Trust & Credibility in Consulting

MANAGEMENT OF CLIENT-CONSULTANT RELATIONSHIPS: BARRIERS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRUST AND CREDIBILITY *
James A. Phills, Jr. Graduate School of Business Stanford University 518 Memorial Way Stanford, CA 94305-5015 Phone: (650) 736-0137 Fax: (650) 725-7979 Email: phills_james@gsb.stanford.edu
Mitzi S. White Department of Psychology Harvard University William James Hall Cambridge, MA 02138 E-mail: mswhite@fas.harvard.edu Under Revision for Journal of Management Studies Revised: January, 2000 Please direct all correspondence to first author
2000 James A Phills, Jr. and Mitzi S. White
* We are grateful to Deb Gruenfeld, Barry ONeill, Victor Vroom and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper. In addition, earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2nd Congress on Careers and the Creation of Employment, at IESE University de Navarro, in 1996 and the 1996 Academy of Management Meetings. The former appears in Spanish in the conference proceedings as: Tensiones en la relacion cliente-consultor. In J. L. Alvarez (Ed.), Empleo y Carreras directivas: Practicas avanzadas y retos de futoro, (pp. 337-361). Bilbao, Espana: Deusto.
Trust and credibility
ABSTRACT
During the 1980s, in the face of questions about their value, management consultants became more concerned with ensuring the implementation of their recommendations. A number of firms endeavored to improve implementation through greater collaboration with their clients, an approach that increases the importance of the client-consultant relationship. This paper reports findings from a two-year field study at a leading management consulting firm. In the course of this study trust and credibility emerged as important dimensions of the clientconsultant relationship meaning they were of concern to both parties and that their dynamics influenced the effectiveness of consulting engagements. We examined consultants efforts to establish trust and credibility and clients attempts to assess consultants trustworthiness and credibility, as well as the resulting behavioral dynamics. Our results show that contextual features of the client-consultant relationship create significant barriers to the development of trust and credibility, and further that consultants and clients responses to these barriers can limit the effectiveness of an engagement particularly the quality and implementation of the recommendations. Implications for theory and practice of consulting are discussed.
MANAGEMENT OF CLIENT-CONSULTANT RELATIONSHIPS: BARRIERS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRUST AND CREDIBILITY
THE IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEM AND THE EMERGENCE OF A COLLABORATIVE

APPROACH TO CONSULTING
One of the perennial challenges faced by management consulting firms that work with organizations on issues of strategy has been the problem of implementation, which is that consultants costly advice often does not produce significant or enduring change in the strategic choices and actions of client organizations (Ginsberg, 1989; Kahn, 1984; Kelley, 1979; Nahavandi & Chesteen, 1989; Schaffer, 1997; Turner, 1982; Zaltman & Moorman, 1988). Sometimes clients may reject the advice as impractical, incomplete, or simply wrong. In other cases they may agree with the advice but lack the understanding or skill necessary to implement it effectively. A number of observers as well as consultants have attributed the implementation problem to the nature of the conventional approach to strategic consulting (see Kahn, 1984; Perry, 1987; Schaffer, 1997; Solomon, 1998; Turner, 1982). The stereotypical view of this approach is that consultants descend on the client organization to collect data, leave to analyze the problem, and return months later to deliver a voluminous report to senior management. Consultants provide little guidance or assistance with the actual execution of their recommendations. In an attempt to improve the degree and quality of implementation a number of consulting firms adopted a more collaborative approach to the consulting process. The central feature of this approach is that clients actively participate in the analysis of their strategic
challenges and in the formulation of recommendations about how to address them. In contrast to the conventional model, consultants meet frequently with a wide range of clients. Moreover, these managers have formal roles as members of a joint case team or a project steering committee. This shift to a collaborative model appears to be based on consultants inductively derived belief that collaboration should lead to better implementation (Martin, 1993; Schaffer, 1997). This belief is consistent with research showing a general link between participation and implementation (Vroom & Jago, 1988; Walton, 1985). In principle then, the collaborative approach to consulting should be an ideal solution to the problem of implementation. However, by their own accounts, consultants often encounter difficulty in working collaboratively with clients (see for example Argyris, 1985). The present research builds on earlier work by Argyris (1985; 1991a) by examining in greater depth the nature and causes of the difficulties associated with a collaborative approach. Based on an a qualitative field study of a number of consulting engagements we show that, in part, these difficulties stem from contextual features of the client-consultant relationship. More specifically, the collaborative approach creates ongoing working relationships between consultants and clients that are not unlike the relationships between managers and their subordinates, or peers and superiors. The quality of the latter relationships is an important determinant of individual and organizational effectiveness (Gabarro, 1978; 1987b; Kotter, 1982; Mintzberg, 1973). Yet client-consultant relationships exist in the context of multiple organizations, non-hierarchical social structures, and ambiguous roles and responsibilities. These characteristics stand in stark contrast to the intra-organizational working relationships described in the literature (Gabarro, 1987b; Kotter, 1982). Moreover, they contribute to behavioral dynamics that systematically interfere with the development of
effective clientconsultant relationships. We identified two dimensions of the client consultant relationship that were critical to a collaborative approach to addressing the problem of implementation. These were trust and credibility. We found that consultants and clients attempts to build effective working relationships, and their concerns about these relationship tended to fall into two categories: a) those related to demonstrating/evaluating competence and expertise, and b) those related to demonstrating/evaluating trustworthiness (especially signaling interests, allegiances, and values). The dynamics surrounding each set of concerns were relatively distinct in the minds of both consultants and clients. Consistent with this naturally occurring distinction between trust and credibility we used the following definitions:1 Credibility refers to concerns, judgments, and actions connected to competence-related attributes, like knowledge and expertise, that influence clients' and consultants perceptions of each other's value and effectiveness and/or the validity each others substantive assertions. Trust refers to concerns, judgments, and actions connected to motivational and character-related attributes, such as interests and values, that influence clients or consultants willingness to make themselves vulnerable. Drawing on these conceptions, we present evidence in support of two key findings. First, we identify contextual and behavioral features of the client-consultant relationship and
In both common and academic usage, trust and credibility overlap significantly. Indeed, the terms are often used to refer to the same phenomena and the literature on trust and credibility is plagued by considerable fragmentation, definitional heterogeneity, and conceptual confusion (Gambetta, 1988; Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). While our introduction of yet another conceptualization contributes to the proliferation of definitions, it is necessary given the inductive nature of this study. As our data will illustrate, this distinction is consistent with the meanings that both consultants and clients attach to these terms. For the reader interested in a discussion of relationship between our conception and the voluminous literature on trust and credibility we offer a lengthy analysis in Appendix A. In addition, we have reserved our review of the relevant empirical findings regarding the causes/consequences of trust and credibility for the discussion section.
show how these can interfere with the development of trust and credibility. Second, we show how common attempts to deal with these barriers produces dynamics that undermine the effectiveness of consultant assisted strategy formulation and implementation efforts. Prior to developing this argument, however, we review the literature on client-consultant relationships and implementation and outline the study's methodology. In the final sections of this paper, we relate our findings to the extant research on trust and credibility and discuss the implications for both theory and practice. RESEARCH ON CLIENT-CONSULTANT RELATIONSHIPS Empirical research on management consulting processes and the nature of the clientconsultant relationships is sparse. While there are studies of organizational development or process consultation (for reviews see Beer & Walton, 1990; Porras & Robertson, 1992; Schein, 1988), this type of consulting is very different from the purchase of expertise model that underlies strategy consulting (Schein, 1988 p. 5). In the area of strategy, the lack of research is in part due to the difficulties associated with securing access to such firms due to the highly confidential and sensitive nature of the engagements these firms undertake for their corporate clients. In one of the few studies that involved direct observation of strategy consultants in a major firm, Argyris (1985) found that technically sound solutions to strategic problems were often ineffective because they were implemented poorly or altered due to counterproductive political dynamics in the client organizations, which he calls "defensive routines. Moreover, in a number of cases consultants found themselves caught in relationships with clients that reinforced these defensive routines -- further compounding the implementation problem.
Argyris (1985) also found that with training, consultants could develop alternative approaches that begin to interrupt these dynamics in client organizations. In another study that involved direct observation, Bloomfield and Danieli (1995) found that technical and socio-political (e.g., persuasion and communication) skills must be tightly linked for information technology (IT) consultants to be effective in helping their clients to develop and implement information systems. Furthermore, their observations also highlight the importance that consultants place on developing good client relationships and illustrate the way in which behavioral dynamics influence the evaluation and selection of technological judgments and choices. Similarly, Bashein and Markus (1997) found IT professionals' effectiveness was dependent on non-technical or interpersonal skills and their ability to develop relationships with their clients. In particular, they focus on credibility and trust. Although the authors do not define either of these terms precisely, their notion of credibility appears to draw on the idea of "credit" or the value clients placed on IT professionals services. Bashein and Markus' (1997) view of trust appears to be used to refer to more general elements of the working relationship like affinity and understanding. In a study of consultants based on survey and interview data, Clark (1995) shows how certain characteristics of consulting services influence the client-consultant relationship. In particular, Clark focuses on how the intangible nature of the product and the inherent difficulty clients face in selecting and evaluating consultants heighten consultants ' efforts to "manage the relationship in such a way that they convince the client of the value and quality of service" (1995 p. 15). He argues that the consulting process can be more usefully understood in terms of the metaphor of a theatrical performance and "impression management", than in terms of prevailing views of consultants as "professional helpers" (1995
p. 108). In part, Clark attributes the failure of the latter perspective to the lack of a robust and agreed upon body of knowledge on which management consulting is based. His critique, though provocative and well argued, is based on research that involves executive search consultants and management gurus (individual speakers on change or management theory) and is, like OD literature, probably less applicable to more technical types of consulting such as strategy. In another study that involved interview and survey data, Sturdy (1997) describes the dynamics of threat, insecurity, resistance, and competence in the client consultant relationship. His description echoes these the notions of expertise and value which are central to our definition of credibility:
Consultancy is fueled by their provision of a sense of reassurance to management and at the same time reinforcing or creating insecurities. The consultants' sense of control may however be challenged by the increasing sophistication of clients and their criticisms of, and resistance to, consultancy which is shown to be founded on the threat consultants pose to their own sense of competence. (Sturdy, 1997, p. 397)
Taken as a whole, these studies highlight aspects of the client-consultant interaction, (especially expertise, knowledge, and validity of advice) that we characterize in terms of credibility. Similarly, they also devote the attention both clients and consultants give to each others interests and motivations part of the phenomenon that we define as trust. The present study examines these phenomena particularly as they affect implementation in collaborative approach to strategic consulting focusing on attempts to establish trust and credibility, and some consequences of these attempts. METHODS
Overview The current project used a field-based multiple case study approach (Schatzman & Strauss, 1973; Yin, 1989) to explore client-consultant relationships. The work was conducted in an international management consulting firm specializing in strategy formulation and implementation, which I will call Strategic Technology Associates (STA).2 At the time of the study, the firm operated offices throughout North America, Europe, and Asia. Their clients represented a range of industries including consumer products, retailing, financial services, telecommunications, and various industrial manufacturing businesses. The first author played a number of roles within the host organization. These ranged from a relatively passive observational role to a more active participant-observer role. In a few instances, this role included acting as a consultant to STA in their internal training efforts. This approach corresponds to what Argyris, Putnam, and Smith (1985) refer to as "action science. It is predicated on the notion that the most useful and valid data for developing narrative theory about organizational phenomena is obtained in the course of efforts to solve important organizational problems. Under such conditions, participants (as opposed to subjects) have a stake in the validity and usability of the knowledge generated by the research. Indeed, the quid pro quo for gaining research access to STAs consultant and clients was an agreement to share the findings from this research with members of the firm. Data and Analysis
One of the major considerations in selecting this firm was its willingness to provide a remarkable degree of access. This was unusual given the highly sensitive and confidential nature of strategy consulting. While it might have been interesting to study multiple firms, the access provided by STA would have precluded gaining a comparable access to other firms.
This investigation drew on multiple sources of data including formal retrospective interviews with consultants and clients, informal conversation with consultants, observations of consultants at their office and on-site with clients, and documents prepared by consultants. Data collection occurred over a two-year period during which the researcher typically spent two to three days each week observing the STA consultants. Most of the formal observations and interviews occurred on STA projects with three different client organizations, although for each client there were multiple case teams working on different issues. Analysis of the data entailed the iterative and inductive approach characteristic grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and case-study research (Yin, 1989). The goal was to understand the critical themes and challenges in the development of the client-consultant relationship with respect to implementation. Trust and credibility emerged as central aspects of this phenomenon. THE DYNAMICS OF TRUST
Contextual Features Related to Trust In the course of observing client-consultant interactions, we identified three major contextual factors that shape the dynamics of trust: multiple inter-organizational relationships, divergent interests, and constraints on information flows. Below, we describe each of these at a conceptual level with some references to their description in the literature. In the subsequent analysis of how consultants and clients actually deal with issues of trust, we will show how these factors were manifested in the current study. Multiple Inter-Organizational Relationships Individual relationships between clients and consultants were embedded in a network of other relationships that spanned (at least) two separate organizations. Each consultant had relationships with a number of clients, who in
turn had relationships with each other as well as with other consultants. Each person was also embedded in his or her own distinct organizational hierarchy. Hence, lines of authority, responsibility, and allegiance were often ambiguous, overlapping, or conflicting for consultants and clients working collaboratively. Divergent Interests Fundamental changes in the operation and direction of a firm generally have significant implications for managers of that organization, introducing a political element to strategic decision making (Bower & Doz, 1979; Burns, 1961; Cyert & March, 1963; Pettigrew, 1973; Pfeffer, 1992; Tichy, 1983). As this literature highlights, change produces a struggle among organizational actors and subgroups for power, rewards, or control over scarce resources. Because consulting studies often recommend changes that affect the distribution of these important interests, such studies are highly consequential for clients and often produce resistance to change. In contrast, consultants are not directly affected by their recommended changes to the same degree as their clients (Kanter, 1985; Lawrence, 1954; Lipton, 1996; Sturdy, 1997). Given this differential impact, recommendations for change are likely be evaluated differently by consultants and clients. Moreover, the different interests of consultants and client managers can be exacerbated because consultants are frequently hired by the CEO or corporate staff departments to circumvent defenses that conceal and reinforce performance problems in firms (Argyris, 1985). Finally, consultants have their own interests, such as maximizing client billings, project profitability, and the utilization and development of their human resources. Together these various interests work to further increase the potential for fragmentation among members of client-consultant teams and disrupt client-consultant relationships.
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Constraints on Information Flows In the complex web of relationships there were often restrictions on the flow of certain kinds of information, especially of a political nature. This led to situations in which information available to a consultant or client, by virtue of one relationship, could not be communicated to other individuals with whom they had relationships. This was especially true for consultants who were often privy to restricted information. The constraints on the exchange of information that led to censoring are somewhat ironic considering that the technical model which informs the consulting process is an empirical one which emphasizes the importance of extensive, timely, and accurate collection of objective information. Indeed, for estimates of product or customer profitability, competitive cost analyses, or assessments of market performance, consultants analytical tools are only as good as their inputs. Clients were the source of, or controlled access to, much of this information. For example, they regulated access to customers, a key source of information about a firm's competitive position. They controlled internal financial and accounting information, a key window onto a firms strategic capabilities or relative cost position. Yet, because of real and perceived divergent interests and the large number of channels created by multiple client-consultant relationships, there were often constraints on the flows of information. Nevertheless, the sharing of information was often used to signal related interests and allegiances. Thus, exchanges of information became a fundamental element in the dynamics and development of trust.3 Behavioral Dynamics Surrounding Trust
Bennis et al. (1964 p. 513) have highlighted the fundamental role of "Information transaction" in instrumental relationships. Zaltman et al (1988) note the role of information exchange in creating trust.
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Many of the dynamics surrounding trust involved the sharing and control of information. In order to build trust in their relationships with clients and gain cooperation and information, consultants often used the disclosure of information as a way to signal allegiance to clients and concern for their interests, or as one consultant put it, to "keep them happy". For example, a common practice among STA consultants was what was called "prewiring" or sharing information with a client prior a review or presentation. In principle, this practice allowed clients to be prepared for a meeting and to raise any objections they might have to the analysis prior to the meeting. Under conditions where the information was not restricted, sharing information would seem like a sensible way of building trust and securing commitment. Problems, however, arose when there were restrictions on disclosure of such information. For example, in one awkward incident a consultant had shown some financial results to a client before the formal presentation. When the client's superior, who had been prewired by a different consultant, subsequently showed this information to him the client had to pretend that he had not already seen the material. While consultants goal in the relationship was primarily to acquire information from the client in order to perform their analyses and evaluations, clients were typically in a more vulnerable position. It was not uncommon for the information that consultants collected to reflect unfavorably on their past performance. Thus, clients were less likely to use information sharing as a means of building trust. Rather, clients tended to actively solicited information from consultants that they believed would help them to protect their interests. Moreover, they sometimes sought information, not only for its own sake, but also as a way of testing consultants' allegiances. On occasion, some clients even tried to influence the course
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of a project by withholding or distorting the information sought by consultants. Indeed, some clients actively tried to influence consultants' allegiances, analyses, or recommendations in order to protect their interests. For example, in one episode, a consulting study was commissioned by the corporate planning department of a large utility to evaluate possible diversification by one of the firm's divisions into a new line of businesses. As the project team examined the new business opportunity, they encountered what they saw as a bias in the strategic focus of the division president. One consultant described the division president as an "ambitious...empire builder," because he urged the consultants to limit the scope of their analysis to the structural attractiveness of the industry and not to conduct analyses that would evaluate the division's competitiveness in the industry. In effect, this omission would have biased the conclusions in favor of the diversification (cf. Porter, 1985). Another consultant noted the difficulties that this pressure created for the joint project team; "[The vice president] has his people on the client case team.... [They] are obstructing the collection of some pieces of data. The consultant then related other examples in which this type of conflict arose with clients, illustrating how trust can influence consultants ability to collect the data necessary for valid strategic analyses. Specifically, if consultants choose to protect top managements interest by collecting the potentially threatening data, middle managers (like the vice president and his staff) will trust them less. However, if they acquiesce to attempts to constrain the collection or analysis of information, then top management will trust them less because of the potential for strategic missteps for which they will be held accountable. Finally, in cases where consultants were able to acquire the data that they needed, clients sometimes tried to restrict the dissemination of the results of the consultants' analysis
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(output rather than input constraints stemming form collection of data). An STA partner described how one division manager had tried to prevent him from discussing an analysis of the division's problems with corporate:
There was a problem with the business unit manager and [our senior consultant]. The manager was resistant, not seeing the corporate perspective.... When we questioned the [fit between his business and the corporate goals] he said, "We don't need to bore [my boss] with this. I said, "I'm sorry. I'm happy to work with you, and I'm not going to go around you, but if asked [by your boss] I will have to say [there are questions about your business]."
Dilemmas Surrounding Trust As the above examples illustrate, consultants and clients used information exchanges to assess and establish trust. However, the combination of divergent interests, multiplerelationships, and constraints on the exchange of information limited their ability to develop trust in this manner. In effect, the consultant and the client each faced a dilemma with regard to the sharing of information. For the consultant, the dilemma was that if she withheld or censored important information from a client with whom she had a relationship, trust might be diminished, especially if the client expected such information to be communicated to them. Generally, clients expected personally relevant information to be shared (e.g., recommendations about plant closings or major cost reduction initiatives). On the other hand, if the consultant communicated such information to the client, she might diminish trust with another client who expected the information to be kept confidential. Regardless of which choice the consultant made, she risked damaging trust with at least one client.
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The client's dilemma was that if he withheld or distorted information in order to protect his interests, he might be seen as political or not acting in the corporations best interest. On the other hand, if the client provided the consultant with sensitive or negative information, this might also harm his interests especially if other clients were protecting their interests covertly as in the case of budgetary politics (Wildavsky, 1979) or resource allocation games (Bower, 1970). Faced with these dilemmas, consultants and clients had to choose an option that was unsatisfactory, and then tried to deal with the limitations of their choice by enacting it in a way that was covert. While covert actions allowed for the development of some level of trust, this was based on the withholding, exchange, or distortion of restricted information. The consultants goals of encouraging client participation or cooperation in providing information were achieved but at a cost. From a normative perspective, we might raise concerns about a trust that is based, not on principles of integrity, consistency, and fairness, but on reciprocity, compromise, and an illusion of convergent interests and fleeting allegiances. When either party experiences conflicting demands based on this notion of trust, their only alternatives require them to violate the expectations of at least one other party and risk the disruption of the relationship. Furthermore, in the case of covert approaches, both parties were at constant risk of discoveryeither for having exchanged informationor having withheld or distorted information. Under these conditions, trust continued to exist as long as clients and consultants did not detect covert exchanges or the withholding of information. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that both parties were aware that trust was opportunistic and that the possibility of deception existed. Moreover, the underlying behavioral patterns (e.g., deception or distortion
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of information) became routinized and implicitly legitimized. When they persist, such routines ultimately inhibit organizational learning (Argyris, 1985). For example, in one incident in the present study a senior financial manager had intentionally manipulated accounting information to increase his bonus. Though the consultants' analysis brought this to light, the managers behavior was never confronted. Top management simply transferred him to another division. A number of consultants on the project reported that this approach was widely used in the client organization, not only in instances of parochial behavior, but also around problems of incompetence. Sometimes the fundamental inconsistencies in this de facto notion of trust became readily apparent. Consider an incident that occurred at the conclusion of one STA study. A senior consultant had to meet with the head of a functional department to give this client a summary of the findings. Because of the timing of the meeting, key details of the recommendations had not yet been communicated to the CEO. These recommendations proposed reductions in the department head's staff and responsibility and, hence, could easily be seen as adversely affecting his interests. The consultant explained she was constrained by a number of factors:
I did not have time to go through the details of the report with him... [Nor did I] know what his boss had told him [about the imminent changes]... I could not talk specifically about [aspects of the change in which he would be interested]... and was supposed to reassure him, [which was not] my personal view, [but was] what the partner and the CEO wanted him to be told.
During the meeting the client asked the consultant directly what STA's recommendations would be. The consultant found herself in the awkward situation of trying
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to avoid disclosing the restricted information while not damaging the trust that she had worked methodically to develop in her relationship with the client.
Consultant: There will [have to be some changes]. We did not make specific recommendations... We can help you to assess [how to implement the changes].... In terms of [specifics, the partner needs] to go over them with [The CEO]. Client: So you mean you know, but are not supposed to tell me? Consultant: I wouldn't say I'm not supposed to tell you, because no one told me not to; I don't think I am the right channel.
The discomfort captured in this exchange reflects the essence of the dilemma created by a trust based on covert exchanges of information in the context of multiple relationships, constraints on the disclosure of information, and divergent interests. Presumably, in the short term, this interaction diminished trust in the relationship between the client and the consultant. Moreover, when the full extent of the recommendations was eventually communicated to him, the client became upset anyway and the level of trust in his relationship with the consultant was diminished- if not destroyed. While an extensive discussion of the practical implications of this analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, consider an alternative approach to dealing with the dilemma around trust. The crux of this alternative is that it makes the dilemma explicit.4
Consultant: We have developed recommendations for a number of changes. I cant discuss the specifics with you now because the partner needs to review and approve them with the CEO first. However, when I am able to discuss them with you, Id like
(For a more complete description on this theory of intervention see Argyris et al., 1985; Argyris & Schn, 1978).
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to talk about any concerns they raise and see if we can find a way to address them within the constraints of the study. Of course, if you see issues that we have not considered, we can reexamine the changes. If you wish, we would also be willing to help you to assess how to implement the changes. Client: So you mean you know, but are not supposed to tell me? Consultant: Yes I do know; and I understand that you would like to know as well, but no, I am sorry, I cant tell you yet because of the constraints I just mentioned
In sum, the powerful influence of the contextual constraints shapes the dynamics of trust in the client- consultant relationship. Moreover, clients and consultants common responses to these pressures tend to involve behaviors and strategies that are primarily covert. The result is a trust that even when it is developed -- is fragile. THE DYNAMICS OF CREDIBILITY In their efforts to solve clients business problems strategy consultants employ some type of conceptual framework. Typically, these frameworks are grounded in industrial economics (e.g., Caves, 1984; Oster, 1994; Porter, 1985) and involve complex analyses. This was true for STA and the components of a typical STA study were usually quite intricate. For example, the firm had detailed quantitative methodologies for measuring and modeling the behavior of product or plant costs, elaborate statistical procedures for identifying customer segments, and sophisticated data and financial analysis evaluating acquisition candidates. While the specifics of these analyses varied across engagements, STA's approach always relied heavily on the systematic collection and analysis of quantitative economic data on the client company and its industry.
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With respect to the dynamics of credibility, this approach had a dual significance. First, the rigorous nature of the approach was the basis of consultants ability to provide valuable advice to clients and hence, the primary source of their credibility. At the same time, the specialized and complex nature of the approach was often threatening and intimidating to clients. Moreover, consultants sometimes compounded this problem by using the technical complexity of their framework analysis as a defense when clients challenged their credibility.
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Contextual Features Related to Credibility As in the case of trust, we identified three major contextual factors that shaped the dynamics of credibility in the client-consultant relationship: differentiated skills, knowledge, and orientations, competitive pressures and client vulnerability, and the centrality of influence. Differentiated skills, knowledge, and orientations Although the literature on strategy consulting firms is scant, it suggests that these firms are quite different from their typical client organizations in terms of basic tasks, demographics, culture, and reward systems. For example, descriptions of major consulting firms (Argyris, 1991b; Miner, 1971) paint a picture of an industry populated by young graduates of elite professional and undergraduate institutions; cultures in which long hours and intellectual and analytical ability are highly valued; and high levels of compensation, especially at entry levels. The data on STA collected in the present study were consistent with this image. While it is difficult to generalize about a heterogeneous client base, on average, STA's clients (particularly the midlevel managers assigned to joint project teams) tended to work fewer hours, possess and value industry or functional experience over formal business education, and earn less than the average consultant. Moreover, the basic nature of managerial work (Kotter, 1982; Mintzberg, 1973) contrasts sharply with the typical analytical and empirical activities of consultants (Argyris, 1985; Phills, 1996). Thus, we might expect clients and consultants to have fundamentally differentiated skills, knowledge, and orientations (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). In fact, skills and knowledge are one of the most salient differences between consultants and clients. In describing collaborative client-consultant relationships, Poulfelt (1986) characterizes the ideal as "a task force in which both partners contribute their
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knowledge and experience. The client knows the industry and the organization; the consultant knows... planning techniques and tools and has experiences from other companies" (1986: 87).5 In principle, a marriage of these two knowledge bases should enhance the quality of strategic analysis. Indeed, this was part of the rationale behind STA's use of a collaborative approach. In practice, however, the knowledge that each party lacked was often as important as the knowledge they possessed. More specifically, clients lacked significant experience with the strategic tools and concepts used by consultants. Thus, consultants had to teach clients strategic tools and concepts before the two could collaborate on the analysis. Working with consultants as a member of a joint case team represented an opportunity for clients to develop new skills and knowledge and to demonstrate these in a highly visible context. At the same time, it also represented a risky journey into the unfamiliar and arcane territory of complicated financial and statistical analyses -- under conditions where failure could have severe personal and organizational consequences. Likewise, consultants began projects with a deficiency with respect to company and industry-specific knowledge. They referred to this challenge as having to "get up to speed on the client's business. This imperative stemmed partly from the need to address the clients' problem. However, it was also driven by the consultants desire to establish their credibility with clients in order secure their cooperation in the initial process of gathering and analyzing data. In addition, many consultants saw early impressions of credibility as enduring and, hence, likely to affect their ability to influence clients' strategic decisions and actions later in a study. Ultimately, most consultants believed that the quality of their overall analysis and recommendations would be the basis for their credibility. Thus, they felt that the sooner they
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Alvesson (1993 p. 1012) downplays the actual importance of knowledge in consulting but highlights the importance of the appearance or "claims of knowledge" in the central task of persuasion.
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produced what they called "deliverables," the sooner early proxies of credibility and value would become less salient for clients. Pressures around credibility were particularly intense early in an engagement and exacerbated tensions related to these differences in skills and knowledge. These pressures stemmed from the economic stakes involved in consulting. First, the fees charged by STA, like most major consulting firms, represented a significant expenditure for clients. Second, as noted earlier with the exception of STA partners and top executives, consultants' compensation tended to be high in comparison with clients? This combination created an environment in which consultants experienced a compelling need to establish their value by demonstrating expertise and capabilities which clients lacked, and by generating insights that clients were unable to produce on their own. Indeed, Sturdy (1997 p. 402) found that "cost/value for money" and "lack [of] industry experience" to be among the most common client concerns about consultants. Not surprisingly, we discovered that metaphors of value pervaded consultants' culture and language. For example, during an orientation session, one STA partner cautioned new consultants; "The first five to ten things you say to a client will determine their opinion of you for the first two to three months of a study. Every word out of your mouth builds or lowers your equity." Competitive Pressures and Client Vulnerability Although companies hired STA for a variety of reasons, most were prompted by a performance deficit with roots inside the firm and for an external competitive threat/opportunity. These strategic issues were typically associated with a sense of urgency and risk for the company. Yet, the decision to engage a consultant reflected a judgment that management was unable to address the situation on its own. Although this could have been due to lack of time, resources, or information, it was
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often construed in terms of a lack of competence or initiative on the part of the company. The latter interpretation tended to increase the threat associated with consultants' arrival. The implicit question that clients admitted to thinking (but not saying) was, "Why couldn't we solve the problem on our own?" As a result, clients often experienced intrinsic pressure to demonstrate their competence and defend past strategic choices. Again, this theme is echoed in Sturdy's (1997, p. 403) observation that the very insecurity which leads clients to hire consultants is reinforced by the threat they "pose to managers identities as competent and 'in control'." The Centrality of Influence Once consultants completed the data collection and analysis for a study, the recommendations had to be conveyed and "sold" to the senior decision-makers and other constituencies within the organization as the first step toward implementation. Consultants in conjunction with selected clients endeavored to persuade organization members to accept the studys conclusions and implement the recommendations. In effect, influencing clients' beliefs and values was one of consultants' primary tasks. This is consistent with evidence that social influence is a key determinant of consulting (Ginsberg, 1989; Martin, 1993) and managerial effectiveness (e.g., Cohen & Bradford, 1990; Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980; Yukl, Falbe, & Youn, 1993), as well as successful organizational change (Kanter, 1983; Kotter, 1996; Pettigrew, 1985). Behavioral Dynamics Surrounding Credibility Initial Interactions Surrounding Credibility Overall, the contextual factors around credibility created a situation in which clients needed help, but were ambivalent about this need. On the one hand, they needed the expertise that consultants could bring to bear on their problem. Yet this meant accepting help from individuals who based on their age and
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industry experience did not immediately appear qualified to offer such help. One reflective client expressed this ambivalence poignantly:
You have been running a business for twenty to twenty-five years and have had a positive impact... and historically been successful. Then a group of people without your expertise make a suggestion that is 90 degrees from where you are . That's a tough thing to accept [there is the] sense that, "If these twelve people who don't understand this market can come up with this, how come you couldn't figure it out? What is wrong with you that you couldn't see that? So for the team to be right, do you have to be wrong? Some people will see it that way... at first cut you are still walking in here with a twenty-eight year old MBA saying "I'm going to fix your problems. And we're paying a half million dollars for a couple of twenty-eight year old MBAs to fix our problems. There are a lot of people who have been in the business for twenty years who resent the hell out of that.
Similarly, consultants were asked and expected to help, but could not help until they learned the clients business and collected the necessary data. To do this, they needed the clients cooperation and support at a point in the process in which clients were uncertain of consultants value. Moreover, given the first two contextual conditions, clients were often understandably threatened by consultants' arrival with their proliferation of unfamiliar jargon and sophisticated models. When this happened, clients' initial reactions increased the existing pressures on consultants around credibility. For example, clients frequently challenged consultants' credibility in the first interaction. New consultants were regularly asked by clients, "How long have you been with STA? Consultants interpreted this question an attempt to assess or challenge their seniority and experience and hence their ability to generate insights to the client or situation which would be valuable. In one instance, a client's
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response to a rookie consultant's honest answer suggests that concerns around credibility (as we defined it) are behind the question. The client responded to the consultant's admission that he had just joined the firm with the somewhat joking retort "So you mean you are being trained on our time!" Another younger, though experienced, consultant related the skepticism he often encountered from clients on new cases:
Everyone is questioning why STA is there. On a new project [the clients feel] "I bought this case. I'm paying a lot of money. Who the hell are you to tell me how to run my business? Second, you are a hell of a lot younger than I expected. The guy who sold me this project was a lot older and more impressive [consultant laughs] ... Where is he?... Is this what he thinks we should do here?"
These two examples illustrate the types of interactions in which clients challenged consultants' credibility, as well as how these interactions might be threatening to the consultant. In addition, we also found that both senior and junior consultants at times expressed apprehension about their ability to add value relative to their cost, or to their own, partners', and clients' expectations. The defensiveness such conditions produced in consultants, suggests one explanation for some of the observed excesses in their efforts to establish credibility (see also Sturdy's 1997 discussion of the sources of consultants insecurities ). Consultant focus on work inputs and outputs In response to these pressures around credibility, most consultants attempted to establish credibility by relying on proxies of credibility and value, such as the amount of time spent working (inputs) and the volume of competitive data and analysis produced (outputs). One consultant's view of how to establish credibility illustrates this approach:
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At the start up of every case you have to basically bust your ass, and work a lot harder than they do. That's when [the clients] see that, "These guys are smart, they are working really hard, and all this stuff is getting done that wouldn't get done if they weren't here."
Unfortunately, because of differences in orientation and demographics, this seemingly straightforward approach often simply served to exacerbate tensions between clients and consultants. A comment made by one client revealed the friction that often arose around these types of input proxies:
The level of intense work it takes to be successful as an STA consultant is different than the level to be successful [in our firm]. So there was some culture conflict around how hard [the team] would work. It is true for me that I would not leave my wife and family to make more money. It is a trade-off I'm well aware of ... some [client team members] felt put upon by a disproportionate emphasis on work.
Consultants responses to these tensions were often defensive, a particularly common reaction was the tendency to disparage clients. One consultant confessed, "We look down on our clients because they don't want to work hard. Another was more contemptuous:
[The clients] don't work hard. They have one of the cushiest jobs I've ever seen. They come in at 9:30 and they are out by 5:00 p.m. They are out before the secretaries...and they have these off-site meetings, which it took me six months to realize that an "off-site meeting" means "I am going home to play with my kids. I won't be in tomorrow."
The second proxy for credibility that consultants relied on was the sheer quantity of output produced. In some instances, consultants acknowledged this excessive reliance on
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output to clients before a presentation. Cautioning, "You may feel like you are taking a drink from a fire hose. In other instances, they apologized after the presentation saying, "I know I've bludgeoned you with numbers. Moreover, within STA, consultants referred to large presentations metaphorically as the "acetate enema." One consultant described the negative consequences of this practice: "In [my current project] we give too much ... to the point where it hurts us. Where the [clients] are so confused by the volume of things we are telling them that they can't absorb it all. Another consultant framed the dilemma that he thought led him and others to knowingly overwhelm clients: "If the client absorbs and understands 100% of what you say, they are not impressed. If they absorb 20% [which tends to be the case] they cannot act. This quote suggests that the intention behind consultants' reliance on large volumes of material was, at least partially, to establish their credibility and value. Although STA's empirically driven approach contributed to this tendency, consultants did sometimes avoid overwhelming clients. For instance, a few consultants designed projects to stagger the presentation of complex or dense material across multiple meetings, allowing the clients more time to absorb the information. While there were sometimes questions about the feasibility of STA's recommendations, most of the clients interviewed, as part of this research, acknowledged the thoroughness and rigor of the firm's analyses. Thus, the quality of their analysis once the full measure of analytical tools and concepts had been brought to bear on the clients' problem appeared to help establish the consultants credibility. Nevertheless, the early dynamics around credibility sometimes created a pattern of reciprocal denigration that at the end of some engagements, left a legacy of negative attitudes. These attitudes were reflected in consultants' and clients' comments about one another. In fact, this behavior on the part of consultants was a source of
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concern for STA's managing partner and contributed to his willingness to participate in this research. For instance, an internal memorandum attributed the following negative statements about clients to STA consultants.
"What an idiot! When I said 'industry structure' he thought I was talking about the construction industry." "I'm not going to waste my time holding the client's hand"
While these comments were made privately, and may have even represented caricatures of what a few consultants said about clients, in some instances clients clearly experienced consultants as condescending. One client recalled his perception of the message conveyed by a senior STA consultant during the initial meeting of a new project:
Here is why you've had the problems you've had for the last X years. I'm going to set you straight. You've screwed up. You're going nowhere and you're getting there fast. If you don't listen to me you're dead."
While this may not be a verbatim account of what the consultant actually said, it was the clients interpretation of the interaction. Presumably, the consultant in was simply trying to convey a sense of confidence and authority in order build his credibility. Yet, the impact of his behavior on the client was quite different than what he intended. Again, alternative ways of managing the dilemmas around credibility involve making the contextual pressures and the dilemmas explicit. For example, recall the challenge consultants have in trying to establish their credibility using the thoroughness of their analyses, while also trying not overwhelm clients by the volume or complexity of these analyses. A consultant facing this dilemma might say something like the following:
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We have completed a significant amount of work and produced an analysis which we believe captures the complexity of your business. However, one of the difficulties we face in conveying this analysis to you is gauging the appropriate pacing and amount of information to present. On one hand, we want to present a rigorous and compelling case for our recommendations. On the other hand, there is a danger that in doing this we might inadvertently overwhelm you. Thus, we would ask that if, at any point, you find we are moving too quickly, or if you have doubts about the analysis, please let us know.
In sum, these examples illustrate tensions that exist between consultants and clients around credibility. Consultants believe that by working hard and producing prodigious outputs and analyses, they can demonstrate their expertise, value, and establish a basis for influencing their clients strategic choices. And in fact, clients are often impressed by the end result of consultants efforts. For example, one manager acknowledged, "Clearly there is a level of intellectual power, which is part of what we are buying the best and the brightest." Nevertheless, the most common tactics for establishing credibility often lead to tensions that make effective collaboration between clients and consultants more difficult, particularly early in the client-consultant relationship. DISCUSSION
Trust We found that contextual features of the client-consultant relationship create significant dilemmas for consultants and clients. In the case of trust, these dilemmas are manifested primarily with respect to exchanges of information. Each individual must make choices about what information they can disclose to other actors in the network of relationships within
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which they function. These choices simultaneously influence their own and others interests as well as the level and type of trust in multiple relationships. Moreover, this process occurs continuously throughout a consulting engagement, as new information is generated, and the nature of relationships and interests evolve. This complex and dynamic aspect of trust in working relationships is apparent in Lewicki and Bunkers (1995) developmental view of trust as an ever-changing process. Their model captures many of the dynamics that we observed between consultants and clients. More specifically, building on the earlier work of (Shapiro, Sheppard, & Cheraskin, 1992), Lewicki and Bunker (1995) propose three sources of trust: calculus-based trust, knowledge-based trust, and identification-based trust. Calculusbased trust rests on an individuals assessment of the negative consequences of failing to do what he says versus the positive benefits of sustaining the relationship. Knowledge-based trust is grounded in behavioral predictability. It occurs when one has enough information about a person to predict their behavior. Identification-based trust is based on an internalization of the other persons desires and intentions. It occurs when each party understands, agrees with and empathizes with the other person to the degree that he or she can act for him. Lewicki and Bunker (1995) conceptualize these bases of trust as representing stages in the development of trust in a relationship. Calculus-based trust is the first type of trust that develops in a relationship. As individuals in the relationship gather more information about each other, they can more accurately predict each others behavior and knowledge-based type of trust may develop. Finally, some relationships may move to an identification-based type of trust. These stages, however, often overlap with relationships at times containing elements of more than one type of trust. Moreover, the relationship may regress to a lower level of trust
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when one party violates the others trust. In the calculus-based stage, relationships are particularly fragile and violations can result in a termination of the relationship. Gabarro's (1987b) findings provide empirical for support Lewicki and Bunkers (1995) conceptualization of trust as the product of a developmental process. He found that effective managerial relationships evolved over time and went through predictable stages, typically taking at least eighteen months to stabilize. The first stage involved a period of impression making and mutual orientation. The second stage involved a period of learning and exploration, which in some cases evolved into a third stage, in which the parties tested the limits of trust in the relationship and attempted to arrive at a mutual set of expectations. The first two stages appear to be similar to Lewicki and Bunkers (1995) information collecting phase which precedes the development of knowledge-based trust. Lewicki and Bunkers (1995) characterization of the dynamics of trust also reinforces our observations about the fragility of trust in client-consultant relationships. These relationships involved calculus-based trust in which both clients and consultants calculated what information they could safely reveal to the other parties and tried to influence the calculus of others through elaborate signaling of allegiances. As Lewicki and Bunker (1995) note, this is a tenuous type of trust that can easily deteriorate. This risk is even greater given the contextual factors that constrain client-consultant relationships. A collaborative approach to consulting requires a more stable and robust trust, such as that provided by knowledge or identification-based trust and not moment to moment calculations and transactions. While knowledge-based and identification-based trust typically only develop over longer periods of time (cf. Gabarro, 1987b), some of the data from this study suggests that the most senior
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consultants devoted considerable effort to building trust with senior client executives that was based on identification. Credibility As with trust, contextual features of the client-consultant relationship create dilemmas around credibility. These dilemmas lead clients and consultants to devalue each other. Consultants often respond to clients questions regarding their value and credibility by working harder than the clients and generating tremendous amounts of data and analysis. Yet, at least, in the initial stages of the client-consultant relationship, it is unclear to what degree this actually enhances consultants credibility. Moreover, it can lead to polarization and defensiveness. These findings are consistent with research by (Bashein & Markus, 1997) and Gabarro (1978). While Bashein and Markus (1997 p. ) definitions of trust and credibility differ from our own, they found that a pure reliance on expertise was not sufficient for effective client-consultant collaboration. They note, stressing ones expertise and track record early in a new project will not improve credibility; it may even hurt. Similarly, Gabarros (1978) study of managerial relationships found that influence was dependent on elements of both trust and credibility. Since influence is logically related to behavior change, it seems reasonable to suspect that the development of both trust and credibility are critical to more effective implementation. CONCLUSIONS
Implications for Theory and Research The evidence presented throughout this paper shows that clients and consultants' typical responses to the contextual features of strategy engagements can systematically inhibit the
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development and maintenance of trust and credibility. This is especially true in the early stages of an engagement. These findings suggested a number of directions for future research. The basic forces contributing to the dynamics and the findings described in this paper presumably occur in other technically-oriented consulting firms. By this we mean firms operating in a domain where there is a recognized body of technical knowledge such as IT, engineering, or operations management. Like STA and other strategy consultants, these firms should share a history of operating in the purchase of expertise model of consulting described by Schein, {,1988 #866:5}. Nevertheless, additional research is needed to explore the degree to which these tensions and problems surrounding the development of trust and credibility are generalizeable to other firms and models of consulting. For example, concern with credibility evident in our research is consistent with Clark's (1995) study of executive search consultants and management gurus in which he found that issues of credibility underlie the consulting relationship. In contrast to Clark (1995) subjects, however, we found STA consultants try to establish credibility through quite different mechanisms. They relied on knowledge and analysis, whereas Clarks relied on impression management. While this may be a function of the fact that in strategy consulting the knowledge base is more clearly defined and accepted, additional research is needed to identify the various mechanisms that different types of consultants use to establish trust, as well as the factors that limit the generalizeability of such mechanisms. In addition, while the present study suggests that difficulties around trust and credibility can limit the quality and implementation of strategy consultants' recommendations, the link
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between these dimensions of the client-consultant relationship and these two outcomes should be examined directly. Implications for Practice Unfortunately, an extensive discussion of how consultants and clients might manage these dynamics around trust and credibility is beyond the scope of this paper. The first step, however, is a recognition of the underlying contextual forces and behavioral patterns. By acknowledging these forces and behavior patterns surrounding trust and credibility, consultants and clients might at least anticipate some of the difficulties and dilemmas they each face in the course of their relationship. A second step would be for consultants and clients to maintain an on-going dialogue focused on making these tensions and dilemmas more explicit. A caveat here is that raising and discussing these issues involves elements of threat and embarrassment; and as Argyris (1985) notes, conducting constructive conversations about these dilemmas and tensions requires considerable skill. Nevertheless, if issues around trust and credibility were discussed explicitly, they would become more manageable. In fact, many of the contextual factors that contribute to the dilemmas might be altered or eliminated. For instance, the relaxation of the restrictions on information and expectations around what kinds of information might be shared could be negotiated explicitly at the outset of a consulting study. Approaches such as these would enhance clients' ability to collaborate with consultants not only on the substance of the analysis, but also on the challenge of building effective relationships.
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APPENDIX A Conceptual Confusion and the Meaning Trust and Credibility In both common and academic usage, trust and credibility overlap significantly. Indeed, in much of the literature the terms have often been used to refer to the same phenomena. For example, credibility in the most generic sense means "believability" or the extent to which one can have confidence in the veracity of someone's assertions. Credibility first received attention in early studies on attitude change. These studies found that subjects' evaluation and acceptance of persuasive messages were influenced by information about the communicator's expertise as well as potential motives (Hovland, Janis, & Kelly, 1953; Hovland & Weiss, 1951). In particular, communicators who lacked issue-related knowledge or experience or who had a vested interest in an issue were viewed as less credible. While subsequent research has revealed the effects of credibility-related attributes on persuasion to be far more complex, (Johnson, Torcivia, & Poprick, 1974; Liska, 1978; Stiff, 1986) judgments about credibility (in this case, believability), under a range of conditions, have been found to be based partly on perceptions of interests and intentions, and partly on expertise (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981:62-65). Thus, in the main body of research on credibility, we see two distinct considerations. One is the question of whether the communicator has the knowledge, expertise, or credentials that would make it likely that he or she would possess valid information about a topic. The second is the question of whether the communicator has an interest or motive that would lead him or her to convey that information accurately (i.e. what we refer to as "trust"). In effect, someone might reject an assertion either because they see the communicator as ill-informed or misinformed, or because they see the person as likely to misrepresent the information they do have. 6 Similarly, Gabarro's (1978; 1987a) longitudinal field study of working relationships between new general managers and their colleagues also highlights the overlap between trust and credibility. Specifically, Gabarro describes trust as a multidimensional construct which encompasses two broad domains, "character based" sources of trust (integrity, discretion, openness, motives) and "competence based" sources (expertise, knowledge, skill). His
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research illustrates how attributions of trustworthiness become increasingly differentiated as managerial relationships develop, and that trust can exist in one domain but not in another. For example, a manager may trust a subordinates integrity but not his business judgment. In exploring the consequences of trust, Gabarro focuses on "influence," defined as "one person's ability to affect the behavior and thinking of another," (1978 p. 298) and notes that managers made frequent references to "credibility" as one of the most important bases of influence for new executives. While Gabarro distinguishes credibility as the link between trust and influence, he found that managers' descriptions of credibility were similar to those of trust, illustrating the overlap between the two in everyday usage. Indeed, examples of overlap between trust and credibility in scholarly research (e.g., Bashein & Markus, 1997; Kouzes & Posner, 1993; Rusaw, 1996), simply seem to reflect popular usage of these terms. Despite the overlap and interrelationships between many of the prevailing notions of trust and credibility, we will use our specific definitions presented above, in order to treat then separately in this paper. While this separation is driven by the distinctiveness of the two dynamics in the client-consultant relationship, we would note that our definition of trust is consistent with core features of the literature on that construct. For example, Deutsch, one of the early social scientists to write about trust, framed it in terms of beliefs about the likelihood that someone will act in a way that is in conflict with one's own interests (1962). A range of other theorists conceptualize trust as a set of positive expectations about the future behavior of others (Hosmer, 1995; Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; Luhmann, 1979). Our definition also encompasses a range of mediating factors that theorists have associated with these expectations including motivation, values and morals, past behavior, interests and incentives, and identity (Coleman, 1990; Gabarro, 1978; Hosmer, 1995; Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; Luhmann, 1979; Mayer et al., 1995; Shapiro et al., 1992; Zand, 1972). Finally, we would note that as these theorists developed the above conceptions of trust they also outlined the features of situations in which trust becomes important. For example, in his later writing, Deutsch identified such situations as relationships or interactions where "an individual may enhance his own satisfaction to the disadvantage of another by not adhering to the moral expectations or social rules governing the situation" (Deutsch, 1985:
6
There is also the possibility that the information the individual collects may be biased by their motives or preferences.
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122). Similarly, other theorists have noted the contextual salience of vulnerability and dependence, risk and uncertainty, and conflict among the interests of multiple actors in a social system (Chiles & McMackin, 1996; Coleman, 1990; Deutsch, 1962; Hosmer, 1995; Mayer et al., 1995). Thus, we believe that our definition of trust is particularly applicable to client consult relationships which are often characterized by the above contextual features. It is somewhat more difficult to connect our definition of credibility to the current literature, because (in contrast to trust) credibility has received considerably less attention since the initial boom during the early days of research on persuasion and attitude change (Hovland & Weiss, 1951). In fact, contemporary studies of attitudes and persuasion have tended to study "expertise" or "authority" rather than credibility (cf. Shavitt & Brock, 1994). In part, this shift reflects the recognition of the conceptual problems with early operationalizations of the construct (Liska, 1978). Again, in accordance with more precise conceptualization, our own definition moves away from a simple notion of believability, to one of the key antecedents, knowledge and expertise, which are consistently identified in discussions of credibility (Kouzes & Posner, 1993; Rusaw, 1996). Our conception is also consistent with treatments of credibility that emphasizes the element of "credit" or economic value (Bashein & Markus, 1997). Finally, the key element in our strategy for dealing with the overlap between credibility and trust is the exclusion of competence-related attributes from the definition of trust. This decision is directly aligned with Hosmer's (1995) decision to explicitly exclude competence attributes in his recent attempt to integrate various definitions of trust in the literature.
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MANAGEMENT OF CLIENT-CONSULTANT RELATIONSHIPS: BARRIERS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRUST AND CREDIBILITY *

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

MANAGEMENT OF CLIENT-CONSULTANT RELATIONSHIPS: BARRIERS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRUST AND CREDIBILITY

THE IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEM AND THE EMERGENCE OF A COLLABORATIVE

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

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Trust and credibility

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Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

Trust and credibility

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Trust & Credibility in Consulting

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