Review: Aristotle and the Aristotelian Tradition Author(s): Keimpe Algra Source: Phronesis, Vol. 50, No.

3 (2005), pp. 250-261 Published by: BRILL Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182781 . Accessed: 13/08/2011 15:01
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Book Notes

Aristotle and the Aristotelian Tradition

KEIMPEALGRA

This will be my last set of booknotes on 'Aristotle': I am handing over this task to Ben Morison. Four of the books which I kept for this occasion concern aspects of the Aristotelian tradition (ancient, medieval and modern) rather than Aristotle himself, and I shall start with these. Robert Todd's annotated translation of Themistius' commentary on, or rather interpretative paraphrase of, Aristotle's Physics IV, published in Richard Sorabji's series 'The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle', is dedicated to the memory of Henry Blumenthal, to whose careful scholarship on the Aristotelian commentators we owe so much.' T.'s translation appears to be clear and reliable and his explanatory notes are brief (in accordance with the general format of the series) but generally adequate. In his introduction he characterizes Themistius' paraphrases as targeted at readers who wished to revisit Aristotelian treatises with which they were already familiar, and as pitched at a level somewhere between strictly elementary expositions on the one hand and more expansive commentaries of the kind written by Alexander of Aphrodisias on the other. In a separate preface Sorabji more or less qualifies Blumenthal's characterization of Themistius as a (or in fact: the last) 'Peripatetic commentator', by noting that there are some occasions where Themistius does side with contemporary Neoplatonism, as in his commentary on the DA where he rejects Aristotle's empiricist account of concept formation. True though this may be, such occasions are few and far between. In general Themistius stays pretty close to Aristotle, although he sometimes includes digressions offering material that does not correspond with anything in Aristotle's text. In the commentary on Physics IV we find two examples of this procedure, both directed against Galen's attacks on Aristotle. One (149, 4-19) con-

' Themistius On Aristotle's Physics 4, translated by Robert B. Todd (series The Ancient Commentatorson Aristotle), Ithaca NY (Cornell University Press) 2003; x + 150 pp.; ISBN 0 8014 4103 X; $ 62.50.
? KoninklijkeBrill NV, Leiden, 2005 Also available online - www.brill.nl Phronesis L13

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cerns the alleged circularity of Aristotle's attempt to define time. The other (114, 7-12) discusses a thought experiment adduced by Galen to prove the existence of a self-subsistent three-dimensional space. Imagine a vessel with its contents removed and no other body flowing in. What are we to suppose will be left between its extremities? According to Themistius, Galen is begging the question by just assuming the existence of the void space which he is supposed to prove. In his Corollary on Place (576, 12 ff.) Philoponus will later claim that Galen is not assuming any such thing, but that he is just exploring the consequences of the assumption that no other body flows in. Themistius himself, by the way, brings in his own presuppositions: 'eliminating the mutual replacement of bodies is no different from completely eliminating body'. In other words, he claims that Galen's thought experiment ignores a fundamental principle of physics, viz. the theory of antiperistasis. As Todd suggests in his notes ad loc., there is a strong possibility that these anti-Galenic passages go back to Alexander of Aphrodisias, who is known to have attacked Galen's views on place and time. So even here (pace Sorabji's introduction, p. vii) 'originality' need not be the correct term. But of course in the history of ideas lack of originality does not entail insignificance, and instead of desperately looking for traces of originality we may simply value Themistius' commentary on the Physics for what it is: a clear and intelligent survey which constituted an important link in the transmission of Aristotle's ideas. It is good to have this part of it available in translation. As for the significance of Themistius in general, his paraphrasesenjoyed great popularity among the Aristotelian commentatorsof late antiquity and, in Latin translations,in the Aristoteliantraditionin the later Middle Ages and the early modern period. His commentary on the De Anima, for example, played an importantrole in the late medieval debate on the immortality of the individual intellect. In the 15th century Nicoletto Vernia's Padovan lectures on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics made constantreferenceto Themistius, and claimed that no one could be found who was more learned: 'proinde adorate verba Themistii'. I owe this reference to EdwardMahoney's contribution ('Aristotle and Some Late Medieval and Renaissance Philosophers') to the volume The Impact of Aristotelianismon Modern Philosophy, edited by Riccardo pozzo.2 The book presents the papers of a 1999 conference on the Rezeptionsgeschichteof Aristotle's conception of the intellectual virtues, but only some of the articles actually address this theme. One of these is Stanley
2 R. Pozzo (ed.), The Impact of Aristotelianismon Modern Philosophy (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, vol. 39), Washington D.C. (The Catholic

of America University Press)2003; xvi + 336 pp.; ISBN0 8132 13479; ?50.50.

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Rosen's 'Phronesis or Ontology: Aristotle and Heidegger', which focuses on Heidegger's 1924/5 Marburglectures on Plato's Sophistes and on how they misinterpret or adapt (the difference is not always clear in Heidegger) Aristotle's conception of phronesis by taking it as 'der Ernst der bestimmten Entscheidung' and as the silent call of Gewissen (consciousness). Heidegger shifts the focus of applicationof phronesis from the practicalto the ontological level and by doing so rather blurs the Aristotelian distinction between theory and practice, while actually 'transforming both into poetry' (thus Rosen, on p. 258). And of course this ontology derives all significance of human life from its finitude, and the terror of its obliteration (Angst vom Tode), to which man may respondby deciding to act 'authentically'.It is here, in fact, that phronesis comes in - an odd appearance,if one takes into considerationthat Aristotle instead emphasizes the possibility of leading a suprahuman life and that for him eudaimoniaratherthanAngst is the centraltheme. In fact the general incompatibilitybetween the two theories makes one wonder why Heidegger insisted on building on Aristotle in the first place. And what, in the end, is the net result? Rosen, for one, concludes that when compared to Aristotle's conception of phronesis with its orientation towards everyday life, 'Heidegger's existential ontology, however brilliant, and perhaps because of its very brilliance, can bring nothing to human affairs but blindness' (p. 265). I am not quite sure I understandwhat this means, but I have no doubt it is right. Hans-GeorgGadamerhappens to have been among those who attended Heidegger's lectures on the Sophist, but, as Enrico Berti shows in his essay 'The Reception of Aristotle's Intellectual Virtues in Gadamer and the Hermeneutic Philosophy', Gadamer's Wahrheit und Methode as well as his 1998 commentary on NE VI remained much more faithful to Aristotle's text and intentions, though Gadamer appears to have over-emphasized the practical element in Aristotle's ethics, while playing down the role of theoria. With Michael Davis' 'defense' of Aristotle against Nietzsche on tragedy ('Tragedy in the Philosophic Age of the Greeks: Aristotle's Reply to Nietzsche') we move away from the main topic. Nietzsche's critique, as is well known, centered on Aristotle's rationalizingand cognitivist approachto tragedy. The upshot of D.'s defense seems to be that the Poetics is not just about poiesis in the sense of 'making poetry', but also directly about human behaviour (p. 216: 'poiesis understood as action') a curious claim which to my mind gets insufficient support from the juxtaposition of Doric dran and him Attic prattein and poiein in Poet. 1048b1-2. D. concludes, if I understand correctly, that the Poetics, in so far as it is about action, shows us how the action on stage (even when irrational)can figure as somehow exemplary, so that in this respect 'Nietzsche does seem to have erred in underestimating Aristotle's grasp of the intimacy of the relation between the rational and the irrational'(p. 226). I am not sure whether this interpretation succesfully res-

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cues Aristotle from Nietzsche's critique;though it provides some room for the irrational,it still appears to do this in some sort of moralizing context. But perhapsI missed something, as in fact did the editor, who in his Introduction (p. xiv) claims that D. 'points out that Nietzsche is right [my italics] in minimizing Aristotle's grasp of the intimacy of the relation between the rational - the exact oppositeof what the above quotationseems to say. and the irrational' I single out three furthercontributionsall of them broadening their scope beyond the issue of the intellectual virtues, but all of them well worth reading. Mahoney's article 'Aristotle and Some Late Medieval and Renaissance Philosophers', already referred to above, offers a selective but informative overview of the reception of Aristotle and his ancient commentators in medieval and renaissance philosophy, of course without breaking much new ground for those acquainted with the author's own earlier work and with Charles B. Schmitt's classic study Aristotle in the Renaissance. Also the solid contributions of Antonino Poppi (on 'Zabarella or Aristotelianism as a Rigorous Science') and William A. Wallace ('The Influence of Galileo's Logic and Its Use in His Science') basically take up and summarize earlier work by the same authors. They demonstrate a common ground between Zabarella and Galileo in their use of the Aristotelian regressus i.e. the combination of analysis (starting from the effects, 'better known to us', arriving at a mere approximateor hypothetical discovery of principles and supplying knowledge quia) and synthesis (moving from principles to the effects deriving from those principles, and supplying knowledge propter quid). Between the two stages there is a reflective pause which should allow one to determine that the cause found is really the one that is true and necessarily bound to the effect. This is what Zabarella calls a mentale ipsius causae examen. I would maintain that in Aristotle's own works this role is being played by dialectical scrutiny. Zabarellaratherseems to have thought of something like mathematicalanalysis. Galileo, who remains committed to the overall framework of the Aristotelian regressus, introducesa crucial innovation in linking the examen of this intermediatestage to attestationby the senses and to experiment (periculum). It is clear, however, that both Zabarella and Galileo thought of the doctrine of the Posterior Analytics, on which the conception of regressus was based, as offering essentially a methodusfor scientific investigations (on which more below).3

I Other contributions:John P. Doyle, 'Wrestlingwith a Wraith:Andre Semery, S. J. (1630-1717) on Aristotle's Goat-Stag and Knowing the Unknowable'; ChristiaMercer, 'Leibniz, Aristotle and Ethical Knowledge'; RichardL. Velkley, 'Speech, Imagination, Origins: Rousseau and the Political Animal'; Riccardo Pozzo, 'Kant on the Five Intellectual Virtues';AlfredoFerrarin, 'Hegel's Appropriation of the Aristotelian Intellect'; Richard Cobb-Stevens, 'The Presence of Aristotelian Nous in Husserl's Philosophy'.

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A similarvolume, which appeareda few years earlier,editedby Bob Sharples, It features, among other contriis Whose Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism?4 butions, fine essays by M. W. F. Stone on 'The Debate on the Soul in the Second Half of the ThirteenthCentury' (which in passing has valuable things to say about the origin and limitations of the notion of 'Aristotelianism'),by Barneson 'Locke andthe Syllogism', andby EnricoBertion Brentano's Jonathan of Aristotle's metaphysics and theology ('Brentano influential interpretations and Aristotle's Metaphysics'). Monique Dixsaut ('Is There Such a Thing as Nietzsche's Aristotle?') offers a clear and systematic survey of Nietszche's reaction(s) to Aristotle's Poetics, including his views on katharsis, the role of the chorus and the importanceof dramaticperformance,and his negative view of Aristotelian ethics as the ethics of 'Aristotle and everyone'.5 My next book could in principle have been covered in the book notes on Neoplatonism as well, but may be better at home here. For many centuries Porphyry'sIntroduction(Eisagoge) played a key role in the philosophicalcurriculum, although nowadays it is no longer among the favourites of students of ancient philosophy. We are fortunateto have a translation- the first one to be publishedin English - with introductionand extensive commentary(288 pages on 19 pages of translatedtext) by Jonathan Barnes, published in the Clarendon Later Ancient Philosophers series.6 As is well known, this little treatise discusses five items (genus, species, difference, property, accident) which later became known as the praedicabilia or the pente phonai or quinque voces, i.e. 'the five words' (on the history of these terms, see furtherL. M. De Rijk, Aristotle. Semantics and Ontology, vol. 1, Leiden/Boston/Koln2002, 491-498). According to Porphyry's preface, knowing what these items are is necessary 'even for a schooling in Aristotle's predications[...] and also for the presentationof definitions, and generally for matters concerning division and proof'. B. is probably right in characterizingthis text as an introduction to logic, and hence to philosophy in general, ratherthan as just an introduction to the Categories (the view of many earlier commentators, such as Ammonius; note, however, that not too much is at stake here, since the Cat. was itself generally regardedas an introductionto philosophy). The Platonist Porphyryclaims thathe has takenhis materialfrom 'the old masters- and espe-

I R. W. Sharples (ed.), Whose Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism?, Aldershot (Ashgate) 2001; ix + 181 pp.; ISBN 0 7546 1362 3; ? 35.00. s Other contributions: Helen S. Lang, 'Philoponus' Aristotle: The Extension of Place'; Ahmed Hasnawi, 'Topics and Analysis: the Arabic Tradition'; William Charlton, 'Aquinas on Aristotle on Immortality';there are also responses by Franqois de Gandt to the contributionsof JonathanBarnes and Monique Dixsaut. 6 Porphyry'sIntroduction, edited by Jonathan Barnes,Oxford(ClarendonPress)2003; xxvi + 415 pp.; ISBN 0 19 9246149; ? 50.00.

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cially the Peripatetics among them', but then again the relevant Peripatetic material had by this time become part of the philosophical koine, and deeper metaphysical issues are left undiscussed. Accordingly, and paradoxically,the Introduction,which became the startingpoint for all medieval discussions of the 'problemof universals',itself declines to deal with this question.As Porphyry puts it in his preface: 'about genera and species - whetherthey subsist, whether they actually depend on bare thoughts alone, whether if they actually subsist andwhetherthey are separableor are in perceptible they are bodies or incorporeal items and subsist about them - these matters I shall decline to discuss, such a subject being very deep and demanding another and larger investigation'. It might be thought that with such general philosophical questions out of the way, what remains is a short and rather bland elementary text, which hardly deserves a commentaryof a few hundredpages. This would be wrong. Not only is the text itself at times crabbed and obscure, it also, for all its brevity, raises importantand wide-ranging philosophical questions. On both accounts ancient students were no doubt helped by the fact that they were supposed to study this text under the guidance of a teacher. B.'s commentary takeson a similarguidingrole vis-a-vishis readers.He managesto putPorphyry's text in perspective by explaining the many issues of Aristotelian logic, ontology and semantics which are raised by it, and by guiding us throughthe various ways in which these matterswere discussed by later ancient philosophers, such as Alexander, Galen, Ammonius, Dexippus, Marius Victorinus, Boethius and Simplicius. He thus offers a marvellously rich and engaging context - a context which is in many respects more interesting than Porphyry's actual text. The book winds up with some very useful 'Additional Notes' - one of them succesfully defusing claims concerningStoic influenceon the Introduction, another offering a welcome survey of the various possible references of the term 'the old masters' (hoi palaioi or hoi archaioi). B. ends his Introduction (p. xxiv) by expressing the hope that 'anyone who reads this commentarywill be half persuaded that Porphyryrepays the ride'. In the end, however, it is surely B. who makes the ride worth while. From Porphyrywe move back to Aristotle. Orna Harari'sbook Knowledge and Demonstrationre-examines the role of syllogistic logic in Aristotle's theory of demonstrativeknowledge.7Her main claim is that we should view the Posterior Analytics not as an attemptto analyse the structureand methods of scientific practice (on which see the remarks above on Zabarella and other early modern thinkers), but as an attempt to articulate a general notion of knowledge, viewed as conceptualization, within the constraints set by

I Orna Harari,Knowledgeand Demonstration. Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, Dordrecht (Kluwer Academic Publishers) 2004; ix + 158 pp.; ISBN 1 4020 2787 7;
e 90.00.

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Aristotle's metaphysicaltheory and his conception of substance in particular. In her view it is the fact that Aristotle conceives all objects of knowledge as quasi-substances thatdetermines the formof reasoning- focusingon the relations subsisting between subject and predicate of demonstrative conclusions which underliesthe theory of demonstration.Against this backgroundH. connects the distinction between 'knowing that' and 'knowing the reason why' on the with the distinction between what she labels 'perceptualunderstanding' one hand and 'conceptual understanding'on the other. Just as induction (i.e. induction as presented at APo II, 19, which H. distinguishes from the 'argumentative' conception of inductionwhich Aristotle employs in dialectical conwith the materialmanifold texts) involves moving fromthe sensualacquaintance to an apprehensionof the form (essence), apodeixis leads from perceptual (i.e. of the dihoti), understanding (i.e. of the hoti) to conceptual understanding thus in a sense covering both ways of what renaissancephilosophers(in their of the same material) called regressus. methodological interpretation Apart from having the merit of emphasising the link between the theory of demonstrative knowledge on the one hand and Aristotle's ontology and offers some sort of a solution to the semantics on the other, this interpretation familiar problem that the extant works of Aristotle do not exhibit the method allegedly presentedby the APo, because what the APo has to offer is now no longer regardedas a method. On the other hand this in itself does not make it any easier to see how then the APo should be related to actual scientific practices. In fact what is arguably the most interestingchapterof the book is designed to show that even Aristotle's formalizationsof mathematicalproofs (which surely are meant to examplify his general theory of apodeixis) do not match the practice of Euclidean geometry (where proofs are conceived as the results of construction). But even if questions and doubts remain, H. does which in passing has some valuable obseroffer a challenging interpretation vations to make on such subjects as the ambiguity of the term arche or the natureof epagoge. On the other hand, the 'Select Bibliography' and the coverage of rival scholarly views in the text (and the footnotes) are arguably a bit too selective. I noticed, for example, the absence of Patrick Byrne's Analysis and Science in Aristotle (1997), and A. Back's Aristotle's Theoryof Predication (2000). Another book which focuses on the relation between Aristotle's metaphysics and the Posterior Analytics' conception of scientific knowledge approachingit, so to speak, from the otherdirection- is Ian Bell's Metaphysics as an Aristotelian Science.8 It is basically an attemptto show that Aristotle's account of the science of being as developed in what he calls the 'method-

' Ian Bell, Metaphysics as an Aristotelian Science (InternationalAristotle Studies vol. 2), Sankt Augustin (Academia Verlag) 2004; 261 pp.; ISBN 3 89665 292 3;
e 4.50.

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ological' books of the Metaphysics (books 1, 3, 4, and 6) is influenced by the conception of scientific knowledge outlined in the APo, or even that 'the Metaphysics represents an attempt to construct a science of being along the rigorous lines proposed in the Posterior Analytics' (p. 241). Here there is no hint of a conflict between theory and practice, presumablybecause B. focuses on the explanatory framework underlying these books of the Metaphysics, ratherthan on their investigative procedure.B. goes on to show that his interpretationof the 'methodological' books, which allows us to conceive of metaphysics as a true 'science' of being (rather than as a kind of second-order inquiry into the conditions for the possibility of first-ordersciences), also throws light on the conclusions of the so-called 'central' books. In addition, he claims it helps us clarify the relation between the conception of a science of being qua being and the conception of first philosophy, conceived of as dealing with separate, eternal and unmoved entities as causally prior to, and explanatory of, susbstantiality in the sense required by the APo (even if a truly generic account of the principles of substance is impossible, given the fact that there is no genus of substance). IncidentallyB.'s conception of metaphysics as a 'science' in the sense of the APo, dealing with principlesof being qua being, forces him to follow Ross and Owens in excluding Metaphysics Lambda from the earlier ten-books version of the work, because (in his view) it does not present god as a principle of the being of things. Whether we needed anotherattemptto map this rough but nevertheless much travelled territory is a question I do not dare to answer. Yet I do think that, given the enormous numberof existing interpretations, any book on this subject should at least attempt to position itself systematically against the backgroundof the status quaestionis. I hope I am not just being cantankerous if I say that I missed such an overview in the Introduction,or elsewhere in the book. The Sophistical Refutations is certainly not among the most studied works in the corpus aristotelicum. Reason enough to welcome Scott Schreiber's Ar-istotle on False Reasoning which appearsto be the first modernbook-length study in English of this text.9 In the S.E. Aristotle has a double project: he aims to identify the various sources of false but 'apparent' reasoning, and then to provide the means to resolve the resultant confusion. His analysis is based on a distinction between false reasoning 'due to language' (para ten lexin) and false reasoning 'outside of language' (exo tes lexeos). Commentators have tended to regard this distinction (and the way in which Aristotle assigns examples to the various sub-classes) as arbitrary, and have even often regarded the arguments 'outside of language' as basically reducible to

9 Scott G. Schreiber,Ari.stotle on False Reasoning. Language and the Worlld in the Sophistical Refutations, New York (SUNY Press) 2003; xv + 243 pp.; ISBN 0 7914 5659 5 (hc.) / 0 7914 5660 9 (pbk.); $ 68.50 (hc.) / $ 22.95 (pbk.).

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arguments 'due to language'. S.'s main aim in this clearly written and well organized book is to argue against this reductionist view and to show that most types of false reasoning (including all those 'due to language' that are based on 'double meaning') derive their persuasiveness from some sort of extralinguistic misconception. Proper reasoning, in other words, requires a properontology. This is not to say that S. defends Aristotle's approachin the S.E. at all costs: he also shows, for example, that Aristotle's account of multivocity is confused in failing to see the multivocity of "multivocity"(i.e. by not distinguishing between semantic multivocity in the strict sense and multivocity which is due to the same signifier making reference to multiple individuals under one universal). All in all, this book offers a clear and overall persuasiveaccount of the logic of the S.E. as not being metaphysicallyneutral. I move on to the new general introductionto Aristotle's philosophy by It think it is fair to say that it tries to distinguishitself from RichardBode'us.'0 most existing introductionsby a slightly more historical approach, focusing on what was at stake for Aristotle himself in doing philosophy. Centralquestions are: what is the nature of the corpus aristotelicum, how did Aristotle work and how did he see his philosophical project (a question which also involves the issue of the interrelation- or lack of it - between the various partsof philosophy).The book consists of three partswhich do not correspond to any of the traditionalways of carving up Aristotle's philosophy, but rather work out three key aspects of Aristotle the philosopher:the studentof nature, the student of Plato, the promoter of the complete life. The first part ('l'Asclepiade') deals with Aristotle's physics and biology, rightly stressing that this area representsthe main focus of Aristotle's philosophical activity (something which modern exegesis, with its predilection for the problems of 'first philosophy' tends to forget); the second part ('Le Platonicien') charts the continuityand discontinuitybetween Plato and Aristotle, covering not only Aristotle's criticism of the theory of the Forms, but also dialectic, rhetoric, logic and scientific method (one misses a treatmentof the Poetics); the third part ('Le philosophe de l'intelligence') focuses on the two intellectualvirtues that are most crucial for human happiness: 'sagacite' (phronesis) and 'sagesse' (sophia) and on the more or less correspondingdisciplines of practical philosophy and metaphysics or first philosophy. Because of its unorthodox structure the book may be a bit inaccessible as a primer, and the 'bibliographieselective' contains some odd choices. All in all, however, what we get here is a very decent and historically accurateintroductionto Aristotle.

dsavoir, Paris (Vrin) 2002; 't RichardBodeus, Aristote. Une philosophic en que dte 267 pp.; ISBN 2 7116 1564 2; e 18.00.

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B. includes a fairly extensive discussion of Aristotle's concept of matter (pp. 61-66), pointing out that it is 'un concept relatif' and signalling the difference between 'matiere prochaine' and 'matiere lointaine'. Yet he has no qualms in speaking of 'matiere premiere' and - probablyin line with his general tendency to keep his discussion of Aristotle as free as possible from modern philosophical and exegetical preoccupations- he does not even allude to the recent debate on the feasibility of the very notion of materia prima. From the point of view of the earlier Aristotelian traditionthis may be defensible, and it should be said that modern discussions of the problem are sometimes irritatinglypedantic as if it is clear to any objective observer what Aristotle himself actually believed and as if the whole ancient and medieval tradition consisted of fools who didn't realize that they were saddling Aristotle with a basically incoherent notion. Those interested in this problem and in recent attemptsto deal with it may be especially interestedin the volume Aristotle's On Generation and Corruption,Book I, edited by Frans de Haas and Jaap Mansfeld,which containsthe proceedingsof the XVth SymposiumAristotelicum, held in Deurne (The Netherlands)in August 1999." Since I am myself among the contributors,I refrain from discussing its contents here in any detail. Let me just signal that the book contains a chapter-by-chapter discussion of the whole of GC I, as well as an introductorychapter by Myles Burnyeat, and an additional note on Aristotle on mixture by John Cooper,'2 and that the problem of prime matter figures prominently - and is treated in different ways - in three of the contributions(Algra, Broadie and Charles).'3

" Frans de Haas & Jaap Mansfeld (eds.), Aristotle On Generationand Corruption, Book 1, Oxford (Oxford University Press) 2004, viii + 347 pp.; ISBN 0 19 924292 5; ? 45.00. 12 Contents: M. F. Burnyeat, 'Aristotle on the Foundationsof Sublunary Physics'; Jacques Brunschwig, 'On Generation and Corruption I, 1: A False Start?'; David Sedley, 'On Generation and Corruption I, 2'; Keimpe Algra, 'On Generation and Corruption 1, 3: Substantial Change and the Problem of Not-Being'; Sarah Broadie, 'On Generation and Corruption I, 4: Distinguishing Alteration'; David Charles, 'Simple Genesis and Prime Matter';Alan Code, 'On Generationand CorruptionI, 5'; Carlo Natali, 'On Generation and Corruption I, 6'; Christian Wildberg, 'On Generation and Corruption 1, 7: Aristotle on poiein and paschein; Edward Hussey, 'On Generation and Corruption I, 8'; Michel Crubellier, 'On Generation and Corr-uption I, 9'; Dorothea Frede, 'On Generation and Corruption I, 10: On Mixture and Mixables'; John M. Cooper, 'A Note on Aristotle on Mixture'. 13 Perhaps I may add a small correction:Algra's contributiondoes not claim that Aristotle did have a 'philosophical motivation to posit prime matter', as the Editor's Introduction (p. 3) seems to suggest. It just claims that such a motivation is not unthinkable;for the rest it suspends judgement on the general issue, which it claims should be treated as an empirical question, ratherthan as a matter of principle.

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Finally, I turn to Robert Mayhew's The Female in Aristotle's Biology.'4 It is a small book - actually in a sense more of a pamphlet- designed to deflate the often repeatedclaim that Aristotle's biological works are thoroughlycontaminated by misogynist prejudice. Part of the book apparentlygrew out of an article on entomology ('King-bees and Mother-wasps:a Note on Ideology and Genderin Aristotle's Entomology') publishedin this journal in 1999. M.'s starting point, in trying to salvage Aristotle, is an 'ideology test' which he takes over, in a slightly modified form, from an article by Charles Kahn. According to this test we are entitled to interpreta certain claim as ideologically biased if (1) it does in fact tend to promotea certain ideological agenda or justify particularsocial interests, and (2) if it either (a) rests upon arbitraryor implausible assumptionsor unusually bad arguments,or (b) conflicts with other fundamentalprinciples held by the same thinker.Armed with this of Aristotle's biolitmus test M. attacks a variety of feminist interpretations logical works. Thus he shows that in entomology Aristotle is open-minded ratherthanjust intent to show male superiority(against (1)), and that his arguments are not unusually bad, for he relies, as he so often does, on traditional views and common names (against (2a)). As for embryology, M. convincingly argues that Aristotle allows for a specific contributionof the female in the according formation of the foetus (defusing the rathercommon interpretation to which she merely offers a receptacle, or inert matter) and that the arguHe also argues that Aristotle's claim ments used by Aristotle are non-arbitary. that the female is 'as it were a mutilated male' is supportedby evidence of sorts (i.e. by the kind of evidence Aristotle is in general preparedto admit in biology), ratherthan based on mere bias. M. goes on to show that also in the area of anatomy, where we encountersome notorious views (for example that women have smaller brains and fewer teeth), Aristotle may have had the wrong reasons for his beliefs, but that these reasons were not ideologically biased (the claim about smaller brains, for example, crucially depends on Aristotle's conviction that the brain is supposed to cool the pericardialblood, coupled with the claim that in the male the region around the heart is more sanguine and hotter than in the female; contraryto what many critics suggest, it is nowhere connected with a difference in cognitive capacities, which after all are located in the heart). Finally, claims on women being softer and 'less spirited' (which, by the way, even to Aristotle is not necessarily a bad thing) are to be explained not by reference to any particular gender bias on Aristotle's part, but by the boring fact that contemporaryGreek culture as a whole tended to view women in this way. And of course Aristotle's philosophical method, making ample room for popularlyheld beliefs, arguablydid not foster a particularlycritical attitude on his part in this respect.
1' Robert Mayhew, The Female in Aristotle's Biology, Chicago (The University of Chicago Press) 2004; x + 136 pp.; ISBN 0 226 51200 2; $ 28.00.

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All this seems pretty sound, even if M.'s argument is not always elegant (we hardly need the repeated assertion that Aristotle and his contemporaries lacked the microscope), and even if he is sometimes a shade too apologetic on Aristotle'spart.Thus, I thinkBertrand Russell's famousremarkthat 'Aristotle could have avoided the mistake of thinking that women have fewer teeth than men, by the simple device of asking Mrs. Aristotle to keep her mouth open while he counted' (quoted on p. 81) is hardly a mark of 'breathtakingarrogance' (M., ibidem). It is just funny and actually rather to the point (given the fact that in other cases Aristotle the biologist does appear to be capable of the kind of straightforward and careful observation Russell had in mind). Anyway, the bottomline of the story seems to be that Aristotle lived and worked in a different era and in a different culture, whereas his concept of 'evidence' was broader than what we would be willing to accept. M. winds up his concluding chapterby claiming that Aristotle 'would have changed his mind about the capabilities of women (e.g. concerning their ability to be scientists or philosophers) after one conversation with a female scientist or philosopher- though not with some of his harshest feminist critics, whom he might easily have taken as evidence for his original position'. He is probably right on both accounts.