UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES CAVE HILL CAMPUS DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT, SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WORK

The European Union and the African Union

Democratic governance within regional institutions: A critical analysis of the European Union and African Union

Sandra Ochieng-Springer
April 19, 2012

This work is going to critically analyse the scope of democratic governance adopted by the two regional integration movements; the African Union (AU) and European Union (EU) using the institutional lens. Both the AU and EU claim democratic governance as one of their core values. Democratic governance is theoretically engendered in and practiced to varying degrees through their institutions which represent different nation states and the people of the regions. This paper will use as its analytical framework concepts of power and power sharing, consensus building and legitimization mechanisms that have been sought to enhance democratic governance and overcome democratic deficits within the institutions of the AU and EU. Before the analysis of the institutional framework however, a definition of democratic governance will be given and a contextualization of the regions will be ascertained. Democratic governance will be defined as the establishment of democratic institutions based on the principles of equity, freedom, participation in decision making (includes freedom to choose representatives through free and fair elections), accountability and inclusion; that have capacity to establish policy and resolve conflicts peacefully within the rule of law. It involves promoting the sustainability of democracy which includes an enduring capacity for: the separation of powers, checks and balances and the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2006; United Nations 2012; United Nations Development Programme 2012). Democratic deficit will denote a deficiency within these institutions of the aforementioned democratic principles. The AU and EU came about out of separate states desires to unite under the ideas of a Europe and an Africa. Their reasons for integrating were different with the EUs main focus being to rebuild Europe after the war and Africas main focus was to consolidate independence. They have therefore developed differently and within distinct historical contexts as well as different realities in terms of socio-political economy. According to Van der Mei, they differ on the basis of certain factors such as size1, funding2 (capacity and capability) and the time that they would have had to develop as well as the framework within which they developed3 (2007). They also differ in terms of their historical experiences4 and the

Van der Mei states that while the EU had to deal with only six members at its start in 1957 to 27 members in 2007, the AU, formerly the OAU began at inception with 32 independent states gradually incorporating 51 states as they gained independence (2007). 2 Inadequate funding of the AU clearly makes it less effective than the EU. Funding does not pose a problematic issue within the EU which is made up of wealthy and relatively wealthy countries 3 The EU was established in a relatively stable and peaceful context, it therefore had the luxury of time to build up its authority and institutions. In contrast, the history of African states has been characterized by political instability. The AU also faces

availability of a support system that boosted the integration process 5. There are therefore limits to comparison. The European Union Ginsberg states that the institutions of the EU are important agencies which ensure that the Union runs effectively by enforcing rules and acting in the common interest of all member states (2007). There have been efforts to make them more accountable, representative and democratic over the years. This is because although within all EU states, it is requisite that the conditions for democracy exists, overtime, there have been concerns as to whether these conditions can exist at the Union level. Such concerns have been voiced with regard to the legitimacy of its institutions and the limits of the exercise of institutional powers. This has led to revisions of Treaties in attempts to rectify the institutional deficits. These will be discussed below. The first issue of concern with regards to democratic deficit is that the integration process had increased executive power at the expense of national parliaments. According to Follesdal and Hix, EU decisionmaking was largely controlled by actors at the Council of Ministers and Commission, executives that were beyond the control of national parliaments, which gave them leeway to bypass their national parliaments when making decisions (2006). Secondly, there were reservations that the European Parliament (EP) was too weak. It did not initiate legislation and its control of the budget was limited. It was a consultative body and Bomberg et al called it little more than an expensive talking shop (2008). To rectify this deficit, every Treaty change from the Single European Act in the mid-1980s up to the Reform/Lisbon Treaty has strengthened the role of parliament in EU decision making and attempted to make the EU more democratic 6.

conditions in Africa of poverty, along with serious public health issues, such as HIV/AIDS and malaria with limited capabilities to deal with these issues (Ibid). 4 African countries were exploited by European countries and this exploitation helped to build the economies of European countries while regressing those of the African continent 5 All these problems for the AU are compounded by the lack of a system of support similar to the Marshall Plan in Europe which makes it harder for the AU to pursue its agenda (Van der Mei 2007). 6 Under the SEA, the EPs legislative role was enhanced through the introduction of the cooperation procedure. This was the first attempt at increasing the influence of the EP and improving democratic accountability. Under this procedure, if the Parliament did not agree with the Councils proposed amendments, it could review the legislation and ask for further amendment. The EP could also reject legislation under this procedure but the Council could still overrule the objection. The Maastricht Treaty extended this procedure by introducing a more potent legislative procedure called co-decision which unlike the cooperation procedure extends to almost all legislation. Under the co-decision, the EP formally shares legal responsibility for legislation jointly with the Council of Ministers. The Parliament and Council must enter into direct negotiations if they

The manner in which these deficits were remedied, was through ensuring some form of checks and balances and power sharing within the institutions so that the distribution of functions among the institutions has ensured a check on their powers. For example, the Commission which was thought to be very powerful is now answerable to the Parliament in the way in which it exercises powers but is also subject to guidance from the European Council. Under the co-decision procedure, neither the Council of Ministers nor the Parliament can enact laws without the agreement of the other. Originally, Parliament could only give an opinion on a Commission proposal for legislation prior to adoption by the Council7.This amendment although including Parliament in decision making, enhances supranationalism through quality majority voting of the Council, because of the fact that decisions can be made about the union without the consent of some members. Further, Parliament now has power to increasingly supervise the Commission which was a non-elected powerful institution (Ginsberg 2007). When a Commission is appointed by member governments, the EP holds hearings with the nominee Commissioners and then can appoint or choose not to appoint, the whole Commission by a vote of confidence. The EP must also approve the Councils nominee for Commission President. More dramatically, the EP has the right to sack to entire Commission through a vote of censure (Milev 2004; Van Oudenaren 2005). With regards to budgetary issues, it has significant powers over expenditure but not over revenues and has the last word in particular areas such as spending on regions, social policy, culture and education. Although its importance is recognized by organized interest groups who lobby the EP intensely on these issues, its powers over expenditure with regards to agriculture (which accounts for more than half of the budget) is limited because it can only suggest amendments but the Council has the final say. However EPs role in promoting special interests such as consumer protection, enterprise, culture, education and employment has developed as its

cannot agree on a proposal. If these negotiations fail to reach an agreement, the legislative proposal fails. The EP powers have been further enhanced by the Reform Treaty (Bomberg, Peterson and Stubb 2008)
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An example of this rectification can be seen in Chapter II, Section I of the Single European Treaty where there is replacement of former articles highlighting the cooperation procedure that is inclusive of the EP in consultations with the Council of Ministers, following proposal from the Commission 3. In Article 49 of the EEC Treaty the terms the Council shall, acting on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee shall be replaced by the Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, in co-operation with the European Parliament and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee. (The European Union. 1986. The Single European Act. February 17, 1986 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/singleuropeanact.pdf)

general powers have been enhanced. This is because of the presence of influential lobby groups within the EU. There is a measure of consensus building between institutions and other key non state actors 8. A third source of the democratic deficit is related to European wide elections that are meant to serve as a legitimization mechanism for the election of representatives to the institution of the European Parliament. The deficit relates to the fact that there are no European-wide elections based on competition for control over political authority/power and deliberation of ideas and EU policy. Even though Europeans directly elect their representatives for the EP, those elections are often characterized as second-order national contests (Sore 2011). They are not about political parties at the European level or the EU policy agenda. Follesdal and Hix suggest that the lack of the European element to these elections leads Europeans to vote in line with their attitudes towards the EU and not based on well informed decisions about policy (2006). Van der Ploeg, contends that the decreasing interest in European elections can be attributed to this lack of a clear battle of ideas or political agendas (2009). Since the 1979 EP elections, voter turnout has been on the decrease reaching an all-time low of 43% in 2009 a significant drop from 62% in 1979 (European Elections Database 2012). Moreover, the institutional structures of the Union appear too complicated for the citizen to understand further disconnecting them from the EU (Sore 2011). Therefore, although the EP is hailed as the only directly elected EU institution which legitimizes it as a democratic institution, an argument can be made in the opposite direction by stating that as long as there is no battle of ideas in Europe, EP elections will leave much to be desired in terms of popular participation. The deficit is reflected in the discrepancy between public opinion and decisions made by the EU. Another legitimization mechanism that has been used within the Union by several states has been the referendum. These referenda seek to legitimize the activities of the institutions of the Union (Micossi 2008). Rerefenda have been held in most states that sought accession into the Union and by Union Members on other sensitive and important issues such as the Union constitution, ratification of treaties and joining the Euro. These however are based on single issues so there is still a gap between the referenda and elections because on the one hand the elections are questionable to the extent that there is a lack of deliberation of ideas at the Union level and referenda though legitimate as direct form of

Lehman and Bosche affirm this relationship between interest groups and EP by stating that the growth of lobbying has led to codes of conduct for greater regulation set out on Annex XI of the Parliament Rules of Procedure. This is seen as a means to place relations between the two actors on a solid basis and to address concerns about legitimacy of the EP as a European institution by increasing transparency and openness (2003).

democracy is too narrow in focus as the electorate is usually asked to accept or reject specific issues and not all countries within the Union participate. Another legitimization mechanism within the EU can be found in the principle of subsidiarity which regulates the exercise of powers in the European Union and its institutions. It is intended to determine whether, in an area where there is joint competence, the Union can take action or should leave the matter to the Member States. The subsidiarity principle is based on the idea that decisions must be taken as closely as possible to the citizen: the Union should not undertake action (except on matters for which it alone is responsible) unless EU action is more effective than action taken at national, regional or local level (Bomberg, Peterson and Stubb 2008). This principle was introduced under the Maastricht Treaty and cemented under the Lisbon Treaty which established political and judicial procedures to keep in check the Unions competences. It was introduced to avoid what Micossi calls the risk of jurisdiction creep that would allow the Union to elude democratic control (2008). It is a means of trying to find some power balance between member states and the Union. The European Union demonstrates that the logic of deepening integration necessitates reflection and reform in order to meet the demands of enlargement and change. The Response from Brussels in form of different treaties and other apparatuses have sought to ensure corrective action and enhance democracy governance in its institutions through power sharing, checks and balances and creation of certain legitimization mechanisms. The African Union The AU and its institutions face different challenges from the EU with regards to democratic governance. This emanates from the nature of the political regimes. Sore views this feature of authoritarianism as an indirect cause of democratic deficit to the AU (2011). There are also direct challenges or deficits that can be found within the Union itself that are as a result of its structure. Due to the unstable nature of African countries, predispositions towards authoritarianism by many leaders in the post-colonial era, certain undemocratic norms that existed in national governments were passed onto the OAU9 and subsequently the AU. This coupled with the principle of non-interference in
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The main objectives of the OAU were, inter alia, to rid the continent of the remaining vestiges of colonization and apartheid; to promote unity and solidarity among African States; to coordinate and intensify cooperation for development; to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States and to promote international cooperation within the framework of the United Nations (OAU Charter, Article II)

the internal affairs of other member states ensured that certain authoritarian tendencies were cemented in nation states and had detrimental effects on the efficacy of the OAU. If the OAU is viewed with a constructivist lens10 then there is evidence of the transference of certain norms from the national to the Union level. According to the constructivists the ongoing processes and authoritarian ideas are deliberately constructed at the national level and are authenticated through certain institutions and structures of human association (shared ideas). These norms were therefore collectivized within the OAU/AU where the same leaders (HOS/Gs, Ministers, Commissioners) congregated and dominated discussions on Union matters. It is through the internalization of certain norms according to Bomberg et al that actors acquire their identities and establish their interests (2008). This is manifested in the objectives of the Charter of the OAU which remained intact for over four decades with very few amendments towards democratisation. These objectives included non interference, sovereignty and equality for all members, which were taken to extremes. Further, Intergovernmentalism within the OAU also reinforces this point as leaders want to maintain power in a similar manner that they do in the national arena. The AU which replaced the OAU after its dissolution, inherited the old structures and institutions such as the Assembly of the Union, formerly Assembly of Heads of government, Executive Council formerly the Conference of Ministers, the Commission formerly the Secretariat. According to Sore, from the inception of the OAU project, there had been no specific organ created as a platform for popular participation (2011). Indeed, the OAU Charter presents a structure strictly limited to government officials, and centers power in nation-states. In an effort to bring the peoples voice to the decision-making process, the AU established additional bodies through which the general population, civil society and the African diaspora can influence the organization. These are the Pan African Parliament (PAP) and Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSSOC). The Pan African Parliament (PAP) which is composed of parliamentarians elected from parliaments of each member state was launched on 2004. Each member state has 5 parliamentarians represented who are selected by the Head of state or government from both the ruling and opposition parties

10

Constructivists are of the opinion that ideas matter and interests are constructed and not predetermined. They focus on the social construction of collective rules and norms that guide political behaviour. Norms are shared understandings that reflect legitimate social purpose. (Payne 2001; Bomberg, Peterson and Stubb 2008)

participating in the national parliaments of member states 11. Unlike the EU parliament, in which larger states have larger representation in parliament, the AU PAP in adherence to the principle of equality of member states has the same amount of members from all states. The fact that opposition members are included in PAP can be considered a positive in terms of the inclusion aspect of democracy. Since the AU is an organisation working for the people of the continent, it is only appropriate that the minority within the member states gain some representation within the wider arena of which they are part. However, the tenure of parliamentarians in PAP runs concurrently with their tenure at their national parliament so this provides for discontinuity of initiatives/deliberations if different members come into PAP at different times (Roberts 2008). The primary objective of the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) is to provide a platform for the peoples of Africa and their grass-roots organizations to be more involved in discussions and decisions pertaining to the continent (ibid). Although the idea of a PAP was novel and noble, it has no powers over AU legislation as it is only an advisory body to the Assembly of Heads of Government or other organs. So on the one hand, the parliament is deemed as this democratic institution because of its representative nature but on the other hand it has no legislative powers so it cannot represent the people adequately. A paradoxical institution as it was created to empower and represent the people yet it is still powerless. Further PAP is required to discuss its budget and the budget of the Community and make recommendations prior to approval by the Assembly. This, unlike its European counterpart, deprives it of its oversight function to ensure transparency and accountability of the other governing bodies of the AU. Another major difference of PAP from the EP according to Hugo is that the EP shares co-decision power with the Commission and is granted veto, budgetary and legislative powers (2008). The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) was launched in 2005. It was created as a platform for civil society organizations (CSOs) to take part in the building process of Africa (Sore 2011). It serves as an advisory body composed of representatives of civil society, professional groups, non-governmental organisations, labour unions, community, religious and cultural groups both in Africa and the Diaspora to the AU. It is governed by a bureau of five regional representatives, a standing committee, and a general assembly of 150 members (Murithi and Ndinga-Muvumba 2005). The establishment of the ECOSOCC was considered a major step for the AU in its intent to be more democratic and inclusive of

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Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament (adopted 2 March 2001, entered into force 14 December 2003) art. 4 (1) (2).

civil society in the promulgation and implementation of its policies and norms and to develop communication between ordinary citizens of Africa on common issues of the continent (Badejo 2008). However, challenges to civil participation may hinder the Councils work. Akokpari et al make the point that CSOs in many African states are weak and cannot be influential in the AU (2009). Sore states that labor unions, for instance, can hardly be effective, when a large amount of the labour force works in the informal sector or in remote rural areas. To include most people, would require that grass-roots organizations be incorporated in ECOSOCC. However there are many grass roots organisations that are not registered by governments and this registration is one of the requirements for participation in ECOSSOC (2011). This is unlike what obtains in the EU where certain interest groups are well organized and wield a considerable amount of influence. For example, Bomberg et al state that although it is the formal right of the Commission to initiate policy, many initiatives emanating from the Commission are a response to pressures from sources such as these influential interest groups. The Com missions own initiatives account for around 10-20 percent of proposals. (2008) The EU is shaped by a number of players, member states, EU institutions, private interests and other interest groups which entails a lot of bargaining, negotiating and consensus building which the AU has to try and achieve. Furthermore since elections of ECOSOCC require that CSOs are nominated at national levels and registered by their own governments, this poses a problem when CSOs are not acknowledged by their governments. In Ethiopia, for instance, a law was passed earlier12 in 2009 criminalizing any foreign NGOs and foreign-funded national NGOs involved in issues related to gender, human rights and governance (Human Rights Watch 2012). Under the premise of making NGOs more accountable and transparent, the Ethiopian government has effectively blocked a great deal of civil society activity that it does not approve of. In such cases, civil society at the domestic level is weakened, and the requirement that organizations be validated by governments can limit their participation at the AU level as well. Consensus building therefore within the AU is curtailed because of indirect sources of democratic deficits emanating from the authoritarian nature of member states. The AU adopted a structural functionalist approach to its adaptation of organs. Although there were three organs inherited from the OAU, it has adopted more organs and revamped old ones modeled after
12

Charities and Societies Proclamation Law establishes a Charities and Societies Agency that has enormous discretion to regulate CSOs with few procedural safeguards and virtually no right of appeal of most of its decisions. Agency officials can arbitrarily refuse to register an organisation, order organisation staff or leadership suspended or make onerous demands for documents or other information (Human Rights Watch 2012)

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the EU to perform similar functions but with no power because of its insistence on intergovernmentalism. The AU Executive Council (ministers) has responsibility for many decisions in many sectors but their decisions must go to the General Assembly for discussion and final decision. Within the EU, the Council of the European Union is the primary decision making body along with EP. The Commission in the AU, smaller than that of the EU is responsible for the day to day running of the AU. Its functions are delegated by the Assembly and they report to the Executive Council. Similar to the European variant, it initiates policy and budget proposals for consideration by other organs and it is responsible for implementing the decisions of the PRC, Executive Council and Assembly. The EU Commission however implements legislation that it develops with EP. Further, there are other areas in which the Commission has supranational powers for example in negotiation of international trade and cooperation agreements where it has power to veto mergers even of companies based outside the EU. The AU Commission has no supranational powers. The Assembly of Heads of government is the highest decision making body of the AU with a wide range of responsibilities which include the determination of Unions policies, approval and adoption of the AU budget, oversight of the affairs of the Union, monitoring the implementation of the decisions of the Union and ensuring compliance by Member states issuing directives and regulations to the Executive Council, appointment of AU Personnel among others (OXFAM 2009; African Union 2012). Almost all decisions have to go through the Assembly yet they meet only twice a year. The European Council, composed of heads of governments and state meet four times a year and are the major agenda setters of important decisions such as enlargement issues and issues relating to the monetary union. They also settle unresolved problems at the lower levels (Bomberg, Peterson and Stubb 2008). The AU has also attempted to adopt legitimization mechanisms. One such mechanism that has been used to promote good governance is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). As an initiative of Africas New Partnership for Development (NEPAD), the APRM was launched in July 2003 as a monitoring tool of good governance. Countries sign up on a voluntary basis to be peer reviewed by a team that assesses the countrys performance based on consultations with government officials and civil societies. The team then writes a report to be submitted to the APRM secretariat for approval before it is sent to the organs of the AU. Thereafter, the country reviewed is expected to follow with the suggestions (Sore 2011).

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The main limitations of the APRM stem from its voluntary and non-binding character. This renders the mechanism almost devoid of power. Members, even though signed up for the APRM can opt out or ignore the review reports without fear of sanctions if they find the governance criteria applied too stringent (Akokpari, Ndinga-Muvumba and Murithi 2009). In addition, the AU allows for membership of any African country democratic or not. Unlike the EU, it has no thorough process for membership13. In the EU, membership requires that applicants first meet political and economic benchmarks, referred to as the Copenhagen criteria14 set by the European Council in 1993 (European Union 2012). Further, the same authoritarian leaders sit in and chair the Committee of Heads of State and Government of countries participating in the APRM. With no filter for membership, a voluntary mechanism for promoting democracy and authoritarian leadership, the AU struggles to enforce its commitment to good governance stipulated in its Constitutive Act. The legitimization mechanism can therefore not be authenticated. Given the analysis of the institutions of these two regional integration organisations it is imperative to ask the question, In which institution does power lie within the AU and the EU? Within the AU it is clear that power lies in the Assembly of heads of state and government. With the transition of the union from the OAU to the AU power has remained concentrated in the assembly of heads of government. This in itself means that they have not transcended the national arena and are still operating at the intergovernmental level. The Executive Council of Ministers is also based on intergovernmentalism. The Commission is supposed to be the mediating entity between the national and the regional setting but it has no real power. It only has executive functions of implementing legislation. It has no power over the outcome of the legislation yet it has to implement legislation. The other organs are advisory with no real power. Like the EU which has sought to consistently reform itself and become more democratic, transparent and legitimate through treaties and amendments almost every 5 years, though not without faults, the
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Article 29 of the AU Constitutive Act stipulates that any country can submit a request for membership to the president of the Commission. Upon voting by a simple majority of member states, the applicant state can become a member. 14 As stipulated in Article 49 and 6 (1) of the treaty on the EU. Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union states that any European country may apply for membership if it respects the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.A country can only become a member if it fulfils all criteria for accession as first defined by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993, and reinforced in 1995. Article 6(1), Treaty of the European Union The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States. (European Union 2012)

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AU can hardly make similar claims of consistent corrective action towards democratic governance 15. It has attempted to build inclusive institutions and legitimization mechanisms, but they only seem good structurally but functionally, there are still a lot of bottlenecks as they are hindered by undemocratic norms among other issues. Consensus building is still nascent and is mired by structural realities of the African states as well as undemocratic norms that are transferred from the national setting. Within the EU there are two sides of the debate between intergovernmentalists and supranationalists. Both can cite changes in formal rules of the EU to buttress their case. For example, as the EP has gained powers and the Council of Ministers has accepted more proposals on the basis of quality majority voting (QMV) rather than unanimous voting, it could be claimed that supranationalism is on the rise. On the other hand, as the European Council has come to dominate high-level agenda, it could be said that intergovernmentalism is holding strong. Despite introducing legitimization mechanisms and attempting to be more inclusive, there are downsides to the structurally functional approach adopted by the AU. The first is that it has justified the status quo (Ball 1988). The approach is more concerned with maintenance of political structures/institutions and processes which enable the system to persist. It is more concerned with establishing institutions and their relationships than analyzing why institutions are or should be structured in certain ways. They have established novel and developmental institutions such as ECOSSOC, nonetheless, structure is one thing, but the functional aspect of it is still lacking because of contextual setting and norms. Still following the structural functional approach that the AU adopted, one of the criticisms of such an approach is that it tends to be very elitist and focuses on grand structures/organs of the system and functions of the elites. The AU has attempted to include the masses in ECOSSOC which is still in its infancy stage and yet to prove its presence. However, by and large the integration movement has taken a top bottom approach with HOS/Gs, Ministers, Commissioners and the like seeming to be the dominant actors while the masses are seen as followers and not as independent actors in the integration process. This criticism can be applied to the EU as well, which has been criticized as an elitist project that is too complicated for the ordinary citizen and where citizens do not have possibilities to intervene during
15

Landmark declarations of the OAU that addressed democratic governance were far and wide and included: the Monrovia Declaration of 1979 and its strategies were incorporated in the Final Act of Lagos 1980, the African Charter for popular participation in development and transformation, Arusha 1990 and the OAUs relaunching of Africas economic and social development: the Cairo agenda for Action 1995 (Bujra, N.D)

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legislation periods (Pausch 2011). Bomberg et al capture its complexity in the following phrase Its institutions seem remote, its remit unclear, its operations complex and its outpu ts perplexingit defies simple categorization (2008 4). These criticisms have become more vocal with the ongoing euro crisis that has increased mistrust of Brussels and Euro skepticism. Within the structural functional realm, it can be concluded that institutions have been used within the two movements to define who (actors) participates in governance, how they participate and how what is desired is defined and by whom. The paper began by stating that the two regions claim democratic governance as one of their core values and also highlighted democratic principles. The institutions of the EU have evidenced certain principles of democratic governance and there have been attempts to reform facets of the integration process (institutions and policy) to become even more democratic through power sharing, consensus building and legitimization mechanism despite some limitations. The AU is now attempting to adopt democratic principles and portray democratic governance through certain mechanisms and institutions but it is apparent that there is much more to be done within the AU to promote a balance between democratic governance at the national and Union level. Power is still concentrated at the top within the Assembly of Heads of Government and State and this central feature impedes any efforts of power sharing, consensus building and effectiveness of democratic legitimization mechanisms. The OAU now the AU and EC now the EU have both since inception created certain entrenched path dependencies in terms of institutions and policy where certain decisions have reinforced themselves over time, as evidenced with the AUs insistence on intergovernmentalism and tolerance of certain undemocratic norms and tendencies and EUs insistence of enhancing democracy and efficiency through multilevel governance involving supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. The EU model has allowed for some form of sustainability in terms of democracy while the AU (which has expanded in scope but with limited capacity) is making attempts towards democratic governance, it needs to find some balance of power between different institutions to make governance work for the citizens of Africa.

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