerstobothsides):
( )
}
=
2
0
4
2
b
o o
b
s w dx x s w
b

Thisutilityislargerthanifandonlyif
4 4
b
s w
b
s w
o o
+ + > > t t (3)

Wenowpresentoneimportantresult:ascompetitiondecreases(enough),angerismorelikely.The
followingpropositionshowsthatascompetitiondecreases,apoolingequilibriumislesslikely.Butsince
22

poolingequilibriahavenoanger,andseparatingequilibriado(inexpectedtermstherewillbesome
selfishfirms),whenpoolingequilibriadisappear,angerappears.

Proposition1.Thereisacriticaln*suchthatforalln>nn*,thesetofpoolingwagesissmallerwhen
therearenfirmsthanwhentherearen.Thatis,ascompetitiondecreases,angerismorelikely.

Proof.Defineb*sothatequations(3)and(1)holdwithequalityandareequated:
( ) t t = = + + s p b b p
b
s
5
4
4
* *
*

Letn*=1/b*.Forb*>bthesetofequilibriumwagesisincreasinginb(decreasinginn)because:
equation(3)isnotbinding;theslopeof(2)issmaller(inabsolutevalue),thantheslopeof(1).QED

Theplotbelowillustratesthethreeconstraintsonw
o
imposedbyequations13.Thewagew
o
mustlie
betweenthetwolociwithnegativeslopes(theflatteroneisequation2andthesteeper,1)whicharise
fromthefirmsincentivesnottodeviate.Thewagemustalsolieabovethepositivelyslopedconstraint
(equation3thatarisesfromtheconditionthatfewerfirmsimplyhigherwagesifworkersaretoobtain
theirtargetutilities).

Nextwepresentanotherrelevantresult,connectingtheproductivityoffirms,theriseinanger,andthe
possiblesubsequentregulation.Thisresultprovidesapotentialexplanationforwhypeopleinless
developedcountriesdon'tlikecapitalism.IfproductivityislowerandmorevolatileinLDCs,thatwould
explainwhycapitalistsandcapitalismarenotpopular.

Proposition2.Whenproductivitydecreases,orwhenitbecomesmorevolatile,angerismorelikely.

b
Boundsonw
AdmissibleRegion
23

Proof.Whenproductivitydecreases,thetwolociofequations(2)and(1)movedownwardsbythe
amountofthedecreaseinproductivity.Sinceequation(3)isunchanged,thesetofpoolingequilibrium
wagesshrinks.

Alargervolatilityinproductivitiesmakesitmorelikelythatalow(poolingbreaking)costwillhappen,
andthentheselfishfirmswillrevealthemselvesassuchandangerwillarise.QED

AninterestingpointtonoteisthathighervariabilityinproductivityinLDCscouldbetheconsequenceof
higherregulationstobeginwith:firmsinsectorswithacomparativeadvantagecouldhavehigher
workerproductivitieswhilefirmsinprotectedsectors,lowerproductivities(evenconsidering
governmentregulationstoprotectthem).Inasense,then,Peronismbyintroducingdistortions
generatesangertowardscapitalists,andperpetuatesthebeliefsthatPeronismfostered.

Thenextresultillustratesanotherobviousfeatureoftheriseinanger:whenforsomeexogenousreason
workersbecomecaptiveofoneparticularfirm,angerismorelikely.Themechanismisasonewould
expect:whenworker'slaborelasticityofsupplydecreases,localmonopolieshaveanincentivetolower
wages.Thetemptationmaybelargeenoughthatanangertriggeringwagedecreasemaybeprofitable.
Incountrieswithconcentratedindustries,likeArgentina,andwithlittleinterindustrymobility,workers
donothavemobilityandsoelasticityofsupplyislower.

Wemodelthisincreaseincaptivitybychangingthecostofreconvertingtoanotherindustry,while
keepingrival'swagesfixed.Thereasonforthisassumptionissimple:ifitissuddenlyharderforworkers
employedinfirmitoworkinfirmi1ori+1,thosefirmswillkeeptheirwagesfixed:iftheydidn'twishto
attractthemarginalworkerbeforethechangeinreconversioncosts,theydon'twanttoafter,sothere
isnoincentivetoraisewages;iffirmi1didntwanttoloweritswagebeforethechangeincosts,they
don'twanttodosoafter,sincetheincentivesofthemarginalworkerworkingforthemhaven't
changed.Aswillbecometransparentintheproof,anequivalentwayofmodelingthisisassumingthat
thetwoneighborsofthefirmbeinganalyzedmovefartheraway,asiftherehadbeenadecreaseinthe
numberoffirms.

Proposition3.Assumethatforagivenparameterconfiguration,thereisapoolingequilibriumwitha
wageofw
o
.Ifthecostofreconvertingtofirmsi1ori+1increasesfrom1tot>1,butthecosttofirmi
remainsconstant,thefirmsincentivestodecreaseitswageincrease.Thereisathresholdt*suchthatif
tt*firmilowersitswageandworkersbecomeangry.

Proof.Whenthecostofconvertingtofirmsi1andi+1increasestot,thesupplyfacedbyfirmi(afteran
angertriggeringdecreaseinwage)anditsprofits,are

( )
( )
( )
1
2
1
2
+
+ +
=
+
+ +
=
t
bt p w w w
w p
t
bt p w w w
S
o o

24

andtheoptimalwageandprofitare

( )
( )
( )( ) 1 1 2 1 2
2
2
+ +
+
=
+
+ +
=
t
bt w p bt p w p
w
o

Noticethatintheequationfortheoptimalwage,anincreaseintisequivalenttoanincreaseinb:afall
inthenumberoffirms.Forlargeenought,theseprofitsexceedtheoligopolyprofit,andthefirmlowers
itswageitsprice,causinganger.QED

Intheabovepropositionwehaveassumedthatworkerscontinuetomakeinferencesbasedonthe
equilibriumpriortotheshock.Althoughonecouldarguethatanewequilibrium(onewithfewerfirms,
orwithhighert)shouldbethebenchmark,webelievethatkeepingtheoldequilibriumbeliefsisalso
plausible.Inaddition,thecaseoffewerfirmsalsoleadstomoreanger,asestablishedbyProposition1.

ThepreviouspropositionmaybeparticularlyrelevantfortheriseofPeronismandPeronistbeliefs.Ina
timeofrisingspeedoftechnologicalchange,thecostofreconvertingtootherindustriesalsorises.
Hence,wemayviewtheascentofPeronasaconsequenceoftheincreasingexploitationbyfirmsthat
hadgainedmorepowerovertheirworkers.

Anywagew
o
intherangedeterminedbyequations(2)and(1)canbepartofapoolingequilibriumifwe
chooseorappropriately.Notethatifthefirmisaltruisticanditlowersitswageenough,therecould
beautilitycostofprovidingworkerswithaverylowlevelofutility.Sincewefoundnecessary
conditions,wefocusedonlyontheincentivesoftheselfishfirm.Whenwewanttobuildanequilibrium
withawagew
o
withintherangewehavejustidentified,weneedtotakeintoaccountthisutilitycostfor
thealtruisticfirm.Butchoosingorlowenough,anyoneofthesewagesispartofanequilibrium.We
donotelaborate,becausetheconstructionissimple.

Abriefdiscussionofpoliciesinthismodel.

Inthismodeltherearethreechannelsthroughwhichregulation(settingminimumwagesandmakinga
transfertothefirm)affectswelfare.First,thereisthestandardchannel:aminimumwagelargerthan
marketwages,butstillbelowproductivityincreasestotalwelfarebyattractingworkerstothefirm(to
producesomethingworthpatacostintermsoflostleisureandtransportationcostoflessthanp).A
second,quitedirectandsimple,channelisthroughthereductioninanger:sinceanincreaseinwages
lowersfirmsprofits,andtotalangerdependsonthesizeofprofits,ariseinwagesreducesangerand
increaseswelfare.Finally,anychannelthatreducesanger(whetheritincreaseswagesornot)induces
workerstostartworking,andthatfurtherincreaseswelfare.Thesecondchanneldoesnotdependon
individualschangingbehavior;thisthirdchannelarisesbecauseworkersreoptimize.Imaginefor
exampleapolicythatkeepswagesattheirprepolicylevels,but"expropriates"theprofitsfromthefirm
(throughafineforexample).Inthatcase,inthestandardmodel,welfarewouldbeunchanged.Inthe
25

currentmodelwelfareincreasesfortworeasons:first,eachworkerwhowasemployedishappier,but
somewhowerenotworkingwillnowentertheworkforceandbecomeavailableatthefinedfirm.

Intuitionandsomesimplecalculationsshowthatinthismodeltheappealoffinestothefirmsandother
populistpoliciesincreasesrelativetotheirappealinasettingwhereangerplaysnorole(thatis=0).
Toillustrate,imaginethatapolicywithwagewandtransferT>0tothefirmisslightlybetterintermsof
totalwelfare(inastandardmodelwithnoanger)tothepolicy(w,T=0).Inthemodelwithanger,when
consumersareangry,thesecondpolicythatbeatsonthefirmispreferred,sinceitreducesthe
amountofanger.Thisisanexampleofapolicythatlooksbadinastandardmodel(abadpopulist
policy),butthatispotentiallywelfareenhancingwhenemotionsaretakenintoaccount.Althoughwe
dontclaimthatallofthebadArgentinepoliciesaredrivenbyattentiontoemotions,webelievethat
thereisatleastsometruthtotheideathatpoliciesthatarebadforlongrunmaterialgrowthmaybe
optimalwhenworkers(orconsumersmoregenerally)areangryatcertainbusinesssectors.

VI. Conclusions

AcentralobservationinArgentinasrelativedeclineisthatitwasaccompaniedbyastrongreductionin
private investment: from the formidable rates of capital accumulation pre1913 financed primarily by
foreigners to the dismal later performance. Diaz Alejandro (1970) and Taylor (1994) have emphasized
thelowsavingsrateandthehighrelativepriceofcapitalgoodspre1960.Inthisstudywehavefocused
on the possibility that the decline in investment is connected to the countrys populist tradition, which
helped spread interventionist policies and fueled political instability. In particular, we have tried to
identifythenatureofPeronistpoliciesandtheelementsthatmadethemsoattractive,evenwhenthere
wasaclearassociatedmaterialcost.

Argentinasrelativedeclinebecomesvisibleinthe1930sandappearstoaccelerateinthe1970s.These
two periodscoincide with political instability: 1930 is the year of the first of several military coups and
marks the beginning of the infamous decade that would set the stage for the first Peron
administration; while the 1970s is marked by the armed conflict involving left wing guerrillas and the
military (and paramilitary) forces which led to the military coup of 1976. Indeed, following Perons
ascenttothelaborsecretaryin1943,Peronismhasbeenthepreeminentpoliticalforceinthecountry,
leadingmanytoassumethatnogovernmentcouldsucceedwithoutitsexplicitsupport.Onereasonfor
itsenduringlegacyisthatPeronsinterventionistpolicieswhereintunewiththetimes:afterthe1930s,
the increased presence of the State the economy was the norm, both in Argentina and in other
countries. But there are other factors that have made Peronist policies attractive to voters for such a
longperiodoftime,eveniftheyhavecontributedtoitsrelativematerialdecline.Inthispaperwefocus
on three elements that help us throw light on the nature of Peronist policies and their enduring
significance.
26

First,westudysomebeliefsandvaluesabouttheeconomicsystempresentinPeronsspeechesduring
the period 194355. We emphasize that Peron appears to be concerned with the income generating
process, and note that he insists on the possibility that it is influenced by others and of there being
exploitation.Indeed,whereaseconomistshaveemphasizedtheroleofluckversusindividualeffortin
the determination of income and how beliefs about their relative impact can affect economic system
(see for example, Piketty, 1995), it seems that Peron is focused on the influence of actors (elites,
foreigners) and how they can corrupt authorities and change the income of Argentines (as in Di Tella
and MacCulloch, 2009). This provides one possible explanation for why the process of learning in
policymakingmightbelessrationalthantheonedescribedinBuera,etal(2010),inparticularbecauseit
isaffectedbyattemptstounderstand/discovertheintentionsofdifferentpoliticalactors(whichbytheir
very nature are hard to verify). In Perons speeches, there are also a number of references to the idea
that labor relations can have nonmonetary dimensions and the speeches connect exploitation to this
nonmaterial dimension. This (trivially) explains why markets that are interpreted (and regulated) in
thiswaymayperformpoorly(fromamaterialstandpoint).

Second, we study survey data for the 1990s on the beliefs of Peronist and Non Peronist voters in
Argentina and Democrat and Republican voters in the US. While Peronist have low income and
education relative to the opposition (so that they look like the US Democrats), their beliefs and values
suggest that Peronists are the Argentine equivalent of the Republicans. For example, whereas all
respondentsinArgentinatendtobelievethatthepoorareunluckyratherthanlazy,Peronists(justlike
RepublicansintheUS)aresomewhatmoreinclinedthantheopposition(e.g.,NonPeronists)tobelieve
that the poor are Lazy. In other words, while the opposition to Peron during 194355 came from the
conservatives,theoppositiontoPeronisminthe1990scomesfromtheleftoftheideologicalspectrum.
It is worth reiterating that in both periods, the Peronists seem to have lower income and educational
achievementthantheopposition.Thissuggests,attheveryleast,thatthePeronistsarechanginglessin
termsofpoliticalideologythantheopposition.

Finally, given that these beliefs are nonstandard (for economists), we present a model formalizing the
possibility that they are suboptimal from a narrow material perspective, but that they may be
associated with improved wellbeing (for example, they reduce anger at aspects of economic
organization). In particular, we present a formal model of exploitation in the labor market where
agents derive pleasure from treating well (badly) those that have behaved well (badly) towards them.
Firmsareoftwotypes:oneisastandardfirmwhichmightexploittheworkerbypaying him/herthe
minimum possible wage, whereas the other type of firm cares for the worker. Even with few
altruisticfirms,theequilibriummightinvolvenoexploitation,aslongasthereissufficientamountof
competition. With monopsony power, the good equilibria break down and there is scope for
regulation (of the kind proposed by Peron in his speeches) that generates first order welfare gains
(beyond Harberger triangles). We note that a firm might be exploiting workers even if it is paying the
same wage than other firms, as long as workers believe this firm is doing it out of unkindness
(formalizedasreciprocalaltruism).
27

Appendix1:PeronsSpeechesquotedinthetext
CuidaremoselfactorbrazoyharemosunaArgentinadehombreslibres,15deoctubrede1944.
BuenosAires,1944,SecretaradeTrabajoyPrevisin,DifusinyPropaganda.
Lasreivindicacioneslogradasporlostrabajadoresargentinosnopodrnserdestruidas,1deMayo
de1945.BuenosAires,1945,sindatosdeimprenta.
DiscursopronunciadoenelCongresodelaNacin,21deOctubrede1946,HablaPern,Subsecretara
deInformes,BuenosAires.
DiscursopronunciadoenelCongresodelaNacin,aldeclararinauguradoelperododesesiones,1de
Mayode1947,LosMensajesdePern,SerieAzulyBlanca,MundoPeronistaEd.,BuenosAires,1952.
ManifestacionesdelgeneralPernantelosrepresentantespatronalesdelaProduccin,Industriay
ComerciodelaNacin,24deJuniode1948,HablaPern,SubsecretaradeInformes,BuenosAires.
Pern,lealamigodelostrabajadoresdelcampo,5deMarzode1950,Subsecretarade
InformacionesdelaPresidenciadelaNacin.
DiscursopronunciadoenelCongresodelaNacin,aldeclararinauguradoelperododesesiones,1de
Mayode1950,LosMensajesdePern,SerieAzulyBlanca,MundoPeronistaEd.,BuenosAires,1952.
Economaysindicalismojusticialista,24deMayode1950,sindatosdefechadepublicacinnide
imprenta.
LaCGTescuchaaPern,9deAgostode1950,sindatosnidefechanideimprenta.
Unaetapamsenlaejecucindeladoctrinaperonistaenelordeneconmico,7deFebrerode
1950,SubsecretaradeinformesdelapresidenciadelaNacin.
Pernhablasobrelaorganizacineconmicadelpas,12deMayode1950,sindatosnidefechani
deimprenta.
PernyEvahablanenelDadelosTrabajadores,1deMayode1951,PresidenciadelaNacin,
SubsecretaradeInformaciones.
Discursopronunciadoel5demarzode1952,sindatosdeimprentanidefecha.
DiscursopronunciadoenelCongresodelaNacin,aldeclararinauguradoelperododesesiones,1de
Mayode1952,LosMensajesdePern,SerieAzulyBlanca,MundoPeronistaEd.,BuenosAires,1952.

28

Appendix2:DefinitionsofVariablesused(formtheWorldValuesSurvey)

PoorareLazyreferstothequestion:Why,inyouropinion,aretherepeopleinthiscountrywholivein
need? Here are two opinions: Which comes closest to your view? 1. They are poor because of
lazinessandlackofwillpower,2.Theyarepoorbecausesocietytreatsthemunfairly.Group1
isthatansweringoption1,whileGroup2isthatansweringoption2.
RunbyafewbigInterestsreferstothequestion:Generallyspeaking,wouldyousaythatthiscountryis
run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the
people? 1. Run by a few big interests, 2. Run for all the people. Group 1 is that answering
option1,whileGroup2isthatansweringoption2.
WorkersShouldFollowInstructionsreferstothequestion:Peoplehavedifferentideasaboutfollowing
instructions at work. Some say that one should follow one's superior's instructions even when
one does not fully agree with them. Others say that one should follow one's superior's
instructionsonlywhenoneisconvincedthattheyareright.Withwhichofthesetwoopinionsdo
youagree?1.Shouldfollowinstructions,2.Depends,3.Mustbeconvincedfirst.Group1isthat
answeringoption1,whileGroup2isthatansweringoptions2and3.
JobsforMenreferstothequestionDoyouagreeordisagreewiththefollowingstatements?Whenjobs
are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women. 1. Agree, Neither Agree nor
Disagree, 3. Disagree. Group 1 is that answering option 1, while Group 2 is that answering
option3.
MoreRespectforAuthorityreferstothequestion:I'mgoingtoreadoutalistofvariouschangesinour
way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to
happen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind? Greater
respectforauthority.1.Good,2.Dontmind,3.Bad.Group1isthatansweringoption1,while
Group2isthatansweringoption3.
Less Emphasis on Money refers to the question: I'm going to read out a list of various changes in our
way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to
happen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind? Less
emphasisonmoney.1.Good,2.Dontmind,3.Bad.Group1isthatansweringoption1,while
Group2isthatansweringoption3.
AcceptabletoCheatreferstothequestion:Pleasetellmeforeachofthefollowingstatementswhether
youthinkitcanalwaysbejustified,neverbejustified,orsomethinginbetween,usingthiscard.
Cheating on taxes if you have a chance (scale 1 to 10 is shown with Never Justifiable below 1
and Always Justifiable below 10). Group 1 is that answering options 1 and 2, while Group 2 is
thoseansweringoptions3,4,5,6,7,8,910.
CompetitionGoodreferstothequestion:NowI'dlikeyoutotellmeyourviewsonvariousissues.How
wouldyouplaceyourviewsonthisscale?1meansyouagreecompletelywiththestatementon
theleft;10meansyouagreecompletelywiththe statementontheright;andifyourviewsfall
somewhereinbetween,youcanchooseanynumberinbetween.Ascaleisshownwitha1to10
scalewiththewordsCompetitionisgood.Itstimulatespeopletoworkhardanddevelopnew
ideasbelow1andCompetitionisharmful.Itbringsouttheworstinpeoplebelow10.

29

TableI:TheEducationandIncomeofPeronistsandDemocrats

Peronists
Non
Peronists
Democrats Republicans
Percentageofgroupanswering
FamilyincomeisinLowest5of
10categories
69 59

42 29

Percentageofgroupanswering
educationisinLowest6of9
categories
88 69

56 47
Note:Peronist(NonPeronist)isthesubsampleofArgentinesthatdeclareanintentiontovoteforthe
PeronistParty(AnypartythatisnotthePeronistParty).Democrats(Republicans)isthesubsampleof
Americans declaring an intention to vote for the Democrat (Republican) Party. Family Income is the
respondents answer to a question about total family income. Education is the respondents
educationalachievement.
30

TableII:TheBeliefsofPeronistsandDemocrats:LuckvsEffort

Peronists
Non
Peronists
Democrats Republicans
Laziness 39 20

49 75
UnfairSociety 61 80 51 25
Ratio 0.64 0.25 0.96 3

Peronists
Non
Peronists
Democrats Republicans
RunbyafewbigInterests 71 95 76 68
Runforall 29 5 24 32
Ratio 2.4 19 3.2 2.1
Note: (1) Peronist (NonPeronist) is the subsample of Argentines that declare an intention to
voteforthePeronistParty(AnypartythatisnotthePeronistParty).Democrats(Republicans)is
the subsample of Americans declaring an intention to vote for the Democrat (Republican)
Party. (2) Laziness is the fraction of these groups answering They are poor because of
laziness and lack of willpower to the question Why in your opinion are there people in this
country who live in need?, whereas Unfair Society is the group answering They are poor
becausesocietytreatsthemunfairly.(3)Runbyafewbiginterestsisthegroupgivingthat
answertothequestionGenerallyspeaking,wouldyousaythatthiscountryisrunbyafewbig
interestslookingoutforthemselves,orthatitisrunforthebenefitofallthepeople?
31

TableIII:BeliefsinArgentinaandtheUS:PeronistslooklikeRepublicans

Argentina
Ratio
(Peronist/NonPeronist)
UnitedStates
Ratio
(Republican/Democrat)
PoorareLazy
2.6=0.64/0.25
0.64=39/61;0.25=20/80
3.1=3/0.96
3=75/25;0.96=49/51
Workersshouldfollow
instructions
1.6
=0.81/0.51;45/55;34/66
2.4
=3.35/1.4,77/23;58/42
Runbyfewbiginterests
0.1
=2.4/19;71/29;95/5
0.7
=2.1/3.2,68/32;76/24
JobsforMeninsteadofwomen
2.1
=0.59/0.28,34/58;20/71
1.3
=0.37/0.3,23/63;21/71
Morerespectforauthority
4.4
=15/3.4,75/5;54/16
2.2
=28/12,84/3;75/6
Moreimportanceofmoney
0.5
=3.3/6.5;66/20;72/11
0.8
=9.6/11,67/7;70/6
Acceptabletocheat
1.9
=4.9/2.6,83/17;72/28
1.2
=6.1/4.9,86/14;83/17
Competitiongood
1.2
=1.2/1,55/45;50/50
2.1
=2.7/1.3,73/27;57/43
Note: Note: (1) Peronist (NonPeronist) is the subsample of Argentines that declare an intention to vote
forthePeronistParty(AnypartythatisnotthePeronistParty).Democrats(Republicans)isthesubsample
ofAmericansdeclaringanintentiontovotefortheDemocrat(Republican)Party.(2)Definitionsofbeliefsin
theappendix.
32

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