ON WHAT IS SIGNIFIED, PART I.

Bart A. Mazzetti

1
 PART I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Signification in the Ante-Predicaments: Categories ch. 1.

II. On what is signified according to the Categories.

III. On things said denominatively.

IV. On signification in relation to substance and accident.

V. On things said either with intertwining or without it.

Supplement: De Ente et Essenti, cap. 3, nn. 24-36.

Supplement: On accidental predicates and the singular in the genus of substance as what
exists per se.

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I. SIGNIFICATION IN THE ANTE-PREDICAMENTS: CATEGORIES CH. 1.

1. Translations.

Cf. Aristotle, Categories ch. 1 (1a 1-15):

(tr. R. Glen Coughlin) (tr. unknown)

Those are called equivocal of which the name
alone is common but the account of the sub-
stance according to the name is different, as
both man and a picture of a man [are called]
“animal”,
[1a] Things are named equivocally whose name
alone is common but the thought of the sub-
stance according to that name is different, as a
man and a picture of a man are named “animal”.

for, of these, the name alone is common but the Only the name of these things is common, since
account of the substance according to the name the thought of the substance according to that
is different. name is different for each.

For should someone give out what it is for each For if anyone were to say [5] what it is for each
of these to be animal, he will give out a proper of these to be animals, he would give the proper
account of each. account for each.

Those are called univocal of which both the Things are named univocally whose name is
name is common and the account of the common and the thought of the substance ac-
substance according to the name is the same, as cording to that name is the same,
both man and ox [are called] “animal”.

For each of these is called by the common name as a man and an ox are called by the common
“animal”, and the account of the substance is the name “animal”, and the thought of the [10] sub-
same. stance is the same for both.

For should someone give out an account of For if anyone were to give an account of what it
each, what it is for each of these to be animal, is for each of these to be animals, he would give
he will give out the same account. the same account.

Those are called denominative, which, differing
from something by falling away {by case, by
ending,  }, have their name according
to its name, as “the grammarian” from “gram-
mar”, and “the brave” from “bravery”.
Things are named denominatively which have a
name according to another name with a [15] dif-
ferent ending, as “grammarian” from “gram-
mar”, and “brave” from “bravery”.

Cf. Aristotle, Categories ch. 1 (1a 1-15):

(tr. E. M. Edghill) (tr. H. G. Apostle)

Things are said to be named ‘equivocally’
when, though they have a common name, the
definition corresponding with the name differs
for each.
[1a] Things are named equivocally if only the
name applied to them is common but the ex-
pression of the substance [i.e. the definition]
corresponding to that name is different for each
of the things,

Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can as in the case of a man and a picture when each
both lay claim to the name ‘animal’; is called ‘animal’.

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yet these are equivocally so named, for, though For only the name is common to these, but the
they have a common name, the definition expression of the substance corresponding to
corresponding with the name differs for each. that [5] name differs for each;

For should any one define in what sense each is for if one were to state what it is to be an
an animal, his definition in the one case will be animal, he would give a different definition for
appropriate to that case only. each of them.

On the other hand, things are said to be named Things are named univocally if both the name
‘univocally’ which have both the name and the applied to them is common and the expression
definition answering to the name in common. of the substance corresponding to them is the
same for each of the things,

A man and an ox are both ‘animal’, as in the case of ‘animal’ when applied to a man
and to an ox.

and these are univocally so named, inasmuch as For a man and an ox may be called by the
not only the name, but also the definition, is the common [10] name ‘animal’, and the expression
same in both cases: of the substance [corresponding to that name] is
the same for both;

for if a man should state in what sense each is for if one were to state for each of them what it
an animal, the statement in the one case would is to be an animal, he would give the same
be identical with that in the other. definition.

Things are said to be named ‘derivatively’, Things are derivatively named if they are called
which derive their name from some other name, by a name which is borrowed from another
but differ from it in termination. name but which differs from it in ending.

Thus the grammarian derives his name from the For example, a man may be called ‘grammar-
word ‘grammar’, and the courageous man from ian’, and this name is borrowed [15] from
the word ‘courage’. ‘grammar’; and he may be called ‘brave’, and
this name is borrowed from ‘bravery’.

Cf. Aristotle, Categories ch. 1, (1a 1-15) (tr. Richard P. Diamond):

Things are said to be equivocal whose name alone is common, but the definition cor-
responding to the name of the substance is different; animal, for example, which is both a
man and a drawing [of one]. For only the name of these is common, and the definition corre-
sponding to the name of the substance is different.

(a) Forms of translation compared:

“Those are called equivocal...” (tr. Coughlin)

“Things are named equivocally...” (tr. unknown)
“Things are said to be named equivocally....’” (tr. Edghill)
“Things are named equivocally...” (tr. Apostle)
“Things are said to be equivocal...” (tr. Diamond)

(b) My trans.: “Those (things) are called ‘equivocal’....” (see further below)

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2. Definition, description, and a division of names into four.

Cf. Porphyry, Commentary on the Categories (In: Porphyry: On Aristotle’s Categories.

Translated by Steven K. Strange, Ithaca, New York, 1992, pp. 38-39):

A. I claim that everything possesses both a name and either a definition (horismos) or
a description (hupographê).40 For example, this thing has the name ‘man’, and is indicated
by that name, but there also exists a definition of it, for we say that man is a mortal rational
animal capable of receiving intelligence and knowledge. Each thing is indicated not only by
its name but also by the account that defines and conveys its essence, as for example when
we say that sound is the proper sensible of hearing. Since everything has both a name and
a defining account, there are four sorts of relations that [38-39]
40
The Neoplatonic version of this distinction is well illustrated by Boethius 166A: a defi-
nition (diffinitio) reveals the essence of something according to its genus and differentia,
whereas a description (descriptio) merely indicates it by means of a common characteristic
(propria quadam proprietate)....

obtain between defining accounts and names. Things either share both the same name
and the same defining account, or the name but not the defining account, or the
account but not [25] the name, or neither the account nor the name. 41 When things share
the same name but have entirely different accounts, they are called homonyms.1 When they
share both the account and a name, they are referred to as synonyms, since together with
(sun-) the name they also have the same account. When things share the same account but
not the same name, they are called polyonyms, and when they have in common neither [30]
a name nor an account, they are called heteronyms. There is a fifth sort of case: when
certain things come to be from other things, participating in a way in both the name and the
account of the things from whence they come, differing however in grammatical form. These
are called paronyms.42
41
[note omitted]
42
According to Simplicius, who presumably depends for his information on Porphyry’s
larger commentary, the division of homonyms, synonyms, heteronyms, polyonyms, and
paronyms was reported by Boethus to have been due to Speusippus (Simpl. 38,19-24 =
Speusippus fr. 34a Lang). Porphyry’s text appears to imply, probably correctly, that Aristotle
adopted Speusippus’ division for his own purposes in the Categories....

Cf. Porphyry the Phoenician Isagoge. Translation, Introduction and Notes by Edward W.
Warren (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1975, n. 17), p. 30:

...Boethius remarks, “Carefully he says describentes, not definientes: for a definition arises
from a genus, but a genus cannot have another genus.” E.S. p. 180, 20 -22.2 A descriptio is
given, not a definitio. “A descriptio, as we said in an earlier book, is a kind of sketch of a
thing based on its qualities and like a characterization from outward appearances. For,
when many qualities unite together so that all of them at the same time are equal to the thing
to which they apply—this is called a descriptio, unless this collection is composed of a
genus or differences.” E.S. p. 181, 8-13....

Cf. Simplicius, Commentary on the Categories (Kalbfleisch 29.16-25) (In: Simplicius: On

Aristotle’s Categories 1-4. Translated by Michael Chase. Ithaca, New York, 2003, p. 43):

1
On this choice of terms, see my comments further below.
2
N.B. “E.S.” means Boethius’ second edition of his commentary on Porphyry’s work.

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 He said ‘account’ (logos) rather than ‘definition’ (horismos), in order to include the de-
scriptive account318 as well, which fits both with the highest genera and with individuals [=
‘infimae species’]; these cannot be included by a definition (horismos), since it is not
possible to take either a genus of the highest genera, nor differentiae of individuals [=
‘infimae species’].319 Descriptions (hupographê), by contrast, which give an account of
the characteristic property (idiotês) of substance,320 extend to these321 as well. This is
why he did not say ‘the definition[3] (logos) in accordance with the name’ but the definition[1]
(logos) ‘of substance’: since a descriptive definition[1] (logos)325 defines the characteristic
property of a substance, whereas a definitory (horistikos) one defines both the quiddity322 of
each thing, and the substance itself. Thus ‘definition[1] (logos) of substance’ includes both
the descriptive and the definitory definition[1] (logos).323
318
tên hupograpikên apodosin.
319
The highest genera have no genera above them; if they did they would no longer be
highest. Individuals, by contrast, as the most specific species (eidê eidikôtata), have no
differentiae; if they did, then the differentia in question, combined with the new species,
would give rise to another lower species; cf. Boethius In Cat. 166A; Simplicius below,
45,24. But the definitions (horismoi) in the strict Aristotelian sense proceed by genus and
differentiae (cf. Topics 1.8, 103b14-15), so that in the absence of either of these two
elements, strict definition is impossible.
320
cf. Boethius In Cat. 166A.
321
viz. the highest genera and individuals.
322
to ti ên einai, an Aristotelian term of art meaning ‘essence’.
323
cf. Boethius In Cat. 166B1-2. (emphasis added)

Cf. Susanne Bobzien, “The Stoics on Fallacies of Equivocation” (In: Dorothea Frede &
Brad Inwood ed., Language and Learning: Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age,
Cambridge, 2005, Stoic Definitions, p. 186):

Section One: Stoic Theories of Definition

The basic evidence for the Stoic theory of definition is given by Diogenes Laertius in an ap-
pendix to his report on the grammatical part of dialectic:

According to Antipater in Book One of his On Definitions, a definition is a statement by

analysis expressed commensurably; alternatively, as Chrysippus has it in his On Definitions,
it is a rendering of a peculiar characteristic (idion). A delineation (hupographê) is an account
introducing the things (pragmata) in outline, or a definition having the effect of a definition
in a simpler fashion.81 (D.L. 7.60, FDS 621, SVF 2.226)
81
[Greek omitted] ...The translation follows the MSS; Sedley’s emendation of the genitive
(horou) for the MSS nominative (horos) in the last clause (Long and Sedley 1987: II.194)
yields ‘or <a statement> having the effect of a definition in a simpler fashion than a defi-
nition.’ This implies that there are two kinds of delineation, or two different ways to charac-
terise delineations; the received text instead disambiguates two senses of the word ‘deline-
ation’ – i.e. roughly between ‘introductory book’ (sic) and ‘provisional definition’.

Cf. A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 1. Translations of the
Principal Sources with Philosophical Commentary (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 190-191.

C Diogenes Laertius, 7.60-2

3
Obviously, logos here should also be translated ‘account’ and not ‘definition’.

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 (1) A definition is, as Antipater says in On definitions book I, ‘a statement of analysis match-
ingly expressed’, (2) or, as Chrysippus says in his On [190-191] definitions, a representation of
a peculiar characteristic. (3) An outline account is a statement introducing us to things by
means of a sketch, or which conveys the force of the definition more simply than a definition
does....

E Alexander, On Aristotle’s Topics 42,27-43,2 (SVF 2.228, part)

Those [i.e. the Stoics] who say that a definition is a statement of analysis matchingly ex-
pressed (meaning by ‘analysis’ the filling out of the definiendum, and in succinct fashion,
and by ‘matchingly’ that it is neither broader nor narrower)4 would say that the definition is
no different from the representation of the peculiar characteristic.

Note by Long & Sedley, op.cit., pp. 193-194.

It must however be admitted that one or two apparent instances of definitions [193-194] which
seem not to be the products of division could in fact be not the definitions in the strict sense
at all, but ‘outline accounts’. ‘Outline account’ (hupographê) is an Aristotelian notion inher-
ited by both Stoics (C3; 26H) and Epicureans (19 commentary). It is a formula used for the
preliminary marking off of a definiendum, prior to the construction of a true definition. It
clarifies what it is that is under discussion, but may not yet reveal that thing’s nature. This
contrasts with a genuine definition (C2), which presents the (or ‘a’) ‘peculiar characteristic’
of a species. One critic of the Stoics, Alexander (in the sequel to E), argued that a peculiar
characteristic might itself turn out to be something quite inessential to the nature of the
definiendum, e.g. that man might be on the Stoic view defined as ‘animal with a sense of
humour’. But there seems no doubt (cf. 32D; 58A 5; 63D, M) that ‘peculiar characteristic’
(idion) is an expression intended by the Stoics to apply only to features which are not just
unique but also essential. Alexander is perhaps unduly influenced by the more flexible
Aristotelian use of the term.

Cf. C.H.M. Versteegh, Greek Elements in Arabic Linguistic Thinking (Leiden: Brill, 1977),
pp. 129-130:

3. The type of definition favoured by the theologians is the description (rasm), about which
van Ess observes: ‘One was not primarily concerned with the problem to find out the essence
of a thing, but rather how to circumscribe it in the shortest way so that everybody could
easily grasp what was meant’.13 In other words, the aim of the description is to differentiate
the object to be defined from other objects resembling it, by mentioning a characteristic pro-
perty it does not share with any other object. In Fārābi’s words: ‘Both (sc. the definition and
the description) share the use of the genus of the thing, and they differ in that the definition
13
van Ess, 1970, 38. [= van Ess, J. The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology, Grunebaum,
1970, 21-50]

adds to the genus the substantial differentiae, while the description (adds) the accidental
differentiae’.14
It is to this type of definition which Zaġġāġī refers when he talks about the difference
between various definitions of ‘philosophy’: in his view, definitions may indeed differ, since
they are made for different aims.15 It is evident that this type of definition is related to the
Stoic ‘description’ (hupographê), which is defined by Chrysippus as ‘showing the charac-
teristic properties’ (hê tou idiou apôdosis).16

4
On this point, see Simplicius (op.cit., pp. 42-43).

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 14
Translation Dunlop, 1951, 83 [= Dunlop, D.M. The Existence and Definition of
Philosophy: From an Arabic text Ascribed to al-Fārābi, Iraq, 13, 1951, 76-94]; cf. also
Zaġġāġī’s analysis of the definition of ‘man’, Id. 46, 7-11.
15
[note omitted]
16
SVF 2, 226; cf. van Ess, 1970, 37 sqq. and note 90; van den Bergh, 1954, 2, 84; 129. [=
van den Bergh, S. Averroes’ Tahafut al-tahafut. Translated from the Arabic with Introduc-
tion and Notes, 1954]

3. On the art of defining: The difference between the quid nominis and the quid rei.

Cf. Michael A. Augros, Excerpt from a letter to Sean Kelsey:

In defining anything, how can we know we have the right definition? Against what do we
test it? Let us recall the definition of definition: speech making known distinctly what a thing
is (which is composed of genus and differences, etc.). The thing to be defined, then, must be
known vaguely or indistinctly before it can be defined. Take for example “nougat”. What is
nougat? It’s that whitish sweet gook in a Three Musketeers Bar. That is a vague grasp of
what nougat is; in fact, since it does not tell us the intrinsic causes and principles of nougat,
it does not tell us what the thing is, but merely points out to us what the word refers to. It is a
definition of the name (a “quid nominis” as opposed to a “quid rei”). From this we can often
reason to a definition of the thing, as Aristotle reasons to a definition of what the soul is from
what the name refers to. In short, there must be something in our experience which made us
wonder what something is in the first place, and this something in our experience can be a
test or starting point for our proposed definitions.

In his discussion of place in the Physics, Aristotle says something about a good definition
of place that can be extended to many other definitions. A good definition should say what
the thing is (not just some property of it), and it should manifest the properties of the thing
(i.e. make a good middle term in a demonstration), it should resolve the difficulties sur-
rounding the thing to be defined, and it should show why anyone had difficulties about it in
the first place.

Cf. Michael A. Augros, Excerpt from another letter to Sean Kelsey:

“Knowing” is a word used by everyone, and by quid nominis all we mean is “what are you
talking about”? If no one had any idea what they were talking about, if they meant nothing
by the word, it would soon fall from common speech.

Cf. E.D. Buckner, “On Connotation”:5

Introduction.

The distinction between nominal and real essence originates with Aristotle. In the passage
from the Posterior Analytics below [= II.7], he argues that we can know the meaning of a
made up name (he gives the example ‘goat stag’) that denotes no-thing, without knowing
what he calls the ‘essential nature’ of the thing that the name would denote, if there were
such a thing.
These brief remarks, as with many of his brief remarks, are the starting point of a huge
controversy and discussion which lasts throughout the Middle Ages, which occupies a
defining position in the early modern era (it occupies most of book III of Locke’s Essay
Concerning Human Understanding), and which is a philosophical issue today....

5
(http://uk.geocities.com/frege@btinternet.com/connotation/nominaldefinitions.htm [3/14/08])

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 They imply the following distinctions. First, between the meaning of a name such as
‘man’, which the medieval logicians called the quid nominis or ‘whatness of the name’, and
the underlying nature common to all the things it names, which they called the quid rei or
‘whatness of the thing’. (Early modern philosophers like Locke used the corresponding
English terms ‘nominal essence’ and ‘real essence’). The name ‘hobbit’, for example, is
perfectly meaningful. It has a quid nominis. But we could not know the real nature of
hobbits, even if there were such things (presumably there would be a hobbit genetic
structure, but we cannot tell this from the meaning of the word ‘hobbit’). So we cannot know
the real nature, the quid rei of hobbits. By contrast, the name ‘man’ denotes real things
(men) that have a certain quid rei. The meaning of a name is distinct from the nature that
thing must have in order that the name apply to it.
Second, between nominal and real definition. A nominal definition is the definition ex-
plaining what a word means, i.e. which says what the ‘nominal essence’ is. (The Latin cor-
responding to the English term ‘nominal definition’ is definitio exprimens quid nominis,
literally a definition expressing the quid nominis or ‘nominal essence’ of the term). A real
definition is one expressing the real nature or quid rei of the thing.
Third, between the meaning or connotation or intension of a name, and the objects that the
name applies to or ‘denotes’. ‘Connotation’ is a term introduced by Mill, which closely cor-
responds to the idea of nominal essence. (He claimed it was derived from the Latin con-
notare, however in Latin logic this term has a slightly different use - see Ockham’s dis-
cussion of connotative terms). Mill makes it clear that what he calls ‘connotation’ is what we
would ordinarily call meaning. ‘In the case of connotative names [i.e. common nouns], the
meaning, as has so often been observed, is the connotation’ (System of Logic, I. viii. 1). The
definition of a name, in turn, is any proposition that says what its connotation is.6 Note that
Mill, following Locke, makes no distinction between nominal and real essence, or nominal
and real definitions.

6
N.B. The consideration of ‘connotation’ versus ‘denotation’ will be met with in several places below.

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4. On homonuma or ‘equivocals’.

Cf. Porphyry, Commentary on the Categories (In: Porphyry: On Aristotle’s Categories.

Translated by Steven K. Strange (Ithaca, New York, 1992), pp. 39-40:

Q. Why does he begin with homonyms {= equivocals},7 not with synonyms {= univocals},
if synonyms {univocals} are things that share both the same name and the same account, and
something sharing both its account and its name would be a clearer case than something that
has only [39-40] its name in common with something else?
A. I claim that Aristotle discusses homonyms {equivocals} first because he holds that
being is a homonym {equivocal} and because predications (kategoriai) are homonymously
{equivocally} said to be predications of that of which they are predicated.43
Q. Why does he not discuss homonymy {equivocity} before discussing homonyms {equi-
vocals}, given that ‘homonymy’{equivocity} is a word, whereas homonyms {equivocals}
are things, and you claim that he is primarily concerned in this treatise with words, not with
things?44
A. Because what produces homonymy {equivocity} in words is not the character of the
expression itself, but rather things are found to be different and in no way have anything in
common yet acquire one and the same expression as their name.45 Until it is recognised that
a word applies to a number of things that do not share the same account, there cannot be
homonymy {equivocity}.
43
[Note omitted]
44
[Note omitted]
45
[Note omitted]

Cf. ibid.:

Q. How then does Aristotle define homonyms {= equivocals}?

A. ‘Those things are said to be homonyms {equivocals} that have only their name in
common, and have a different account of the essence corresponding to the name’ (1a1-2).

5. On sunonuma or ‘univocals’.

Cf. ibid., p. 49.

[Concerning Synonyms {= Univocals}]

A. ‘Those things are called synonyms {univocals} that have the name in common and the
same account of the essence corresponding to the name, as for example <both man and ox>
are animal.73 For both man and ox are called by the common name ‘animal’, and the account
is also the same. For if one is to give the account for each of them, what it is for each to be
an animal, one will give the same account.’
Q. Explain this definition.
A. He is saying that synonyms {univocals} are things that have their name in common, but
not merely their name, as in the case of homonyms {equivocals}. It is clear that ‘name’ here
must be taken in its general sense, as applying to all parts of speech, and ‘in common’ must
be understood in the way previously explained.74
73
Supplying zoion <ho te anthropos kai ho bous> at 68, 6-7 as Busse suggests, following
Cat. 1a8.

7
In order to avoid misunderstanding, here and in what follows I have inserted the more familiar term.

10
 74
At 62, 17-33.

6. Aristotle on homonuma understood as ‘equivocals’ and sunonuma understood as

‘synonyms’.

Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. III, 2 (1404b 36—1405a 2) (tr. J. H. Freese; rev. B.A.M.):

In regard to names, equivocals8 [homonumiai] are most useful to the sophist, for by their
help he does his damage, and synonyms [sunonumiai] to the poet.
By synonyms which are current [kuria] [1405a] I mean, for example, ‘going’ [preuesthai]
and ‘walking’ [badizein], for these words are both current and synonymous with each other
[sunonuma allelois].

7. That sunonuma has one meaning in the Poetics and Rhetoric and another in the Cate-
gories.

Cf. Simplicius, Commentary on the Categories (Kalbfleisch 36.13, citing Porphyry) (tr.
Richard Janko, but rev. B.A.M. after James Hutton’s translation of the definition of
sunonuma):

Aristotle in the Poetics9 said that synonyms are names more than one in number [pleio] but
with the same account [logos], like the poluonuma [‘polyonyms’] (of Speusippus), such as
‘cloak’ [lupion], and ‘wrap’ [himation], and ‘mantle’ [pharos].
But there is nothing strange, says Porphyry, in the fact that Aristotle uses both meanings
(of synonymy), since the usage is twofold…. (there is one usage in the logical works, but)
where his concern is entirely with vocal sounds or the multiform nomenclature of each
(thing), as in the Poetics and the third book of the Rhetoric (cf. ch. 2, 1404b 37 ff.), we need
the other kinds of synonym, which Speusippus called the ‘polyonym’.

8. On Aristotle’s understanding of sunonuma.

From Simplicius’ report we may recover Aristotle’s definition of sunonuma in the

sense proper to poetics and rhetoric: “sunonuma [‘synonyms’] are names more than one in
number [pleio] but with the same account [logos], such as ‘cloak’ [lupion], and ‘wrap’
[himation], and ‘mantle’ [pharos]”. This sense of the term must be distinguished from the
meaning appropriate to logic proper: “those (things) are called sunonuma [‘univocal’]
whose name is common, as well as the account of the substance corresponding to the
name, as man and ox are ‘animal’” (Cat. 1, 1a 6-9, tr. B.A.M.).

9. On polyonyms, heteronyms, and the other kinds of names.

Cf. Simplicius, Commentary on the Categories (Kalbfleisch 38.1-40.11) (In: Simplicius:

On Aristotle’s Categories 1-4. Translated by Michael Chase, Ithaca, New York, 2003, pp.
53-54):

8
That Aristotle intends homonuma here to be understood as ‘equivocals’ is proven by Soph. Ref. III, 4, 165b
25-27 where he lists equivocation (= homonumia) as one of the ways an apparent refutation may arise from
the language (lexis).
9
Presumably in the lost second book.

11
 Now, whereas Aristotle has spoken of homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms, he omitted
both heteronyms and polyonyms. Polyonyms were omitted because they do not present any
difference or common feature with regard to realities (pragmata), but only multiple ex-
pressions (lexeis) [i.e. they are synonyms (B.A.M.)], while heteronyms were omitted because
the present discussion does not carry out a division of expressions which are numerically
infinite, but of those which signify something generically [15] (kata genos).398 Moreover, as
has been said, Aristotle omitted both of them because they pertain more to rhetorical and
poetical punctiliousness than they do to philosophical speculation.399 Nevertheless, it is as
well to include these [two classes of words] as well into one single division, together with
those that have been taken up.
Now Boethus reports400 that Speusippus adopted a division which included all names. ‘Of
names’, he says, ‘Some are tautonyms, and [20] others are heteronyms. Of tautonyms, some
are homonyms, and others are synonyms – and here we understand ‘synonyms’ according to
the usage of the ancients. ‘Of heteronyms’, he says, ‘some are heteronyms properly (idiôs),
others polyonyms, and others paronyms.’
An account has already been given of the other types.401 As for polyonyms, they are
several different names for one reality, when [25] their account (logos) is one and the same,
as in aor, xiphos, makhaira, and phasaganon.402 Heteronyms, by contrast, are things which
differ [39,1] in names, accounts (logoi), and realities, such as ‘grammar’, ‘man’, and ‘wood’.
They differ from each other, then, in so far as polyonyms have in common both the same
account (logos) and the same reality, whereas heteronyms differ in both respects.403
With regard to the first,404 polyonyms are convertible (antistrephei) with homonyms {=
equivocals}, in [5] so far as in the case of homonyms the name was common, while the
definition (horos) of each thing was particular (idios). In the case of polyonyms the reverse
is true: the reality (pragma) and the definition are common, but the names are different.
Heteronyms, for their part, are the opposite of synonyms {univocals}; for while the latter
have something in common in both respects, the former have nothing in common in either
respect.405
We must watch closely, in the case of polyonyms, lest we mistakenly consider that things
which are not polyonyms are such. It is not [10] the case, for example, that if several names
are predicated of one thing, they are eo ipso already polyonyms. Rather, [such names are
polyonyms] only if, in addition, the same predicate is said of one thing. For instance,
‘partless’ (ameres) and smallest (elakhiston) are two names, and are said of one reality, e.g.
the letter ‘A’ or ‘B’; and ‘convex’ and ‘concave’ are said of a circle, but that of which they
are said is by no means a polyonym. For since the account (logos) of each one [sc. of [15]
[53-54]
398
cf. Porph. In Cat. 70, 29-30.
399
cf. above, 23, 13-19 (opinion of Syrianus).
400
On the following passage (Speusippus fr. 32a Lang = fr. 68a Tarán); cf., in addition to
Tarán’s commentary ad loc., J. Pepin 1980, with further bibliography 275 n. 1. Again, it
seems that Simplicius has his information from Boethus via Porphyry’s commentary Ad
Gedalium.
401
See above, 22,20-3, 10.
402
All of which mean, as <Sophonias> reminds us (Anon; Paraphr. 4,5), a ‘two-edged piece
of iron’; i.e. a sword. Cf. Porph. In Cat. 69,1ff.
403
Porphyry (69,10ff.) gives a rather different account of heteronyms; he uses different
examples (fire/gold; Socrates/bravery) and leaves the reality (pragma) out of consideration,
speaking only of the logos and the name being different.
404
sc. name and logos.
405
cf. the following table:

polyonyms heteronyms homonyms synonyms

12
Logos same different different same
Onoma different different same same
Pragma same different

If the values of a column are different, then the types of words are opposite or ‘con-
vertible’; here this is true of the couple polyonyms/homonyms, and of the couple heter-
onyms/synonyms.

convex and concave] is different, each does not belong to it [sc. the circle] in the same re-
spect.406 It is worth noting, however, that even in the case of polyonyms properly so called –
as when, in the case of ‘man’, the same person is called both meropes and brotos – each of
the names is given in accordance with different aspects of man’s nature. For instance, man is
given one [20] name in so far as he is analogical,407 another in accordance with the ethnic
differences in his dialect, and another according to his mortal condition; 408 and the account
(logos) of each of these things is different.
What, then? Do polyonyms not exist at all? Rather, those things alone are polyonyms to
which different names apply not with regard to their various natures, but as if with regard to
the same nature, either because different people name them differently with regard to any
random aspect, or because different names have been given out [25] with regard to the same
aspect, not etymologically, but in accordance with whatever license the imposer of names
may have had. This is shown by the fact that names which apply to one reality are often sub-
stituted for the names of others, as ‘however’ (alla mên) was transferred to become a name
of a slave;409 for if we do not follow etymology, we can impose as many names, and of as
many kinds, as we wish.410
It must also be a property of polyonyms that they are called by [30] many names within the
same ethnic group; otherwise hêmera and hamera411 will be considered polyonyms. They
also do well to note the following fact: whereas in the case of homonyms, ‘homonymy’
denotes both the homonymous name and the relation (skhesis) itself, in the [40,1] case of
polyonyms ‘polyonymy’ denotes only the reality (pragma), but not the name. Moreover,
homonyms are at any rate said relative to something else: ‘O homonym of the blessed
Dardanids’412 – whereas polyonyms do not have their being in any relation (skhesis).
[5] Why, however, did Archytas omit this instruction about names in his On the Universal
Formulae? The answer is that since the Pythagoreans say that names are by nature and not
by imposition, they reject both homonyms and polyonyms, saying that by nature one name is
said of one reality. It is therefore fitting that they should distinguish homonyms by ancestral
or hopeful reference,413 but that [10] they should show that polyonyms, when they are
genuinely words, are not said with reference to one thing, but are given according to
different etymologies.414 They will also appropriately explain the change in form
(paraskhêmatismos) that takes place in the case of paronyms by means of the couplings
(suzugiai) of realities.415
406
For two predicates to be polyonyms, they must fulfil two conditions: (i) they must be the
same (to auto legetai); and (ii) the subject of which they are predicated must one and the
same (kath’hen). ‘Partless’, and ‘least’ fulfil both conditions and are polyonyms, as is that of
which they are said (e.g. letters of the alphabet); but since ‘convex’ and ‘concave’ are
different (Simplicius says they have a different logos), they do not fulfil condition (ii),
either: for ‘convex’ and ‘concave’ cannot be predicated of the same circle; rather, they are
names for different circles. At De Caelo 1.4, 270b35f., Aristotle states that convex and
concave lines are (‘apparently’) contrary; yet at Physics 4.13, 222b3-4 he says that the
convex and the concave are in what is ‘in a sense’ the same circle. Presumably what
Aristotle means in the latter passage is that ‘convex’ and ‘concave’ are both said of a ‘circle’
in the abstract and generic sense of the term, although they can never simultaneously
characterize the same individual circle.

13
 407
This appears to be an imperfect recollection of Plato’s Cratylus 399c, where the word
‘man’ (anthrôpos) indicates that the other animals do not examine, or consider
(analogizetai), or look up at (anathrei) any of the things that they see, but man has no sooner
seen – that is, opôpe – than he looks up at and considers (logizetai) that which he has seen.
Therefore of all the animals man alone is rightly called man (anthôpos), because he looks up
at (anathrei) what he has seen (opôpe)’. Thus, while Plato, etymologises anthrôpos as
deriving from anathrei + opôpe, Simplicius has recalled analogizetai from the same passage,
and wrongly thinks that analogizomai is connected to the etymology of anthrôpos.
408
Simplicius seems to be following here the same school tradition concerning the etym-
ological explanation of anthrôpos, merops and brotos, as that given by Ammon. In De
Interp. 38,9ff.: man is called merops because he uses a divided-up voice (meristêi opi), i.e.
different languages; while brotos refers to ‘the fall of his soul into the realm of becoming
and the contamination it incurs down here’, i.e. to his mortality.
409
By Diogenes; cf. above, 27,19f. and n. 294.
410
There is thus the implication that we always should follow etymology; indeed, since, for
the Neoplatonists, names had been imposed by an onomatothetês/group of onomatothêtai, if
not divine then at least extremely wise, to make up names arbitrarily – that is, without regard
to the natural consonance of names and realities – would be to fly in the face of nature.
411
Respectively, the Epic/Attic and Doric Greek words for ‘day’. Simplicius’ point is that
dialect variations in the form of a word do not constitute instances of polyonymy.
412
Pindar Encomium to Alexander son of Amyntas, fr. 120-1 Schroeder = Ecloges fr. 2
Puech (Budé) = fr. 126 Tuyrn = fr. 120 Maehler/Snell (Teubner).
413
homônuma têi progonikêi ê kat”elpida anaphorai. As we learn from Philoponus (In Cat.
22,7ff.) we have hopeful (kat’elpida) homonymy when a father names his son ‘Plato’ in the
hope he will turn out to be like the Philosopher, while homonyms by ancestral reference
occur when the child is named after his grandfather, so that the latter’s memory may be
preserved.
414
Since, for the Pythagoreans, one name corresponds to one reality, they had to account for
apparent cases of polyonymy. They seem to have done so in at least the following ways: (i)
In the case of proper names, polyonymy could be explained by the intentions of parents (see
previous note); such names were definitely thesei, not phusei. (ii) Some ostensible
polyonyms, they claimed, were not words at all. (iii) Finally, if two non-proper genuine
names really do designate the same object, the this is not due to arbitrary naming, as in the
case of Diogenes’ slave; instead, the two apparent polyonyms have two different
etymological derivations.
415
The Pythagorean suzugiai are the series of contrasting couples of opposed realities such
as we find in Aristotle Metaphysics 1, 986a22; but how these may be used to explain
changes of linguistic form in paronyms is not clear to me.

Cf. Christos Evangeliou, Aristotle’s Categories and Porphyry (Leiden: Brill, 1986), pp.
49-50.

c. Paronymy

In comparison to o(mw/numa and sunw/numa the case of parw/numa was the least discussed
by the ancient commentators. In contrast to the other two there were not variant writings of
Aristotle’s definitions of them. This is best explained by the fact that in the Categories
doctrine the role of “paronymous things” is not as important as the roles of the synonymous
and homonymous things. Accordingly, the treatment of them can be brief.
To begin with, it seems that derivative names designate “paronymous things”. With regard
to this issue, the examples which Aristotle gives speak for themselves. The “grammarian”
and the “courageous” are paronymously called from grammar and courage respectively (1a

14
 13-15). However, Porphyry specified three criteria which must be met in any case of genuine
paronymy.

(a) Sharing in name (mete/xein tou= o)no/matoj)

(b) Sharing in reality (mete/xein tou= pra/gmatoj)
(c) Transformation (metasxhmatismo/j) (p. 69, 33-35)144

Unless all three criteria are met, it would not be correct, Porphyry suggests, to speak of
parw/numa. He proceeds to give examples....

144
[note omitted] [49-50]

From the text of the Categories it is evident that Aristotle makes use of parw/numa in
two cases: (a) In his discussion of the category of poio\n (quality); and (b) in his discussion
of the category of kei=sqai (position). The relevant passages are as follows:

These, then, that we have mentioned are qualities, while things called paronymously because
of these or called in some other way from them are qualified. Now in most cases, indeed in
practically all, things are called paronymously, as the pale man from paleness, the gram-
marian from grammar, and so on. (10a 27-32)

Again:

Lying, standing, and sitting are particular positions; position is a relative. To-be-lying, to-be-
standing, or to-be-sitting are themselves not positions, but they get their names parony-
mously from the aforesaid positions. (6b 11-14)

Consequently, Aristotle, needed parw/numa in order to distinguish between qualities

(poio/thtej) and things qualified (poia\) in the first case and, in the second case, in order to
separate the category of position (kei=sqai) from the category of relation or relatives (pro/j
ti).10 In this respect, the doctrine of paronymy was useful to Aristotle, though it was not as
important as the doctrines of homonymy and synonymy were.11

10
Actually, Aristotle is making a distinction between being a position and being named from being in a posi-
tion: When one says ‘Socrates is standing’, he is denominated ‘standing’ from being in a certain position—
for ‘to-be-standing’ differs from ‘to-be-sitting’ by position.
11
It hardly needs to be said that the ways of naming things are equally important for the Categories.

15
10. Supplement: A review of the doctrine of paronymy.

Cf. D. P. Henry, “Why ‘Grammaticus’?”12

§ 2. PARONYMS IN ANCIENT LOGIC AND GRAMMAR.

The dialogue [sc. of St. Anselm] with which we are concerned takes its customary title from
its incipit, viz: “De ‘grammatico’...”, and from the fact that ‘grammaticus’ is employed as a
crucial example. However, as its first sentence also makes clear that this word is used as an
instance of a paronym (nomen denominativum, denominative name, denominative) from
which generalisations are permissible5, a more illuminating title would be “Dialogue on
Paronyms”.
The last notable use of the term ‘denominative’ is one which occurs in J. S. Mill’s
“System of Logic”6, and is enlarged on below, the tradition of its use extends back to the
ancient grammarians and logicians. Priscian7 employs the term to cover any kind of
derivation from a ‘nomen’, or name; as ‘nomen’ is for the ancient Latinists a wider term than
the modern ‘noun’ (it embraces what would nowadays be distinguished as adjectives) a very
wide range of types is here in question.
Of course, the notion of derivation must not be taken too seriously here: usually some
species of word-similarity is in question. The same applies to the cases envisaged by
Aristotle in Chapter 1 of the Categories8: things are there stated to be named paronymously
(or derivatively) “which derive their name from some other name, but differ from it in ter-
mination. Thus the literate derives his name from ‘literacy’ and the courageous man from
‘courage’”. However, Boethius, when commenting on this passage9, appears to restrict
his account

5. SL 159.3, 161.11.12.
6. Bk. I, Ch. II § 5.
7. Inst. Gramm. Bk. IV. References to this work will henceforward take the form of volume,
page and line-numbers of Keil’s Grammatici Latini, prefaced by a « K » , e.g. KII 55.6.
8. 1a 12-15 (The Oxford translation has been used and amended as required).
9. Patr. Latina Vol. 64 Col. 167D. References to this volume will hereunder consist of a « B
» followed by the column-number and letter.

167

to contexts of the elementary sort which are indicated by Aristotle’s concrete examples,
and asserts that the (supposed) derivation of the ‘nomen’ reflects ‘participation’ in
whatever is named by the cognate abstract noun; e.g. because a given man participates
in the virtue of justice, we denominate him ‘just’10. This Platonic-sounding supplement
does not necessarily have as its consequence that those who make use of the term ‘paronym’
(or ‘denominative’) are committed to holding that we first perceive, e.g. the quality,
subsequently note the participant, and finally consider ourselves licensed to use the paronym
in respect of that participant. Boethius remarks that the opposite is the case: whites and
literates are cognitively prior (‘notior’) to whiteness and literacy respectively11. In all, he
holds, three marks distinguish paronyms: (i) participation in ‘something’ by the thing
paronymously named, (ii) participation by the paronym in the name of that ‘some-
thing’ mentioned in (i), i.e. the two names must differ in termination only, and (iii) the
non-identity of the paronym and the name of that in which the thing paronymously
named participates12. When condition (iii) is unfulfilled, says Boethius, equivocation

12
(http://irevues.inist.fr/bitstream/2042/3099/1/04+TEXTE.pdf [3/13/08]).

16
 results.[13] Thus ‘musica’ names both a female musician and the art in which she is versed13.
Leaving aside this third condition, at least three variable factors are apparent here, and
thinkers of the Middle Ages were quick to exploit them. The first such variable is the word
‘participation’ used in respect of things. Now while derivative words may be said to
‘participate’ in the words from which they are derived, or which have the same stem, and
this in a perfectly familiar and intelligible sense, nevertheless the use of ‘participate’ in
respect of things is far from intelligible. In practice this was later, e.g. at the hands of
Aquinas, to be interpreted as any kind of connection implied by the purposive transference
of words in accordance with human needs and interests. The second variable lies in the range
of objects in which such participation is envisaged. Boethius’ examples appear to

10. B168A.
11. B240C.
12. B168A Cf. Peter of Spain, Summulae Logicales (ed. Bochenski) §§ 2.22, 3.01.
References to §§ of this edition will hereafter be prefaced by « PH » only.
13. B168B-C.

168

confine this range to qualities in which things might be said to ‘participate in common’. But
there seems to be no reason why this range should not be extended to other categories
(quantity, state, etc). The most serious question here is, however, still to be faced: what kind
of a thing is a quality, if it really is a thing at all? The third variable is the language used.
Thus, suppose participation in qualities is in question: exactly what is to count as a paronym
will then depend upon the extent to which names given to things on account of their qualities
happen to have, in the language of the period, corresponding abstract names of those
qualities. A simple example of the effect of this third variable can be drawn from Boethius’
own text: ‘virtus’ (‘excellence’, ‘virtue’) is the name of a quality to which, it would appear,
the Latin of Boethius’ time had no corresponding paronym, since he tells us that a man
having ‘virtus’ was called ‘sapiens’ (wise) or ‘probus’ (honest14); ‘virtus’ could hence not be
considered by him in connection with paronyms. Yet in medieval Latin the corresponding
paronym (‘virtuosus’) exists and is used freely.
In a situation of the kind described, two reactions are possible: one can either recognise
that there are limits to the use of linguistic classifications for the delineation of logical
problems, or one can make artificial additions to the language in an attempt to force it to
reflect those problems. Aristotle, on whose text Boethius comments, is quite alive to the
dangers of circumscribing a class of cases by reference to the contingent features of non-
technical language, and hence takes the first course: he merely uses the notion of paronymy
as a rough guide, and concludes by noting that the name borne by a thing in virtue of a given
quality possessed by that thing may or may not be derivative from the name of that quality 15.
Boethius, following him, used the general heading ‘qualia’ for things having qualities,
whether paronymously named or no16. The medievals tended to take the second course, and
invented constructions to fit their needs: this is particularly evident in the case of abstract
nouns like ‘animalitas’, ‘corporeitas’, and the like, against which Locke inveighs17,

14. B254B.
15. Categ. l0b 9.
16. B253B cf. PH § 3.26, § 3.27.
17. Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. III, Ch. 8, § 2.

169

13
Cf. the discussion of Porphyry’s position outlined above by Evangeliou.

17
 although these are no worse than the abstract nouns formed by the addition of ‘–ness’ or ‘-
hood’ to the concrete noun, and used in contemporary philosophical writings in English.
However, this possibility of systematic artificial amendment of a language can, unless used
with great caution, give the impression that all cases which are linguistically alike are sus-
ceptible of like logical classification. The difference between the cautious and incautious
attitude on this point may be exemplified by the cases of Aquinas and J. S. Mill: both hold
explicitly that ‘white’ and ‘man’ are paronymous: in Aquinas’ terms, “... things are ordin-
arily denominated from their forms, as the white from ‘whiteness’ and man (homo) from
‘humanity’ (humanitas)”18 [14], and Mill’s, “Snow, and other objects, receive the name
‘white’ because they possess the attribute which is called ‘whiteness’; Peter, James, and
others, receive the name ‘man’ because they possess the attributes which are considered to
constitute humanity. The attribute, or attributes, may therefore be said to denominate those
objects, or to give them a common name”19. Now this is part of Mill’s evidence for the
possibility of treating both ‘man’ and ‘white’ as belonging to the class of ‘connotative’
names, and so of regarding them as signifying in the same fashion. Aquinas, on the other
hand, was not thus misled, as an inspection of his Commentary on the Posterior Analytics20
makes clear.
Boethius’ description of paronyms not only contains the variables which have been
mentioned, but is also such that any change in the interpretation of one of those variables
tends to affect the interpretation of the others: thus it would appear that the meaning of
paronyms such as ‘sweet’ or ‘white’ is bound up in some sense with the corresponding
qualities (‘sweetness’, ‘whiteness’), hence such denominatives were said to ‘signify a
quality’21. Now given the use of ‘humanitas’ in medieval Latin to mean ‘human nature’, and
granted that ‘white’ signifies the quality ‘whiteness’, are we to say also that ‘homo’ (‘man’)
si-

18. Summa Theologica I, q. 37, art. II, corpus.

19. System of Logic, Bk. I, Ch. II, § 5.
20. Ed. Spiazzi, §§ 285. 295; cf. §§ 87, 259, 281, 289.
21. Nihil enim a album n significat quam qualitatem, B194C cf. ARISTOTLE, Categ. 3a 18.

170

gnifies the quality ‘humanitas’ (‘humanity’, ‘attributes constituting human nature’)? Hence
arise repercussion (sic) in the range of the second variable: is ‘humanitas’ a quality in which
men participate—a set of attributes, a form, a nature, or a ‘quiddity’? And leaving aside the
vexed question of the ontological status of attributes, one can still ask: if ‘man’ signifies,
say, a quality in this way, does this not exclude the view that man is a substance, as opposed
to a quality? In Minto’s words: “When we say ‘This is a man’ do we not declare what sort of
a thing he is? Do we not declare his Quality? If Aristotle had gone further along this line, he
would have arrived at the modern point of view22 that a man is a man in virtue of his
possessing certain attributes, that general names are applied in virtue of their connotation”23.
Minto goes on to suggest, most significantly, that Aristotle failed to take this further step,
which would make ‘man’ into a quality-signifying word, only because he had not at his
disposal a “separate name in common speech for the common attributes of man”24. Boethius,
when commenting on the topic of ‘secondary substances’, appears to go quite a long way in
the direction suggested by Minto, when he admits that ‘man’ “shows what a substance is
like”, i.e. shows its qualities26. Indeed, he holds that both ‘man’ and ‘white’ signify qualities
in ways sufficiently similar to establish the need for further criteria to distinguish which of

14
In view of the fact that they do not have the same definition, one should not suppose that for St. Thomas,
denomination in the case of a name like ‘man’ means the same thing as it does in the case of accidental predi-
cates. Hence it is inaccurate to attribute to the Angelic Doctor the view that saying something like ‘Socrates
is a man’ is an instance of paronymous naming.

18
 the two indicates a ‘substance’26, e.g. lack of contrary, insusceptibility of degree, and so
forth27.

22. i.e. that of J. S. Mill, mentioned in the previous paragraph.

23. W. MINTO, Logic Inductive and Deductive, London, 1894, p. 117. He is here referring
to Aristotle’s Categ. 3 b 10-24, cf. B194B195C.
24. Op. cit., p. 118.
25. Qualis substantia sit demonstratur, cum dicitur « homo ».B194D.
26. B195C.
27. B195D et seq.

11. Note on the foregoing.

While I shall return to this subject below, here let it suffice to note that in determin-
ing the signification of a name like ‘man’ Aristotle was well aware of the relation of sub-
stance to quality: Cf. Categories ch. 5 (3b 21), where the Philosopher states that “genus
and species determine a quality with respect to substance, for they signify such a sub-
stance”. Cf. also Soph. Ref., ch. 22 (178b 37—178b 10) (tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge):
“Again, there is the proof that there is a ‘third man’ distinct from Man and from individual
men. But that is a fallacy, for ‘Man’, and indeed every general predicate, denotes not an in-
dividual substance, but a particular quality....” Also to be noted is that this question has no-
thing to do with paronyms or ‘denominatives’ properly so called, but rather with sub-
stantives.
On the whole matter of naming things from accidents, see further below on de-
nominative naming, where I give further texts of St. Thomas, as well as the relevant ex-
cerpt from Minto and related passages from other authors reviewing the doctrine of certain
medievals and moderns on this subject.

19
12. Definitions of ‘paronym’.

Cf. The Hutchinson Encyclopaedia. Helicon Publishing LTD 2008. s.v “paronym”:

paronym n.

[a] word having [the] same derivation as another, or formed from [a] foreign word, or having
[the] same form as [a] cognate foreign word. paronymic, paronymous, a.

Cf. Robert Lawerence Trask, A Dictionary of Phonetics and Phonology (Routledge, 1996),
s.v. “paronym”:

Any word derived from a second word or from the same root; a derivative or a cognate.

Cf. Wikipedia, s.v. ‘paronym’:

A paronym or paronyme in linguistics may refer to two different things:

• A word that is related to another word and derives from the same root, e.g. a cognate
word;
• Words which are almost homonyms, but have slight differences in spelling or pro-
nunciation and have different meanings.

13. On paronymy in the Tractatus Coislinianus.15

Cf. Lane Cooper, An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy. With an Adaptation of the Poetics
and a Translation of the ‘Tractatus Coislinianus’ (New York, 1922), p. 225:

Laughter arises (I) from the diction [= expression] (II) from the things [= content].

(I) From the diction, through the use of—

(A) Homonyms
(B) Synonyms
(C) Garrulity
(D) Paronyms,
(?1) addition and
(?2) clipping
(E) Diminutives
(F) Perversion
(1) by the voice
(2) toward the better
(G) Grammar and syntax

Cf. Ibid., The Tractatus Illustrated, pp. 233-234:

15
See also the relevant discussion in Richard Janko, Aristotle on Comedy: Toward a Reconstruction of
Poetics II (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1984), pp. 175-178, a passage I excerpt below. In agreement with
Cooper and Janko, I believe the Tractatus, garbled though it is, preserves in outline certains parts of the lost
second book of the Poetics on comedy, although it requires much argument to make this thesis persuasive.

20
 (I) Paronyms. They are formed (1) by adding to a word, and (2) by taking something away
from it. [Or the sense may be that they are formed by first dropping some part of a word and
then adding something to what remains. A paronym is, so to speak, a name lying at the
side of another. In each case, two words are concerned, one of them being derived from
the other, generally by a change of termination. The relation may be a true one according
to scientific principles. Or it may be a fancied one according to popular notions of etym-
ology – as in the time of Aristophanes, before the advent of strict linguistic science. Or it
may be a pretended one based upon an assumed principle. Thus Hermippus (frg. 4, Kock
1.225-6) derives the rolling ‘year’ (e)niauto/j), which contains all within itself, from e)n
au=t%. Similar derivatives are common in everyday speech while a language is in the ma-
king. In comedy they are extempore formations, or else formations otherwise rare in the
language. In a given instance it may be difficult to say whether the word is a coinage of the
poet, or a term, not previously recorded, from common usuage. If the reading ‘great oneyers’
is authentic, a paronym formed by addition is found in Gadshill’s ‘I am joined with no foot-
land-rakers, no long-staff sixpenny strikers, none of these mad mustachio-purple-hued-malt-
worms, but with nobility and tranquility, burgomasters and great oneyers’ (I Henry IV 2.1.
76-9). So also (from au=to/j, by dropping j and adding -tatoj) au=to/tatoj in Plutus 83: ‘Are
you really he? ‘I am.’ ‘Himself?’ ‘His own self’s self.’ Here, too, perhaps, belongs
kunto/tatoj – ‘the most shameless (most doglike) of all’ (see above, pp. 29, 150).16 In a
comic compound epithet, if we take the first element as a base, the whole may be regarded as
a paronym derived from it. Those of Gadshill (as ‘long-staff sixpenny strikers’ and ‘mad
mustachio-purple [233-234] -hued-malt-worms’) he formed by addition....
But the device, strictly considered, seems to involve a stem of some word in regular usage:
the customary termination of the word may be dropped, and then something may be added.]

14. On paronuma in sum:

Paronyms are things which have a name according to another name, but with a dif-
ference in ending. Hence, to say that things are said to be called something “from parony-
my” means “from naming one thing after another thing”. A paronym, then, is the name by
which one thing is named after another—that is, it is the appellation one thing has when it
is ‘appellated’ after another, but differing from it in ending, as when Socrates is named
‘grammarian’ after ‘grammar’, which is the grammatical knowledge he has: the name
‘grammarian’ is that by which he is ‘named’ or ‘appellated’ after ‘grammar’.

But, as we have seen, in rhetoric and poetic there is a related meaning of paronymy
that is not the same as denominative naming, as in the language employed by comedy there
are names by which a thing is named after another thing, but with a difference in ending, as
by an addition, a subtraction or shortening, by use of a diminutive, or from an alteration of
the word, as one may see from Richard Janko’s version of the Tractatus, excerpted below.

15. Definitions of ‘synonyms’, ‘homonyms’, and ‘paronyms’.

SUNONUMA (‘SYNONYMS’). (1) ‘‘Synonyms’ [sunonuma] are names more than

one in number [pleio], but with the same account [logos], such as ‘cloak’ [lupion], and

16
Cf. p. 150: “We may close the section with the interesting gloss, not found in our Poetics, of the Anti-
Atticist: kunto/twn. )Aristote/lhj peri\ poihtikh=j: to\ de\ pa/ntwn kunto/taton. I translated: (21) ‘Most dog-
like [= ‘shameless’], Aristotle, On the Art of Poetry: “the most shameless of all.”‘3” (Cf. Cooper’s note 3:
Anti-Atticista in Bekker, Anecdota Graeca I. 101. 32; Aristotle frg. 77, Rose, p. 81.)

21
‘wrap’ [himation], and ‘mantle’ [pharos]”;17 (2) “sometimes ‘synonym’ signifies a
plurality of names with a unity of account and of the thing signified, which Speusippus
called polyonyms, and which at the present time among the Latins are called synonyms, like
‘Paris’ and ‘Alexander’, which were names of the son of Priam”;18 (3) “‘synonyms’ are
things which agree in account, but differ in the names”;19 (4) “‘synonyms’ are names
which signify one thing according to one account”;20 (5) “for synonyms are names which
signify exactly [omnino] the same thing”.21

HOMONUMA (‘HOMONYMS’). (1) ‘Homonyms’ (homonuma) are names more

than one in number which are the same (or similar sounding), but with differing accounts,
such as ‘pear’, ‘pair’, and ‘pare’ (B.A.M., after Aristotle via Simplicius and Porphyry); (2)
sometimes ‘homonym’ signifies a unity of names with a plurality of account and of the
thing signified (B.A.M., after Ferrariensis); (3) ‘homonyms’ are things which agree in
name, but differ in account ;22 (4) ‘homonyms’ are names which signify more than one
thing according to more than one account (B.A.M., after St. Thomas Aquinas); (5)
‘homonyms’ are similar sounding names which signify different things (B.A.M., after St.
Thomas Aquinas).

PARONUMA (‘PARONYMS’). (1) ‘Paronyms’ are names by which a thing has an

appellation after another thing, but with a difference in ending;23 or again (2) “[a] paronym
is, so to speak, a name lying at the side of another. In each case, two words are concerned,
one of them being derived from the other, generally by a change of termination.” (Lane
Cooper, op.cit.); according to Richard Janko’s composite text of the Tractatus Cois-
linianus, paronymy comes about in four ways: (a) by addition, when something extraneous
is attached to the current name, e.g. [**]; and (b) by shortening, e.g. “I’m called Midas the
scrounge”, instead of “scrounger”; (c) from a diminutive, e.g. “Socratididdles, Euripi-
dipides”, instead of “Socrates, Euripides”; (d) from an alteration, e.g. “the worstest of
all”.24

16. Some dictionary definitions.

Cf. Liddell Scott Greek English Lexicon:

17
Cf. Simplicius on Aristotle’s Categories 36.13 Kalbfleisch, drawing on Porphyry: o( )Aristote/lehj e)n t%=
Peri\ Poihtikh=j sunw/numa ei)=pen ei)=nai w(=n plei/w me\n ta\ o)no/mata lo/goj de\ o( au)to/j, oi(=a dh/ e)sti ta\
polouw/numa, to/ te lw/pion kai\ i(ma/tion kai\ fa/roj. “Aristotle in the Poetics said that synonyms are when
there are several words with the same meaning, like (Speusippus’) ‘polyonyms’ indeed, such as ‘cloak’,
‘wrap’ and ‘mantle’”. (tr. Richard Janko, rev. B.A.M. after James Hutton in his edition of the Poetics)
18
Aliquando enim significat pluralitatem nominum, cum unitate rationis et rei significatae; quae Speusippus,
polynyma vocabat; quae et nunc etiam a latinis dicuntur synonyma, ut Paris et Alexander quae fuerunt
nomina filii Priami. (Sylvester of Ferrara (Ferrariensis), Comm. in Lib. Quat. Contra Gentes, cap. 35, tr.
B.A.M.)
19
Illa (synonyma) vero sunt, quae conveniunt in ratione et differunt nominibus. (Ferrariensis, ibid.)
20
Cf. In I Sent., dist. 22, q. 1, art. 3, c.: non tamen significant unam secundum unam rationem; et ideo non
sunt synonyma. “…nonetheless they do not signify one thing according to one account, and so they are not
synonyms.” (tr. B.A.M.)
21
synonyma enim nomina dicuntur, quae omnino idem significant. “For names are called ‘synonyms’ which
signify exactly the same thing.” (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 4, obj. 1, tr. B.A.M.)
22
Ista (homonyma) enim sunt quae conveniunt in ratione in nomine et differunt in ratione (Ferrariensis,
ibid.).
23
B.A.M., after Aristotle, Cat. 1, 1a 14, in the light of the Philosopher’s definition of homonyms.
24
See my separate discussion.

22
sunw/nu m-oj , on , having the same name as, c.gen., h( . . sunw/numoj th=j e)/ndon ou)/shj
e)/gxeluj Antiph.217.1 , cf. E. Hel.495; o( j. th=? po/lei [potamo/j ] Plb.9.27.5.
II. in the Logic of Arist. sunw/numa are things having the same name and the same
nature and definition, Cat.1a6, cf. Top.123a28, 148a24, Thphr.HP9.11.5; e)/sti tij
a)diki/a para\ th\n o(/lhn a)/llh e)n me/rei, sunw/numoj, o(/ti o( o(rismo\j e)n tw=?
au)tw=? ge/nei Arist.EN1130a33 ; ta\ polla\ tw=n j. toi=j ei)/desi the many
particulars which have the same name as the forms, i.e. things denoted by the same
univocal or unambiguous word, e.g. man and ox, both called zw=?on in the same sense
of zw=?on, opp. o(mw/numa (v. o(mw/numoj IV), Id.Metaph.987b10. Adv. -mwj
Id.Cat.3a34 , Plb.3.33.11, Phld. Rh.1.148 S.
2. of pairs of the form ‘A: non-A’, opp. e(terw/numa (q. v.), Procl. in Prm.
p.955 S.
III. in Rhet. ta\ j. are synonyms, words having different forms but the same sense, as
poreu/esqai and badi/zein, Arist.Rh.1405a1; to\ j. tou= ne/fouj, i.e. nefe/lh,
A.D.Synt. 199.27.

o(mw/nu m-oj , (o)/nwma) having the same name, Il., etc.

Cf. Robert J. Shubinski, Glossary of Poetic Terms, s.v. “Homonym”, s.v. “Synonym”:25

HOMONYM

One of two or more words which are identical in pronunciation and spelling, but different in
meaning, as the noun bear and the verb bear.

Although often called ‘homonyms’ in popular usage (indeed, in some dictionaries as well),
homophones are words which are identical in pronunciation but different in meaning or
derivation or spelling, as rite, write, right, and wright, or rain and reign.

Heteronyms are words which are identical in spelling but different in meaning and
pronunciation, as sow, to scatter seed, and sow, a female hog.

Homographs are words which are identical in spelling but different in meaning and
derivation or pronunciation, as pine, to yearn for, and pine, a tree, or the bow of a ship and a
bow and arrow.

SYNONYM

One of two or more words that have the same or nearly identical meanings.

17. On homonymy and synonymy.

Cf. PHIL 410: Classical Philosophy (Spring 2005) Instructor: Robin Smith
(rasmith@tamu.edu). Predication, Homonymy, and the Categories:26

Homonymy and Synonymy

25
Glossary of Poetic Terms from BOB’S BYWAY. Compiled, edited and cross-referenced by Robert G.
Shubinski. Copyright © 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002. rgs@poeticbyway.com.
26
(http://aristotle.tamu.edu/~rasmith/Courses/Ancient/predication.html [3/9/08])

23
 A good place to begin is with the very beginning of the Categories, in which Aristotle makes
a distinction between homonymous and synonymous things. Though these terms look just
like English words, it’s a good idea to pretend that you’ve never seen them before: those
English words are just close enough to Aristotle’s in meaning to be seriously confusing.
Here are Aristotle’s definitions:

A and B are homonymous = A and B are both called F, but with different definitions of F
A and B are synonymous = A and B are both called F and with the same definition of F

Homonymous things, not words. The first point to notice is that these define relationships
of things, not of words.27 In English, homonymy and synonymy are relationships between
words. Two words are homonyms if they sound alike but have different spellings, or at least
different meanings, and two words are synonymous if they have different sounds (or at least
spellings) but the same meaning. From a modern philosophical viewpoint, this at once raises
questions about whether it is words or occurrences of words that are homonymous or syn-
onymous and what the identity conditions are for words. Those issues do not really arise for
Aristotle’s distinction, however, since for him it is things, not words, which are homo-
nymous or synonymous. ‘Homonymous’ really means ‘like-named’, and ‘synonymous’
means ‘named together.’ Things are homonymous, in Aristotle’s sense, if the same word
applies to them both but not in virtue of the same definition, and things are synonymous if
the same word applies to them in virtue of a single definition.
Aristotle gives as an example a human being and picture. The Greek word zôion (usually
translated ‘animal’) applies to these both, but with different definitions: it applies to a human
being because a human being is a certain kind of living entity, whereas it applies to a picture
because the Greeks used this same term of drawings or illustrations (rather like our use of
the word ‘figure’).28 For an English example, a fingernail and a roofing nail are both called
nails, and a fingernail file and a computer file are both called files, but in each case with
different definitions.

<...>

Intracategorial and Cross-Categorial Predication

Since the categories are fundamentally different kinds of thing, nothing in one category can
be the same as anything in another category. This much may seem obvious. However, what
is not obvious, and what is equally important for Aristotle, is that when A and B belong to
the same category, A can express ‘what B is’. For instance, Socrates, human, and animal are
all substances, and it is true to predicate animal of human and human of Socrates. Aristotle
describes these predications as saying what the subject is. The relationship between predicate
and subject in a true same-category predication has certain properties.

Same-category predication is synonymous. That is, if A and B are in the same category
and A is predicated of B, then the definition of A will also be predicated of B. This is pre-
cisely Aristotle’s definition of synonymy: both A and its definition are true of B as well as
A, so A and B are synonymous.

27
Compare Duane H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories (Cat.4, a text to be cited more fully below):
“In the ante-predicaments there are really two main uses of the word “substance”. One is in Chapter 1, where the
Greek says that univocal things have both a name in common...and the logos tes ousias....”
28
Cf. H. L Cooke’s note to his Loeb translation: “Z%=/on had two meanings, a living creature and the repre-
sentation of a living creature. (We have no corresponding ambiguous noun, although we use the word,
‘living’ of real living things and for certain artworks that are ‘true to life’)”. I myself employ the word
‘figure’ below.

24
 Same-category predication is transitive: if A is predicated of B and B is predicated of C,
then A is predicated of C. For instance, if animal is predicated of man, and man is predicated
of Socrates, then animal is predicated (synonymously) of Socrates.

In a case such as this, Aristotle describes the predicate as saying what the subject is.

Contrasted with these are cross-categorial predications, with subjects and predicates from
different categories. In ‘Socrates is pale’, for instance, the subject is a substance and the pre-
dicate is a quality. Since the definition of a quality cannot apply to a substance, this predica-
tion cannot be synonymous: from the fact that Socrates is pale, it does not follow (and in-
deed it cannot be true) that the definition of pale applies to Socrates. Similarly, cross-cate-
gorial predications are not transitive. Thus, though Socrates is pale and pale is a color, it
does not follow that Socrates is a color. From the standpoint of modern (post-Fregean) logic,
this contrast seems to make little sense. A Fregean analysis of ‘Socrates is pale’ decomposes
it into a proper name, ‘Socrates’, and an incomplete expression ‘is pale’ which becomes a
statement when an appropriate number of arguments is supplied (in this case, one). The
meaning of ‘Socrates’ is that which it names, Socrates. The meaning of ‘is pale’ is the class
of objects to which it applies.29 The sentence is true if and only if the object named by
‘Socrates’ is a member of the class named by ‘is pale.’ Exactly the same form of analysis
applies to ‘Socrates is a man’: it is true if and only if the object designated by ‘Socrates’ is a
member of the class of objects satisfying ‘___is a man’.

Aristotle approaches this matter differently. He regards ‘pale’ as designating, not the class of
pale things, but paleness. That is to say, ‘paleness’ is a name of paleness in the same way
that ‘Socrates is a name of Socrates. The difference between Socrates and paleness (and
therefore between ‘Socrates’ and ‘paleness’) is a categorial one: Socrates is a substance,
whereas paleness is a quality. Now, Aristotle notes that we do not say ‘Socrates is paleness’’
but ‘Socrates is pale’. He calls this a matter of paronomy, ‘naming after’: pale things are
named ‘pale’ because they are named after paleness.30 Since paleness and Socrates are
categorially different, Socrates cannot be paleness. He can, however, have paleness, that is,
paleness can be present in him as a subject. When that is the case, then Socrates is paron-
ymously called ‘pale’ after paleness.

29
While there is a “class of objects” which are pale, this is not what the name means. Rather, when used in a
sentence such as ‘Socrates is pale’, it supposes or stands for this accident existing in him. In sum, one must
distinguish what names stand for from what they signify, although the latter includes the former.
30
N.B. Just as pale things are named ‘pale’ after paleness, so human things are named ‘human’ after
humanity, an essential, not an accidental, predication, for which sort of ‘denomination’, see further below.

25
18. The treatment of these matters in the Categories and the Topics.

Cf. Isaac Husik, The Categories of Aristotle [In: Philosophical Essays, Ancient, Mediaeval,
and Modern - Edited by Milton C. Nahm and Leo Strauss, Oxford, Blackwell, 1952, pp.
96-112, pp. 97-103.] (Greek citations omitted):31

(...) When we pass over to matters of doctrine, it is surprising how many points of
contact there are between the two works [Categories and Topics]. I shall follow the
Categories and point out the parallels in the Topics.

The homonyms, which are given a definition and an illustration in the beginning of
the Categories, have a whole chapter devoted to them in the Topics, the fifteenth of the
first book, where they are also called pollachos legomena [= ‘things said in many
ways’]. Of particular significance is 107a 18-20, for in 20 we seem to have a direct
allusion to the definition in the Categories. We must see, Aristotle says, if the genera
designated by the given name are different and not subordinate to one another, (...) (which is
therefore a homonym), for the definition of these genera as connected by the name is
different (...). The greater space given to homonyms in the Topics is not due so much to a
development in doctrine as to the necessities of the subject. The object of the Topics is a
purely practical one, to provide the disputant with ready arguments properly pigeon-holed,
and a single general definition of homonyms is not adapted to such use. We must needs go
farther and show in what different special ways homonyms can be detected. The Categories
have more the appearance of materials gathered in the shape of preliminary definitions of
necessary concepts.
Synonyms are referred to in the Topics 109b 7, 123a 27, 127b 5, 148a 24, and 162b 37.
Of these, the first is the most important, since it states that the genera are predicated
synonymously of their species; for the latter admit both the name and the definition of the
former (...), assuming it as established that this condition constitutes synonymity. This
is neither more nor less than a silent reference to the definition in the Categories (1a 6)
[When things have the name in common and the definition of being which corresponds
to the name is the same, they are called synonymous].
Moreover we have almost the very words of the Topics in another place in the Categories,
3b 2, [And the primary substances admit the definition of the species and of the genera, and
the species admits that of the genus; for everything said of what is predicated will be said of
the subject also.] 148a 24 also gives the same definition of synonyms merely in passing.
Aristotle is dealing with the definition, and makes a statement that if the opponent makes use
of one definition for homonyms it cannot be a correct definition, for it is synonyms and not
homonyms that have one definition connoted by the name (...). He speaks of the definition as
already known. (...).
Paronyms also are made use of in the Topics, 109b 3-12, in a way which shows the
definition in the Categories is not purely grammatical, as it may seem at first sight, but
has a logical significance quite as important as that of the former two. Paronymous
predication is predication per accidens, as contrasted with synonymous, which may be
per se (cf. also Trendelenburg, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, p.27 et seq. and 30). Here
also paronyms are not defined. It is assumed that the reader knows what they are. (...)
Categories 3, p. 1b 10-15 expresses very much the same thought as Topics IV, 1, p. 121a
20-6. The former states that whatever is true of the species is true of the individuals under
the species (...), the latter that to whatever the species applies the genus does also (...). They
both involve the logical hierarchy of genus, species and individual, and the two principles
are: (1) The genus applies not only to the species but also to the individual; (2) to the
individual belongs not only the species but also the genus. What is especially important to

31
(http://www.formalontology.it/aristotle-categories.htm [3/24/08])

26
 notice is that, in the Topics, the principle is stated as already known and is applied to the
particular case, thus assuming the existence of another treatise where these principles are
stated and proved for the first time.
The treatment of the difference develops gradually in the Topics in the following pas-
sages: 107b 19 sq., 144b 12 sq., and 153b 6. The first of these is word for word the same
with the statement in the Categories, 1b 16 sq., and they were both quoted above.
Moreover the way in which the passage in the Topics is introduced, (...) makes it a direct
reference to the Categories. Aristotle’s doctrine concerning the difference so far is that of
different genera which are not subordinated one to the other: the differences are different in
species. In the second passage quoted above, 144b 12, Aristotle corrects this view by adding
that the differences in the given case need not be different unless the different genera cannot
be put under a common higher genus. In the third passage, 153b 6, Aristotle adds some more
qualifications which make it clear that in the preceding statements the word etéron, in the
phrase etéron ghenon, must be understood as including contrary genera (enantía). For there
the case is different. If the contrary genera belong to higher contrary genera, their differences
may be all the same.

The preceding examination seems to show very clearly that the Topics build upon the basis
laid down in the Categories and carry the structure higher and broader. It would be a very
absurd alternative to suppose that a later writer, making use of the Topics, found nothing else
on the subject of logical difference than the first passage, which he copied verbatim in his
treatise, where, besides, it has no particular reason for existence. As a thought tentatively
suggested, with the view of further elaboration and insertion as a proper link in a chain, the
passage in the Categories assumes a different meaning, and its lack of connection with the
preceding and following ceases to cause us serious difficulty.
If the view of the Categories taken here is justified by the preceding arguments and by
what is still to come, it might even be a legitimate procedure to make use of the Topics in
determining a disputed reading in the Categories. And we have one at hand in the passage
quoted above on the difference.

19. On the categories in relation to signification.

Cf. Aristotle, Topics, I. 9 (103b 27-39) (In: Aristotle. Topics Books I and VIII. Translated
With a Commentary by Robin Smith, Oxford University Press, 1997):

It is clear at once that an <expression> signifying the what-it-is will sometimes signify a
substance, sometimes a quantity, sometimes a quality, and sometimes one of the other cate-
gories. For, supposing the example under consideration is a man, if it says that the example
is a human or an animal, then it says what it is and signifies a substance. On the other hand,
supposing the example under consideration is a white color, if it says that the subject is a
white or a color, then it says what it is and signifies a quality. Similarly, supposing that the
example under consideration is a foot-long length, if it says that the example is a foot-long
length, then it says what it is and signifies a quantity. And likewise with the other <cate-
gories>. For any of these, both in the case in which the same thing is said about itself and in
the case in which its genus is said about it, signifies what it is. But when it is said about
another <category>, then it does not signify what it is, but how much or what sort or one of
the other categories.

Cf. John Marmysz, “Is Heidegger Telling the Truth?” Notes:32

32
(http://users.aol.com/geinster/Heid.html [3/9/08])

27
 In the Categories, Aristotle undertook an examination of language which he claimed
would be useful for an inquiry into the question of being. According to Aristotle, things may
be called by “equivocal,” “univocal,” or “derivative” names. If things are named univocally,
then the definition of the things so named is the same. If things are named equivocally, then
those things have differing definitions but the same name. If things are derivatively named,
then those things derive their names from a common source, yet find their ultimate, specific
definitions in differing places.

20. On homonuma and sunonuma.

Those are called homonuma’ (= ‘equivocals’) whose name alone is common, but
the account of the substance corresponding to the name is different: e.g. ‘the bark of the
dog’ and ‘the bark of the tree’: both the sound made by the dog and the covering of the tree
are called ‘bark’, which is ‘the same name’; hence they are said to ‘have the same name’ or
are ‘homonymous’. Those are called sunonuma (= ‘univocals’) whose name and whose ac-
count of the substance corresponding to the name are both the same. In sum, homonuma
are things having the same name, sunonuma, things having the same meaning.

• homonuma: ‘having the same name and the same account of the substance corres-
ponding to the name of the thing’
• sunonuma: ‘having the same name and the account of the substance corresponding
to the name of the thing differing’

In sum:

• things can either have the same name or not

• if they have the same name then either the account of the substance corresponding
to the name of the thing is the same or not

21. Note on the definitions of Categories Chapter 1.

As a glance at the Greek, as well as the foregoing commentaries, makes clear, in

laying down the three ways in which things are named, Aristotle says that ‘they’ or ‘those
(things)’ are ‘called’ something, and then gives the name variously translated as ‘homo-
nyms’ or ‘equivocals’ (or ‘synonyms’ or ‘univocals’, etc.)—which name, being singular,
should not be translated as a plural, nor as an adverb (= ‘equivocally’, etc.)—nor does he
say that they are named this or that, nor that they are ‘said to be x or y’. Hence all such
translations are inaccurate.

28
II. ON WHAT IS SIGNIFIED ACCORDING TO THE CATEGORIES.

1. On three ways in which things are said.

Cf. Aristotle, Categories ch. 1, 1a 1-15 (tr. B.A.M.; Lat. Boethius):

Those (things) are called ‘equivocal’ whose name alone is common, but the account of the
substance corresponding to the name is different, as man and picture are zôion.33 For of these
only the name is common, but the account of the substance corresponding to the name is dif-
ferent. For if one were to assign what it is for either of these to be to zôiô, he would give the
account proper to each.34
But they are called ‘univocal’ whose name is common, as well as the account of the
substance corresponding to the name, as man and ox are ‘animal’. For each of these is called
by the common name ‘animal’, and the account of the substance is the same. For if one were
to give the account of each, what it is for each of these to be animals, he would give the
same account.35
But they are called ‘denominative’ which, with a different ending [or ‘case’, or ‘fall’,
ptosei], have an appellation [prosegorian] from something corresponding to the name, as
‘grammarian’ from ‘grammar’, and ‘brave’ from ‘bravery’.36

The subjects being determined about, which are certain ‘things’:

(1) things whose name alone is common, but the account of the substance correspond-
ing to the name is different, as man and picture are zôion
(2) things whose name is common, as well as the account of the substance correspond-
ing to the name, as man and ox are ‘animal’
(3) things which have an appellation from something corresponding to a name but
differ only by ending—that is, the ‘designation’ each ‘has’ (or ‘derives’) from its
source-name differs solely in ‘case’ or ‘fall’, as ‘grammarian’ from ‘grammar’, and
‘brave’ from ‘bravery’

Hence, ‘things’ may either have a ‘name’ in common’ or not, or they may either by named
from another name or not. But, as we learn from the Peri Hermeneias, names are vocal
sounds, the significations of which are pragmata. Now although the latter word does not
occur here, it is nevertheless implied: for if one were to ask, ‘What is it that are called
‘equivocal’ or ‘univocal’ or ‘denominative’?’, the answer would be, ‘certain things which
are signified by agreed upon vocal sounds’. Hence, in one way, what we might call the
‘thing of a name’ (res nominis) is seen to be the signification of a vocal sound.

33
In Greek, zôion signifies both ‘animal’ and ‘figure’ or’ image’, as in a painting (cf. LSJ, s.v. zw=?on); an
English equivalent to Aristotle’s example would be, “as a famous person and a triangle are ‘figures’”, the
account of what it is to be a ‘figure’ for each of these being different although the name is the same.
34
Aequivoca dicuntur quorum solum nomen commune, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa, ut
animal homo et quod pingitur. Horum enim solum nomen commune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae
ratio diversae. Si quis enim assignat quid sit utrumque eorum, quo sint animalia, propriam assignabit
utrique rationem. Note that ‘substance’ here means the ‘what it is’ and not the ‘this something’ of a name.
35
Univoca vero dicuntur quorum nomen commune est, et secundum nomen eadem ratio substantiae, ut
animal homo atque bos, communi enim nomine utraque animalia nuncapuntur, et est substantiae ratio
eadem. Si quis enim assignet utriusque rationem quid utrumque sit, quo sint animalia, eamdem assignabit
rationem.
36
Denominativa vero dicuntur quaecumque ab aliquo, solo differentia casu, secundum nomen habent
appellationem, ut a grammatica grammaticus, et a fortitudine fortis.

29
2. The way in which the foregoing definitions are to be understood.

In support of our reading of the text, let us take our example of the name ‘figure’:
When we say things like ‘The President is a (public) figure’ and ‘A triangle is a figure’,
both man and geometrical object are called something, namely, ‘figure’. Now in both cases
we observe that the significative vocal sound ‘figure’ is uttered and hence what is signified
by the name (which is a ‘thing’) is ‘said’. Still, each time it is said the account of the sub-
stance corresponding to the name (which is what it signifies) is different, for which reason
we say that they are called ‘equivocal’, and that the name ‘figure’ is said of them equi-
vocally.37 Were we, however, to call both a triangle and a square a ‘figure’, ‘they’ (mean-
ing the things signified by the name ‘figure’ in both statements) are ‘said’ univocally be-
cause their accounts are the same. Now, so far as I can see, the only interpretation con-
sistent with Aristotle’s ipsissima verba is to understand by ‘things’ the significations of the
vocal sounds naming them (cf. the comment by Joseph, excerpted below). Hence, when we
look at the things signified by the vocal sound ‘figure’, ‘they’, meaning the things of which
the name is said, are either ‘called equivocal’ or ‘univocal’: they are called the one when
the account of the substance corresponding to the name is different; but they are called the
other when it is the same. Likewise, in the case of denominatives, when one says ‘gram-
marian’ or ‘brave’ of someone, a vocal sound is uttered and a thing is said; the one thing
being named by a name taken from another thing, but with a different case or ending. And
note here that if instead of “Those (things) are called equivocal”, etc., the text were to read,
‘Those (things) are said equivocally (aequivoce, o(mwnu/mwj)’, the continuity of the argu-
ment would be more in evidence, inasmuch as in Chapters 2 and 4 Aristotle takes up the
signification of ‘things said’. (For more on this point, see further below.)
In sum, then, we distinguish (1) three ways in which things are said, equivocally,
univocally, and denominatively; (2) the ‘things’ signified by ‘names’, in virtue of which
observation we may understand the ‘thing’ of a name to be its signification; and (3) the
account of the substance corresponding to the name, telling us what these things are.

3. On the ways in which things are predicated according to St. Thomas Aquinas.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In II De Anima, lect. 2, n. 5 (tr. B.A.M.):

And this is so because they are ‘equivocal’ [aequivoca sunt] whose name alone is common
and the account of the substance different.38

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, De Principiis Naturae, cap. 6 (tr. B.A.M.).

But being is not a genus, since it is not predicated univocally, but analogously. In order to
understand this one must bear in mind that something is predicated of many things in three
ways, namely, univocally, equivocally, and analogously.39

37
We then go on to speak of ‘equivocal’ naming and the like, and then of names themselves as being
‘equivocal’ or ‘univocal’, even though it is not the names as such which produce equivocation or uni-
vocation, but rather their use; there being certain instances where usage establishes different meanings.
38 et hoc ideo est, quia aequivoca sunt, quorum nomen solum commune est et ratio substantiae diversa.

Hence, they are ‘univocal’ [univoca] whose name is common, as well as the account of the substance corres-
ponding to the name. For the complete passage from which this excerpt is taken, see further below.
39
ens autem non est genus, quia non praedicatur univoce, sed analogice. ad huius intelligentiam sciendum
est, quod tripliciter aliquid praedicatur de pluribus: univoce, aequivoce et analogice.

30
 That is predicated univocally which is predicated according to the same name and
according to the same account—that is, definition, as ‘animal’ is predicated of man and ass.
For both are called ‘animal’, and both are ‘animated sensible substance’, which is the
definition of ‘animal’.40

That is predicated equivocally which is predicated of certain things according to the same
name, but according to a different account, as ‘dog’ is said of what can bark and of the
celestial object (the star), which agree only in name, but not in definition or signification: for
what is signified by the name is the definition, as is said in the fourth book of the
Metaphysics.41

That is said to be predicated analogously which is predicated of many things whose

accounts and definitions are diverse, but are attributed to some one and the same thing, just
as ‘healthy’ is said of the body of an animal and of urine and of medicine, but it does not
signify entirely the same thing in all three. For it is said of urine as of the sign of health, of
the body as of the subject, and of medicine as of the cause. But nevertheless, all of these
accounts are attributed to one end, namely to health.42

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In II De Anima, lect. 2, n. 5 (tr. B.A.M.):

Then when he says, But one must consider, he manifests the definition of the soul from its
parts, saying that what has been said about the whole soul and the whole living body one
must consider in each of its parts. The reason for this is, if the eye were an animal, its sight
would have to be its soul, because sight is the substantial form of the eye, and the eye is the
matter of sight, just as the organic body is the matter of the soul. But sight being lacking, the
eye would not remain except equivocally, just as an eye rendered in stone or depicted in a
painting is called an eye equivocally. And this is so because ‘equivocal’ are those things of
which only the name is common and the account of the substance diverse: and so the form
by which it is the account of the substance of the eye being taken away, the name of “eye”
would not remain unless said equivocally.43

N.B. For more on equivocation as founded on a difference in things, see further below, but
for an account which anticipated my interpretation, cf. the following:

40
univoce praedicatur quod praedicatur secundum idem nomen et secundum rationem eamdem, idest
definitionem, sicut animal praedicatur de homine et de asino.utrumque enim dicitur animal, et utrumque est
substantia animata sensibilis, quod est definitio animalis.
41
aequivoce praedicatur, quod praedicatur de aliquibus secundum idem nomen, et secundum diversam
rationem: sicut canis dicitur de latrabili et de caelesti, quae conveniunt solum in nomine, et non in
definitione sive significatione: id enim quod significatur per nomen, est definitio, sicut dicitur in quarto
metaph..
42
analogice dicitur praedicari, quod praedicatur de pluribus quorum rationes diversae sunt sed attribuuntur
uni alicui eidem: sicut sanum dicitur de corpore animalis et de urina et de potione, sed non ex toto idem
significat in omnibus. dicitur enim de urina ut de signo sanitatis, de corpore ut de subiecto, de potione ut de
causa; sed tamen omnes istae rationes attribuuntur uni fini, scilicet sanitati.
43
deinde cum dicit considerare autem manifestat definitionem animae ex partibus, dicens, quod id quod
dictum est de tota anima et de toto corpore vivente, oportet considerare in partibus utriusque; quia, si oculus
esset animal, oporteret quod visus esset anima eius, quia visus est substantialis forma oculi, et oculus est
materia visus, sicut corpus organicum materia animae. deficiente autem visu, non remanet oculus nisi
aequivoce, sicut oculus lapideus aut depictus aequivoce dicitur oculus. et hoc ideo est, quia aequivoca sunt,
quorum nomen solum commune est et ratio substantiae diversa: et ideo sublata forma a qua est ratio
substantiae oculi, non remanet nisi nomen oculi aequivoce dictum.

31
Cf. H.W.B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic (Oxford, 1916), Ch. II, Terms and Their
Principal Distinctions, p. 47:

The history of the words univocal, equivocal, and analogous will illustrate the tendency to
treat Logic from the standpoint of an affair of names. The Aristotelian distinction already
alluded to (p. 31) between suno/numa and o(mo/numa was one of things. Univocum and
equivocum are merely translations of suno/numa and o(mo/numa, and they were defined in
the same way (cf. Crackenthorpe’s Logic, Bk. II. c. i. ‘Aequivoca ita describuntur: aequi-
voca sunt quorum nomen solum est commune, ratio vero illius nominis est alia atque alia.’ c.
ii. ‘Univoca describuntur in hunc modum: univoca sunt res vel entia quorum nomen est
commune, et ratio illius nominis est una et eadem in omnibus quibus nomen convenit’).
Similarly, it would have been not the word ‘foot’, but the man’s and the mountain’s foot that
would have been called analogous.44 If we remember that terms are not primarily names,
but the objects of thought intended by the names,45 we might still say that equivocal
terms are different objects of thought with the same name, rather than the same name
with different meanings. But in English usage the distinction of names has really displaced
that of things: we do not even retain both, like the Latin, when it was said that ‘aequivoca’
were either ‘aequivocantia, ipsae voces aequivocae’, or ‘aequivocata, res ipsae per illam
vocem significatae’. And even in Aristotle’s Rhet. g. ii. 2 1405a 1, we find the example of
the use which calls words synonymous....]

44
Unfortunately for Joseph, his chosen example is one of metaphor, not analogy.
45
That is, those things I call, after Aristotle, pragmata. See further below.

32
4. Supplement: Additional texts of St. Thomas from the Thomas-Lexikon.

aequivocatio

a) gleiche Benennung, Gleichnamigkeit, Namensgleichheit zweier oder mehrerer Dinge,

welche ihrem Begriff und Wesen nach voneinander verschieden sind (vgl. aequivocus sub
a), synonym mit univocatio (← sub a): secundum aequivocationem id est communica-
tionem nominum,46 th. III. 2. 6 c; diversa ratio (Begriff, Wesen) minus communium non
facit aequivocationem in magis communi,47 ib. I. 29. 4 ad 4; aequivocatio inducitur ex di-
versa forma significata per nomen, non autem ex diversitate suppositionis (Bedeutung),
non enim hoc nomen homo aequivoce sumitur ex eo, quod quandoque supponit (← sub c)
pro Platone, quandoque pro Socrate,48 cg. IV. 49.

• Zu fallacia aequivocationis → fallacia sub b; zu significare per modum ae. →

significare.

• Als Arten der aequivocatio gehören hierher: aequivocatio pura sive multum
distans & ae. propinqua sive proxima (th. I. 13. 5 c; cg. I. 33; 1 sent. 35. 1. 4 c;
pot. 7. 7 c; 7 phys. 8 g) = die reine oder rein zufällige und deshalb (ab unitate gen-
eris) weit abstehende oder entfernte (ubi est pura aequivocatio, nulla similitudo in
rebus attenditur, sed solum unitas nominis,49 cg. I. 33) und die wegen einer größern
oder geringern Ähnlichkeit der mit demselben Namen bezeichneten Dinge nahe
oder sehr nahe gelegene Gleichnamigkeit (per similitudinem et propinquitatem ad
unitatem generis multorum aequivocatio latet. Sunt autem quaedam aequi-
vocationum multum distantes, in quibus sola communitas nominum attenditur, sicut
si canis dicatur caeleste sidus et animal latrabile. Quaedam vero sunt, quae habent
quandam similitudinem, sicut si hoc nomen homo dicatur de vero homine et de ho-
mine picto, inquantum habet similitudinem quandam veri hominis. Quaedam vero
aequivocationes sunt proximae, aut propter convenientiam in genere, sicut si corpus
dicatur de corpore caelesti et de corpore corruptibili, aequivoce dicitur naturaliter
[im Sinne der Physik] loquendo, quia eorum non est materia una [conveniunt tamen
in genere logico, et propter hanc generis convenientiam videntur omnino non
aequivoca esse], aut etiam sunt propinquae secundum aliquam similitudinem, sicut
ille, qui docet in scholis, dicitur magister, et similiter ille, qui praeest domui, dicitur
magister domus aequivoce, et tamen propinqua aequivocatione propter similitu-
dinem; uterque enim est rector, hic quidem scholarum, ille vero domus. Unde pro-
pter hanc propinquitatem vel generis vel similitudinis non videntur esse aequivo-
cationes, cum tamen sint,50 7 phys. 8 g).

46
“according to equivocation, that is, a communication of names”
47
“a diverse account of the less common does not produce equivocation in the more common”
48
“equivocation is introduced from diverse things signified by a name, but not from a diversity of suppos-
ition, for this name man is not taken equivocally from the fact that sometimes it supposes for [stands for]
Plato, sometimes for Socrates”
49
“where there is pure equivocation, no likeness in the things is taken into consideration, but only a unity of
name”
50
“by a likeness and nearness to the unity of the genus the equivocation of many things lies hidden. But there
are certain instances of equivocation very far apart, in which only a community of names is taken into consi-
deration, just as if ‘dog’ were said of the star in the sky and the barking animal. But there are certain ones
which involve a certain likeness, just as if the name ‘man’ were said of a true man and a painted one,

33
b) Zweideutigkeit: multiplicitas (Vielheit) horum sensuum non facit aequivocationem aut
aliam speciem multiplicitatis (Vieldeutigkeit), th. I. 1. 10 ad 1; ne intelligerentur tres
essentiae propter nominis aequivocationem,51 ib. 30. 1 ad 1; vgl. ib. III. 2. 6 c; 1 sent. 23.
1. 3 c; deceptus est Galenus ex aequivocatione eius, quod est per se,52 7 phys. 1 b; in his
autem, quae multum distant, magis manifestatur aequivocatio, si idem nomen eis impo-
natur,53 5 eth. 1 g.

aequivoce

a) nach Weise oder im Sinne der Gleichnamigkeit (vgl. aequivocus sub a): Augustinus
aequivoce utitur nomine creationis,54 th. I. 45. 1 ad 1; non est intellectus agens et pos-
sibilis, nisi forte aequivoce,55 cg. II. 96; vgl. ib. IV. 29; 2 anim. 2 b.

• Zu causa aequivoce agens → causa sub b; zu commune ae. → communis sub a;

zu dicere omnino sive proprie sive pure ae. → dicere sub c; zu praedicare
omnino sive pure ae. → praedicare sub b.

b) nach Weise oder im Sinne der bloßen Gleichnamigkeit, synonym mit omnino sive pure
aequivoce (→ sub a).

• Zu accipere aequivoce → accipere sub c; zu dicere ae. → dicere sub c; zu

praedicare ae. → praedicare sub b; zu sumere ae. → sumere sub c.

aequivocus, a, um

a) gleichnamig, namensgleich im weitern Sinne des Wortes, wie alle diejenigen Dinge
heißen, welche zwar an demselben Namen, nicht aber an dem nämlichen Begriff und
Wesen teilhaben, gleichviel, ob sie einander ähnlich sind, oder nicht, der Gegensatz zu
univocus (← sub b): largo modo accipit aequivoca, secundum quod includunt in se analoga
(←),56 th. I. 13. 10 ad 4; aequivoca id est non (simul) convenientia in nomine et ratione
(Begriff, Wesen),57 5 phys. 7 a; aequivoca sunt, quorum nomen solum commune est et
ratio substantiae diversa,58 2 anim. 2 b.

inasmuch as [a picture of a man] has a certain likeness to a true man. But certain equivocations are near at
hand, either by reason of an agreement in genus, just as if ‘body’ were said of the heavenly body and or the
corruptible body, it [‘body’] is said equivocally naturally speaking, since there is not one matter of them [still
they agree in a logical genus, and by reason of the agreement of the genus they are seen not to be entirely
equivocal], or also are near at hand according to some likeness, just as he who teaches in a school is called
magister [of a school = ‘school teacher’], and likewise he who presides over a house is called magister
domus [= ‘major domo’] equivocally, and yet the equivocation is near at hand by reason of the likeness; for
each one is a ruler, the one of students, the other of a house. Whence by reason of the nearness either of the
genus or of a likeness they do not appear to be instances of equivocation, when they still are.”
51
“lest three essences be understood by reason of the equivocation of the name”
52
“Galen was deceived by its equivocation, which is per se”
53
“but in these which are far apart, the equivocation is more obvious, if the same name be imposed on them”
54
“Augustine uses the name ‘creation’ equivocally”
55
“for [in separated substances] there is no agent and possible intellect, except perhaps equivocally”
56
“He takes ‘equivocal’ largo modo, according as they include analogy in themselves”
57
“equivocal, that is not (at once) an agreement in name and in account”
58
“they are equivocal of which the name alone is common and the account of the substance diverse”

34
 • Zu agens aequivocum → agens; zu causa ae. → causa sub b; zu effectus ae. →
effectus; zu generatio ae. → generatio sub a.

• Eine Art des aequivocus im weitern Sinne des Wortes ist das aequivocus a casu
sive per casum et fortunam sive omnino sive pure (th. I. 13. 5 ad 1; cg. I. 33; 1
sent. 35. 1. 4 c; pot. 7. 7 c; 7 phys. 8 g; 1 eth. 7 i) = zufälligerweise oder gänzlich
oder rein und bloß gleichnamig (ista dicuntur aequivoca a casu, quia scilicet casu
accidit, quod unum nomen unus homo imposuit uni rei et alius alii rei, ut praecipue
patet in diversis hominibus uno nomine nominatis,59 1 eth. 7 i), der Gegensatz zu
analogicum oder analogum (←) .

• Omne aequivocum reducitur ad univocum60 (th. I. 13. 5 ob. 1; vgl. ib. ad 1; pot. 7.
7 ob. 7) = jedes aequivocum ist mit seinem Benennung auf ein univocum zurück-
zuführen, m. a. W. wesensverschiedene Dinge werden deshalb mit einem gemein-
samen Namen bezeichnet, weil es wesensgleiche Dinge gibt, denen der betreffende
Name zuerst zukommt.

b) gleichnamig, namensgleich im engern Sinne des Wortes, was von denjenigen Dingen
gilt, welche zwar denselben Namen tragen, aber nicht bloß dem Begriff und Wesen nach
verschieden, sondern auch nicht einmal einander ähnlich sind, synonym also mit aequi-
vocus a casu (→ sub a), der Gegensatz zu analogicus oder analogus (←): univocorum est
omnino eadem ratio (Wesen), aequivocorum est omnino ratio diversa, in analogicis vero
oportet, quod nomen secundum unam significationem acceptum ponatur in definitione
eiusdem nominis secundum alias significationes accepti,61 th. I. 13. 10 c; aequivocum enim
dividitur secundum res significatas, univocum vero dividitur secundum differentias, sed
analogum dividitur secundum diversos modos,62 1 sent. 22. 1. 3 ad 2.

• Zu dictio aequivoca → dictio sub b; zu nomen ae. sive pure ae. → nomen sub b;
zu praedicatio ae. → praedicatio sub b.

59
“these are called ‘equivocal by chance’, because it happens by chance that one name of one man was
imposed on one thing and by someone else on another thing, as is especially clear in different men named by
one name” (cf. standard example of the two Ajaxes; cf. also Boethius, In Categorias, near the beginning)
60
“every equivocal is reduced to a univocal”
61
“of univocals the account is entirely the same, but of equivocals the account is entirely diverse, but in
analogates, it is necessary that the name taken according to one signification be placed in the definition of the
same name taken according to other meanings”
62
“for the equivocal is divided according to the things signified, but the univocal according to differences,
but the analogous is divided according to diverse modes” (see further below on substance and accident)

35
5. Supplement: St. Thomas Aquinas on ‘animal’ said equivocally.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 10, sc. (tr. B.A.M.):

But to the contrary, it must be said that what is in the intellect is a likeness of that which is
in the thing, as is said in the first book of the Peri Hermeneias. But ‘animal’ said of a true
animal and of a painted one is said equivocally. Therefore the name ‘God’, said of the true
God and of ‘god’ according to opinion, is said equivocally.63

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 10, ad 4 (tr. B.A.M.):

To the fourth it must be said that ‘animal’ said of a true animal and a painted one is not
said purely equivocally: but the Philosopher largo modo [‘speaking largely’] takes ‘equi-
vocal’ according as it includes analogy in itself. And the reason is because ‘being’, which is
said analogously, is sometimes said to be predicated equivocally of diverse predicaments.64

N.B. Notice how in the first excerpt St. Thomas speaks of things being ‘said equivocally’,
but in his reply to the fourth objection he states that things “are said to be predicated equi-
vocally”, etc. With regard to equivocation, then, we observe three ways of speaking: (1)
“things are called ‘equivocal’”; (2) “things are said equivocally”; and (3) “things are said
to be predicated equivocally”, etc, as is also the case with univocation.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Veritate, q. 2, art. 11, ad 8 (tr. B.A.M.):

obj. 8. Further, our science is nothing other than an image of divine science. But the name
of a thing does not belong to an image except equivocally; whence ‘animal’ is said equi-
vocally of a true animal and a painted one according to the Philosopher in the Categories
(ch. 1, 1a 1-6). The name of ‘science’, then, is said purely equivocally of ours and of the
science of God.65

ad 8. To the eighth it must be said that the name ‘animal’ is not imposed to signify the
exterior figure in which a picture imitates a true animal, but to signify the interior nature in
which it does not imitate it, and so the name of ‘animal’ is said equivocally of a true one and
a painted one; but the name of ‘science’ belongs to the creature and the Creator according to
that in which the creature imitates the Creator, and so it is not predicated of both wholly
equivocally.66

6. The foregoing in sum.

63
sed contra, illud quod est in intellectu, est similitudo eius quod est in re, ut dicitur in i periherm.. sed
animal, dictum de animali vero et de animali picto, aequivoce dicitur. ergo hoc nomen deus, dictum de deo
vero et de deo secundum opinionem, aequivoce dicitur.
64
ad quartum dicendum dicendum quod animal dictum de animali vero et de picto, non dicitur pure
aequivoce: sed Philosophus largo modo accipit aequivoca, secundum quod includunt in se analoga. Quia et
ens, quod analogice dicitur, aliquando dicitur aequivoce praedicari de diversis praedicamentis.
65
praeterea, scientia nostra non est nisi quaedam imago divinae scientiae. sed nomen rei non convenit
imagini nisi aequivoce, unde animal aequivoce dicitur de vero animali et picto secundum philosophum in
praedicamentis; ergo et nomen scientiae pure aequivoce dicitur de scientia dei et nostra.
66
ad octavum dicendum, quod hoc nomen animal imponitur non ad significandum figuram exteriorem, in
qua pictura imitatur animal verum, sed ad significandum interiorem naturam, in qua non imitatur; et ideo
nomen animalis de vero et picto aequivoce dicitur; sed nomen scientiae convenit creaturae et creatori
secundum id in quo creatura creatorem imitatur; et ideo non omnino aequivoce praedicatur de utroque.

36
 Notice how the equivocation of the Latin term, as with its English equivalent, does
not arise from a difference in meanings, as does its Greek counterpart, but rather from a
difference in the things of which the name is being said, for since a hand in a painting can-
not do the work of a hand truly so called, it is called a ‘hand’ equivocally. For the founda-
tion of equivocation in things, cf. De Part. Animal. I. 1 (640b 30–641a 7) (tr. William
Ogle.):

Does, then, configuration and color constitute the essence of the various animals and of their
several parts? For if so, what Democritus says will be strictly correct. For such appears to
have been his notion. At any rate he says that it is evident to every one what form it is that
makes the man, seeing that he is recognizable by his shape and color. And yet a dead body
has exactly the same configuration as a living one; but for all that is not a man. So also no
hand of bronze or wood or constituted in any but the appropriate way can possibly be a hand
in more than name. For like a physician in a painting, or like a flute in a sculpture, in spite
of its name it will be unable to do the office which that name implies. Precisely in the same
way no part of a dead body, such I mean as its eye or its hand, is really an eye or a hand.

Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, In VII Physic., lect. 5, n. 5 (tr. B.A.M.):

Now for the evidence in support of these arguments one must consider that among all the
qualities, figure [or ‘shape’] more than anything else follows on and reveals the species of
things. This is most evident in plants and animals, in which no more certain judgement of the
diversity of species can be made than by the diversity of figures [‘shapes’]. And this is so
because, just as among the other accidents quantities stand nearest to substance, so figure,
which is a quality around quantity, stands nearest to the form of the substance.67

It will be understood, then, that the doctrinal point with which we are here con-
cerned, namely, what the signification of vocal sounds consists in, remains unaffected by
the foregoing distinction in kinds of equivocation.

In sum:

equivocation
founded in a difference between meanings
founded in a difference between things

equivocation
what is wholly [purely] equivocal (e.g. a baseball bat and a flying mammal, which are far
apart)
what is equivocal according to a likeness which is near at hand
what is not wholly equivocal but analogous (e.g. ‘healthy’ as said of its instrument or its
final cause)

67
ad evidentiam autem harum rationum considerandum est, quod inter omnes qualitates, figurae maxime
consequuntur et demonstrant speciem rerum. quod maxime in plantis et animalibus patet, in quibus nullo
certiori iudicio diversitas specierum diiudicari potest, quam diversitate figurarum. et hoc ideo, quia sicut
quantitas propinquissime se habet ad substantiam inter alia accidentia, ita figura, quae est qualitas circa
quantitatem, propinquissime se habet ad formam substantiae. unde sicut posuerunt aliqui dimensiones esse
substantiam rerum, ita posuerunt aliqui figuras esse substantiales formas.

37
 Excerpts from Commentary on Peter of Spain’s Tractatus
By Simon of Faversham
Ed. De Rijk, Vivarium VI 2, pp. 69 ff.
Translated by John Longeway

Square brackets [] are used to indicate summaries.

Diamond brackets <> indicate words supplied by the translator.

Prooemium: The Philosopher says in Metaphysics IV that every natural thing is determined
by its proper function (operatio)—when it is capable <in that function> it is called a
singular, that is, a <single> being of that sort, and when it is not, it is only called a singular
equivocally. And he gives the eye as an example. For the eye, when it is capable in its proper
function, which is seeing, is called an eye, but when it is not capable, it is only called an eye
equivocally. But since a human being is of the number of natural things, it must have a
proper operation, and when it is capable in it it is called a human being, and when it is not it
is only called a human being equivocally. But being is not a function of this sort, since being
is an actuality of every being. Nor is vegetative activity, since it agrees with plants; nor
sensing, since it is in every animal; nor understanding, since intelligences also understand.
The Philosopher, noting that these are not functions proper to human beings, says that
human being agrees with all beings in being, with plants in vegetative functions with brutes
in sensing, with angels in understanding. It follows therefore that these are not functions
proper to human beings.
But the function proper to a human being is reasoning, and this is evident from both reason
and authority. First, by reason thus: That is the operation proper to human beings from which
the specific difference of human being is taken, but the specific difference of human being is
taken from reasoning; therefore this is the function proper to human beings. The major
premise is obvious from Avicenna, who says that its difference is taken from the form proper
to each reality. But the proper function arises from the proper form. Therefore etc. Again,
that is the function proper to human being which agrees with human being alone, but the act
of reasoning agrees with human being alone; therefore reasoning is its proper function. The
major premise is obvious, since a property is what agrees with only one reality. The minor
premise is explained through the definition of reasoning—John the Grammarian
<Philoponus> defines it in this way: reasoning is the passage of reason from things known
beforehand to things that are to be known afterwards. But it is certain that Intelligences don’t
understand in this way. Therefore this function, reasoning, agrees with human being alone.
This appears in authoritative remarks of the Philosopher, first in the Epistle to Alexander,
lust certainly, and anger and the rest occur in all the rest of the animals, but reason in none of
them except human beings. The Philosopher means by this that reasoning is the function
proper to human beings. The Philosopher in Metaphysics I: “others certainly live by
imagination and memory, but the race of men alone lives by art and reasoning.” And it is
apparent from this that reasoning is the primary function of human beings. Again, Seneca:
“Human beings and lions are more beautiful, and peacocks, of those who have voluntary
motion and impetus; and as other beasts and worms have voice, but a tom-cat the loudest and
most distinct, dogs the sharpest and the eagle the deepest, the bull the most delightfully
glowing. . .” Reason, therefore, is the good proper to human beings, and the other goods are
common enough with the other animals. It appears from what has been said, then, that
reasoning is the function proper to human beings, and when a human being is capable in this
function, it is called a human being, and when it is not, it is only called a human being
equivocally.
Restating the argument, then: each natural reality is determined by its proper function.
When it is capable in this, it is called a singular, that is, a being falling under its kind. When
it is not capable in this, it is only called a singular, falling under its kind, equivocally. But
since human being is of the number of natural realities, it therefore has a proper function.

38
This is reasoning. Thus it is obvious from what has been said that when it is capable in this
function, reasoning, it is called a human being, and when it is not, it is only called a human
being equivocally.
One ought to note that the Philosopher, in De Caeli et Mundo II, says that each reality of
which there is some function, is ordered to that function as to an end. Since, then, the act of
reasoning is the function proper to a human being, a human being is related to the act of
reasoning as to an end. And whoever does not have reasoning, such a human being is called
useless and a beast. And so three things appear: that a human being who does not have the
act of reasoning is called a human being equivocally, second, that such a human being is
useless, and third, that such a human being is a beast.
But since we cannot have the function, reasoning, except through logic, therefore logic is
greatly to be sought.
And immediately you will ask, don’t all human beings reason naturally? I reply that
although all do reason naturally, still one can never reason perfectly without logic. That we
have the act of reasoning perfectly through logic is obvious from the authority of Al Farabi,
for he says, “just as grammar directs discourse and speech so that one does not err in
interpretation, so logic directs reason so that one does not err in reasoning.” It follows
therefore that a human being reasons rightly and perfectly by means of logic.
Again, this is explained through the interpretation of this word “logic.” In one way it is
called “log–“ from “logos,” that is, “discourse,” and “–ic” means “science”—the science of
discourse, as it were. And through this interpretation it is one of the sciences of discourse,
and extends to the entire trivium. In another way, it is called “logic” from “logos” in Greek,
which is “reason” (“ratio”) in Latin, and “ycos,” “science”—so the science of reason, as it
were, which directs one’s reason, the function proper to human beings.
It is apparent, then, from what has been said, that a human being without logic is not
human except equivocally.

39
7. On ‘substance’ in the expression logos tes ousias.

Note that in the phrase ‘the account of the substance’, ‘substance’ means the quid
est or ‘what it is’ (for which see below), in Aristotle’s examples these differing as follows:

• the account of ‘man’: an animal with reason (or mortal rational animal)
• the account of to zôô: a likeness in species or in a sign of the species68

Hence, looked at in one way, we see that the signification of such names consists in the ac-
count of the ‘what it is’ of the things they name, in accordance with which observation it is
commonly said that the logos or ratio which a name signifies is the definition,69 but in an-
other way, ‘what is signified’ is a ‘thing’, like a man, which has the definition.
Note also that in logic the sort of names said univocally of many things are the five
predicables. But, as one may gather from the Isagoge of Porphyry, among the predicables
only genus and species are predicated in the ‘what it is’; ‘genus’ being a name said uni-
vocally of many things other in species, signifying what they are, but a species a name said
univocally of many things under a genus, signifying what they are.

Cf. Duane H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories (Cat. 4). Excerpt from a Seminar
delivered at Thomas Aquinas College:

Maybe we can stop here for a moment and read it in the Greek; you’ll notice that Aristotle in
the Categories is using the word “substance” in more than one way. In the ante-predicaments
there are really two main uses of the word “substance”. One is in Chapter 1, where the Greek
says that univocal things have both a name in common and the logos (which can be
translated either as the speech or as the thought) tes ousias (of the substance). Now, what
does “substance” mean there? Does it mean the category of substance? No. It means the nature,
the what it is, of a thing. Is “substance” in that sense placed under some genus? No. It’s found in
some way in all the genera. But if you take it in the abstract like that, “the nature of a thing”,
even the nature of man is not directly in the genus of substance, but what has that nature. And
substance in that sense is not an individual or a species or a genus under any one of the ten, but
what it in fact is is the formal beginning of all the species, the genera, and so on. There’s one
text in the Metaphysics where Aristotle is giving a division of “substance”. He says it can mean
what it is, meaning the nature, it can mean this something, the individual substance, or it can
mean the genus, the universal. <...>
In the ante-predicaments you already have to distinguish those two senses of “substance”. The
first sense is “substance” meaning the nature, the essence, the what it is of a thing, and not only
in the first genus but in all ten, e.g. the what it is of virtue, the substance of virtue. Thomas,
when he talks about that sense, says that’s what we mean when we say definition is speech
signifying the substance of a thing; it’s the what it is of a thing. The second sense you meet
is in the fourth chapter, the genus of substance. And now we are meeting in Chapter 5 two other
senses.

68
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 35, art. 1, c. where he defines image in this way. Needless to
say, in English the word ‘animal’ never has the proper meaning of ‘image’ or ‘picture’, which is why I have
taken the word ‘figure’ as a substitute. Cf. the remarks of Robin Smith excerpted above.
69
Of course, one must then go on to distinguish the various kinds of definition, as one would first give the
meaning of a name (which is a nominal definition) before being able to define it through its principles (which
is a real definition) once these are discovered or recognized as such. As for the logoi of the highest genera,
which have no definition, in addition to the texts cited above on hupographe, cf. the explanation of ratio dis-
cussed in the second passage excerpted from Duane Berquist below, a text I give in extenso further on.

40
Cf. Duane H. Berquist, The Categories. The Ante Predicaments: Things as Named:70

APPENDIX

What is meant by the logos of the ousia in the first two definitions? Perhaps logos is more
universal than definition in the strict sense. Consider Thomas’ teaching here in the Latin
word for logos which is ratio:

...ratio, prout hic sumitur, nihil aliud est quam id quod apprehendit intellectus de
significatione alicujus nominis: et hoc in his quae habent definitionem, est ipsa rei definitio,
secundum quod Philosophus dicit, IV Metaphy., text. 11: “Ratio quam significat nomen est
definitio.” Sed quaedam dicuntur habere rationem sic dictam, quae non definiuntur, sicut
quantitas et

14

qualitas, et hujusmodi, quae non definiuntur, quia sunt genera generalissima. Et tamen ratio
qualitatis est id quod significatur nomine qualitatis; et hoc est illud ex quo qualitas habet
quod sit qualitas. Unde non refert, utrum illa quae dicuntur habere rationem, habeant vel non
habeant definitionem.14 [71]

If the species immediately under a highest genus have a name common to them uni-
vocally, but a genus that is not a species cannot be defined in the strict sense, then we
would have to understand logos not as the definition of what it is, but as the same
thought of what it is. And what is the meaning of ousia or substance in the first two defi-
nitions of Chapter One? The following text of Thomas gives the two meanings of sub-
stance in the ante-predicaments:

...substantia duplicitur dicitur, ut ex V Metaphysicorum, text. 15, patet. Uno enim modo
dicitur substantia, secundum quod significat rationem primi praedicamenti: et hoc est vel
forma, vel materia, vel compositum, quod per se in genere est. Alio modo dicitur substantia
illud quod significat quid in omnibus rebus, sicut dicimus quod definitio significat rei sub-
stantiam: et hoc modo quidquid positive dicitur, in quocumque genere sit, substantia est vel
substantiam habet.15 [72]

70
(www.aristotle-aquinas.org/.../
02-categories/02-ante-predicaments/01-Things% 20as%20Named%20Ch.1.pdf [2/28/08]) Note that I furnish
English translations of the texts of St. Thomas quoted by Dr. Berquist.
71
“Regarding what pertains to the first point, it must be understood that ratio, as it is taken here, is nothing
other than that which the intellect apprehends from the signification of a name: and this—in those things
which have a definition—is the definition itself of the thing, according to what the Philosopher says: ‘the
ratio which the name signifies is the definition’. But some things are said to have a ratio in the way men-
tioned which are not defined, such as quantity and quality and the like, which, since they are the most general
genera, are not defined. And nevertheless the ratio of quality is what is signified by the name of ‘quality’;
and this is that from which quality has what quality is [illud ex quo qualitas habet quod sit qualitas]. For this
reason, he does not refer to whether those things which are said to have a ratio either have or do not have a
definition.” (tr. B.A.M.)
72
“[I reply that it must be said that] substance is said in two ways, as is evident from Metaphysics V, text 15.
For in one way ‘substance’ is said according as it signifies the ratio of the first predicament [category]: and
this is either the form, or the matter, or the composite, which is in the genus per se. In another way
‘substance’ means that which signifies the ‘what’ in all things, just as we say that the definition signifies the
‘substance’ of a thing: and in this way whatever is said positively, in whatever genus it is, is ‘substance’, or
has ‘substance’.” (tr. B.A.M.)

41
Why does Aristotle give examples from substance in the definition of things named uni-
vocally? But does this mean that accidents cannot be named in this way? Thomas explains
Aristotle’s teaching in the seventh book of Wisdom or First Philosophy:

...dicendum est, sicut in praedicta solutione est dictum, quod quod quid est et definitio non
est accidentium, sed substantiarum: aut oportet secundum alium modum solvendi dicere,
quod definitio dicitur multipliciter sicut et quod quid est. Ipsum enim quod quid est, uno
modo significat substantiam et hoc aliquid. Alio modo significat singula aliorum

14
Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Distinctio II, Quaest I, Art. III, Solutio
15
Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum, Distinctio XXXVII, Quaest I, Art. I, Solutio

15

praedicamentorum, sicut qualitatem et quantitatem et alia hujusmodi talia. Sicut autem ens
praedicatur de omnibus praedicamentis, non autem similiter, sed primum de substantia, et
per posterius de aliis praedicamentis, ita et quod quid est, simpliciter convenit substantiae,
“aliis autem alio modo”, idest secundum quid.73

Quod enim “aliquo modo”, idest secundum quid aliis conveniat quid est, ex hoc patet, quod
in aliis praedicamentis respondetur aliquid ad quaestionem factam per quid. Interrogamus
enim de quali sive qualitate quid est, sicut quid est albedo, et respondemus quod est color.
Unde patet, quod qualitas est de numero eorum in quibus est quod quid est.74

Non tamen simpliciter in qualitate est quid est, sed quid est qualitatis. Cum enim quaero quid
est homo, et respondetur, animal; ly animal, quia est in genere substantiae, non solum dicit
quid est homo, sed etiam absolute significat quid, id est substantiam. Sed cum quaeritur quid
est albedo, et respondetur, color, licet significet quid est albedo, non tamen absolute
significat quid, sed quale. Et ideo qualitas non habet quid simpliciter, sed secundum quid.
Invenitur enim in qualitate quid huiusmodi, ut cum dicimus quod color est quid albedinis. Et
hoc quid, magis est substantiale quam substantia.75

Propter hoc enim quod omnia alia praedicamenta habent rationem entis a substantia, ideo
modus entitatis substantiae, scilicet esse quid, participatur secundum quamdam simili-

73
1331 ....He accordingly says, first (582), that it is necessary to say, as was stated in the foregoing solution
(581:C 1325) that there is no definition and whatness of accidents but only of substances; or according to an-
other solution it is necessary to say that the terms definition and whatness are used in many senses. For in one
sense whatness signifies substance and this particular thing, and in another sense it signifies each of the other
categories, such as quantity, quality and the like. Moreover, just as being is said to belong to all the other
categories, although not in the same way, but primarily to substance and secondarily to the others, in a
similar fashion whatness belongs in an unqualified sense to substance, “but in another sense to the other cate-
gories,” i.e., in a qualified sense. (In VII Meta., tr. John P. Rowan)
74
1332. For the fact that it belongs to the others “in another sense,” i.e., in a qualified sense, is clear from the
fact that in each of the other categories some reply may be made to the question “What is it?” For we ask of
what sort a thing is, or what its quality is, as “What is whiteness?” And we answer, “Color.” Hence it is evi-
dent that quality is one of the many things in which whatness is found.
75
1333. However, quality does not have whatness in an unqualified sense but the whatness of quality. For
when I ask what man is, and one answers “Animal,” the term animal, since it belongs in the genus of
substance, not only designates what man is, but also designates a what, i.e., a substance, in an un-
qualified sense. But when one asks what whiteness is, and someone answers, “Color,” this word, even
though it signifies what whiteness is, does not signify what something is in an unqualified sense, but of
what sort it is. Hence quality does not have whatness in an unqualified sense, but with some qualification.
For this kind of whatness is found in quality, as when we say that color is the whatness of whiteness; and this
kind of whatness is substantial rather than substance.

42
 tudinem proportionis in omnibus aliis praedicamentis; ut dicamus, quod sicut animal est quid
hominis, ita color albedinis, et numerus dualitatis; et ita dicimus qualitatem habere quid non
simpliciter, sed huius. Sicut aliqui dicunt logice de non ente loquentes, non ens est, non quia
non ens sit simpliciter sed quia non ens est non ens. Et similiter qualitas non habet quid
simpliciter, sed quid qualitatis.16 [76]

16
In VII Metaphysicorum, Lectio IV, n. 1331-1334

16

This sense of substance is also found in the sense of “how” which is that of the species-
making difference. Thomas repeats the teaching of Aristotle in the fifth book of Wisdom:

....unus modus qualitatis est secundum quod qualitas dicitur “differentia substantiae,” idest
differentia, per quam aliquid ab altero substantialiter differt, quae intrat in definitionem
substantiae.17 [77]

Is the example of things named equivocally an example of things named purely equivo-
cally? Consider this text of Thomas:

hoc nomen animal imponitur non ad significandum figuram exteriorem, in qua pictura
imitatur animal verum, sed ad significandum naturam, in qua pictura non imitatur; et ideo
nomen animalis de vero et picto aequivoce dicitur; sed nomen scientiae convenit creaturae et
Creatori secundum id in quo creatura Creatorem imitatur; et ideo non omnino aequivoce
praedicatur de utroque.18 [78]

17
In V Metaphysicorum, Lectio XVI, n. 987
18
De Veritate, Q. 2, Art. 11, Ad 8

DUANE H. BERQUIST

76
1334. For by reason of the fact that all the other categories get the notion of being from substance, the
mode of being of substance, i.e., being a what, is therefore participated in by all the other categories ac-
cording to a certain proportional likeness; for example, we say that, just as animal is the whatness of man, in
a similar fashion color is the whatness of whiteness, and number the whatness of double; and in this way we
say that quality has whatness, not whatness in an unqualified sense, but a whatness of this particular kind;
just as some say, for example, in speaking of non-being from a logical point of view, that non-being is, not
because non-being is in an unqualified sense, but because non-being is non-being. And in a similar way
quality does not have whatness in an unqualified sense, but the whatness of quality.
77
“He says therefore first that one mode of quality is according as ‘quality’ means the difference of sub-
stance—that is, the difference by which something differs substantially from another, which enters into the
definition of a substance.” (tr. B.A.M.)
78
“[To the eighth it must be said that] the name ‘animal’ is not imposed to signify the exterior figure in
which a picture imitates a true animal, but to signify the interior nature in which it does not imitate it, and so
the name of ‘animal’ is said equivocally of a true one and a painted one; but the name of ‘science’ belongs to
the creature and the Creator according to that in which the creature imitates the Creator, and so it is not pre-
dicated of both wholly equivocally.” (tr. B.A.M.) For more on this matter, cf. the preceding section.

43
III. ON THINGS SAID DENOMINATIVELY.

As will become clear from what Aristotle explains further on, when we say things
like ‘Trypho is a grammarian’ or ‘Achilles is brave’, we are naming them from certain ac-
cidents existing in them as in a subject, which are grammar and bravery respectively. Con-
sequently, we say that things like ‘grammarian’ and ‘brave’ are called ‘denominative’ inas-
much as they are derived from the names ‘grammar’ and ‘bravery’ with a change in end-
ing, the reasons for which are well-explained in the following texts:

1. Denomination explained.

Cf. Duane H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories (Cat.2):

So Aristotle has indicated that logic is ordered to knowing things, that it has a foundation in
things, but at the same time, the third bird, which you can obviously see from what he’s saying
what it would mean to speak about a univocal name, or an equivocal name. A fourth thing,
which I haven’t mentioned yet, is that his procedure will help you to understand when you get
to the division ton onton, of beings, well, what kind of name is “being”, which is said of
substance and accident? It is said equivocally. And when you come to Chapter 4, you don’t
say that man is virtue, but that man is virtuous, and you don’t say that man is courage,
but that man is courageous, so something is being said denominatively. Well, we’ve talked
about that in the first chapter. So maybe we’ve killed five or six birds.
Let’s look a bit at Chapter 1 in particular. In Chapter 1 we have three definitions. Is this a
division? Is he dividing something into three, here? Notice the difference in the way he speaks
here in Chapter 1, and the way he speaks in Chapter 2. In Chapter 2 he says “ton legomenon”,
“of those said”, and then he divides. Later on, in Chapter 2, he says “ton onton”, “of beings”,
and then he divides. He doesn’t say “of ways said”, or something, in Chapter 1, does he? He just
gives the three definitions. And you can see a certain opposition, of course, in the first two
definitions, but is it fair to introduce a division in between those first two? No. He has the same
example in both; that’s the first point to make. But in the third, there’s a difference here
between, let’s say, the word “virtuous”, and the word “virtue”, and we can say the same about
“courage” and “honor” and so on. And the word “virtuous” is a denominative, taken from
“virtue” in some way, with a difference in its ending. But basically it has the same meaning.
But, if you have a substance like man, you don’t really say “virtue” of man, you don’t say “man
is a virtue”, no matter how good he is. But you might say of a good man that he is “virtuous”.
When you say “virtuous” of man, this is being said denominatively, but when I say
“virtuous” of courageous, and of moderate, and of just, then what do we say? Is “virtuous”
being said denominatively of “courageous”, “moderate”, and “just”? No; they’re said
univocally, the same way that “virtue” is said of “courage”, “moderation”, and “justice”.
Looking at it this way, it seems to be essentially the same, and it seems to be what kind of
predication? All of these are said to be “virtuous” with the same speech about what they are in
mind. But when “virtuous” is said of man, “virtuous” is not saying what man is, but
something outside of the nature of man; there’s another nature there, another what-it-is.
This is important, because when he comes to Chapter 2, at the division ton onton, and he makes
the distinction between substance and accident, and accident is not said of substance, but it
exists in substance, it’s not said of substance in the strict sense of saying what it is, but it
exists in it. And because it exists in, that’s why there can be denomination. And that way
of speaking with denominatives is going to tie up with accidents, and then you’ll see when
you get to Chapter 4, when he distinguishes the nine genera of accidents, what words does he
use? Does he use words such as “virtue” or “virtuous”? Does he use “quality” or “qualis”,
“poion” or “poios”? He uses the denominative names. And there is a reason for that. For the
denominative name corresponds to its nature as an accident. When you say “virtue”, it’s

44
 almost like you’re talking about a substance, a thing in itself. But when you say
“virtuous”, you’re thinking of it in the manner of an accident, and in the way that it can
be said of substance. And yet when we compare “virtuous” to “courageous” or “moderate” or
“just”, it seems to be really the same relation between “virtue” and “courage” and “moderation”
and “justice”; they just differ in ending. But you are still talking about what they are in both
cases. So it’s not really a division that we have in Chapter 1, is it? But there is something of
opposition in the first two. Now when you use “equivocal” and “univocal”, there, in the first
two definitions, I’ve said already that this is a more narrow sense of “univocal” than you have in
the Isagoge.

Cf. ibid.:

What about the third definition, the denominative? Albert the Great, I think, is good on this.
Should you understand this grammatically? Is it talking about how one word might be derived
or formed from another word? Albert the Great uses the example of the word “just” and the
word “justice”. The grammarian, looking at the words “just” and “justice”, will say just is the
original word, and it comes before justice. In the same way you would have “hard” before
“hardness”. But is it the word justice and the word hardness that will be said denominatively?
No. If you think so, you’re confusing logic with grammar. Grammar is concerned with the
physical word itself. The actual word “justice” might very well be derived from “just”, but
what you mean in the case of denomination is you have two natures, say the nature of this
man, and the nature of this virtue. And you are going to say this alien nature of man. And
so you change the ending of the word, even though you’re talking about the same reality.
“Just” can be said of man, and “justice” cannot. So “justice” not only will not be said
denominatively of man, but it won’t be said of man at all. It is “just” that is said denominatively
of man. So that is what is called denominative; it gets its name from another, but in terms
of the nature, there are two natures involved there. One of those natures is adapted to the
other, and in order to do that, we change the name, so “just” in that sense is the denominative,
even though grammatically the word “just” might come before “justice”. But there is the nature
of justice, the nature of a virtue, there, which is going to have a name derived so that it can be
said of substance. The nature is something in itself before it is something you apply to another.
The key thing about denomination is that none of these accidents exists by itself. The word
“just”, in a way, is more true to accident than the word “justice”. So when he distinguishes the
nine genera of accidents, he uses the denominative names, because they are being
distinguished by the ways they are said of individual substance. And the abstract name is
not said of. As we were saying in the prologue, logic is concerned with the way something is
said of something or not said of something. Here, you’ve got something that can be said of
substance, and something that cannot be said of substance. “Justice” almost signifies the
accident as if it were a substance by itself, and “just” does not.
Let’s look at a few places where Thomas talks about denomination. In the Sentences in
Distinction 17 Question 1 Article 5 Ad2, he says

denomination is properly secundum habitudinem accidentis ad subiectum [according to

the relatedness of an accident to a subject]

In that text, he’s talking about the words “dilectum” and “dilectione” meaning loved and love.
You might say, isn’t the word “loved” derived from “love”? Thomas says that’s not what we
mean by denomination, because in talking about love and loved we are not talking about the
accident with respect to its subject, you’re talking about the object of the love. The loved is the
object of love. This is not what we mean by denomination, which is when we are talking about
an accident in relation to a subject.

A second text from Thomas is from the De Potentia Question 7 Article 10 Ad8. He says

45
 that from which something is denominated, it is not necessary that it always be a form
according to the nature of the thing. It suffices that it be signified by way of form [in the
mode of a form], grammatically speaking. For man is denominated from action and from
his clothing and from other things of this sort, which really are not forms.1

Notice the difference in what he’s saying. Let’s say I’m clothed, and let’s say I’m courageous.
Courage is like an accidental form in me, a habit or disposition. Is clothing really a form of me?
No. But grammatically, there is a certain similarity there. By my courage I’m said to be
courageous, and by my clothing I’m clothed. I’m denominated by my clothing and I’m
denominated by my courage. What are the examples Aristotle gives for denomination? From
what category are they taken? Quality. Is that by chance? No. There you have “forma secundum
rei naturam”, a form according to the nature of the thing, it actually is a form. But clothing is
not. So you could take clothing and clothed as an example, but it would not be the most perfect
example. We don’t speak as much of a man’s quantity or size as a form, do we? But we do
think of his virtue or his knowledge as form. That is most perfectly there in quality. Another
aspect of that is to say the others seem to denominate insofar as they are how in some respect.
How much? How tall? Or how in some other way, but simply or without qualification “how”
means quality. See how carefully he chooses?
There is always a reason why Aristotle picks the examples he does. When Thomas comments
on Aristotle’s examples, he always sees a reason for the example. In the second book of the
Physics, Aristotle talks about the maker, the mover, he gives the examples of the father and the
advisor. Thomas says there are two movers, reason and nature, and thus you have the advisor
and the father. Later on we find the examples of the doctor (from art, again) and the seed. So he
gives an example from reason and one from art, and two from nature. There is always a reason
why he chooses the examples he does.
Aristotle takes his examples of quality from the first species, not the third. Why does he do
that? Why doesn’t he take “red” or “white”, or something like that? Notice the examples he
takes: grammatikos, which is taken from an art or science, and courage. Why does he take
such examples? The others are more connected to the nature; some people are naturally
healthy, and white seems to be something by nature, but grammar is something I was born
without, and I had to acquire it, and likewise with virtue. So he picked things that we have to
acquire to some extent by our own efforts, which brings out the idea of denomination where
you have two different natures. One is being denominated from the other. I didn’t always
have grammar, I didn’t always have courage, so if I’m grammatical or if I’m courageous,
I’m certainly being denominated from something other than my very nature. See how he
chooses not only that species of quality, but perhaps even those within it that are more
obviously acquired? He wrote with extreme care.

Cf. ibid.:

But the other distinction, between accident and substance, where the accident exists in the
subject, but is not said of it, how is that going to be relevant? One genus is substance, and the
rest are going to be accidents. But is there something more subtle in addition to that, for which
this will be useful and, in fact, necessary? There’s a connection between this distinction
between “exists in a subject” and “does not exist in a subject” and what we had in chapter
one in the discussion of denominative names. The distinction between equivocal and univocal
names has more a connection with the distinction between what’s universal and what’s singular,
since the universal is being said univocally, although it’s limited to being said of its subject in

1
“Ad octavum dicendum est, quod illud a quo aliquid denominatur, non oportet quod sit semper forma
secundum rei naturam, sed sufficit quod significetur per modum formae, grammatice loquendo. Denominatur
enim homo ab actione et ab indumento, et ab aliis huiusmodi, quae realiter non sunt formae.” Cfr. the obj.:
“Praeterea, omnis denominatio est a forma. Forma autem est aliquid inhaerens ei cuius est. Cum ergo deus
nominetur a relationibus ad creaturam, videtur quod ipsae relationes aliquid sint in deo.”

46
 terms of what it is. But [the distinction between “exists in a subject” and “does not exist in a
subject” is connected more with] denominatives. An accident is something existing in a
subject, but it’s not that subject. But there is some reason to say something of the subject
because of this thing it has existing in it. I’ve got health existing in me or I’ve got sickness
existing in me, and so there’s reason to say something about me, because of this thing I’ve got
existing in me. But you can’t say it univocally of me in the sense of saying this is what I am,
“health”, or this is what I am, “sickness”. But you could say something important about me
denominatively. Instead of saying “health” of me (you can’t get away with that), you can say
“healthy” of me, or “sick”, “courageous” or “cowardly”, “virtuous” or “vicious”, “beautiful” or
“ugly”, or whatever. In other words, in order to see the importance of denominative
naming you have to understand the distinction between the accident and that in which it
exists, and how there is thus a foundation in things for saying something denominatively
of me such as “I’m healthy”, or “I’m white”, or “I’m logical” (perhaps). <...>

You see how these three things tie together? [We have just seen the connection between] the
third definition of Chapter 1, and “exists in a subject”. But then the key thing to note in Chapter
4, where he distinguishes the genera of accidents, is that the words he uses there are all
denominatives. Now later on, when you get into the chapter on quantity or quality, then you use
words like quantity or quality. And that’s not denominative. He’s already gotten through the
labor of distinguishing the genera of accidents. And once he gets to talking about quantity, he’s
thinking of quantity in comparison to its species, or he’s thinking of quality in comparison to its
species. And if he used the denominative there, he wouldn’t be using it as being said
denominatively. If he were thinking of “virtue”, say, as said of “courageous”, “moderate”, and
“just” and so on, he would still be thinking of it more as genus and species, since he is not now
interested in these things in comparison to substance (that’s the first thing to see) but more in
the order of the universal to the less universal below it and all the way down to those of us in the
lowest rank who are singular.

Any questions now about Chapter 2 and why it’s necessary for understanding the division of
Chapter 4? It is necessary to understand why he uses denominative words in making that
division. And it’s necessary to see the connection between denomination and what an accident
is.

Cf. Duane H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories (Cat.3):

But without getting into the order yet, apart from that, notice that he names the other nine by
what kind of word that we studied before? Denominatives. And there’s a reason why he does
that. The denominative word fits the nature of the accident which, as we know from Chapter 2,
exists in a subject. When you say “healthy”, as opposed to “health”, you bring out better
the accidental nature of the thing. My “health” seems to be something existing by itself,
the way it’s said. But “healthy” signifies something that exists in another, and implies
something else. So it’s important to note that he does that. But when he takes up these ten, he
may use not the denominative, say “how much” (which in Greek would have one word, poson),
he’ll just give the word for quantity. Instead of saying “how” he’ll say “howness”, instead of
“poios”, “poiotes”, he’ll give the abstract word, we’d say. Because then he’s no longer con-
cerned with seeing how these things are towards substance, but how they are toward the species
that come under them. You first distinguish them, as you’ll see when we get into the texts of
Thomas, you distinguish them by how they are said of individual substances. And Thomas will
go into that. But they’re not said of substance at all if you use the abstract name. See how
careful he is? So you should notice that difference.

47
Cf. Duane H. Berquist, The Categories. The Ante Predicaments: Things as Named:79

The third definition of Chapter One has a much different purpose than the first two. Things
are named denominatively so they can be said of another thing. We cannot say truly that
Socrates is virtue or justice and that a dog is health. But we can truly say that Socrates is
virtuous or just and that a dog is healthy. When Aristotle first distinguishes the nine
genera of accidents in the Fourth Chapter, he will speak denominatively. And this is
necessary, for as we shall see there, the ten genera are distinguished by how something
can be said of individual substances. And accidents can be said of individual substances
only denominatively. But when he orders genera and species of accidents under their
own highest genera, there is no need to speak denominatively. We can place courage,
moderation and justice as species under virtue and likewise we could place courageous,
moderate and just under virtuous. But only the latter could be said of Socrates.
What is denomination and what is it to be named denominatively? Perhaps the first thing
to be considered is the difference between logical and grammatical denomination or what
denomination means in these

two arts. And before this difference, there is another one as regards the nature of things or
what they are. In a text which Msgr. Dionne first called to my attention, Thomas Aquinas
pointed out a likeness of logic and natural philosophy in distinction from grammar. The
former are about the nature of things while the latter is more concerned with the words
themselves. In talking about passion or undergoing, the logician and the natural philosopher,
in distinction from the grammarian, consider undergoing as regards the nature of the thing.
Here is the text:

passio potest sumi dupliciter: vel quantum ad naturam rei prout logicus et naturalis
passionem considerat, et hoc modo non oportet omnem poenam passionem esse, sed
quamdam poenam, scilicet poenam sensus; vel quantum ad modum significandi, prout
grammaticus considerat, et sic illud passive dicitur quod a verbo passivo derivatur.2

As Albert the Great teaches us, logical denomination is not the derivation of one word from
another, but from the name of the nature itself. In the chapter on things named de-
nominatively, St. Albert distinguishes between denomination in grammar and in logic:

Quamvis secundum grammaticam justitia derivetur a justo, tamen secundum naturam et

rationem denominationis et denominati, a justitia formatur justus. Grammaticus enim
nominum modos et formas attendit: et quia in declinatione sic declinatur justus, justi,
addita tia fit justitia: ideo dicit justitiam formari vel derivari a justo: hoc enim modo
justum a justitia formari non potest. Natura autem denominationis e contrario est: quia
denominans est alienam naturam informans: et ideo nomen illius naturae praeintelligere
oportet.3

Albert explains that three things are necessary for denomination as the word is used in logic:

In denominatione ergo haec tria necessaria sunt, scilicet natura aliena, subjecto extrin-
secus aptata et circumposita, in principali et denominativo eadem res significata, et di-
versi modi significandi.4

79
(www.aristotle-aquinas.org/.../
02-categories/02-ante-predicaments/01-Things% 20as%20Named%20Ch.1.pdf [2/28/08])

48
 2
Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum, Dist XXXV, Q. 1, Art . 1, Ad 5
3
De Praedicamentis, Tractatus I, Caput IV, ed. Doyon, p. 14a
4
De Praedicamentis, Tractatus I, Caput IV, ed. Doyon, p. 14b

The “from something” of the definition touches upon the alien nature, the “differing in case”
or ending that they do not differ in their principal signification but in the mode of signifying
only, and the last part “are called according to the name” that the alien nature is brought to
the subject in some way.
Thomas states that denomination strictly speaking is according to how an accident is
toward a subject when explaining that the loved is not a denomination from love, but as its
object:

denominatio proprie est secundum habitudinem accidentis ad subjectum. Sic autem

dilectum non denominatur a dilectione, sed magis sicut objectum.5

Thus denomination is from what is like a form, but as Thomas explains elsewhere it does not
have to be really a form:

illud a quo aliquid denominatur, non oportet quod sit semper forma secundum rei
naturam, sed sufficit quod significetur per modum formae, grammatice loquendo. Deno-
minatur enim homo ab actione et ab indumento, et ab aliis huiusmodi, quae realiter non
sunt formae.6[80]

However, when the nine genera of accidents are signified denominatively in the Categories,
they signify only accidents for the reason Thomas gives when rejecting the position of Avi-
cenna. Consider this more at length.
What do names like colored and virtuous signify? And can they be placed in a category?
What is the difference in meaning between colored and color? (Or between virtuous and
virtue?) It is a mistake to think that color means the quality and colored the substance that
has this quality. Or that virtue means the quality and virtuous the substance that has the
quality. This is the error of Avicenna as Thomas explains:

Nec est verum quod Avicenna dicit, quod praedicata, quae sunt in generibus accidentis,
principaliter significant substantiam, et per posterius accidens, sicut hoc quod dico album
et musicum. Nam album ut in praedicamentis dicitur, solam qualitatem significat. Hoc
autem nomen album significat subiectum ex consequenti,
5
Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum, Dist XVII, Q. I, Art. V, Ad 2
6
De Potentia, q. 7, Art. 10, Ad 8

inquantum significat albedinem per modum accidentis. Unde oportet, quod ex con-
sequenti includat in sui ratione subiectum. Nam accidentis esse est inesse. Albedo enim
etsi significet accidens, non tamen per modum accidentis, sed per modum substantiae.
Unde nullo modo consignificat subiectum. Si enim principaliter significaret subiectum,
tunc praedicata accidentalia non ponerentur a Philosopho sub ente secundum se, sed sub

80
That is, something is called ‘loved’ (dilectum) by being the object of love (dilectio); but to be related to
something as its object is other than being an accident in a subject, by virtue of which relation a thing is truly
said to be denominated. Cf. Dr. Berquist’s explication in the text excerpted above. (B.A.M.)

49
 ente secundum accidens. Nam hoc totum, quod est homo albus, est ens secundum acci-
dens, ut dictum est.7

The difference between colored and color (or between virtuous and virtue) is thus not
in what they chiefly signify because they both signify the same quality. They differ in
that colored (or virtuous) signifies this accident per modum accidentis while color sig-
nifies this accident per modum substantiae (as does virtue). From the above text, it can
also be seen that colored is placed in a category. (If one examines the above text carefully,
one will also see that it confirms the position that the praedicatum which is the subject of the
Categories is a nomen or name.) If colored signified a substance with a color, it would be ac-
cidental being in the sense of the fifth book of Wisdom (Or Metaphysics). Accidental being
there does not mean accident as distinguished from substance, but accidental as distin-
guished from as such or per se. The distinction of being according to the figures of predi-
cation, the ten highest genera, is one of the two main distinctions of being as such or through
itself.
We have said that Chapter One contains three definitions while Chapter Two will contain
two divisions: the division of those said and the division of beings. This is also the way
Cajetan speaks in his commentary on the Categories.8 This seems correct because in Chapter
Two he begins with what is to be divided and then gives the division into parts. But since
division and distinction are before definition, is there some division or distinction implied in
the definitions of Chapter One? There seem to be two distinctions implied in Chapter
One. The three definitions do not correspond to one distinction or division. They are
not parts of one division.
7
In V Metaphysicorum, Lectio IX, n. 894
8
Cajetan, De Praedicamentis ed Doyon, p. 13B: “diffinitionibus tribus praeponendis iam
completis, divisiones inchoat.”
8

The first two definitions imply a distinction which can be made with one name or two
names. Things can have a name in common with or without the same definition of what it is
that is meant when that name is said of each of them. The baseball bat and the bat in the
belfry have the name bat in common, but the definition of what it is for each to be a bat is
not the same. The square and the oblong have in common the name quadrilateral and the
definition of what it is for each to be a quadrilateral is the same. In these examples, we used
two different names, bat and quadrilateral. But in Aristotle’s examples, one name, animal,
was used (but with different things having that name). But the third definition corresponds to
a distinction between two names, one of which in meaning is derived from the other. This is,
for example, the distinction between healthy and health or between virtuous and virtue or
between wise and wisdom or between good and goodness. In the first two examples, the
first word is derived from the second. But in the last two examples, the second word
seems to be derived from the first. However, as far as the meaning of these words is
concerned (and the logician is concerned with words only insofar as they mean some-
thing), the first word is derived from the second in all four examples. For to say that the
body is healthy means that it has health. And to say that Socrates is virtuous means that
Socrates has a virtue. And to say that Aristotle is wise means that he has wisdom. And to say
that someone is good means that they have goodness.

The distinction of these two names is important for the logic of the Categories, for the
logic of definition, for natural philosophy, and for theology; but in different ways. In the
logic of definition, there is a distinction between the definition of the concrete such as
healthy and the abstract such as health. The subject of an accident is found diversely in its
definition when the accident is taken in abstraction and concretely. The subject is a
difference when the abstract is defined. One might define health as the good condition of the

50
body. But if we defined healthy, body would be a genus. For the healthy is a body in good
condition. Thomas explains:

accidens dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo in abstracto; et sic consideratur secundum
propriam rationem; sic enim assignamus in accidentibus genus et speciem; et hoc modo
subiectum non ponitur in definitione accidentis ut

genus, sed ut differentia, ut cum dicitur: Simitas est curvitas nasi. Alio modo possunt
accipi in concreto; et sic accipiuntur secundum quod sunt unum per accidens cum sub-
iecto; unde sic non assignantur eis nec genus nec species, et ita verum est quod subiectum
ponitur in definitione accidentis ut genus.9

The natural philosopher wants to understand change. And following Heraclitus, Plato and
Aristotle, he discovers that change is between contraries. But when the natural philosopher
considers that change is between contraries, he sees an important difference between the
contraries health and sickness and the contraries healthy and sick. Health never becomes
sickness, or sickness, health. But the healthy can become sick, and the sick can become
healthy. For the healthy involves health and what has the health (the body) and the latter can
lose its health and become sick. Likewise, the sick signifies sickness in a body which can
lose that sickness and acquire the opposite health. Hence, in some way, at least by hap-
pening, if not as such, the healthy can be said to become sick, and the sick can become
healthy. The natural philosopher sees that if the body was its health, it could never become
sick. And if the body was its sickness, it could never become healthy. Thus change is be-
tween composed things, things composed of the pure contrary and its subject. The theologian
finds the limitation of our words and thoughts in speaking of God who is good and wise, but
altogether simple. Since God is completely simple, He is whatever He is said to have. When
we say that God is good and wise etc., we seem to admit in our way of speaking, some com-
position in Him. And to avoid this, we say that God is goodness itself and wisdom itself. But
when we say this, we seem to be saying that he is that by which something is good and wise
etc. rather than being good and wise Himself. Hence, we must also say that He is good, wise
etc. Neither way of speaking, derived from our understanding of material things (where form
and what has it are not the same) is adequate to speaking about God. But the logician in the
Categories considers this distinction because the abstract name cannot be said of sub-
stance, but the denominative can. And the genera of categories are distinguished by
how something can be said of individual substances. But when the logician considers a
genus of accidents by itself, he can use the abstract name of a genus or species.
9
De Veritate, Q. 3, Art. 7, Ad 2

10

Further, the logician in the Categories takes the denominative as signifying only the
accident per modum accidentis and not also its subject when he is distinguishing the ten
highest genera.
Aristotle in Chapter One, with marvelous brevity,10 shows the three ways things are
named that are relevant to the treatise of the Categories. Some of the Greek Commen-
tators at this point bring in other ways that things are named, But Aristotle (brevitati studens)
defines only those ways things are named that are necessary for understanding the Categor-
ies. As happens many times, three is enough.
To see fully the necessity of these three definitions for the Categories and their order re-
quires a long discourse. As one proceeds, one perceives that these three definitions are

51
necessary for the rest of the ante-predicaments and that the order in which they are given in
Chapter One corresponds somewhat to their use in the remaining ante-predicaments.
But before entering into this longer discourse, one can perhaps indicate briefly the ne-
cessity and order of these three definitions by comparison to the skopos or aim of the
Categories. We name things as we know them. But we know things in a confused way
before we know them distinctly. Hence, we first name things equivocally calling them
things or beings before we separate them under highest genera which involves naming
them univocally. And the names of the highest genera are also said univocally of what
is below them while things in some genera (the genera of things that exist in another
subject) are said denominatively of first substances. An understanding of things named
equivocally or of names said equivocally of many things is necessary for understanding
well the division or distinction of beings. Things such as substance and accident are
said to be equivocally, or being is said equivocally of substance and accident.

The division of those said is necessary for determining the skopos or the subject of the
Categories (those said without intertwining) and distinguishing it from the subject of the
Peri Hermeneias (something said with intertwining, the statement or enunciation). Substance
and accident can be said with or without intertwining.
10
“brevitati studens” to use the phrase of Thomas in his commentary on the Peri
Hermeneias, n. 53

11

The second definition of Chapter One is clearly relevant to the three rules of Chapter
Three. These rules are concerned with placing species under the highest genera and dividing
genera by appropriate differences so as to see how species and differences are ordered under
diverse highest genera. This is by an order of univocal predication and hence the second de-
finition of Chapter One is relevant here. The highest genera are said with one meaning of the
species below them and, if these species have species below them, they are also said uni-
vocally of them. Likewise, the differences are said univocally of the species below them.
The third definition of Chapter One, the definition of things named denominatively,
is necessary for understanding the division of the meaning or signification of those said
without intertwining according to ten highest genera or for distinguishing those ten
highest genera themselves. The reason for this is that accidents (which we already
know to exist in a subject, substance, from the division of beings) must be named deno-
minatively before they can be said of substance; and the highest genera can be
distinguished in logic only by the diverse ways they are said of first substances. Hence,
the nine genera of accidents must be named denominatively before they can be distin-
guished from substance and each other by the diverse ways they are said of first
substances. This is why when Aristotle distinguishes them in Chapter Four; he names them
denominatively, (but when he considers each genus of accident by itself, he may speak
univocally, but not denominatively.) <...>

12

<...>

By way of summary, we can give some questions and their answers. What is the reason for
the first two definitions? The logic of the first act of reason is ordered to knowing what
things are. Since we begin to know what things are by knowing their genus, we need to
know how to place things in their genus. Things are not placed in a genus (or species) inso-
far as they are named equivocally. Rather things are placed in a genus insofar as they are so
named univocally. Hence, we see the need

52
 11
Categories, Chapter 5, 3a 15 and 3a 33-3b 9
12
Bk. I, Ch. 32
13
In VII Metaphysicorum, Lectio II, nn. 1288-1289

13

for the first two definitions to find how things as named can or cannot be placed under some
genus. Why does he define things named equivocally before those named univocally? The
division of beings must come before the distinction of the genera of categories because the
latter will be distinguished by how something can be said of individual substances and the
latter is arrived at by the division of beings. Substance and accident are called being equi-
vocally. But things will be placed under one of the ten highest genera insofar as they are
named univocally.
What is the reason for the third definition? When he distinguishes the Categories, the
genera of accidents are named denominatively, but not when each genus is divided into its
species. Diverse genera of accidents are distinguished by diverse way of denominating sub-
stance. Hence, there is a need to speak of denomination in the ante-predicaments. Why is the
third definition last? In the division of beings, accident is not said denominatively. Accidents
are first said denominatively when the ten genera are distinguished. (emphasis added)

2. Some further observations on denominative naming.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIIa, q. 60, art. 4, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

To the first it must be said that each thing is principally denominated from that which
belongs to it first and through itself, but not through that which belongs to it through
another.81

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Pot., q. 7, art. 10, obj 8, ad 8 (tr. B.A.M.):

obj. 8. Further, every denomination is from a form. But a form is something inhering in
that to which it belongs. Since, then, God is named from relations to the creature, it seems
that the relations themselves are something in God.82

<…>

ad 8. To the eighth it must be said that that from which something is denominated need not
always be a form according to the nature of the thing [i.e. in reality], but it suffices that it be
signified in the manner of a form, grammatically speaking. For ‘man’ is denominated from
action and from clothing, as well as from other things of the sort, which in reality are not
forms.83

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 37, art. 2, c. (in part) (tr. English Dominican
Fathers):

81
ad primum ergo dicendum quod unumquodque praecipue denominatur et definitur secundum illud quod
convenit ei primo et per se, non autem per id quod convenit ei per aliud.
82
praeterea, omnis denominatio est a forma. forma autem est aliquid inhaerens ei cuius est. cum ergo deus
nominetur a relationibus ad creaturam, videtur quod ipsae relationes aliquid sint in deo....
83
ad octavum dicendum est, quod illud a quo aliquid denominatur, non oportet quod sit semper forma
secundum rei naturam, sed sufficit quod significetur per modum formae, grammatice loquendo. denominatur
enim homo ab actione et ab indumento, et ab aliis huiusmodi, quae realiter non sunt formae.

53
 To make the matter clear, we must consider that since a thing is commonly denominated
from its forms, as “white” from whiteness, and “man” from humanity; everything whence
anything is denominated, in this particular respect stands to that thing in the relation of form.
So when I say, “this man is clothed with a garment,” the ablative is to be construed as having
relation to the formal cause, although the garment is not the form. Now it may happen that a
thing may be denominated from that which proceeds from it, not only as an agent is from its
action, but also as from the term itself of the action—that is, the effect, when the effect itself
is included in the idea of the action. For we say that fire warms by heating, although heating
is not the heat which is the form of the fire, but is an action proceeding from the fire; and we
say that a tree flowers with the flower, although the flower is not the tree’s form, but is the
effect proceeding from the form. In this way, therefore, we must say that since in God “to
love” is taken in two ways, essentially and notionally, when it is taken essentially, it means
that the Father and the Son love each other not by the Holy Ghost, but by their essence.
Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 7): “Who dares to say that the Father loves neither
Himself, nor the Son, nor the Holy Ghost, except by the Holy Ghost?” The opinions first
quoted are to be taken in this sense. But when the term Love is taken in a notional sense it
means nothing else than “to spirate love”; just as to speak is to produce a word, and to flower
is to produce flowers. As therefore we say that a tree flowers by its flower, so do we say that
the Father, by the Word or the Son, speaks Himself, and His creatures; and that the Father
and the Son love each other and us, by the Holy Ghost, or by Love proceeding.84

Cf. Duane H. Berquist. Commentary on the Categories (Cat.4):

There is an interesting text of Thomas in this regard where he’s talking about, of all things,
creation, and certain things are mentioned explicitly, and others are not. The creation of time is
mentioned explicitly in the text that he’s commenting on, referring to, but not that of place. And
that’s an occasion for him to say that place is more intrinsic, and therefore there’s less need to
mention that as opposed to time. The text is from the commentary on the Sentences, II, D12 Q1
A5 Ad2:

Some accidents denominate that in which they are, as whiteness. And such are under-
stood to be created in the creation of their subjects [so there is no separate mention of
them], if they are about those things that follow upon the first being, as figure and quan-
tity and things of this sort.

Some things denominate also that in which they are not as in a subject, as place. For the
place of the containing body, in which place is as in a subject, is not the place of that
body, but is of the body contained. And time is the number of all motions, although first
of that in which it is as in a subject, namely the motion of the first mobile, by which other

84
Unde ad huius evidentiam, sciendum est quod, cum res communiter denominentur a suis formis, sicut
album ab albedine, et homo ab humanitate; omne illud a quo aliquid denominatur, quantum ad hoc habet
habitudinem formae. Ut si dicam, iste est indutus vestimento, iste ablativus construitur in habitudine causae
formalis, quamvis non sit forma. Contingit autem aliquid denominari per id quod ab ipso procedit, non solum
sicut agens actione; sed etiam sicut ipso termino actionis, qui est effectus, quando ipse effectus in intellectu
actionis includitur. Dicimus enim quod ignis est calefaciens calefactione, quamvis calefactio non sit calor,
qui est forma ignis, sed actio ab igne procedens, et dicimus quod arbor est florens floribus, quamvis flores
non sint forma arboris, sed quidam effectus ab ipsa procedentes. Secundum hoc ergo dicendum quod, cum
diligere in divinis dupliciter sumatur, essentialiter scilicet et notionaliter; secundum quod essentialiter
sumitur, sic pater et filius non diligunt se spiritu sancto, sed essentia sua. Unde Augustinus dicit, in XV de
Trin., quis audet dicere patrem nec se nec filium nec spiritum sanctum diligere nisi per spiritum sanctum? Et
secundum hoc procedunt primae opiniones. Secundum vero quod notionaliter sumitur, sic diligere nihil est
aliud quam spirare amorem; sicut dicere est producere verbum, et florere est producere flores. Sicut ergo
dicitur arbor florens floribus, ita dicitur pater dicens verbo vel filio, se et creaturam, et pater et filius
dicuntur diligentes spiritu sancto, vel amore procedente, et se et nos.

54
 things are numbered. Nevertheless there is another reason about time and about place, be-
cause place is the same by essence as the surface of the body containing. Time, however,
is not the same in number with any accident founded in a substance. And moreover, place
has its whole completion in the thing, but the definition of time is completed in some way
from the action of the soul numbering.

[You may recall that from the fourth book of the Physics, that you wouldn’t have time
fully without the numbering soul, because it is the number of the before and after in
motion, and these don’t exist together, so the soul has to take them together in order to
number, and that’s necessary to complete the definition of time. The key thing here now,
as far as the question of order is coming up next. From the two things before, he con-
cludes]

Whence it has more the aspect of something extrinsic than place does, and therefore one
more numbers it with the things created than place, or some other accident.1

Interesting. That might cast some light, too, on when he talks about place and time in the
category of quantity. But it also casts some light on why he puts where before when; it’s based
on something that is not as extrinsic as time.

Cf. Michael Augros, “Subjectivism and the Internal Principles of Knowing” (Thomas
Aquinas College Senior Thesis), Sec. 2, A Dialectical Critique of the Arguments for Sub-
jectivism:

[A subject is denominated from what is in it; for, as St. Thomas says, “every accident
denominates its proper subject”. (Ia Q77 A5.) For example,] ...Socrates is called “white”
from the whiteness that is in him. But Socrates is not called a horse when he thinks of a
horse; rather, he is called a thinker. And yet the horse is what Socrates knows. Therefore
what is known (the horse) and the thought are not “in” him in the same sense of the word,
since he is denominated from one and not the other.

3. On ‘thought’ in relation to denomination.

Note that observations such as the foregoing are indispensable for distinguishing a
thought from its object. Some commentators, mistakenly thinking Aristotle failed to do so,
understand the Stoics to have observed the distinction with their terminus technicus lekton.
We, however, believe Aristotle himself to have used that word for a thing which, being the
object of a thought, is ‘sayable’ before being ‘said’, a usage preserved in Diogenes Laertius
and the Suda, for which texts see Part II of this paper.

1
“ad secundum dicendum, quod accidentia quaedam denominant illud in quo sunt, sicut albedo; et talia
intelliguntur creata in creatione suorum subjectorum, si sunt de illis quae esse primum consequuntur, ut
figura et quantitas, et hujusmodi. quaedam autem denominant etiam illud in quo non sunt ut in subjecto, sicut
locus. non enim est locus corporis continentis in quo est ut in subjecto, sed corporis contenti: et tempus est
numerus omnium motuum, etsi primo ejus in quo est ut in subjecto, scilicet motus primi mobilis, per quem
omnes alii numerantur, ut in 10 metaph. dicitur. sed tamen alia est ratio de tempore et de loco: quia locus est
idem per essentiam quod superficies corporis locantis; tempus autem non est idem numero cum aliquo
accidente in substantia fundato: et praeterea locus totum complementum suum habet in re; sed temporis ratio
aliquo modo completur ex actione animae numerantis; unde magis habet rationem extrinseci quam locus; et
ideo potius connumeratur primo creatis quam locus, vel aliud aliquod accidens. et praecipue hoc factum puto
ad removendum antiquum errorem philosophorum, qui tempus posuerunt aeternum,praeter platonem, ut in 8
physic. dicitur.” [DS12QU1 AR5- RA2]

55
4. Definitions.

DENOMINATIVE. (1) (a) A name taken (or derived) from another name, but with
a change in ending; hence, (b) a name, taken (or derived) from the name of an accident
belonging to a subject, whose ending is changed so that it may be said of the subject; hence
(c) a name of an accident signifying in the manner of an accident.

Note that some denominations are extrinsic, as when we say ‘the wall is seen’,
others are not, as when we say Socrates is ‘white’ or ‘musical’.

5. Supplement: On a whole’s being denominated from the element which gives it form.

Cf. D. S. Margoliouth, The Poetics of Aristotle (London, 1911), pp. 25-26:

In 1461a 27 we are told that certain difficulties in the poets can be solved by “the usage of
ordinary language”; thus “people say a dilution is wine1, whence we get the half verse
“greaves of new-wrought tin.’” The reader will probably fail to see the connexion, whence
amateur emendations are suggested; but the teacher is expected to refer the student to the
discussions in the first book de Generatione on “molecular mixture”. There we are told why
a dilution is called wine; viz. because in certain mixtures one element counts as form and the
other as matter, and in such a case the whole is named after the element that gives form;
wine and water does the work of wine, and therefore is called wine [321b 1]. If, however, the
amount of wine be so small that the whole does the work of water, then it should be called
water [Cf. 328a 27]. The same, we are told in the last chapter, is what happens with tin and
copper; the tin counts as form and the copper as matter; for the tin colours the surface but
adds little or nothing to the bulk [328b 9]; and that which is at the top belongs to the form
[De Caelo 312a 12]. Tin and copper, therefore, in their molecular mixture come under the
rule which causes wine and water to be called wine; and the whole may on the same
principle be called tin. That the two mixtures to some extent follow the same rule is also
insisted on in the de Generatione Animalium [747b 4, 7]. Hence this matter, which is
obviously a puzzle to the outsider, is a commonplace to the Aristotelian. But it is only to the
Aristotelian that it will be intelligible; for it is based on the philosophy of form and matter,
and the doctrine that things are called after the work which they do [Meteorology 390a 12].2
1
The reading of B ton kekramenon is clearly right. O kekamenos is the Greek for “wine and
water”. Problems 874a 30.
2
and see In I Pol. text.

56
6. The principal point of doctrine to be understood from the foregoing.

As we hope to have shown by our remarks above, inasmuch as Aristotle’s concern

in the Categories is with ‘things said’, the Philosopher begins the work of logic by disting-
uishing the three ways in which things are said, while in his definitions of the first two he
describes their meaning or signification by the phrase “the account of the substance”. But,
as we have also pointed out, ‘substance’ here names the ‘what it is’ expressed by a name
rather than a ‘this something’, a point to which we shall return below. But we have also
noted a distinction to be observed in the meaning of ‘signification’:

the signification of a vocal sound

the thing of the name (res nominis), which is a pragma (which some call its denotation)
the account of the thing, which is either a definition or a description (which some call its
connotation)

7. On accidental predicates as being adjectival.

A. That names predicated denominatively are concrete adjectivally.

Cf. Ignotus Auctor, Summa Totius Logicae Aristotelis, tract. 2, cap. 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

But those things are said to be predicated denominatively which are concrete adjectivally,
and are denominated or derived from certain abstract accidents,85 as ‘white’ is predicated of
man and horse denominatively because ‘white’ is derived from this abstract thing which is
the whiteness which is in man, which, when taken in the abstract, cannot be predicated of
man; for, as was said above, no part can be predicated of the whole—for ‘whiteness’ is a
certain accidental part of a white man, and so it cannot be predicated of him. But what is
considered together with and is called ‘white’ is the same as ‘that (thing) having whiteness’;
and such a thing can be predicated of man.86

B. That predicates in the genera of accident do not signify substance principaliter and acci-
dent per posterius; rather, they signify accident principally and the subject ex consequenti.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 10 (tr. B.A.M.):

Nor is what Avicenna says true, that predicates in the genera of accident signify substance
principally and accident per posterius, as when I say ‘white’87 and ‘musical’. For ‘white’, as
it is said in the predicaments, signifies only a quality.

Now this name ‘white’ signifies the subject ex consequenti, insofar as it signifies whiteness
in the manner of an accident. And so it is necessary that it include the subject in its account

85
N.B. To say “...and are denominated and derived,” etc. seems strange, inasmuch is it is the things named
which are ‘denominated’, but it is the names themselves which are ‘derived’.
86
denominative vero dicuntur praedicari, quae concreta sunt adjective, et ab aliquibus accidentibus
abstractis denominantur seu derivantur: ut album de homine praedicatur, et de equo denominative: quia al-
bum derivatur ab hoc abstracto quae est albedo quae est in homine, quae sic in abstracto sumpta de homine
praedicari non posset: nulla enim pars, ut supra dictum est, potest de toto praedicari: albedo enim est quae-
dam pars accidentalis hominis albi, et sic de eo praedicari non posset. concernitur autem et dicitur album,
quod idem est quod habens albedinem: et tale potest de homine praedicari.
87
Or ‘the white’, or ‘the white thing’. In Latin, one may say album currit ‘the white runs’, whereas in Eng-
lish to speak so would sound strange (although we do say that ‘the just live by faith’, and the like).

57
 consequently. For the being of an accident is to be in. For ‘whiteness’, although it signify an
accident, nevertheless does not do so in the manner of an accident, but in the manner of a
substance. And so in no way does it consignify the subject [as does album]. For if it [sc.
album] were principally to signify the subject [rather than to consignify it, as has been
said],88 then Aristotle would not have placed accidental predicates under being according to
itself, but under being according to accident [sc. accidental being]. For this whole which is a
white man, is a being according to accident, as has been said.89

8. Summary of St. Thomas’ teaching on predicates in the genera of accident.

Predicates in the genera of accident, or accidental predicates, such as album, ‘(the)

white’, or musicum, ‘musical’, do not signify substance principaliter and accident per pos-
terius; rather, they signify accident principally and the subject ex consequenti. Now the
name album, ‘(the) white’, signifies only a quality (which is an accident), but it signifies
the subject ex consequenti, insofar as it signifies albedo or ‘whiteness’ in the manner of an
accident, the being of which is to inhere. But ‘whiteness’ itself, although it signify an acci-
dent, does not do so in the manner of an accident, but in the manner of a substance, for
which reason it in no way consignifies the subject.

‘white’ (album)

• signifies an accident principally and the subject consequently (for it signifies a

quality)
• signifies an accident in the manner of an accident, and hence consignifies its
subject
• an accidental predicate placed under being according to itself

‘whiteness’ (albedo)

• signifies an accident in the manner of a substance

• therefore in no way does it consignify the subject as does ‘white’

Note. As will be seen from texts to be cited below, in marked contrast to their lucid
treatment by St. Thomas Aquinas, representative accounts of connotative and denotative
names (as in J.S. Mill), as well as of substantive and adjectival names (as in certain Modis-
tae or speculative grammarians of the Middle Ages), exhibit great confusion.

88
It seems to me that the words I have added are necessary to complete the sense.
89
nec est verum quod avicenna dicit, quod praedicata, quae sunt in generibus accidentis, principaliter
significant substantiam, et per posterius accidens, sicut hoc quod dico album et musicum. nam album ut in
praedicamentis dicitur, solam qualitatem significat. hoc autem nomen album significat subiectum ex
consequenti, inquantum significat albedinem per modum accidentis. unde oportet, quod ex consequenti
includat in sui ratione subiectum. nam accidentis esse est inesse. albedo enim etsi significet accidens, non
tamen per modum accidentis, sed per modum substantiae. unde nullo modo consignificat subiectum. si enim
principaliter significaret subiectum, tunc praedicata accidentalia non ponerentur a philosopho sub ente
secundum se, sed sub ente secundum accidens. nam hoc totum, quod est homo albus, est ens secundum
accidens, ut dictum est.

58
9. Supplement: On being ‘supposed’ by a name and being ‘coupled’ by it.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Pot., q. 9, art. 4, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

And so in order to make this question clear, it must be understood that the proper ratio of
the name is what the name signifies, according to the Philosopher. But that to which a name
is attributed, if it be taken directly under the thing signified by the name, as the determined
under the undetermined, is said to be supposed by the name [dicitur supponi per nomen]; but
if it not be taken directly under the thing of the name, it is said to be coupled by the name
[dicitur copulari per nomen],90 just as the name ‘animal’ signifies animated sensible sub-
stance, and ‘white’ signifies a color which pierces the sight. But man is taken directly under
the ratio of animal, as the determined under the undetermined. For man is a sensible sub-
stance animated by such a soul, namely, rational; but he is not taken directly under ‘white’,
which is outside his essence. And so ‘man’ is supposed by the name ‘animal’, but is coupled
by the name ‘white’. And because the inferior which is supposed by the common name
stands to the common as the determined to undetermined: that which was supposed produces
the significatum by a determination placed next to the common: for ‘rational animal’ signi-
fies man.
But it must be understood that something signifies in two ways: in one way formally, and
in another way materially. Formally, in fact, is signified by the name, that for which the
name is principally imposed in order to signify, which is the ratio of [or ‘the account lying
behind’] the name, just as the name ‘man’ signifies something composed of a body and a
rational soul. But materially is signified by the name that by which such a ratio is preserved,
just as the name ‘man’ signifies something having a heart and a brain and parts of this sort,
without which there cannot be a body animated by a rational soul.91

Examples:

• statements: ‘Man is an animal.’ ‘Man is white.’

• definitions: ‘animal’ is ‘animated sensible substance’; ‘white’ is ‘a color which

pierces the sight’

‘Man’ is that to which the name ‘animal’ is attributed. But ‘man’ is also that to
which the name ‘white’ is attributed. Now ‘man’ is taken directly under ‘animal’, for
‘man’ is an ‘animated sensible substance’; but ‘man’ is taken indirectly under ‘white’; for
90
That is, they belong to separate categories. Cf. Robin Smith on the ‘transitivity’ of same-category predi-
cations.
91
…et ideo ad evidentiam huius quaestionis sciendum, quod propria ratio nominis est quam significat
nomen, secundum philosophum. id autem cui attribuitur nomen, si sit recte sumptum sub re significata per
nomen, sicut determinatum sub indeterminato, dicitur supponi per nomen; si autem non sit recte sumptum
sub re nominis, dicitur copulari per nomen; sicut hoc nomen animal significat substantiam animatam sensi-
bilem, et album significat colorem disgregativum visus: homo vero recte sumitur sub ratione animalis, sicut
determinatum sub indeterminato. est enim homo substantia animata sensibilis tali anima, scilicet rationali;
sub albo vero, quod est extra essentiam eius, non directe sumitur. unde homo supponitur nomine animalis,
copulatur vero nomine albi. et quia inferius quod supponitur per nomen commune, se habet ad commune
sicut determinatum ad indeterminatum: id quod erat suppositum, fit significatum, determinatione apposita ad
commune: animal enim rationale significat hominem. sed sciendum, quod aliquid significat dupliciter: uno
modo formaliter, et alio modo materialiter. formaliter quidem significatur per nomen ad id quod signi-
ficandum nomen est principaliter impositum, quod est ratio nominis; sicut hoc nomen homo significat aliquid
compositum ex corpore et anima rationali. materialiter vero significatur per nomen, illud in quo talis ratio
salvatur; sicut hoc nomen homo significat aliquid habens cor et cerebrum et huiusmodi partes, sine quibus
non potest esse corpus animatum anima rationali.

59
‘white’, which is ‘a color which pierces the sight’, is outside his essence—that is, it be-
longs to another category. Hence ‘man’ is said to be supposed by the name ‘animal’, but to
be coupled by the name ‘white’. To be ‘supposed’ by a term, then, means to be taken as
standing directly under that term; but to be ‘coupled’ by a term means to be taken under it
indirectly.

10. The meanings of suppositio and copulatio according to St. Thomas:

That to which a name is attributed, if it be taken directly under the thing signified
by the name, as the determined under the undetermined, is said to be supposed by the name
(dicitur supponi per nomen). Hence, the supposition of a name is that to which a name is
attributed when it is taken directly under the thing signified by the name, as the determined
under the undetermined. That to which a name is attributed, if it not be taken directly under
the thing of the name, is said to be coupled by the name (dicitur copulari per nomen).
Hence, the copulatio (or ‘coupling’) of a name is that to which a name is attributed when
it is not taken directly under the thing signified by the name, as belonging to another
category.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia q. 39. art. 5, ad 5 (tr. B.A.M.):

To the fifth it must be said that there is this difference between substantive and adjectival
names, since substantive names bear their own supposit, but adjectives do not, but rather
place the thing signified around a substantive. Whence the Sophists say that substantive
names ‘suppose’, but adjectives ‘couple’. Personal substantive names, therefore, can be
predicated of the essence by reason of an identity of the thing, nor does it follow that the
personal property determine a distinct essence; rather it is placed around the implied
substantive by the substantive name. But notional and personal adjectives cannot be predi-
cated of the essence unless adjoined to some substantive. Whence we cannot say ‘the
essence is generating’. Yet we can say that ‘the essence is a thing generating’, or ‘God gen-
erating’, if ‘thing’ and ‘God’ suppose [or ‘stand’] for the Person, but not if they suppose [or
‘stand’] for the essence. Whence there is no contradiction if it be said that ‘the essence is a
thing generating, and a thing not generating’, since by the first ‘thing’ is taken for the
Person, by the second, for the essence.92

• substantive names bear their own supposit, and hence are said to ‘suppose’
• but adjectives do not, and hence are said to ‘couple’

N.B. For a closely-related account of supposition from a work earlier than St. Thomas, cf.
the following excerpt from the Dialectica Monacensis (ca. 1200), of which I first give the
Latin as edited by De Rijk, followed by an English translation taken from the Internet.

92
Ad quintum dicendum quod haec est differentia inter nomina substantiva et adiectiva, quia nomina
substantiva ferunt suum suppositum, adiectiva vero non, sed rem significatam ponunt circa substantivum.
Unde sophistae dicunt quod nomina substantiva supponunt; adiectiva vero non supponunt, sed copulant.
Nomina igitur personalia substantiva possunt de essentia praedicari, propter identitatem rei, neque sequitur
quod proprietas personalis distinctam determinet essentiam; sed ponitur circa suppositum importatum per
nomen substantivum. Sed notionalia et personalia adiectiva non possunt praedicari de essentia, nisi aliquo
substantivo adiuncto. Unde non possumus dicere quod essentia est generans. Possumus tamen dicere quod
essentia est res generans, vel Deus generans, si res et Deus supponant pro persona, non autem si supponant
pro essentia. Unde non est contradictio, si dicatur quod essentia est res generans, et res non generans, quia
primo res tenetur pro persona, secundo pro essentia.

60
Dialectica Monacensis, VI De Dictione Significativa (In: L. M. De Rijk, Logica
Modernorum, Volume II Part 2 published by Koninklijke Van Gorcum & Company N.V.
Assen, The Netherlands, 1967, pp. 605-607).

VI DE DICTIONE SIGNIFICATIVA

De dictionum divisione

Dictionum alia significativa, alia consignificativa. Dictio signi- [f. 115vb] ficativa
est que per se et sine adiunctione alterius dictione significantis aliquid significat, ut hec
dictio ‘homo’. Consignificativa est illa que non [5] per se sed cum alia dictione significante
adiuncta aliquid significat, ut sunt prepositiones et coniunctiones et similiter hoc verbum
‘est’ secundum quod solam compositionem importat: sic enim infinitum est et finiri habet
per ea que componit.
Sciendum tamen quod predicta divisio dictionis eadem est cum [10] hac: dictionum
alia categoreumatica, alia sincategoreumatica. Categoreumatica idem est quod significans;
syncategoreumatica idem est quod consignificans. Et dicitur sincategoreumatica a ‘sin’,
quod est con, et ‘categoreumatica’, quod est significans; inde sincategoreumatica quasi
consignificativa.

De dictionum divisione
[15]

Relicto autem ad presens de dictione sincategoreumatica agendum est de dictione

categoreumatica, idest de dictione significativa. Cuius talis solet proponi divisio: dictionem
significativarum alia supponit, alia copulat. Supponit ut ‘homo’, et quodlibet nomen
substantivum [20] vel aliqua pars substantiva. Copulat, ut ‘albet’, et quodlibet adiectivum
manens adiectivum.

De termino

Sed quia eadem divisio solet fieri sic: terminorum alius supponit, alius copulat,
ideo ad horum intelligentiam videndum est quid sit [25] terminus. Dicitur autem terminus
proprie id quod terminat aliquid, ut punctus, instans, et similia. Punctus enim terminat
lineam, quia post punctum nil est de linea. Similiter instans est terminus diei, quia est [605-
606] instans nil magis est de die; et sic de aliis. Unumquodque istorum dicitur terminus a
terminendo sive finiendo; est enim idem terminare quod finire.

Sciendum autum quod dialectus subiectum et predicatum vocat terminos proprie eo

quod terminant propositionem. Sicut enim linea, [5] per se inperfecta est93 et infinita et
finiri habet per duo extrema et est finis eius ex una parte subiectum et predicatum. Et
notandum quod non solum sibiectum et predicatum dicuntur terminus a dialecto, sed etiam
quelibet dictiones que determinare habent habitudinem vel respectum aliquem in locutione.
Quales habitudines in- [10] portantur per verbum et prepositiones et coniunctiones. Ut
patet in hac:

‘ego video Sortem cum Platone’,

93
sc. propositio.

61
in qua hec dictio ‘Sortem’ non est subiectum nec predicatum; similiter hec dictio ‘Platone’.
Et tamen dicuntur termini quia terminant aliquas habitudines. Quod patet in eadem locuti-
one, in qua iste accusativus [15] ‘Sortem’ determinat habitudinem huius prepositionem
‘cum’. Ex hiis patet quod prepositiones et coniunctiones non possunt vere dici termini, qui
nil terminant, sed solum exigunt terminari. Et similiter hoc verbum ‘est’, secundum quod
solam compositionem importat. [20]

Quid sit supponere, quid copulare

Viso quid sit terminus, videndum est quid sit supponere et quid copulare. Sup-
ponere siquidem est substantive <rem> significare et per se et sine dependentia tali
que est in principali significatione. Copulare est adiective rem significare et in tali de-
pendentia que est de principali [25] significatione. Dicitur autem terminus ille sup-
ponere qui nullam dependentiam habet in principali sua significatione. Ut patet in hoc
termino ‘homo’, qui substantiam cum qualitate finite significat, que sunt de principali
significatione. Et similiter pateat de quolibet substantivo. Dicitur autem ille terminus
copulare qui dependentiam habet in principali [30] [f. 116ra] sua significatione. | Ut patet in
hac dictione ‘albus’, que significat qualitatem finite, substantiam vero infinite; unde depen-
dens est ad subiectum per quod suam finiat substantiam.

Ex hiis patet quod licet obliquus termini supponentis aliquam [606-607] habeat
dependentiam, tamen supponit, quia illa dependentia non est ex principali significatione,
sed consignificatione, scilicet ex casu. Ut patet, in hoc genitivo ‘hominis’, qui solum
dependens est ex modo significandi genitive propter quod exigit aliquam dictionem per
quam determinetur. [5] Patet etiam quod predicta divisio, scilicet terminorum alius
supponere, alius copulat, non debet habere medium, quia omnis terminus aut habet
dependentiam in principali significatione, aut non. Si non, tunc est supponens; si sic, tunc
est copulans.

Si autem queratur de hiis terminis ‘magister’, ‘miles’, ‘dux’, [10] ‘statua’ utrum
supponant aut copulant, dicendum est quod, si manent adiectiva, copulant tantum; si vero
substantiva, supponunt tantum, quia tunc nullam habent dependentiam. Notandum autem
quod huiusmodi termini quando substantivantur determinant circa suas substantias illarum
rerum species ad quas substantivantur. Unde hoc nomen [15] ‘magister’ determinant
humanitatem circa suam substantiam, per quam finit eam. Similiter hoc nomen ‘album’
cum substantiavatur determinant circa suam substantiam corporeitatem. Unde idem est
dicere: ‘album est’ quod ‘corpus album est’.

De hiis autem terminis: ‘res’, ‘ens’, ‘unum’ et similia, dicendum [20] quod substan-
tivantur ad res predicamentorum, scilicet ad substantiam, qualitatem, et ita de aliis, et hoc
secundum prius et posterius. Dicitur enim ens primo et principaliter de substantia,
secundario vero de qualitate, et de aliis, sicut ‘sanum’ dicitur de urina et de animali.

On Significant Words. A Selection from The Monacensis Dialectic

[A translation of the first third of section VI of Dialectica Monacensis (author anonymous)

Part (pages 605-616) of Item XI (pages 453-638) of L. M. De Rijk, Logica Modernorum,
Volume II Part 2 published by Koninklijke Van Gorcum & Company N.V. Assen, The

62
Netherlands, 1967. Draft by Calvin Normore, and Terry Parsons with suggestions by Steve
Barney July 1997] Version 2.0

Copyright (c) 1999 by the translators.

This translation is not in final form; it is made available for the convenience of readers.
The manuscript may be duplicated for noncommercial purposes only.

Origin of the Text:

De Rijk (Part 1 of Volume II, page 443) dates this text:

(410) ‘as early as the second half of the twelfth century,’
(414) ‘not later than the last decades of the twelfth century,’
and he cites some evidence that (411) ‘seems to point to the sixties or seventies of
the twelfth century.’

Translation Conventions:
[ . . . ] Square brackets contain material that is not explicitly present in the Latin text; this material is meant to be
read along with the rest of the text. It conveys information needed to render the English grammatical, or to clarify
some matter in keeping with the translators’ views about what is being said. Normal liberties are taken with most
of the text without being indicated by brackets, such as supplying definite and indefinite articles (which do not
exist in Latin); but these are often bracketed in quoted examples when exact syntax may be important. In the case
of ‘homo’ we occasionally use our square bracket convention backwards, translating it ‘[hu]man’ when English
grammar allows ‘man’ but ‘human’ is only marginally grammatical.

{ . . . } Curly brackets contain brief explanatory comments or translations or paraphrases. Material in them is not
meant to be read along with the text.

We have generally followed de Rijk’s punctuation, paragraphing, and use of quotation marks, but since very little
of this is present in the original manuscript we have felt free to make changes when they seemed natural to us.

This long work contains an introduction plus six sections:

Introduction

I. Syllogistic Argumentation
II. Universals
III. Kinds of Categories
IV. Topics
V. Sophistical Argumentation
VI. Significant Words
There follows a translation of a portion of the last section.

VI ON SIGNIFICANT WORDS

Concerning the Division of Words

Of words, some are significative, others consignificative. A significative word is one

which in itself and without the addition of another signifying word signifies something, as
this word ‘human’. A consignificative one is one which not through itself, but together
with another adjoined signifying word, signifies something, such as prepositions and

63
combining [words], and similarly the verb ‘is’ according as it only brings in composition:
for as such it is inspecific {infinitum}1 and it has to be specified {finiri} through those
things which it compounds.

It should be known however that the foregoing division of words is the same as this
one: of words, some are categorematic, others syncategorematic. Categorematic is the
same as signifying, and syncategorematic is the same as consignifying. And it is called syn-
categorematic from ‘syn’, which is, together with, and ‘categorematic’, which is signifying;
hence ‘syncategorematic’ as if significative-with {consignificativa}.

Concerning a Significative Word

However, leaving aside for the present the syncategorematic word, we should treat of the
categorematic word, that is, the significative word. Of this it is customary for a division of
this kind to be proposed: of significative words, some supposit and others combine {copu-
lat}. One supposits, like ‘human’ and any substantive name or some substantive part. An-
other combines, as ‘whiten’, and any adjective which persists as adjectival.2

Concerning a Term

But because the same division is customarily made thus: of terms, some supposit, others
combine, therefore, for understanding this it should be seen what a term is. Properly, ‘term’
is said to be that which terminates something, as a point, or an instant, and similar things.
For a point terminates a line, because after the point there is nothing of the line. Similarly,
an instant is the endpoint of a day, because after /606/ the instant there is nothing more of
the day, and thus in other cases. And any one of these is called a ‘term’ from terminating
or specifying, for it is the same to terminate as to specify.

It should be known, however, that the dialectician properly calls subjects and pre-
dicates terms, in that they terminate a sentence. For just as a line by itself is imperfect and
inspecific, and has to be specified through two extremes, the specification of it {the
sentence} on one side is the subject and on the other side the predicate. And it should be
noticed that not only are the subject and predicate called terms by the dialectician, but also
any words which have to bound {determinare} some condition or relation in speech. Such
conditions are brought in through the verb, and through prepositions and conjunctions. As
is evident in this: ‘I see Socrates with Plato’, in which this word ‘Socrates’ is neither sub-
ject nor predicate; similarly this word ‘Plato’.

However they are called terms because they terminate some conditions. This is
evident in the same locution in which the accusative ‘Socrates’ bounds the transitive fun-
ction of the verb ‘I see’; and the word ‘Plato’ bounds the condition of this preposition
‘with’. From these things it is evident that prepositions and conjunctions cannot truly be
called terms because they terminate nothing, but only require terminating. And similarly
this verb ‘is’, according as it brings in only composition.

What it is to Supposit, What to Combine

Having seen what a term is, it should be seen what it is to supposit and what to combine.
Indeed, to supposit is to signify a thing substantively, and through itself, and without

64
such a dependence as is in the principal signification. To combine is to signify a thing
adjectivally {adjoiningly}, and in such a dependence as is in its principal signification.
That term is said to supposit which has no dependence in its principal signification, as is
evident in this term ‘human’, which signifies specifically a substance together with a
quality, which are in its principal signification. And similarly it may be evident concerning
any substantive. That term is said to combine which has a dependence in its principal sig-
nification, as is evident in this word ‘white’, which signifies a quality specifically, but a
substance unspecifically; hence it is dependent on a subject through which it specifies the
substance.

From these things it is evident that although an oblique3 suppositing term may have
/607/ a dependence, nevertheless it supposits, because that dependence is not from its
principal signification, but from its consignification, namely from its [grammatical] case,
as is evident in the genitive, ‘of-a-human’, which has dependence only from the genitive
mode of signification, on account of which it requires some word through which it may be
determined.

It is evident also that the foregoing division (namely: of terms some supposit, some
combine) should not have an intermediate case, because every term either has a depen-
dence in its principal signification, or not. If not, then it is a suppositing [term]; if so, it is a
combining [term]. But if it be asked of these terms ‘teacher’, ‘soldier, ‘general’, ‘statue’,
whether they supposit or combine, it should be said that if they persist as adjectives 4 they
only combine, but if [they persist as] substantives, they only supposit, because they have
no dependence. It should be noted however that terms of this sort, when they are made
substantives, determine with respect to the substances of their things the species according
to which they are made substantives.5 Hence this name ‘teacher’ determines humanity with
respect to its substance, through which it specifies it. Similarly this term ‘white [thing]’,
when it is substantive, determines corporeity with respect to its substance. Hence it is the
same to say ‘a white [thing] is’ as ‘A white body is’.

However of these terms: ‘thing’, ‘being-, ‘one’ and similars, it should be said that
they are made substantive with respect to the categories, namely substance, quality, and so
on of the others, and this according to prior and posterior. For ‘being- is said primarily and
principally of substance, secondarily of quality, and so on for others, as ‘healthy- is said of
urine and of animals.[94]

Notes
1
Throughout this work we translate finitum and its cognates as ‘specific- and infinitum as ‘in-
specific’. A more orthodox translation would be ‘finished’, or ‘completed’, or, sometimes,
‘bounded’, but these fit only awkwardly with some of the passages below. There is no relation
suggested between this word and species.
2
In Latin, most adjectives can be used alone substantively, as if they were nouns; one can say ‘A
white runs- meaning that a white thing runs. Presumably an adjective -persists as adjectival’ when
it is not used as a noun in this way.
3
‘Oblique’ means any grammatical case other than nominative.
4
Although adjectives are regularly used as nouns in Latin, the reverse is not true; the words cited
here cannot be used grammatically as adjectives. We are not sure what the author has in mind.

94
N.B. The text continues with a division of supposition, for which, see the relevant Appendix.

65
5
We are quite uncertain about the translation of this sentence.

N.B. For St. Thomas Aquinas’ account of relative names like ‘teacher’ and ‘soldier’, see
further below.

66
11. On ‘connotative’ names.

Cf. William Minto, Logic, Inductive and Deductive (London, 1893), The Elements of
Propositions, note 1, pp. 46-48:

The whole denotation, etc., is the class; the whole connotation, etc., is the concept.1
1
It has been somewhat too hastily assumed on the authority of Mansel (Note to Aldrich, pp.
16, 17) that Mill inverted the scholastic tradition in his use of the word Connotative. Mansel
puts his statement doubtfully, and admits that there was some licence in the use of the word
Connotative, but holds that in Scholastic Logic an adjective was said to “signify primarily
the attribute, and to connote or signify secondarily (proshmai/nein)95 the subject of in-
hesion. The truth is that Mansel’s view was a theory of usage not a statement of actual usage,
and he had good reason for putting it doubtfully.
As a matter of fact, the history of the distinction follows the simple type of increasing
precision and complexity, and Mill was in strict accord with standard tradition. By the
Nominalist commentators on the Summulae of Petrus Hispanus certain names, adjectives
grammatically, are called Connotativa as opposed to Absoluta, simply because they have a
double function.96 White is connotative as signifying both a subject, such as Socrates, of
whom “whiteness” is an attribute, and an attribute “whiteness”: the names “Socrates” and
“whiteness” are Absolute, as having but a single signification. Occam himself speaks of the
subject as the primary signification, and the attribute as the secondary, because the answer to
“What is white?” is “Something informed with whiteness,” and the subject is in the
nominative case while the attribute is in an oblique case (Logic, part i. chap. x.). Later on we
find that Tataretus (Expositio in Summulas, A.D. 1501), while mentioning (Tract. Sept. De
Appellationibus) that it is a matter of dispute among Doctores whether a connotative name
connotat the subject or the attribute, is perfectly explicit in his own definition, “Terminus
connotativus est qui praeter illud pro quo supponit connotat aliquid adjacere vel non adjacere
rei pro qua supponit” (Tract. Sept. De Suppositionibus). And this remained the standard
usage as long as the distinction remained in logical text-books. We find it very clearly
expressed by Clichtoveus, a Nominalist, quoted as an authority by Guthutius [page 47] in his
Gymnasium Speculativum, Paris, 1607 (De Terminorum Cognitione, pp. 78-9). “Terminus
absolutus est, qui solum illud pro quo in propositione supponit, significat. Connotativus
autem, qui ultra idipsum, aliud importat.” Thus man and animal are absolute terms, which
simply stand for (supponunt pro) the things they signify. White is a connotative name,
because “it stands for (supponit pro) a subject in which it is an accident: and beyond this,
still signifies an accident, which is in that subject, and is expressed by an abstract name”.
Only Clichtoveus drops the verb connotat, perhaps as a disputable term, and says simply
ultra importat.
So in the Port Royal Logic (1662), from which possibly Mill took the distinction: “Les
noms qui signifient les choses comme modifiees, marquant premierement et directement la
chose, quoique plus confusement, et indirectement le mode, quoique plus distinctement, sont
appeles adjectifs ou connotatifs; comme rond, dur, juste, prudent” (part i. chap. ii.).
What Mill did was not to invert Scholastic usage but to revive the distinction, and extend
the word connotative to general names on the ground that they also imported the possession
of attributes. The word has been as fruitful of meticulous discussion as it was in the
Renaissance of Logic, though the ground has changed. The point of Mill’s innovation was,
premising that general names are not absolute but are applied in virtue of a meaning, to put
emphasis on this meaning as the cardinal consideration. What he called the connotation had

95
N.B. In the De Interpretatione Aristotle uses this word to mean ‘consignifies’, as the verb consignifies
time.
96
On this distinction, see the excerpt from John of St. Thomas below.

67
 dropped out of sight as not being required in the Syllogistic Forms. This was as it were the
point at which he put in his horn to toss the prevalent conception of Logic as Syllogistic.
The real drift of Mill’s innovation has been obscured by the fact that it was introduced
among the preliminaries of Syllogism, whereas its real usefulness and significance belongs
not to Syllogism in the strict sense but to Definition. He added to the confusion by trying to
devise forms of Syllogism based on connotation, and by discussing the Axiom of the
Syllogism from this point of view. For syllogistic purposes, as we shall see, Aristotle’s forms
are perfect, and his conception of the proposition [page 48] in extension the only correct
conception. Whether the centre of gravity in Consistency Logic should not be shifted back
from Syllogism to Definition, the latter being the true centre of consistency, is another
question. The tendency of Mill’s polemic was to make this change. And possibly the secret
of the support it has recently received from Mr. Bradley and Mr. Bosanquet is that they,
following Hegel, are moving in the same direction.
In effect, Mill’s doctrine of Connotation helped to fix a conception of the general name
first dimly suggested by Aristotle when he recognised that names of genera and species
signify Quality, in showing what sort a thing is. Occam carried this a step farther towards
clear light by including among Connotative Terms such general names as “monk,” names of
classes that at once suggest a definite attribute. The third step was made by Mill in extending
the term Connotation to such words as “man,” “horse,” the Infimae Species of the School-
men, the Species of modern science.
Whether connotation was the best term to use for this purpose, rather than extension, may
be questioned: but at least it was in the line of tradition through Occam.

Cf. E.D. Buckner, “Joseph on Ockham on Connotation”:97

The following passage is from An Introduction to Logic (pp 140-2)98 by the Oxford logician
H.W.B. Joseph, where he explains the origin, as he sees it, of the scholastic distinction be-
tween connotative and non-connotative terms. He says that the distinction is found in
Ockham, and he characterises it in two ways.

1. A term is connotative when we can suppose that it does not apply to the individual thing
that in fact it does apply to.99 We can suppose that this piece of paper, though white, could
have been a different colour, and so its whiteness is not a necessary part of my notion of the
paper. ‘White’ is therefore connotative: it denotes two things, white paper, primarily, being
white, secondarily. By contrast, given that John is a man, we cannot abstract being a man
from him, or he disappears too. Thus ‘man’ is not connotative. It denotes only John, Jim,
Joseph &c.

2. A connotative term is either adjectival, or a relational word like ‘father’, or a noun from
which an adjective can be formed like ‘pedant’ (for example, pedant – pedantic, circle –
circular, Englishman – English).

Neither of these definitions appears explicitly in the passages of Ockham that he mentions,
from chapter 10 of part I of the Summa Logicae (all quotations from which he apparently
took from a secondary source, Geschichte der Logik by the German historian Carl Prantl).
Ockham does not say that what is signified by a non-connotative term is logically or
psychologically inseparable from the subject of which it is truly predicated. Nor does he say
that connotative terms are essentially adjectival in meaning. (He considers ‘body’ to be a
connotative name, for example).

97
(http://uk.geocities.com/frege@btinternet.com/connotation/josephconnote.htm [3/14/08])
98
In my edition, the excerpt comes from pages 156-158, and I have edited Buckner’s text accordingly.
99
This is most inaptly worded.

68
 This may have influenced Prior, who frequently refers to Joseph’s writing. Prior says (The
Doctrine of Propositions and Terms, p. 57, that and adjective is never, in its meaning,
complete in itself – there is always an implied reference to something qualified, and
mentions the medieval distinction between ‘absolute’ and ‘connotative’ term. Again, this is
not entirely accurate. Ockham considers ‘body’ to be connotative.
The comment that Mill misunderstood the scholastic distinction is not entirely fair. See
here [omitted].

[H.W.B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic (Oxford, 1916), Ch. VI, Intension and Extension
of Terms, pp. 156-158.]

[For the sake of the curious, a few words may be added on the history of the term
‘connotative’. In William of Occam a distinction is found between absolute and connotative
terms. Absolute terms have not different primary and secondary significations; ‘nomen
autem connotativum est illud, quod significat aliquid primario et aliquid secundario’. He
gives as instances relative names (for father signifies a man, and a certain relation between
him and another): names expressing quantity (since there must be something which has the
quantity): and certain other words: v. Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, Abs. xix. Anm. 831, vol.
iii. p. 364. Johannes Buridanus said that some terms connote nothing beyond what they stand
for (‘nihil connotantes ultra ea, pro quibus supponunt’); but ‘omnis terminus connotans
aliud ab eo, pro quo supponit, dicitur appellativus et appellat illud quod connotat per
modum adiacentis ei, pro quo supponit’. [N1] Thus meus and teus stand for something
which is mine or yours; but they connote or signify further and ‘appellant me et te tanquam
adiacentes’ (id. ib. xx. 111, vol iv. p. 30). In the same way elsewhere we are told that
‘rationale’ ‘connotat formam substantialem hominis’ (xx. 232, vol. iv. p. 63: cf. Anm. 459,
p. 109). Album and agens are given elsewhere by Occam (ib. xix. 917, vol. iii. p. 386) as
examples respectively of connotative and relative terms; and it is explained (ib. Anm. 918)
that a connotative or relative term is one which cannot be defined without reference to one
thing primarily and secondarily another; thus the meaning of album is expressed by ‘aliquid
habens albedinem’; and when by any term anything ‘connotatur vel consignificatur, pro quo
tamen talis terminus supponere non potest, quid de tali non verificatur [N2]’ such a term is
connotative or relative. Thus a term was called connotative if it stood for (‘supponit pro’)
one thing, but signified as well (‘connotat’) something else about it; as Archbishop Whately
says (Logic II. c. v. ~1, ed. 9, p. 122), ‘it “connotes”, i.e. “notes along with” the object [or
implies], something considered as its attribute therein’. The Archbishop suggests the term
attributive as its equivalent; and though connotative terms were not all of them adjectives,
since relative terms also connote, and so do terms like ‘mischief-maker’ or ‘pedant’, which
though adjectival in meaning are substantives in form, yet adjectives are the principal class
of connotative terms, in the original sense of that word.
Connotation and denotation were thus originally not opposed to each other, and the terms
were by no means equivalent (as they have come to be treated as being) to intension and
extension. And James Mill, who probably by his remarks upon the word connote had some
influence in directing his son’s attention to it, says that ‘white, in the phrase white horse,
denotes two things, the colour, and the horse; but it denotes the colour primarily, the horse
secondarily. We shall find it very convenient to say, therefore, that it notes the primary,
connotes the secondary, signification’. (Analysis of the Human Mind, vol. i. p. 34, ed. [157-
158] 1869.) By the schoolmen it would commonly have been said to connote the colour, and
the primary signification was that ‘pro quo supponit’. J.S. Mill, in a note to p. 299 of the
same volume, objects to his father’s inversion of the usage. But he himself, by extending the
term connotative to cover what the schoolmen called absolute, and opposed to connotative,
names, introduced a complete alteration into its meaning. John and man are both absolute
names in Occam’s sense. Man, no doubt, according to some (though not according to a
nominalist like Occam) may stand for either an individual or an universal; for an individual

69
 when I say ‘this man’, for an universal or species when I say that man is mortal. (Occam
would have said that in the latter case it stood for all the individuals). But even when I say
‘this man’, meaning John, the name man does not denote two things, man and John; for John
is a man; and if I abstract from that, John disappears too; I have no notion of John as
something with which I can proceed to combine in thought another thing, viz. man. With
white it is different; I have a notion of paper, and a notion of whiteness, and whiteness is no
necessary part of my notion of paper; and so with any other subject of which whiteness is
only an attribute and not the essence. Hence the name white may be said to denote two
things, the colour, and that which is so coloured; for these can be conceived each without the
other, as John and man cannot. James Mill, who thought that objects were ‘clusters of ideas’,
and that we gave names sometimes to clusters (in which case the names were concrete) and
sometimes to a particular idea out of a cluster (in which case they were abstract), could also
say that white, when predicated of this paper, denoted two things – the whiteness, and the
cluster not including whiteness which I call paper. But John only denotes one thing – the
cluster of ideas which make John; and man only one thing, the cluster of ideas common to
John and Peter. J.S. Mill, however, distinguished what is common to John and Peter from
John or Peter, and said not indeed that man denoted two things, but that it denoted one and
connoted the other. But if he had been asked what John, the subject, was as distinct from
man, his attribute, he would either have had to say that he was not something different from
man, any more than slowness is something different from a fault, though fault was also held
by him to denote one thing and to connote another; or that John was just the uncharacterised
substance, in which those attributes inhered, the unknown subject; or else that he was what
remained of the concrete individual when his humanity had been left out of his nature. None
of these answers would be very satisfactory. Again, coloured is connotative, in the original
meaning of that word, because it is predicable, say of a horse, and to be a horse is something
else than to be coloured; in J.S. Mill’s usage, because it is predicable of brown, though to be
brown is to be coloured. Mill treats as two, when he opposes a term’s denotation to its
connotation, things like John and man, brown and colour, whereof the latter is simply the
universal realised in the former, and the former nothing without the latter: as well as things
like horse and colour, which are conceptually two. Originally, only a name that was
predicated of something thus conceptually distinct thing from the attribute implied by
predicating it was called connotative; and it is only where there are thus conceptually two
things, together indicated by the name, that the word connotative has any appropriateness.
(Cf. also on the history of the word Connotative a note in Minto’s Logic, p. 46).]

[N1] i.e. to use J.S. Mill’s terms, it denotes ‘id pro quo supponit’, and connotes ‘id quod
appellat’. For appellatio cf. Prantl, vol. III. xvii. 59 (‘proprietas secundum quam
significatum termini potest dici de aliquo mediante hoc verbo est’. Cf. ib. xix 875.
[N2] Occam means that, e.g. snow can be referred to as album, but not as albedo.

N.B. The reader will note that, as indicated by the foregoing witnesses, the use of the term
‘connotes’ in certain authors in the later Scholastic tradition departs significantly from the
perfectly logical and unproblematic account of accidental predicates found in St. Thomas
Aquinas, an account which, as we have seen, is made in terms of what is signified princi-
paliter and what ex consequenti: the former being the accident itself, the latter, the subject
in which the accident inheres. Now, since the ‘con-’ in ‘connote’ means ‘with’, if one
wishes to employ the term ‘connotes’ in this regard, the word could be used logically and
defensibly in the same way as ‘consignifies’, and hence for the latter principle only, so that
the meaning would be that a name for an accident not only signifies the accident itself, but
also ‘imports’, or ‘brings with it’, the subject in which that accident exists, which is to ad-
ditionally signify the subject. Of course, the fact that St. Thomas speaks of a substantive as
‘bearing’ its supposit may be thought to undermine my argument, since one could take

70
‘connotes’ to mean the very same thing, but in its defense I would merely point out that my
claim is founded on a manner of speaking that is more in keeping with the way in which
such words are customarily used, in the light of which it seems to me that, just as to speak
of what ‘consignifies’ something when this is taken to mean ‘what signifies something ex
consequenti’ is perfectly logical, so, too, the same sensibility requires that what something
is said to ‘connote’ be other than the principal thing signified. Hence to apply a term like
‘connotes’ to what is signified principally rather than to what is signified ex consequenti
can only lead to confusion. It also goes without saying that the practice of a thinker like
Buridan, who is found using the term ‘connotes’ for both the principal and consequent
things signified, rather than for just one—even if it is the wrong one—is even less
defensible; such an unnecessary multiplication of terms being the sort of thing bringing
Scholasticism into disrepute.

12. Peter of Spain on the twofold composition of the noun.

Cf. Peter of Spain, Tractatus Syncategorematum (ap. Peter of Spain, Tractatus Syncate-
gorematum and Selected Anonymous Treatises. Translated by Joseph P. Mullaley, Ph.D, p.
19):

Therefore one must note that the composition of a noun is twofold. One is the composition
of an essential quality with a substance, as in the case of a substantive noun, as “man” has
for its object the reality under humanity. There the reality is a substance and humanity is a
quality of it. The other is the composition of an accidental quality with a substance, as exists
in the case of adjectival names; for example, “white” signifies an accident in relation to an
indefinite substance which is contained in such a noun as a substance and the accident as a
quality. And in each composition of a quality with a substance, the quality is compounded
with a substance without an intermediate because of a tendency which it has toward the sub-
stance, as every form and every accident are naturally united in that in which they are. For if
such a composition be other than and distinct from the quality and from the substance, it
would be united with them, and, therefore, without an intermediate. And then for the same
reason it will have to be determined in the first way or through an intermediate. However,
one should ask about that intermediate through which it would be united with the extremes.
The process then would be infinite unless something were naturally united with another.

N.B. Notice how Peter’s account, like that of St. Thomas cited above, is perfectly clear and
logical, avoiding any occasion for confusion.

71
13. Martin of Denmark on substantives and adjectives with respect to their modes of
signifying.

Cf. Martin of Denmark (d. 1304), Tractatus de Modis Significandi (tr. B.A.M.):

CAPUT XVIII CHAPTER XVIII

De modo significandi per se stantis et adia- On the mode of signifying of standing by itself
centis. and (the mode) of the adjacent.

37. Viso quomodo modus significandi per
modum communis dividitur in modum per se
stantis et in modum adiacentis, consequenter de
utroque illorum specialiter videamus, et primo
de modo per se stantis, postea de modo adia-
centis.
37. Having seen how the mode of signifying
through the mode of the common is divided into
the mode of standing by itself and the mode of
the adjacent, consequently let us see about both
of them in particular, and first about the mode
of standing by itself, and afterward about the
mode of the adjacent.

38. Iuxta primum notandum quod res extra non 38. With respect to the first it is to be noted that
est ens per alterum nec ens in altero, sed modum the thing outside is neither a being through
essendi per se stantis sive fixi habet. another, nor a being in another, but it has the
mode of standing by itself or of having been
fixed.

Nam realiter loquendo nulla res habet esse per For speaking according to the reality of the case,
alterum sive in altero nisi accidens, quod pro- nothing has being through another or in another
prie dicitur disposito rei. except an accident, which properly means the
disposition of a thing.

Ab hoc autem modo essendi acceptus est modus Now from this mode of being is taken the mode
significandi per se stantis qui facit nomen sub- of signifying of standing by itself, which makes
stantivum. the substantive noun.

Significat enim nomen substantivum per For the substantive noun signifies through the
modum per se stantis. mode of standing by itself.

39. Iuxta secundum notandum quod nulla res est
quae alteri adiacet sive ad alteram dependet,
praeter quasdam dispositiones sive accidentia
rerum quae non habent esse per se, sed in altero,
quia habent naturalem dependentiam sive incli-
nationem ad res, cuiusmodi sunt album et
nigrum et similia.
39. With respect to the second it is to be noted
that there is nothing which is adjacent to another
or depends upon another besides certain dispo-
sitions or accidents of things which do not have
being by themselves, but in another, because
they have a natural dependence on or inclination
to the thing, of which sort are ‘white’ and
‘black’ and the like.

Habent enim huiusmodi accidentia talem pro- For accidents of this sort have a certain property
prietatem sive modum essendi, scilicet modum or mode of being, namely, the mode of the
adiacentis sive modum ut esse in altero. adjacent, or the mode as being in another.

Et a tali proprietate sive a tali modo essendi in And from such a property or from such a mode
re acceptus est modus significandi per modum of being in the thing is taken the mode of
adiacentis alteri vel <ut> esse in altero, signifying through the mode of the adjacent to
another, or <as> being in another,

72
et hic modus significandi est qui facit nomen and this mode of signifying makes the adjectival
adiectivum, scilicet modus adiacentis alteri sive noun, namely, the mode of the adjacent to
modus ut esse in altero. another, or the mode as being in another.

40. Sed nota quod aliquid esse in altero est 40. But note that something <can>100 be in
duobus modis: another in two ways:

vel prout essentialiter habet esse distinctum either according as it essentially has being dis-
contra subiectum, et sic est nomen abstractum ut tinct from the subject, and thus there is the ab-
albedo. stract noun like ‘whiteness’.

Et omne tale secundum grammaticum est
nomen substantivum et secundum loycum
huiusmodi ponuntur in genere. Et nota quod
abstrahere nihil aliud est quam aliquid contra
alterum distinctim accipere.
And every such thing according to the gram-
marian is a substantive noun, and according to
the logician such (names) are placed in a genus.
And note that ‘to abstract’ is nothing other than
to take something distinctly from another.

41. Alio modo potest aliquid esse in altero, non
ut essentialiter contra ipsum distinctum est, sed
prout accidentaliter facit unum cum subiecto, et
hoc modo est concretum sive adiectivum secun-
dum grammaticum.
41. In another way something can be in another
not as essentially distinct from it, but according
as it accidentally makes one thing with the sub-
ject, and in this way there is the concrete or
adjective according to the grammarian.

42. Incidenter nota quod duplex est concretum: 42. In passing note that the concrete is twofold:

quoddam est quod essentialiter concernit sua there is a certain one which relates to its sup-
supposita ut homo, equus et similia. posits essentially, like ‘man’, ‘horse’, and the
like.

Homo enim hoc modo concretionis concernit For ‘man’ in this mode of concretion relates to
omnia sua supposita ut Socratem, Platonem et its supposits like ‘Socrates’, ‘Plato’, and the
cetera. rest.

Et generaliter omne superius concernit inferius And generally every superior relates to its in-
hoc modo concretionis. feriors in this mode of concretion.

Quod autem talia concreta sint, patet; But that such things are concrete is clear:

nam bene dicitur Socrates est homo, Plato est for it is well said (that) ‘Socrates is a man’, or
homo, sed non bene dicitur Socrates est ‘Plato is a man’, but it is not well said (that)
humanitas. ‘Socrates is humanity’.

Unde talia concreta semper habent poni in And so such concrete things must be placed in a
genere, quia huiusmodi concreta non respiciunt genus because concrete things of this sort do not
nisi res sui generis. regard anything except their own genus.

43. Aliud est concretum, quod accidentaliter
respicit suum subiectum vel quod semper
respicit res alterius generis, ut album, niger et
generaliter omnia accidentia concreta.
43. The other is the concrete thing which re-
gards its subject accidentally, or which always
regards a thing belonging to another genus, like
‘white’, ‘black’, and generally all the concrete
accidents.

100
Reading potest aliquid esse, which is how the text expresses the second way of esse in in n. 41 below.

73
Primus modus concretionis nihil differt a According to the grammarian, the first mode of
nomine substantivo secundum grammaticum. concretion in no way differs from the substan-
tive noun.

Et secundus modus concretionis est idem cum And the second mode of concretion is the same
nomine adiectivo. as the adjectival noun.

44. Unde ista nomina pater, magister, dominus 44. And so these names ‘father’, ‘teacher’,
et similia adiectiva sunt sive concreta, quia ‘lord’ and the like are adjectives101 or concrete
accidentaliter faciunt unum cum subiecto things because they accidentally make one thing
with their subject,

et habent se per modum adiacentis alteri and they have themselves through the mode of
respectu subiecti determinati sexus. the adjacent to another with respect to a subject
of determinate gender.

Patet ergo quod nomen substantivum significat
per modum per se stantis; nomen vero adiec-
tivum per modum adiacentis sive per modum
concretionis quod idem est.
It is clear, then, that the substantive noun signi-
fies through the mode of standing by itself; but
the adjectival noun through the mode of the
adjacent, or through the mode of concretion,
which amounts to the same thing.

Nam concretum et adiectivum idem sunt, et For the concrete and the adjective are the same
substantivum et abstractum idem sunt. thing, and the substantive and the abstract are
the same thing.

Patet etiam cum hoc quod modi significandi no-
minis substantivi et adiectivi modo significandi
essentiali generali nominis non repugnant, quia
nomen substantivum significat per modum per
se stantis ut ipsum est per se quiescens,
It is also clear that the modes of signifying of
the substantive noun and of the adjective are not
repugnant to the general essential mode of signi-
fying of the noun because the substantive noun
signifies through the mode of standing by itself
as it is resting by itself,

nomen vero adiectivum significat per modum but the adjectival noun signifies through the
adiacentis ut ipsum est quiescens in altero et ita mode of the adjacent as it is resting in another,
utrumque significat per modum quietis. and so both signify through the mode of rest.

14. Thomas of Erfurt on the nomen adjectivum as signifying through the mode of inhering
in another according to being.

Cf. Thomas of Erfurt, De Modis Significandi, sive Grammatica Speculativa (ante 1310),
cap. x (tr. B.A.M.):

CAPUT X CHAPTER X

De modis significandi subalternis minus gener- On the less general subalternate mode of signi-
alibus Nominis communis. fying of the common Noun.

[6. Modus adjacentis unde sumatur.] [6. Whence the mode of the adjacent is taken.]

101
For the character of such names according to St. Thomas, see on relatives further below.

74
Modus significandi per modum adjacentis sumi- The mode of signifying through the mode of the
tur a proprietate rei, quae est proprietas alteri adjacent is taken from the property of a thing
adhaerentis secundum esse. which is the property of adhering to another
according to being.

Sicut enim modus generalissimus Verbi sumitur For just as the most general mode of the Verb is
a proprietate ipsius esse absolute, ut postea pate- taken from its property of being absolutely, as
bit, will be shown hereafter,

sic modus adjacentis in [N]omine sumitur a pro- so the mode of the adjacent in the Noun is taken
prietate ipsius esse, inhaerentis alteri secundum from its property of being, of inhering in an-
esse: et hic modus constituit Nomen adjectivum. other according to being: and this mode con-
stitutes the adjectival Noun.

Nomen ergo adjectivum significat per modum Therefore the adjectival Noun signifies through
inhaerentis alteri secundum esse, ut Albus, the mode of inhering in another according to
lapideus, etc. being, like ‘White’, ‘stoney’, etc.

[7. Instantia.] [7. Objection.]

Et si instetur, nomina differentiarum in genere And if it be objected that names of the differ-
substantiae, sicut corporeum, et animatum, ences in the genus of substance, like ‘bodily’,
sensible, rationale, adjectiva quidem sunt, and ‘animate’, ‘sensible’, ‘rational’, are in fact
adjectives,

congrue enim substantivis adjunguntur, dicendo for they fittingly are joined to substantives, as
corpus animatum, animale rationale, when one says ‘animate body’, ‘rational ani-
mal’,

et tamen non significant per modum inhaerentis still they do not signify through the mode of
alteri secundum esse; quia significant substan- inhering in another according to being because
tiam, quae secundum esse alteri non inhaerent. they signify substance, which does not inhere in
another according to being.

[8. Solutio.] [8. Solution.]

Dicendum, quod hujusmodi nomina sunt It must be said that nouns of this sort are sub-
substantiva, quia significant substantiam, et stantives because they signify substance, and
probatur; it is proved;

nam idem significat rationale quod homo: et for ‘rational’ signifies the same thing as ‘man’,
animatum quod animal, et cum dicitur quod and ‘animate’ as animal, and when it is said that
congrue cum substantivis conjunguntur, dicendo they are fittingly joined to substantives when
animale rationale, corpus animatum; one says ‘rational animal’, ‘animate body’,

dicendum quod ibi est constructio appositoria, et it must be said that there one has an appository
est incongrua de se, construction, and of itself it is ungrammatical,

tamen per appositionem admissitiva, hoc est, still it is admissible through apposition; that is,
propter specificationem specificandam. because the specification is to be specified.

75
15. On Thomas of Erfurt’s account of the adjectival name.

Unless properly qualified, to say, as Thomas the Modist does, that “‘rational’ sig-
nifies the same thing as ‘man’”, is seriously misleading.102 ‘Rational’ does not signify the
same thing as ‘man’—at least not tout court—since the latter’s definition includes
‘rational’ as its species-making difference, so that that word’s signification is only a part
and not the whole of the definition of man. In sum, one must see that ‘rational’ signifies a
property of man, which is used as the differentia in man’s definition, and hence signifies
only a part of his substance, whereas ‘man’ signifies the genus ‘animal’ in addition to the
difference ‘rational’, and hence signifies the whole substance. Further, such names do sig-
nify in the manner of an accident—that is, as inhering: As with other adjectival names,
while signifying the subject, they do so ex consequenti, and through the mode of inhering:
‘white’, for instance, signifies ‘a thing having whiteness’. Similar criticisms could be
directed at the other examples Thomas cites. Consequently, by calling them ‘substantives’
and accounting for them by bringing in apposition, Thomas is very wide of the mark and
so must be corrected. Further, his statement that “they do not signify through the mode of
inhering in another according to being” betrays a stunning lack of understanding of the in-
dependence a mode of signifying may have from the mode of its ‘thing’, as with an
accident signified in the manner of a substance, thereby vitiating his entire argument.

16. Supplement: St. Thomas Aquinas on relative names: That some relatives are imposed
in order to signify the relative habitudes themselves, and these are called relativa secun-
dum esse; but some are imposed in order to signify the things which certain habitudes fol-
low upon, and these are called relativa secundum dici.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 30, q. 1, art. 2, c. (tr, B.A.M.):

DS30QU1 AR2- CO

…aliquando enim nomen imponitur ad signifi- …For sometimes a name is imposed in order to
candum ipsam habitudinem; sicut hoc nomen signify the relationship itself, just as the name
dominus, et hujusmodi, quae sunt relativa ‘Lord’, and the like, which are relatives secun-
secundum esse, dum esse [according to being],

et alia dicta de deo, sunt quidem relativa, quia and other things said of God which are in fact
etiam significant ex primo suo intellectu habi- relatives, since they also signify from their first
tudinem quae secundum rationem est in deo; understanding a relationship which is in God
according to reason—

sed ex consequenti faciunt intellectum essentiae, but subsequently produce an understanding of

secundum quod talis habitudo fundatur in aliquo the essence according as such a relationship is
essentiali. founded on something essential.

aliquando autem nomen imponitur ad signifi-
candum illud supra quod fundatur habitudo,
sicut hoc nomen scientia, qualitatem, quam con-
sequitur respectus quidam ad scibile.
But sometimes a name is imposed in order to
signify that upon which a relationship is foun-
ded, just as the name ‘knowledge’, a quality
upon which follows a certain respect to a know-
able thing.

102
Cf. St. Thomas on the way in which the genus and difference are taken from the matter and form.

76
unde ista talia non sunt relativa secundum esse; And so these sorts of things are not relatives
sed solum secundum dici. secundum esse [according to being], but only
secundum dici [according to being said].

unde ista principaliter dant intelligere rem And so these principally give us to understand a
alterius praedicamenti, et ex consequenti impor- thing belonging to another predicament [cate-
tant relationem. gory], and subsequently imply a relation.

ita etiam in divinis; ut patet in hoc nomine
creator, quod imponitur ad significandum divi-
nam actionem, quae est ipsius essentiae, quam
consequitur habitudo quaedam ad creaturam:
So also in the divine, as is clear in the name
‘Creator’, which is imposed in order to signify
the divine action, which belongs to the essence,
upon which follows a certain relationship to the
creature.

et ista principaliter essentiam significant, et ex And these things principally signify the essence,
consequenti important respectum ad crea- and subsequently imply a respect to the
turam…. creature….

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 7, obj. 1, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

QU13 AR7 AG1

ad septimum sic proceditur. To the seventh one proceeds as follows.

videtur quod nomina quae important relationem It seems that names which imply a relation to
ad creaturas, non dicantur de deo ex tempore. creatures are not said of God from time [or
‘temporally’].

omnia enim huiusmodi nomina significant divi- For every name of this sort signifies the divine
nam substantiam, ut communiter dicitur. substance, as is commonly said.

unde et ambrosius dicit quod hoc nomen And for this reason Ambrose says that the name
dominus est nomen potestatis, quae est divina ‘Lord’ is the name of a power, which is the
substantia, et creator significat dei actionem, divine substance, and ‘Creator’ signifies the
quae est eius essentia. action of God, which is His essence.

sed divina substantia non est temporalis, sed But the divine substance is not temporal, but
aeterna. eternal.

ergo huiusmodi nomina non dicuntur de deo ex Therefore, names of this sort are not said of God
tempore, sed ab aeterno. from time, but from eternity.

QU13 AR7 RA1

ad primum ergo dicendum quod relativa
quaedam sunt imposita ad significandum ipsas
habitudines relativas, ut dominus, servus, pater
et filius, et huiusmodi, et haec dicuntur relativa
secundum esse.
To the first, then, it must be said that certain
relatives are imposed in order to signify the
relative habitudes [or ‘relationships’] them-
selves, like ‘Lord’, ‘servant’, ‘father’, and ‘son’,
and the like, and these are called relatives
secundum esse [according to being].

77
quaedam vero sunt imposita ad significandas res
quas consequuntur quaedam habitudines, sicut
movens et motum, caput et capitatum, et alia
huiusmodi, quae dicuntur relativa secundum
dici.
But some are imposed in order to signify the
things upon which certain habitudes [or
relationships] follow, like ‘mover’ and ‘the
thing moved’, ‘head’ and ‘the thing having the
head’, and others of the sort, which are called
relatives secundum dici [according to being
said].

sic igitur et circa nomina divina haec differentia In this way, then, this difference is also to be
est consideranda. taken into consideration in the case of the divine
names.

nam quaedam significant ipsam habitudinem ad For certain ones signify the very relationship to
creaturam, ut dominus. the creature, like ‘Lord’.

et huiusmodi non significant substantiam And names of this sort do not signify the divine
divinam directe, sed indirecte, inquantum substance directly, but indirectly, insofar as they
praesupponunt ipsam, sicut dominium presuppose it, just as ‘lordship’ presupposes
praesupponit potestatem, quae est divina power, which is the divine substance.
substantia.

quaedam vero significant directe essentiam
divinam, et ex consequenti important
habitudinem; sicut salvator, creator, et
huiusmodi, significant actionem dei, quae est
eius essentia.
But some signify the divine essence directly,
and imply the relationship subsequently, just as
‘Savior’, ‘Creator’, and the like, signify the
action of God, which is His essence.

utraque tamen nomina ex tempore de deo Still, both names are said of God from time [ or
dicuntur quantum ad habitudinem quam ‘temporally’] with respect to the relationship
important, vel principaliter vel consequenter, which they imply, whether principally or
subsequently,

non autem quantum ad hoc quod significant but not with respect to the fact that they signify
essentiam, vel directe vel indirecte. the essence, whether directly or indirectly.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Potentia, q. 27, art. 1, ad 11 (tr. B.A.M.):

QU7AR10RA11

ad undecimum dicendum, quod distinctio ista To the eleventh it must be said that this
relativorum secundum esse et secundum dici, distinction between relatives secundum esse and
nihil facit ad hoc quod sit relatio realis. secundum dici has nothing to do with what is a
real relation.

quaedam enim sunt relativa secundum esse quae For some things are relatives secundum esse
non sunt realia, sicut dextrum et sinistrum in which are not real, like right and left in a
columna; column;

et quaedam sunt relativa secundum dici, quae and some are relatives secundum dici which
tamen important relationes reales, sicut patet de nevertheless imply real relations, as is clear in
scientia et sensu. knowledge and sensation.

dicuntur enim relativa secundum esse, quando For they are called relatives secundum esse

78
nomina sunt imposita ad significandas ipsas when the names are imposed in order to signify
relationes; the relations themselves;

relativa vero secundum dici, quando nomina but relatives secundum dici when the names are
sunt imposita ad significandas qualitates vel imposed in order to signify qualities or prin-
aliquid huiusmodi principaliter, ad quae tamen cipally something of the sort which relations
consequuntur relationes. follow upon.

nec quantum ad hoc differt, utrum sint Nor do they differ according to whether they are
relationes reales vel rationis tantum. real relations or [relations] of reason only.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp de Veritate, q. 21, art. 6, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

QU21AR6 CO

responsio. dicendum, quod ratio boni in tribus In reply it must be said that the account of the
praedictis consistit, secundum quod augustinus good consists in the three things mentioned
dicit. [namely, species, mode, and order], as Augus-
tine says.

ad huius autem evidentiam sciendum est, quod To see that this is so, it must be understood that
aliquod nomen potest respectum importare some name may imply a respect in two ways.
dupliciter.

uno modo sic quod nomen imponatur ad In one way such that the name is imposed in
significandum ipsum respectum, sicut hoc order to signify the respect itself, as does the
nomen pater, vel filius, aut paternitas ipsa. name ‘father’, or ‘son’, or ‘fatherhood’ itself.

quaedam vero nomina dicuntur importare
respectum, quia significant rem alicuius generis,
quam comitatur respectus, quamvis nomen non
sit impositum ad ipsum respectum significan-
dum;
But some names are said to imply a respect be-
cause they signify a thing belonging to some
genus upon which a respect follows, albeit the
name is not imposed in order to signify the
respect itself,

sicut hoc nomen scientia est impositum ad just as the name ‘knowledge’ has been imposed
significandum qualitatem quamdam, quam se- in order to signify a certain quality upon which
quitur quidam respectus, non autem ad signifi- a certain respect follows, but not in order to sig-
candum respectum ipsum. nify the respect itself.

et per hunc modum ratio boni respectum
implicat: non quia ipsum nomen boni significet
ipsum respectum solum, sed quia significat id
ad quod sequitur respectus, cum respectu ip-
so….
And in this way the account of the good implies
a respect: not because the very name of ‘good’
signifies the respect itself alone, but because it
signifies that upon which a respect follows,
together with the respect itself….

17. Relative names in sum.

• names relativa secundum esse are “imposed in order to signify the relative habi-
tudes themselves, like ‘Lord’, ‘servant’, ‘father’, and ‘son’”, which “sort do not sig-
nify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, insofar as they presuppose it, just
as ‘lordship’ presupposes power, which is the divine substance”

79
• names relativa secundum dici are “imposed in order to signify that upon which a
relationship is founded, just as the name ‘knowledge’, a quality upon which follows
a certain respect to a knowable thing”; hence “some signify the divine essence dir-
ectly, and imply the relationship subsequently, just as ‘Savior’, ‘Creator’...”

80
IV. ON SIGNIFICATION IN RELATION TO SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT.

1. That ‘accident’ is said in two ways.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Veritate, q. 3, art. 7, ad 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

‘Accident’ can be taken in two ways. In one way in the abstract; and thus it is considered
according to its proper notion;103 for thus we assign genus and species to accidents; and in
this way the subject is not placed in the definition of an accident as genus, but as difference,
as when it is said, Snubness is a curvature of the nose. In another way they can be taken in
the concrete; and thus they are taken according as they are one per accidens with a subject;
whence in this way genus and species are not assigned to them, and so it is true that the
subject is placed in the definition of an accident as its genus.104 [I.e. Snub is a curved nose.]

In sum:

accident
taken in the abstract: ‘snubness’ (the subject is placed in its definition as a difference)
taken in the concrete: ‘snub’ (the subject is placed in its definition as its genus)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Physic., lect. 1, n. 2 (tr. Richard J. Blackwell et. al.):

2. It must be understood, therefore, that there are some things whose existence depends upon
matter, and which cannot be defined without matter. Further there are other things which,
even though they cannot exist except in sensible matter, have no sensible matter in their
definitions. And these differ from each other as the curved differs from the snub. For the
snub exists in sensible matter, and it is necessary that sensible matter fall in its definition, for
the snub is a curved nose. And the same is true of all natural things, such as man and stone.
But sensible matter does not fall in the definition of the curved, even though the curved
cannot exist except in sensible matter. And this is true of all the mathematicals, such as
numbers, magnitudes and figures. Then, there are still other things which do not depend
upon matter either according to their existence or according to their definitions. And this is
either because they never exist in matter, such as God and the other separated substances, or
because they do not universally exist in matter, such as substance, potency and act, and
being itself.105

103
“For the being of an accident is to be in” (nam accidentis esse est inesse.) (St. Thomas Aquinas, In V
Meta., lect. 9, n. 10, tr. B.A.M.).
104
accidens dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo in abstracto; et sic consideratur secundum propriam
rationem; sic enim assignamus in accidentibus genus et speciem; et hoc modo subiectum non ponitur in
definitione accidentis ut genus, sed ut differentia, ut cum dicitur: Simitas est curvitas nasi. Alio modo possunt
accipi in concreto; et sic accipiuntur secundum quod sunt unum per accidens cum subiecto; unde sic non
assignantur eis nec genus nec species, et ita verum est quod subiectum ponitur in definitione accidentis ut
genus.
105
sciendum est igitur quod quaedam sunt quorum esse dependet a materia, nec sine materia definiri
possunt: quaedam vero sunt quae licet esse non possint nisi in materia sensibili, in eorum tamen definitione
materia sensibilis non cadit. et haec differunt ad invicem sicut curvum et simum. nam simum est in materia
sensibili, et necesse est quod in eius definitione cadat materia sensibilis, est enim simum nasus curvus; et
talia sunt omnia naturalia, ut homo, lapis: curvum vero, licet esse non possit nisi in materia sensibili, tamen
in eius definitione materia sensibilis non cadit; et talia sunt omnia mathematica, ut numeri, magnitudines et
figurae. quaedam vero sunt quae non dependent a materia nec secundum esse nec secundum rationem; vel
quia nunquam sunt in materia, ut deus et aliae substantiae separatae; vel quia non universaliter sunt in
materia, ut substantia, potentia et actus, et ipsum ens.

81
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 53, art. 2 (tr. English Dominican
Fathers):

Reply to Objection 3: No matter how we take an accident, its very notion implies
dependence on a subject, but in different ways. For if we take an accident in the abstract, it
implies relation to a subject, which relation begins in the accident and terminates in the
subject: for “whiteness is that whereby a thing is white.” Accordingly in defining an acci-
dent in the abstract, we do not put the subject as though it were the first part of the de-
finition, viz. the genus; but we give it the second place, which is that of the difference;
thus we say that “simitas” [‘snubness’] is “a curvature of the nose.” But if we take
accidents in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates in the concrete, the
relation begins in the subject and terminates at the accident: for “a white thing” is
“something that has whiteness.” Accordingly in defining this kind of accident, we place
the subject as the genus, which is the first part of a definition; for we say that a
“simum” is a “snub-nose.” [i.e. ‘Snub is a curved nose’] Accordingly whatever is befitting
an accident on the part of the subject, but is not of the very essence of the accident, is
ascribed to that accident, not in the abstract, but in the concrete. Such are increase and
decrease in certain accidents: wherefore to be more or less white is not ascribed to whiteness
but to a white thing. The same applies to habits and other qualities; save that certain habits
and other qualities; save that certain habits increase or diminish by a kind of addition, as we
have already clearly explained (Q[52], A[2]).106

Cf. Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas, translated by John P.

Rowan (Chicago, 1961), Book VII, lect. 11, n. 1532:

1532. For the substance, of which matter is not a part, “is the specifying principle,” i.e.,
the form, which is present in matter; and from this form and matter “the whole
substance” is derived, i.e., made determinate and defined; for example, concavity is a
form of this kind, for from this and from nose snub nose and snubness are derived. And in
the same way man and humanity are derived from soul and body. For if nose, which plays
the part of matter, were part of curvature, then when curved nose is referred to, the term nose
would be expressed twice; for it is expressed once by its own name, and it is included again
in the definition of the curved. However, this would be the case if nose were placed in the
definition of the curved as part of the essence of curvature, and not by addition, as was stated
above (624:C 1472). And even though matter is not present in the essence of form, it is
nevertheless present in the whole composite substance; for example, curvature is present in
snub nose, and individual matter is also present in Callias.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima translated by Kenelm Fos-
ter, O.P. & Sylvester Humphries, O.P. (New Haven, 1951), Bk. II, lect. 1, n. 3:

106
ad tertium dicendum quod, quocumque modo significetur accidens, habet dependentiam ad subiectum
secundum suam rationem, aliter tamen et aliter. nam accidens significatum in abstracto, importat
habitudinem ad subiectum quae incipit ab accidente, et terminatur ad subiectum, nam albedo dicitur qua
aliquid est album. et ideo in definitione accidentis abstracti non ponitur subiectum quasi prima pars
definitionis, quae est genus; sed quasi secunda, quae est differentia; dicimus enim quod simitas est curvitas
nasi. sed in concretis incipit habitudo a subiecto, et terminatur ad accidens, dicitur enim album quod habet
albedinem. propter quod in definitione huiusmodi accidentis ponitur subiectum tanquam genus, quod est
prima pars definitionis, dicimus enim quod simum est nasus curvus. sic igitur id quod convenit accidentibus
ex parte subiecti, non autem ex ipsa ratione accidentis, non attribuitur accidenti in abstracto, sed in
concreto. et huiusmodi est intensio et remissio in quibusdam accidentibus, unde albedo non dicitur magis et
minus, sed album. et eadem ratio est in habitibus et aliis qualitatibus, nisi quod quidam habitus augentur vel
diminuuntur per quandam additionem, ut ex supradictis patet.

82
 § 213. It should be noted here that, according to the teaching of Book VII of the
Metaphysics, there is this difference between defining substance and defining accidents that
in the former case nothing extrinsic is included: every substance is defined in terms
merely of its material and formal principles; but in the latter case something extrinsic
to the thing defined is referred to, i.e. the subject of the accidents in question—as when
one defines snubness as ‘curvature of the nose’. The reason is that a definition must
express what a thing is, and while substance is something complete in its being and kind,
accidents have being only in relation to a substance. In the same way no form as such is
complete in kind; completeness in this sense belongs only to the substance composed of
form and matter; so that the latter’s definition is complete without reference to anything else,
whilst that of the form has to include a reference to its proper subject which is matter. Hence,
if the soul is a form its definition will not be complete without reference to its subject or
matter.107

Cf. Aristotle: On Interpretation. Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan. Translated from
the Latin with an Introduction by Jean T. Oesterle. Milwaukee, 1962, lect. 4, n. 5:

5. It should be noted, however, that while it is true that artificial things are in the genus of
substance on the part of matter, they are in the genus of accident on the part of form, since
the forms of artificial things are accidents. A name, therefore, signifies an accidental form
made concrete in a subject. Now the subject must be posited in the definition of every
accident; hence, when names signify an accident in the abstract the accident has to be
posited directly (i.e., in the nominative case) as a quasi-genus in their definition and the
subject posited obliquely (i.e., in an oblique case such as the genitive, dative, or
accusative) as a quasi-difference; as for example, when we define snubness as curved-
ness of the nose. But when names signify an accident in the concrete, the matter or sub-
ject has to be posited in their definition as a quasi-genus and the accident as a quasi-
difference, as when we say that a snub nose is a curved nose. Accordingly, if the names
of artificial things signify accidental forms as made concrete in natural subjects, then it is
more appropriate to posit the natural thing in their definition as a quasi-genus. We would
say, therefore, that a salver is shaped wood, and likewise, that a name is a significant vocal
sound. It would be another matter if names of artificial things were taken as signifying
artificial forms in the abstract.108

107
sciendum autem est, quod sicut docet philosophus in septimo metaphysicae, haec est differentia inter
definitionem substantiae et accidentis, quod in definitione substantiae nihil ponitur quod sit extra
substantiam definiti: definitur enim unaquaeque substantia per sua principia materialia vel formalia. in
definitione autem accidentis ponitur aliquid quod est extra essentiam definiti, scilicet subiectum; oportet
enim subiectum poni in definitione accidentis. sicut cum dicitur simitas est curvitas nasi. et hoc ideo est, quia
definitio significat quod quid est res; substantia autem est quid completum in suo esse et in sua specie;
accidens autem non habet esse completum, sed dependens a substantia. similiter etiam nulla forma est quid
completum in specie, sed complementum speciei competit substantiae compositae. unde substantia composita
sic definitur, quod in eius definitione non ponitur aliquid quod sit extra essentiam eius. in omni autem
definitione formae ponitur aliquid, quod est extra essentiam formae, scilicet proprium subiectum eius sive
materia. unde, cum anima sit forma, oportet quod in definitione eius ponatur materia sive subiectum eius.
108
sed dicendum quod artificialia sunt quidem in genere substantiae ex parte materiae, in genere autem
accidentium ex parte formae: nam formae artificialium accidentia sunt. nomen ergo significat formam
accidentalem ut concretam subiecto. cum autem in definitione omnium accidentium oporteat poni subiectum,
necesse est quod, si qua nomina accidens in abstracto significant quod in eorum definitione ponatur accidens
in recto, quasi genus, subiectum autem in obliquo, quasi differentia; ut cum dicitur, simitas est curvitas nasi.
si qua vero nomina accidens significant in concreto, in eorum definitione ponitur materia, vel subiectum,
quasi genus, et accidens, quasi differentia; ut cum dicitur, simum est nasus curvus. si igitur nomina rerum
artificialium significant formas accidentales, ut concretas subiectis naturalibus, convenientius est, ut in
eorum definitione ponatur res naturalis quasi genus, ut dicamus quod scutella est lignum figuratum, et
similiter quod nomen est vox significativa. secus autem esset, si nomina artificialium acciperentur, quasi

83
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, cap. 7 (In: Aquinas on Being and Essence, tr.
Gyula Klima).109

We should know, however, that in the case of accidents, genus, species, and difference are
taken in a different manner from the case of substances. For in the case of substances, from
the substantial form and matter conjoined in one nature, there results something that is one
per se, which properly falls into the category of substance;77 therefore, in the case of sub-
stances, their concrete names, which signify the composite, are properly said to be in
this category as species and genera, as are the names “man” and “animal.” But matter
and form are not in this way in this category, except by reduction, as principles are said to be
in a category.110
77
I am following here Roland-Gosselin’s reading, noted by Boyer in his n. 122, according to
which it is the thing that is per se one (and not its nature, as Boyer’s reading would have it),
that properly falls into the category of substance. To be sure, the nature of a substance is also
in the category of substance, insofar as it is signified by all substantial predicates of the
thing. But those predicates are predicated of the thing, and not of its nature, although they
are predicated of the thing on account of its having this nature signified by these predicates.

However, from an accident and its subject there does not result something that is one
per se, whence they are not conjoined in one nature to which the intention of genus or
species could be attributed. Therefore, the concrete names of accidents, such as “white
[thing]” [album] or “educated [person]” [musicum], do not fall under the categories as
species and genera, except by reduction, only insofar as [the species and genera of accidents]
are signified by the corresponding abstract names, such as “whiteness” [albedo] and “edu-
cation” [musica]. And since accidents are not composed of matter and form, their genus
cannot be taken from their matter and their difference from their form, as is the case
with composite substances, but their first genus has to be taken from their mode of ex-
istence [modus essendi], insofar as “being” is predicated in different, primary and
secondary, senses in the ten categories, as for example quantity is said to be [a being]
insofar as it is a measure of substance [i.e., of what is a being in the primary sense], and
quality [is said to be a being] insofar as it is a disposition of substance, and so on, as the
Philosopher explained in Book 4 of the Metaphysics.78
78
Aristotle, Metaph., 4, c. 2, 1002b5–7; Commentary of St. Thomas, lc. 1. Cf. also In Meta.,
Bk. 5, lc. 9.

Their differences, on the other hand, are taken from the diversity of the principles causing
them. And since its proper attributes are caused by the proper principles of the subject,
in the definition of an accident defined in the abstract form (in the form in which it is
properly in a category), in the place of the difference one has to include its subject, as
for example, pugness is defined as the curvature of a nose. But it would have to be the
other way around if it were defined in the concrete form. For in that case their subject
is included in their definition as their genus; since then they would be defined similarly

significantia ipsas formas artificiales in abstracto. For the difference between abstract and concrete names,
see further below.
109
(www.fordham.edu/gsas/phil/klima/Blackwell-proofs/MP_C30.pdf [2/28/08]).
110
sciendum est etiam quod in accidentibus alio modo sumitur genus, differentia et species quam in
substantiis. quia enim in substantiis ex forma substantiali et materia efficitur per se unum una quadam
natura ex earum coniunctione resultante, quae proprie in praedicamento substantiae collocatur, ideo in
substantiis nomina concreta, quae compositum significant, proprie in genere esse dicuntur sicut species vel
genera, ut homo vel animal. non autem forma vel materia est hoc modo in praedicamento nisi per
reductionem, sicut principia in genere esse dicuntur.

84
 to material substances, in the case of which the nature of the genus is taken from their
matter, as we say that a pug is a curved nose.111

2. On the manner in which accidents exist and are signified.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Pot., q. 8. art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

I reply that it must be said that, having supposed that relations exist in the divine, it is
necessary to say that they are the divine essence, otherwise one would have to hold that there
is composition in God, and that relations in the divine are accidents, because everything in-
hering in something beyond its substance is an accident. It would also be necessary that
some things be eternal which will not be the divine substance, all of which are heretical.112

Accordingly, to see that this is so, it must be understood that among the nine genera which
are contained under accident, some are signified in accordance with the ratio of an accident:
for the ratio of an accident is to be in; and so I maintain that those things are signified in
the manner of an accident which are signified as inherent in another, like quantity and
quality; for quantity is signified as belonging to that in which it is, and likewise quality. But
toward something [ad aliquid] is not signified in accordance with the ratio of an accident:
for it is not signified as something of [= ‘belonging to’] that in which it is, but as to that
which is outside. And on this account the Philosopher also says that knowledge, insofar as it
is a relation, is not of the knower, but of the knowable.113

And so some men, paying attention to the mode of signifying in relatives, have said they
do not inhere in substances, as, so to speak, being ‘attached’ to them [eis assistentia]:
because they are signified as a sort of intermediate between the substance which refers, and
that to which it refers. And from this it would follow that in created things relations are not
accidents, because the being of an accident is to be in. And so certain theologians, for
instance, the followers of Porretanus, have extended an opinion of this sort even to the divine

111
sed ex accidente et subiecto non fit unum per se. unde non resultat ex eorum coniunctione aliqua natura,
cui intentio generis vel speciei possit attribui. unde nomina accidentalia concretive dicta non ponuntur in
praedicamento sicut species vel genera, ut album vel musicum, nisi per reductionem, sed solum secundum
quod in abstracto significantur, ut albedo et musica. et quia accidentia non componuntur ex materia et
forma, ideo non potest in eis sumi genus a materia et differentia a forma sicut in substantiis compositis, sed
oportet ut genus primum sumatur ex ipso modo essendi, secundum quod ens diversimode secundum prius et
posterius de decem generibus praedicatur; sicut dicitur quantitas ex eo quod est mensura substantiae, et
qualitas secundum quod est dispositio substantiae, et sic de aliis secundum philosophum ix metaphysicae.
differentiae vero in eis sumuntur ex diversitate principiorum, ex quibus causantur. et quia propriae passiones
ex propriis principiis subiecti causantur, ideo subiectum ponitur in diffinitione eorum loco differentiae, si in
abstracto diffiniuntur secundum quod sunt proprie in genere, sicut dicitur quod simitas est nasi curvitas. sed
e converso esset, si eorum diffinitio sumeretur secundum quod concretive dicuntur. sic enim subiectum in
eorum diffinitione poneretur sicut genus, quia tunc diffinirentur per modum substantiarum compositarum, in
quibus ratio generis sumitur a materia, sicut dicimus quod simum est nasus curvus.
112
respondeo. dicendum quod, supposito quod relationes in divinis sint, de necessitate oportet dicere quod
sint essentia divina: alias oporteret ponere compositionem in deo, et quod relationes in divinis essent
accidentia, quia omnis res inhaerens alicui praeter suam substantiam est accidens. oporteret etiam quod
aliqua res esset aeterna, quae non erit substantia divina; quae omnia sunt haeretica.
113
ad huius ergo evidentiam sciendum est, quod inter novem genera quae continentur sub accidente,
quaedam significantur secundum rationem accidentis: ratio enim accidentis est inesse; et ideo illa dico
significari per modum accidentis quae significantur ut inhaerentia alteri, sicut quantitas et qualitas;
quantitas enim significatur ut alicuius in quo est, et similiter qualitas. ad aliquid vero non significatur
secundum rationem accidentis: non enim significatur ut aliquid eius in quo est, sed ut ad id quod extra est. et
propter hoc etiam dicit philosophus, quod scientia, in quantum est relatio, non est scientis, sed scibilis.

85
 relations, saying that the relations are not in the Persons, but are, so to speak, ‘attached’ to
them [eis quasi assistere].114

And because the divine essence is in the Persons, it would follow that relations are not the
divine essence; and because every accident inheres, it would follow that they would not be
accidents. And they understood in accordance with this the words adduced from Augustine,
namely, that relations are not predicated of God with regard to substance, nor with regard to
accident. But upon this opinion it follows that relation is not some thing, but only according
to reason: for everything is either a substance or an accident. Wherefore some of the
ancients also held that relations are of second things understood [esse de secundis
intellectis], as the Commentator says in the eleventh book of the Metaphysics. And so it was
also necessary for the followers of Porretanus to say that the divine relations do not exist
except according to reason. And thus it would follow that the distinction of Persons will not
be real, which is heretical.115

And so it must be said that nothing prevents something from being inhering,
although it is not signified as inhering, as even ‘action’ is not signified as in the agent, but
as from the agent, and yet it is undeniable that action is in the agent. And likewise, although
something is not signified as inhering, still it is necessary that it be inhering. And this is
when the relation is some thing; but when it is merely according to reason, in that case it is
not inhering. And just as there must be accidents in created things, so there must be
substance in God, because whatever is in God is His substance. And so relations with regard
to the thing [= in reality] must be the divine substance, which, nevertheless, do not have the
manner of a substance, but have another manner of predicating from those things which are
predicated in God.116

3. Supplement: Metaphysics VII. 5: Text and Commentary.

Cf. Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics by Thomas Aquinas (translated by John P. Ro-

wan. Chicago, 1961 [slightly rev. B.A.M.]):

Chapter 5

114
unde quidam attendentes modum significandi in relativis, dixerunt, ea non esse inhaerentia substantiis,
scilicet quasi eis assistentia: quia significantur ad quoddam medium inter substantiam quae refertur, et id ad
quod refertur. et ex hoc sequebatur quod in rebus creatis relationes non sunt accidentia, quia accidentis esse
est inesse. unde etiam quidam theologi, scilicet porretani, huiusmodi opinionem usque ad divinam relationem
extenderunt, dicentes, relationes non esse in personis, sed eis quasi assistere.
115
et quia essentia divina est in personis, sequebatur quod relationes non sunt essentia divina; et quia omne
accidens inhaeret, sequebatur quod non essent accidentia. et secundum hoc solvebant verbum augustini
inductum, quod scilicet relationes non praedicantur de deo secundum substantiam, nec secundum accidens.
sed ad hanc opinionem sequitur quod relatio non sit res aliqua, sed solum secundum rationem: omnis enim
res vel est substantia vel accidens. unde etiam quidam antiqui posuerunt relationes esse de secundis
intellectis, ut commentator dicit xi metaph.. et ideo oportet hoc etiam porretanos dicere, quod relationes
divinae non sunt nisi secundum rationem. et sic sequetur quod distinctio personarum non erit realis; quod est
haereticum.
116
unde dicendum est, quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse inhaerens, quod tamen non significatur ut inhaerens,
sicut etiam actio non significatur ut in agente, sed ut ab agente, et tamen constat actionem esse in agente. et
similiter, licet ad aliquid non significetur ut inhaerens, tamen oportet ut sit inhaerens. et hoc quando relatio
est res aliqua; quando vero est secundum rationem tantum, tunc non est inhaerens. et sicut in rebus creatis
oportet quod sit accidens, ita oportet quod sit in deo substantia, quia quidquid est in deo, est eius substantia.
oportet ergo relationes secundum rem, esse divinam substantiam; quae tamen non habent modum
substantiae, sed habent alium modum praedicandi ab his quae substantialiter praedicantur in deo.

86
 585. Now if one denies that a logos which involves the addition of something else is a
definition, the problem arises how there can be a definition of things which are not simple
but compound; for this must come about by way of addition. I mean, for example, that there
is nose and concavity and snubness, which is a word compounded of the two, because the
one is found in the other; and neither concavity nor snubness is an accidental attribute of
nose, but an essential one. Nor do they belong to nose as white belongs to Callias or to man
(because Callias, who happens to be a man, is white), but as male belongs to animal and
equal to quantity, and as all those attributes which are said to belong to something else
essentially. Now these attributes are those in which is found either the logos or name of the
subject to which each one belongs, and which cannot be explained apart from it; for
example, it is impossible to explain white apart from man, but not female apart from animal.
Hence there is either no essence and definition of any of these things, or if there is, it is in
the way we have described (582-84).

586. And there is also a second difficulty about them. For if snub nose and concave nose are
the same, snub and concave will be the same; but if they are not, then, since it is impossible
to use the word snub without the thing of which it is a proper attribute (because snub is
concavity in a nose), either it is impossible to speak of a snub nose, or the same term is used
twice—a concave nose nose. For a snub nose will be a concave nose nose. Hence it is absurd
that such things should have an essence. And if they have, there will be an infinite
regression; because some other nose will be found in the nose of snub-nose. It is clear, then,
that there is definition of substance alone; for if the other categories also had a definition,
this would have to be a result of adding something, just as there is no definition of equal and
odd without number or of female without animal. And by “adding something” I mean those
expressions in which the same thing happens to be said twice. And if this is true, there will
not be any definition of those things which are compounded, for example, odd number.

587. But this is hidden from us, because the logos of these things are not expressed exactly.
But if these things also have formulae, either they have such in a different way—or, as we
have said (582-84), definition and essence must be used in many senses. Hence in one sense
there will be no definition of anything, and definition and essence will be found only in
substance; and in another sense the other things will have a definition and essence. It is
evident, then, that a definition is a logos of the essence of a thing, and that essence belongs
to substances either alone, or chiefly, primarily, and without qualification.

COMMENTARY

1331. Here he gives the second solution to the question which was raised; and in regard to
this he does three things. First (582:C 1331), he gives the solution. Second (584:C 1339), he
proves it (“Now it is evident”). Third (585:C 1342), he dispels certain difficulties which
could arise from the previous discussion (“Now if one denies”). He accordingly says, first
(582), that it is necessary to say, as was stated in the foregoing solution (581:C 1325) that
there is no definition and whatness of accidents but only of substances; or according to
another solution it is necessary to say that the terms definition and whatness are used in
many senses. For in one sense whatness signifies substance and this particular thing,
and in another sense it signifies each of the other categories, such as quantity, quality
and the like. Moreover, just as being is said to belong to all the other categories, although
not in the same way, but primarily to substance and secondarily to the others, in a similar
fashion whatness belongs in an unqualified sense to substance, “but in another sense to the
other categories,” i.e., in a qualified sense.117

117
hic ponit secundam solutionem propositae quaestionis: et circa hoc tria facit. primo ponit solutionem.
secundo probat eam, ibi, illud autem palam, etc.. tertio removet quasdam dubitationes, quae possent ex
praedictis oriri, ibi, habet autem dubitationem. circa primum duo facit. primo ostendit quomodo definitio et

87
 1332. For the fact that it belongs to the others “in another sense,” i.e., in a qualified sense, is
clear from the fact that in each of the other categories some reply may be made to the
question “What is it?” For we ask of what sort a thing is, or what its quality is, as “What is
whiteness?” And we answer, “Color.” Hence it is evident that quality is one of the many
things in which whatness is found.118

1333. However, quality does not have whatness in an unqualified sense but the whatness of
quality. For when I ask what man is, and one answers ‘“Animal,” the term animal,
since it belongs in the genus of substance, not only designates what man is, but also
designates a what, i.e., a substance, in an unqualified sense. But when one asks what
whiteness is, and someone answers, “Color,” this word, even though it signifies what
whiteness is, does not signify what something is in an unqualified sense, but of what
sort it is. Hence quality does not have whatness in an unqualified sense, but with some
qualification. For this kind of whatness is found in quality, as when we say that color is the
whatness of whiteness; and this kind of whatness is substantial rather than substance.119

1334. For by reason of the fact that all the other categories get the notion of being from
substance, the mode of being of substance, i.e., being a what, is therefore participated
in by all the other categories according to a certain proportional likeness; for example,
we say that, just as animal is the whatness of man, in a similar fashion color is the whatness
of whiteness, and number the whatness of double; and in this way we say that quality has
whatness, not whatness in an unqualified sense, but a whatness of this particular kind; just as
some say, for example, in speaking of non-being from a logical point of view, that non-being
is, not because non-being is in an unqualified sense, but because non-being is non-being.
And in a similar way quality does not have whatness in an unqualified sense, but the
whatness of quality.120

1335. Therefore it is also (583).

He now shows that whatness and definition are predicated of the nature found in substance
and in accidents. He says that, since definition and whatness are found in some way both in

quod quid est invenitur in substantia et accidentibus. secundo quomodo de utrisque praedicetur, ibi, oportet
quidem igitur intendere. dicit ergo primo, quod dicendum est, sicut in praedicta solutione est dictum, quod
quod quid est et definitio non sit accidentium, sed substantiarum: aut oportet secundum alium modum
solvendi dicere, quod definitio dicitur multipliciter sicut et quod quid est. ipsum enim quod quid est, uno
modo significat substantiam et hoc aliquid. alio modo significat singula aliorum praedicamentorum, sicut
qualitatem et quantitatem et alia huiusmodi talia. sicut autem ens praedicatur de omnibus praedicamentis,
non autem similiter, sed primum de substantia, et per posterius de aliis praedicamentis, ita et quod quid est,
simpliciter convenit substantiae, aliis autem alio modo, idest secundum quid.
118
quod enim aliquo modo, idest secundum quid aliis conveniat quid est, ex hoc patet, quod in singulis
praedicamentis respondetur aliquid ad quaestionem factam per quid. interrogamus enim de quali sive
qualitate quid est, sicut quid est albedo, et respondemus quod est color. unde patet, quod qualitas est de
numero eorum, in quibus est quod quid est.
119
non tamen simpliciter in qualitate est quid est, sed quid est qualitatis. cum enim quaero quid est homo, et
respondetur, animal; ly animal, quia est in genere substantiae, non solum dicit quid est homo, sed etiam
absolute significat quid, id est substantiam. sed cum quaeritur quid est albedo, et respondetur, color, licet
significet quid est albedo, non tamen absolute significat quid, sed quale. et ideo qualitas non habet quid
simpliciter, sed secundum quid. invenitur enim in qualitate quid huiusmodi, ut cum dicimus quod color est
quid albedinis. et hoc quid, magis est substantiale quam substantia.
120
propter hoc enim quod omnia alia praedicamenta habent rationem entis a substantia, ideo modus entitatis
substantiae, scilicet esse quid, participatur secundum quamdam similitudinem proportionis in omnibus aliis
praedicamentis; ut dicamus, quod sicut animal est quid hominis, ita color albedinis, et numerus dualitatis; et
ita dicimus qualitatem habere quid non simpliciter, sed huius. sicut aliqui dicunt logice de non ente
loquentes, non ens est, non quia non ens sit simpliciter, sed quia non ens est non ens. et simpliciter qualitas
non habet quid simpliciter, sed quid qualitatis.

88
 substance and in accidents, therefore one must try to consider how we should “predicate it,”
i.e., predicate the definition, of each thing, yet no more than its condition warrants; so that,
namely, we do not say that those predicates are applied univocally which do not have one
essential character in reality.121

1336. And for this reason the things which have been said about definition and whatness in
regard to substance and accidents is clear, namely, that whatness will belong primarily and
unqualifiedly to substance, and secondarily to the other categories, not, of course, so as to be
whatness in an unqualified sense, but the whatness of this or that particular category,
namely, of quantity or quality. For it is evident that definition and whatness must be
predicated of substance and accidents either equivocally or by adding or removing
something to a greater or lesser degree; or in a primary or secondary way, as being is
predicated of substance and accident, and as we say that “the unknowable is known” in
a qualified sense, i.e., secondarily, because so far as the unknowable is concerned we
can know that it is not an object of knowledge; and thus we can also say of non-being
that it is not.122

1337. For the truth is that whatness and definition are not predicated of substance and
accidents either equivocally or unqualifiedly and according to the same meaning, i.e.,
univocally, but as the term medical is predicated of different particulars in reference to one
and the same thing, although it does not signify one and the same thing in the case of all the
things of which it is predicated; nor is it also predicated equivocally. For, a body is said to be
medical because it is the subject of the art of medicine, and an activity is said to be medical
because it is performed by the art of medicine, as purging; and an instrument, such as a
syringe, is said to be medical because it is used by the art of medicine. Thus it is clear that
the term medical is not used in a purely equivocal sense of these three things, since
equivocal things have no relationship to some one thing. Nor again it is used univocally
according to the same meaning, for the term medical is not predicated in the same sense of
one who uses the art of medicine and of something that assists the art of medicine to produce
its effect, but it is predicated analogically in reference to one thing, namely, to the art of
medicine. And similarly whatness and definition are not predicated of substance and
accident either equivocally or univocally, but in reference to one thing. For they are
predicated of an accident in relation to substance, as has been explained.123

121
deinde cum dicit oportet igitur. ostendit quomodo quod quid est et definitio praedicetur de eo quod
invenitur in substantiis et accidentibus; et dicit, quod ex quo definitio et quod quid est invenitur aliquo modo
in accidentibus et in substantia, oportet igitur intendere ad considerandum quomodo oportet dicere, idest
praedicare definitionem circa singula; non tamen magis quam quomodo se habent; ut videlicet, non ea
dicamus univoce praedicari quorum non est una ratio in essendo.
122
quapropter id quod dictum est de definitione et quod quid est in substantia et accidentibus, est
manifestum: scilicet quod quod quid erat esse primo et simpliciter inest substantiae, et consequenter aliis:
non quidem ita quod in aliis sit simpliciter quod quid erat esse, sed quod quid erat esse huic vel illi, scilicet
quantitati vel qualitati. manifestum est enim quod oportet definitionem et quod quid est vel aequivoce
praedicari in substantia et accidentibus, vel addentes et auferentes secundum magis et minus, sive secundum
prius et posterius, ut ens dicitur de substantia et accidente. et sicut dicimus, quod non scibile est scibile
secundum quid, idest per posterius, quia de non scibili hoc scire possumus quod non scitur; sic et de non ente
hoc dicere possumus, quia non est.
123
non enim est rectum quod quod quid est et definitio dicatur de substantia et de accidentibus, neque
aequivoce, neque simpliciter et eodem modo, idest univoce. sed sicut medicabile dicitur de diversis
particularibus per respectum ad unum et idem, non tamen significat unum et idem de omnibus de quibus
dicitur, nec etiam dicitur aequivoce. dicitur enim corpus medicabile, quia est subiectum medicinae; et opus
medicabile, quia exercetur a medicina, ut purgatio et vas medicinale, quia eo utitur medicina, ut clystere. et
sic patet quod non dicitur omnino aequivoce medicinale de his tribus, cum in aequivocis non habeatur
respectus ad aliquod unum. nec iterum univoce dicitur secundum unam rationem. non enim est eadem ratio
secundum quam dicitur medicinale id quo utitur medicina, et quod facit medicinam. sed dicitur analogice per

89
 1338. And since he had given two solutions, he adds that it makes no difference as to the
way in which one wishes to answer the above question, i.e., whether one says that accidents
do not have a definition, or that they have one in a secondary and qualified sense. However,
the statement made in the first solution, to the effect that accidents do not have a definition,
is to be understood in a primary and unqualified sense.124

1339. Now it is evident (584).

Second he proves the solution which was given. He says that it is evident that definition and
essence belong primarily and unqualifiedly to substances, yet not to substances alone since
in a sense accidents also have a definition and essence, though not in the first way. This is
made clear as follows: not every logos by which a word is explained is the same as a
definition, nor is the word explained by each logos always something defined; but it is
proper that there should be a definition of any determinate logos, namely, of one that
signifies one thing. For if I say that Socrates is white and musical and curly-headed,
this logos does not signify one thing, except perhaps accidentally, but signifies many;
and therefore such a logos is not a definition.125

1340. However, it is not enough that the thing signified by a logos should be one thing from
the viewpoint of continuity in order that there may be a definition of it; for then the “Iliad,”
i.e., the poem about the Trojan war, would be a definition, because that war was waged over
a continuous period of time. Nor again is it enough that the thing should be one by
connection; for example, if I were to say that a house is stones and mortar and wood, this
logos would not be a definition of a house. But a logos that signifies one thing will be a
definition if it signifies in some one of those senses in which the term one is predicated
essentially; for the term one is used in as many senses as being is. And in one sense being
signifies this particular thing, and in another, quantity, and in another, quality, and so on for
the other categories. Yet it is predicated primarily of substance and secondarily of the other
categories. Therefore the term one in an unqualified sense will apply primarily to substance
and secondarily to the other categories.126

respectum ad unum, scilicet ad medicinam. et similiter quod quid est et definitio, non dicitur nec aequivoce
nec univoce, de substantia et accidente, sed per respectum ad unum. dicitur enim de accidente in respectu ad
substantiam, ut dictum est.
124
et quia posuerat duas solutiones, subiungit quod nihil differt qualitercumque aliquis velit dicere de
praemissa quaestione; sive dicatur quod accidentia non habent definitionem, sive quod habent, sed per
posterius secundum quid. quod tamen dicitur in prima solutione quod non habent definitionem accidentia,
intelligitur per prius et simpliciter.
125
deinde cum dicit illud autem probat secundo positam solutionem dicens, illud palam esse quod definitio et
quod quid erat esse, primo et simpliciter est substantiarum, non tamen solum et substantiarum, cum etiam
accidentia aliquo modo habeant definitionem et quod quid erat esse, non tamen primum. et hoc sic patet. non
enim omnis ratio, qua nomen per rationem exponitur, idem est quod definitio; nec nomen expositum per
quamcumque rationem, semper est definitum; sed alicui determinatae rationi competit quod sit definitio; illi
scilicet quae significat unum. si enim dicam quod socrates est albus et musicus et crispus, ista ratio non
significat unum, sed multa, nisi forte per accidens, et ideo talis ratio non est definitio.
126
non tamen sufficit quod sit unum in continuitate illud quod per rationem significatur, ad hoc quod sit
definitio. sic enim ilias, idest poema de bello troiano esset definitio, quia illud bellum in quadam continuitate
temporis est peractum. aut etiam non sufficit quod sit unum per colligationem; sicut haec ratio non esset
definitio domus, si dicerem, quod domus est lapides et cementum et ligna. sed tunc ratio significans unum
erit definitio, si significet unum aliquod illorum modorum, quorum quoties unum per se dicitur. unum enim
dicitur multipliciter sicut et ens. ens autem hoc quidem significat hoc aliquid, aliud quantitatem, aliud
qualitatem, et sic de aliis; et tamen per prius substantiam et consequenter alia. ergo simpliciter unum per
prius erit in substantia, et per posterius in aliis.

90
 1341. If, then, it is characteristic of the notion of definition that it should signify one thing, it
follows that there will be a definition of white man, because white man is in a sense one
thing. But the logos of white will be a definition in a different sense than the logos of
substance, because the logos of substance will be a definition in a primary sense, and the
logos of white will be a definition in a secondary sense, just as the term one is predicated of
each in a primary and in a secondary sense.127

1342. Now if one denies (585).

He clears up some of the difficulties pertaining to the point established above; and this is
divided into two parts corresponding to the two difficulties which he removes. The second
(586:C 1347) begins where he says “And there is also.”

Now there are two things which have to be noted first of all in order to make the first part of
this division evident. The first is that some said that no definition comes about “by way of
addition,” i.e., no definition contains anything extrinsic to the essence of the thing defined.
And they seemed to have in mind the fact that the definition signifies the essence of a thing.
Hence it would seem that whatever is extrinsic to the essence of a thing should not be given
in its definition.128

1343. The second thing which has to be noted is that some accidents are simple and some
compound. Those are said to be simple which have no determinate subject included in their
definition, for example, curved and concave and other mathematical entities; and those are
said to be compound which have a determinate subject without which they cannot be
defined.129

1344. Hence a problem arises if someone wants to say that a logos which is formed by
addition is not a definition of those accidents which are simple, but of those which are
compound; for it seems that none of these can have a definition. It is clear, then, that if
compound accidents are defined, their definition must be formed by addition, since they
cannot be defined without their proper subject. For example, if we take the following three
things: nose, concavity, and snubness, then concavity is an accident in an unqualified sense,
especially in relation to nose, since nose is not contained in the logos of concavity. And
snubness is a compound accident, since nose is a part of its logos. Thus snubness will be an
expression of both inasmuch as it signifies that “the one is found in the other,” i.e., a definite
accident in a definite subject, and neither concavity nor snubness is an attribute of nose in an
accidental way, as white belongs accidentally to Callias and to man, inasmuch as Callias,
who happens to be a man, is white. But snubness is an essential quality of nose, for it is
proper to nose as such to be snub. Another translation has aquiline in place of concave, and
its meaning is more evident, because nose is given in the definition of aquiline just as it is in
the definition of snub. Concavity or snubness, then, belongs to nose essentially, just as male

127
si igitur ad rationem definitionis pertinet quod significet unum, sequitur quod erit ratio albi hominis
definitio, quia albus homo est quodammodo unum. sed alio modo erit definitio ratio albi, et ratio substantiae;
quia ratio substantiae erit definitio per prius, ratio albi per posterius, sicut unum per prius et posterius de
utroque dicitur.
128
deinde cum dicit habet autem removet quasdam dubitationes circa praedeterminata; et dividitur in duas,
secundum duas dubitationes quas removet. secunda, ibi, est autem et alia dubitatio. praenotanda autem sunt
duo ad evidentiam primae particulae. quorum primum est, quod quidam dicebant nullam definitionem esse
ex additione, idest quod in nulla definitione ponitur aliquid, quod sit extra essentiam definiti. et videbantur
pro se habere hoc, quod definitio significat essentiam rei. unde illud quod est extra essentiam rei, non debet
poni in eius definitione, ut videtur.
129
secundum est, quod quaedam accidentia sunt simplicia, et quaedam copulata. simplicia dicuntur, quae
non habent subiectum determinatum, quod in eorum definitione ponatur, sicut curvum et concavum et alia
mathematica. copulata autem dicuntur, quae habent determinatum subiectum, sine quo definiri non possunt.

91
 belongs to animal essentially, and equality to quantity, and all other things which are said to
be present essentially in something else, because the logos of all is the same; and “these
attributes are those in which,” i.e., in the logos of which, there is found either the name of
the thing “to which this attribute belongs,” namely, substance, or its logos. For in definitions
the logos can always be given in place of the name; for example, when we say that man is a
mortal rational animal, the definition can be given in place of the term animal, just as it may
be said that man is a mortal rational sensory animated substance. And similarly if I say that a
male is an animal capable of generating in another, I can also say that a male is a sensory
animated substance capable of generating in another.130

1345. Thus it is clearly impossible “to explain” this, i.e., to convey knowledge of, one of the
accidents mentioned above which we called compound, apart from its subject, as it is
possible to convey knowledge of whiteness without giving man in its definition or logos. But
it is not possible to convey knowledge of female without mentioning animal, because animal
must be given in the definition of female just as it must be given in the definition of male.
Hence it is evident that none of the compound accidents mentioned above have a whatness
and real definition if there is no definition by way of addition, as happens in the definitions
of substances.131

1346. Or if they have some kind of definition, since they can be defined only by way of
addition, they will have a definition in a different way than substances do, as we said in the
second solution. Hence in this conclusion he states the solution to the foregoing difficulty;
for the statement which he made there, namely, that there is no definition by way of addition,
is true of definition insofar as it applies to substances. Hence the accidents mentioned above
do not have a definition in this way but differently, i.e., in a secondary sense.132

130
est ergo dubitatio, si aliquis velit dicere quod ratio, quae est ex additione, non est definitio illorum
accidentium quae sunt simplicia, sed copulatorum erit definitio. videtur enim, quod nullius eorum possit esse
definitio. palam est ergo, quod si illa definiuntur, necesse est eorum definitionem ex additione facere, cum
sine propriis subiectis definiri non possint. sicut si accipiamus haec tria, idest nasus, et concavitas, et
simitas: concavitas est simpliciter accidens, praecipue in comparatione ad nasum, cum non sit nasus de
intellectu concavi. simitas autem est accidens compositum, cum sit nasus de intellectu eius. et ita simitas erit
quoddam dictum ex duobus, inquantum significat hoc in hoc, idest determinatum accidens in determinato
subiecto, et nec concavitas nec simitas est passio nasi secundum accidens, sicut album inest calliae et homini
per accidens, inquantum callias est albus, cui accidit hominem esse. sed simum est passio nasi secundum se.
naso enim inquantum huiusmodi competit esse simum. alia autem translatio loco eius quod est concavum,
habet aquilinum. et est planior sensus; quia in definitione aquilini ponitur nasus, sicut in definitione simi. sed
sicut masculinum per se competit animali, et aequale quantitati, et omnia alia quaecumque secundum se
dicuntur existere in aliquo, quia de omnibus est eadem ratio, et huiusmodi sunt in quibus, idest in quorum
rationibus existit nomen eius cuius est passio, idest substantia, aut etiam ratio eius. semper enim in
definitionibus potest poni ratio loco nominis: sicut si dicimus quod homo est animal rationale mortale, potest
poni loco nominis animalis definitio, ut dicatur quod homo est substantia animata sensibilis rationalis
mortalis. similiter si dicam quod masculus est animal potens generare in alio, possum etiam dicere quod
masculus est substantia animata sensibilis potens generare in aliquo alio.
131
et sic patet, quod non contingit separatim ostendere, idest notificare aliquod praedictorum accidentium
quae diximus copulata, sicut contingit notificare album sine hoc quod in eius definitione sive ratione ponatur
homo. sed non contingit ita notificare femininum sine animali; quia oportet quod animal ponatur in
definitione feminini sicut et in definitione masculini. quare patet, quod non est alicuius praedictorum
accidentium copulatorum quod quid erat esse et definitio vera, si nulla definitio est ex additione, sicut
contingit in definitionibus substantiarum.
132
aut si est aliqua definitio eorum, cum non possint nisi ex additione definiri, aliter erit definitio eorum
quam substantiarum, quemadmodum diximus in solutione secunda. et sic in hac conclusione innuit
solutionem dubitationis praemissae. quod enim dicebatur, quod nulla definitio est ex additione, verum est de
definitione prout invenitur in substantiis. sic autem praedicta accidentia non habent definitionem, sed alio
modo per posterius.

92
 1347. And there is (586).

Here he states the second difficulty; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he raises
the difficulty; and second (587:C 1350, he gives its solution (“But this is hidden”). He
accordingly says, first (586), that there is another problem concerning the points discussed
above. For to say “snub nose” and “concave nose” is either to say the same thing or not. If it
is the same, it follows that snub and concave are the same; but this is clearly false since the
definition of each is different.133

1348. But if to say snub nose and concave nose is not to say the same thing, because snub
cannot be understood “without the thing of which it is a proper attribute,” i.e., without nose,
since snubness is concavity in a nose (although concave can be spoken of without nose being
involved), and if what I call snub involves more than concave, then it follows that this thing
which I call nose either cannot be called a snub nose, or if it is called such, the word will be
used twice, namely, inasmuch as we might say that a snub nose is “a concave nose nose”; for
the definition of a word can always be given in place of that word. Hence when the word
snub nose is used, the word snub can be removed and the definition of snub, which is a
concave nose, can be added to the definition of nose. Thus it would seem that to speak of a
snub nose is merely to speak of a concave nose nose, which is absurd. And for this reason it
would seem absurd to say that such accidents have an essence.134

1349. For if it is not true that they do not have an essence, the same word may be repeated an
infinite number of times when the definition of the word is put in place of that word. For it is
obvious that, when I say “concave nose,” the word snub can be understood in place of
concave, because snubness is merely concavity in a nose; and the term concave nose can
also be understood in place of snub; and so on to infinity.135

1350. Hence it would seem to be evident that only substance has a definition; for if the other
categories also had a definition, this would have to be a result of adding something to their
subject, as the definition of equal and that of odd must be derived from the definition of their
subjects. For there is no definition of odd without number, or of female, which signifies a
certain quality of animal, without animal. Therefore if some things are defined by way of
addition, it follows that the same words may be used twice, as was shown in the example
given above. Hence if it is true that this absurd conclusion would result, it follows that
compound accidents do not have a definition.136

133
deinde cum dicit est autem ponit secundam dubitationem: circa quam duo facit. primo movet
dubitationem. secundo ponit solutionem, ibi, sed latet etc.. dicit ergo primo, quod est alia dubitatio de
praedictis. aut enim est idem dicere nasus simus et nasus concavus, aut non. si idem, sequetur quod idem sit
simum et concavum: quod patet esse falsum, cum alia sit definitio utriusque.
134
si autem non est idem dicere nasum simum et nasum concavum, propter hoc quod simum non potest
intelligi sine re cuius est per se passio, idest sine naso, cum simum sit concavitas in naso, concavum vero
potest dici sine naso; sequetur, si hoc quod dico simum plus habet quam concavum, quod hoc, scilicet quod
est nasus, vel non possit dici nasus simus, vel si dicatur, erit bis idem dictum, ut dicamus, quod nasus simus
est nasus nasus concavus. semper enim loco nominis potest poni definitio illius nominis. unde cum dicitur
nasus simus, poterit removeri nomen simi, et addi naso definitio simi, quae est nasus concavus. sic ergo
videtur dicere, quod nasum simum, nihil aliud est quam dicere, nasum nasum concavum, quod est
inconveniens. propter quod, inconveniens videtur dicere quod in talibus accidentibus sit quod quid erat esse.
135
quod si hoc non est verum, quod in eis non sit quod quid erat esse, in infinitum fiet repetitio eiusdem
nominis, semper posita nominis definitione pro nomine. constat enim, quod cum dico, nasus concavus, loco
concavi potest accipi simum, quia concavitas in naso non est nisi simitas, et loco simi iterum nasus concavus,
et sic in infinitum.
136
palam est itaque, ut videtur, quod solius substantiae est definitio. si enim esset aliorum
praedicamentorum, oporteret quod esset ex additione subiecti, sicut definitio aequalitatis et definitio imparis
oporteret quod sumeretur ex definitione suorum subiectorum. non enim definitio imparis est sine numero;

93
 1351. But this is hidden (587).

He solves the problem raised above. He says that anyone who raises the above question is
ignorant of the fact that these logoi are not expressed exactly, i.e., with exactness, as those
which are used univocally, but are employed in a primary and secondary way, as was stated
above (582:C 1331). But if the compound accidents mentioned above have a formula, or
conceptual expression, they must have such in a different way than definitions do, or
definition and essence, which is signified by definition, must be used in different senses.137
1352. Hence “in one sense,” i.e., primarily and without qualification, only substance will
have a definition, and only substance will have an essence. “And in another sense,” i.e.,
secondarily and with some qualification, the other categories will also have a definition. For
substance, which has a quiddity in the absolute sense, does not depend on something else so
far as its quiddity is concerned.

An accident depends on its subject, however, although a subject does not belong to the
essence of its accident (in much the same way as a creature depends on the creator, yet the
creator does not belong to the essence of the creature), so that an extrinsic essence must be
placed in its definition. In fact, accidents have being only by reason of the fact that they
inhere in a subject, and therefore their quiddity depends on their subject. Hence a
subject must be given in the definition of an accident at one time directly and at
another, indirectly.138

1353. Now a subject is given directly in the definition of an accident when an accident is
signified concretely as an accident fused with a subject, as when I say that snubness is a
concave nose; for nose is given in the definition of snub as a genus in order to signify
that accidents subsist only in a subject. But when an accident is signified in the
abstract, after the manner of a substance, then the subject is given in its definition
indirectly, as a difference, as it is said that snubness is the concavity of a nose.139

1354. Hence it is clear that when I say snub nose, it is not necessary to understand concave
nose in place of nose; because nose is not included in the definition of snub as though it were
part of its essence, but as something added to its essence. Hence snub and concave are
essentially the same. But snub adds over and above concave a relation to a determinate

nec definitio feminini, quod significat quamdam qualitatem animalis, est sine animali. si ergo definitio
aliquorum est ex additione, sequetur quod bis accidat idem dicere, sicut in praemissis est ostensum. unde, si
verum est quod hoc inconveniens sequatur, sequitur quod accidentia copulata non habent definitionem.
137
deinde cum dicit sed latet solvit praemissam quaestionem; dicens, quod moventem praedictam
quaestionem latet, quod rationes, non dicuntur certe, idest certitudinaliter, quasi ea quae dicuntur univoce,
sed dicuntur secundum prius et posterius, ut supra dictum est. si autem praedicta accidentia copulata habent
terminos, idest rationes aliquas, oportet quod alio modo sint illi termini quam definitiones: aut quod definitio
et quod quid erat esse, quod significatur per definitionem, dicatur multipliciter.
138
quare sic quidem, idest simpliciter per prius, nullius erit definitio nisi substantiae, nec etiam quod quid
erat esse. sic autem, idest secundum quid et posterius, erit etiam aliorum. substantia enim quae habet
quidditatem absolutam, non dependet in sua quidditate ex alio. accidens autem dependet a subiecto, licet
subiectum non sit de essentia accidentis; sicut creatura dependet a creatore et tamen creator non est de
essentia creaturae, ita quod oporteat exteriorem essentiam in eius definitione poni. accidentia vero non
habent esse nisi per hoc quod insunt subiecto: et ideo eorum quidditas est dependens a subiecto: et propter
hoc oportet quod subiectum in accidentis definitione ponatur, quandoque quidem in recto, quandoque vero in
obliquo.
139
in recto quidem, quando accidens significatur ut accidens in concretione ad subiectum: ut cum dico,
simus est nasus concavus. tunc enim nasus ponitur in definitione simi quasi genus, ad designandum quod
accidentia non habent subsistentiam, nisi ex subiecto. quando vero accidens significatur per modum
substantiae in abstracto, tunc subiectum ponitur in definitione eius in obliquo, ut differentia; sicut dicitur,
simitas est concavitas nasi.

94
 subject; and thus in this determinate subject, nose, snub differs in no way from concave, nor
is it necessary that any word should be put in place of snub except the word concave. Thus it
will not be necessary to use concave nose in place of snub, but only concave.140
1355. In bringing his discussion to a close he draws the conclusion which follows as
obvious, namely, that a definition, which is the logos of a thing’s essence and the essence
itself, belongs to substances alone, just as the first solution maintained. Or substances are
defined in a primary and unqualified sense, and accidents in a secondary and qualified sense,
as has been stated in the second solution.141

4. On the ways in which ‘substance’ is said.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In II Sent., dist. 37, q. 1, art. 1, c., ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

c. I reply that it must be said that substance is said in two ways, as is evident from
Metaphysics V, text 15. For in one way ‘substance’ is said according as it signifies the ratio
of the first predicament (category): and this is either the form, or the matter, or the com-
posite, which is in the genus per se. In another way ‘substance’ means that which signifies
the ‘what’ in all things, just as we say that the definition signifies the ‘substance’ of a thing:
and in this way whatever is said positively, in whatever genus it is, is ‘substance’, or has
‘substance’.142

ad 1. To the first, therefore, it must be said that that objection procedes with respect to sub-
stance according as it signifies a thing of the first predicament [or ‘category’]: and taking
substance in this way, in no way is sin a substance.143

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 29, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

I reply that it must be said that, according to the Philosopher in the fifth book of the
Metaphysics, ‘substance’ is said in two ways. In one way ‘substance’ means the whatness of
a thing, in accordance with which [usage] we say that the definition signifies the substance
of a thing, which ‘substance’, in fact, the Greeks call ousia, [and] which we may call ‘es-
sence’. In another way ‘substance’ means the subject or supposit which subsists in the genus
of substance. And this, in fact, taking it commonly, can also be named by a name signifying
an intention, and thus it means the supposit.144

140
patet igitur quod cum dico, nasum simum, non oportet loco simi accipere nasum concavum; quia nasus
non ponitur in definitione simi, quasi sit de essentia eius; sed quasi additum essentiae. unde simum et
concavum per essentiam idem sunt. sed simum addit supra concavum, habitudinem ad determinatum
subiectum: et sic determinato subiecto quod est nasus, nihil differt simus a concavo; nec oportet aliquid loco
simi ponere nisi concavum: et sic non erit dicere loco eius, nasus concavus, sed solum concavus.
141
ultimo concludit ex praedictis, quod palam est, quod definitio quae est ratio eius quod quid erat esse, et
ipsum quod quid erat esse, solum est substantiarum, sicut prima solutio habebat. vel est primo et simpliciter
earum, et per posterius et secundum quid accidentium, ut in secunda solutione dicebatur.
142
respondeo dicendum quod substantia duplicitur dicitur, ut ex V Metaphysicorum, text. 15, patet. Uno enim
modo dicitur substantia, secundum quod significat rationem primi praedicamenti: et hoc est vel forma, vel
materia, vel compositum, quod per se in genere est. Alio modo dicitur substantia illud quod significat quid in
omnibus rebus, sicut dicimus quod definitio significat rei substantiam: et hoc modo quidquid positive dicitur,
in quocumque genere sit, substantia est vel substantiam habet. Note that the ratio of the first predicament is
‘what is neither said of a subject nor in a subject’. (cf. Cat. ch. 5, 2a 11)
143
ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa objectio procedit de substantia secundum quod significat rem primi
praedicamenti: et hoc modo sumendo substantiam, peccatum nullo modo substantia est.
144
respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in v metaphys., substantia dicitur dupliciter. uno
modo dicitur substantia quidditas rei, quam significat definitio, secundum quod dicimus quod definitio
significat substantiam rei, quam quidem substantiam graeci usiam vocant, quod nos essentiam dicere
possumus. alio modo dicitur substantia subiectum vel suppositum quod subsistit in genere substantiae. et hoc

95
Cf. Duane H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories (Cat.4):

There is a text I mentioned before in the Sentences where Thomas, when discussing the
definition of “person”, distinguishes all four senses together. There are other texts where he
distinguishes just the two senses in the ante-predicaments, and you can bring those texts in.
When we are just doing the ante-predicaments, I bring in the texts that just distinguished those
two senses. But now that we’re distinguishing two more, I will bring in the text with all four
meanings. First the texts that you use when doing the ante-predicaments. The first text is from
the commentary on the second book of the Sentences Distinction 37 Question 1 Article 1 in the
Solution:

Substance is said in two ways, as is clear from the fifth book of the Metaphysics. In one
way substance is said as it signifies the ratio of the first predicament. And this is either
form or matter in the genus of substance, or the composite, which is per se in the genus
[in some sense man’s soul and man’s body are in the genus of substance, but per se or
directly just the composite]. In another way substance is said that which signifies what in
all things, as when we say that a definition signifies the substance of a thing [you can
have a definition of virtue, or a definition of number, or a definition of what a father is, as
well as a definition of what a man is; it can be found in all these genera]. And in this way,
whatever is said positively [as opposed to a negation] in whatever genus it is, is a
substance or has substance.

Those are the two senses you meet in the antepredicaments. “Substance” can signify one of the
ten genera, which in the Topics is called “what it is”, or it can signify the nature of anything, as
it does when Aristotle says that things are named univocally when they have not only the name
in common but also the speech about their substance, logos tes ousias. Translating that into
Latin, sometimes they’ll say ratio substantiae. They have the name in common, and the ratio
substantiae. You could translate logos with oratio, too. It is either the speech about their
substance or the thought about their substance, but what “substance” means there is the nature
of the thing, the essence of the thing, the what it is of the thing. And that is found not only in the
category of substance, but also quantity, quality, and the rest. And Thomas says that is what you
mean when you say that a definition signifies the substance of a thing. And that’s what we mean
when we say that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, He’s of the same substance, He has
the same nature, there is only one nature there, for those two persons. That’s one very important
meaning. And he says in another text from the Metaphysics that that’s the formal beginning of
the individual, the species, and the genus. And the formal is the kind of cause which it is proper
to the logician to consider. But then another sense of “substance” is one of the ten highest
genera, and that’s the sense of “substance” that we meet in the fourth chapter when he
distinguishes the ten highest genera.
Thomas will distinguish those two from Chapter 5 in addition, when he gets into the context
of discussing Boethius’s definition of “person”. Boethius’s definition is “individua substantia
rationalis naturae”, an individual substance of a rational nature. Of course Thomas has to go
through this definition word by word. Sometimes you have an objection: what does the word
“substance” mean in the definition? Does it mean first substance, or does it mean second
substance? If it means second substance, then you’re not talking about a person, are you? A
person is a first substance. But if it means first substance, why do you have to add “individual”?
Thomas says that in the definition the word “substance” doesn’t mean first substance, it doesn’t
mean second substance, it means substance as it’s common to both. Then it’s restricted by the
word “individua”, individual.

quidem, communiter accipiendo, nominari potest et nomine significante intentionem, et sic dicitur
suppositum.

96
 Now for this text where he distinguishes all four of them. Even though he’s not talking about
the Categories, one can see the applicability of what he says to it. This is again from the
commentary on Book I of the Sentences Distinction 25 Question 1 Article 1 Objection 7 &
Reply. I’ll read you part of the objection:

Substance in the use of the Latins is equivocal for essence and hypostasis. When,
therefore, person is said to be individual substance, either it’s laid down for the essence
[which is, again, one sense] or for the hypostasis. If for the hypostasis, since that is a
particular substance or individual, it seems that “individual” is added superfluously

This objection you will find elsewhere; Thomas takes it up a lot of times when he discusses the
definition of person. In the reply, he says

To the seventh objection it should be said that “substance” is said in four ways. In one
way, “substance” is the same thing as essentia, the essence or the nature of a thing [that’s
the sense you meet in Chapter 1 of the Categories]. And thus substance is found in all
genera, just as essentia or nature is found [nature being taken in the sense of what it is].
And this is signified “what is albedo?” and the answer is “color” [he takes an example
from a genus of accident in order to show that that sense is not limited to substance]. In
another way, it signifies an individual in the genus of substance, which is called first
substance or hypostasis. In a third way it is called second substance [so the two meanings
from Chapter 5 are the second and third of the senses he is talking about here]. And then
in a fourth way substance is said commonly insofar as it abstracts from first substance
and second substance. And thus it is taken here [he gives that last because that’s the one
he wants] in the definition of the great Boethius]. And by “individual”, as it were through
a difference, it is drawn to standing for first substance.

That last sense is the one you have in Chapter 4, which is in a way common to first and second
substance. This sense resembles something common, but it’s something imperfectly abstracted.
I’ve always been a little bit puzzled by similar things in the distinctions of the meanings of the
word “nature” in the fifth book of the Metaphysics. One of the senses of “nature” there is the
very definition of nature in the Physics. But then Aristotle gives matter and form in the genus of
substance as two other meanings of the word “nature”. In the Physics, after he defines nature,
then he shows that matter is nature, and it’s more known to be nature, and then he shows that
form is also nature, and then he shows that even more so is it nature. If he said that nature had
only these two meanings of matter and form, there would be no reason why Aristotle or Thomas
would distinguish the definition of nature as another meaning from those two. But still it doesn’t
seem to be said altogether equally of those two. It’s not a strict genus, or anything like that. He
gives it as a separate meaning. You can’t really avoid a lot of difficulties unless you see that as a
separate meaning. Somehow, when you say that form is more nature than matter, you have
some common notion of nature there. Now if you take this formula, and you consider “first
substance” and “second substance”, and someone says you have two words in each case,
“substance” and “first”, “substance” and “second”, then if you say “first substance”, what does
the word “substance” mean? If you say it means first substance, then the word “first” is super-
fluous. Unless you have some common thought, you might say, of substance, as what does not
exist in a subject or something of that sort, it would have to mean either first substance or
second substance. One would be false and the other would make the word “first” superfluous.
You have to make the distinction, there.

97
V. ON THINGS SAID EITHER WITH INTERTWINING OR WITHOUT IT.

Cf. Aristotle, Categories ch. 2 (1a 15—1b 6) (tr. R. Glen Coughlin):

4. Of things said, some are said with intertwining, some without intertwining: the ones,
therefore, with intertwining are like “man runs”, “man wins”; the ones without intertwining
are like “man”, “ox”, “runs”, “wins”.145

5. Of beings [lit. ‘of those which are’], some are said of something underlying, but are in no
underlying thing, as “man” is said of something underlying, of this man, but is in no
underlying thing.146

6. Some, however, are in an underlying thing, but are said of no underlying thing. (I call “in
an underlying thing” what is in something, not as being a part [but as] unable to [exist]
separately from that in which it is, as this grammar is in an underlying, the soul, but is said
of nothing underlying, and this white is in an underlying, the body, for every color is in
body, but is said of nothing underlying.)147

7. Some, however, are both said of an underlying and are in an underlying, as science is in
an underlying, the soul, but is said of an underlying, grammar.148

8. Some, however, are neither in an underlying nor are said of an underlying, as this man or
this horse. For not one of such things is either in an underlying or said of an underlying.149

9. Simply, however, things indivisible and one in number are said of no underlying thing, but
nothing prevents some [of these] from being in an underlying, for this grammar is among
things in an underlying.150

1. In sum:

Since substances come before all else, the first thing a name will signify is ousia.
Now among substances some are universal, but others particular. Again, following upon
substances are accidents which themselves may be either universal or particular. Conse-
quently, in the meaning of names we must distinguish the foregoing principles.

2. In relation to predication, ‘those which are’, or ‘beings’, are of four kinds:

145
Eorum quae dicuntur, alia quidem secundum complexione dicuntur, alia vere sine complexione; et eas
quae secundum complexione dicuntur sunt ut homo currit, home vincit; ea vero quae sine complexione
dicuntur sunt ut homo, bos, currit, vincit.
146
Eorum quae sunt, alia de subjecto quodam dicuntur, in subjecto vero nullo sunt, ut homo de subjecto
quidem dicitur aliquo homine, in subjecto autem nullo est.
147
Alia in subjecto quidem sunt, de subjecto autem nullo dicuntur. In subjecto autem esse dico quod cum in
aliquo non sicut quadam pars sit, impossible est sine eo esse in quo est, ut quaedam grammatica in subjecto
quidem est in anima, de subjecto autem nullo dicitur, et quoddam album in subjecto est corpore (omnis enim
color in corpore est), de subjecto autem nullo dicitur.
148
Alia et de subjecto quodam dicuntur, et in subjecto sunt, ut scientia in subjecto quodem est in anima, de
subjecto autem dicitur, ut de grammatica.
149
Alia neque in subjecto sunt neque de subjecto dicuntur, ut aliquis homo, vel aliquis equus; nullam enim
horum neque in subjecto est neque de subjecto dicitur.
150
Simpliciter autem quae sunt individua et numero singularia de nullo subjecto dicuntur; in subjecto autem
nihil prohibet horum aliqua esse; quaedam enim grammatica in subjecto est, de subjecto autem nullow
dicitur.

98
 (1) universal substance (‘man’, ‘animal’)
(2) particular accident (‘this grammar’, ‘this white’, ‘this science’)
(3) universal accident (‘grammar’, ‘whiteness’, ‘science’)
(4) particular substance (‘Socrates’, ‘Plato’, ‘this ox’, ‘this horse’)

Inasmuch as beings are things signified by vocal sounds, things signified by vocal
sounds are, in one way, divided into these four. Hence, what is signified is either a sub-
stance or an accident; and it is either universal or particular. But in the names of these four
one must go on to distinguish the principles of their signification, as, for instance, par-
ticular substance will prove to signify a ‘what it is’ and a ‘this something’, as we shall
observe hereafter.

3. On the two ways in which things are said:

(1) according to intertwining: (a) affirmations or negations; (b) complex words like
‘white man’
(2) according to not one intertwining: simple words like ‘white’ or ‘man’

4. On what the things said signify:

substance, and the nine genera of accidents

5. On the way in which things said signify:

in the manner of a substance or an accident

but if in the manner of an accident, then in the manner of a quantity or a quality, etc.

6. On what ‘things said’ or ‘beings’ said without any intertwining signify.

Cf. Aristotle, Categories ch. 2 (1a 17-19) (tr. R. Glen Coughlin).

Of things said, some are said with intertwining, some without intertwining: the ones,
therefore, with intertwining are like “man runs” “man wins”; the ones without intertwining
are like “man”, “ox”, “runs”, “wins”.151

Cf. ibid. ch. 4 (1b 25-27) (tr. R. Glen Coughlin).

Of what are said according to not one intertwining, each signifies either substance
{ousia}, or so much {poson}, or such {poion}, or relative {proj ti}, or where {pou}, or
sometime {pote}, or to be positioned {keisqai}, or to have {ecein}, or to do {poiein}, or
to suffer {pascein}.152

7. That what signifies are vocal sounds.

151
Eorum quae dicuntur, alia quidem secundum complexione dicuntur, alia vere sine complexione; et eas
quae secundum complexione dicuntur sunt ut homo currit, home vincit; ea vero quae sine complexione
dicuntur sunt ut homo, bos, currit, vincit.
152
Eorum quidem quae secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur, singulum aut substantiam significat, aut
quantitem, aut qualitatem, aut ad aliquid, aut ubi, aut quando, aut situm, aut habere, aut facere, aut pati.

99
Cf. Duane H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories (Cat.1):

14. Let’s take the opinion that the Categories is about names, vocal sounds. Well, in the second
chapter Aristotle will give a division there, saying “of those said, there are those said with
intertwining, and those said without intertwining”, and those said with intertwining are those in
which something is affirmed or denied of something, where you have a statement. And in the
Perihermeneias, Aristotle will define the statement as a h, a vocal sound. And then he says
there are those said without intertwining, without affirming or denying. And later on, he says
that these signify either substance, or how much, or how, and so on. But what “signifies”? It’s
not things that signify; things are signified. But Aristotle will say in Chapter 4 “signifies”.
He seems to be talking about words, names, vocal sounds. On the other hand, vocal sound
seems to be far below the dignity of logic, and seems to pertain to grammar. Notice how
different these things are. In the first opinion, logic seemed to be confused with metaphysics,
and with this opinion it comes down to grammar.

8. On what “those said according to not one intertwining” means.

Cf. Duane H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories (Cat.3):

Now, the first thing I want to do in regard to Chapter 4 is to go through the chapter a bit with
you, and then we’ll look at Thomas’s two distinctions. But I want to get more of a material
knowledge of the chapter first.
Do you all have the English translation before you? Now Aristotle seems to be picking up on
the end of the division that he gave in the beginning of Chapter 2. He says

Of those said without any intertwining ...

Now you recall that in the beginning of Chapter 2 he said “of those said, some are said with
intertwining, and some without intertwining”. So he’s going to subdivide, if you wish, he’s
going to distinguish the univocal names said without intertwining. Now he does add (perhaps)
something here, because he says “without ANY intertwining”, whereas before he had just said
“without intertwining”. What did that mean, when he spoke of it before? Well, he spoke of
affirmation, making a statement, like “man runs”, or something like that. And that is the kind of
intertwining that involves truth or falsity. But some of the commentators say “he may add”. The
Greek says kata medemian, which he [Coughlin] translates correctly here, in the sense of
“without any”. According to NO intertwining. So maybe he has in mind other kinds of
intertwining. Suppose we gave a name to a substance with an accident. Suppose you had a
black man. And suppose you gave one name to a black man, like “negro”, let’s say. Could
“negro” be put under one of these genera? No: “man” would be under substance, and “black”
would be under quality. If by “saint” I meant a man with some virtue, let’s say, could I put
“saint” under a category if that’s what I meant by it? No. Now, if you go back to the division of
beings, where you distinguish between subject and accident, if you have an intertwining of two
different natures, the nature of the substance and the nature of the accident, can you place that in
one category? No. So he may want to eliminate not only the intertwining that you have in a
statement, as when you say “man is a stone”, or “man is white”, but also if you were to
signify by a name something that involved intertwining.
The second thing to be noted, as we have said many times before, he says

of those said without any intertwining, each SIGNIFIES

and that’s the key that he’s talking about names, and not about things, that the categories
are names. And then he enumerates them:

100
 each signifies either substance, or how much, or how, or toward something, or where, or
when, or laid out [however you translate keisthai], or to have, or to act upon, or to undergo.

He enumerates the ten there. We will talk eventually about the order of those ten. It’s already
pretty obvious why substance comes first; because everything else will be said of substance or
exist in substance.

Cf. Duane H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories (Cat.8):

Now we have the ten genera of names said per se with the same speech or thought (the Greek
word is logos which can be translated as speech or thought) tes ousias, about what it is, in mind.
But before I add “of things”, I must add from the beginning of Chapter 2, “without inter-
twining”. If we want to be really complete, remember we mentioned how in Chapter 2 he
said that of those said some are said with intertwining and some without, and he explained
intertwining by when you affirm one of another. But when he got down to dividing the ten
in Chapter 4, he said not “of those said without intertwining”, but “of those said according
to no intertwining”, as if he had in mind other kinds of intertwining, not just affirmation
and negation (although those primarily). As I mentioned at the time, if “negro” is a name
meaning a black man, if that’s what that means, then there is an intertwining of two different
natures. One would be the nature of a particular kind of color, the other is the nature of a
particular kind of animal, a man, then you couldn’t put “negro” under one of the ten, because
there is an intertwining of two natures that are not in the same genus. You have to put man
under substance, and black under color and quality. So we have to add “without any
intertwining”, or as Aristotle says, “with no intertwining”. Finally, we add “of things”.

The ten genera of names said per se, univocally, and without any intertwining, of things.

Let me mention something which I don’t know if I made explicit.

Aristotle calls those ten the “genera of categories”, and the word “category” is used to mean all
those things that I spelled out. Sometimes I think even Aristotle himself, and I know everyone
else does, uses the word “categories” to mean the genera themselves. Some use the word
“categories” just to mean the ten highest genera. We saw the reason for that before by
antonomasia: these are the said-ofs, because nothing is said of them univocally, whereas if you
go down the line you get something that is both a predicate and a subject. I continue to call these
ten “the categories”, but Aristotle calls these ten “the genera of categories”. You do find that use
of the word.153

9. On ‘things said’ with respect to intertwining:

things said
without any intertwining: the ten genera of names
with some sort of intertwining
of a subject with a predicate: affirmation or denial
of a subject with an accident, etc.

the intertwining of a subject with a predicate: e.g. ‘Socrates is pale’.

the intertwining of a subject with an accident: e.g. ‘pale Socrates’.

153
Hence, according to Dr. Berquist, the word ‘categories’ means, first of all, the ten genera of names said
per se, univocally, and without any intertwining, of things; but by an extension of its meaning, the things
receiving this name, the ten highest genera of beings, are also called ‘categories’.

101
10. What substances signify in the acceptation of the logician.

Cf. Aristotle, Categories ch. 5 (3b 10-24) (tr. not given, rev. B.A.M.; Lat. Boethius):

[10] Every substance appears to signify a this something [= hoc aliquid]. It is indis-
putable and true that first substances signify a this something, for what is signified is some-
thing individual and one in number. But with second substances, although by the appearance
of the appellation it seems likewise to signify a this something, as when someone says either
“man” or [15] “animal”, this is not true, but rather it signifies such a something [= quale
quid]; for the subject is not one in the way a first substance is one, but rather “man” and
“animal” are said of many. Now this sort of name does not signify such a something simply,
in the way [20] “white” does; for “white” signifies nothing other than quality, whereas
genus and species determine a quality with respect to substance, for they signify such a
substance. Now more is in the determination of the genus than of the species; for saying
“animal” embraces more than “man”.154

11. What certain names signify in sum:

1. a “this something” (hoc aliquid) (e.g. first substance, like ‘Socrates’)

2. “such a something” (quale quid) (that is, it signifies a ‘sort’ or quality)
(a) what signifies such a something simply (e.g. an accident like ‘white’)
(b) not simply (e.g. second substance like ‘man’, a substance of a sort)

Note how the foregoing account makes clear that a name like ‘man’ signifies “such a
something”, where the ‘such’ names the form or nature, not the ‘substance’ of Chapter 1;
‘substance’ here meaning the supposit and not the ‘what it is’.

12. On quality in relation to substance.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 49, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

…[F]or, properly, quality imports a certain mode of substance. But as St. Augustine says
(Super gen. ad litteram), a mode is what a measure establishes beforehand, for which reason
it implies a certain determination according to some measure. And so, just as that according
to which the potency of matter is determined according to substantial being is called a
‘substantial’ quality, which is the difference of substance—so that according to which the
potency of a subject155 is determined according to accidental being is called an ‘accidental’

154
Omnis autem substantia videtur hoc aliquid significare, atque in primis quidem substantiis indubitabile et
verum est quoniam hoc aliquid significant. Individuum enim et unum numero est quod significatur. In se-
cundis vero substantiis, videtur quidem similiter appellationis figura hoc aliquid significare, quando quis
dixerit vel hominem vel animal, non tamen verum est, sed magis quale aliquid significat; neque enim est
unum quod subiectum est, quemadmodum prima substantia, sed de pluribus homo dicitur et animal. Non au-
tem simpliciter quale quid significat, quemadmodum album; nihil enim aliud album significat quam quali-
tatem, genus autem et species circa substantiam qualitatem determinant, qualem enim quamdam substantiam
significant. [In] plus autem in genere quam in specie determinatio fit; dicens enim animal plus complectitur
quam hominem.
155
On the difference between ‘subject’ and ‘matter’, cf. St. Thomas’ little work De Principiis Naturae, cap.
1: item, proprie loquendo, quod est in potentia ad esse accidentale dicitur subiectum, quod vero est in
potentia ad esse substantiale, dicitur proprie materia.... “Again, properly speaking, what is in potency to
accidental being is called ‘subject’, but what is in potency to substantial being is properly called ‘matter.”

102
 quality, which is also a certain difference, as is clear through the Philosopher in Metaphysics
V (cf. ch. 14, 1020a 33).156

• substantial quality is that according to which the potency of matter is determined to

substantial being (i.e. the substantial form)
• accidental quality is that according to which the potency of a subject is determined
to accidental being (i.e. an accidental form)

St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta. lect. 16, n. 1 (tr. B.A.M.).

He says therefore first that one mode of quality is according as ‘quality’ means the
difference of substance—that is, the difference by which something differs substantially
from another, which enters into the definition of a substance. And for this reason, it is said
[in the Isagoge] that difference is predicated in the quale quid. For example, if one were
asked, ‘What sort [quale] of animal is a man?’ we answer, ‘Two-footed’: ‘And what sort of
animal is a horse?’ we answer, ‘Four-footed’: ‘And what sort of figure is a circle?’ we
answer ‘sideless’—that is, ‘without an angle’; as if (a) quality were the very difference of
substance. In one way, then, ‘quality’ means the very difference of substance.157

13. On the difference between the quid est and the quale quid in predication.

Cf. Porphyry the Phoenician, Isagoge, cap. 1, “On Genus” (In: Porphyry. Introduction to
the Predicaments of Aristotle. By Charles Glen Wallis. Annapolis: St. Johns College, 1938,
p. 5):

And again, genus is distinguished from differences and common accidents in that, although
differences and common accidents are predicated of many differing in species, they are not
predicated in answer to “what is it?”* For when someone asks us of what differences and
common accidents are predicated, we reply that they are not predicated in answer to “what is
it?” but rather in answer to “of what quality [or ‘sort’] is it?”** For we reply, “Rational,” to
the question, “of what quality is man?” and to “of what quality is the crow?” we reply,
“Black.” For rational is the difference, and black is an accident. But when we are asked what
man is, we answer that he is an animal. For animal is the genus of man.

* e)n t%= ti/ e)/sti [= in the “what is it?”]

** e)n t%= poi=o/n ti e/)sti [= in the “of what sort is it?”]

156
…proprie enim qualitas importat quendam modum substantiae. modus autem est, ut dicit augustinus,
super gen. ad litteram, quem mensura praefigit, unde importat quandam determinationem secundum aliquam
mensuram. et ideo sicut id secundum quod determinatur potentia materiae secundum esse substantiale
dicitur qualitas quae est differentia substantiae; ita id secundum quod determinatur potentia subiecti
secundum esse accidentale, dicitur qualitas accidentalis, quae est etiam quaedam differentia, ut patet per
philosophum in v metaphys.. Note that since, in the next passage cited, St. Thomas explains the difference of
substance by taking specific differences, one must learn how the difference entering into a definition is taken
from the substantial form, the doctrine concerning which will be found below.
157
dicit ergo primo, quod unus modus qualitatis est secundum quod qualitas dicitur differentia substantiae,
idest differentia, per quam aliquid ab altero substantialiter differt, quae intrat in definitionem substantiae. et
propter hoc dicitur, quod differentia praedicatur in quale quid. ut si quaeratur, quale animal est homo?
respondemus quod bipes: et quale animal equus? respondemus quod quadrupes: et qualis figura est
circulus? respondemus quod agonion, id est sine angulo; ac si ipsa differentia substantiae qualitas sit. uno
igitur modo ipsa differentia substantiae qualitas dicitur. Note that these differences, inasmuch as they are
species-making ones, are essential. Cf. Edward Warren’s remark on Porphyry, excerpted on the next page.

103
Cf. Porphyry the Phoenician Isagoge. Translation, Introduction and Notes by Edward W.
Warren (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1975, n. 25, pp. 32-33):

The doctrine in this passage separates the specific difference qua quality from the essence.
Porphyry is following the thrust of the discussion in Topics 128a 20-29 where Aristotle
asserts that the genus most appropriately indicates essence. Also Metaphysics 1024b 5-6. At
Topics 122b 16-18 he asserts “...no differentia indicates the essence, but rather some quality,
such as ‘pedestrian’ and ‘biped’” (Loeb). To indicate the essence of the species one names
the genus. To indicate the essence of a primary substance one names the species and a
fortiori the difference. Categories 2b 7-22.... Later in Porphyry’s discussion of difference,
pp. 42-47 of the translation, he distinguishes three kinds, one of [32-33] which is specific
difference which brings about the division of genera into species. Thus, two kinds of
difference are qualitative and accidental, and the third is specific and essential. At a
conclusion of this discussion Ammonius remarks, “Consequently, the genus is analogous to
matter, the difference to form. Since matter provides existence158 for each thing while the
form supplies the qualitative difference, it is reasonable that the genus be predicated
essentially, analogous to matter, and for difference to be predicated qualitatively, analogous
to form.”

Cf. Porphyry the Phoenician, Isagoge, cap. 1, “On Difference” (In: Porphyry. Introduction
to the Predicaments of Aristotle. By Charles Glen Wallis. Annapolis: St. Johns College,
1938, pp. 10-11):

Again, they define difference also thus: difference is predicated in answer to “of what
quality [or ‘sort’]?” of those differing in species. For rational and mortal are predicated of
man in answer to “of what quality [or ‘sort’]?”. For when we are asked what man is, we
properly reply that he is animal; but when we are asked what quality [or ‘sort’] of animal he
is, we properly reply that he is rational and mortal. For since things are constituted of [10-11]
matter and form, or have a constitution analogous to matter and form,—as a statue is
constituted of bronze as matter and figure as form—, man as common and specific is
constituted of genus as the analogue of matter and of difference as the analogue of form; yet
man is the whole,—animal, rational, mortal—, in the same way as the statue.

14. On quale quid as meaning “how something is what it is”.

Cf. Duane H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories (Cat.2):

So it [sc. ‘difference’ understood as a predicable] is a name said with one meaning of many
things other in kind, but instead of signifying what it signifies how, although not an accidental
“how”, but it signifies how they are what they are. This is expressed in Latin with quale quid.
Aristotle says that “how” simply means an accident, particularly something in the genus of
quality, as if I asked “how are you today”, and you said “healthy” or “sick”, you are answering
from quality. Anything else would be “how” only in some respect or in a qualified way. When
you get to quantity, for example, we don’t say simply “how”, but “how much” or “how many”.
Now for difference, the Greek is very precise, and the Latin expresses something of the word
for “how” there, “quale quid”. That’s again qualified. It’s not “how” period, but how you are
what you are. And so “how” is unique to the genus of quality insofar as “how” is said without
qualification. If I want to talk about quantity, I say “how much” or “how many”, and if I want to
talk about the essential differences of things, I say “how is it what it is”. In grammar, the genus
is often a noun, and often both an accident and a difference would be, grammatically, an

158
Since matter has existence only through form, I am not certain what this statement means.

104
 adjective (not necessarily, but usually). I say “equilateral triangle” and “green triangle”, so I
have two adjectives modifying triangle, and so from a grammatical point of view there’s no
difference. But the logician looks at these and says that green is something accidental, it has
nothing to do with nature of triangle at all. On the other hand, he sees that it is of the very nature
of a triangle to have three sides, and “equilateral” says something about how those sides are,
and therefore says something about how the triangle is what it is. This is difference in the sense
of a species-making difference (sometimes the word “difference” is used for accidental things
too).

15. On quale quid in reference to the species-making difference.

Cf. Duane H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories (Cat.7):

This is true even of the sense of “how” that is in the Metaphysics that isn’t in this chapter
in the Categories. The sense of “how” that you have in the definition of difference in logic.
In Latin they express that quale quid; the difference doesn’t signify quid or what, like genus
and species do, but the difference signifies quale quid. But using “how” for quale, which is
the closest translation in English, I say that a difference signifies how it is what it is. It’s a
name said with one meaning of many things other in kind, signifying how they are what they
are. So I give the genus of square, and I say square is a quadrilateral. But not only is a square
a quadrilateral, but a rhombus and a rhomboid and an oblong and a trapezium and so on.
Then I use a difference like “equilateral” or “right angled” and so on. And so I limit
quadrilateral; even there you see the idea of determination. When I say “four sided”, that
says nothing about the length of the sides, that says nothing about the angles at which they
meet, all of that is undetermined. And the difference determines which it is. But the
difference signifies how they are what they are under the genus.
You’ll see that in various uses of the word “how”: “how much”. Someone says this is a
long sofa, and I say I have a long wall, or this stretch limousine, but I have a long garage.
You have to say “how long”.“We’re sending you up for many years”. Well, “how many
years?” You can see in these many uses of the word “how” that it has what Thomas is
saying. It’s the idea of a determination, it determines something. That’s going to be
important for the reason Thomas will give for distinguishing these species.
Now in the next paragraph he makes a comparison, a bit like I was doing, between an
accidental how, or a how that is tied up with one of the kinds of accident, and the other
that I mentioned, the quale quid, which you can have even in substance. He says:

Just as that according to which the potency of matter according to its substantial being is
determined is called a quality, which is the difference of substance, so that according to
which the potency of the subject is determined according to accidental being is called
accidental quality, which is also a difference in a way, as is clear through the Philosopher
in the fifth book of the Metaphysics.

I think, if you look at the Isagoge, you’ll see that Porphyry is distinguishing the species-
making difference from accidental differences. So if some triangles are red and some tri-
angles are white and some triangles are blue, those are differences, but not species-making
differences. And Porphyry is defining species-making difference, although we often call it
“difference” for short. But the word “difference” can actually be applied to accidental
differences, like red white and blue triangles. So Thomas is comparing what determines
the potency of matter in its substantial being, what we call the substantial form, with
the accidental determination of something by a quality in the genus of quality. In both
cases what you have in common is the idea of determination, of limiting something that
could be more than one way. [end excerpt]

105
Supplement: Plato on the foregoing principles:

Cf. Plato, Timaeus (tr. Benjamin Jowett):

In the first place, we see that what we just now called water, by condensation, I suppose,
becomes stone and earth; and this same element, when melted and dispersed, passes into
vapour and air. Air, again, when inflamed, becomes fire; and again fire, when condensed and
extinguished, passes once more into the form of air; and once more, air, when collected and
condensed, produces cloud and mist; and from these, when still more compressed, comes
flowing water, and from water comes earth and stones once more; and thus generation
appears to be transmitted from one to the other in a circle. Thus, then, as the several
elements never present themselves in the same form, how can any one have the assurance to
assert positively that any of them, whatever it may be, is one thing rather than another? No
one can. But much the safest plan is to speak of them as follows: — Anything which we see
to be continually changing, as, for example, fire, we must not call “this” or “that,” but rather
say that it is “of such a nature”; nor let us speak of water as “this”; but always as “such”; nor
must we imply that there is any stability in any of those things which we indicate by the use
of the words “this” and “that,” supposing ourselves to signify something thereby; for they
are too volatile to be detained in any such expressions as “this,” or “that,” or “relative to
this,” or any other mode of speaking which represents them as permanent. We ought not to
apply “this” to any of them, but rather the word “such”; which expresses the similar prin-
ciple circulating in each and all of them; for example, that should be called “fire” which is of
such a nature always, and so of everything that has generation. That in which the elements
severally grow up, and appear, and decay, is alone to be called by the name “this” or “that”;
but that which is of a certain nature, hot or white, or anything which admits of opposite
equalities, and all things that are compounded of them, ought not to be so denominated.

16. The difference between quale quid and quid est in the Isagoge of Porphyry and their
agreement in the Categories of Aristotle.

Note the difference between the roles played by the foregoing terms in their re-
spective parts of logic: In Porphyry’s treatment of the predicables, quale quid is opposed to
quid est, inasmuch as differences and common accidents are predicated in the ‘what sort is
it?’, but genera and species in the ‘what is it?’ But in Aristotle’s treatment of the predica-
ments, quale quid and quid est come together, inasmuch as the form or nature expressing
the ‘what it is’ or essence of a substance by that very fact says the ‘sort of thing’ it is, as
saying ‘a man’ tells us the sort of thing Socrates is.159 Hence, in the Isagoge we observe
that Porphyry distinguishes between the quale quid and the quid est in the exercise of pre-
dication, whereas in the Categories Aristotle, by explaining how the ‘what it is’ of a name
expresses the sort of thing it is, brings them together. As for the question of how ‘the dif-
ference of substance’ is explained in one way by the substantial form but in another by the
specific difference, cf. the passages quoted below in which St. Thomas explains the way in
which genus and difference are taken from matter and form.

17. Supplement.

159
Cf. Dirk M. Schenkenveld and Jonathan Barnes, Hellenistic Philosophy, Part II. Logic and Language, Ch.
6, “Language”, p. 196: “The word ‘cow’ signifies an animal of such-and-such a sort.” Cf. the remarks of
Henry and Buckner questioning Aristotle’s grasp of this point cited above.

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Cf. Michael Augros, “Porphyry’s Isagoge as an Introduction to Logic”:

We can now see the chief reason why the logician must discuss various predicables before
investigating how to make definitions. A definition itself is composed of many names for the
thing defined, and so we must know the thing well enough to name it by any one of those
names before we know it well enough to name it by all of them together and in a certain
order, i.e. before we know it well enough to define it. In short, we name things before we
define them. Therefore some consideration of naming must precede any consideration of
defining. The art of naming, then, is a part of the logic of the first act presupposed to its chief
part, the art of defining. Since, for example, every name in a definition (or in a premise or a
syllogism) must be a proper name of the thing defined, it is necessary before beginning the
art of defining to distinguish the proper name from the improper name such as the metaphor
or metonym. And among proper names, it is necessary to distinguish between those said of
many things and those said of only one, such as “Socrates”, since the definition will employ
only names said of many things. And among those said of many, it will be necessary to
distinguish between those said of many for the same reason, and those said of many for
different reasons. One begins to see, here, why Aristotle opens his Categories as he does.
Finally, one must understand “names said univocally of many things” before one is ready to
begin the art of defining, since such names are the only kinds of names to be used in
definitions. But “name said univocally of many things” is the definition of “predicable”, and
hence Porphyry’s Isagoge, which defines and distinguishes the predicables, should be read
before Aristotle’s Categories.
If the chief purpose of the logic of the first act is to direct reason in making definitions,
then it must determine what are the parts of definition and in what order they are to be put
together. Now a perfect definition is composed of many names, namely of a genus and
several species-making differences, and the name of the thing being defined is a species in
comparison to the first name in the definition. All three of these predicables, therefore, are
mentioned explicitly in the Categories.
But, as Aristotle notes in other logical works, and even in his writings concerned with
other sciences, it is not always possible to define a thing so perfectly. Sometimes it is
difficult or altogether impossible for reason to discover the species-making differences, in
which case it is necessary to use names less perfect in making the definition, namely
properties. For a property, like a species-making difference, distinguishes and separates
things. Although the species-making difference signifies how a thing is what it is, and the
property does not signify the what-it-is of its subject at all, at least the property signifies
what the subject has because of what it is. The property, then, is not entirely disconnected
from the what-it-is of its subject, but names an effect of it, and so may be used in place of a
species-making difference. But in no case is it acceptable to use the kind of name called an
accident in making a definition of a thing, since the accident not only does not signify the
what-it-is, but signifies what the subject has because of something other than what it is. Such
a name is worthless in defining a thing, but perhaps useful in defining a name (which
nominal definition might be a useful starting point in finding the definition of the thing
signified by the name). For example, in explaining what is meant by the name “chalk”, one
might include that it is something white.
One might define each of the predicables, then, in two ways. First, in themselves and in
their order to each other. Accordingly, a genus is a name said univocally of many things
other in species signifying what they are, a difference is a name said univocally of many
things other in species signifying how they are what they are, a species is a name said
univocally of many things under a genus signifying what they are, a property is a name said
univocally of many things signifying what they have because of what they are, and an
accident is a name said univocally of many things signifying what they have because of
something other than what they are. Second, in their order to definition. Accordingly, the
species is the name of a thing being defined, the genus is the first name in the definition, a

107
 difference is one of the other names in the definition, a property is the second-best name to
use if we do not know the difference, and an accident is a name wholly useless in the
definition of the thing (though perhaps useful in the definition of its name). It is necessary,
then, to understand the different kinds of names said univocally of many things (predicables)
before one can understand the nature of success and failure in definition. Therefore, if one
does not know the various kinds of names, one will not see the order Aristotle’s Categories
has to the work of making definitions.
In summary, the logician investigates the various categories or highest genera because they
are found at the roots of every definition. Hence, to the extent that one’s understanding of
the highest genera is weak and vague, so too is one’s understanding of what anything is.
Moreover, one road to definition is by appropriate division of a genus. But one cannot
possibly divide the genus of a thing if one does not know what its genus is. Hence it is
necessary to understand well the genera of all things before defining, for the genus is the
beginning of a definition. But does this mean that nothing is to be read before the
Categories? Obviously, one cannot understand what the Categories is about if one does not
understand what a category is. Since a category is a highest genus and a genus is a kind of
predicable, one cannot understand what the Categories is about without understanding what
a predicable is and how a genus differs from the other kinds of predicables. But Aristotle
does not discuss this in the Categories itself. Consequently, it is necessary to read the
Isagoge (or something very like it), which defines and distinguishes all the predicables,
before reading the Categories, and so before any of the later parts of logic.

18. Supplement.

Cf. De Ente et Essentia by Thomas Aquinas translated as Aquinas on Being and Essence a
translation and interpretation by Joseph Bobik, cap. 3, nn. 24-36:

24. It is clear, therefore, that the essence of man and the essence of Socrates do not differ,
except as the non-designated from the designated. Whence the Commentator says in his
considerations on the seventh book of the Metaphysics that “Socrates is nothing other than
animality and rationality, which are his quiddity.”160

25. The essence of the genus and that of the species also differ in this way, i.e., as the non-
designated from the designated, although the mode of the designation differs in each case.
Whereas the designation of the individual with respect to the species is through matter
determined by dimensions, the designation of the species with respect to the genus is
through the constitutive difference which is taken from the form of the thing.161

26. This designation which is in the species with respect to the genus is not through
something in the essence of the species which is in no way in the essence of the genus;
rather, whatever is in the species is also in the genus, but as undetermined. For, if animal
were not the whole that man is, but a part of man, it would not be predicated of man,
since no integral part may be predicated of its whole.162

160 sic ergo patet quod essentia hominis et essentia socratis non differunt nisi secundum signatum et non
signatum. unde commentator dicit super vii metaphysicae: socrates nihil aliud est quam animalitas et
rationalitas, quae sunt quiditas eius.
161
sic etiam essentia generis et speciei secundum signatum et non signatum differunt, quamvis alius modus
designationis sit utrobique, quia designatio individui respectu speciei est per materiam determinatam
dimensionibus, designatio autem speciei respectu generis est per differentiam constitutivam, quae ex forma
rei sumitur.
162 haec autem determinatio vel designatio, quae est in specie respectu generis, non est per aliquid in essentia

speciei exsistens, quod nullo modo in essentia generis sit, immo quicquid est in specie, est etiam in genere ut

108
 27. We can see how this comes about if we examine how body taken as part of animal
differs from body taken as genus; for body cannot be a genus in the same way in which body
is an integral part.163

28. The word “body” can be taken in many ways. Body according as it is in the genus
substance is so called from the fact that it has a nature such that three dimensions can be
designated in it; but the three designated dimensions themselves are a body according as
body is in the genus quantity. Now, it happens in things that what has one perfection may
also attain to further perfection. This is clear, for example, in man who has a sensitive
nature, and further an intellectual nature. Similarly, another perfection, such as life or some
other such perfection, can be added to the perfection of having a form such that three
dimensions can be designated in it. The word “body,” therefore can signify some real thing
which has a form from which follows the possibility of designating in it three dimensions,
and signify this in an excluding way, i.e., in such a way such that no further perfection may
follow from that form; in a way such that if anything be added, it is outside the signification
of body.

Taken in this way, body will be an integral and material part of animal because soul will be
outside what is signified by the word “body”; the soul will be something over and above the
body, in a way such that animal is constituted out of these two as out of parts, i.e., out of soul
and body.164

29. The word “body” can also be taken in another way, namely, to signify a thing which has
a form such that three dimensions can be designated in it, no matter what sort of form it is,
whether some further perfection can come from it or not. And taken in this way, body will be
a genus of animal, because there is nothing in animal which is not implicitly contained in
body. Soul is not a form other than the form through which three dimensions could be
designated in that thing; thus, when we said that body is that which has a form such that
because of it three dimensions can be designated in the body, form meant any form, whether
animality or stoneness, or any other form. And so the form of animal is implicitly contained
in the form of body, when body is its genus.165

non determinatum. si enim animal non esset totum quod est homo, sed pars eius, non praedicaretur de eo,
cum nulla pars integralis de suo toto praedicetur.
163 hoc autem quomodo contingat videri poterit, si inspiciatur qualiter differt corpus secundum quod ponitur

pars animalis et secundum quod ponitur genus. non enim potest eo modo esse genus, quo est pars integralis.
164 hoc igitur nomen quod est corpus multipliciter accipi potest. corpus enim, secundum quod est in genere

substantiae, dicitur ex eo quod habet talem naturam, ut in eo possint designari tres dimensiones; ipsae enim
tres dimensiones designatae sunt corpus, quod est in genere quantitatis. Contingit autem in rebus, ut quod
habet unam perfectionem ad ulteriorem etiam perfectionem pertingat, sicut patet in homine, qui et naturam
sensitivam habet et ulterius intellectivam. similiter etiam et super hanc perfectionem, quae est habere talem
formam, ut in ea possint tres dimensiones designari, potest alia perfectio adiungi, ut vita vel aliquid
huiusmodi. potest ergo hoc nomen corpus significare rem quandam, quae habet talem formam, ex qua
sequitur in ipsa designabilitas trium dimensionum cum praecisione, ut scilicet ex illa forma nulla ulterior
perfectio sequatur; sed si quid aliud superadditur, sit praeter significationem corporis sic dicti. et hoc modo
corpus erit integralis et materialis pars animalis, quia sic anima erit praeter id quod significatum est nomine
corporis et erit superveniens ipsi corpori, ita quod ex ipsis duobus, scilicet anima et corpore, sicut ex
partibus constituetur animal.
165 potest etiam hoc nomen corpus hoc modo accipi, ut significet rem quandam, quae habet talem formam, ex

qua tres dimensiones possunt in ea designari, quaecumque forma sit illa, sive ex ea possit provenire aliqua
ulterior perfectio sive non. et hoc modo corpus erit genus animalis, quia in animali nihil est accipere quod
non implicite in corpore continetur. non enim anima est alia forma ab illa, per quam in re illa poterant
designari tres dimensiones; et ideo, cum dicebatur quod corpus est quod habet talem formam, ex qua possunt
designari tres dimensiones in eo, intelligebatur: quaecumque forma esset, sive animalitas sive lapideitas sive
quaecumque alia. et sic forma animalis implicite in forma corporis continetur, prout corpus est genus eius.

109
 30. And such likewise is the relation of animal to man. For, if animal were to name only that
thing which has a perfection such that it can sense and be moved by a principle within itself,
and name this thing as excluding other perfection, then any further perfection would be
related to animal as a part, and not as implicitly contained in the notion of animal; and so,
animal would not be a genus.

Animal is a genus according as it signifies a thing from whose form the senses and
movement can come forth, no matter what sort of form it is, whether a sensible soul
only or a soul which is both sensible and rational.166

31. The genus, thus, signifies indeterminately everything that is in the species; it does
not signify the matter alone. Similarly, the difference, too, signifies everything in the
species, and not the form alone; the definition, too, signifies the whole, and so does the
species, but in diverse ways.167

32. For the genus signifies the whole as a name determining what is material in the real
thing without the determination of the proper form. Whence the genus is taken from
the matter, although it is not the matter.

And from this it is clear that a body is called a body from the fact that it has a perfection
such that three dimensions can be designated in the body, and that this perfection is related
materially to further perfection.168

33. The difference, on the contrary, is a name taken from a determinate form, and
taken in a determinate way, i.e. as not including a determinate matter in its meaning.
This is clear, for example, when we say animated, i.e., that which has a soul; for what it is,
whether a body or something other, is not expressed. Whence Ibn-Sînâ says that the genus is
not understood in the difference as a part of its essence, but only as something outside its
essence, as the subject also is understood in its properties. And this is why the genus is not
predicated essentially of the difference, as the Philosopher says in the third book of the
Metaphysics and in the fourth book of the Topics, but only in the way in which a subject is
predicated of its property.169

166 et talis est etiam habitudo animalis ad hominem. si enim animal nominaret tantum rem quandam, quae
habet talem perfectionem, ut possit sentire et moveri per principium in ipso existens cum praecisione alterius
perfectionis, tunc quaecumque alia perfectio ulterior superveniret, haberet se ad animal per modum partis et
non sicut implicite contenta in ratione animalis, et sic animal non esset genus; sed est genus secundum quod
significat rem quandam, ex cuius forma potest provenire sensus et motus, quaecumque sit illa forma, sive sit
anima sensibilis tantum sive sensibilis et rationalis simul.
167
sic ergo genus significat indeterminate totum id quod est in specie, non enim significat tantum materiam;
similiter etiam differentia significat totum et non significat tantum formam; et etiam diffinitio significat
totum, et etiam species. sed tamen diversimode,
168
quia genus significat totum ut quaedam denominatio determinans id quod est materiale in re sine
determinatione propriae formae. unde genus sumitur ex materia, quamvis non sit materia, ut patet quod
corpus dicitur ex hoc quod habet talem perfectionem, ut possint in eo designari tres dimensiones; quae
quidem perfectio est materialiter se habens ad ulteriorem perfectionem.
169
differentia vero e converso est sicut quaedam denominatio a forma determinate sumpta praeter hoc quod
de primo intellectu eius sit materia determinata, ut patet, cum dicitur animatum, scilicet illud quod habet
animam; non enim determinatur quid sit, utrum corpus vel aliquid aliud. unde dicit avicenna quod genus non
intelligitur in differentia sicut pars essentiae eius, sed solum sicut ens extra essentiam, sicut etiam subiectum
est de intellectu passionum. et ideo etiam genus non praedicatur de differentia per se loquendo, ut dicit
philosophus in iii metaphysicae et in iv topicorum, nisi forte sicut subiectum praedicatur de passione.

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 34. The definition, lastly, and the species include both, namely the determinate matter
which the name of the genus designates, and the determinate form which the name of
the difference designates.170

35. From this it is clear why the genus, the difference, and the species are related
proportionately to the matter, to the form, and to the composite in nature, although
they are not identical with them.

36. The genus is not the matter, but taken from the matter as signifying the whole; nor
is the difference the form, but taken from the form as signifying the whole.171

Ibid., nn. 48-49.

48. It is clear, therefore, that the word “man” and the word “humanity” signify the essence of
man, but diversely, as we have said; the word “man” signifies it as a whole, inasmuch as it
does not exclude designation by matter, but contains it implicitly and indistinctly, as we have
said before that the genus contains the difference. And this is why the word “man” is
predicated of individuals. But the word “humanity” signifies it as a part, because it contains
in its signification only what belongs to man as man, and it excludes all designation by
matter. Whence it is not predicated of individual men.172

49. And this is why the word “essence” is sometimes found predicated of a real thing, for we
say that Socrates is a certain essence; and sometimes it is denied, as when we say that the
essence of Socrates is not Socrates.173 (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 76, art. 4, obj. 3, c. (in part), ad 4 (tr.
English Dominican Fathers):

Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 2), that the genus is
taken from the matter, and difference from the form. But “rational,” which is the dif-
ference constituting man, is taken from the intellectual soul;174 while he is called
“animal” by reason of his having a body animated by a sensitive soul. Therefore the
intellectual soul may be compared to the body animated by a sensitive soul, as form to
matter. Therefore in man the intellectual soul is not essentially the same as the sensitive
soul, but presupposes it as a material subject.175

170
sed diffinitio vel species comprehendit utrumque, scilicet determinatam materiam, quam designat nomen
generis, et determinatam formam, quam designat nomen differentiae.
171
ex hoc patet ratio quare genus, species et differentia se habent proportionaliter ad materiam et formam et
compositum in natura, quamvis non sint idem quod illa, quia neque genus est materia, sed a materia
sumptum ut significans totum, neque differentia forma, sed a forma sumpta ut significans totum. Note that
this last statement makes clear the relation of the substantial form to the difference of substance.
172
sic igitur patet quod essentiam hominis significat hoc nomen homo et hoc nomen humanitas, sed
diversimode, ut dictum est, quia hoc nomen homo significat eam ut totum, in quantum scilicet non praecidit
designationem materiae, sed implicite, continet eam et indistincte, sicut dictum est quod genus continet
differentiam; et ideo praedicatur hoc nomen homo de individuis. sed hoc nomen humanitas significat eam ut
partem, quia non continet in significatione sua nisi id, quod est hominis in quantum est homo, et praecidit
omnem designationem. unde de individuis hominis non praedicatur.
173
et propter hoc etiam nomen essentiae quandoque invenitur praedicatum in re, dicimus enim socratem esse
essentiam quandam; et quandoque negatur, sicut dicimus quod essentia socratis non est socrates.
174
Which is man’s substantial form. Consequently, considered as a principle of his being, the ‘difference of
substance’ is referred to his substantial form, which is the intellectual soul; but considered as that from which
he is what he is, his ‘quality’ is referred to the specific difference, ‘rational’.
175
Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VIII Metaphys., quod genus sumitur a materia, differentia vero a forma.
Sed rationale, quod est differentia constitutiva hominis, sumitur ab anima intellectiva; animal vero dicitur ex

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 corp. ...The opinion of Plato might be maintained if, as he held, the soul was supposed to be
united to the body, not as its form, but as its motor. For it involves nothing unreasonable that
the same movable thing be moved by several motors; and still less if it be moved according
to its various parts. If we suppose, however, that the soul is united to the body as its form, it
is quite impossible for several essentially different souls to be in one body. This can be made
clear by three different reasons.176

In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely one, in which there were several souls.
For nothing is absolutely one except by one form, by which a thing has existence: because a
thing has from the same source both existence and unity; and therefore things which are
denominated by various forms are not absolutely one; as, for instance, “a white man.”
If, therefore, man were ‘living’ by one form, the vegetative soul, and ‘animal’ by another
form, the sensitive soul, and “man” by another form, the intellectual soul, it would follow
that man is not absolutely one. Thus Aristotle argues, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6), against
Plato, that if the idea of an animal is distinct from the idea of a biped, then a biped animal is
not absolutely one. For this reason, against those who hold that there are several souls in the
body, he asks (De Anima i, 5), “what contains them?”—that is, what makes them one? It
cannot be said that they are united by the one body; because rather does the soul contain the
body and make it one, than the reverse.177

Secondly, this is proved to be impossible by the manner in which one thing is pre-
dicated of another. Those things which are derived from various forms are predicated
of one another, either accidentally, (if the forms are not ordered to one another, as
when we say that something white is sweet), or essentially, in the second manner of
essential predication, (if the forms are ordered one to another, the subject belonging to
the definition of the predicate; as a surface is presupposed to color; so that if we say
that a body with a surface is colored, we have the second manner of essential
predication.) Therefore, if we have one form by which a thing is an animal, and another
form by which it is a man, it follows either that one of these two things could not be
predicated of the other, except accidentally, supposing these two forms not to be ordered to
one another—or that one would be predicated of the other according to the second manner of
essential predication, if one soul be presupposed to the other. But both of these consequences
are clearly false: because “animal” is predicated of man essentially and not accidentally; and
man is not part of the definition of an animal, but the other way about.

hoc quod habet corpus animatum anima sensitiva. Anima ergo intellectiva comparatur ad corpus animatum
anima sensitiva, sicut forma ad materiam. Non ergo anima intellectiva est eadem per essentiam cum anima
sensitiva in homine; sed praesupponit eam sicut materiale suppositum.
176
...Opinio autem Platonis sustineri utique posset, si poneretur quod anima unitur corpori, non ut forma,
sed ut motor, ut posuit Plato. Nihil enim inconveniens sequitur, si idem mobile a diversis motoribus
moveatur, praecipue secundum diversas partes. Sed si ponamus animam corpori uniri sicut formam, omnino
impossibile videtur plures animas per essentiam differentes in uno corpore esse. Quod quidem triplici ratione
manifestari potest.
177
Primo quidem, quia animal non esset simpliciter unum, cuius essent animae plures. Nihil enim est
simpliciter unum nisi per formam unam, per quam habet res esse, ab eodem enim habet res quod sit ens et
quod sit una; et ideo ea quae denominantur a diversis formis, non sunt unum simpliciter, sicut homo albus. Si
igitur homo ab alia forma haberet quod sit vivum, scilicet ab anima vegetabili; et ab alia forma quod sit
animal, scilicet ab anima sensibili; et ab alia quod sit homo, scilicet ab anima rationali; sequeretur quod
homo non esset unum simpliciter, sicut et Aristoteles argumentatur contra Platonem, in VIII Metaphys., quod
si alia esset idea animalis, et alia bipedis, non esset unum simpliciter animal bipes. Et propter hoc, in I de
anima, contra ponentes diversas animas in corpore, inquirit quid contineat illas, idest quid faciat ex eis
unum. Et non potest dici quod uniantur per corporis unitatem, quia magis anima continet corpus, et facit
ipsum esse unum, quam e converso.

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 Therefore of necessity by the same form a thing is animal and man; otherwise man would
not really be the thing which is an animal, so that animal can be essentially predicated of
man.178

Thirdly, this is shown to be impossible by the fact that when one operation of the soul is
intense it impedes another, which could never be the case unless the principle of action were
essentially one.179

We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the intellectual soul, and the
nutritive soul are numerically one soul. This can easily be explained, if we consider the
differences of species and forms. For we observe that the species and forms of things
differ from one another, as the perfect and imperfect; as in the order of things, the
animate are more perfect than the inanimate, and animals more perfect than plants, and man
than brute animals; and in each of these genera there are various degrees. For this reason
Aristotle, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 3), compares the species of things to numbers, which differ
in species by the addition or subtraction of unity. And (De Anima ii, 3) he compares the
various souls to the species of figures, one of which contains another; as a pentagon contains
and exceeds a tetragon. Thus the intellectual soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the
sensitive soul of brute animals, and to the nutritive souls of plants. Therefore, as a surface
which is of a pentagonal shape, is not tetragonal by one shape, and pentagonal by another—
since a tetragonal shape would be superfluous as contained in the pentagonal—so neither is
Socrates a man by one soul, and animal by another; but by one and the same soul he is both
animal and man.180

Reply to Objection 4. We must not consider the diversity of natural things as proceeding
from the various logical notions or intentions, which flow from our manner of
understanding, because reason can apprehend one and the same thing in various ways.
Therefore since, as we have said, the intellectual soul contains virtually what belongs to the
sensitive soul, and something more, reason can consider separately what belongs to the
power of the sensitive soul, as something imperfect and material.

178
Secundo, hoc apparet impossibile ex modo praedicationis. Quae enim sumuntur a diversis formis,
praedicantur ad invicem vel per accidens, si formae non sint ad invicem ordinatae, puta cum dicimus quod
album est dulce, vel, si formae sint ordinatae ad invicem, erit praedicatio per se, in secundo modo dicendi
per se, quia subiectum ponitur in definitione praedicati. Sicut superficies praeambula est ad colorem, si ergo
dicamus quod corpus superficiatum est coloratum, erit secundus modus praedicationis per se. Si ergo alia
forma sit a qua aliquid dicitur animal, et a qua aliquid dicitur homo, sequeretur quod vel unum horum non
possit praedicari de altero nisi per accidens, si istae duae formae ad invicem ordinem non habent; vel quod
sit ibi praedicatio in secundo modo dicendi per se, si una animarum sit ad aliam praeambula. Utrumque
autem horum est manifeste falsum, quia animal per se de homine praedicatur, non per accidens; homo autem
non ponitur in definitione animalis, sed e converso. Ergo oportet eandem formam esse per quam aliquid est
animal, et per quam aliquid est homo, alioquin homo non vere esset id quod est animal, ut sic animal per se
de homine praedicetur.
179
Tertio, apparet hoc esse impossibile per hoc, quod una operatio animae, cum fuerit intensa, impedit
aliam. Quod nullo modo contingeret, nisi principium actionum esset per essentiam unum.
180
Sic ergo dicendum quod eadem numero est anima in homine sensitiva et intellectiva et nutritiva.
Quomodo autem hoc contingat, de facili considerari potest, si quis differentias specierum et formarum
attendat. Inveniuntur enim rerum species et formae differre ab invicem secundum perfectius et minus
perfectum, sicut in rerum ordine animata perfectiora sunt inanimatis, et animalia plantis, et homines
animalibus brutis, et in singulis horum generum sunt gradus diversi. Et ideo Aristoteles, in VIII Metaphys.,
assimilat species rerum numeris, qui differunt specie secundum additionem vel subtractionem unitatis. Et in
II de anima, comparat diversas animas speciebus figurarum, quarum una continet aliam; sicut pentagonum
continet tetragonum, et excedit. Sic igitur anima intellectiva continet in sua virtute quidquid habet anima
sensitiva brutorum, et nutritiva plantarum. Sicut ergo superficies quae habet figuram pentagonam, non per
aliam figuram est tetragona, et per aliam pentagona; quia superflueret figura tetragona, ex quo in pentagona
continetur; ita nec per aliam animam Socrates est homo, et per aliam animal, sed per unam et eandem.

113
 And because it observes that this is something common to man and to other animals, it
forms thence the notion of the “genus”; while that wherein the intellectual soul exceeds
the sensitive soul, it takes as formal and perfecting; thence it gathers the “difference” of
man.181 (emphasis added)

Cf. Ignotus Auctor, Summa Totius Logicae Aristotelis, tract. 1, cap. 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

TR1 CP02

genus, ut hic sumitur, est quod praedicatur de Genus, as it is taken here, is what is predicated
pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quid. of many things differing in species in the ‘what
it is’.

ad videndum autem particulas hujus descripti- In order to see the particulars of this description,
onis, sciendum est, quod genus dicitur praedi- it must be understood that genus is said to be
cari de pluribus speciebus, seu dividitur in predicated of many species, or divided into
plures species. many species.

et cum non sit unum re, sed solum secundum And since it is not one in the thing [i.e. ‘in
rationem, ideo non dividitur secundum rem. reality’], but only according to reason, therefore
it is not divided according to the thing.

et quia genus non est unum re; ideo partes sub- And because a genus is not one in the thing;
jectivae, seu species in quas dividitur, sunt therefore the subjective parts or species into
realiter diversae et distinctae inter se: which it is divided are really [in reality] diverse
and distinct among themselves.

ideo oportet quod aliquod reale habeant in se, And so it is necessary that something real be
per quod reale una sit diversa ab alia. possessed in itself through which real thing one
is diverse from another.

ubi nota, quod una et eadem res per suam
essentiam cum essentia alterius rei habet ali-
quam conformitatem seu convenientiam, et ali-
quam difformitatem realem: quae conformitas
vel difformitas potest esse major vel minor per
comparationem ad diversas res.
Where note that one and the same thing by its
own essence has a certain conformity or aggre-
ment with the essence of another thing, and
some real difformity [difference in form]: which
conformity or difformity can be greater or less
in comparison to diverse things.

verbi gratia, socrates per essentiam suam quae For example, Socrates by his own essence
est ex hac anima et hoc corpore, conformatur which is from this soul and this body, is con-
platoni, et huic equo, et huic plantae: formed to Plato, and to this horse, and to this
plant:

socrates enim per suam essentiam est rationalis, for Socrates by his own essence is rational, and
sensibilis et vivus: sensitive, and living:

181
Ad quartum dicendum quod non oportet secundum diversas rationes vel intentiones logicas, quae
consequuntur modum intelligendi, diversitatem in rebus naturalibus accipere, quia ratio unum et idem
secundum diversos modos apprehendere potest. Quia igitur, ut dictum est, anima intellectiva virtute continet
id quod sensitiva habet, et adhuc amplius; potest seorsum ratio considerare quod pertinet ad virtutem
sensitivae, quasi quoddam imperfectum et materiale. Et quia hoc invenit commune homini et aliis animali-
bus, ex hoc rationem generis format. Id vero in quo anima intellectiva sensitiva excedit, accipit quasi formale
et completivum, et ex eo format differentiam hominis.

114
in omnibus his tribus est conformis platoni: in all three things he is conformed to Plato:

huic autem equo est conformis in duobus, but to this horse he is conformed in two things,
scilicet in sensibili et in vivo, et in uno est namely, in sensitive and in living, and in one
difformis, quia in eo est realiter rationale, quod difform, because in in him ‘rational’ really
non est in hoc equo: exists, and not in this horse:

huic vero plantae conformis est in uno, scilicet, but to this plant he is conformed in one thing,
in vivo. namely, in living.

quia vero intellectus noster ea quae in re sunt But because our intellect can distinguish those
conjuncta potest distinguere, quando unum things which are conjoined in the thing, when
eorum non cadit in ratione alterius; one of them does not fall into the account of the
other—

et cum rationale in se consideratum non sit de
ratione sensibilis, nec sensibile de ratione vivi,
ideo ea in socrate separatim accipit, ut dictum
est, per respectum ad diversa.
and since ‘rational’ considered in itself is not of
the account of ‘sensitive’, nor ‘sensitive’ of the
account of ‘living’, therefore each is taken
separately in Socrates by a respect to diverse
things.

quando ergo intellectus considerat in re illud in When, therefore, the intellect consider in a thing
quo convenit cum aliis rebus, illi rei conceptae that in which it agrees with other things, to
attribuit intentionem universalitatis. those things conceived it attributes the intention
of universality.

et quia in qualibet re singulari est considerare
aliquid quod est proprium illius rei in quantum
est haec res, sicut in socrate est considerare
aliquid quod est ita proprium socratis in
quantum est hic homo, quod nulli alii convenit.
And because in any singular thing there is to
consider something that is proper to that thing
inasmuch as it has this thing, just as in Socrates
there is to consider something which is thus
proper to Socrates inasmuch as he is man, which
belongs to no other other things.

rei ergo sic conceptae attribuit intellectus inten-
tionem singularitatis, et vocat illud singulare vel
individuum: et hae secundae intentiones sunt,
scilicet universalitas et singularitas.
Therefore to the thing thus conceived the
intellect attributes the intention of singularity,
and calls that ‘singular’ or ‘individual’: and
these, namely, universality or singularity, are
second intentions.

unde, licet supra dictum fuerit quod intentiones Whence, although it was said above that inten-
fiunt ab intellectu, tamen oportet quod aliquod tions are made by the intellect, still it is neces-
fundamentum habeant in re extra: sary that they have a foundation in the thing
outside:

nam intentioni singularitatis respondet extra
illud quod est proprium socratis in quantum est
hic homo; intentioni vero universalitatis
respondet extra ut fundamentum illud in quo
socrates est conformis cum aliis rebus.
for to the intention of singularity corresponds
outside that which is proper to Socrates inas-
much as he is this man; but to the intention of
universality corresponds outside as a foundation
that in which Socrates is conformed to other
things.

cum igitur ea quae in uno conformantur et in Since, therefore, those things which are con-
alio sunt difformia, dummodo talis difformitas formed in one thing and are difform in another,
sit secundum formam, et non secundum even though such difformity be according to a

115
materiam signatam, vel secundum illud quod est
proprium huic individuo in quantum hujusmodi;
illi uni in quo talia conveniunt, attribuit intel-
lectus intentionem generis, et vocat genus.
form, and not according to designated matter, or
according to that which is proper to this indi-
vidual inasmuch as he is of this sort—to that
one thing in which they agree, the intellect attri-
butes the intention of genus, and calls it genus.

ubi nota secundum avicennam quod duplex est Where note according to Avicenna that form is
forma: twofold:

quaedam est quae est pars compositi, sicut there is a certain one which is part of a com-
anima est forma hominis: ex anima enim et posite, as the soul is the form of man: for a man
corpore componitur homo; is composed of soul and body;

quaedam autem sequitur totum compositum, ut but a certain one follows a composed whole, as
humanitas, quae etiam est forma hominis: humanity, which is also the form of man.

et isto modo sumpta forma dicitur quidditas, et And taken in this way the form is called a quid-
est illud quod intellectus intelligit de re. dity, and it is that which the intellect under-
stands of a thing.

quando ergo intellectus intelligit praedictam But when the intellect understands the aforesaid
formam seu quidditatem ut est determinata ad form or quiddity as it is determined to this
hanc materiam, matter—

puta humanitatem ut est in hac materia signata, for instance, humanity as it is in this designated
scilicet in his carnibus et in his ossibus et matter, namely, in this flesh and in these bones
hujusmodi; and the like—

tunc faciendo concretum, puta hunc hominem, then by making it concrete, for instance, ‘this
intelligit singulare, et huic attribuit intentionem man’, it understands a singular, and it attributes
singularitatis. to this the intention of singularity.

si vero dictam formam intelligit non ut est But if it understands the said form not as it is
determinata ad hanc materiam, quia omnis talis determined to this matter, since every such form
forma de se plurificabilis est ad hanc et ad illam is of itself plurifiable to this and to that matter—
materiam;

habenti talem formam intellectus attribuit to the thing having such a form the intellect
intentionem universalitatis, unde homo est attributes the intention of universality, and so
universale. man is universal.

et si ea quae in hac forma conveniunt, non
habent inter se difformitatem pertinentem ad
dictam formam, sed solum sunt difformia per
materiam signatam istius vel illius, in qua dicta
forma determinata est in isto vel in illo,
secundum modum qui dicetur in tractatu de
specie, illa dicuntur solum differre numero;
And if those things which agree in this form do
not have between them a difference in form per-
taining to the said form, but only differ by the
designated matter of this or that thing, in which
the said form is determined in this or in that
thing, according to the mode which will be dis-
cussed in the treatment of species, those things
are said to differ solely in number—

et concretum substantivum hujusmodi formae and the concrete substantive of this sort of form
acceptae ut plurificari potest, puta homo, dicitur taken as it may be plurified, for instance, man,
species specialissima. is called the most particular species.

116
si vero ea quae conveniunt in aliqua forma
plurificabili, ut dictum est, sunt inter se diffor-
mia non solum quantum ad materiam signatam,
ut dictum est, sed quantum ad difformitatem
specificam:
But if those things which agree in some pluri-
fiable form, as has been said, are different in
form not only with respect to designated matter,
but with respect to a specific difference in
form—

puta, quod talis forma est animalitas, in qua
conveniunt socrates et hic equus, qui inter se
non solum sunt difformes quantum ad has
carnes et haec ossa, sed in hoc quia hic homo
habet formam humanitatis, et ille equinitatis;
talia dicuntur differre specie:
for instance, that such a form is animality, in
which Socrates and this horse agree, which
differ not only with respect to this flesh and
these bones, but in this, that this man has the
form of humanity, and that of equinitity—such
things are said to differ in species:

et talis forma in qua conveniunt in concreto and such a form in which they agree when taken
sumpta, puta, animal, est genus. concretely, for instance, animal, is the genus.

et quia, ut dictum est, talis natura sumpta in
concreto, de pluribus formaliter differentibus,
quae sunt in diversis speciebus, dici potest; hinc
est quod tali naturae intentio generis potest
attribui:
And because, as has been said, such a nature
taken concretely, may be said formally of many
differing things, which are in diverse species—it
is from this that the intention of genus can be
attributed to such a nature:

ideo dicitur quod genus praedicatur, idest and so it is said that a genus is ‘predicated’, that
praedicabile est de pluribus differentibus specie, is, is ‘predicable’ of many things differing in
seu dicitur dividi in plures species. species.

et hoc quod dictum est in concreto sumptum And this that is said taken concretely is under-
intelligitur solum in praedicamento substantiae: stood solely in the predicament of substance:

in aliis vero praedicamentis, et maxime in but in the other predicaments, and chiefly in the
absolutis, sumitur genus et species in abstracto. absolute ones, genus as well as species is taken
abstractly.

dicitur autem genus praedicari in eo quod quid But genus is said to be predicated in the what it
est, idest, substantive secundum grammaticos; is, that is, substantivally, according to grammar-
ut animal quod de homine et de equo praedi- ians; as animal which is predicated of man and
catur, est substantivum et non adjectivum. horse, is a substantive and not an adjective.

sensibile enim quod de animali praedicatur,
quamvis sit de essentia animalis, non tamen
dicitur praedicari in quid, sed in quale; et causa
est quia est adjectivum.
For sensitive predicated of an animal, even
though it is not of the essence of animal, is
nevertheless not said to be predicated in the
‘what’, but in the ‘what sort’, and for this reason
it is an adjective.

sciendum est autem quod quia ea quae in quid But it must be understood that because those
praedicantur sunt de essentia seu quidditate things which are predicated in the ‘what’ are of
eorum de quibus praedicantur; the essence or quiddity of those things of which
they are predicated,

ideo praedicari in quid non solum potest dicere therefore, to be predicated in the ‘what’ not only
modum significandi, ut dictum est; sed etiam may express the mode of signifying, as has been
dicit quidditatem ipsius de quo prae-dicatur. said, but it also expresses the very quiddity of
that of which it is predicated.

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et patet quid sit genus. And so genus is clear.

Cf. ibid., tract. 1, cap. 4 (tr. B.A.M.).

differentia, ut hic sumitur, dupliciter describitur. Difference, as it is taken here, is described in

two ways.

primo sic. differentia est quae praedicatur de In the first way thus: Difference is what is predi-
pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quale. cated of many things differing in species in the
‘what sort?

secundo sic. differentia est qua species abundat In the second way thus: Difference is that by
a genere. which the species exceeds the genus.

ad videndum autem primam descriptionem
sciendum est, quod, ut supra dictum est, in ali-
quibus formis potest esse latitudo in eadem
forma secundum gradus formales, quorum unus
secundum se est nobilior et perfectior alio: et ab
hac forma sumitur genus.
In order to grasp the first description it must be
understood that, as was said above, in any form
there can be a latitude in the same form with re-
spect to formal grades, one of which in and of
itself is more noble and perfect than another:
and from this form the genus is taken.

ubi nota, quod in entibus sunt diversi gradus
essendi, sive sint gradus substantiales, sive acci-
dentales: qui gradus licet in aliquibus entibus
sint dispersi, tamen aliquando invenitur aliquod
unum plures gradus perfectionis substantiales
vel accidentales comprehendens.
Where note that in beings there are diverse
grades of being, whether they be substantial
grades or accidental ones: which grades, al-
though they be dispersed in certain beings, still
at times there is found something one compre-
hending many grades of substantial or acci-
dental perfection.

verbi gratia, vegetabile, sensibile, rationale, sunt
gradus entium substantiales: planta enim sub-
stantialiter est vegetabilis: canis vero substan-
tialiter est sensibilis: et homo substantialiter est
rationalis; et isti gradus dispersi in multis, ali-
quando inveniuntur in uno solo, puta in homine:
For example, vegetative, sensitive, rational, are
grades of substantial being: for plant is
substantially vegetative: but dog is substantially
sensitive: and man is substantially rational; and
these grades, dispersed in many things, some-
times are found in one thing alone, such as man;

homo namque per suam formam substantialem
quae est in una, habet omnes istas tres per-
fectiones: nam est vegetabilis, et est sensibilis,
et est rationabilis: unde socrates per unam suam
essentiam conformatur plantae et cani et platoni,
ut supra dictum est.
For man through his substantial form, which is
in one thing, has all three of these perfections:
for hr is vegetative, and he is sensitive, and he is
rational: whence Socrates by his one own
essence is conformed to plant and dog and
Plato, as was said above.

haec autem conformitas quae est socratis ad
plantam, potest esse una duorum: sicut enim
similitudo duorum nigrorum est una amborum,
quia unius ut subjecti, et alterius ut termini; sic
talis conformitas est socratis ut subjecti, et illius
plantae ut termini.
But this agreement in form which is of Socrates
with respect to plant, can be one of two things:
for just as a likeness of two black things is one
thing of both, being of one thing as of a subject,
and another as of a term, thus such an agree-
ment in form is of Socrates as of a subject, and
of a plant as of a term.

nec propter hoc dico quod talis conformitas sit Nor on this account do I say that such an agree-
relatio secundum esse; sed est relatio secundum ment in form is a relation according to being;

118
dici, ut fundamentum relationis secundum esse. rather it is a relation according to being said, as
the foundation of a relation according to being.

talis autem conformitas quae realiter una est, ut
dictum est, movet intellectum nostrum ad unum
conceptum, puta vivum, a quo conceptu sumitur
genus, vel aliquando species, ut ex supradictis
haberi potest.
Now such an agreement in form which in reality
is one thing, as was said, moves our intellect to
one concept, such as living, from which concept
the genus is taken, or sometimes the species, as
one may gather from what was said above.

unde talis conformitas se habet ad genus ut And so such agreement in form stands to the
fundamentum remotum. genus as a remote foundation.

conceptus vero vivi ad quem talis conformitas But the concept of living to which such an
movet intellectum, se habet ad genus ut agreement in form moves the intellect stands to
fundamentum propinquum: the genus as the foundation near at hand.

et sic licet unitas generis sit unitas rationis, And thus although the unity of the genus be a
tamen aliquo modo habet fundari in uno unity of reason, still, in some way it must be
secundum rem. founded on one thing in reality.

difformitas vero quae est inter socratem et
plantam, est, quia socrates sentit, non autem
planta: a qua difformitate sumitur differentia,
quae dividit vivum quod commune est homini et
plantae.
But there is a disparity of form which exists
between Socrates and plant, because Socrates
senses, but a plant does not: from which diffor-
mity the difference is taken, which divides the
living that is common to man and plant.

unde per hanc differentiam ostenditur, quod Whence by this difference it is shown that in the
vivum invenitur in habente aliquam aliam thing having life there is found some other
perfectionem, quae non est in planta. perfection which is not in plant.

et quia in tali perfectione, puta sensibili,
convenit socrates cum cane; similiter inter eos
est una conformitas movens ad unum concept-
tum; a quo, si sumatur in concreto substantive,
ita quod tale concretum de suo significato dicat
explicite et vivum et sensibile, sumitur aliud
genus, scilicet animal.
And because in such a perfection, for example,
sensitive, Socrates agrees with dog, likewise
between them there is an agreement in form mo-
ving the intellect to one concept; from which, if
it be taken in the concrete substantively, such
that such a concrete of its own signification ex-
press explicitly both living and sensitive, an-
other genus is taken, namely, animal.

si vero sumatur in concreto adjective, ita quod
de suo significato dicat solam illam perfecti-
onem explicite, scilicet sensibile, sumitur differ-
entia, puta in quantum dicatur sensibile:
But if it be taken in the concrete adjectivally,
such that of its own signified it express that per-
fection alone explicitly, namely sensitive, the
difference is taken, for example, inasmuch as it
be called sensitive:

et sic de aliis usque ad ultimam differentiam and thus of the others up to the ultimate specific
specificam, infra quam non est perfectio difference, below which there is no formal
formalis. perfection.

cum ergo de tot possit dici sensibile de quot
dicitur animal: sed animal quod est genus, prae-
dicatur de pluribus differentibus specie: similiter
et sensibile quod est differentia, praedicatur de
pluribus differentibus specie.
Since, therefore, as many times as animal is
said, so many times may sensitive be said, but
animal is a genus predicated of many things
differing in species: likewise sensitive, which is
a difference, may be predicated of many things

119
 differing in species.

notandum quod forma substantialis habet duplex It must be noted that a substantial form has a
esse. twofold being.

unum est objective in intellectu; et secundum One is objective in the intellect; and according
hoc esse intellectus attribuit sibi nomen abs- to this being the intellect attributes to it an
tractum: abstract name:

considerat enim eam intellectus non con- For the intellect considers it by not considering
siderando materiam in qua est; et propterea dat the matter in which it is; and then it gives to it
sibi nomen abstractum, ut humanitas. an abstract name, such as humanity.

aliud esse habet in materia: ad quam habet It has another being in matter, to which it has a
duplicem habitudinem. double relationship.

una est, quia inhaeret ei tamquam salvata in One is, because it inheres in it as being pre-
ipsa; served in it;

et sic aliquo modo habet modum accidentis: et and thus in some way it has the mode of an
sic dat ei intellectus nomen concretum adjecti- accident: and thus the intellect gives a concrete
vum, quale est nomen accidentis, ut humanum. adjectival name to it, of which sort is the name
of an accident, such as human.

secunda comparatio quam habet ad materiam, ut But the second comparison which it has to
complens et perficiens ipsam; et sic non habet matter [is] as completing and perfecting it; and
modum accidentis, sed modum substantiae: thus it does not have the mode of an accident,
but rather the mode of a substance.

et sic dat ei intellectus nomen concretum And thus the intellect gives to it a concrete
substantivum, ut homo. substantive name such as man.

notandum, quod animal differt a sensibili: quia It must be noted that animal differs from sen-
animal dicitur ab anima sensibili; sensibile sitive because animal is said from the sensitive
autem dicitur a sensibilitate. soul, but sensitive is said from the ability to
sense.

et quia anima ad sensibilitatem se habet, sicut
potentia ad actum; ideo differentia magis est
actualis quam id cujus est differentia, licet tan-
tum ambiant ambo.
And because the soul relates to sensibility just
as potency to act, therefore the difference is
more actual than that of which it is the differ-
ence, although both [sc. animal and sensitive]
embrace as much

dicitur autem differentia praedicari in quale, But the difference is said to be predicated in the
idest adjective: hujus ratio est. ‘of what sort?’, that is, adjectivally, of which
this is the reason:

ut enim dictum est, differentia divisiva alicujus
generis sumitur a perfectione quam non habent
omnia quae sunt sub genere: quae perfectio
comparata ad illud unde sumitur genus, se habet
ut quoddam perfectum, et per consequens ut
formale.
For, as has been said, the difference divisive of
any genus is taken from a perfection everything
under the genus does not have: which perfec-
tion, compared to that whence the genus is
taken, stands as something perfect, and conse-
quently as formal.

120
et quia adjectiva communiter a formis sumuntur,
quae formae habent adjacere; ideo ad designan-
dum quod differentia sumitur a solo formali, et
illud solum dicit explicite, perfecta est differ-
entia per modum adjectivum in sui praedica-
tione.
And because adjectives are commonly taken
from forms, which forms have to be adjacent—
therefore for the purpose of designation that
difference is taken from what is solely formal,
and it expresses that alone explicitly, the perfect
is the difference in the mode of an adjective in
its predication.182

ad videndum autem secundam definitionem
differentiae, sciendum quod impossibile est
partem de toto praedicari; sed quidquid de alio
vere praedicatur, oportet quod dicat totum.
But in order to see the second definition of
difference, it must be understood that it is im-
possible for a part to be predicated of a whole;
but whatever be truly predicated of another, it
must express the whole.

cum autem de socrate praedicetur homo et Now when man and animal and rational is pre-
animal et rationale, oportet quod homo dicat dicated of Socrates, it is necessary that man
totum formale quod est in petro: express the formal whole which is in Peter:

et dico formale, loquendo de forma quae and I say ‘formal’, by speaking of the form
sequitur totum compositum. which follows on the composed whole.

similiter oportet quod animal dicat totum Likewise it is necessary that animal express the
formale, et similiter rationale dicat totum formal whole, and likewise rational express the
formale: sed diversimode: formal whole; but in different ways:

nam rationale dicit totum illud quod dicit homo, for rational expresses the whole which man ex-
non tamen explicite, sed implicite: rationale presses, but not in an explicit manner, but im-
enim dicit habens rationem. plicitly: for rational means having reason.

unde de suo principali significato dicit solum And so of its principal signified it expresses
rationem. reason alone.

sed quia dicit habens rationem in hoc quod dicit
habens intelligitur implicite homo quicumque sit
ille: et sic dicit totum quod dicit homo; aliquid
tamen explicite, et aliquid implicite.
But because it expresses (the one) having
reason in this that it says (the one) having there
is understood implicitly man whoever he is: and
thus it expresses the whole that man expresses;
the one explicitly, the other implicitly.

similiter etiam animal dicit totum quod dicit
homo, non tamen explicite; dicit enim animal
habens vitam et sensum; unde de suo principali
significato solum dicit vitam et sensum:
Likewise animal expresses the whole which
man expresses, but not explicitly; for animal ex-
presses (the one) having life and sense; whence
of its principal signified it expresses life and
sense alone:

sed in hoc quod dicit habens implicite intelli- but insofar as it expresses (the one) having, man
gitur homo. is understood implicitly.

homo vero dicit explicite totum formale quod But man expresses explicitly the formal whole
est in socrate: that is in Socrates.

nam dicit habens humanitatem: quae humanitas For it expresses (the one) having humanity: of

182
That is, the difference, which expresses explicitly a perfection the thing has that other things in the genus
do not, signifies in the manner of an accident in its predication.

121
dicit explicite motum et sensum, quod dicit which humanity expresses explicitly movement
animal, et rationem quam dicit rationale. and sense, which animal expresses, and reason
which rational expresses.

unde homo de suo principali significato dicit Whence man of its principal signified expresses
animal rationale: rational animal;

comparando enim significata istorum explicite:
cum genus et differentia, ut dictum est, non
significent quodlibet eorum nisi partem, species
vero explicite significet illud quod significat.
for by comparing the signifieds of these things
explicitly with the genus and difference, as has
been said, they do not signify any of them ex-
cept a part, but the species explicitly signify that
which it signifies.

utrumque ergo significatum explicitum speciei Therefore both [?] the explicit signified of the
excedit significatum explicitum generis in species exceeds the explicit signified of the
significato explicito differentiae. genus in the explicit signified of the difference.

similiter etiam excedit significatum differentiae Likewise also the signified of the difference
in significato generis. exceeds the signified of the genus.

bene ergo dicitur in praedicta descriptione, quod
differentia est qua species abundat a genere:
quia species abundat, idest excedit in suo signi-
ficato etiam illud quod explicite significat dif-
ferentia.
Therefore it is well said in the aforementioned
description that the difference is that by which
the species exceeds the genus, that is, exceeds in
its own signified also that which the difference
explicitly signifies.

et sic patet quid est differentia secundum sui And thus it is clear what difference is with
rationem. respect to its own account.

122
19. Supplement: On accidental predicates and the singular in the genus of substance as
what exists per se:

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Post. An., lect. 10, n. 5 (In: Commentary on the Posterior
Analytics of Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas, translated by Fabian R. Larcher, O.P., lect. 10):

Lecture 10
(73a34-b26)
HOW SOMETHING IS SAID TO BE PREDICATED PER SE OF A THING

a34. Essential attributes are— a38. (2) such that, while— b5. Further (a) that— b10. In
another sense again— b16. So far then as concerns— b25. Thus, then, we have

After determining about “said of all,” the Philosopher now determines about “said per se”
[i.e., said in virtue of itself] and does three things. First, he shows the number of ways some-
thing is said per se. Secondly, how the demonstrator makes use of these ways (73b16).
Thirdly, he summarizes (73b25).183

In regard to the first it should be noted that this preposition per [“in virtue of” or “by”]
denotes a causal relationship, although sometimes it also signifies a state, as when someone
is said to be per se, i.e., by himself, when he is alone. But when it designates a relationship
to a cause, sometimes the cause is formal, as when it is stated that the body lives in virtue of
the soul; sometimes the relationship is to a material cause, as when it is stated that a body is
colored in virtue of its surface, i.e., because the surface is the subject of color; again, it might
even designate a relationship to an extrinsic cause, particularly an efficient cause, as when it
is said that water is made hot in virtue of fire. But just as this preposition per designates a
relationship to a cause, when something extrinsic is the cause of that which is attributed to
the subject, so also when the subject or something pertaining to the subject is the cause of
that which is attributed to the subject. This latter is what per se, i.e., in virtue of itself,
signifies.184
Therefore, the first way of saying something per se (73a34) is when that which is attribu-
ted to a subject pertains to its form. And because the form and essence of a thing are
signified by its definition, the first mode of that which is per se is when the definition itself
or something expressed in the definition is predicated of the thing defined. This is what he
means when he says, “Essential attributes are such as belong to their subject as elements in
its essential nature,” i.e., included in the definition which indicates what it is, whether those
elements are stated in the nominative case or in one of the oblique cases. Thus, “line” is
stated in the definition of triangle. Hence “line” is in triangle per se. Again, in the definition
of line, “point” is mentioned; hence “point” is per se in line. And the reason why they are
mentioned in the definition is stated when he says, “for the very being or substance” [i.e., the
essence, which the definition signifies] “of triangle and line is composed of these elements,”
namely, of lines and points. However, this does not mean that a line is formed out of points,

183
n. 1. Postquam determinavit philosophus de dici de omni, hic determinat de per se. Et circa hoc duo facit:
primo, ostendit quot modis dicitur aliquid per se; secundo, ostendit qualiter his modis demonstrator utatur;
ibi: quae ergo dicuntur et cetera.
184
n. 2. Circa primum sciendum est quod haec praepositio per designat habitudinem causae; designat etiam
interdum et situm, sicut cum dicitur aliquis esse per se, quando est solitarius. Causae autem habitudinem
designat, aliquando quidem formalis; sicut cum dicitur quod corpus vivit per animam. Quandoque autem
habitudinem causae materialis; sicut cum dicitur quod corpus est coloratum per superficiem: quia scilicet
proprium subiectum coloris est superficies. Designat etiam habitudinem causae extrinsecae et praecipue
efficientis; sicut cum dicitur quod aqua calescit per ignem. Sicut autem haec praepositio per designat
habitudinem causae, quando aliquid extrinsecum est causa eius, quod attribuitur subiecto; ita quando
subiectum vel aliquid eius est causa eius, quod attribuitur ei, et hoc significat per se.

123
 but that “point” is involved in the very notion of line, just as “line” is involved in the very
notion of triangle. And he asserts this in order to exclude things which are part of a thing’s
matter and not of its species: thus, “semicircle” is not mentioned in the definition of circle,
or “finger” in the definition of man, as it is stated in Metaphysics VII.
He states further that all those items which are found universally in the definition
expressing what a thing is are attributed to it per se.185

The second mode of saying per se is when this preposition per implies a relationship of
material cause, in the sense that that to which something is attributed is its proper matter and
subject. For it is required, when defining an accident, to mention its proper subject in one of
the oblique cases: thus when an accident is defined abstractly, we say that “aquilinity” is a
curvature of a nose,” but when it is defined concretely, the subject is put in the nominative
case, so that we say that “the aquiline is a curved nose.” Now the reason for this is that since
the being of an accident depends on its subject, its definition—which signifies its being—
must mention that subject. Hence it is the second mode of saying per se, when the subject is
mentioned in the definition of a predicate which is a proper accident of the subject.186
And this is what he means when he states (73a38), “essential attributes are those such that
while they belong to certain subjects,” i.e., to subjects of accidents, “the subjects to which
they belong are contained in the attribute’s own defining formula,” i.e., in the expression
which describes what the accident is, i.e., in the definition of the accident. “Thus straight and
curved belong to line per se.” For “line” is mentioned in their definition. For the same reason
“odd” and “even” belong per se to number, because “number” is mentioned in their defi-
nition. Again, prime and compound are predicated per se of number, and “number” is
mentioned in their definition. (For a prime number, for example, seven, is one which is
exactly divisible by no other number but “1”; but a compound number, for example, nine, is
one which is exactly divisible by some number greater than “1.” Again, “isoplural,” i.e.,
equilateral, and scalene, i.e., having three unequal sides, belong per se to triangle, and
“triangle” is mentioned in their definition. Accordingly, he adds that their respective subjects
belong to each of the aforesaid accidents and are mentioned in the expression which states
what each is, i.e., in the definition: thus “line” belongs to some of them, and “number” to
others.187

185
n. 3. Primus ergo modus dicendi per se est, quando id, quod attribuitur alicui, pertinet ad formam eius. Et
quia definitio significat formam et essentiam rei, primus modus eius quod est per se est, quando praedicatur
de aliquo definitio vel aliquid in definitione positum (et hoc est quod dicit quod per se sunt quaecunque
insunt in eo, quod quid est, idest in definitione indicante quid est), sive ponatur in recto sive in obliquo. Sicut
in definitione trianguli ponitur linea; unde linea per se inest triangulo: et similiter in definitione lineae
ponitur punctum; unde punctum per se inest lineae. Rationem autem quare ista ponantur in definitione
subiungit dicens: substantia, idest essentia, quam significat definitio ipsorum, idest trianguli et lineae, est ex
his, idest ex linea et punctis. Quod non est intelligendum quod linea ex punctis componatur, sed quod
punctum sit de ratione lineae, sicut linea de ratione trianguli. Et hoc dicit ad excludendum ea, quae sunt
partes materiae et non speciei, quae non ponuntur in definitione, sicut semicirculus non ponitur in definitione
circuli, nec digitus in definitione hominis, ut dicitur in VII metaphysicae. Et subiungit quod quaecumque
universaliter insunt in ratione dicente quid est, per se attribuuntur alicui.
186
n. 4. Secundus modus dicendi per se est, quando haec praepositio per designat habitudinem causae
materialis, prout scilicet id, cui aliquid attribuitur, est propria materia et proprium subiectum ipsius. Oportet
autem quod proprium subiectum ponatur in definitione accidentis: quandoque quidem in obliquo, sicut cum
accidens in abstracto definitur, ut cum dicimus, quod simitas est curvitas nasi; quandoque vero in recto, ut
cum accidens definitur in concreto, ut cum dicimus quod simus est nasus curvus. Cuius quidem ratio est, quia
cum esse accidentis dependeat a subiecto, oportet etiam quod definitio eius significans esse ipsius contineat
in se subiectum. Unde secundus modus dicendi per se est, quando subiectum ponitur in definitione
praedicati, quod est proprium accidens eius.
187
n. 4. Et hoc est quod dicit, et per se dicuntur quibuscunque eorum, idest de numero eorum, quae insunt
ipsis, idest subiectis accidentium, ipsa subiecta insunt in ratione demonstrante quid est ipsum accidens, idest
in definitione accidentis. Sicut rectum et circulare insunt lineae per se: nam linea ponitur in definitione
eorum. Et eadem ratione par et impar per se insunt numero, quia numerus in eorum definitione ponitur: nam

124
 In each of these subjects that have been mentioned, I say that its accident is in it per se.
But those predicates which are neutral, i.e., of such a nature as not to be mentioned in
the definition of their subjects, nor the subjects in their definition, are accidents, i.e.,
are predicated per accidens: for example, “musical” and “white” are predicated per
accidens of animal.188 (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Post. An., lect. 10, n. 6 (In: Commentary on the Posterior
Analytics of Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas, translated by Fabian R. Larcher, O.P., lect. 10):

Then (73b5) he sets down another mode of that which is per se, i.e., the sense in which it
signifies something in isolation [solitarium]. Thus something which is a singular in the
genus of substance and which is not predicated of any subject is said to be per se. The
reason for this is that when I say, “walking” or “white,” I do not signify either of them
as something isolated or apart, since something else which is walking or white is under-
stood. But this is not the case with terms which signify a “this something,” i.e., with
terms that signify first substance. For when I say, “Socrates” or “Plato,” it is not to be
supposed that there is something else, over and above what they really are, which
would be their subject. Therefore, things which are thus not predicated of any subject are
per se, but things which are predicated of a subject, as being in the subject, are accidents.
However, not all things predicated of a subject, as universals of their inferiors, are accidents.
It should be noted, however, that this mode is not a mode of predicating, but a mode of
existing; hence at the very start he said that they exist per se and not that they are said per
se.189

20. In sum:

• what signifies something solitarius: the singular in the genus of substance “which
is not predicated of any subject is said to be per se”; e.g. ‘man’
• what signifies ‘something else’ besides a hoc aliquid or first substance: accidents,
which are things predicated of a subject as being in a subject; e.g. ‘white’ or
‘musical’

par est numerus medium habens. Et similiter primum et compositum per se praedicantur de numero, et
numerus in definitione eorum ponitur. Est enim primum in numeris, numerus qui nullo alio numero
mensuratur, sed sola unitate, ut septenarius. Compositus autem numerus est, quem etiam alius numerus
mensurat, sicut novenarius. Et similiter isopleuros, idest aequilaterum, et scalenon, idest trium inaequalium
laterum et altera parte longius, per se insunt triangulo, et triangulus ponitur in definitione eorum. Et ideo
subiungit quod, subiecta quae insunt omnibus praemissis accidentibus in ratione dicente quid est, idest in
definitione, sicut alicui praedictorum accidentium inest linea, alicui vero numerus, et similiter in aliis,
unicuique, inquam, ipsorum subiectorum, per se inesse dico suum accidens.
188
n. 4. quae vero praedicata neutraliter insunt, idest neque ita quod ponantur in definitione subiectorum,
neque subiecta in definitione eorum, sunt accidentia, idest per accidens praedicantur, sicut musicum et
album praedicantur de animali per accidens.
189
deinde cum dicit: amplius quod non etc., ponit alium modum eius, quod est per se, prout per se significat
aliquid solitarium, sicut dicitur quod per se est aliquod particulare, quod est in genere substantiae, quod non
praedicatur de aliquo subiecto. et huius ratio est, quia cum dico, ambulans vel album, non significo
ambulans vel album, quasi aliquid per se solitarium existens, cum intelligatur aliquid aliud esse quod sit
ambulans vel album. sed in his, quae significant hoc aliquid, scilicet in primis substantiis, hoc non contingit.
cum enim dicitur socrates vel plato, non intelligitur quod sit aliquid alterum, quam id quod vere ipsa sunt,
quod scilicet sit subiectum eorum. sic igitur hoc modo quae non praedicantur de subiecto sunt per se, quae
vero dicuntur de subiecto, scilicet sicut in subiecto existentia, accidentia sunt. nam quae dicuntur de
subiecto, sicut universalia de inferioribus, non semper accidentia sunt. sciendum est autem quod iste modus
non est modus praedicandi, sed modus existendi. unde etiam in principio non dixit, per se dicuntur, sed, per
se sunt.

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Cf. John of St. Thomas, Outlines of Formal Logic, translated from the Latin with an intro-
duction by Francis C. Wade, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee 1955, Absolute and
Connotative Terms, p. 36:

Some categorematical terms are absolute, others connotative. The absolute term is one that
signifies a thing as a per se being, i.e. after the manner of a substance, whether it be in itself
a substance, as man, or an accident conceived without its subject, such as whiteness. The
connotative term is one that signifies a thing as modifying another, such as white, blind.
Whence the connotative term ought to have one principal and direct signified object which is
the same as its absolute—such as white and whiteness—and another indirect signified object,
viz. that which it modifies and in which it is found. And the connotative does not signify
indirectly and connotatively anything other than what it truly fits; not what it fits
imaginatively and falsely. Nor is it enough to connote an object, as do science and wisdom,
which are absolutes and yet look to their objects and connote them. The connotative term
ought to connote the subject in which it is found. And beware not to confuse connotative,
concrete, and adjective. For the concrete is opposed only to the abstract and can be found in
an absolute term, e.g. man; whereas the abstract signifies it as “that by which” it is con-
stituted, e.g. humanity. Also, the adjective is opposed to substantive, not to connotative.
Whence a connotative term can be found that is not an adjective expression, such as father,
creator, even though every adjective is connotative.

21. Categorematic terms in sum:

• “The absolute term is one that signifies a thing as a per se being, i.e. after the man-
ner of a substance, whether it be in itself a substance, as man, or an accident con-
ceived without its subject, such as whiteness.”
• “The connotative term is one that signifies a thing as modifying another, such as
white, blind. Whence the connotative term ought to have one principal and direct
signified object which is the same as its absolute—such as white and whiteness—
and another indirect signified object, viz. that which it modifies and in which it is
found.”

connotative terms
relatives, which, as absolute terms, are substantives
adjectives

Cf. ibid., p. 63.

CHAP. 10 Supposition (excerpt)

We conclude secondly, that supposition, as explained in the definition, is so generally de-

fined that it can be applied also to adjectives, when they are taken in the adjectival sense. For
instance, if I say, Peter is white, white also is accepted for something of which it is verified
and which fulfills the nature of a white thing according to the demands of the copula. How-
ever, if supposition is taken more strictly for that which is not only to be accepted for some-
thing, but especially to supply a supposit to the verb, which is the stricter way of supposing,
then adjectives do not have supposition in this sense; rather they join their own formally sig-
nified objects to another supposit, as the ancient logicians used to say.

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 (c) 2013; 2024 Bart A. Mazzetti.

N.B. For the continuation of this paper, see On What Is Signified, Part II.

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