International Studies Perspectives (2012), 118.

Intervention in Libya: From Sovereign Consent to Regional Consent

LUKE GLANVILLE Grifth University
The adoption of Resolution 1973 authorizing intervention in Libya represented the rst time that the UN Security Council had authorized military intervention in a functioning and non-consenting sovereign state for the purpose of protecting civilians. A crucial factor prompting skeptical states to allow the passage of the resolution in the absence of sovereign consent was the fact that relevant regional organizations had consented to, indeed appealed for, such action. This article examines this possible shift away from reliance on sovereign consent and toward reliance on the consent of regional organizations in Security Council deliberations about the authorization of military intervention to protect civilians, and it considers what it might mean for the future of civilian protection.

Keywords: Libya, sovereignty, regional organizations, Security Council, responsibility to protect, humanitarian intervention

The adoption of Security Council Resolution 1973 on March 17, 2011, was a landmark in the history of international efforts to protect civilians from mass atrocities.1 Prior to its adoption, the Council had never authorized military intervention in the affairs of a functioning sovereign state without its consent for the purpose of civilian protection. This may come as a surprise to some. After all, the 1990s is often described as the decade of humanitarian intervention (Kaldor 2001). And during that decade, the Council had repeatedly authorized Chapter VII military interventions in response to mass atrocities and humanitarian crises. However, in each instance, intervention was authorized either with the consent of the governing authorities (for example, Resolution 929 on Rwanda) or in the absence of a functioning governmental authority which could provide consent (for example, Resolution 794 on Somalia).2 Those interventions that did take place against the wishes of functioning states were undertaken in the absence of clear authorization by the Council (for example, northern Iraq and Kosovo). The passage of Resolution 1973, authorizing the use of all necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya from the threat of mass atrocities, marked a signicant shift in Security Council practice. To be sure, member states had

1 I am indebted to Alex Bellamy, Richard Devetak, Tim Dunne, Jess Gifkins, Sarah Teitt, and three anonymous reviewers for comments that strengthened this article. 2 In another instance, the Council adopted Resolution 940 authorizing intervention in Haiti against the wishes of the military junta but with the explicit support of the de jure Haitian authorities (Williams 2011:249). It is worth acknowledging that, while Indonesia consented to the authorization of a peacekeeping mission in East Timor in 1999 (Resolution 1264), this consent was granted under intense international pressure (Wheeler and Dunne 2001).

Glanville, Luke. (2012) Intervention in Libya: From Sovereign Consent to Regional Consent. International Studies Perspectives, doi: 10.1111/j.1528-3585.2012.00497.x 2012 International Studies Association

Intervention in Libya

unanimously agreed at the UN World Summit in 2005 that they were prepared to take Chapter VII collective action in instances where states had manifestly failed to protect their populations (A/60/L.1, September 20, 2005, para. 139). However, the Security Council had yet to authorize such action in practice. In the years since the 2005 World Summit, a number of skeptical states, including two veto-wielding members of the Council, China and Russia, had repeatedly insisted that such action could not be legitimate without the consent of the sovereign state. It would seem that a primary factor prompting these states to allow the passage of Resolution 1973 authorizing force against the wishes of the Libyan government was the fact that relevant regional organizations, in particular the League of Arab States, had consented to, indeed appealed for, the adoption of such a resolution. In this instance at least, skeptical states accepted that the opposition of a state to interference in its sovereign affairs could be trumped by the approval of relevant regional organizations. The purpose of this article is to examine this possible shift away from reliance on sovereign consent and toward reliance on the consent of regional organizations in Security Council deliberations about the authorization of Chapter VII action to protect civilians. While it is of course too soon to regard this as an established or permanent shift in the inter-related politics of sovereignty, regionalism, and civilian protection, it nevertheless is a development which demands close study. The article considers how we got to where we are today by tracing the evolution of discourse on non-consensual interference within the Security Council, particularly since 2005, and it explores what the adoption of Resolution 1973 might mean for the future of international efforts to protect civilians absent sovereign consent. The argument is advanced in four sections. The rst examines articulations of the claim that intervention in the affairs of states for the purpose of protecting civilians should not be authorized in the absence of sovereign consent. It briey traces the way these arguments have developed since 1990 and explores, in particular, the reliance on such arguments in the years since the 2005 World Summit by states that did not wish to directly repudiate the responsibility to protect concept that had been endorsed at the Summit but that were nevertheless unwilling to embrace the international enforcement of sovereign responsibilities. The second section considers how these states that have opposed nonconsensual intervention have also appealed to the positions of relevant regional organizations when justifying their resistance to the authorization of enforcement measures in recent years. In Security Council debates on crises in Darfur, Myanmar, and Zimbabwe, these states argued that the international community should rely on the opinions and respect the wishes of the African Union (AU), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) when contemplating how to appropriately respond to mass atrocities and humanitarian crises within the member states of these organizations. In each of these cases, the relevant organization or organizations had been opposed to strong interventionist measures within their region. The third and fourth sections turn to the appeals made in 2011 by relevant regional organizations to the Security Council to authorize action to protect civilians in Libya, and the subsequent adoption of Resolution 1973 authorizing the use of all necessary measures to protect civilians despite the absence of Libyan consent. These sections examine the willingness of those states that had previously been opposed to non-consensual intervention to acquiesce in this case and consider whether their actions can be best explained by reference to the rhetorical entrapment produced by their appeals to the wishes of regional organizations in earlier cases or whether the Libyan case indicates an emergent and authentic willingness to allow the non-consensual international enforcement of sovereign responsibilities when such action is approved by relevant regional bodies. It is

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further observed that regional consent was not only decisive in tempering the opposition of skeptical states to intervention, but it was also crucial in generating agreement among the more pro-interventionist states to push for a resolution authorizing the use of force in Libya. Regional consent was a pragmatic requirement for those Western states seeking a strong international response to the crisis just as sovereign consent was a pragmatic requirement for those same states considering collective action in Darfur 5 years earlier. These sections also consider the question of whether this apparent shift from reliance on sovereign consent to regional consent will take hold, particularly given the opposition among skeptical states to the manner in which the Libyan intervention was conducted, the fact that those states that undertook the intervention found that a successful outcome would take longer to achieve and be more costly than rst anticipated, and the reality that, as in Libya, there may often be multiple relevant regional organizations that offer divergent opinions on the appropriate response to a given crisis. Finally, the article briey outlines how claims about the emerging importance of regional opinion are not necessarily belied by the unwillingness of Russia and China to submit to the wishes of regional organizations in international deliberations on violence in Syria in early 2012. The Prioritization of Sovereign Consent The debates over humanitarian intervention that were waged during the 1990s are well known.3 These debates were largely conducted not in the language of sovereignty as responsibility, as they tend to be today, but in the language of sovereignty versus human rights.4 Sovereignty was understood in terms of a right of non-intervention, and the international enforcement of human rights was framed as its antithesis. Some states insisted on the primacy of the sovereign right of non-intervention while others argued that the demands of human rights trumped the rights of sovereignty.5 Opposition to interference in the affairs of states was commonly expressed in terms of the requirement for sovereign consent.6 Through the course of the decade, international society increasingly accepted that governments ought to be answerable for the treatment of their populations, and states were repeatedly subject to scrutiny, condemnation, the imposition of sanctions, and even the application of military force in response to grave violations of human rights. However, there remained rm opposition among numerous states, including China and Russia who were permanent, vetowielding members of the Security Council, to attempts to weaken the sovereign right of non-intervention, and this precluded the adoption of any resolutions in the Council authorizing military action in the affairs of functioning states without their consent.7 In the wake of NATOs unauthorized and controversial intervention in Kosovo at the end of the decade, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteika, then President of the Organization of African Unity, spoke for many concerned states when he referred to sovereignty as our nal defence against the rules of an unjust world and insisted that interference in internal affairs may take place only with the consent of the State in question (Bellamy 2009:32).
The nest study of humanitarian intervention in this period remains Wheeler (2000). To be sure, the concept of sovereignty as responsibility was developed in these years by Francis Deng (1995) and others, but it featured little in international debate about humanitarian intervention prior to 2001. 5 See, for example, statements by China on the one hand and by Slovenia and the Netherlands on the other in S/PV.4011 (June 10, 1999:913). 6 See, for example, statements by the Group of 77, Pakistan, Tunisia, Morocco, and Iran in A/46/PV.41 (November 11, 1991). 7 An additional reason for the failure to adopt such resolutions was of course the lack of political will to respond to some crises, most notoriously during the Rwandan genocide.
4 3

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In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) produced a report titled The Responsibility to Protect, which was aimed at overcoming the intractable humanitarian intervention debates of the previous decade. State sovereignty implies responsibility, the commission claimed, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. However, the commission continued: Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect (ICISS 2001:xi). The commission insisted that in instances where states failed to protect their own populations, international society could rightfully take up its responsibility to protect and intervene militarily against a state or its leaders, without its or their consent (ICISS 2001:8). The responsibility to protect (RtoP) concept emerged at a remarkable pace, and in less than 4 years it was unanimously endorsed by member states at the 2005 UN World Summit. While signicant aspects of the ICISS formulation were abandoned or diluted during negotiations for the World Summit agreement (see Bellamy 2006; Hehir 2010), the agreement made clear that the Security Council may rightfully authorize Chapter VII collective action to enforce the performance of sovereign responsibilities and implied that such enforcement may be appropriately undertaken without sovereign consent. The inclusion of reference to Chapter VII enforcement measures was opposed during negotiations by a group of states led by China and India, but these states ultimately agreed to accept the provision since they did not want to be seen as responsible for preventing an agreement at the Summit (Wheeler 2005:8). Member states declared:
we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (A/60/L.1, September 15, 2005, para. 139).

This provision would appear to endorse non-consensual intervention in the affairs of a functioning state should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to full their responsibilities. Indeed, it is difcult to conceive why the inclusion of the provision on Chapter VII collective action was so contentious if not for the fact that it implied the permissibility of non-consensual intervention. The non-consensual collective enforcement of sovereign responsibilities had never before been so plainly endorsed by the society of states. The RtoP concept would quickly take a prominent place in international debates about the protection of civilians from mass atrocities. It would be invoked by states, NGOs, and commentators both to justify and to condemn behavior and both to advocate and to deter international action in response to crises in many parts of the world including Darfur, Kenya, Georgia, Myanmar, Gaza, Sri Lanka, the Congo, North Korea, Cote dIvoire, and several states caught up in the recent Arab Spring. The concept would be referred to in numerous resolutions by the General Assembly and the Security Council.8 Nevertheless, having seemingly endorsed non-consensual collective action to protect civilians, a number of states quickly reverted to insisting that the deployment of force for protection purposes could
8 UNGA Resolution 63/308 (September 14, 2009) and UNSC Resolutions 1674 (April 28, 2006), 1706 (August 31, 2006), 1894 (November 11, 2009), 1970 (February 26, 2011), 1973 (March 17, 2011), 1975 (March 30, 2011), 1996 (July 8, 2011), 2014 (October 21, 2011), and 2016 (October 27, 2011).

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not be rightfully authorized by the Security Council in the absence of sovereign consent. This renewed insistence on the necessity for sovereign consent was made clear in Security Council debates on the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan. By 2006, it had become undeniable that the Sudanese government had failed to discharge its responsibilities and protect civilians in Darfur under the terms of the World Summit agreement.9 States that were opposed to military intervention such as China and Russia could no longer plausibly argue that a threshold for collective action had not been passed as they had done in 2004 (see Bellamy 2005). Instead, as discussion within the Security Council moved in the direction of the authorization of a UN force, these states reverted to the claim that troops could not legitimately be deployed in the absence of sovereign consent. On August 31, the Council adopted Resolution 1706 which invited the consent of the Sudanese government to the deployment of over 20,000 UN peacekeepers in Darfur. This UN force was to take over an overstretched mission of the AU. However, it was widely accepted that Sudanese consent would be required before UN forces could be deployed.10 Even though Resolution 1706 invited Sudanese consent, Russia, China, and Qatar still abstained in the vote on principled grounds. Russia did so because the Sudanese government had not yet given its consent to the proposed peacekeeping mission (S/PV.5519, August 31, 2006:89). China lamented that the phrase with the consent of the Government of National Unity was not included in the text of the resolution given that this was a xed and standardized phrase utilized by the Council when deploying United Nations missions (S/PV.5519, August 31, 2006:5). Qatar suggested that the passage of the resolution in the absence of the voluntary consent of Sudan amounted to a contravention of the concrete principles of international practice (S/PV.5519, August 31, 2006:6). Moreover, several of those states who voted in favor of the resolution also acknowledged the necessity of sovereign consent.11 The British representative, for example, conceded: It remains the case that the United Nations cannot deploy in Darfur until we have that agreement; that is not in dispute (S/ PV.5519, August 31, 2006:3). Of the fteen Council members, only Ghana was willing to claim during the debate that international society could rightfully deploy troops in the absence of Sudanese consent (S/PV.5519, August 31, 2006:11). There were pragmatic reasons for member states insisting on the necessity of sovereign consent to deployment of forces. Sudan made it clear that it would resist any non-consensual deployment and, as US Ambassador to the UN John Bolton later reported, there was no countryno matter how High Minded, and despite endless posturing by somethat was actually prepared to ght its way into Darfur (Bolton 2007:355). Moreover, a number of key public gures such as Francis Deng and NGOs such as the International Crisis Group argued that, absent consent, intervention would likely do more harm than good (Bellamy 2009:14955). The acknowledgment of the need for Sudanese consent by states such as Britain, therefore, was a prudential acceptance of the reality of the situation as much as it was a concession to the demands of China and Russia.12
9 An International Commission of Inquiry, for example, found that, while Sudan had not pursued a policy of genocide, International offences such as the crimes against humanity and war crimes that have been committed in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous than genocide (International Commission of Inquiry 2005:4). 10 It is worth clarifying at this point that, when host states do grant their consent to the deployment of troops for the purpose of protecting civilians, it is usually understood not as a humanitarian intervention or a consensual intervention but as a peacekeeping mission. 11 See statements by the United Kingdom, Japan, Denmark, and Argentina in S/PV.5519 (August 31, 2006). 12 It is worth observing that China and Russia also offered pragmatic and prudential arguments in addition to their principled objections to intervention in Darfur.

Intervention in Libya

Nevertheless, it would seem from China and Russias principled insistence on the necessity of sovereign consent that, even if Western states did have the political will to intervene in Darfur without Sudanese consent and such intervention was deemed prudent, a resolution authorizing such action could not have been passed in the Security Council. China and Russia subsequently reafrmed their principled opposition to non-consensual interference in several Council debates on the protection of civilians in armed conict held in 200610. They repeatedly insisted that RtoP does not override the necessity for sovereign consent and that international assistance should only ever be provided with full respect for the will of the state concerned.13 These arguments seemingly represented a retreat from the provision for collective action agreed to at the World Summit. Despite the shift in international discourse toward acceptance of the idea that sovereignty entails a responsibility to protect, therefore, there remained rm opposition to the idea of non-consensual enforcement of these responsibilities. The Security Council nally and unanimously authorized the deployment of a hybrid UN-AU force in Darfur in Resolution 1769, adopted on July 31, 2007, but only after the Sudanese government had granted its consent. The Reliance on the Position of Regional Organizations During these years, states that were reluctant to embrace the international enforcement of sovereign responsibilities repeatedly appealed to the opinions of relevant regional organizations when justifying their opposition to interventionist measures.14 They commonly combined their insistence on the need for sovereign consent with the demand that the (non-interventionist) positions of regional organizations be respected. Such arguments can be clearly contrasted with the erce opposition of some of these same states to the non-consensual intervention to protect civilians in Kosovo in 1999, which was not merely supported but undertaken by a relevant regional alliance, NATO. Regional organizations, it was now suggested, understood best the dynamics of conicts and crises and were best placed to know how to protect civilians and preserve regional peace and security. Their opinions, therefore, should be given full consideration when the society of states deliberates how to respond to mass atrocities. Chinas 2005 Position Paper on UN Reforms, released prior to the World Summit, combined in plain terms the asserted need for sovereign and regional consent. It acknowledged that massive humanitarian crises occurring within states were the legitimate concern of international society and suggested that the Security Council had a role to play in pursuing peaceful solutions and, where necessary, prudently considering enforcement actions to protect populations. However, it rmly insisted that any responses to such crises should strictly conform to the UN Charter and the opinions of the country and the regional organization concerned should be respected (Peoples Republic of Chinas 2005; Teitt 2011:302). This position was reected in the claims of China, Russia, and other states that expressed opposition to international enforcement of sovereign responsibilities in Security Council debates about Darfur. The AU was much more reluctant than western states to endorse the application of international sanctions and the deployment of non-African troops in Darfur prior to 2006, and skeptical states repeatedly appealed to the opinion of the AU in justifying their wariness or opposition to coercive and interventionist measures. In an early debate on Darfur in
13 See, for example, S/PV.5577 (Resumption 1), December 4, 2006:8; S/PV.5989, May 27, 2008:9; S/PV.6354, July 7, 2010:28. 14 A regional organization can be understood broadly as a regional grouping of states, typically with legal personality and organizational structure, which claims a degree of responsibility for regional peace and security. For a useful overview of the concept, see Tavares (2010: chapter 1).

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2004, China insisted that the Security Council should listen attentively to the voice of the African Union, and Algeria similarly declared, on behalf of the three African states on the Council, While we fully understand the need for the Council to assume its obligations under the Charter, we need to make sure that its actions complement and support the efforts of the African Union (S/PV.5015, July 30, 2004:56). Speaking against the application of sanctions on Sudan, Russia cautioned that it was counterproductive to seek to apply sanctions when the AU was already engaged in constructive peacebuilding efforts and insisted that the Council should abide strictly by the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter on cooperation with regional organizations (S/PV.5040, September 18, 2004:4). China similarly warned that the Council should fully support the African Union in its mediation efforts, rather than increase its difculties (S/PV.5040, September 18, 2004:4). In debates about the possible deployment of a UN force or a hybrid UN-AU force in Darfur in 200607, these skeptical states made clear that their willingness to abstain or vote in favor of resolutions was made in accordance with the decision of the AU to consent to the deployment of non-African troops to the region.15 Some of those states that more enthusiastically supported deployment and that led the way in sponsoring and promoting the passage of these resolutions similarly emphasized that they were responding to requests of the AU that its existing mission to Darfur be supplemented by an international force.16 The opinion of relevant regional organizations, then, was clearly understood as something that should guide Council deliberations, or at least something that could be fruitfully appealed to in order to justify ones position. In 2007, China and Russia both vetoed the adoption of a draft resolution in the Security Council, which would have condemned human rights violations committed by the government of Myanmar. South Africa also voted against the resolution. Each of these states recognized that Myanmar was confronted with grave humanitarian challenges and that progress in dealing with these challenges had been slow. However, they also insisted that the situation remained an internal affair of a sovereign state and did not constitute a threat to international or regional peace and security. The proposed Council resolution, they argued, would not only exceed the Councils mandate but it would hinder efforts by other UN agencies work with Myanmars leadership to improve the situation. They defended their position on the grounds that ASEAN had also concluded that the situation did not threaten regional peace and security (S/PV.5619, January 12, 2007:24, 6). China rmly stated that all of Myanmars immediate neighbours, all ASEAN members and most Asia-Pacic countries agreed that the situation did not pose a threat to regional peace and security, and therefore, there was no need for the Security Council to get involved (S/PV.5619, January 12, 2007:3). Later that year, ASEAN openly criticized Myanmars leadership in the wake of government attacks against Buddhist monks and civilian protesters. While the ASEAN foreign ministers did not consent to international interference in Myanmars internal affairs, they issued a statement that expressed their revulsion to the Myanmar Foreign Minister Nyan Win over reports that the demonstrations in Myanmar are being suppressed by violent force and that there has been a number of fatalities (Security Council Report 2007:2). This strong reaction by ASEAN coincided with the willingness of China to pressure Myanmar to allow the UN Secretary-Generals Special Advisor on Myanmar, Ibrahim Gambari, to visit the country and meet with top leadership (Security Council Report 2007:3). The willingness of China to pressure a sovereign state even in this small
15 See statements by China and Russia (S/PV.5519, August 31, 2006:45, 89; S/PV.5727, July 31, 2007:5, 911). See also Teitt (2009:222). 16 See statements by the United Kingdom and France (S/PV.5519, August 31, 2006:34, 78; S/PV.5727, July 31, 2007:35).

Intervention in Libya

way was signicant, and it was noteworthy that it corresponded with a shift in posture of the relevant regional organization. In 2008, China and Russia again cast a double veto in the Security Council, this time preventing the adoption of a draft resolution that would have imposed an arms embargo in response to a troubled electoral process, increasing violence, and a worsening humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe. South Africa, Libya, and Vietnam also voted against the resolution. These ve states argued that the situation did not constitute a threat to international peace and security and that the Security Council should refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. They also emphasized that the proposed resolution ran counter to the wishes of relevant regional organizations. South African President Thabo Mbeki had been leading the mediation efforts of the SADC that were aimed at nding a peaceful solution to the crisis, and the AU had followed the lead of the SADC and appealed to all actors to refrain from any action that may negatively impact on the climate for dialogue (S/PV.5933, July 11, 2008:4; see also Howard-Hassmann 2010; Williams 2009). In the Security Council debate, Russia lamented that The sponsors of the draft resolution have not considered the opinions of the States of the region, which reject its sanctions philosophy and are calling for the search for a political solution to be continued. Indeed, the draft ignores the consensual decision of the African Union appealing to States to refrain from any act that could have a negative impact on advancing the dialogue between the Zimbabwean parties (S/PV.5933, July 11, 2008:910). China regretted that the sincere appeals and reasonable proposals of the AU and its members, that sanctions not be imposed and that more time be allowed for the good ofces and mediation efforts of the SADC and the AU to work, were not taken on board and insisted that the Security Council give the AU great attention and full respect when deliberating how to respond to crises within the region (S/PV.5933, July 11, 2008:1213). South Africa, Libya, and Vietnam similarly suggested that the opinions of the SADC and the AU should be respected and claimed that the imposition of sanctions would hinder the efforts of these regional organizations to resolve the crisis (S/PV.5933, July 11, 2008:45, 7). It is noteworthy that some of those states that voted in favor of the draft resolution similarly sought to justify their own position on the grounds that it was in accord with the opinions of relevant regional actors. The United States noted that the AU had adopted a resolution expressing its concern regarding the urgent need to prevent a further worsening of the situation and observed that three African states, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Burkina Faso, were among the sponsors of the draft resolution (S/PV.5933, July 11, 2008:14). The draft resolution had also recalled the AU resolution cited by the United States as well as statements of the SADC, Pan-African Parliament, and AU Observer missions to Zimbabwe, which had found that the June elections were neither free nor fair (Williams 2009:411). Regional opinion, then, was increasingly appealed to as a relevant guide for Security Council deliberations. In the crises in Darfur, Myanmar, and Zimbabwe, the opinions of the host state and relevant regional organizations on the acceptability of international measures to ensure the protection of civilians were largely in accord with each other. In the case of Libya in 2011, however, these opinions would diverge. Those states that had justied their opposition to interventionist measures on the grounds that the will of both the sovereign state and the relevant regional organizations should be respected would now need to choose between the two. The Authorization of Intervention in Libya The origins of the Security Councils actions in Libya lie in the so-called Arab Spring, a revolutionary wave of anti-government protests and demonstrations that had been sweeping across North Africa and the Middle East since December

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2010. In the rst 2 months of 2011, massive protests had led to the overthrow of the leaders of Tunisia and Egypt. Political demonstrations in Libya began in mid-February in the capital, Tripoli, and quickly spread across the state. In contrast to Tunisia and Egypt, protests in Libya quickly turned violent, partly because of Gaddas decision to crush dissent and partly because of the rapid establishment of an armed opposition group, the Interim Transitional National Council (Williams 2011). The Libyan leader soon made clear his willingness to commit atrocities to stay in power. Echoing the infamous language employed by the Rwandan genocidaires, he urged his supporters to go out and attack the cockroaches and rats protesting against his rule. He declared that he would cleanse Libya house by house and execute anyone who threatened the unity of the state (BBC News 2011a). Whereas opposition forces enjoyed early success, Gaddas forces regained the ascendancy from late February through to mid-March and were soon threatening to crush the rebel capital of Benghazi. Relevant regional organizations and the United Nations each responded unusually quickly to the emerging crisis. On February 22, only a week after the violence had begun, the League of Arab States (LAS) suspended Libya from its organization. The Security Council issued a statement later that day, which welcomed the decision of the LAS, condemned the violence and the use of force against civilians, and called for an immediate end to the violence and for steps to address the legitimate demands of the population (SC/10180, February 22, 2011). The following day, the Peace and Security Council of the AU issued a statement declaring that the aspirations of the people of Libya for democracy, political reform, justice and socio-economic development are legitimate and that it strongly condemns the indiscriminate and excessive use of force and lethal weapons against peaceful protestors (African Union 2011a). The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) similarly issued a statement condemning the excessive use of force against civilians and calling for an immediate cessation of violence (Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC 2011). Two days later, the UN Human Rights Council established a commission of inquiry and called for the General Assembly to suspend Libya from the Human Rights Council. The Assembly suspended Libya from the Council on March 1.17 On February 26, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1970. The resolution welcomed the condemnation by the LAS, the AU, and the OIC of the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law being committed in Libya and asserted that the widespread and systematic attacksagainst the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity. It recalled the Libyan authorities responsibility to protect its population and stressed the need to hold to account those responsible for attacks against civilians. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Council demanded an immediate end to the violence and called for steps to full the legitimate demands of the population; referred the situation to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court; established an arms embargo; and imposed travel bans and asset freezes on particular members of Gaddas regime. Several states, including China and Russia, indicated that they had voted in favor of the resolution after taking into account the views of African and Arab regional organizations and their member states (S/PV.6491, February 26, 2011:4). As the situation continued to worsen over the next few weeks, a number of relevant regional organizations urged the Security Council to take stronger action. On March 7, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) called for the Security Council to take all necessary measures to protect civilians, including enforcing a no-y zone over Libya. The following day, the OIC also released a statement supporting the establishment of a no-y zone, but rejecting the deployment of
17

UNGA Resolution 65/265 (March 1, 2011).

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foreign ground forces (Williams 2011:252). On March 10, the AU repeated its earlier condemnation of the indiscriminate use of force against civilians. However, in contrast to the more interventionist appeals of the GCC and OIC, the AU articulated its strong commitment to the respect of the unity and territorial integrity of Libya, as well as its rejection of any foreign military intervention, whatever its form (African Union 2011b).18 Crucially, however, on March 12, the LAS made the unprecedented move of calling on the Security Council to establish a no-y zone and safe areas to protect civilians in Libya. The organization declared its commitment to preserve the unity, territorial integrity, and political independence of Libya and to reject all forms of foreign intervention in Libya. Nevertheless, it plainly decided: 1. To call on the Security Council to bear its responsibilities towards the deteriorating situation in Libya, and to take necessary measures to impose immediately a no-y zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in Libya 2. To cooperate and communicate with the Transitional Council of Libya and to provide the Libyan people with urgent and continuing support as well as the necessary protection from the serious violations and grave crimes committed by the Libyan authorities, which have consequently lost their legitimacy (Council of the League of Arab States 2011).19 The precise reasons why the LAS, which had in previous years expressed rm opposition to humanitarian intervention, reached this decision remain largely a matter of conjecture. Nevertheless, a few points are worth noting. Only eleven of the twenty-two members of the LAS were present at the meeting, and a majority of the eleven were also members of the GCC that had called for the establishment of a no-y zone only 5 days earlier. While the foreign minister of Oman who chaired the meeting told the press that the decision was agreed upon by all states that were present, it has since been reported that Syria and Algeria were opposed to the decision (Al Jazeera 2011; BBC News 2011b). We should take care, therefore, not to exaggerate Arab support for a no-y zone (see Lynch 2011). Nevertheless, it remains that a sufcient number of states were able to reach agreement within the LAS to call for the establishment of a no-y zone. It is plausible that this can be partly attributed to genuine humanitarian concern and a desire to support the Libyan people. Chief of Cabinet to the Arab League Secretary-General, Hesham Youssef, contended that things are changing around the Arab world, and indeed in the Arab League as well. He suggested that the Arab world is entering a new phase such that some of the practices that could have passed before cannot pass now (Ezzat 2011). However, it is also likely that other factors were at play. Some states may have feared that failure to take a rm stance against Gadda could arouse dissent and activism within their own states. Moreover, Gadda possessed few friends in the region and had a particularly sour relationship with Saudi Arabia (Bellamy and Williams 2011:842). If Saudi Arabia was one of the states that were most open to strong measures against Libya, as some commentators have speculated (Lee 2011), then its inuence in the GCC and the region more generally may have been important in leading more skeptical states to agree to the Leagues decision.20
18 I outline why Arab opinion was prioritized over the reservations of the AU and also consider the broader implications of divergence in regional opinions about how to respond to the threat of mass atrocities in the next section. 19 For discussion of why the LAS took this position, see Bellamy and Williams (2011:84142). 20 I am grateful to Sarah Teitt for useful insights on these points.

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The appeal of the LAS was decisive in generating agreement among key states to push for a resolution authorizing the use of force and also in tempering the opposition among other states to the passage of such a resolution. On March 16, US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton suggested that the LAS statement had led to a sea change in opinion such that many of the countries on the Security Council that were reluctant or opposed are now willing to discuss what might be possible (Condon 2011).21 Among those states that ultimately voted in favor of intervention, the appeal made by the LAS would seem to have been particularly important for the United States. The Obama administration had for some time been expressing deep ambivalence about how to respond to the Libyan crisis. While some ofcials advocated military intervention on humanitarian grounds, others expressed concern about the complexities, risks, and costs of such an operation as well as concerns about the political fallout from interfering militarily in the affairs of yet another Muslim state. As Bellamy and Williams (2011:843) observe, the resolution of the LAS strengthened the hand of those within the administration supporting stronger measures against Libya. President Obama reportedly reached the decision to push for military action at a seniorlevel White House meeting on March 15, and following 2 days of intensive diplomacy, the Security Council passed a resolution authorizing the use of force (see Rogin 2011). Resolution 1973 was adopted on March 17 as Gaddas troops advanced toward Benghazi. Hours earlier, Gadda had warned the citys residents, We are coming tonightWe will nd you in your closets. He promised amnesty for those who throw their weapons away, but no mercy or compassion for those who opposed his forces (Kirkpatrick and Fahim 2011). The resolution recalled the condemnation of Gaddas actions by the LAS, the AU, and the OIC and took explicit note of the LAS call to impose a no-y zone and to establish safe areas to protect civilians. Under the heading, No Fly Zone, the Council established a ban on all ights in Libyan airspace in order to help protect civilians, with the exception of ights for humanitarian purposes and those necessary to enforce compliance with the ban. Under the heading, Protection of Civilians, the Council authorized the use of all necessary measuresto protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory. This was a groundbreaking resolution authorizing a broad range of coercive measures against a sovereign state for the purpose of protecting civilians. The resolution, sponsored by France, Britain, and Lebanon, was passed with ten votes in favor, no votes against, and ve abstentions (China, Russia, India, Brazil, and Germany). Those who supported the resolution cited the appeals of regional organizations, particularly the LAS, as justication for authorizing forceful measures to protect civilians. The United Kingdom declared that it was due to the particularly clear demands of the LAS that it pressed for the quick adoption of the resolution (S/PV.6498, March 17, 2011:4). Lebanon suggested that the resolution essentially takes into account the demands by the LAS for an end to the violence against civilians (S/PV.6498, March 17, 2011:3). And the United States framed the resolution as a powerful response to the call of the LAS (S/PV.6498, March 17, 2011:5). It is noteworthy that no state chose to vote against the resolution authorizing military intervention in the affairs of a non-consenting sovereign state. It would seem that the request for military measures by the LAS was crucial in this regard. Three of the abstaining states indicated that they took the position of the LAS as a guide when deliberating how to respond to the crisis. Russia and Brazil
21

I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this reference.

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suggested that they took the request of the LAS into account, but lamented that the text of the resolution went beyond those measures called for by the LAS. Thus, they approved of the resolution to the extent that it coincided with the demands of the regional organization, and expressed dissent to the extent that the resolution departed from the wishes of the organization (S/PV.6498, March 17, 2011:6, 8). China was even clearer on the importance it attached to the request of the LAS. The Chinese representative declared that his government was always against the use of force in international relations and suggested that it had serious difculty with parts of the resolution. However, guided by the request of the LAS, China had decided to abstain:
China attaches great importance to the relevant position by the 22-member Arab League on the establishment of a no-y zone over Libya. We also attach great importance to the position of African countries and the African Union. In view of this, and considering the special circumstances surrounding the situation in Libya, China abstained from the voting on resolution 1973 (S/PV.6498, March 17, 2011:10).

Implications In the case of Libya, then, the existence of regional consent trumped the absence of sovereign consent. Following the request of a relevant regional organization, the Security Council willingly authorized military intervention against a non-consenting sovereign state for the express purpose of protecting civilians. Five years earlier, China and Russia had opposed military intervention in Darfur on the principled grounds that the intervention lacked sovereign consent, and Western permanent members of the Security Council had decided against intervention on the pragmatic grounds that intervention would be too difcult and costly in the absence of sovereign consent. In 2011, China and Russia acquiesced to a resolution authorizing military intervention in Libya on the principled grounds that the Council should be guided by the opinions of relevant regional organizations, and Western permanent members pushed this resolution through the Council once their pragmatic requirement for regional consent had been met. Bellamy and Williams (2011:847) helpfully describe an emerging gatekeeper role which is being played by regional organizations in international deliberations about how to respond to the threat of mass atrocities. They suggest that regional organizations can increasingly be seen to inuence how issues are framed and the range of plausible policy options available to the Security Council. Of course, the request of the LAS was far from being the only determinant of international action in Libya. However, in the absence of sovereign consent, this regional consent was crucial in convincing skeptical states to acquiesce and in generating the will among other states to push for the authorization of military intervention to protect civilians.22 It is too early to determine how best to explain the willingness of skeptical states to allow the passage of Resolution 1973. Had these states rhetorically entrapped themselves by explicitly tying their positions to the positions of regional organizations when seeking to justify their opposition to non-consensual intervention in previous years?23 Or were their positions the product of an authentic emergent policy of following the opinions of relevant regional
22 It is worth noting that a similar story of reliance of the Security Council on the consent of relevant regional organizations (in this case ECOWAS and the AU) can be told about the decision to recognize Alassane Ouattara as President of Cote dIvoire after the November 2010 election and to forcibly oust former President Laurent Gbagbo who refused to stand down in 2011, although in this instance international action obviously also enjoyed the consent of the recognized de jure authorities (see Bellamy and Williams 2011:82938). 23 On the idea of rhetorical entrapment, see Schimmelfennig (2001).

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organizations when considering how to respond to the threat of mass atrocities? Each of these skeptical states had repeatedly accepted, in previous General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and in their own statements within these organs, that the Council has a role to play to protect civilians threatened with mass atrocities, and in this instance, Gadda had made his intentions to perpetrate atrocities against civilians unusually clear. Further, these skeptical states had also repeatedly insisted, in previous Assembly and Council debates, that the Council should be guided by the opinions of relevant regional organizations when deliberating the forceful protection of civilians, and in this instance, the LAS had made a clear request for action. These states, therefore, did not have strong arguments available that they could use to justify vetoing or voting against the adoption of Resolution 1973. An appeal to the necessity of sovereign consent in this instance, in face of such a clear and imminent threat to civilians, would have been very difcult to defend. In this sense, then, they can be understood to have been rhetorically entrapped. However, it may be the case that, confronted with this manifest threat of mass atrocities and having expressed their skepticism about the value of resorting to coercive intervention in plain terms in the Council debate, they were genuinely content to follow the wishes of the LAS and to allow the passage of the resolution, either for the principled reason of respecting regional opinion or for the more calculated reason of not wanting to be seen to oppose the regional view.24 China, for example, had become increasingly close to and also dependent upon Saudi Arabia in recent years. Saudi Arabia had been the largest aid donor to China following the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, and China had in 2009 surpassed the United States as the biggest importer of oil from the Arab state. Given the inuential role played by Saudi Arabia in the GCC and the LAS, China may have been reluctant to be seen to stand in the way of their requests for international action against the Gadda regime.25 Either way, the adoption of Resolution 1973 indicates an important development. Whether or not China and Russia, among others, were sincere in their acquiescence, their willingness to allow the resolution to pass demonstrates at least to some degree the power of the idea that the opinion of regional organizations in matters of civilian protection should be respected. Even if this acquiescence was the product of rhetorical entrapment, constructivist research indicates that such behavior can over time lead to acceptance and internalization of a norm.26 That being said, it is by no means settled that this apparent shift from reliance on sovereign consent to regional consent will last beyond even this single case. First, the initial response of African and Arab regional organizations to the manner in which the intervention in Libya was conducted seemed to indicate that they might be more cautious about appealing to the Security Council to authorize action to protect civilians in the future due to fear that interventionist states will use such authorization to justify measures that exceed what the regional organizations request. On March 19, the Ad Hoc High-Level Committee of the AU called for an immediate stop to the attacks by Western forces against Gaddas regime. The following week, the chairperson of the AU Commission, Jean Ping, lamented that the wishes of the regional organization had been totally ignored in the decision to undertake military intervention in Libya (Williams 2011:25556). On March 20, the LAS Secretary-General, Amr Moussa, was quoted as criticizing the air strikes, saying: What has happened in Libya
I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for this formulation. I am grateful to Sarah Teitt for useful insights on this point. See also Lee (2011). 26 This claim is pervasive in constructivist literature. Two well-known examples are Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) and Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999).
25 24

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differs from the goal of imposing a no-y zone, and what we want is the protection of civilians and not bombing other civilians (The Age 2011). Nevertheless, the willingness of the LAS in early 2012 to call for a rm international response to escalating violence in Syria, including the creation of a joint ArabUN peacekeeping force, indicates that at least this organization has not been deterred from requesting Security Council authorized interference in the affairs of sovereign states (Washington Post 2012). Second, the willingness of key Western states to push resolutions through the Security Council and to intervene to protect civilians in accordance with requests of regional organizations in the future is by no means assured. While it was successful, the military intervention in Libya took several months longer than Western leaders publicly anticipated. It was nancially costly and, for as long as victory eluded NATOs forces, politically fraught. As early as March 28, President Obama was making sure to downplay expectations and make clear that Libya was a unique case in which military intervention was feasible and necessary, not one of many. He insisted: America cannot use our military wherever repression occurs. And given the costs and risks of intervention, we must always measure our interests against the need for action (Obama 2011). The Libyan intervention, then, by no means guarantees that pro-RtoP states will always be willing to undertake difcult interventions when requested by regional organizations. Indeed, at the time of writing (March 2012), the call by the LAS for the authorization and deployment of a peacekeeping force in Syria has yet to be acted upon by these states. Most crucially, while the potential mass slaughter of civilians in Benghazi was averted and the liberation of Libya was eventually declared, there was and has continued to be a strong backlash against NATOs intervention by several skeptical states. Russia, China, and others began to express deep reservations within days of American and European forces beginning their broad campaign of strikes against Gaddas regime. They claimed that the strikes went beyond the mandate provided by the Security Council, and they criticized the intervening states for blurring the line between civilian protection and regime change. This criticism continued through the course of the intervention and was a recurring feature of Security Council debates during 2011.27 Russia in particular has made clear its belief that NATOs implementation of Resolution 1973 meant that a Security Council resolution turned into its opposite and has rmly rejected any suggestions that the intervention should be seen as a model for future implementation of the responsibility to protect (S/PV.6627, October 4, 2011:4). It has been suggested by some observers that it is this backlash against the Libyan intervention that has led Russia and China to twice exercise their veto powers to block resolutions condemning the Assad regime for violence in Syria in spite of the increasingly rm stance against Assad that has been taken by the LAS (Reiff 2011; Welsh 2012). We need to be careful, however, not to overstate the extent to which the positions of Russia and China in the particular case of Syria challenge the broad trend toward prioritizing regional opinion in international deliberations on civilian protection. The rst double veto was cast in October 2011 on a draft resolution condemning violence by Syrian authorities against civilians. At this point, the LAS was not yet clamoring for international action as it had over Libya, and both sides of the debate within the Security Council once again professed to be guided by the opinions of regional organizations (S/PV.6627, October 4, 2011). The second double veto was cast in February 2012 on a draft resolution that,
27 See Associated Press (2011a,b) and also statements by China, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa in Security Council debates in May on Libya and on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conict and in October on the crisis in Syria in S/PV.6528, May 4, 2011; S/PV.6531, May 10, 2011; S/PV.6627, October 4, 2011.

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echoing clear statements of the LAS, condemned the violence by Syrian authorities, lamented the failure of Syrian authorities to implement promised reforms, and called for a LAS-facilitated political transition to a democratic, plural political system (S/2012/77, February 4, 2012). The backlash in the wake of Libya is certainly a crucial part of the explanation for Russian and Chinese opposition to these resolutions, but so too are Russias close ties to Syria and Chinas alliance with Russia (see Mead 2012; Thakur 2012). There is nothing particularly novel or surprising about permanent members of the Council placing strategic interests above other concerns. The tentative shift toward being guided by regional opinion does not guarantee that states will always act in accordance with such opinion any more than the emphasis on sovereign consent always prevented non-consensual intervention, as Russias military action in Georgia in 2008 made clear. Moreover, the arguments made by Russia and China to justify their use of veto, and the responses of other states to the use of veto, demonstrate the emergent importance of regional opinion in international deliberations. In Council debates about the second draft resolution, Russia and China again, though now less plausibly than before, attempted to frame their position as consistent with the opinion of the LAS, declaring that they wished to see a proper settlement of the Syrian crisis within the framework of the Arab League and that they were wary of undermining the intermediary efforts of the regional organization (S/PV.6710, January 31, 2012:25; S/PV.6711, February 4, 2012:9). Further, states, such as India, Brazil, and South Africa, that had expressed skepticism about Resolution 1973 on Libya and the rst draft resolution on Syria now willingly voted in favor of the second resolution, declaring that they were voting in accordance with the will of the LAS (S/PV.6711, February 4, 2012:8, 11). Two weeks later, the General Assembly voted overwhelmingly in favor of a resolution that was very similar to the draft Council resolution,28 and states have ercely condemned Russia and China, expressing their disgust and distress at what is perceived to be shameful intransigence in face of regional efforts to stem human suffering (The Telegraph 2012; S/PV.6711, February 4, 2012:56). Despite the exercise of the veto by two permanent members in this specic case, therefore, regional consensus clearly continues to be treated as an authoritative guide to how the Council should act on matters of civilian protection. A nal factor compounding the possible reluctance of both skeptical and pro-interventionist states to allow or to carry out interventions to protect civilians at the request of regional organizations in the future is the fact that there may often be multiple relevant regional organizations that offer different opinions on a given crisis. In the case of Libya, there were several organizations with reasonable claims to be the voice of the region, and while the LAS, GCC, and OIC each called for the establishment of a no-y zone, the AU rmly rejected foreign military intervention in any form. It would seem that several factors combined such that both skeptical and pro-RtoP states chose to prioritize the opinion of Arab organizations over the AUs stated position. These included not only the felt imperative to prevent seemingly imminent atrocities, but also the strategic desire, particularly of China, to be seen to respect the wishes of key Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, and the fact that several African states, most notably South Africa, ultimately voted in favor of Resolution 1973, thus alleviating fears that support for the resolution would be interpreted as a rejection of African opinion. If regional organizations can be increasingly understood to be playing a gatekeeping role in international deliberations about the protection of civilians, Bellamy and
28

UNGA Resolution GA/11207/Rev.1 (February 16, 2012) was adopted by 137 votes to 12 with 17 abstentions.

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Williams (2011:846) warn, then any lack of clarity about which regional organization should take priority in a given crisis could give rise to forum shopping in which states simply appeal to the position of the organization whose opinion on how to respond to a crisis happens to coincide with their own. Alternatively, it could lead to states making political and strategic calculations about the benets of being seen to defer to the opinion of one organization rather than another. Tensions between GCC states and the broader LAS have been evident at various points during the Syrian crisis, and while this has not been a prominent feature of Council deliberations on the crisis to date, it is conceivable that such divergence of opinion between relevant regional organizations could become a pressing issue in future crises. In short, caution must be exercised before drawing rm conclusions about the meaning of Libya for future deliberations within the Security Council about the protection of civilians. Nevertheless, it is clear that in March 2011, regional consent trumped sovereign consent. For the rst time, the Security Council authorized military intervention in the affairs of a functioning and non-consenting sovereign state for the purpose of protecting civilians, and it did so at the request of relevant regional organizations. This willingness to be guided by regional opinion was in accord with an emerging trend in Council deliberations on civilian protection since at least 2005, and it may well prove to be an important indicator of Security Council practice in the years ahead. Conclusion In June 2011, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon released his report on the role of regional and subregional arrangements in implementing RtoP. He noted that the views of neighboring states and regional organizations are increasingly taken into account by members of the Security Council when determining how to respond to particular crises. This is as it should be, he declared. Such actors often have a nuanced understanding of the situation, and they may play a critical role in the implementation of resolutions. Moreover, Timely and decisive response is most likely when inter-governmental bodies at both the global and regional levels favour similar courses of action. In such cases, decision-making at each level reinforces the political legitimacy of the other (United Nations 2011; para. 6). The Secretary-General recognized that the implementation of RtoP should respect institutional and cultural differences from region to region, and he accepted that each region will operationalize the principle at its own pace and in its own way. However, he also insisted that RtoP is a universal principle and cautioned that the national and international responsibilities which had been agreed to at the 2005 World Summit must not be diluted or diminished through reinterpretation at the regional, sub-regional, or national levels (United Nations 2011, para. 8). The tentative shift toward reliance on the opinions of regional organizations in international deliberations about civilian protection points to the fact that, while the society of states is global in scope, different regions interpret different norms and values in different ways. Willingness to be guided by regional opinion would seem to be one way of attempting to uphold universal norms and values in such a pluralist world. However, the SecretaryGenerals warning is instructive. While regional differences may well demand respect, the efcacy of this cautious shift toward accepting that regional opinion should guide international action will be at least in part dependent upon the extent to which regional organizations can consistently respond to crises in ways that facilitate timely and decisive action to protect civilians from mass atrocities.

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