David S.

McDonough

Afganistan and renewing Canadian leadership

Panacea or hubris?
Canada has committed significant resources to military operations in Afghanistan. By 2011, roughly 41,000 Canadian forces personnel will have served in the country (15,000 more than fought in Korea) and $7.5 billion will have been spent on combat operations.1 It is highly unlikely that the Canadian government could make any other significant military commitmentin Darfur, for exampleuntil after the combat mission ends.2 It would not be an exaggeration to claim that Canadas international security policy has essentially been reduced to the current Afghan campaign.

David S. McDonough is a PhD candidate in political science and a doctoral fellow at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University, as well as a recipient of the SSHRC Canadian graduate scholarship and an honourary Killam scholarship for 2008-09. The author would like to thank the organizers of the workshop, Philippe Lagass and Justin Massie, for providing the opportunity to present this research and for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. 1 David Perry, Canadas seven billion dollar war: The cost of Canadian forces operations in Afghanistan, International Journal 63, no. 3 (summer 2008): 703. 2 The Afghan mission has reportedly consumed the resources of both our first and second lines of operation. See Report on plans and priorities 2008-2009,

| International Journal | Summer 2009 | 55 |

| David S. McDonough |

The Stephen Harper government has not been coy about the merits of this mission and relies frequently on a security rationale to justify the current combat role. Reconstruction, stabilization, and counterinsurgency, according to this argument, are critical to prevent the return of an al Qaeda terrorist sanctuary in Afghanistan. Other justifications have also been usedlikely due to the growing skepticism of Canadians about the threat of terrorism after several years without an attack in North America. Perhaps most interesting has been the argument that Canadas military commitment raises the countrys international leadership profile. The previous Liberal government was the first to interject such a rationale into Canadian policy, but Harper has been less shy in his claims that Canada is back on the world stageand critical support for such a bold assertion has been the expenditure of blood and treasure in Afghanistan. Claims of reinvigorating the countrys international leadership role, especially as it pertains to the related notion of obtaining influence amongst its allies, can be found on two levels. First, the Afghan mission is seen as facilitating the long-awaited renewal of the Canadian forces. The rebuilding of Canadas military assets, which had deteriorated under a succession of deficit-cutting governments, is seen as heralding a more robust international security role. Second, Canada will have expanded its influence in two longstanding pillars of Canadian foreign policynamely, the Canada-US relationship and NATO. As one of the few NATO countries participating in high-intensity combat operations, Canada appears to have reinforced both familial ties with the US and solidarity within the alliance. Upon closer examination, however, the diminishing returns and increasing costs of this intervention should at least raise doubts about any alleged renewal of Canadian leadership or influence. As strategist Colin Gray wisely observed, it remains notoriously difficult to evaluate claims that Canadian military activity results in influence in, or access to, the important political/military councils of the West.3 I have argued elsewhere that the
Department of National Defence, 2008, 35. This fact also appears to contradict General Rick Hilliers assurances to the government that the forces deployment to Kandahar would still allow for a contingent to be sent to Darfur (or elsewhere). See Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar (Viking Canada, 2007), 192. For a useful point of comparison, the Canadian military was able to undertake a combat role in the Korean War and simultaneously deploy a 6000-strong combat contingent to bolster NATO commitments in western Europe. 3 Colin Gray, Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question of Relevance (Toronto, Vancouver: Clarke, Irwin & Co., 1972), 12.
| 56 | Summer 2009 | International Journal |

| Afghanistan and renewing Canadian leadership |

mission represents a gamble for the forces that could further facilitate either the militarys rebuilding or its eventual hollowing.4 This article will expand that analysis with further details on the declining prospects for a reinvigorated Canadian forces, and will provide a wider strategic context by showing how Canadas Afghan role intersects withbut has minimal influence oncritical developments in the US and NATO. Ultimately, the gamble does not appear to be paying off: the decision to extend deployment until 2011 seems destined only to limit further the countrys strategic options.
THE ROAD TO KANDAHAR

In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Canada deployed a relatively significant maritime force to the region. Operation Apollo witnessed the deployment of 16 warships over a two-year period, whose primary task was maritime interdiction and force protection. This was followed by the 2002 deployment of a Canadian battalion that was initially rebuffed by European governments and then operated closely with the Americans, most notably by leading operations Torii and Harpoon, and taking part in operation Anaconda. These soldiers were withdrawn after six months, though elements of Canadas joint task force 2 continued to operate in theatre. Canada returned to the Afghan front in 2003, when political leaders agreed to deploy the forces to support the UN-mandated international security assistance force (ISAF) that was responsible for security in Kabul and the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Canadian troops operated in a peacesupport capacity in the city of Kabul from 2003 to mid-2005. As one of its largest military contingents, Canada was instrumental in both expanding ISAF to the surrounding region and convincing NATO to take over the mission. Canada agreed that its lead-nation role in Kabul would be followed by the deployment of a provincial reconstruction team in support of the ISAF transition plan to provide stability and reconstruction for the entire country. Stages one and two were largely completed by 2005, with the deployment of reconstruction teams to north and west Afghanistan. Stages three and four required NATO to establish teams in south and east Afghanistan. Military forces attached to the US-led operation Enduring Freedom were conducting

4 David McDonough, The paradox of Afghanistan: Stability operations and the renewal of Canadas international security policy, International Journal 62, no. 2 (summer 2007): 620-41.

| International Journal | Summer 2009 | 57 |

| David S. McDonough |

counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in these former Taliban bastions, and NATOs growing involvement promised to transform the ISAF mission radically. The Paul Martin government was eager to resolve any lingering tension in the Canada-US relationship following Canadas 2003 refusal to participate in the Iraq War and its 2005 refusal to endorse US ballistic missile defence plans. Canadian political and military leadersmost notably Prime Minister Paul Martin, Defence Minister Bill Graham, and Chief of the Defence Staff General Rick Hillierwere also reportedly eager to demonstrate the countrys military prowess and ability to achieve strategic influence. Despite the fact that there were other options, the Martin government made the fateful decision to deploy a 2500-strong Canadian contingent, including both a civil-military reconstruction team and a battlegroup, to replace American forces in Kandahar province.5 Progress in the ISAF transition plan has proven difficult. The Canadian army continues to conduct combat operations against the Taliban, often in close cooperation with the US and the UK. This has resulted in a steep incline in Canadian casualties, which as of March 2009 included 116 military fatalities and one civilian fatality. Cleavage has developed within NATO itself. Canada and a few allies conduct combat-intensive operations in south and southeast Afghanistan, while a number of coalition partners are hobbled by national caveats that can restrict their operations. The number and types of caveats vary; perhaps most problematic have been geographic restrictions that prevent redeployment to the more dangerous regions of Afghanistan. As one of the frontline countries in ISAF, Canada has frequently joined other countries in criticizing certain NATO allies for refusing to increase troop levels or eliminate these caveats. Harper was responsible for overseeing the Canadian military deployment to Kandahar in 2006 and initially extending the mission to 2009. Despite growing public concerns, he has proven to be a stringent defender of the Afghan mission and was at the forefront of efforts to further extend Canadas deployment to Kandahar to 2011. The New Democratic party and Bloc Qubecois have been stridently opposed to this commitment. The official Liberal opposition, while suspicious of an open-ended commitment
5 This account of the Kandahar deployment decision is from Stein and Lang, The Unexpected War, chapter 10. The other options included remaining in Kabul or deploying to either Herat or Chagcharan, in western and northern Afghanistan respectively.

| 58 | Summer 2009 | International Journal |

| Afghanistan and renewing Canadian leadership |

to Afghanistan, has also been keen to avoid turning the Afghan mission into a possible election issue. The Harper government created the independent panel on Canadas future role in Afghanistan, headed by John Manley, to provide expert, nonpartisan advice on the possible extension of the mission. The panel released its final report in January 2008 and recommended a continued military commitment in Kandahar beyond 2009 and a renewed emphasis on reconstruction, development, and the training of the Afghan national army and police. The mission extension was, however, contingent on two key factorsan additional coalition battalion (roughly 1000 troops) to support Canadian military operations and the acquisition of medium helicopter lift capacity and unmanned aerial vehicles. The Manley reports recommendations were ultimately accepted by the Liberal opposition, and in March 2008, the house of commons voted in favour of a mission extension until 2011. Aside from some vague promises at the 2006 Riga summit to lift caveats in an emergency, NATO proved unable either to increase significantly the number of ISAF forces or allied participation in combat operations. However, the Manley reports conditions were largely met at the 2008 Bucharest summit. In April 2008, France agreed to send an army battalion for operations in the increasingly dangerous region surrounding Kabul in eastern Afghanistan. Frances decision to send reinforcements has certainly helped to free up American troops and has allowed the US to agree to send 3500 marines to work with frontline allies (including the Canadian forces) in southern Afghanistan. Moreover, Canada has signed an agreement to lease unmanned aerial vehicles and helicopters from Russia, as well as to purchase six used Chinook helicopters from the US for expected deployment in early 2009. Problems with troop shortfalls have persisted in the wake of the Bucharest summit. At the time of writing, there are roughly 62,000 ISAF troops and the additional 10,000 Enduring Freedom troops in Afghanistan, with promises of increases announced at the Bucharest summit and more recently by the Obama administration. But recent additional American troops in southern Afghanistan have been assisting the British in Helmand province or helping to train the Afghan army; it was only in August 2008 that 800 American troops began serving in Kandahar.6 It appears inevitable that
6 Mike Blanchfield, Troop shortfalls persist in Afghanistan: Manley, Canwest, 11 September 2008.

| International Journal | Summer 2009 | 59 |

| David S. McDonough |

Canadian troops will continue to play an active role in Afghanistan, with a renewed focus on training the Afghan army, until at least 2011, at which time Canadas battlegroup will be either redeployed outside of Kandahar or withdrawn entirely. The cost of this planned 10-year military commitment to Afghanistan has been unprecedented. Aside from the tragic casualties, Canada will have spent an estimated $7.5 billion on military operations and $1.2 billion on development assistance by 2011. The Afghan mission can indeed be seen as a reversal of Canadas frugal or pinchpenny approach to international securityinsofar as it consists of a voluntary commitment involving a significant application of military power and the consequent human and material costs.7 However, it would be imprudent to assume that such a shift in foreign policy does not carry exceedingly stiff costs and, as will be shown below, purported benefits that are more illusionary than real.
AFGHANISTAN AND THE LIMITS OF CANADIAN LEADERSHIP

Canadas role in Afghanistan has been extolled as the hallmark of a revolutionary foreign policy.8 A rebuilt Canadian military will finally be able to play a commensurately larger role in Canadas international security policy. Canadian forces combat operations reinforce the strategic importance of Canadas international security policy to US policymakers and NATO allies alike. Indeed, Canada constitutes a critical linchpin that forestalls any lingering American interest in abandoning Afghanistan and prevents the failure of NATOs first out-of-area operation. International influence is not simply the preserve of great powers, but can and should be sought after by ambitious and strategically adroit middle powers. This was most clearly spelled out in the 2007 speech from the throne: [r]ebuilding our capabilities and standing up for our sovereignty have sent a clear message to the world: Canada is back as a credible player on the international stage.9
7 Kim Richard Nossal, Pinchpenny diplomacy: The decline of good international citizenship in Canadian foreign policy, International Journal 54, no. 1 (winter 199899): 88-105. This does not mean that Canada has reversed its low spending patterns on international development or the diplomatic service. But, as Nossal makes clear, a key indicator of pinchpenny diplomacy is in the realm of military policy and voluntary international commitments. 8 Alexander Moens, Afghanistan and the revolution in Canadian foreign policy, International Journal 63, no. 3 (summer 2008): 586. 9 Michalle Jean, Speech from the throne: Strong leadership, a better Canada, government of Canada, 16 October 2007.
| 60 | Summer 2009 | International Journal |

| Afghanistan and renewing Canadian leadership |

These arguments do have certain advantages when compared to the alternatives. A strict security argument emphasizes the need to prevent Afghanistans reversion to a terrorist sanctuary. But the argument rings somewhat hollow when one takes into account that northwest Pakistanan area that is effectively outside of ISAFs authorityhas already become a safe haven for al Qaeda. The Obama administration has recently recognized the importance of Pakistan to the Afghan war effort and seeks to refocus its foreign aid and military assistance to undermine and destroy these tribal safe havensthough whether this belated effort will succeed remains to be seen. Indeed, after several years without an attack in North America, and with growing concern over home-grown terrorism, it is questionable whether the security argument even provides a sufficiently pressing issue to justify the high cost of the Afghan campaign.10 The human security argument, on the other hand, refocuses attention on the plight of the Afghan people. But military force, when employed in pursuit of lofty human security goals, must also be employed with far greater attention to proportionality and collateral damage, lest it contradict the humanitarian justification for its use. The Canadian role in Afghanistan is therefore somewhat problematic; a counterinsurgency mission carries the inevitable risk of Afghan civilian casualties, and its justification on humanitarian grounds is unlikely to be considered legitimate. The continued risk of Canadian military casualties is difficult enough to justify when national security is clearly at stake. Notwithstanding the sacrifice of the soldiers to this cause thus far, it is unlikely that the mission could be maintained on solely altruistic grounds. The argument that the Afghan mission will result in renewed Canadian leadership is seductive. It nicely complements Canadas traditional emphasis on having a seat at the table in the councils and organizations that deal with global strategy and security.11 It can even be articulated in the value-laden

10 One should also recognize that al Qaeda, even with the potential employment of catastrophic attacks using weapons of mass destruction, does not constitute an existential threat to the US or its allies. See Sean Clark, Afghanistan and the paradox of moral imperialism, in Anita Singh and David McDonough, eds., From Defence to Development: Resolving Threats to Global Security (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2007), 135-58. 11 Joel Sokolsky, A seat at the table: Canada and its alliances, Armed Forces and Society 16, no. 1 (fall 1989): 12.

| International Journal | Summer 2009 | 61 |

| David S. McDonough |

language of internationalism and multilateralism that resonates with the Canadian public. But its high cost makes it imperative to reexamine this strategic rationale. It may be comforting to think that an international leadership role is being borne on the plains of Afghanistan. Yet if Canada emerges with its military hollowed out and international influence unappreciated, Afghanistan might instead be remembered as the place that finally revealed the hard limits of Canadian power. Hubris, like influence, is the preserve of great powers and middle powers alike.
SUSTAINABILITY OF THE CANADIAN FORCES RENEWAL

Given American concerns over the ISAF mission and its frequent exhortations to European allies for more troops, Canadas decision to deploy to Kandahar seems to have been made with remarkable foresight. Canadian political and military leaders were also fully cognizant of the significant military commitment required for this mission. An integrated military packageconsisting of a battlegroup, provincial reconstruction team, joint task force 2 units, command of the multinational Headquarters, and a strategic advisory team in Kabulwas meant to be transformational for both the military and, more generally, Canadas global role. At first glance, there is little doubt that the forces have clearly benefited from increased defence spending since the mission began in 2001. The previous Liberal government promised an increase of nearly $13 billion from 2005 to 2010, and the Conservatives promised to top this amount with an additional $5.3 billion. Despite initial suspicion, it does appear that the government is on track to achieve a $19-billion defence budget by 2010. The most recent budget, for example, was nearly $17 billion, and if one adds the supplemental fundingwhich has traditionally been used to cover Afghan operational coststhe government is allocating roughly $18 billion for defence. This brings the total increase over the last two years to 22.2 percent and places Canadian defence expenditures at 1.3 percent of GDP.12 The Canadian forces will be acquiring major equipment at a total cost of more than $30 billion (including in-service support). This initially included the planned procurement of a fleet of strategic and tactical airlifters, mediumto-heavy lift helicopters, transport trucks, and multipurpose replenishment ships. This was followed by plans to acquire 100 Leopard II tanks and a short-

12 Brian MacDonald, Waiting for defence budget 2008: Another pleasant surprise? Conference of Defence Associations commentary, 15 February 2008.

| 62 | Summer 2009 | International Journal |

| Afghanistan and renewing Canadian leadership |

term loan of 20 tanks for ongoing operations. Most recently, the government has promised up to eight Arctic patrol vessels, the modernization and life extension of frigates and long-range reconnaissance aircraft, and the acquisition of American Chinook helicopters for use in Afghanistan. The number of military personnel is also expected to increase through a major recruitment drive, though the original target of 75,000 regular members and 35,000 reservists has since been reduced to 70,000 and 30,000, respectively. With so many soldiers engaged in ongoing combat operations, Canadian policymakers are finally finding it politically palatable to increase defence spending. In turn, the rejuvenation of the forces will give Canada the opportunity to play a robust and ambitious international role after the current mission ends. According to this view, Afghanistan demonstrates that Canada is no longer simply willing to ask, as Joel Sokolsky puts it, [h]ow much is just enough?13 However, a closer examination raises a number of troubling questions. Is the cost of the mission having any impact on the forces revival? Are equipment acquisitions based on short-term operational needs or longterm force planning requirements? Are current budgetary increases for defence sustainable in the long-term? There is already some evidence that, with current operational requirements, the forces are currently facing a resource-constrained environment.14 With the reduction in supplemental funding since 2006, it is likely that a portion of the budget has already been redirected away from funding capital acquisitions or personnel expansion in order to cover the cost of current operations. One should also add the indirect costs of the Afghan campaign. More than $2 billion in equipment has been earmarked for the Afghanistan mission, including tanks, howitzers, and transport trucks, and given the countrys harsh operating conditions, many of the armys capability platforms will have a shortened life expectancy and be in need of replacement by 2011.15 The Conservatives 2008 Canada first defence strategy envisions a traditional multipurpose, combat-capable military that would be able to operate in a number of different environments, most notably expeditionary

13 Joel Sokolsky, Clausewitz, Canadian style, Canadian Military Journal (autumn 2002): 4. Emphasis in original. 14 Report on plans and priorities 2008-2009, 35. 15 Perry, Canadas seven billion dollar war, 703-25.

| International Journal | Summer 2009 | 63 |

| David S. McDonough |

and sovereignty-protection missions. The introduction of a 20-year funding framework, while perhaps lacking the excitement of previous grand visions, can be seen as the sensible addition of much-needed long-range planning.16 But there are still concerns that promises of an automatic two-percent annual defence budget increase do not take into account either realistic projections of inflation rates or ongoing shortfalls in the capital budget.17 Even with the promise of $490 billion from 2011 to 2028, it will prove very difficult to cover the planned acquisition of 15 new naval ships, 10-12 maritime patrol aircraft, 65 fighter aircraft, and a number of different land combat vehicles. A picture is gradually taking shape of the force structure that is emerging from the stresses of Afghanistan. Canada has already acquired C-17 Globemasters strategic airlifters and M-777 medium howitzers, and despite current delays in procurement, the forces are likely to be the recipient of most of these platforms and some very useful new capabilities (e.g., strategic lift, Arctic patrol, etc.).18 But some of the recent capital acquisitions (e.g., tanks, CH-47D Chinook helicopters) will be used for operations in Afghanistan, and it is uncertain whether this equipment will either return in serviceable condition or fit comfortably in the militarys long-term force structure plans. Meanwhile, even modest plans for personnel expansion will suffer from continued retention problems, and their high cost will only further constrain the insufficient capital budget. The forces will continue to use many of their existing platforms past their life expectancy, and be forceddue to the high cost of major recapitalizationto further shrink the size of future fleet replacements. This is apparent in the defence strategys proposed reductions in the total number of naval ships and fighter aircraft: irrespective of qualitative improvements in capability, this will make it more difficult for Canada to deploy significant military forces for both continental and expeditionary operations. The army will meanwhile join the air force and navy in requiring urgent capital

16 Eric Lerhe, Canada first defence strategy: Better than it looks, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, Dispatch 6, no. 3 (fall 2008). 17 Brian MacDonald, The Canada first defence strategy of 2008 and the 20-year defence budget, Conference of Defence Associations, Commentary 4, 28 July 2008. 18 The joint supply ship has been a long-standing capital acquisition project for the forces, but it appears that the project has been placed on hold. Darcy Knoll, Joint support ship program has floundered in a minefield, Hill Times, 25 August 2008.

| 64 | Summer 2009 | International Journal |

| Afghanistan and renewing Canadian leadership |

replacement. The forces will acquire some useful new capabilities, but they also must recognize that sustained operational tempo will only result in a magnified capability-commitment gap and significant long-term force structure problems.
HOMELAND SECURITY AND CANADA-US RELATIONS

The deployment of the joint task force Afghanistan is Canadas largest and most dangerous mission since the Korean War. The rationale of such a deployment would be defensible if the current mission was indeed vital to Canadian national interests. The need to placate American concerns and garner some influence within Washington might, in extremis, be considered such a worthwhile endeavour. But it is more doubtful whether Canadas decision for a full package option in Afghanistan will be remembered so favourably. It was neither a necessary requirement to allay American security concerns, nor sufficiently important to be operationally or strategically relevant to the United States. The central importance of the Canada-US relationship is clearly stated by Denis Stairs: the first priority of Canadian foreign policy must be the maintenance of a fundamentally working relationship with the United States.19 The 9/11 attacks certainly provoked an ambitious global strategic response by the US. Canadas initial deployment in 2001 clearly showed that it was under no illusions concerning the need to demonstrate at least symbolic solidarity with its American allythough what precise consequences would have resulted in the absence of Canadas immediate post-9/11 military deployments is more difficult to determine. More recently, the US is certainly more than happy to have the Canadian military deployed for combat operations in Kandahar. But it is important not to overvalue the size and operational importance of Canadas current contribution. While it is true that Canada was one of the largest contributor nations in the early days of ISAF, Canada now only deploys roughly 2800 troops out of a total ISAF force of roughly 62,000. The UK, which had earlier maintained a similar-sized contingent, has dramatically expanded its troop levels to 8300, and there are discussions of further increases for anywhere

19 Denis Stairs, Challenges and opportunities for Canadian foreign policy in the Paul Martin era, International Journal 58, no. 4 (autumn 2003): 485. Emphasis in original.

| International Journal | Summer 2009 | 65 |

| David S. McDonough |

from several hundred to an additional 2000 troops.20 Even more telling, the Obama administration recently announced a sizable American surge of over 21,000 combat troops, 4000 of which are to be used as trainers, alongside a 2800 aviation brigade and thousands of support troops. The total number of American troops in Afghanistan is therefore expected to rise to 68,000, and American commanders have already requested an additional 10,000 troops for deployment in 2010.21 In contrast, there are concerns that Canadas relatively modest deployment is already having sustainability issues, and will prove to be very difficult to expand or to even maintain beyond 2011. Despite its important combat role, the smalland decliningrelative size of the Canadian contribution should not make one sanguine about the forces importance. To be sure, Canada is providing a valuable addition to the current allied effort to combat the Taliban and to rebuild and reconstruct the Afghan state, and even with the forthcoming American troop surge, it will still be entrusted with patrolling the criticalif fortunately smaller area surrounding Kandahar City.22 But it is doubtful whether the redeployment of the forces to a more secure region in the north, or indeed from Afghanistan itself, would have had any strategic impact on the longterm success or failure of the mission. Any Canadian forces deployment in US-led coalitions of the willing, given the relative small size of Canadas expeditionary capabilities, is likely to be only politically symbolic in nature. Canadas previous military deployments in the 1990s recognized this inherent limitation. Even the

20 Michael Evans and Sam Coates, British army chief ready to send 2000 more troops to Afghanistan, Times, 27 March 2009; Thomas Harding, Patrick Hennessy, and James Kirkup, NATO accused of failures in Afghanistan by head of Britains armed forces, Telegraph, 3 April 2009. According to the British air marshal chief, Sir Jock Stirrup, Britain has 4.2 percent of its military in Afghanistan, while Germany and France have a little over one percent deployed (3600 and 2800, respectively). The figure for Canada, in comparison, is roughly 4.3 percent if ones uses Canadian forces nominal strength (and upwards of five percent if one uses effective strength). 21 Karen De Young, Obama outlines Afghan strategy, Washington Post, 28 March 2009, A01; Ann Scott Tyson, Military wants more troops for Afghan war, Washington Post, 2 April 2009, A03. It is even questionable whether the UK, which did deploy sizable contingents to both Iraq and Afghanistan, actually obtained any strategic leverage in the US for its military efforts. 22 Matthew Fisher and Mark Blanchfield, Canadas Afghan focus changes as US readies troop influx, National Post, 26 March 2009.

| 66 | Summer 2009 | International Journal |

| Afghanistan and renewing Canadian leadership |

forces strategy of interoperability was essentially premised on the need to adapt to American military dominance. In contrast, combat operations in Afghanistan represent an ambitious attempt to reverse this limited military approach. But, as Sokolsky reminds us, Canada should be under no illusions about being able to leverage military contributions into influence over the strategic and political direction of the war on terrorism.23 If the political ends can only be symbolic, it remains to be seen what additional benefits, if any, will be achieved by the more robust military approach inherent in the 200611 mission in Kandahar. More broadly, Canadian decision-makers have wrongly assessed the current strategic landscape. Forward defence may have been an immediately necessary measure to reassure Canadas superpower neighbour in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, but Canada has a critical role in securing American homeland security. The countrys geostrategic position in North America entails the longstanding responsibility to not become a security liability for the US. In the post-9/11 period, it is imperative that Canada not be perceived as a terrorist staging area and support base for operations against American targets. As David Haglund concludes, military spending levels are less significant than budgetary allocations made to...homeland security.24 The home game, in this formulation, takes clear priority over the otherwise symbolic away game. Canadian domestic security and bilateral continental security measures help protect the approaches to the US, and prevent Washington from doing whatever is necessary to protect the homelandbe it closing the Canada-US border or unilateral deployment of American forces into Canadian waters, airspace, or territory.25 It is therefore not surprising that the number of homeland security measuresboth domestic and bilateralhave accelerated since 2001, most visibly with the

23 Sokolsky, Clausewitz, Canadian style? 9. 24 David Haglund, North American cooperation in an era of homeland security, Orbis 47, no. 4 (fall 2003): 678, 690. 25 Joel Sokolsky and Philippe Lagass, Suspenders and a belt: Perimeter and border security in Canada-US relations, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 12, no. 3 (2005-06): 20. References to the home and away games can be found in Joel Sokolsky, Guarding the continental coast: United States maritime homeland security and Canada, Policy Matters 6, no. 1 (March 2005).

| International Journal | Summer 2009 | 67 |

| David S. McDonough |

creation of amalgamated homeland security departments and continentally oriented military commands on both sides of the border.26 Canada plays a direct role in securing the continental US and has a certain degree of leeway in minimizing its expeditionary away game commitments without seriously damaging this relationship. A modest approach to free-riding, where costly Canadian international commitments are selectively minimized but more vital hemispheric duties are maintained, is still a feasible option for Canadian decision-makers and should not be casually dismissed. Sadly, successive Canadian governments appear to have totally miscalculated means and ends with the Afghan mission. A far more astute approach would have been to recognize that the away game is far more discretionary in the post-9/11 environment: there would likely have been very few strategic consequences if Canada had either avoided the forces deployment to Kandahar or refused to extend the mission.
ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY WITHIN A GLOBAL NATO

Canada has traditionally emphasized NATOs multilateral institutional makeup; this provided a consultative framework within which Canada could help build coalitions of like-minded states that could mitigate the unilateralism of American policy.27 Canada in turn supported a number of important NATO initiatives in the post-Cold War period. NATO enlargement into the former Soviet bloc, first in 1997 and later in 2004, was supported by successive Canadian governments. The same could also be said of NATOs gradual interest in out-of-area missions, which led to operations in the Gulf War and later in the Balkans, as well as concepts like the combined joint task force.

26 The US Department of Homeland Security was created in 2001, which was followed by Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (later termed Public Safety Canada). The US also modified its Unified Command Plan in order to create Northern Command, which was in turn followed by the forces Canada Command. Other notable bilateral developments include the Canada-US smart borders initiative, the short-lived binational planning group, and the decision to add a maritime warning function to NORAD. 27 Paul Buteux, NATO and the evolution of Canadian defence and foreign policy, in David Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown, eds., Canadas International Security Policy (Toronto: Prentice Hall Canada, 1995), 159. Also see David Haglund, The NATO of its dream? Canada and the cooperative security alliance, International Journal 52, no. 3 (summer 1997): 464-82.

| 68 | Summer 2009 | International Journal |

| Afghanistan and renewing Canadian leadership |

It should come as no surprise that Canada strongly supported the NATOled effort in Afghanistan. If the alliance fails in its first global out-of-area mission, the US will be far less likely to use a multilateral framework for future operations, and may drift back towards the extreme unilateralism most evident in the first years of the Bush administration. Fissures in the transatlantic relationship, most recently evident in the American and European bickering that accompanied the 2003 Iraq War, would only deepen. At its most ambitious, Canada strives to play a critical role in restraining American unilateralism and healing the transatlantic divide. Yet Canada also needs to recognize underlying strategic developments in both the US and NATO. The strength of the US military is unprecedented. The US exercises a formidable command of the commons over the air, sea, and space environments, and it is unlikely that strategic competitors (or allies) will rival the US in any of these areas. David Yost aptly summarizes the full extent of this NATO capabilities gap: Of all the NATO allies, only the United States can project power in the form of large-scale long-range non-nuclear air and missile strikes at great distances from its homeland. Only the United States can deploy hundreds of military aircraft beyond its homeland and even transport the logistics to upgrade airfields with limited facilities. The synergistic effects...imply an even greater overall superiority.28 A US grand strategy of primacy seems inevitable in the current period of systemic unipolarity and a renewed sense of American strategic vulnerability. The strategy may be couched in more cooperative language, but future administrations will be united by the need for primacist strategies and unlikely to heed calls for strategic restraint.29 Rather than NATO exerting multilateral pressure on the US, it is more likely that latent American pressure will prompt NATO (and indeed all institutions) to adapt to American strategic preeminence.
28 David Yost, The NATO capabilities gap and the European Union, Survival 42, no. 4 (January 2000): 98-99. For more on the command of the commons, see Barry Posen, Command of the commons: The military foundation of US hegemony, International Security 28, no. 1 (summer 2003): 5-46. 29 This argument appears in David McDonough, Beyond primacy: Hegemony and security addiction in US grand strategy, Orbis 52, no. 3 (winter 2009): 6-22.

| International Journal | Summer 2009 | 69 |

| David S. McDonough |

Early signs of this adaption can be gleaned from the largely US-driven effort to expand NATO into eastern Europe. Political criteria were primarily used for the 1997 and 2004 expansion, which saw the inclusion of 10 additional members, as well as the recent 2009 inclusion of Albania and Croatia as the newest NATO members. Many expect that an enlarged NATO will effectively become a security community with a much-weakened article five guarantee.30 Yet an enlarged NATO must also adapt to the requirements for out-of-area missions. The alliance has already seen abstention from countries like Greece in the Kosovo War. The shift towards global out-of-area missions will only make unanimous decisions even more difficult especially when NATO is no longer so united by collective interest and includes new and militarily weak members. It remains to be seen whether the unanimity principle will survive unscathed from the confluence of expansion and a global out-of-area role. Washington clearly has an interest in a global NATO role, and many European countries have (albeit somewhat reluctantly) responded. The 2002 Prague summit witnessed a number of initiatives to improve NATOs expeditionary capabilities: the Prague capabilities commitment to minimize the capabilities gap, the NATO response force to develop a mobile and rapidly deployable 20,000-strong, primarily European force, and the restructuring of NATOs command system to incorporate the US allied transformation. These three initiatives serve as a potential test-bed for making the alliance into a global expeditionary force structure usable for global security operations.31 However, Washington will not be inclined to accept any alliance constraints on effectively US-led NATO operationsespecially when membership includes such weak states as Bulgaria, Romania, or the Baltic countries. There will be an inevitable preference for coalitions of the willing or -la-carte multilateralism. For NATO to maintain strategic relevance, it will likely have to shift towards more open use of constructive abstention, qualified majority voting, or the use of NATO coalitions of the willing under the authority of the North Atlantic Council. Early hints of a possible solution can be seen in a policy paper written by five former NATO military leaders. This study advances a transatlantic grand

30 Richard Rupp, NATO 1949 and NATO 2000: From collective defense toward collective security, Journal of Strategic Studies 23, no. 3 (September 2000): 154-76. 31 Alexander Moens, Transatlantic bipolarity and NATOs global role, Journal of Transatlantic Studies 4, no. 2 (2006): 245.

| 70 | Summer 2009 | International Journal |

| Afghanistan and renewing Canadian leadership |

strategy that, in the short term, recommends the abandonment of the unanimity or consensus principle at all levels below the North Atlantic Council and a restructuring for operational decision-making whereby only those nations that contribute to a missionshould have the right to a say in the process of the operation.32 More would still have to be done in order to truly streamline the alliance decision-making for future out-of-area operations, but this study does at least recognize the potential problems associated with unanimous decisions. True, the current drive towards expansion seems to have halted temporarily with the 2008 decision to reject memberships for Georgia and Ukraine, and early calls for a global NATOintended to include other close American allies such as Australia and Japanfell on deaf ears. But an expanding NATO that begins to adopt a majority-voting process does carry a certain logic in a unipolar world. The US will benefit from a looser alliance structure and an expanded pool of countries able to assist it, while allowing it a multilaterally legitimate mechanism for bypassing the UN security council.33 In effect, it would create an interoperable NATO toolkit, which the US could then use to fashion a coalition of the willing behind a facade of multilateral legitimacy. NATO remains a consensus-based organization, and the US has not exerted public pressure for either a global NATO or the adoption of majority voting in the North Atlantic Council. But the expansion of NATO and the current drive towards out-of-area operations in places like Afghanistan does seem inadvertently to facilitate just such an outcome. Canada therefore needs to understand that its role in Afghanistan, while not necessarily causing such a transformation, intersects with certain transatlantic strategic developments. Rather than reinforcing multilateral constraints on the US, Canada seems to be buttressing a transformation within NATO that will only lead to a looser multilateral structure for the alliance, and one more congenial to American unilateralism.

32 Gen. (retd) Klaus Naumann et al., Towards a grand strategy for an uncertain world: Renewing transatlantic partnership, Noaber Foundation, Lunteren, Netherlands, 2007, 125. 33 Thomas Mowle and David Sacko, Global NATO: Bandwagoning in a unipolar world, Contemporary Security Policy 28, no. 3 (December 2007): 597-618. The initial advocacy for a globalizing NATO can be found in Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, Global NATO, Foreign Affairs 85, no. 5 (2006): 105-14.

| International Journal | Summer 2009 | 71 |

| David S. McDonough |

Canada should also be aware that these strategic developments have not gone unnoticed in Europe. In partial response to American unipolarity, the European Union began to build a European security and defence policy (ESDP).34 The 1998 Anglo-French summit at Saint-Malo was a particularly important milestone as it heralded Great Britains support for the ESDP and led to an increasing number of important initiatives designed to give the ESDP a more concrete existence.35 With the recent American acquiescence over these developments, this trend is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. NATO will continue to be an important partner for European states. The Berlin-plus arrangements show the continued importance of alliance assets for the ESDP, and even France now plans to rejoin NATOs military committee. But one should not be sanguine about Europes long-term interest in NATO: if the alliance becomes more of a tool for American primacist strategies, one will likely see a significant increase in the autonomy and capability of the ESDP at the expense of NATO. In this broader context, European countries may see national caveats as a strategically prudent means to conserve scarce resources, in recognition of the possible loosening of NATOs alliance configuration and the consequent requirement to support ESDP developments. Fissures within the transatlantic alliance cannot simply be papered over by renewed cooperation in Afghanistan, but are in fact a result of systemic and structural factors that are likely to deepen in the years ahead.36 The US will likely seek to transform NATO into a more compliant tool in its global strategy while Europe becomes even more focused on its own

34 See Barry Posen, European Union security and defence policy: Response to unipolarity? Security Studies 15, no. 2 (2006): 149-86. 35 Initiatives include an EU rapid reaction corps of 60,000 soldiers for 2010, headline goals for increased EU military capabilities, a Berlin-plus agreement, a political and security council to provide advice on foreign and defence policy, and a civilian-military cell to begin strategic and contingency planning. See Alexander Moens, ESDP, the United States, and the Atlantic alliance, in Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, eds., Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 25-37. 36 See Charles Pentland, Odd man in: Canada and the transatlantic crisis, International Journal 60, no. 1 (winter 2003-04): 145-56; and David Haglund, The comparative continentalization of security and defence policy in Europe and North America, Journal of Canadian Studies 38, no. 2 (spring 2004): 9-28.

| 72 | Summer 2009 | International Journal |

| Afghanistan and renewing Canadian leadership |

affairs. European countries may even acquiesce to a looser NATO alliance structure, given the potential to participate selectively in expeditionary missions (e.g., by avoiding a mission entirely or using caveats to limit their operational role). A transatlantic dumbbell that combines Europe and the US, and a looser NATO alliance that increasingly becomes a toolkit for US policymakers and a free-riding mechanism for European countries, may not be an ideal scenario for Canadian policymakers still wedded to the notion of multilateral constraints on American policies or eager to play a bridging role in a North Atlantic triangle. But Canada should also recognize that draining its resources in Afghanistan is unlikely to alter this potential strategic reality.
CONCLUSION

Canada has invested an inordinate amount of military and economic resources in the coalition effort in Afghanistan and has certainly paid a hefty (and tragic) price in the number of soldiers wounded and killed. Yet any claim that this commitment has renewed Canadas international role, either by facilitating the long-term renewal of the Canadian forces or appreciably reinforcing relations to the US and NATO, should be questioned. Instead, the mission seems destined to only further dampen Canadian influence and leadership pretensionswhether through the accelerated erosion of its military assets, an overinvestment in a dangerous expeditionary operation, or support for a questionable NATO role. Canada faces diminishing returns with its military engagement in Afghanistan, and the recent decision to extend the mission until 2011 seems particularly unnecessary. Homeland security remains the most important area for Canada to reaffirm its strategic relationship to the US. Free-riding in the away game, as long as sufficient attention is paid to the home game, is a feasible strategic option. True, Canadian homeland security measures are unlikely to ensure a moderate American border response in the event of another mass casualty terrorist attack.37 But no number of expeditionary operations would, at that point, be sufficient. Greater selectivity and prudence in international commitments, while rebuilding the core competencies needed for a sustainable international security policy, might be the wiser option. At a minimum, it will help prevent overstretch that could eventually endanger the home game.
37 Frank Harvey, The homeland security dilemma: Imagination, failure and the escalating costs of perfecting security, Canadian Journal of Political Science 40, no. 2 (June 2007): 283-316.

| International Journal | Summer 2009 | 73 |