9/11 Personal Privacy

Potential Questions for John Flaherty

What exactly did you know about me nature and timing of terrorist threats, both
general and specific, prior to September 11, 2001 ? About threats from al Qaeda?
Threats from the individual hijackers? What actions did you take in response to
this information?

In responding to the events of September 11,2001, what pol icies and procedures (j) of"—
were in place to define and facilitate your role and that of your department in .
relationship to the FAA and to other departments? V\\~ pAA t-

Where were you when the hijacking took place on September 11, when and how
were you notified, and what did you do? Were your actions and responses
following the incident guided by any prepared protocol, or were your required to
respond spontaneously?

What is the residual security role of the Department of Transportation now that
TSA has been created and moved over to the Department of Homeland Security?
How are the individual transportation modal agencies coordinating with TSA?
Why are the Department and its modal administrations (with the exception of
FAA) not pursuing Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) or Agreement (MO A)
with TSA?

5. A psychological study of the aftermath of September 11 performed by researchers

at Carnegie Mellon University found that Americans vastly overestimated the risk
of terrorism during that period, with people estimating that there was a 20 percent
chance that they themselves were at risk and that the "average American" faced a
48 percent risk. Professor Jennifer Lerner said that, "There was an overwhelming
overestimation of risk... For even the 20 percent estimate to be accurate, we
would have had to have September 11 every day and then some." She went on to
indicate that the government and media can unwittingly alter risk perception by
making people either fearful or angry, and that, if used responsibly, that
information could be used to better communicate the actual degree of risk. Given
that the primary goal of terrorists is, after, to create terror, could the government
have done a better job in communicating with the public about terrorist threats
before, during and after September 11,2001 ?

6. Former FAA Administrator Garvey testified to the Commission that the CAPPS
system "was used only to focus efforts to counter explosive sabotage" and
"passengers without checked baggage, such as most of the September 11
hijackers, were not evaluated by CAPPS." Do you concur with this
characterization? If so, why was the system limited in this way and in particular
why was only checked baggage scrutinized if it was the individual who checked
the baggage that triggered the concern?
7. Were you contacted by the intelligence community, or from elsewhere in the
American government, to prepare a response to a heightened intelligence warning
during the summer of 2001 ? If so, what did you do in response?

8. Were you or the Secretary aware at the time of the recently declassified August 6,
2001 Presidential Decision Bulletin? Were you aware of any other reporting of a
heightened threat of hijackings during the summer of 2001? If so, in either case
what did the Department do in response?

9. Who represented the Department at meetings sponsored by the National Security

/o Council's Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) between March 1, 2001 and
' September 11,2001, particularly the meeting held on July 5, 2001 ?

Please describe any CSGtaskings to the Department with regard to civil aviation
security measures, and the Department's actions in response to such tasking,
between March 1, 2001 and September 11, 2001.
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