Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Inayet Hadi
Professor Gage
PAD 5001, Section 001
December 14, 2006
Afghanistan Freedom 22
Table of Contents
Executives Summary 3
Legislative History
I. Historical Background 4
II. House's Committee on International Relations (HCIR) Action 7
III. Committee of the Whole Takes Action 8
IV. Senate Action 10
Provisions of the Law
VI. Title I Economic and Democratic Development Assistance for 13
Afghanistan
VII. Title II Military Assistance for Afghanistan and Certain other 17
Foreign Countries and International Organizations
VIII. Title II Miscellaneous Provisions 20
IX. Analysis of Impact 21
Bibliography 25
Afghanistan Freedom 33
Executive Summary
This paper reviews the background and legislative history of P.L. 107-327, short
title “Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002,” which was passed on December 04,
2002, and provided military and humanitarian support to the new Afghanistan
government. The Act has three titles with a total of nineteen sections. The first title
addresses economic and development assistance for Afghanistan. The second title
focuses on military assistance for Afghanistan and certain other foreign countries and
miscellaneous provisions, such as, forbidden the United States government helping drug
traffickers. It also supports providing body guard services to President Karzai, and
encouraging other nations to disburse the funds pledged to Afghanistan during the first
The turbulent political and civil strife Afghanistan faced over the past three
decades did not end with the enactment of public law 107-327 “Afghanistan Freedom
Support Act of 2002.” The Act formalized the framework from which the United States
justified its involvement in Afghanistan after the Taliban government was removed from
political power. The Act became a guiding principle for the United States government to
ensure Afghanistan does not again becomes a safe haven for the enemies of the United
States.
its referral to the Committee on International Relations on the same day was swift and
quick because of Congress’s concern with placing a policy framework to guide the
Afghanistan Freedom 44
Executive branch actions in Afghanistan. The introduced bills in the House, and
subsequent Senate approved version did not differ dramatically, nor were there any major
The impact of the Act on the reconstruction sector of Afghanistan was considered
phantom reconstruction, where the reconstruction is of low quality not having any
substantive effect on the targeted areas or people. The majority of the aid for Afghanistan
reconstruction never left US soil. The aid was disbursed to high priced US consultants,
firms, and organizations that did not achieve either long or short term benefits to the
Legislative History
Historical Background
The withdrawal of Soviet (i.e. Russian) troops from Afghanistan in 1989 resulted
in a civil war against the communist government. By 1992, the western backed
opposition forces toppled the Afghan communist government. The various Afghan
opposition forces that toppled the communist government could not agree on sharing
power peacefully, because each group wanted to be the first among the many. As a
consequence a brutal internecine civil war was fought between the various factions that
toppled the communist government. After nearly seven years of civil war the Afghan
people were sick and tired of war, and insecurity in Afghanistan. This was one reason
that the Taliban group was able to assert political control vast areas in such a short period
of time by promising to end civil war, and bring order, peace, and security to the Afghan
people. The Taliban initial existence as a group started in 1995 by taking over Kandahar,
Afghanistan Freedom 55
the capitol of a province with the same name in Afghanistan. They were formed by
Mullah Omar promising to end the civil war, bring peace, security, and justice to the
people.
Initially, the Taliban group was sustained and supported by the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) agency of Pakistan along with assistance from other western nations-
states in the late 1990’s. A year later in 1996 the Taliban effectively gained control of
Kabul from the many warring factions involved in the civil war. The civil war
participants after losing to the Taliban formed the Northern Alliance to safeguard their
interests against the new group. The Taliban had asserted direct political control over
Within the same time period that the Taliban came into existence, Osama Bin
Laden (OBL) needed a different state sponsor to move his operation from Sudan, in order
to be able to create a new political order within his native country, Saudi Arabia.
President Bill Clinton’s Administration and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had pressured
the Sudanese Government to expel OBL. When OBL was asked to leave Sudan he sought
Afghanistan, and its controlling regime to offer him protection and sanctuary (Frontline,
n.d. screen. last). Afghanistan was chosen by OBL because of his past involvement with
The Taliban regime welcomed OBL for two primary reasons. First, OBL had
resources to procure military hardware, and support the Taliban government's offensive
against the opposition with men. The Taliban group as the legitimate Government of
Afghanistan (GOA) was recognized by only three other nation-states, United Arab
Afghanistan Freedom 66
Emirate (UAE), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. The United Nations did not
recognize the Taliban controlled GOA as the legitimate government. As a result it could
not secure capital from inter-governmental groups (IGG) or private firms to sustain its
offensive against the Northern Alliance. Second, it is the tradition of Afghans that if a
person seeks your protection then one is obliged to offer it to him, even though if he had
killed your close families relative the day before in order to show your generosity. This
practice is called Nanewatei (Momand, 2000, para. 2). The aim of the practice is to
provide hospitality and protection to anyone that asked for your assistance.
In the late 1990’s the U.S. Government accused and later indicated OBL of
bombing its Navy Ships and Embassy’s abroad, and demanded that the Taliban
leadership extradite OBL to its authorities. The Taliban leadership’s response was two
fold, first was, ‘we have no extradition treaty with the US Government,’ and second, no
evidence was presented to the Taliban controlled Afghan Courts of OBL involvement in
terrorist activities. As a result they would not extradite OBL to US jurisdiction. Later, the
Taliban agreed to hand over OBL only to a Muslim nation-state that was neutral, and
acceptable to USA. United States Government did not consider this offer as being viable
(Borchgrave, 2001, para. 33). The Taliban government could not convince the US
involvement in terrorist activities, the last option left for the Taliban government was to
offer OBL to a neutral Muslim country to be tried according to Islamic law. The Taliban
movement feared that if it buckled under US pressure, then it would have difficulty
With the airplane attacks on the United State’s World Trade Center, the Pentagon,
and a cornfield on September 11, 2001 the U.S. Government changed its rhetoric into
actions. One year after the attack to dethrone the Taliban Government, US Congress
passed and President signed into law on December 04, 2002 the “Afghanistan Freedom
Support Act of 2002.” The Act laid the foundation of US Government involvement in
Afghanistan.
Henry J. Hyde R-IL, Chair of the House’s Committee on International Relations (HCIR)
on March 19, 2002. On the same day it was referred to the House's Committee on
House Committee on International Relations” (H.R. 3994 Bill Tracking). The speed with
which the resolution was introduced, reported to a committee on the same day, and
ordered reported, amended, by the HCIR the following day, demonstrated the urgency of
On April 25, 2002 HCIR issued a report titled 107 H. Rpt. 420 that unanimously
recommended the passage of the Act. The report also contained historical background
Bill. The report states that only two amendments were agreed to in the Markup session,
however, HCIR Markup session itself reads that three amendments were agreed to. The
Markup session records acknowledge three amendments were agreed to, while the report
only mentions that two amendments were agreed to. I will discuss the three amendments
Afghanistan Freedom 88
The first amendment offered in the HCIR, and agreed to was by Representative
Rohrabacher, which included language for the removal of landmines, and to provide ten
million dollars to “carrying out a loya jirga [sic], as well as national, regional and local
elections and political party development” (United States. Cong. House. Committee on
Supreme Assembly, where important public decisions are made in times of crisis and
great change. Representative Hoeffel introduced the second amendment in HCIR, which
was also approved. The Amendment added a statement of Congress to “foster stability
and democratization… that advances the development of democratic civil authorities and
institutions in the broader Central Asia region” (USC-HCIR, “Amending,” 2002, p. 53).
The aim of this amendment was to broaden U.S. foreign policy objectives in the central
Asian region to promote relationships with the Central Asian nation-states. In order to
Representative Lee introduced the third Amendment to authorize funding for the
Ministry of Women Affairs of Afghanistan (MoWA). The text of the amendment does
not allocate a certain amount of funding to MoWA, but only that MoWA should be
House Resolution 3994 was considered by the Committee of the Whole (CotW)
on May 21, 2002, and passed with several amendments to the Senate on the same day.
Afghanistan Freedom 99
There were a total of eight amendments introduced at the CotW, with only two
amendments being withdrawn by the Representatives who had offered them. The other
unanimously.
applied certain sections of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to help counter the
growing of poppies, and to use research performed by U.S. land grant colleges and
universities in the areas of agriculture and rural development to assist Afghanistan. The
amendment offered by Rep. Hyde was agreed to by a voice vote (Bill tracking HR 3994).
with a recorded vote of 415 yeas to 4 nays that would promote “the secure delivery of
humanitarian and other assistance in Afghanistan and require the submission of the
strategy for meeting its security needs within 45 days of enactment” of this Bill (Bill
tracking HR 3994). Another amendment was offered by Representative Hoeffel, and later
withdrawn by him. It would have required and mandated a central coordinator for the
thirteen federal agencies working in Afghanistan to coordinate with other countries and
organizations to ensure that greater cooperation was assured in Afghanistan by the U.S.
government. Representative Hyde (2002) asserted that such an amendment was not
necessary as the State Department already had an individual in that capacity (p. H2769).
fiscal assistance to Afghanistan, if the President did not certify that the Government of
Afghanistan Freedom 110
Afghanistan prohibited the use of children soldiers. Amendments 3 and 4 dealt with the
need for basic healthcare, a good education for Afghan children and orphans.
Amendment 5 prohibited the use of children in armed conflict. All three amendments
prohibited U.S. involvement “in poppy cultivation or illicit narcotics growth, production,
Afghanistan if they were involved in the growth, production, and trafficking of narcotics.
This applied if the instrumentality received U.S. Government funding. As a result of the
passage of this amendment the President was required to issue a report annually of
Senate Action
The six amendments introduced in the Committee of the Whole were agreed to
and passed. House Resolution 3994 was referred to the Senate on May 22, 2002 and
referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (SCFR) on July 09, 2002 to be
come Senate Bill S. 2712 (Bill Tracking S. 2712). Senator Hagel (2002) of Nebraska who
sponsored S. 2712, supported the passage of the Act with an emphasis that the State
these programs and to advance United States interests in Afghanistan” (p. S6600). The
Federal Agencies with other countries and international organizations towards a common
A few months later, SCFR reported, amended, the Act on August 01, 2002.
Senator Biden (2002) of Delaware sponsored the SCFR report 107 S. Rpt. 278, which
discussed the impact of the Act on the budget, examined the purpose of the legislation,
issued a summary, and analyzed each title of the Act and its impacts.
Senator Reid (2002) of Rhode Island offered Senate Amendment 4956, also
amendment required that Afghanistan guarantee in its legal structures fostering religious
freedom, welcoming pluralistic society, and monitoring of human rights. The amendment
also added US Government support for Afghan and international efforts to investigating
crimes committed by the Taliban regime and other parties in the past (p. S11147).
However, mass graves sites were not physically protected, or excavated for the purpose
of keeping evidence of war crimes. The mass grave sites as a result of war crimes
committed by the opposition to the Taliban were cleaned up, or removed. Furthermore,
witnesses had come out into the open, and were willing to testify that Taliban fighters
were murdered in cold blood after they had surrendered to the Northern Alliance (Deliso,
2004, para. 33). Instead of the witness receiving protection, they were left to be
military integration with United Nation's International Security Assistance Force (UN-
ISAF). The US-OEF military operations was US led, its main mission was to hunt and
Afghanistan Freedom 112
destroy al’qaida and Taliban remnants. While ISAF was sanctioned by the UN Security
Council to provide security to the new Afghan Interim Authority in Kabul (UNSC Res.
1386, 2001). Operations Enduring Freedom was only to provide technical support to
other countries involved with the UN-ISAF but no troops. This early separation between
the two military forces working cooperatively had a detrimental effect for Afghanistan's
peace and security. This early separation resulted in the resurgence of the Taliban group
early in 2005 and continuing through 2006 because of the overlapping of command
between the two international missions. The final version passed by the Senate was
Public Law 107-327 is divided into three titles with a total of nineteen sections.
The original Public Law’s sections have has been amended several times over the years, I
will only discuss the provisions of the Law that were passed and amended as of 2005.
There were no provisions in this title that were considered controversial, except by the
few Congress Members that opposed the bill on ideological grounds of not wanting to be
involved with nation building, or that resources were needed to be pay off the national
debt (Paul, 2002, para. 20). If the quotation marks are not provided with citation in this
section then they are directly taken from the section of the public law that is being
analyzed. The engrossed Bill from the House had twenty-two votes against its passage,
This title has eight sections defining it. Section 101 is a Declaration of policy of
Congress; to support the Bonn Agreement, which was an agreement reached by various
Government institutions after the Taliban were removed from power. The language in
this section is broad; it aims to “to foster stability and democratization and to effectively
President to execute the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (AFSA 2002).
purpose of assistance to Afghanistan was to ensure security for the United States itself.
Second, to support a broad based government that would have the capacity to be self
meet the needs of the Afghan people.” Including supporting alleviating a humanitarian
The aim of this section was to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a safe
The first subheading authorizes assistance for urgent humanitarian assistance provisions
for emergency requirements such as food, shelter, water, health care and landmine
clearance. The second subheading addressed repatriating and resettling refugees both
internally displaced Afghans and Afghans outside of the country. It authorized assistance
screen out “individuals not eligible for assistance from the United States.” The language
specifically authorizes by name the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
countries. The third subheading is titled Counternarcotics (sic) efforts. The subheading’s
establish programs for alternative livelihood, and to “purchase nonopium (sic) products
and equipment to Afghan State High Commission for Drug Control to ensure a favorable
activities outlined above, the President was authorized to spend between fiscal year 2003
through 2006 a total of fifteen million dollars to support the United Nations Drug Control
Program in Afghanistan.
irrigation systems, rural roads, and health clinics. The subheading's language enables the
Executive Branch to stay focused, but allowing enough flexibility to achieve the policy
order to write and implement a new constitution, promulgate new laws, and issue
regulations. The subheading also authorized ten million dollars to hold a successful
elected in a fair and free manner, and providing assistance to political parties
development.
The last two subheadings of section 103 required that Afghanistan establish a
market economy, and to assist Afghan women being represented in public service and the
political structure. The section places limits on the disbursement of authorized funding if
elected government, unless the President certifies that the Afghan Government is making
government.” The two requirements can be waived if the President can certify to
designate a coordinator having the status of an ambassador in order to design strategy for
that US Government actions in Afghanistan are consistent with this Act. Also, he is
charged with resolving disputes between the numerous US Agencies that are involved in
Afghanistan.
producing areas; is divided into three subsections. First, the President is authorized to
withhold aid, both bilateral aid directly and indirectly of multilateral aid to opium
producing areas, if it would promote cooperation. Second, to redistribute the aid withheld
from the opium producing areas to other areas within Afghanistan. Third, to continuously
Congress would like to be the outcome of this Public Law, but it allows the Executive
Branch the latitude to execute US Government interests in Afghanistan. For example, the
President can delegate authority to an Executive Branch Agency defining which areas of
were to be recognized in relations to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and to include
Afghan-Americans in both personnel and contracts “to the extent feasible.” The section
equipment” for the development of Afghanistan. The language of this section encourages
the use of research and personnel of colleges and university for “agriculture and rural
development” in Afghanistan. The section allows only seven percent of the total allocated
funds can be used for administrative expense. The Comptroller General (CG) director of
this Act, and the Inspector General (IG) of USAID was to “…conduct audits, inspections,
and other activities…associated with the expenditure of the funds to carry out this title.”
On the websites of CG there were only two annual reports available, and on IG websites
there were only two projects audits reports done in 2003, and only a few more project
audits completed in 2004. As a result of the vast amount of funds were not being
appropriately monitored by the CG and IG. There have been reports from
intended for Afghanistan development, including the reports conducted by the CG and
IG.
Afghanistan Freedom 117
authority, and does not reduce funding or authority provided by other acts legislation.
Section 108 Authorization of appropriations; the President is provided with four hundred
twenty five million dollars each fiscal year to execute this Act except section 103(c) of
this Act, funds authorized by this Act will remain until spent. President Bush referred to
the Marshall Plan developed for Europe after world war two when discussing U.S.
translated into commitments. The language of this section is flexible enough that it
provides the President with the resources to make his rhetoric a reality, but sadly enough
the focus and resources necessary were diverted from the reconstruction of Afghanistan
to the war in Iraq (Maloney, 2004, para. 13). The shift in attention, focus, and funds away
from the mission in Afghanistan to the war in Iraq hampered the implementation of this
Title II Military Assistance for Afghanistan and Certain other Foreign Countries
Afghanistan. It also stipulates the benefits that other countries are to receive for their
military involvement in Afghanistan. This title has eight sections defining it.
Section 201 Support for security during transition in Afghanistan; address the sense of
Afghanistan army,” and to establish “a professional civilian police” force that respect
human rights. In addition, section 201 express supports from Congress to the
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Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to drawdown military hardware, training, and education
for the Government of Afghanistan and other eligible countries and organizations
involved in Afghanistan. The President is also giving the authority to contract or use
other means to execute section 202 with three hundred million dollars, which can be
increased with requesting more funds from Congress. This section creates new authority
for the President in order to successfully use the available capital, hardware, and
personnel to execute U.S. interests in Afghanistan. The language of this section is precise
providing the necessary funds, yet, it gives latitude to the President on how this section is
executed.
describes in detail what type of activities are covered for assistance, and what countries
and international organization can be eligible under section 202, providing non of the
countries have committed gross human rights violations, supported international acts of
terrorism, or are in violation of the Arms Export Control Act. Although Iran is involved
with encouraging that a peaceful and secure Afghanistan is established, this section, I
believe was intended to prevent U.S. assistance from going towards the Iranian
government.
Section 204 Reimbursement for assistance; does not require that assistance
provided under this Act be reimbursed except if assistance is provided under section
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644(m) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The amount of assistance provided under
notify Congress in both classified and unclassified report form fifteen days before
assistance is provided under this title. The report must detail the importance of assistance
“to the national security interests of the United States.” The report form does not have to
be approved by Congress in order to take effect, unless there is a two third vote in each
Afghanistan and expansion of the International Security Assistance Force; Describes the
military intervention in Afghanistan, which forms the policy statement under this section.
The implementation of this section requires the President to submit a strategy to Congress
no later then sixty days after the passage of this Act that would cause Afghanistan to
become a viable nation-state. After the initial report, the President is required to submit
Afghanistan. This section’s language is very specific as to what should be included in the
report, and when the reports should be submitted to Congress. The last part of this section
express the sense of Congress that the President sponsor a resolution at the United
Nations Security Council to expand the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
Afghanistan Freedom 220
throughout Afghanistan. The President also must enlist allies of the U.S. to provide
military forces to expand ISAF. In August of 2003 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) officially took over command of ISAF. In October 2006 NATO-ISAF deployed
throughout Afghanistan. There are some countries within the NATO alliance that have
caveats that restrict where and how their troops can be used in Afghanistan (NATO,
President under this Act “is an addition to any other authority to provide assistance to the
Government of Afghanistan.” The authority is limited by section 512 of Public Law 107-
115. Section 208 Sunset clause; this Act expired on September 30, 2006.
This title has three sections defining it. Section 301 Requirement to comply with
prohibits any US assistance to drug traffickers. The section was original introduced by
Representative Waters with the intent of raising awareness that there is potential for U.S.
personnel to get involved in drug trafficking. With objections from Representative Hyde
that the original amendment would greatly restrict U.S. interests in Afghanistan, Rep.
Waters agreed to modify the original language of the Bill to assuage Rep. Hyde concerns.
The language of this section that was enrolled for the President’s signature removed any
After the assassination of the Vice President of Afghanistan in July of 2002, and
subsequent assassination attempts on President Karzai life, this section required the U.S.
diplomatic security, law enforcement, and military personnel to protect President Karzai
from being killed. These U.S. personnel were to “be succeeded by qualified Afghan
to the President of Afghanistan. The language required the need for such personnel to be
provided, but allows enough flexibility to the President as to how to achieve this
requirement.
Section 303 Donor contributions to Afghanistan and reports; the very first donor
conference held in Tokyo after the defeat of the Taliban regime provided an inadequate
level of support for Afghanistan development, and worse still the amount pledged was
not being disbursed. Thus Congress in very explicit terms stated “the United States
should use all appropriate diplomatic means to encourage all states that have pledged
assistance to Afghanistan to deliver as soon as possible.” Even with this requirement the
amount of assistance pledged was not delivered effectively for the development of
Afghanistan, most of the aid that was disbursed was considered phantom aid, which was
Analysis of Impact
The direct economic beneficiaries of this Act were U.S. corporations who were
awarded hundreds of million of dollars in contracts either by the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) or the Pentagon through the Army Corps of
Engineers (ACE). Also, there was a political benefit for the Bush Administration prior to
Afghanistan Freedom 222
the 2004 Presidential elections in boosting of the success in Afghanistan. However, the
Afghan people were the losers as the result of implementation of this Act.
allocated for the development of Afghanistan were USAID and the Pentagon. The
USAID was the lead agency responsible for managing US funds to reconstruct
Afghanistan, and Pentagon was responsible for ensuring that Afghanistan had a properly
trained national army to protect Afghan territory and government. Both of these agencies
contracted out their responsibilities to US private firms. They in turn subcontracted out
the work to other companies that resulted in finished work not meeting minimum
international quality standard or having the intended results (United States Government
Accountability Office [USGAO], 2005, p. 21; United States Agency for International
Development [USAID], 2006, p. 7). US government issued reports detailing the shabby
Program (RAMP) to Chemonics International Inc (CII). Whose owner, Scott Spangler
was a senior USAID director under the first Bush Administration. According to the
report, Scott Spangler and his wife gave the Republican Party between 1990 to 2003
about one hundred thousand dollars (p. 22). RAMP’s intention was to rebuild the
irrigation systems, build markets for Afghan agriculture products both domestic and
international, and rebuild the livestock sector (USAID, 2006, p. 2). United States GAO
Afghanistan Freedom 223
audit found that CII had failed to develop international markets for Afghan products or to
was awarded two contracts for the same scope of work from two different offices within
ACE (Dept. of Defense Office of the Inspector General [DoDOIG], 2005, p. 13). The
DoDOIG (2005) audit report discovered that contracts awarded were not being properly
tracked of, or designed (p. 28). Furthermore, the contracts were awarded to one firm
when in fact it could have been successfully contracted out to more then one firm (p. 14 ).
here in the States, and robbed the people of Afghanistan from the generosity of the
American people.
Administration was able to paint a story of success in Afghanistan. For example, the
Bush Administration reminded the US public prior to the 2004 Presidential elections the
number of students attending primary school, the number of returning refugees from
neighboring countries, the adoption of a constitution, and etc... While these milestones
were in fact achieved on the surface, there was another undercurrent that was brewing to
the situation that is faced today. This was the unlimited influence of warlords supported
by the United States armed forces, the foreign corruption, the lack of aid circulating in
the Afghan economy, all contributed to the dissatisfaction of the Afghan people from
their own government, which led to support for the Taliban, and while harsh in its
The funding that was allocated to Afghanistan as the result of the passage of this
Act was in reality phantom aid, which never leaves the soil of the donor nation and the
receiving nation has no control over the allocation or the use of the aid money (Jones,
Foundation testified before the House Committee on International Relations (2006) that
more or less of fifteen percent of US aid stays in Afghanistan, the rest of the intended aid
circulates directly back into US economy (USC-HCIR, “Afghanistan: Is the Aid Getting
Through,” p. 11). Audits have been conducted by the various entities of US Government
such as the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, the Comptroller General
of Government Accountability Office, and USAID Inspector General have all mentioned
in their audit reports of a lack of clear instructions to the contractors for requiring quality
work, not requiring reports from the contractors, and not monitoring the contracts
awarded.
manner would achieve long term benefits both for Afghanistan, and the States. The
shabby work conducted by these contractors will no doubt cause long term loss not only
to the Afghan people, but will in fact support the armed opposition in Afghanistan. The
armed opposition can always remind the people that the foreign troops have only
supported those in government that aim to steal their land and resources without
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