United States-Israel Relations April 23, 2013

This document presents the conclusions of the research team set up by the Institute for National Security Studies to formulate recommendations on possible courses of action for Israel vis--vis its relations with the United States. The members of the team, headed by Oded Eran, are Owen Alterman, Avinoam Bar-Yosef, Yehuda Ben-Meir, Cameron Brown, Dani Halperin, Sallai Meridor, Nimrod Novik, Zvi Rafiah, Shmuel Rosner, Aviad Sella, Zaki Shalom, and Shimon Stein. I. General Observations: US-Israel relations remained stable and solid, but not without challenges. President Obamas March 2013 visit to Israel marked an important milestone in this regard, but did not resolve differences of opinion on several essential matters, such as finding a solution to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict or the Iranian nuclear issue. Long range trends In the previous annual conference, we pointed to several trends in US defense and foreign policy, and these remain valid: 1. A continued shift to the Far East (the pivot) as the primary regional and global US interest. Recent tension with North Korea emphasizes this logic. 2. Pressure to make deep cuts in the American budget will continue. One place where its deleterious effects will be felt is on Americas determination to use military force on a wide scale or for long periods of time. 3. Decline in dependence on any foreign energy resources, including oil from the Middle East. That said, the US will remain sensitive both to the dependence of its allies on Middle Eastern oil and to the impact of Middle East energy supply on global energy prices. 4. Continued instability of Middle East regimes creates tough dilemmas for the United States, such as whether to support new regimes that were elected via democratic processes but espouse anti-democratic ideologies. Similarly, should the US use its military to protect populations that are under existential threat during the course of these anti-autocratic uprisings?

Despite all of the above, the United States is not abandoning the region, and eulogies to this effect are premature. 5. Support for Israel in American public opinion remains robust, but there are several important warning lights that must not be ignored. This includes lower support among liberals, the youngest generation, and the religiously unaffiliated.

II. Specific Issues in Bilateral Relations 1. The relationship between leaders Both Obama and Netanyahu failed, if they indeed tried, to get rid of the other. Both have drawn the appropriate operational conclusions from that failure. Obamas visit last month had vast importance for more than the personal relationship. It is important to continue to deal with this issue, but there should be no expectation for a truly warm personal relationship. Both governments have appointed new top officials in the areas of defense and foreign policy. Building close personal relationships should be a priority. The split responsibility among Israeli ministers for the topics that are central to the bilateral relationship will not help matters, and it is recommended that duplication and confusion be eliminated before damage is done. 2. The Palestinian Issue Recent statements by the American President and Secretary of State indicate the US governments determination to remain actively engaged in the Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic process. The government will act along the following tracks: a. Finding a solution to the immediate problems. The US will act to solve the immediate, daily problems of the Palestinians in the realms of economic development, movement of people and goods, and additional steps that will improve the chances for negotiations to begin. This is not an attempt to replace negotiations, rather to build and complement the negotiations on the central topics. It appears that Israel understands the importance of cooperating with the US on this track and has already taken several steps in this regard. b. The diplomatic track. The US administration has already begun scanning possible options and will conduct a comprehensive evaluation to determine whether there is a realistic program for restarting direct negotiations. This evaluation will continue for several months until final determinations will be made. Only based on this determination will the administration decide whether or not to involve the President personally. Special consideration will be given to Israels security needs and for finding solutions to meet those needs. Israel will find itself in a dilemma when the full security needs are fleshed out, and it may lead to a conflict with the American
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government about how essential certain requirements actually are, as this will impact on the different possible delineation of borders and shaping of security arrangements between Israel and the Palestinian state. Difficult as it may be Israel, should not avoid a dialogue with the US on this key issue to the process as well as to relations with the US. c. Settlements will not be dropped from the agenda in the private discussions between the US and Israel. Israel must not fool itself into believing that Obamas public rebuke of Mahmoud Abbas marks any change of his position on the issue. Our clear recommendation is to avoid any action in the coming months that might be perceived by Washington as a provocation aimed at undermining such an American effort.

III. The Iranian Issue The American government is navigating between two foreign policy objectives. The first is guided by the desire to avoid military action that may drag the US into an extended and expensive military confrontation, especially after this administration finally extracted the US from Iraq and is completing its withdrawal from Afghanistan. This line of policy seeks to facilitate a diplomatic solution by using the pressure of sanctions. On the other hand, the administration continually repeats the key code words that all options are on the table, and containment is not an option. Within this space lies the very meaningful difference between the US and Israel. a. Defining the goal: should it be to prevent a nuclear Iran or to prevent Iran from being able to break out and build a nuclear weapon within such a short timeframe that it would be impossible to prevent. b. The meaning and timing of a decision that non-military means have failed; particularly what are the operational implications of such a declaration? c. Who would attack, when would they attack, and what would they attack? Americas considerations for preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon transcend those of Israel, and they have to do with the dangers faced by Americas Gulf allies, as well as the danger of a nuclear arms race in the region. It is important to highlight these considerations and keep the debate in the US evolving around the other elements, and not just the Israeli aspects. From the American perspective, Israel must: a. Create a Zone of Agreement that will encompass as much as possible of the issues where substantive differences have arisen and will arise between the two. This is particularly important for the questions of timing when to decide that the diplomatic track has failed and what are the implications of this assessment.
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This Zone of Agreement must also serve to minimize the possibility of a bad agreement, which might let the US avoid using force but would put Israel in the terrible situation of having to decide whether to initiate its own military option or to come to terms with the terrible situation whereby Iran would maintain a capacity for nuclear break-out at a time of its choosing. The effect of such a bad agreement on IsraeliAmerican relations would be continued tension. b. Maintain a visible and credible Israeli military option c. Help build a wide base of support within the US for the President should he decide that there is no alternative but deploying the military option. d. Leverage the outcome of the present conflict with North Korea, utilizing the motifs that are similar (and not all are similar).

IV. The Regional Situation a. Israel should upgrade its dialogue with the United States about all the issues that are relevant regarding developments in the Arab world. This may include reactions to the fall of various regimes that are considered part of the American camp in the region; the appearance of additional terrorist elements that would fill the power vacuum that would be created should these regimes collapse; the potential leakage of nonconventional weapons into the hands of terrorist groups; and potential cooperation on developing and transporting new energy resources in the Eastern Basin of the Mediterranean Sea. b. Second, Israel should discretely advance (via the United States) the creation of a loose, informal, gradually evolving US-led framework for deliberations over regional security involving all the various pro-American governments in the region. Such a channel could be facilitated by progress in the Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic track. c. Turkey. The rift between Israel and Turkey has not healed, despite the apology, and there is reason to doubt we will see substantial improvement in those bilateral relations in the near future. If the US is interested in thawing these relations, it will have to dedicate more attention and effort toward overseeing this process, and particularly reigning in the expressions and boisterous moves of Turkish leaders, such as their aid to Hamas. V. Strategic Cooperation and Aid a. The American budget difficulties may put Israel in a position where it needs to prioritize the projects and items that it wants to protect from a potential budget cut (the untouchables). Israels own budget difficulties can serve as a catalyst for undergoing an evaluation of Israel's long term armament plans in anticipation of discussion regarding the renewal in 2017 of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on aid.

b. Due to these difficulties, it is important to strengthen the image of Israel as a strategic asset for the United States, and as an asset that advances American interests. This is possible in part through the development of joint projects in the areas of "dual use," such as cyber warfare and other R&D in electronics. VI. Public Opinion in Israel and America President Obamas visit to Israel improved his image among public opinion in Israel and the United States. The visit will help him mainly among those in the Jewish community who doubted his commitment to Israel. At the same time, the lowest relative levels for support of Israel in American public opinion are among Democrats, the youngest generation, and the religiously unaffiliated. These are audiences where President Obama has influence, and so it is important for Israel to leverage Obamas messages given during the visit in order to improve its standing, especially with these audiences. The main messages of his visit and his speeches touched frequently on the connection between the Jewish people and its connection to the land of Israel, Zionism, cooperation between the two countries, Israel's security needs, and the joint fight against the de-legitimization of Israel. It is important that Israel distance itself from the perception that it actively supported one of the candidates in the last presidential elections. VII. Formalization of the Special Relationship As more progress is made in the negotiations to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and as it is more likely that negotiations with Iran will lead to a terrible agreement, there will likely be increased debate in Israel and in the US about ideas such as a defensive alliance, nuclear umbrella, or enshrining into American law some of the central agreements, memoranda of understanding, and other informal understandings between the two countries. Our recommendation, and INSS has decided to adopt it, is to examine the advantages and disadvantages of formalization and anchoring into law those central documents that are the cornerstones of US-Israel relations. INSS will present its findings on this question at the next annual conference.