Int J Semiot Law (2008) 21:247296 DOI 10.

1007/s11196-008-9063-7

Beyond Peirce: The New Science of Semiotics and the Semiotics of Law
Charls Pearson

Published online: 15 August 2008 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Abstract This paper shows how Peirces semeiotic could be turned into a powerful science. The New Science of Semiotics provides not only a new paradigm and an empirical justication for all these applications, but also a rational and systematic procedure for carrying them out as well. Thus the New Science of Semiotics transforms the philosophy of law into the science of legal scholarship, the discipline that I call jurisology. Keywords Semiotics Semeiotic Peirces philosophical principals Phenomenology Metaphysics Taxonomy

Although semiotics received its original spark of life from St. Augustine in the fth century C.E., for which he is rightly regarded as the father of semiotics, a moderate beginning of the development of semiotics as a science was not accomplished until the Scholastic Age [6]. In the Modern Age, the science of semiotics took a step backwards when Descartes framed modern thought in terms of images and ideas, both dyadic relations, although Locke [17] continued to mention semiotics as a goal of study. More recently, many attempts have been made to establish semiotics as a rigorous science, the best known of which are John of Poinsot in the sixteenth century, Charles Peirce [35] in the late ninteenth and early twentieth centuries, Ferdinand de Saussure in the early twentieth century, and Charles Morris [18] in the mid-twentieth century. Among all of these beginnings, only that of Peirce [34] was able to work out all of the logical and philosophical problems required to serve as a strong and solid foundation for the founding of a rigorous, empirical science. Among the many problems that Peirce [33] had to solve was the invention of a philosophy, a logic, an
C. Pearson (&) 4063 Champion Dr., Austell 30106, USA e-mail: Dr.Charls@AVillager.Org

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algebra, and a geometry of relations, including those for the triadic relations which Peirce found to constitute the very heart of semiotics. But if Peirces development [32] is to serve as the foundation of a new science, there must be something that comes after itsomething that goes beyond Peirce and looks like a genuine science rather than mere philosophical eloquence. What is this new science of semiotics? This essay will suggest one possible answer to that questionone that I refer to as the New Science of Semiotics. Peirce called his development semeiotic (pronounced seem-eye-OH-tik) after Lockes reference [17] to the Scholastic development. Therefore I will refer to it as the Semeiotic Paradigm. Over the years, my new science has come to be called the Semiotic Paradigm (pronounced sem-ee-AH-tik), especially within the environment of the Semiotic Society of Americas Special Interest Group for Empirical Semiotics (SIG/ES). I will therefore use that term to refer to it. The word semiotics itself only arose after an accidental mispronunciation by the anthropologist Margaret Meade. In order to qualify as a new science of semiotics, any development must satisfy three conditions. (1) It must extend beyond Peirce in a scientic way. (2) It must satisfy all of the conditions for any scientic paradigm, as rst discovered by Kuhn [16] but later extended by SIG/ES. And nally, it must be able to solve genuine semiotic problems of genuine interest to both semioticians and semioticists and to suggest fruitful new problems and approaches to solving problems. This essay will suggest that the Semiotic Paradigm satises all three conditions and thus provides such a New Science of Semiotics. I will start with the rst condition.

1 Beyond What: Characterizing Sciences Like all things Peircean, beyond is a relative term. In WHAT1 way is WHAT2 beyond Peirces WHAT3. Since my goal is to compare the Semiotic Paradigm of the science of semiotics to Peirces Semeiotic Paradigm of the science of semiotics, the question reduces to asking in what ways may sciences be characterized. I thus ask, In what ways is my Semiotic Paradigm beyond Peirces Semeiotic Paradigm?. 1.1 Taxonomy The rst characteristic of a science that I want to discuss is how it identies, distinguishes, and classies its objects of concern. The study of such problems is called taxonomy. The one characteristic shared by every science is that it must adopt some taxonomic system. Before doing that, scholars can only mumble unscientically (at best) and superstitiously (at worst) about their topic of concern. In the case of alchemy, such mumbles were called magical incantations. Alchemy only learned slowly over the centuries how to identify and distinguish the chemical elements as it gradually transformed itself into the science of chemistry. All sciences start in this pre-scientic stage and gradually evolve by trial and error into what may be called a taxonomic science. We will shortly learn that semiotics, like botany and zoology, remained in this taxonomic stage until just recently.

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Aristotle attempted to develop methods of aiding this effort with his logic of denition. The result of using Aristotles method of denition was to develop a taxonomy. In the study of signs, many scholars wrestled with denitions for their various categories of signs as the taxonomy of semiotics gradually ebbed and owed in its nearly fteen hundred years of development.1 St. Augustine was the rst to see the need for a science of signs and to attempt to dene the important kinds of signs. He is thus considered the father of semiotics. But the names of other scholars attempting to develop the semiotic taxonomy include, but are not limited to, Albertus Magnus, Petrus Hispanus, Duns Scotus, William of Occam, John Poinsot, John Locke, Charles Peirce, and Charles Morris. However, it was Charles Peirce, with his discovery of the nature of triadic relations and the triadic nature of all signs that was the rst to achieve a completely satisfactory and consistent taxonomy with his science of semeiotic. But Peirce, with his discovery of the three metaphysical categories (see Hausmanthis issue) and his all consuming interest in logic, failed to see any potential for semiotics beyond the taxonomic science needed to understand logic. In fact, Peirce died believing that logic and semiotics were coextensive. It was the great ambassador, Charles Morris [18], who foresaw more of the universal possibility and potential for the science of semiotics. 1.2 Teleology A second characteristic that distinguishes sciences is their use of the concept of goals, purposes, or ends. Aristotle [1] distinguished these as the nal of his four causes and determined that science has no place for these teleological2 explanations. Aristotles banishment of teleology from science worked wonderfully well for millenniums while scholars concentrated on the dyadic, or physical, sciences. But once scientists began to examine the human, or social and behavioral, sciences, teleology seemed to creep back into each one [3, 7]. It was Peirce who formally reintroduced teleology back into science, saying that teleology is always a required concept in every one of the triadic sciences but is never allowed in any of the dyadic sciences. In fact, teleology is one of the distinguishing differences between dyadic and triadic relations. 1.3 Triadic Another distinguishing characteristic for sciences refers to the kind of relations that they use to model reality. Experience has proven that all concepts in all of the physical sciences can be modeled mathematically by dyadic, or two places, relations. Although Peirce stated this initially, Faraday phrased it scientically by saying that all physical phenomena must be modeled in terms of eld theory. Later, Einstein rened this by saying that everything in all of the physical sciences can be
1 2

Roughly 400 CE (St. Augustine) to 1900 CE (Peirce). From the Greek word for nal.

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modeled by covariant tensors. On the other hand, it was Peirce who also discovered that all of the semiotic sciences require at least some triadic, or three place, relations. Peirces semeiotic paradigm brilliantly introduced triadic relations and teleology into his taxonomic science, but it still remained in the taxonomic stage nevertheless.

2 Beyond Taxonomy The teleological and triadic properties are required to characterize any stage of semiotics. They are part of what it means to be a sign. Only the taxonomic property characterizes a particular stage3 of any science. Are there any characteristics beyond the taxonomic science? Of course, the modern philosophy of science gives a resounding answer of Yes to this question. As Colapietro says (this issue): The value of Peirces theory of signs resides primarily not in providing us with a formal classication of signs, but in sketching in the most painstaking detail a heuristic framework for instituting and developing an empirical investigation of sign processes in their myriad formsFormal classications are, unquestionably, important; but they are valuable as tools of inquiry. For purposes of inquiry, nomothetic sciences go beyond classication in search of invariances. A mere taxonomy becomes less important than the search for general laws. Peirce, himself, noted this distinction when he referred to it as the qualitative sciences vs. the quantitative sciences. In a manuscript that was unpublished in Peirces lifetime, he says: every science has its Qualitative and its Quantitative stage; (MS 909: Chapter 1). The concepts of observation, measurement, and mathematics are introduced in this stage. Peirces General Law of Mind [32] was an initial attempt to develop a law of semiotics although this was not his motivation and he never interpreted this as an extension of his semeiotic beyond the taxonomic stage. Nomothetic sciences place a heavy reliance on inductive and deductive reasoning that is absent in mere taxonomic sciences. Abductivesubductive sciences are erroneously called hypothetico-deductive sciences. What nominalistic scholars refer to as hypotheses are usually instances of abductive reasoning, rst studied and explained by Peirce [32, 33]; and their socalled deduction (reasoning from interpreted generals to interpreted individuals) is really instances of subduction (reasoning from interpreted abstract theories to interpreted generals). But however they are called, it is obvious that abductive subductive sciences go beyond nomothetic sciences in search of principled explanations. Even though the search for laws remains important, the development of abstract theories to explain these laws also becomes important. Abductive subductive sciences are best described as promoting the invention of abstract theory, with principled explanation following by subduction from theory. Although Peirce developed many abstract concepts and an occasional snippet of theory, he claimed never to have had the time to develop a complete and systematic
3

The rst scientic stage.

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# 1. 2. 3. 4.

Stage Initial Taxonomic Nomothetic Abductive/subductive

Characterized by Alchemy Knowledge of the elements Mendeleevs Periodic Table Bohrs atomic theory

theory to explain his science of semeiotic. I like to think of my New Science of Semiotics as what Peirce would have done, had he had the time to develop itthat is, if Peirce had been a farmer instead of a backwoodsman, and had had the time to plough his own elds. To summarize the last two sections, I will use the history of chemistry as an example. Table 1 outlines the historical stages of chemistry. The rst column shows the historical stage of progression. The second column shows the scientic stage as discussed above. The last column gives an example when chemistry was in that stage.

3 The New Science of Semiotics In the New Science of Semiotics, the Semiotic Paradigm replaces the Semeiotic Paradigm of the Old Science by replacing Peirces metaphysical categorization scheme and taxonomy4 with a new empirical categorization scheme and taxonomy.5 The Semiotic Paradigm is the result of a 10-year campaign by the Semiotic Society of Americas Special Interest Group for Empirical Semiotics (SIG/ES) to nd a way to replace the honoric use of the word science in the phrase science of semiotics with meaningful science by extending semiotics beyond the taxonomic stage. During this time, many paradigms competed but only the Semiotic Paradigm survived [30].

4 The Semiotic Paradigm The Semiotic Paradigm is a complete scientic paradigm in Kuhns sense [16] with all six required subparadigms in the SIG/ES sense [26]. These include a language, terminology, and philosophy subparadigm called the language of Menetics; an observational subparadigm called experimental semiotics, a descriptive and invariance subparadigm called nomothetic semiotics, an explanatory and theoretical subparadigm called theoretical semiotics, a mathematical subparadigm called mathematical semiotics, and an applications subparadigm called applied semiotics.
4 5

Still using Peirces categorization schema, however. To be discussed in Sect. 4.4.2.

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4.1 The Language of Menetics Our rst subparadigm is the Philosophy, Language, and Terminology subparadigm, but it probably would be more appropriate to call it the Ogden and Richards subparadigm since it is their famous book, The Meaning of Meaning [20], that rst brought the necessity of developing a special philosophy, language, and terminology for the scientic study of meaning to the worlds attention. But, in point of historical fact, it is called Menetics, for the language of meaning [21]. 4.1.1 A Special Terminology The language of Menetics contains a special vocabulary designed by means of a computer science methodology used for designing computer languages. It contains a special terminology for studying information, meaning, and communication phenomena. Specications for this terminology were chosen using the procedure suggested by Ogden and Richards in their important book, The Meaning of Meaning [20]. It also is designed in such a way as to satisfy all three of Chomskys requirements for the design of any scientic language. For example, the language can be used to discover and describe an invariance in the nature of the empirical reality of all concepts as discussed next. 4.1.2 The Empirical Reality of Concepts 4.1.2.1 Introduction One overriding question in the philosophy of semiotics concerns the reality of concepts. Peirce [3234] asked how a concept, proposition, or argument could achieve empirical reality and in another place suggested that the Cartesian single-chain mode of deductive reasoning, used by modern logic for system building, be replaced by the multi-lament-cable mode of ampliative reasoning, used by his postmodern logic for scientic inquiry. This was all the hint that Wendell Garner, a mid-twentieth century psychologist, needed in order to develop a concept of operational convergence [12], which explained the empirical reality of operational scientic concepts. However, this still leaves unanswered the status of such important concepts as facts, laws, and theories. The language of Menetics allows Garners approach to be completely generalized giving a satisfactory answer for the empirical reality of all signs. 4.1.2.2 Empirical Convergence A proposed fact that is justied by a single observation is nothing but an ad-hoc eduction from a concrete singular to a specic individualnothing but a convenient shorthand for recording the data from that one observation. But a single fact that records and summarizes the data from many different observations, all made from an innite population of possible observations, and each made objectively and fairly on different individuals chosen by random sampling from the entire population using experimental design theory, gains more empirical reality with each new observation that justies it. This gain in empirical reality is called eductive phematic convergence. We say that the collection of

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observations converges to the empirical reality of the fact. Thus, eductive phematic convergence means that one fact converges to the recording and summarization of the data from many different observations. The resulting fact is a proposition with a concrete singular denotation. A proposed law that is justied by a single fact or single kind of experiment is nothing but an ad-hoc induction from a concrete singular to a hypothetical generalnothing but a convenient shorthand for describing that one fact or the results of that one kind of experiment. But a single law that describes many different facts or the results of many different experimental paradigms all observed from an innite population of possible facts or paradigms gains more empirical reality with each new fact or kind of experiment that requires it. This gain in empirical reality is called inductive phematic convergence. We say that the collection of facts or experimental paradigms converges to the empirical reality of the law. Thus, inductive phematic convergence means that one law converges to a description of many facts or the results of many different experimental paradigms. The resulting law is a proposition with a concrete general connotation. A proposed theory that is justied by a single law is nothing but an ad-hoc abduction from a concrete general to a hypothetical abstractionnothing but a convenient shorthand for remembering that one law. But a single theory that explains many different laws, all derived from an innite population of possible descriptions of independent phenomena, gains more empirical reality with each new law that enters into its network of explanation. This gain in empirical reality is called abductive dolemic convergence. We say that the collection of laws converges to the empirical reality of the theory. Thus, abductive dolemic convergence means that one theory converges to an explanation of many different laws. The resulting theory is an argument with an abstract singular pronotation. The above explication has been sketched out for propositions, or signs with phematic structure. It could equally well have been done for terms, or signs with rhematic structure, and for arguments, or signs with dolemic structure. Thus, we have a two-dimensional, nine-way classication of empirical convergence as shown in Table 2. This makes it clear that Garners concept of operational convergence is just my inductive rhematic convergence. Nevertheless, Garner, who followed a line of reasoning initiated by Peirce, provided the necessary motivation for the above explication.
Table 2 Forms of empirical convergence Convergence Eductive Inductive Abductive Rhematic Eductive Rhematic Inductive Rhematic Abductive Rhematic Phematic Eductive Phematic Inductive Phematic Abductive Phematic Dolemic Eductive Dolemic Inductive Dolemic Abductive Dolemic

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4.1.2.3 Garners Explication Wendell Garner was one of the earliest psychologists to apply Shannons concept of variation measures in modal statistics (informationso called) to problems of perception and other areas of experimental psychology [10, 11, 13, 22]. Although he came to use Shannons quantitative measure of information less and less in later years, the basic idea of information structure led him to develop several interesting semiotic concepts, such as the concept of dimensional integrality, and the concept of energic vs. informational properties [22]. In applying his basic methodology of Critical Realism,6 he had to ask himself how his concepts could achieve empirical reality, and in doing so, he explicated his concept of operational convergence [10, 12, 13, 22]. Garner gave as an example several of his own concepts. But one that will be more easily understood by present readers, is that of the many experiments involving, and the many different ways of observing and measuring, the observational temperature, all of which converge to essentially the same result and play the same role in the laws of thermodynamics, thus giving to the concept of temperature an empirical reality. One method of achieving convergence is to show that the results of two or more experiments based on two or more independent observational techniques are correlated. Garner claims that such corelational techniques provide a form of convergence themselves [12, p. 188]. This process of establishing the existence and nature of a concept based on psychosemiotic and sociosemiotic research and then seeking the semiotic basis for the concept is the very heart of the experimental research I have reported on over the last 35 years. It is, in fact, the very heart of my Paradigm Inversion Principle and its Semiotic Reinterpretation corollary (1981). See Sect. 4.2. Since it is convergence, rather than the precision of a single technique, that provides the empirical meaning of a concept, we should be free to use techniques of reasoning that are not as precise and reliable as we might otherwise prefer. As Garner says, The ultimate validity of a concept does not depend on any single procedure, but on a convergent result, so the importance of any one procedure is greatly diminished. [12, p. 188].7 4.1.2.4 Summary of the General Concept of Convergence Four things have become obvious from performing this systematic analysis of the source of empirical reality for all concepts. First, concepts with empirical reality t together systematically into a diagrammatic system very similar to the ampliative half of the Ladder of Scientic Reasoning [8, 29]. This is shown in Fig. 1: Empirical Convergence and Ampliative Reasoning. Eductive convergence may also be called observational convergence. Inductive convergence may also be called descriptive convergence, although one particular form of it, inductive phematic convergence, was called operational convergence by Garner [12]. And abductive convergence may also be called explanatory convergence.

6 7

Ironically, this is the same name that Peirce gave to his own philosophy. Cf. Peirces concept of a multi-lament cable and his convergence concepts of truth and reality.

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Symbol Abductive Icon Inductive Index Eductive Convergence

Fig. 1 Empirical convergence and ampliative reasoning

Convergence

Convergence Index

Second, the diagrammatic system of Fig. 1 may be factored into the product of two vectors. One vector along the semantic dimension refers to the nature of ^; for ampliative reasoning: eduction, induction, and abduction. Let us call it S semantic, so that ^ hEduction, Induction, Abductioni S The other vector lies along the pragmatic dimension and refers to the ^ ; for pragmatic, so that grammatical complexity of the scientic sign. Let us call it G ^ hRheme, Pheme, Dolemei: G ^T G ^ gives the 3 by 3 matrix that abstracts Table 2 and Then the convergence of S yields back all of Fig. 1. Thus, we can see that all concepts are composed of two, more elementary, semiotic concepts; one involving pragmatic complexity and lying along the pragmatic dimension, while the other involves the nature of ampliative reasoning required to give empirical reality to the concept, and lying along the semantic dimension. As is inherent in semiotic structure, each vector consists of exactly three components and each is also in exactly the order dictated by the universal sign structure theory [21, 2427]. Third, all concepts in Table 2 involve nite sampling from an innite population. ^ or G ^ ; and which one, or must it Can this statistical process be restricted to either S involve both? I think it is clear that the sampling process is a function of only the kind of reasoning involved in developing the empirical reality of the concept and is independent of the pragmatic complexity. This is easiest to see in connection with the inductive modes of reality convergence. Whether it is inductive rhematic convergence (Garners operational convergence), inductive phematic convergence (classical Theophrastian induction), or inductive dolemic convergence (my descriptive convergence), the explication of the concepts above should have made it clear that the nature of the nite sampling from an innite population remains the same.

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In the case of the abductive modes of reality convergence, this is a little more difcult to see, because of the questions of network cohesion and inheritance from the primary convergence concept (that of abductive dolemic convergence to a theory), but not very much more. In the abductive process, the investigator considers a nite sample from an innite population of laws to abduce one abstract explanatory theory. The principles and other propositions of the theory and the terms and other rhematic concepts of the theory then inherit their empirical reality from their cohesiveness in the theory and the empirical reality of the theory itself. I think this may be most difcult to see in the case of the eductive modes of reasoning. This is because traditionally, logicians and philosophers have been conditioned to thinking of eduction as did Aristotle: as reasoning from one individual to another. Instead, we must reason from the innite population of concrete singulars, the distributed collection that results from applying deduction to every one of the undistributed members of the concrete general. We extract a nite sample on this innite population using the Peircean methodology8 and reason to an observation, fact, or procedure. Thus we can now see that all forms of ampliative reasoning require nite sampling from an innite population, and that this is represented within the ^: It also follows that all scientic concepts involve ampliative semantic vector S reasoning. Fourth and last, all concepts involve the asymptotic approach of an innite possibility of vague proposals to a more or less precise xed limit concept as the appropriate sample size increases,9 i.e., as our condence in the knowledge of the sampling process and the nature of the innite population increases. This is consistent with Peirces asymptotic concept of truth and its twin concept of reality, which breaches the distinction between correspondence theories of truth and reality and cohesive theories of truth and reality. 4.2 The Observation Subparadigm Our second scientic subparadigm concerns observation, measurement, and experiment. This section introduces a discussion of this topic that results in the development of a semiotically oriented understanding of semiotic observation, measurement, instrument, experiment, evidence, and data. All of the objects of the physical sciences are tangible. We can grasp billiard balls and hold them in our hands. The only thing that prevents us from grasping, touching, and holding planets in our hands is size and distance. We could do so if we were bigger and they were closer. On the other hand, all of the objects of the semiotic sciences are intangible. We cannot grasp, touch, or hold in our hand a logical form, a legal interpretation, or the meaning of a word. For this reason, they are called ephemeral, or esoteric.

8 9

Combining random selection with the appropriate experimental design. As small as one in the case of a good guess at a theory.

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We can easily observe and measure the tangible objects of the physical sciences. It is much harder to measure the ephemeral objects of the semiotic sciences. But it can be done. This section is about observing and measuring these ephemeral, esoteric intangibles of the semiotic sciences. 4.2.1 Principles of Observational and Experimental Semiotics Five powerful principles have been found useful for designing instruments, experiments, and observations in semiotics. The rst is the principle of semiotic reinterpretation, a generalization of an earlier principle enunciated for the physical sciences by Albert Einstein. The second is the principle of paradigm inversion, a corollary of the rst. The third one is the principle of interdisciplinary translation, an application of the rst two. Finally we have two principles that have always proven useful in all of the sciences: the principle of gedanken experiments and the principle of logical extremes. 4.2.1.1 The Principle of Semiotic Reinterpretation The principle of semiotic reinterpretation states that all USEFUL information measures can be reinterpreted as a natural law describing a regularity between a semiotic measure and another measure in any discipline. This can thus be seen as a rule for interdisciplinary translation.10 A more restricted version of this rule was stated by Einstein in such a way that it held only for the physical sciences. The statement here holds for all semiotic sciences in general. 4.2.1.2 The Principle of Paradigm Inversion The principle of paradigm inversion may be summarized as follows: Every single experimental paradigm in each of the cognitive sciences, in each of the information sciences, and in each of the semiotic sciences, can be inverted to supply an experimental paradigm which may be developed for Semiotics. It is also interesting to note in passing that the principle of paradigm inversion is a corollary of the principle of semiotic reinterpretation but it is beyond the scope of this essay to go into this relationship here. Again, like the principle of semiotic reinterpretation, this is a rule for interdisciplinary translation. The paradigm inversion principle also enables us to distinguish between semiotics and each of the cognitive, information, or semiotic sciences. For instance, psychology uses known properties of signs as a probe to investigate the structure of behavior, whereas semiotics uses the known structure of behavior as a probe to investigate the structure of signs [30]. As another example of an application of the paradigm inversion principle to distinguish between disciplines, logic uses known properties of signs as a probe to investigate the structure of reasoning, whereas semiotics uses the known structure of reasoning as a probe to investigate the structure of signs. And as my nal example: legal studies uses the known properties of signs as a probe to investigate the structure of the Law, whereas
10

See Pearson [24].

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semiotics uses the known structure of the Law as a probe to investigate the structure of signs. The paradigm inversion principle was explicated in Pearson [23] and further rened in Pearson [24]. However, its interdisciplinary aspects have never been fully analyzed before. We will therefore take up this task in Sect. 4.2.2.2. 4.2.1.3 Translation Rules for Interdisciplinarity in Experimental Semiotics The principle of interdisciplinary translation simply provides the translation rules for interdisciplinarity in experimental semiotics. Most of what I am going to say in this section has already been said in other places. However, by bringing it all together into one context and focusing on interdisciplinary translation, a new unity emerges. 4.2.1.4 Gedanken Experiment (a la Carnap) The method of Gedanken experiment was popularized by Einstein who used the term to mean an experiment that could be carried out completely by merely thinking it through without resort to any actual laboratory apparatus and whose result was so clear that it settled some outstanding question, thus the term Gedanken, the German word for thought. However, Carnap [4] adopted the method and used it extensively to show how to conduct experiments in logic and other semiotic sciences. 4.2.1.5 Method of Logical Extremes The method of logical extremes is a form of Gedanken experiment that has always been used to check the soundness of an observation or result. By carrying a preliminary conclusion to its logical extreme and comparing the result to common sense one can check on its original soundness. Peirce warns that this kind of speculative thought is a risky mode of inquiry because it is susceptible to the vagaries of you and me, but it is still essential. He explains, Nothing is more unwise than to carry an idea to extreme lengths, yet in speculative thought, it is the greatest of locomotives for advancing upon the road to truth. Indeed it is the extreme cases which alone teach you anything new [34, p. 193]. 4.2.2 A Close Relation Between Interdisciplinarity, Observation, and Measurement We nd that there are many forms of interdisciplinarity11 and that semiotics provides a means of interdisciplinary translation satisfying all of them. But, in addition, the semiotic approach yields a new understanding of interdisciplinarity, with the concept of measurement playing the key role as the central concept of all forms of interdisciplinarity. In this respect, the paradigm inversion principle is seen as the archetypical method of interdisciplinary translation due to its relation to the notions of measurement and interdisciplinarity. 4.2.2.1 Kinds of Interdisciplinarity In talking of interdisciplinarity, we must distinguish between different kinds of interdisciplinarity, among which are:
11 I want to acknowledge the inspirational help of Thomas Daddesio who rst asked me to analyze interdisciplinary translation.

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Conceptual interdisciplinarity, including the concept of sign and the concept of information measures; Representational interdisciplinarity; Linguistic interdisciplinarity; Mathematical interdisciplinarity; Theoretical interdisciplinarity; Methodological interdisciplinarity; Analysis of concepts that will reformulate the study of other disciplines; Application to semiotics of insights and metaphors drawn from other disciplines; and Semiotics can be used to analyze signs that are the proper object of study by other disciplines.

Conceptual Interdisciplinarity: There are several concepts that cut across many disciplines. First and foremost among these is the concept of sign that cuts across all of the semiotic sciences. The Semiotic Paradigm is a Kuhnian [16] scientic paradigm that specically addresses the interdisciplinarity of sign phenomena. Another concept that cuts across all of the semiotic sciences is that of information measures. The principle of semiotic reinterpretation is an interdisciplinary solution to this problem. Representational Interdisciplinarity: Representation is an interdisciplinary problem that cuts across all the sciences of second intention (the Cognitive Sciences, the Informational Sciences, and the Semiotic Sciences). This problem and its interdisciplinary nature were discussed at length in Pearson [27]. Linguistic Interdisciplinarity: Most talk about language, information, and meaning in any appropriate setting is non-testable and limited to a very narrow range of topics. The language of Menetics was created in a deliberate attempt to design a language that was adequate in all three of Chomskys senses that could create linguistic interdisciplinarity by translating in an empirically testable manner between all of the disciplines that talk about language, logic, information, meaning, and communication. The language of Menetics was developed in Pearson [21] and discussed at length in Pearson [26]. Mathematical Interdisciplinarity: The mathematical structure of information, communication, and meaning is a universal problem across all of the semiotic sciences and one that mathematical semiotics addresses. The mathematics of triadic relations was developed by Peirce and discussed in Pearson [26] as a means of satisfying the formal needs of interdisciplinary research. Theoretical Interdisciplinarity: The theoretical components of the Semiotic Paradigm, the USST and the TOS, discuss the theoretical relations between semiotics and the various semiotic sciences and this gives us a reason for desiring interdisciplinary translation of theory [26]. Methodological Interdisciplinarity: Many experimental methods can be applied, after suitable translation, across several discipline boundaries, giving rise to a concept of methodological interdisciplinarity. The paradigm inversion principle is an interdisciplinary methodological principle that unies the method of translating methodology between disciplines. The paradigm inversion principle was introduced in Pearson [24, 25, 39]. The basis for using this sense of

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methodological interdisciplinarity as a means for deepening our understanding of interdisciplinarity is the thesis of the present section. Interdisciplinarity due to the Reformulation of Other Disciplines: Finally, Semiotics can analyze concepts that will reformulate the study of other disciplines. This will not only aid the development of the other semiotic sciences, it will also help to develop a systematic methodology for interdisciplinary translation. Semiotics can use insights and metaphors drawn from other disciplines. This will not only aid the development of semiotics, but also further aid in the development of a systematic methodology of interdisciplinary translation. Sign theory can be used to analyze systems of signs that are the proper object of study by other disciplines. Such was the meaning of Garners plea to study the structure of the psychological stimulus [12]. 4.2.2.2 Details of the Principle of Paradigm Inversion Many of the sciences related to semiotics are much more mature as sciences than the parent discipline itself and this is especially the case with the cognitive sciences. Examples are experimental psychology, cognitive psychology, perceptual psychology, computer science, linguistics, etc. This claim of maturity is simply a claim that they have developed a more advanced empirical methodology than has semiotics, including an inventory of experimental paradigms. Is there any way that semiotics can avail itself of this reservoir of experimental paradigms in the cognitive sciences? The answer is a resounding yes. The process is called inverting the paradigm or turning the sock inside out. It allows semiotics to adopt every single experimental paradigm in each of the cognitive sciences. The procedure is best understood by noting the role that interdisciplinary translation played in the growth of empirical methodology over the history of scientic development. In eld after eld we see instance after instance where a controlled but unmeasurable unit or process in one eld led to the discovery of a general result in a distinct but related eld. This general result was in turn then inverted and used as the means of measuring the originally unmeasurable unit or process. This process has been repeated many times in the history of science. It is a process that is completely generalizable and holds between semiotics and all of its related sciences. In fact, semiotics is the common ground between all the semiotic sciences, and it is only by taking the semiotic point of view for each of them that their unity can be understood, and their methodology and knowledge become interadaptable. Thus, we have Fig. 2. The statement that humans are too subjective, or too variable, to use as measurement standards just does not hold up. The use of a xed panel of subjects as a measurement standard is no more variable than the use of a bar of only one length as a length standard and is just as complete. We get entirely different concepts of temperature (not just different units) if we change our standard thermometer from alcohol to water, and mercury gives yet another. It took almost two centuries of experimentation to arrive at the theory which incorporated the abstract conception of temperature involving ideal gasses. It will also take many experiments before we arrive at the proper idealizations to replace concrete subjects in semiotics but, in the meantime, experimentation and measurement are both possible and necessary, and the principle of paradigm inversion allows us to proceed with our work.

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Computer Science Esthetics Theology

261

Economics

Semiotics/ Information Science

Psychology

Ethics Sociology

Linguistics

Fig. 2 The interdependence of the semiotic sciences

4.2.2.3 Summary Several of the principles previously enunciated as guides for empirical research in semiotics are in essence translation rules for bringing interdisciplinarity to bear on experimental problems in semiotics [2]. In Subsect. 4.2.2.1, we examined nine different kinds of interdisciplinarity and found that semiotics cuts across all of them and that the Semiotic Paradigm, a scientic paradigm in the Kuhnian [16] sense, for the whole eld of semiotics, has already provided means for handling each of these senses of interdisciplinarity. The examination further showed that the Paradigm Inversion Principle, which generates the experimental component of the Semiotic Paradigm, was at the core of each of these concepts of interdisciplinarity. We then proceeded to examine the Paradigm Inversion Principle in Subsect. 4.2.2.2 and found that, in interdisciplinary translation, the experimental paradigm, the observation procedures, and the measurement methodology were the invariant heart of the success of the Principle. 4.2.3 Measurement In Subsect. 4.2.2, we examined the role of interdisciplinary translation in facilitating the observation, measurement, and design of semiotic experiments. We found that this was due to the fact that the concept of measurement itself played an important role in our understanding of interdisciplinary translation. In this subsection we examine the concept of measurement in greater depth. Those of us who grew up as working scientists have an intuitive understanding of measurements and instruments. When faced with a practical problem of measurement, we can perform it adequately, or invent an instrument to do so. However, when pressed to abstract from the concrete context of the lab and explain the nature of measurement and instruments in general, most of us would probably be perplexed by the question. However, it has a direct bearing on many of the problems faced by semiotics today. This subsection addresses the question of the abstract nature of measurement and instruments in general. Fittingly enough for a tool that is to be applied in empirical semiotics, the question is treated from a semiotic standpoint. The phenomenon to be measured is

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treated as a message of nature and the measurement itself is treated as a translation process that adds indexical, iconic, and symbolic structure to that message in an operationally specied way. Using this analysis, physical and semiotic measurements have the same structure, and physical and semiotic instruments have the same structure [15]. Knowledge of this structure is useful for comparing the nature of semiotic experiments with the nature of physical experiments, and, in passing, shows that semiotic experiments are possible and epistemologically valid. This also legitimizes and explains semiotic evidence and semiotic data. 4.2.3.1 The Measurement Process Measurement theory tells us that measurement is a means of determining the magnitude of some aspect of an individual object by operationally specifying one member of a set of names to the object in such a way that some structure among the set of names is algebraically homomorphic to some structure of the set of all objects of a particular kind that includes the object being measured. The set of names is usually chosen from some number system. However, this measurement theory denition does not tell us anything about the structure of the operational specication, the real heart of the measurement. In particular, we would like to know enough about this structure to determine if semiotic measurement is possible, the nature of semiotic evidence, the nature of semiotic data, whether a semiotic experiment is possible, and whether there can be such a thing as a semiotic instrument. Also, if such things are possible, we would like to compare semiotic measurements to physical measurements, semiotic instruments to physical instruments, and semiotic experiments to physical experiments. The denition I have chosen to explicate is that a measurement selects a particular message of nature and: Translates this into an index by means of a transducer function which uses an operationally specied procedure; Translates the index into an icon (or equivalentlyadds iconic structure to the index) by means of an interpretation-function which uses an operationally specied procedure to employ either a physical linkage or an observer/device interaction; and nally; Translates the icon into a symbol by means of a scale function which uses an operationally specied procedure to add symbolic structure to the icon. The symbol is the measurement and must preserve the original structure of interest by means of a homomorphic mapping.

If a sign process can perform these three functions, then it will accomplish everything that we understand by the term measurement. 4.2.4 Instruments If measurements are messages of nature, then instruments are the communication devices that give us access to those messages. Instruments, in conjunction with the experimental paradigm, select one message of nature and measure that message. They provide access to read and record the measurement in symbolic form.

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Since there are a set of appropriateness conditions at each semiotic interface, the form of the instrument must match the form of the message, and the design of the instrument must satisfy all appropriateness conditions. The instrument provides for the physical or semiotic transducer, as appropriate, the interpretation stage, and the scale; and it assures the satisfaction of the appropriateness condition at each interface. 4.2.5 Summary The important questions to be answered in this summary are four: what are semiotic (1) measurements, (2) instruments, (3) experiments, and (4) data; and a subsidiary result is: how do they compare and differ from their physical counterparts. 4.2.5.1 Semiotic Measurements In Sect. 4.2.3.1 we saw the structure of a measurement. In addition, teleology is important in measurement because of the presence of a true third. In a semiotic measurement, the interpretation function is an observer/device interaction which partakes of a true third in adding iconic structure to the message of nature. The measurement icon is the interpretant of the observer/ device interaction and the observer becomes part of the measurement process. Because the measurement involves a true third and the observer becomes part of the interpretation process the observers goals, motivations, aims, purposes, etc. all become part of that interpretation. Hence, observer training becomes critical for accurate and reliable semiotic measurements. In semiotic measurements, teleology becomes part of the measurement process and good measurement methodology must take this into account. Finally, with these caveats in place we can see that semiotic measurements are certainly possible and that many semioticists have already been making them for many years. We also see that semiotic measurements are the same as physical measurements, with two exceptions. In semiotics, the objects of measurements are regarded as signs while physics regards them as physical objects. This is a nominal difference only. In either case, the messages of nature which these objects or signsthey are the same thinggenerate are called the texts of nature. However, a more important difference between semiotic measurements and physical measurements lies in the interpretation function which requires a true interpretive interaction with the observer in semiotic measurements. Thus the observer becomes part of the measurement process itself in semiotic measurements and the measurement itself becomes a true third, or semiotic process. This can raise all kinds of teleological problems if not controlled in the design of the measurement process; but these problems can be controlled and reliable semiotic measurements made, as evidenced in the theory of instruction used to instruct subjects in all contemporary experiments in cognitive psychology. Thus the critical difference between physical and semiotic measurement is not ontological, but epistemological. 4.2.5.2 Semiotic Instruments In Subsect. 4.2.4, we saw that the notion of an instrument could be generalized in such a way that semiotic and physical

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instruments have the same conceptual structure with the one difference being that semiotic instruments are designed to facilitate the observer/device interaction which constitutes the interpretation linkage of the measurement process. There are thus some additional technological considerations in the design of semiotic instrumentation, but otherwise business is pretty much the same as usual between physical and semiotic instruments. Many psychological instruments are semiotic instruments, such as the IQ Test, to name a notorious one, or familiarity of words as measured in cognitive psychology. The eidometer is a semiotic instrument that has been in use for many years. 4.2.5.3 Semiotic Experiments In this section, we saw that the generalization in the measurement and instrument concepts that allowed for semiotic measurements and instruments required us to distinguish the experimenter from the observer in analyzing the structure of an experiment. Here, too, we found the structure of both physical and semiotic experiments to be encompassed by the same generalized concept of an experiment. This concept, by the way, may be useful to physicists as well, as they wrestle with concepts of observability in fundamental particle physics. Not only are semiotic experiments possible but semioticists have been doing them for years. The one major difference between semiotic experiments and physical experiments lies in physics ability to use the experimenter as the observer and eliminate any considerations on the design of the observer set, while semiotics must not use the experimenter as an observer, and much care must be employed in the design of the observer set to facilitate control and analysis of teleological factors. 4.2.5.4 Semiotic Data We have seen throughout this analysis that data is merely the permanent recording of the measurement symbol and hence not only is semiotic data possible and meaningful, but there is absolutely no difference between semiotic data and physical data. The differences lie in the nature of measurements and instruments. 4.2.5.5 Future Problems for Empirical Semiotics This section showed us the importance of teleology in the conduct of semiotic experiments. It may very well become necessary to develop a technology of teleology, as suggested by John Dewey, including a theory of teleology in the design of very rened semiotic instrumentation and experiments. This is currently encompassed in the instruction and training of the experimental subjects, but this alone may not be enough. In fact, it may ultimately be necessary to revise our whole understanding of the causeeffect relation of science. Also in Sect. 1, it was pointed out that the operational specication of the observer/device interaction may present us with new problems in triadic logic. In the meantime we must proceed with the tools we have to develop the classical empirical interaction between semiotic theory and experimental semiotics, becauseparaphrasing John Tyndallwith accurate experiment and observation to work upon, imagination becomes the architect of semiotic theory.

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4.3 Search for Invariants and Discovery of General Laws Our third scientic subparadigm concerns generalization, the search for invariants, and the discovery of the laws of semiotics. However, semiotic laws are neither so simple nor straight forward as physical laws. This is because of the presence of a true third in the law-like relations of semiotics and their absence in the physical sciences. In the last section, I introduced the concept of observation and measurement of the intangible and ephemeral phenomena of semiotics, the esoteric and living relations of the triadic sciences. We now switch to trying to make semiotic sense of these experiments and observations. Can any patterns or structure be found in semiotic data? Can the observed facts be generalized? Not if some philosophers are to be believed. These are the ones who say that the introduction of any living being or any form of mentation into the observations makes them too variable and too subjective to develop any cognizable patterns. However, this section will give a strongly afrmative answer to these questions. 4.3.1 Principles of Descriptive Semiotics The one great principle of descriptive semiotics is induction. However, since the results of induction are never guaranteed, all results of induction must be tested. This involves forms of metaphor, deduction, and eduction as well as induction. Abduction, Subduction, and Theoreduction also play a lesser role in the discovery of semiotic laws and for this reason their discussion will be delayed until Sect. 4.4. Laws are arrived at by induction from a set of facts and observations to a general description that describes both the known facts and observations as well as many new facts and observations not yet observed. A law has the status of a best working description that describes the patterns in the data.12 Induction carries us from signs with indexical structure to signs with full iconic structure. This allows the development of general concepts and their relations. Generalization is achieved by induction from the observed data to a best working description of a pattern or invariance in the data. 4.3.2 The Law of Word Interpretation, an Example Our example of invariant generalization shows the power of semiotic instruments within the new science of semiotics to increase knowledge and understanding across all the semiotic sciences. This example discusses one measurable aspect of signs, generated by semiotic shape, and a very simple and pervasive regularity which has been found to hold between it and the interpretability of articial words. The technical term for this shape concept is eidontic deviance, which is a metrological explication of the strangeness of the shape of a sign.
12 See Sect. 4.1.2. for the concept of empirical convergence of many facts to one law that describes them all.

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An instrument, called the eidometer, was invented in order to quantify an intuitive relation between eidontic deviance and interpretability suggested by the work of both Shannon regarding the shape of articial words and that of Miller, Bruner, and Postman regarding the interpretability of articial words. Experimental analysis of this relation using the eidometer led to a new law of information, called the Law of Word Interpretation. [21, 24, 26] which the author described as an empirical explication of the MillerBrunerPostman (MBP) effect: E a bS Finally, in investigating deviations from the Law of Word Interpretation, a systematic second order correction term was found that involved an informationlike function that describes a semiotic process of immediate memory, where the fi are the occurrence frequencies of the eight letters composing the shape of the sign [24]. F 1= 8
8 X i 1

lgfi

The experiments required for isolating this function reached the limits of reliability and precision of the Mk. IV eidometer. Without precise quantication of the Law of Word Interpretation, it would have been impossible to isolate this important semiotic relationship. 4.4 Explanation by Theory Our fourth subparadigm of the Semiotic Paradigm concerns abduction and the development of semiotic explanations, i.e., semiotic theories; however, this also requires an understanding of transduction, subduction, and the interpretation of theories. Theories are developed using Peirces method of abductive reasoning and tested by subductive reasoning back to empirical laws, and once accepted they are used to explain new or other laws by subductive reasoning back to the empirically observable world. We take up abduction next and subduction in Subsect. 4.4.4. 4.4.1 Abduction and Explanation One of Peirces many uses of the term abduction was for the invention of abstract theory to explain the generals of nature and life. Peirce called this reasoning to the best explanation of the phenomena. This is the meaning of abduction as used in the Semiotic Paradigm. Abduction carries us from signs with iconic structure to signs with full symbolic structure. This allows the development of abstract concepts, principles, theories, and their relations. Thus theory is arrived at by abduction from a set of known laws to a set of abstract principles that explain both the known laws and many new laws. Therefore, theory has the status of a best working hypothesis that explains the known laws.

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4.4.2 The Universal Sign Structure TheoryUSST The Universal Sign Structure Theory is the main explanatory tool of the semiotic paradigm for static structures. The standard version was adopted by SIG/ES in 2000 and is therefore known as the USST-2000. The USST is the static theory of sign structure for the semiotic paradigm, explaining the static structure of all signs. The dynamics of sign processes is explained by the Theory of Operational Semiotics (TOS), discussed in Subsect. 4.4.3. In Subsect. 4.4.2.1, I present the details of USST-2000, explaining the Universal Sign Structure Diagram and deriving some very elementary but important theorems on sign structure and sign classication that shows the intimate relation between the Peircean theory of taxonomy and the USST theory of sign structure. Then in Subsect. 4.4.2.2, I summarize a very few of the results of the USST, going far beyond the taxonomic science of semeiotic. 4.4.2.1 The USST-2000. Background The USST is an abstract theory whose purpose is to explain the nature of semiotic laws and to aid in the understanding of all semiotic reality. It can be developed logically as a result of Peirces abduction process. A sign is an abstraction and hence cannot really exist in the positivistic sense, but if it did exist, that would explain (insert here whatever semiotic law, effect, or phenomena you are trying to explain), and then apply the USST to derive that law, effect, or phenomena. The derivation is the semiotic explanation of the law, effect, or phenomena. The USST may be considered a development, or outgrowth, of Peirces Theory of Semeiotic. The reason for this is that throughout our investigations we have had occasion to use several different taxonomies, or classication schemes, for signs. Of these, only the classication by Peirce (CP)13 has proved to be satisfactory in every empirical setting for which a classication was wanted. We therefore ascribe the Peircean scheme an empirical reality, and would like our theory of sign structure to explain the applicability and usefulness of the Peircean classication scheme in terms of the structure of the sign. This is accomplished by the rst nine theorems of the theory. However, the USST goes beyond the Peircean theory in that it provides not only a taxonomy, but systematic methods of description and explanation as well. In this theory, language, meaning, information, and information measures are interpreted as semiotic phenomena and semiotic processes. Development of the USST The guts of the USST is embodied in the Universal Sign Structure Diagram, (USSD). The standard version, called the USSD-2000, is shown in Fig. 3. The theory is universal in the sense that it displays the structure of all categories of signs. In order to show how this diagram explains the Peircean taxonomy, we must rst state the following three principles of the theory: The Representation Principle: A sign must consist of a real triadic relation that signies. A sign, therefore, consists of three parts: a syntactic structure, a pragmatic structure, and a semantic structure.
13

The W series was not yet available at the time the majority of this work was performed.

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Pragmatic
God SpiritS EMS

SpiritT

EMT

IS

IT S&BCT The Renvoi Relation

S&BCS

Syntactic Semantic

Medium Cognitive Context

Cognitive Mentellect Syntactic Context

Shape

Ground

Fig. 3 The USSD-2000

The Principle of Internal/External Balance: The internal and external structure of a sign must be balanced, consisting in the syntactic and semantic dimensions of exactly one external component for each internal component and vice versa, and in the pragmatic dimension of exactly two external components for each internal component. The external components are called information generators and the internal components are called components of meaning. The double external structure in the pragmatic dimension is required because of its dual mediating role between the syntactic and the semantic dimensions and also between the source and target interpreters. The two sets of external components belong to the source and target structures, respectively. The Principle of Additional Structure: Whenever a sign has more than the minimum structure of one level in each dimension, the additional structure is built up from the center out (as per Fig. 3), and for each dimension independently (Fig. 4, Table 3). Using the USSD of Fig. 3 and these three principles, we can now explain the Peircean taxonomy of signs by means of nine representation14 theorems. Internal components are represented in the USSD by circles and the external components by ovals.
14

Representation is used here in its mathematical rather than its semiotic sense.

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Semiotic Structure of the Semantic Dimension

Semantic Function Internal Structure Mathematical Mode of Discrimination Model Perceiving Ontological Status

External Structure

Symbol Intension Extension Physical Stimulus Object Similarity Likeness

Pronotation

Pronension

Process

Arrangement

Subjective Interjective Objective

Icon

Connotation

Index

Denotation

External Cognitive Mentellect External Ground External Object

Internal Cognitive Mentellect Internal Ground Internal Object

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Semantic Function

Cognitive Function

MeaningProduced

Ontological Result

EpistemologicalResult

Ontologya

Symbol Generality Actuality

Abstract Singulars Concrete Icon Connotation Categorize Generals Index Denotation Individualize Concrete Singulars Possibility

Pronotation Conceptualize

Abstract Con- Universals cepts General ConProperties cepts Singular Con- Individuals cepts

World of Abstracts World of Generals World of Individuals

Requires only one ontology since each is but one way of looking at the single world (with a single ontology) of trinary relations

Universals include real: abstractions, possibilities, potential theories

Generals include real: properties, aspects, qualities

Singulars include real: individuals, objects 269

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Syntactic Context + Shape

Ontosion

Medium

Syntactic Context + Shape + Medium

Theory of Syntactic Structure

Syntactic Structure Abstracted (Abducted) into Syntactic Categories

Fig. 4 The syntactic sign category diagram

Certain rules of interpretation or translation between the theoretical vocabulary and the observational (or less theoretical) vocabulary will become apparent as we proceed with the proofs of these theorems15. The rules of interpretation are obvious, and they form an integral part of the theory. We rst dene the Peircean taxonomy.16 We then give the nine representation theorems, and nally an example proof. Denition 1 A sign, which exists as an abstract quality both in itself and in its relation to other signs, is called a tone.17 Denition 2 A sign, which exists as a general kind, both in itself and distinguishable from other signs, is called a type. Denition 3 A sign, which exists as an actual, single, physically existing individual, is called a token. Denition 4 A sign, whose interpretant represents it as a sign of possible reference to its interpreter, is called a rheme.

15 16

Now called the subduction rules. See Pearson [29].

Strictly speaking, this will not be exactly the Peircean taxonomy, but an explication of it (in the sense of Quine [36]) since the three classication schemes used by Peirce to dene his sign categories are signicantly changed, despite bearing the same names, due to a change in the concept of semiotic dimensionality [22].
17 It must be remembered that Peirce employed a great number of different and differing nomenclatures. The one adopted here was used in Pearson [22].

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Denition 5 A sign, whose interpretant represents it as a sign of fact or actual reference to its interpreter, is called a pheme. Denition 6 A sign, whose interpretant represents it as a sign of reason to its interpreter, is called a doleme.18 Denition 7 A sign, which is related to its object by an actual, single, existential, cause and effect relation, is called an index. Denition 8 A sign, which is related to its object by a concrete similarity between the shape of the sign and its object, is called an icon. Denition 9 A sign, which is related to its object by an arbitrary convention, agreement, or general law, is called a symbol. We may now state Theorems 19. Theorem 1 A sign is a tone iff it has exactly one level of syntactic structure. It therefore has one component of syntactic meaning (tagmension) and one syntactic information generator (the syntactic context). Theorem 2 A sign is a type iff it has exactly two levels of syntactic structure. It therefore has two components of syntactic meaning (tagmension and eidension) and two syntactic information generators (the syntactic context and the shape of the sign). Theorem 3 A sign is a token iff it has all three levels of syntactic structure. It therefore has three components of syntactic meaning (tagmension, eidension, and ontosion) and three syntactic information generators (the syntactic context, the shape of the sign, and the medium in which it is embodied). Theorem 4 A sign is a rheme iff it has exactly one level of pragmatic structure. It therefore has one component of pragmatic meaning (contension) and two pragmatic information generators (the source social/behavioral context of the sign and the target social/behavioral context of the sign). Theorem 5 A sign is a pheme iff it has exactly two levels of pragmatic structure. It therefore has two components of pragmatic meaning (contension and purporsion) and four pragmatic information generators (the source social/behavioral context, the target social/behavioral context, the source interpretation, and the target interpretation). Theorem 6 A sign is a doleme iff it has exactly three levels of pragmatic structure. It therefore has three components of pragmatic meaning (contension, purporsion, and emosion), and six pragmatic information generators (the source social/behavioral context, the target social/behavioral context, the source interpretation, the target interpretation, the source emotive mentellect, and the target emotive mentellect of the sign).

18

Peirces actual term was deloam from the Greek dekxl:

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Theorem 7 A sign is an index iff it has exactly one level of semantic structure. It therefore has one component of semantic meaning (denotation) and one semantic information generator (the dynamic object of the sign). Theorem 8 A sign is an icon iff it has exactly two levels of semantic structure. It therefore has two components of semantic meaning (denotation, and connotation) and two semantic information generators (the dynamic object and the dynamic ground of the sign). Theorem 9 A sign is a symbol iff it has all three levels of semantic structure. It therefore has three components of semantic meaning (denotation, connotation, and pronotation) and three semantic information generators (the dynamic object, the dynamic ground, and the cognitive mentellect of the sign). Proof of Theorem 1 By the Representation Principle and the Principle of Additional Structure, any sign must have at least one level of syntactic structure and this must be the innermost, or tagmatic, level. According to the USSD-2000 (Fig. 3), the outermost syntactic level consists of the embodiment of a sign in a physical medium. But if a sign had an embodiment in a physical medium, it would exist as an actual, single, physically existing individual and could not exist merely as an abstract quality. It would be a token, not a tone; therefore, a tone cannot have an ontotic level of syntactic structure. Also from Fig. 3, the second (or middle) syntactic level consists of the distinguishability of a sign by a shape. But, if a sign had a distinctive, distinguishable shape, it would exist as a concrete general, serving as an archetype for all tokens of the same type and could not exist, etc. It would be a type, not a tone. Therefore, a tone cannot have an eidontic level of syntactic structure. Thus, a tone has exactly one level of syntactic structure, which is the tagmatic structure. By the principle of Internal/External Balance, this structure will consist of both one internal component and one external component. From Fig. 3, we see that the internal component is tagmension, the meaning component abstracted from the syntactic context, and the external component is the syntactic context, the syntactic information generator abstracted from the tagmatic level of syntactic structure. ( The other proofs are all similar and equally simple, but all nine proofs may be found in Pearson and Slamecka [24, 25, 39]. 4.4.2.2 Going Beyond Semeiotic. Some More Theorems Some other theorems may easily be added to the above. Theorem 10 The sum of the number of syntactic and semantic levels must not be less than four. Letting LX stand for the number of syntactic levels, and LS stand for the number of semantic levels, this may be easily expressed as LX LS ! 4:

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Theorem 11 The number of semantic levels must not be less than the number of pragmatic levels. If we let LP stand for the number of pragmatic levels, then this can be expressed as LS ! LP : This can be interpreted as saying that a term can be an index, icon, or symbol, but a proposition can only be an icon or symbol, while an argument must only be a symbol, an observation rst made by Peirce. The following four theorems assure that every sign must always be able to determine an interpretant. Theorem 12 Theorem 13 recursion. Theorem 14 Three level syntactic structure generates syntactic recursion. The rst three levels of pragmatic structure generate pragmatic Three level semantic structure generates semantic recursion.

Theorem 15 The simultaneous and joint action of syntactic recursion, pragmatic recursion, and semantic recursion guarantee that any sign has the possibility of being interpreted at any time in the future. Many other theorems of semiotic structure may easily be derived from the above theory. These few were chosen as examples for their simplicity, clarity, and importance. As an example of applying the USST to obtain a satisfying solution to a famous philosophical problem, I select Moores Paradox of Analysis. Explaining Moores Paradox G.E. Moore, an early twentieth century British philosopher, was concerned about a paradox discovered earlier by Alexius Meinong, but which has since come to be called Moores Paradox of Analysis, and may be stated as follows: if the analysis of the meaning of a philosophical concept has the same meaning, it is trivial; but if it has a different meaning, then it is wrong. Meinong and Moore both knew well that philosophers very often make correct and non-trivial analyses, but they were never able to develop a theory of analysis which explained the paradox. While other philosophers have tried with varying amounts of success, the problem has never been solved completely. The most popular approach is to say that the problem lies in the formulation of the paradox, which assumes that meaning is either a single or a holistic kind of thing that is either completely the same or else totally different. Frege [9] and Carnap [4] both assumed that the meaning of signs has two semantic components, but their assumptions were for entirely different purposes. Carnap was able to delineate the character of scientic analysis very well with his concepts of extension and intension, but he was never able to handle the kind of philosophic analysis that Meinong and Moore were interested in. Moore himself said that he thought philosophic analysis required something like determining the same objects by the same properties but understanding or cognizing this determination in a different way.

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From the USSD, we note that pronension uniquely determines intension, which in turn uniquely determines extension; while a difference in extension ensures that two terms will have a difference in intension, which in turn ensures a difference in pronension. We may therefore state the solution of Moores Paradox as follows: Scientic analysis requires identical extensions with a difference in intension, while philosophic analysis requires identical intensions with a difference in pronension. It turns out that three levels of semantic structure is just the right amount and kind of structure to solve every known semantic paradox. Of course, this gives us increased condence in the semantic structure hypothesized in the USSD. In this section, we have described the USST, a new theory of sign structure that explains the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic taxonomy of signs due to Charles Peirce [3234], and goes beyond Peirce to begin the development of an abductive/ subductive theory [27, 29]. Fifteen theorems were given in order to show the kind of formal power this theory makes available to the study of semiotics. Moores Paradox of Analysis was solved in order to show the power of the USST-2000 to explain difcult semiotic problems. 4.4.3 The TOS19 The Universal Sign Structure Theory (USST), was introduced more than 30 years ago [21, 24, 26, 27, 39], as the theoretical part of the Semiotic Paradigm [2628], in order to provide a scientic theory that could explain all the semiotic phenomena associated with the static structure of signs. Although the USST was successful for its intended purposes, it could never explain phenomena associated with dynamic semiotic processes (what Peirce called semiosis). Now the Semiotic Paradigm has been expanded to include a second theory that can handle dynamic sign processes. This section will formally present the Theory of Operational Semiotics (TOS), provide examples of its use, and make the claim that the Semiotic Paradigm is now able to explain all semiotic phenomena. Parsing trees and linguistic transformations are too limited to handle all of the processes of semiotics, but trees and transformations are just narrowly restricted forms of mathematical operators. The TOS uses the more general concept of a functor, or operator function [5], to explain what happens when sign processes take place, thus introducing a theory of semiotic dynamics to accompany the USST which is a theory of semiotic statics. 4.4.3.1 Background Bernard Bosanquet, British idealist philosopher (1848 1923), claimed that every proposition can be factored into a predicate about the ideal world. Thus example (1), which appears to predicate blue of sky as in analysis (2), or even to be a two place relation predicating blue and sky of the copula as in analysis (3), actually is predicating a proposition, (4), of the ideal world, as in analysis (5). This thesis was adopted by Francis Bradley, another British idealist philosopher of the same period (18461924) and made a key point of his logic.
19 A preliminary version of this section appeared as The Theory of Operational Semiotics in Pearson [31].

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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

The sky is blue. Blue(sky). Is(blue, sky). the sky being blue The ideal world is such that it can be described by: (the sky being blue). The actual world is such that it can be described by: (the sky being blue).

Actually, their terminology was already obsolete at the turn of the century (1885 1915) when they were working this out, and we now use sentence and proposition for far different concepts than what Bosanquet and Bradley meant, but this has little relevance for us here and now [29, 30]. What is important is that Bosanquets analysis does not require an ideal world; it whatever, (thus analysis (6)), and it does not hold for holds for any world or genre every sentence but it does hold for every utterance of an indicative type in any language. Thus we may call this Bosanquets Law of Factorization. 4.4.3.2 Factoring the Sentence A similar strategy works for any mood, but I would like to use a different example for a very simple reason. One can say both (1) and (7), but it is hard, at least in American, to say (8). This is merely an accident of linguistic history. Therefore I choose proposition (9) for an example, which, at least in American, is fairly easy to utter in each of the more common moods: indicative, imperative, interrogative, etc. (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) Is the sky blue? Blue the sky! the door being open The door is open. Open the door! Is the door open?

The factorizations are as follows: (13) (14) (15) The real world is such that it can be described by: (the door being open). Endeavor to make the real world such that it can be described by: (the door being open)! Is the real world such that it can be described by: (the door being open)?

By all accounts examples (10), (11), and (12) contain the same proposition. Analyses (13), (14), and (15) make it obvious that this is so, a decided advantage for any system of notation. I am not certain, but evidently I am the rst to carry out this complete analysis and so I make the universal claim: Every natural language sentence type can be factored into a mood operator followed by a semantic operator containing a proposition. Propositions have been represented variously thruout history, depending on which aspect it was desired to emphasize. I use the gerundial form to emphasize that the proposition is an abstract semantic operator rather than a concrete sentence, etc. [29, 30]. Thus we have the logical form given by expression (16):

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(16)

PM : PS

where PM is a mood operator and PS is a semantic operator. We have not got to the end of our analysis but already it is yielding very surprising results. When we have nished it will motivate an entirely new approach to semiotic theory. For now, we merely need to notice that according to the conventional sequence: syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, we would expect either a syntactic or a pragmatic operator to appear in the nal factored position, not a semantic operator. But instead, this is just what we do get. This is indeed unusual. Could we have our categories in the wrong sequence? Should it be syntactic, pragmatic, semantic, or semantic, pragmatic, syntactic? Actually both occur depending on whether we are synthesizing the sign, or analyzing it. What will become clear is that the sequence: syntactic, semantic, pragmatic used by Peirce, Morris, Bloomeld, Chomsky, etc. is wrong [29]. 4.4.3.3 Factoring the Mood The next step is to break down what I have loosely called the mood operator into its component factors. It turns out to be difcult because so much of the structure of the sign is contained in it. One such attempted analysis of the indicative operator showed that two distinct interpreters were required for every sign along with a truth warrant, an epistemic operator, a convention binding operator, etc., such as for instance in analysis (17), with similar analyses for each of the other moods. It seems that all of the meaning contained in analysis (17) is imbedded in the sentential period of examples (1) and (10). (17) IS(I) WARRANT to IT(YOU) that IS am placing myself under all the conventions of LANGUAGE COMMUNITY(LC) including all punishments for not adhering strictly to all such conventions and that IS KNOW sufciently a restricted part of the WORLD(W) as it relates to LC and that this part of W may be DESCRIBED(D) by:

This showed that each of the moods can be represented by an invariant operator independently of the semantic proposition, and that each semantic proposition can be represented by an invariant operator independently of the mood of the sentence. At this point I became aware of the work of the American semiotician, John Searle, and the critical relevance it has for the project of factoring semiotic operators in general. Searles work relates to the factorization of what I loosely called the Mood Operator, but concerned not so much mood itself as the pragmatic structure of the sign in its relation to the illocutionary force, a concept developed by the British philosopher, John Austin but adumbrated earlier by Charls Peirce. I later learned that an important part of this relation between the pragmatic operator and the illocutionary force concerned the operation of converting a type into a token, so I thus began to look at the structure of the type-token conversion operator as part of the structure of the pragmatic operator and gradually the concept of semiotic factorization started to become clearer. To nish this brief thought, all complete utterances have both a mood and an illocutionary force and these are always present and distinct in every rheme token, even when they appear identical in the surface structure of the utterance. The mood is part of the type while the illocutionary force is part of the token.

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After guring this out, it became obvious that all sentential utterances can be represented by a pheme operator as in equation (18). (18) Pph PX : PP : PS

where Pph is a general pheme operator governing pheme tokens, PX is a syntactic operator, PP is a pragmatic operator, and PS is the semantic operator as before. Note we have arrived at the sequence: syntactic, pragmatic, semantic which is necessary here to make phematic analysis work. Similarly in the case of phematic synthesis we have equation (19), containing the sequence: semantic, pragmatic, syntactic, just as predicted. There is no way we can force the sequence: syntactic, semantic, pragmatic to work. (19) PS 1 : PP 1 : PX 1 Pph 1

4.4.3.4 Developing the Theory The Theory of Operational Semiotics is abbreviated as TOS. The TOS is intended to explain sign dynamics, or semiosis. It ts within the Semiotic Paradigm [2628], as a second theory that complements the USST rather than competing with it. The TOS starts by assuming one basic principle in addition to the three principles of the USST [39]. All sign processes, all transformations, all changes in sign structure whatever can be represented by an operator which transforms an initial sign into a nal sign. Equation (20) is called the Dynamic Principle. (20) Wf Pf ;in : Win

where Wf represents the nal sign, Win the initial sign, the structure of Wf and Win are given by the USST, and Pf ;in represents the operation of changing Win into Wf : This implies that the USST explains the static structure of sign systems, the TOS explains their dynamic properties, and the USST acts as a set of boundary conditions on the TOS. In many analyses, the structure of the W are assumed given and xed. In such cases, the entire process is characterized by the Pf ;in and all attention is devoted to the study of Pf ;in : Such for example is the case with the study of induction: (21) WKS Pind : WIS

where WKS is an iconic symbol and WIS is an indexical symbol. The problem is to completely characterize the induction operator, Pind : There are similar ways of studying abduction, subduction, deduction, analogical reasoning, and symbolic transformation [29]. When this is done, the following amazing diagram is uncovered, which I call the Ladder diagram of semantic reasoning, see Fig. 5. Equation (18) implies that pheme processes are represented by Eq. (22): (22) Wf PX : PP : PS : Win

This may, in fact, be trying to tell us that conversion from a tone to a token takes place in exactly the same sequence, with the same structure as Eq. (23):

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Abduction

Induction Eduction Index

Deduction

Index

Fig. 5 The Ladder diagram of semantic reasoning [29, p. 309]

(23a) Wph;K PX : Wph;T (23b) PX : PP : Wph;N (23c) PX : PP : PS : Win which implies that we could separate phematic analysis into three distinct stages: (24) (25) (26) Wph;K PX : Wph;T Wph;T PP : Wph;N Wph;N PS : Win

in which case, one is sorely tempted to identify equation (24) with Chomskys program of transformational syntax and to predict two other associated programs: operational pragmatics associated with equation (25); and operational semantics associated with equation (26). This very strongly suggests that linguists and other semioticists should deliberately tackle the development of a science of pragmatics after the development of syntactics (as in transformational grammar) and before attempting systematic development of a science of semantics (as in generative semantics). 4.4.3.5 Intention, Intentionality, and FEMs The complexity of mapping the various detailed operators in any practical sign process may be likened to unraveling the human genome. Many investigators have already started to do this. I already referred in Subsect. 4.4.3.4. to the work of transformational linguistics as working out the details of PX for sign systems having the structure of linear text. Other groups working on this problem include the speech act theorists, especially its founder, John Searle [38], and the logical semanticists, especially Grice [14]. Tools that are available for the semiotic analysis of the operator string include philosophical analysis, logical analysis, speech act theory, discourse theory, transformational grammar, linguistic semantics, linguistic pragmatics, cognitive science, and articial intelligence. Among these, Grices Conversational Postulates

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and Searles Felicity Conditions, Rules, Dimensions, etc. are especially useful with a very important caveat. Grices Conversational Postulates contain a mixture of tone concepts, type concepts, and token concepts all intermingled. I expect that the Conversational Postulates will factor into at least three subsets referring to tone operators, type operators, and token operators, as given by the USST. Similarly, Searles analysis contains a mixture of tone, type and token concepts. If these are distinguished, Searles tools become much more powerful. One area of semiotic operator string analysis that has been developed extensively is speech act theory, SAT. A speech act contains an illocutionary point, followed by an intentional attitude, followed by illocutionary force indicating devices, followed by the propositional content. Illocutionary points are such things as asserting, reporting, promising, warning, etc., i.e., the purpose for which the source interpreter creates the sign [28, 29]. Intentional attitudes express a psychological state, such as believing, intending, wishing, etc. Illocutionary force indicating devices are conditions that require the propositional content to suitably match the illocutionary act and the intentional attitude. And the propositional content contains the abstract proposition along with modal operators, generalization operators, abstraction operators, such as Churchs k; along with other propositional operators. If we let F stand for the illocutionary force of the speech act; I stand for the illocutionary point; S stand for the psychological state; C; for the illocutionary force indicating devices; $ ; for the propositional operators (such as negation); m; for the modal operators; P; for the predicate operators; and s; for the subject operators, then we can represent the speech act, or at least its illocutionary force, by: (27) F I SC $ mPs;

as long as we insist that the notation does not imply simple functionality in the strict mathematical sense, altho, it must be admitted that there is a strong feeling of some kind of functional dependence hinted at by this representation. For this reason, it is better to use an operator notation, so we write: (28) PF PI : PS : PC : P $ : Pm : PP : Ps

for the structure of a general speech act. In this representation, P $ : Pm : PP : Ps corresponds roughly to PS in the notation of Eq. (18), and PI : PS : PC to part of PP in the same notation, along with , K; , I, f ; and others. Now, a very important sign system is intentionality, including all intentions and FEMs, (feelings, emotions, and psychological moods). Semioticians have not always recognized that these all t together in one system. In fact, one of the saddest legacies of the modern age is the separation of intentionality from emotionality along with the separation of mind from body, and science from religion. Semioticians have wrestled with the theory of intention and intentionality for years, but without any good notation for representing intentions, the job has been slow and difcult. The operator string notation employed by the TOS gives us the desired representation. In fact, all we have to do is drop the illocutionary point operator from the front of the right hand string of equation (28) and we have the TOS representation of intentions,

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intentionality, and FEMs as in equation (29), where PN is the operator expression for intentionality. (29) PN PS : PC : P $ : Pm : PP : Ps

Suppose the operator P is the value of S that stands for the psychological state of surprise (not the word surprise), likewise the operator U the value of C that stands for the conditions that relate surprise to unexpected events, H the value of P that stands for the predicate (not the assertion of a predicate) of being in my home, and B the value of S that stands for a burglar (again, not the word burglar), then equation (30) represents the feeling of surprise at encountering the unexpected event of a burglar being in my home. This feeling need never be asserted, nor even expressed silently to oneself. It may remain just a raw, unexpressed, feeling of surprise. And yet equation (30) shows that the TOS has the ability to handle even this ephemeral kind of sign. (30) FP:U:H:B

Now, intentions have often been dened as internal psychological states that relate to objects, events, or conditions in the external world, while emotions have been dened in some instances as simply a rush of hormones. So it may be surprising to nd that equation (29) will handle FEMs as well by the simple expedient of dening various of the operators in expression (29) as either null or identity operators. For instance, if D is the value of S that stands for the psychological state of being depressed, equation (31) represents the feeling, or emotion, of being depressed. (31) ED:1:0

Not all feelings and emotions have trivial values for PC ; PP ; and Ps ; however. The language for discussing intentions, intentionality, and FEMs is notoriously imprecise. Many feelings behave more like propositional attitudes, while many others behave more like emotions, while some even behave like internal perceptions. One advantage of the more precise language and more powerful theory of the TOS is that it should help to sort out and systematize much of our observation and understanding of FEMs. Another advantage of the TOS, not shared by any of its competitors, is the additional insight that the TOS gives into the semiotic interpretation of the sign and its relation to the source interpreter, I S : For instance, SAT represents the utterance (32) as an assertion of the proposition (33). This explains the linguistic and grammatical properties of (32) very well, but also represents I S as a disinterested party with no more personal involvement with (33) than if he had uttered (34) as an assertion of (35). What is needed here is an acknowledgment of the very special rst person, subjective, relation existing between I S and its feeling of sadness that cannot be experienced or shared when it asserts someone elses sadness. Now, this is just what the TOS does when it lets S be the value of S that stands for the psychological state of sadness (not the word sad, nor even the proposition being sad), and explains (32) by (36), and the assertion of (32) by (37), the assertion of G.

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(32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37)

Im sad. my being sad Tom is sad. Toms being sad G = S:1:0 ?:G

We thus see that by bringing each of the components of the USST diagram into the representation as an operator, the TOS gains in both power and exibility in ways that no other semiotic theory can do, especially a theory like SAT which is limited to such a narrow semiotic domain as natural language.20 4.4.4 Subduction and Interpretation of Theory To my knowledge, subduction as a form of inference was rst explicitly noted by Carnap [4] where he called it the one-way codebook. Carnap noted many of the properties of subduction but never managed to give it a technical name. Others21 have either acknowledged Carnaps work or have attempted to work out the details on their own without acknowledging Carnaps priority. But none of them have given it a technical name. Therefore I called it subduction (1991) to both acknowledge its existence and importance and its nature as a form of inference inverse to abduction. In subduction, some of the abstract terms of the theory are interpreted22 as observational concepts so that the theory may be tested against reality.23 The invention of good interpretations can sometimes be as easy as interpreting the mass in Newtons theory as the weight of a body divided by the force of gravity, or as ingenious as Gibbs brilliant guess regarding entropy. 4.5 Application to Applied or more Applied Questions Our fth scientic subparadigm concerns the applications of the Semiotic Paradigm, especially those applications that might shed light on details of the paradigm itself and help to work out those details or help to prioritize the areas of research and development of the paradigm. In the New Science of Semiotics, using the Semiotic Paradigm, general problems are solved by a judicious use of laws, theory, and facts, using triadic logic. It is in its applications that the new science is expected to shine, where its empirical approach keeps it in close touch with real-world problems and its new explanations take it beyond the solutions of Peirces old taxonomic science. Here is one that is very useful in legal studies.

20 21 22 23

However, Peirce, who pioneered SAT [37] did not so limit his analysis. Such as Hempel and Popper. Carnap called it translation, or decoding. And because theories are invented by fallible human beings, they must be tested against reality.

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4.5.1 Understanding the Modes of Reasoning24 This section represents just a bare beginning on an application of the Semiotic Paradigm to understanding the modes of reasoning that is hoped to eventually result in a semiotic theory of reasoning. It sketches an approach to a theory of reasoning that appears to be productive. It relates the nature of a reasoning process and its structure to the changes in the structure of the signs involved in that reasoning process. Seven distinct modes of semantic reasoning are isolated, and a ladder diagram shows their interrelationships. Only one of these modes is deductive, leaving six modes of non-deductive semantic reasoning. 4.5.1.1 Introduction The general problem of reasoning is to determine, given one or more initial signs, what other signs one ought to entertain on the same basis. For instance, if one believes that P and also that P?Q are both true, should one also believe that Q is true? Alternately, if one enjoys doing R and also enjoys doing S, does one necessarily enjoy doing both R and S? There are many forms of reasoning, some more immediate, or more accessible, than others. For instance, to determine the truth of Q, a medium might consult a crystal ball, while a trained scientist might design a controlled experiment. Depending on the meaning of Q either approach might be more or less appropriate under different circumstances. We would not normally believe that the revelation of a crystal ball would be justication for believing that the existence of anyons could be a sufcient explanation of the Anomalous Quantized Hall Effect. On the other hand just such a reason could justify a ladys belief that she will eventually meet a tall, dark, and handsome stranger who will fall in love with her. I think most ladies would not go to the trouble of designing and carrying out a controlled scientic experiment to evaluate this sign. In fact, the very doing so could well destroy the truth of this sign, while believing the crystal ball could, in fact, help to establish its truth. There are many bases for entertaining signs, and some of these get tied up with the notion of truth. For instance, if one believes a sign, this is the same as holding in ones mind that sign to be true. I want to avoid a discussion of truth for now because it is more complex than most methods of analysis are competent to handle, and besides, truth forms only a very small part of the concept of reasoning, although this small part has played a dominant role throughout history in our understanding of the nature and methods of science. It is for this reason that I dened the general problem of reasoning around the more general and less restricting concept of entertaining on the same basis. In addition, this freeing up of the concept of reasoning from the concept of truth allows us to see more of the structure of reasoning and its relation to the signs that must be processed in its behalf. This, in turn, will lead to a better understanding of truth in the long run. In the Semiotic Paradigm, it is possible to examine some of the relations between reasoning and the structure of the signs reasoned with and thereby gain a better understanding of the structure of reasoning. We nd thereby seven semantic modes
24

A preliminary version of this section appeared as Pearson [29].

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of symbolic reasoning and how they t together with each other. These are the ones that have traditionally been called the modes of scientic reasoning. In general, there are many more modes of reasoning than have ever been listed in any logic book, even the ones in Peirces unfullled dreams; and they t together perfectly in what may be regarded as a semiotic jig-saw puzzle. For instance, the modes of semantic reasoning t together to form what might be called the ladder of semantic reasoning.25 It is important to determine which of these forms of reasoning are most reasonable, i.e., have the best justication under given circumstances. This leads to 21 modes of symbolic reasoning. Seven of these are syntactic modes, (i.e., mathematical reasoning); seven are semantic modes, (i.e., scientic reasoning); and seven are pragmatic modes, (i.e., affective reasoning). Six of these modes are information increasing, six are information decreasing, and nine are information transforming. Although the concept of sign dates back to the Greek medics, was foregrounded for epistemology and logic by St. Augustine, and was reintroduced into Western philosophy by John Locke [1], it was the American philosopher, Charles Peirce [35], who rst introduced the concept of sign structure and rst investigated the internal structure of the sign. Peirce was especially concerned with reasoning, especially scientic reasoning, so it is perhaps surprising that Peirce himself did not attempt to relate the structure of reasoning to the structures of the signs involved in the reasoning process. However, from the Collected Papers (CP) it appears that he did not; but then, he only had his taxonomic science of semeiotic to work with [32, 33]. Maybe some indications that he did attempt this kind of analysis will show up in the new Writings edition (W) now in preparation. But if not, at least there is some precedent for this kind of oversight in that Galileo, who was so interested in inventing the clock, and who discovered all of the necessary elements for inventing the clock, simply failed to put them all together. Perhaps Peirce, like Galileo, was just too closely involved with the obvious to take that nal step. 4.5.1.2 USST All of the essential aspects of the USST needed for analyzing reasoning processes are summarized in the USSD.26 We will be working primarily with the structure of the sign. We note specically the syntactic structure represented by the lower left-hand portion of the USSD, the pragmatic structure represented by the upper portion of the USSD, and the semantic structure represented by the lower right hand portion of the USSD. For this example we will concentrate mainly on semantic structure and the semantic forms of reasoning. We will be concerned with the structure of concrete individuals, the structure of concrete generals, and the structure of abstract individuals. We recall from the denitions in Sect. 4.4 of indexes, icons, and symbols that indexes can refer only to concrete singulars, icons only to concrete generals, and symbols to abstract singulars. In this connection we should recall that the USST explains the structure of
25 26

See Figs. 5, 17. Figure 3 of Sect. 4.4.2.1(Background).

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Ground

Intension

Secondness

Object

Exten sion

Thirdness
Fig. 6 Comparison of descents from icon to index by secondness and by thirdness

indexes as consisting of only the rst level of semantic structure with the object as its external structure and extension as its internal structure. It explains the structure of icons as consisting of both of the rst two levels of semantic structure, adding the ground and intension to the structure of the index. And it explains the structure of symbols as consisting of all three levels of semantic structure, adding the cognitive mentellect and protension to the structure of the icon. In our rst cut at attempting to understand reasoning, we shall deal only with symbolic reasoning and so we shall be dealing only with indexical symbols, iconic symbols, and symbolic (or pure) symbols while calling them by their shortened names for simplicity of reference. 4.5.1.3 The Modes of Reasoning. Deduction (Formerly called Demonstration) For purposes of developing theory, we select that meaning of deduction which involves semantic reasoning from an interpreted general to an interpreted singular.27 This reasoning from a general to an individual involves a process of changing the structure of the subject of the entertained sign from that of an icon (iconic symbol) to that of an index (indexical symbol). For instance, from All men are mortal. we apply Socrates is a man. to get Socrates is mortal. Mortal and man are general terms and so the predicates of the hypothesis and of the conclusion retain the same structure. The subject of the hypothesis is all men, a general term, while the subject of the conclusion is Socrates, a singular term. Thus only the structure of the subject has changed. The particular is already predicated in the general so that we know for certain that the predicate applies to it. This allows semiosis to descend by both external and internal structure, i.e., by both a relation of secondness and a relation of thirdness, so that both reinforce and complement each other. The descent by secondness goes from ground to object, while the descent by thirdness goes from ground to intension to extension to object. These descents are illustrated in Fig. 6.
27

We are essentially adopting Quines concept of explication [36] wherein one sets about rening ones concepts in such a way as to maintain those theoretical implications which have the strongest anchors at the lowest levels of observability and doing the least damage in those areas where our intuitions are not as strong. Theoretical implications which have no anchor in reality at all have a dont care impact on the design of our concepts so that in these cases we are free to invent our renements in such a way as to simplify the overall theory.

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Fig. 7 Descent from icon to index with loss of information

Fig. 8 The structure of deduction

ICON

INDEX

The result of this descent process is to eliminate the iconic level of structure from the entertained sign thus leaving us with an index. We can identify this descent process with a loss of information so that loss of information and descent from an icon to an index are both represented by the abstract diagram of Fig. 7. One further abbreviation of the diagram process allows us nally to collapse the diagram of Fig. 7 into the diagram of Fig. 8, thus representing the overall structure of the deduction process. Induction There have been many different forms of induction proposed, ranging from mathematical, or complete, induction, to statistical induction, to ampliative, or incomplete, induction, to even proof by complete listing of cases. Therefore we x our attention here on just one of the many meanings of the word induction, that of scientic, or ampliative, induction. This method of reasoning was also rst commented on by Socrates. Scientic induction, or as we shall call it, simply, induction, has always meant something like reasoning from a set of individuals, a set of indexical symbols, to a general conclusion, an iconic symbol. This requires the following steps: (1) (2) Observation of individuals, and their description by a set of indexical symbols. Invention (or guess) of: (a) A set of pertinent categories (iconic symbols). (b) A general hypothesis (an iconic symbol). (3) (4) Transform the general hypothesis into a more convenient general form. Testing the hypothesis for the categories over the original individuals. (a) Design of experiment. (b) Observation of additional individuals, if necessary. (5) (6) Deduction from the general to new individuals in support of 4. Conclude to the general hypothesis, if warranted.

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Fig. 9 Ascent from index to icon

Although induction is nearly the inverse of deduction, it is considerably complicated by the necessity for the double invention (step (2) above), and an increase of information is occasioned by the conclusion to unobserved individuals in step (6). From the above it can be seen that the value added in induction is due to the increase in structure of a set of indexes to the structure of an icon as illustrated in Fig. 9, which can be seen to be the diagrammatic inverse of Fig. 7. Thus we see that although the diagrams help clarify the nature of structural changes in sign processes, they are abstractions and do not retain the full detail involved in semiosis. For this we need the full Theory of Operational Semiotics (TOS). Induction is an information intensive step in that it requires the addition of extra information in the form of observation of previously unobserved individuals and the invention of both a set of categories and a general hypothesis. Because of these creative steps, the conclusion of an induction can never be assured and must always be tested. We also note that we cannot ascend from object to ground by two different routes as we descended in deduction. This is consistent with the conclusion that induction is never self validating and must always be veried. The general always contains individuals not contained in the original. Because induction is only interesting when it cannot be tested to completion (because of an innite number of individuals, or etc.) induction is always fallible and hence open to revision, or renement. We therefore see that induction as thus dened is completely inverse to deduction in every way. We therefore diagram induction and deduction conceptually as arrows with the tail of deduction leading from icons and its head pointing to indexes and the tail of induction leading from indexes and its head pointing to icons. This conceptual diagram will determine our whole approach to developing a theory of reasoning processes as attempts to change the structure of given signs relative to certain entertainment. We thus diagram induction as in Fig. 10, which may be compared to Fig. 8. Analogical reasoning Several forms of analogical reasoning have been described in the literature. We use the term here to mean reasoning from one set of generals to another set of generals by the use of arguments involving similarity, or the
Fig. 10 The structure of induction

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ICON

Fig. 12 Indirect analogy

SYMBOL

SYMBOL

ICON

ICON

Fig. 13 The process of eduction

ICON

ICON

INDEX

INDEX

reasoning from one icon to another icon while staying on the iconic level. Such a denition would include for instance, troth metaphor, argument by similarity, and physical modeling. Analogical reasoning can be a direct process, as diagrammed in Fig. 11. But it may also proceed indirectly, passing thru the symbolic as diagrammed in Fig. 12. Indirect analogy is also called symbolic analogy, theoretical analogy, abstract analogy, symbolic modeling, theoretical modeling, argument from denition, and/or metaphor. Eduction Eduction is dened as reasoning from an individual to another individual. This would correspond to reasoning from an index to an index. Argument (a) is an example of this type of reasoning. It may be diagrammed as in Fig. 13, wherein the solid arrows indicate the valid, indirect, eduction, while the dotted arrow represents the direct process. Eduction may also proceed by an even more indirect process by passing up to the symbolic level and then back down. (a) This bottle of catsup is red; therefore, that jar of pickles weighs 16 oz. Abduction Peirce, who coined the term abduction, as well as hypothetical reasoning and retroduction, used all three of these terms ambiguously to stand for several forms of reasoning, as well as a kind of inventing which included either categories, a general hypothesis, or an abstract theory. It can be seen that two of

Fig. 14 The semiotic process of abduction

SYMBOL

ICON

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these forms of invention result in the creation of an icon, while the third results in the creation of a symbol. Strictly speaking, these inventings are not forms of reasoning, but steps in several different reasoning processes. For this reason, and to simplify the design of technical language that will be adequate to the resulting theory,28 I use the term hypoduction for Peirces invention of a hypothesis, and I use the term abduction for invention of abstract explanationreasoning from icons to symbolsoften used for development of scientic theory. We see, therefore, that abduction, in this sense, like induction, is information intensive, since it too involves an invention, the hypoduction of an abstract explanation. We diagram this as Fig. 14. The steps to abduction are thus: (1) (2) The development of several general laws for which a single abstract explanation is desired. The hypoduction (invention) of an abstract theory, including theoretical concepts, relations between the concepts, rules for abstract manipulation of the concepts and relations, and rules for translating back to observable concepts (see subduction). Manipulation of the theory by the given rules of transformation in order to arrive at other abstract statements that may be more convenient for interpretation (see symbolic reasoning next). The translation of certain of the abstract concepts and relations into observable concepts and relations by use of the code book (see subduction again). The comparison of resulting singular and general statements with the known facts and laws. Conclusion of the abstract theory, if warranted.

(3)

(4) (5) (6)

Symbolic reasoning Any form of reasoning that starts with pure interpreted symbols in the subject position of the premise, reasons to a conclusion with pure interpreted symbols in subject position, and uses only interpreted symbolic transformations is called symbolic reasoning. Peirce also called this form of reasoning, theorematic reasoning and argument from denition. Manipulation of theory to get from explanatory principles to other abstract statements that are easier to interpret observationally (as in step 3) above is a good example of this kind or reasoning. In science, this kind of reasoning can often be abbreviated by mathematical manipulation, but there is always a ne distinction between the semantic reasoning and the mathematical manipulation. Since symbolic reasoning involves arbitrary conventions, its conclusions can not be guaranteed in advance and must be tested for validity. In the case of scientic theory, this is done as part of the overall theory validation process. We thus diagram symbolic reasoning as Fig. 15. Subduction Interpretation of theoretical concepts can be as apparently simple as the interpretation of the mass of a particle by dividing its weight by the gravitational constant or the interpretation of the temperature of an ideal gas by the observation of a real thermometer, or as obviously contrived as the interpretation
28

The rst modication to the language of Menetics since it was initially designed in 1976, (1977).

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The New Science of Semiotics and the Semiotics of Law Fig. 15 The symbolic reasoning diagram

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SYMBOL

SYMBOL

Fig. 16 Structure of the subduction process

SYMBOL

ICON

of the curvature tensor of empty space by the displaced position of stars during a solar eclipse or the interpretation of the mean kinetic energy of an ensemble of molecules averaged over all of the molecules in the ensemble by the observed temperature of a real gas in a nite container. From the most transparent to the most opaque interpretation, all involve a step down in structure from symbols to icons. Temperature can be either a pure symbol or an iconic symbol depending on whether it is used to mark a theoretical concept or an observable general concept. In either case it is spelled the same, although both meaning and structure are drastically different. Carnap was the rst to isolate and study this form of reasoning although it was certainly used (perhaps unconsciously) by scientists long before his time as witnessed by the examples from Newton, Carnot, Gibbs, and Einstein in the previous paragraph. Carnap [4] used the term code book to describe these translation rules29, but it is a peculiar kind of code book. Whereas most code books show how to translate back and forth either way, this code book only needs to translate in one direction, from theoretical to observable, that is, from abstract to general. In addition, it need not translate every theoretical term in the theory, but only a nite subset of them. Those theoretical statements that are translatable into observable terms must then be amenable to observation and where observation is in accord with the translated statements, this counts as evidence in favor of the theory. Because not every theoretical statement is translatable, subduction is an information decreasing process. The diagram for Subduction is thus given by Fig. 16. 4.5.1.4 The Structure of Semantic Reasoning From this cursory overview of the forms of semantic reasoning we can construct Fig. 17: The Seven Modes of Semantic Reasoning by consolidating each of the previous seven semantic reasoning diagrams. The result is a compact, terse diagram that is reminiscent of the semantic structure of the sign itself. From the placement and t of deduction and induction, we can determine how to interpret this diagram in an overall sense to
29

I provided the name subduction (1991).

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SYMBOL

Symbolic SYMBOL T ransformation Symbolic Reasoning

Cognitive Mentellect
Logic of Demonstration (Information Decreasing)

Cogne xsion

Abstract Singular

Subduction

Abduction

Fig. 17 Seven modes of semantic reasoning

show the relation and t of all seven modes of semantic reasoning.30,31 The purpose of Fig. 17 is to emphasize the structure of the various semantic reasoning processes and the way they t and complement each other, and not to illustrate their most intricate details. We must recall the great variety of usages of these names in the literature and note that Fig. 17 uses these terms each in a particular sense as discussed above. Figure 17 can be used to analyze many of the steps in each of the modes of reasoning and was in fact the means whereby the steps in the above analyses were developed. 4.5.1.5 Pragmatic Modes of Reasoning The semantic modes of reasoning are not the only forms of reasoning, although they are the best known and the best studied because they include the forms of reasoning used by science. All semantic forms analyzed in this example were of the subject-predicate form. Peirce pointed out the importance of studying a more general kind of reasoning using relational forms. Mathematics employs the syntactic modes of reasoning. But in many ways, the pragmatic modes of reasoning are the most interesting, although they are the least studied and the least understood. In a preliminary literature survey, only one name, coduction, was found that referred to a specic form of pragmatic reasoning. Coduction appears to involve the social and behavioral context of the sign, (S&BC). It was Freud who called most attention to the need for a better understanding of pragmatic reasoning, especially in
30 This diagram was originally published as Fig. 8 in my review of Rauch and Carr (1989), in the section discussing Allan Chinens paper (1989).

It was Chinen who originally gave me the idea of relating the various kinds of reasoning to each other, although he related reasoning to the reference of signs. It was I who conceived of interpreting reasoning as the change in structure of the signs used in the reasoning process, and the way these processes t together. I thank Chinen for his original contribution.

31

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Logic of Discovery/Invention (Information Increasing)

ICON

Iconic Transformation Iconic Reasoning

ICON Deduction

Ground

Intension

Concrete General

INDEX

Induction
Indexical T ransformation Indexical Reasoning

INDEX

Object

Extenxsion

Concrete Singular

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his discussions of the logic of dreams and his analysis of the logic of personal relations. Likewise, Jung called attention to the logic of the collective unconscious, again involving the social and behavioral context of the sign. In semantic reasoning we are involved with individuals, generals, and abstractions, through concrete and abstract. It was our knowledge of the semiotic structure of these entities32 that allowed us to analyze the semiotic structure of semantic reasoning. In pragmatic reasoning we are involved with feelings, emotions, moods (in the psychological rather than the grammatical sense), and affect. We shall have to learn more about the semiotic structure of these entities in order to help unravel the semiotics of the pragmatic modes of reasoning. Are emotions rhemes, phemes, or dolemes? What is the difference between feelings, emotions, and moods? The New Science of Semiotics is the best tool for attacking and solving these problems. I suspect that when the pragmatic modes of reasoning are untangled, we shall nd some kind of structural relationship similar to that in Fig. 17. Nature has a habit of preserving structure. Much of the current investigation centers on this pragmatic structure, especially legal inquiry, esthetic inquiry, and theological inquiry. This offers an exciting opportunity to improve our understanding of semiotic structure. Our early studies of grammatical mood have done much to improve our understanding of pragmatic structure, and these studies of reasoning will do far more. 4.6 Mathematical Methods and the Solution of Problems Our last subparadigm of the Semiotic Paradigm involves the rigorous systematization of semiotic thinking in order to bring mathematical reasoning to bear in solving semiotics problems. Any serious study deserves the use of the most powerful tools available; and the most powerful tools all include the use of mathematics. In the new science of semiotics, math pops up everywhere we look: in measurement, in data analysis, in discerning exact laws to describe observed patterns, in the development of the most useful explanatory theories, etc. But that branch specically called mathematical semiotics usually consists of the solution methods for the mathematical formulations of the problems of applied semiotics. A new golden age of mathematics is coming. The old golden age included the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, wherein all mathematics was developed by physicists for solving problems of the physical sciences. All mathematics of the golden age was dyadic mathematics. The new golden age will be the age of triadic mathematics. It will be developed by semioticists for solving the problems of the semiotic sciences. In order to be a good semioticist in the 21st century you must rst be a master of mathematics. The principles of mathematical semiotics have yet to be written. They will be written by you.
32

Due primarily to Peirce and myself.

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5 New Problems for the New Science 5.1 A New Way of Thinking, A New Way of Knowing, A New Way of Understanding Traditionally there have been two ways of looking at the world. The older one is often credited to Socrates, although it was formalized and made explicit by Aristotle [1]. Whitehead [40] most improperly called it the Platonic philosophy and the only true philosophy. It involves looking at the world from outside-in. Aristotle called this hylozoism because it views every existing body as a living being. The newer view was created by Peirce, although the public often associates Jamess name with the phenomenological viewpoint. Husserl is often credited with founding the science of phenomenology, although Peirce actually began to investigate phenomenology as a science some half-century earlier. This viewpoint involves looking at the world from inside-out, but is also called hylozoism because like Aristotle, Peirce viewed every existing body as a living being. In fact, hylozoism has been a very popular philosophy thruout the ages. It has been stressed more recently by both Whitehead and Teilhard de Chardin (Fig. 18). The New Science of Semiotics involves a third way of looking at the world, also initiated by Peirce. This generates a new way of thinking, a new way of knowing, and a new way of understanding. It, thereby, gives us the power and ability to unify science and phenomenology thus providing an integrated and unied methodology for a new way of inquiring. This involves looking at the world from the middle ground inside the sign, from whence one can look both outward toward all existent
This view leads to an integrated methodology for inquiry involving the unification of science and phenomenology, yielding an integrated and unified approach to reality.

This view leads to scientific inquiry.

This view leads to phenomenological inquiry.

Aristotelian Viewpoint Real object as it really is.

Jamesian Viewpoint Phenomenal feeling as actually experienced.

SIGN

Kantian Veil

Peircean Viewpoint Semiotic logic points outwardly to an external world as represented by signs and inwardly to our phenomenal world as cognition of an external world.

Inexpressibility of the 1st person Bilateral structure of the sign

Fig. 18 A new viewpoint for the new science

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bodies of the external world and inward toward all mentating consciousness of the internal world, i.e. what is normally called the self. This approach is made possible by the bilateral structure of the sign. It still involves the hylozoic assumption that in the words of Whitehead: every grain of sand, every electron, is alive [40]. In this assumption, the New Science of Semiotics is consistent with virtually all post-Peircean philosophy. 1. Strengths of the Aristotelian Viewpoint: a. Has lasted since at least the time of Socrates and possibly before. b. Leads to an easy development of science c. Simple and easy to understand d. Supercially obvious and intuitive e. Explains the reality of individuals, generals, and abstractions 2. Faults of the Aristotelian Viewpoint: a. Violates the Kantian Veil b. Leaves out all rst person experiences c. Cannot explain the reality of feelings and emotions 3. Strengths of the Jamesian Viewpoint: a. Concentrates on rst person experiences b. Explains the reality of feelings and emotions 4. Faults of the Jamesian Viewpoint: a. Violates the Veil of Inexpressibility b. Cannot express the objective or the cognitive c. Makes science impossible d. Cannot explain the reality of individuals, generals, and abstractions 5. Strengths of the Peircean Viewpoint: a. Integrates science and phenomenology b. Does not require violation of either the Kantian Veil or the Veil of Inexpressibility c. Integrates the correspondence and cohesion theories of truth with the convergence theory of truth d. Explains the reality of both cognitive and affective aspects of the world e. Explains all aspects of the self, by integrating rst person, second person, and third person experiences 6. Faults of the Peircean Viewpoint: a. Complexbut only complex enough to model nature b. Difcult to understandbut only because nature is difcult to understand c. Requires development of new mathematics and sciencebut only because we have not yet developed the required mathematical and scientic tools

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6 Application to the Philosophy of Law 6.1 Apology There is far too little space here to do justice to the approach to the philosophy of law suggested by the New Science of Semiotics. I have given some examples as small hints thruout this essay. All we can do now is give another small example to tease the reader and promise that, the editors willing, a full essay devoted exclusively to the New Science approach to philosophy of law will appear in this journal at a later date. 6.2 Three Kinds of Justice; Three Kinds of Law For this example, we start with Aristotles claim that there are only two kinds of justice. Political Justice is of two kinds, one natural, the other conventional. A rule of justice is natural that has the same validity everywhere, and does not depend on our accepting it or not. A rule is conventional that in the rst instance may be settled in one way or the other indifferently, though having once been settled it is not indifferent: for example, that the ransom for a prisoner shall be a mina, that a sacrice shall consist of a goat and not of two sheep. (Quoted in Cl. Morris [19, p. 21]) Augustine, on the other hand, distinguishes between two kinds of law, which he calls eternal law and temporal, or human, law. Thomas Aquinas proceeds to interpret these as particular and eternal law, sometimes referred to as divine law. However, the New Science of Semiotics explains that there are three kinds of justice: the rst is material justice. It is directed to a particular good. This is Aristotles natural justice. The second is conceptual justice. It is directed to the common good. This forms part of what Aristotle called conventional justice, but not all. For Aristotle [1] was a conceptualist and recognized only the lower two levels of semantic structure. The third is analytical justice. It is directed to ways of arriving at new or revised good, i.e. pertaining to the eternal good, such as, for example, constitutional justice. This completes what Aristotle called conventional justice. Material justice involves only the denotative/extensional level of semantic structure in an essential way. Conceptual justice involves both the denotative/ extensional and the connotative/intensional levels of semantic structure essentially, but does not involve the pronotative/processional level. Finally, analytical justice requires all three levels of semantic structure, involving all three in an essential way. On the other hand, the New Science of Semiotics explains that there are three kinds of law. In fact, there is one kind of law corresponding to each kind of justice, thus unifying Aristotles theory of Justice with St. Augustines and St. Thomass theory of Law. Material law corresponds to St. Thomass particular law and is that body of law that implements material justice. Conceptual law corresponds to what both of them called eternal law and implements conceptual justice. Finally,

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analytical law corresponds to the laws implementing analytical justice. Such laws are more often called constitutions because they specify the purpose of laws, how they can be changed, and how new laws and institutions can be created.

References
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