THE DILEMMAS OF AMERICAN STRATEGIC PRIMACY

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN-AMERICAN COOPERATION

EDITED BY DAVID S. MCDONOUGH DOUGLAS A. ROSS

RCMI RESEARCH PROCEEDINGS

he Royal Canadian Military Institute is a century old institution, which owns the finest and largest private military library in Canada, and an impressive museum collection of Canadian

military artefacts. A central element in the RCMI research and educational agenda is the hosting, sponsoring and organizing of various conferences, workshops, speaker events and seminars dealing with both heritage and contemporary strategic and military affairs. This offers the opportunity for the Institute, in partnership with other organizations, to gather a number of policy experts, from Canada and abroad, to explore topics related to the Institute's research agenda. For those conferences (and other events) that the Institute sponsors or organizes, in the interest of adding to the debate on the strategic and military issues that have been discussed, the text of the presentations and papers presented will normally be published in the Proceedings of the Institute. The following Proceedings is the record of the 2005 Canadian-American Strategic Review Joint Workshop, which involved the RCMI and was financially supported by Foreign Affairs Canada.

CANADIAN-AMERICAN STRATEGIC REVIEW

he Canadian-American Strategic Review (CASR) is a website project that is operated through Simon Fraser University (www.sfu.ca/casr), which seeks to provide the public with an easy to

access "review" of the relevant materials on Canadian security and defence available on the web, alongside the compiliation and illustration of original materials. The central objective of CASR is to provide an information portal on Canadian defence policy, Canadian foreign policy and Canada-US relations. In a world where a dozen men can bring down two towers in the largest city in North America, our traditional notions of national defence must shift. There are many suggestions about where Canadian defence policy should move next. CASR wants to consider the most important of these individually, and in the larger context of North American security.

ROYAL CANADIAN MILITARY INSTITUTE

he Royal Canadian Military Institute is a century old, independent, member supported organization which: strives to be Canadas premier independent Institute for the study of military

strategy, arts and literature; and which promotes pride in a strong, unified and independent Canada by enhancing public understanding of our political and military history; by means of maintaining, expanding, and opening to scholars our Museum, Archive, Library and Art Collections; and by conducting educational conferences, seminars and open forums as well as preparing and publishing original papers, studies and journals; centred on our historical headquarters in Toronto, which houses our collections, conference facilities and amenities for our members; maintained by the fees and donations and the volunteer services of private members.

CANADIAN-AMERICAN STRATEGIC REVIEW JOINT WORKSHOP 2005

THE DILEMMAS OF AMERICAN STRATEGIC PRIMACY

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN-AMERICAN COOPERATION
EDITED BY DAVID S. MCDONOUGH DOUGLAS A. ROSS

A PUBLICATION

OF THE

ROYAL CANADIAN MILITARY INSTITUTE

 Copyright 2005 Royal Canadian Military Institute All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the Royal Canadian Military Institute.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication

The dilemmas of American strategic primacy : implications for the future of Canadian-American cooperation / edited by David S. McDonough, Douglas A. Ross.

Proceedings of a workshop held at Simon Fraser University, Mar. 18., 2005. Also available in electronic format. ISBN 0-9694714-3-2

1. United States--Military policy--Congresses. 2. United States--Defenses--Congresses. 3. Canada--Defenses--Congresses. 4. United States--Military relations--Canada--Congresses. 5. Canada--Military relations--United States--Congresses. I. McDonough, David S., 1978II. Ross, Douglas A. (Douglas Alan), 1948- III. Royal Canadian Military Institute IV. Title.

E183.8.C2D54 2005

355'.031'0973071

C2005-907188-5

Designed by David S. McDonough

TABLE

OF

CONTENTS

Abbreviations......................................................................................................vii Foreword.................................................................................................................1 Col (Retd) Brian S. MacDonald Introduction...........................................................................................................3 Douglas A. Ross and David S. McDonough MISSILE DEFENCE: THE CURRENT DEBATE A Strange Decision in a Strange Land: The Irrelevance of Ottawas Missile Defence "No"...........................9 James Fergusson American Missile Defence Grand Strategy and Global Security......................................................35 Douglas A. Ross TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGY Where No Bomb Has Gone Before: US Space Weaponization Planning and Its Implications...........69 Wade L. Huntley

The New Triad, Bunker Busters and 'Counterproliferation Wars': Nuclear Primacy and Its Implications for Canadian Security Policy..............................89 David S. McDonough BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION A Revolution in Foreign Policy: The Values and Strategy of George W. Bush.....................................127 Alexander Moens Stuck in the Moment: Prospects for United States Stability Operations in Iraq................141 Karen Gutteiri THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY OPTIONS From 'Neo-Isolationism' to 'Imperial Liberalism': 'Grand Strategy Options' in the American International Security Debate and the Implications for Canada....165 Douglas A. Ross and Christopher N. B. Ross Contributors......................................................................................................219

ABBREVIATIONS

ABM ACM ADW ALCM ASAT BW C4ISR CASR CAV CBO CBW CSBN CONUS CPA CPI CRT CS CTBT DND DPG

anti-ballistic missile Advanced Cruise Missile agent defeat weapon air-launched cruise missile anti-satellite weapon biological weapon command, control, communications, computers / intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance Canadian-American Strategic Review common aero vehicle Congressional Budget Office chemical and biological weapon Confidence and Security Building Measure continental United States Coalition Provisional Authority Counterproliferation Initiative Cooperative Threat Reduction cooperative security Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Department of National Defence Defense Planning Guidance

viii ABBREVIATIONS

DSP EPW FMCT GBI GDP GLASS HDBT HEL IAEA ICBM ICS IIG IL IPS IRBM ISG ISPAN JSF KEW LOW LRP LUA MAD MARV MDA MI MIC MIRV MNNRV MRBM NACD NATO NGO

Defense Support Program earth penetration weapon Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty Ground-based Interceptor gross domestic product Global Area Strike System hard and deeply buried target high energy laser International Atomic Energy Agency intercontinental ballistic missile Indian Civil Service Iraqi Interim Government imperial liberalism International Policy Statement intermediate range ballistic missile Iraq Survey Group Integrated Strategic Planning and Analysis Network Joint Strike Fighter kinetic energy weapon launch on warning Long Range Plan launch under attack mutually assured destruction/deterrence Manoeuvering Re-entry Vehicle Missile Defense Agency missile interceptor Military Industrial Complex Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicle Manoeuverable Non-Nuclear Re-entry Vehicles medium-range ballistic missile non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament North Atlantic Treaty Organisation non-governmental organization

THE DILEMMAS

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AMERICAN STRATEGIC PRIMACY

ix

NI NMD NNWS NORAD NPR NPT NSDD NSPD NSS NUWEP NWS OPLAN OSB P P5 PD PNAC PR PSI PTBT QDR RCMI RMA RNEP RRW SALT SBIRS SCIRI SDI SE SIOP SLBM SLIRBM

neo-isolationism National Missile Defense non-nuclear weapon state North American Aerospace Defence Command Nuclear Posture Review Non-proliferation Treaty National Security Decision Directive National Security Presidential Directive National Security Strategy Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy nuclear weapon state Operations Plan offshore balancing primacy Permanent Five Presidential Directive Project for the New American Century proportional representation Proliferation Security Initiative Partial Test Ban Treaty Quadrennial Defense Review Royal Canadian Military Institute Revolution in Military Affairs Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Reliable Replacement Warhead Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Space Based Infra-red System Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq Strategic Defense Initiative selective engagement Single Integrated Operating Plan sea-launched ballistic missile submarine-launched intermediate-range ballistic missile

x ABBREVIATIONS

SORT SPACECOM SRBM SSBN SSP START STRATCOM SWPS TAL TAV THAAD TMD TNA UAV UGF UNSCOM USAF USSC WMD WOT

Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty Space Command short-range ballistic missile ballistic missile submarine Stockpile Stewardship Program Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Strategic Command Strategic Warfare Planning System Transitional Administrative Law transatmospheric vehicle Theatre High Altitude Air Defence theatre missile defence Transitional National Assembly unmanned aerial vehicle underground facilities United Nations Special Commission United States Air Force United States Space Command weapons of mass destruction War on Terror

FOREWORD
Col (Retd) Brian S. MacDonald

he Royal Canadian Military Institute (RCMI) and the CanadianAmerican Strategic Review (CASR) at Simon Fraser University are very pleased to introduce this special issue of the RCMI Research Proceedings on the subject of the vitally important Canada-US strategic relationship. This joint publication reflects the concern of both the RCMI and CASR over the state of Canada-US strategic cooperation. In an effort to shed further light on this issue, CASR invited a number of policy specialists of international security, from Canada and abroad, to write papers on the subject of "The Future of Canadian-American Strategic Cooperation." One of the presenters was David S. McDonough, the Communications and Programmes Officer of the RCMI, marking the first time that a member of the RCMI Defence Studies Committee has been invited to do a paper on the West Coast. These papers were presented at a CASR Joint Workshop in Vancouver on March 18th, 2005, with the generous financial support of the John Holmes Fund at Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC). This event was envisioned to be the first in a series of annual policy exercises under the auspices of CASR and its Executive Director, Dr. Douglas A. Ross. After this meeting, it was suggested that an edited volume of the Workshop papers might add to the debate on this important issue,

2 BRIAN S. MACDONALD

and benefit both the participants and the general public. A partnership between CASR and the RCMI was later agreed to, whereby excerpts from the papers would appear on the CASR website and the complete papers would be edited, compiled and published as chapters in these Proceedings. This edited volume is the result of this partnership. The arrangement between our respective organizations is a natural one, given the highly complementary mandates of both organizations, as well as the participation of an RCMI researcher in the Workshop itself. We hope that this is the first in a number of future joint endeavors.

INTRODUCTION
By Douglas A. Ross and David S. McDonough

n the post-9/11 period, national security has once again become a central concern for US policy-makers. However, the massive preponderance of American power, and the willingness of the Bush administration to unilaterally make use of it aptly demonstrated in the 'War on Terrorism' and the Iraq intervention has in turn become a growing concern for the international community. Unfortunately, recent positive trends notwithstanding, it remains to be seen whether Canadian policy-makers have any deep substantive understanding of these important developments south of the border. American strategic "primacy" and Canadian functional strategic "isolationism" provide a very uncertain context for the future of this vitally important bilateral relationship. As Lester Pearson reportedly once said to a Canadian audience: "The Americans are our best friends like it or not." His implict message was that it is incumbent on Canadians to pay close attention to what their neighbours and closest allies were up to, not least because American decisions will inevitably have such a major impact on world affairs. Ottawa and Washington have drifted far apart in their approach to world affairs and this should be a source of concern on both sides of the border. To draw attention to, and further expand the dialogue on American primacy, and the impact that this preponderance has had on

4 DOUGLAS A. ROSS AND DAVID S. MCDONOUGH

Canada-US relations, the Canadian-American Strategic Review (CASR) located at Simon Fraser University organized a 2005 Joint Workshop on the issue of "The Future of Canadian-American Strategic Cooperation." This event was financially supported by the John Holmes Fund of Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) and, with the critical involvement of the Royal Canadian Military Institute (RCMI) in the Workshop Proceedings, would become a truly trans-Canada affair. The views expressed in these papers, of course, represent the opinions of each of the respective authors, and not the views of either FAC or RCMI. The organizers of the Workshop would like to thank the support received from the staff at both FAC and RCMI. We hope and trust that John Holmes, with his ever constant effort to apply balanced wisdom, common sense and high strategic analysis to Canadian-American security relations, would approve of the debate and discussion which took place in producing this volume. The Workshop that was held in Vancouver in March 2005 was divided into four thematic areas: the current debate on missile defence and Canada's potential involvement in that initiative; the impact that changes in technology and US strategy will have on Canada-US cooperation; the potential for further Allied bilateral and multilateral cooperation; and the evolution of American grand strategy options. Dr. Jim Fergusson, Professor of Political Science and the Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba, began the event with his thoughts on the Canadian decision to not formally join the US missile defence initiative. He offered an impressive case on why it was still in Canada's national interest to take part in missile defence, and concluded that the government's decision while apparently ending the possibility of Canadian involvement was far from the final chapter in this saga. This was followed with an equally compelling counter argument by Dr. Douglas Ross, Professor of Political Science at Simon Fraser University and Executive Director of CASR, who reviewed the history of the missile defence issue and asserted that it cannot be sepa-

THE DILEMMAS

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rated from the current administration's grand strategy of primacy. This strategy has posed serious problems not only for direct Canadian security interests but the security relationships among all the major nuclear weapon states, and the future of global security cooperation. The opening two papers on Canada's involvement in missile defence sparked considerable debate among the participants, and led perfectly into the wider subject of technology and strategy. The issue of space weaponization remains a potential source of concern for Canadian policy-makers and, for many Canadian critics, is often associated with missile defence. We were therefore fortunate to have Dr. Wade Huntley, Director of the Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research, provide Workshop participants with a succinct and comprehensive overview of the American plans for space weaponization. The subsequent paper was presented by David McDonough, Communications and Programmes Officer at the Royal Canadian Military Institute, on the subject of the Bush administration's recent revisions to American nuclear strategy. Mr. McDonough argued that these revisions, introduced in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and its concept of the 'New Triad,' represented the incorporation of counterproliferation in US nuclear strategy, and posed significant problems for the maintenance of strategic stability and the continued viability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The political and security ideology of the Bush administration, which has informed much of the developments previously outlined, was the subject of a paper presented by Dr. Alexander Moens, Professor of Political Science at Simon Fraser University. Dr. Moens argued that the Bush administration has pursued an essentially valuebased domestic and international policy, and that this policy was in fact compatible with the policies and values of both Canada and among European countries, despite the considerable international criticism that has been directed at President Bush's approach.

6 DOUGLAS A. ROSS AND DAVID S. MCDONOUGH

A more pessimistic and critical account of American interventionary practice was then offered by Dr. Karen Guttieri, Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. In an in-depth analysis of the potential for multilateral cooperation in stability operations in Iraq, she concluded that such cooperation had fallen sharply, and would not likely improve in the near future. This workshop ended with an examination of the Bush administration's grand strategy, which as both critics and admirers would admit was certainly a dramatic departure from previous administrations. In their concluding paper, Dr. Douglas Ross and Christopher Ross provided an overview of American grand strategy options, and argued that the Bush administration has pursued what can be termed a grand strategy of "primacy" with elements of "imperialism." The far-reaching implications of American efforts to perpetuate a condition of strategic primacy have the potential of creating the most grave risks to Canadian society a a possibility that is neither accepted nor even acknowledged in policy circles in Ottawa. We would particularly like to thank the presenters as well as the participants at this Joint Workshop, who with their excellent papers and insightful remarks did much to contribute to the ongoing debate on Canada-US strategic cooperation. We are also heavily indebted to Robin Frost and Christopher Ross for their hard work and assistance in the organizational preparatory work for of Workshop. Finally the editors would like to note that these published Proceedings could not have been created without the considerable and generous support the Royal Canadian Military Institute, and the encouragement of Colonel Brian S. MacDonald, Acting Executive Director and Chair of Defence Studies at the RCMI, to whom we extend our sincerest gratitude.

MISSILE DEFENCE: THE CURRENT DEBATE

A STRANGE DECISION IN A STRANGE LAND:

The Irrelevance of Ottawa's Missile Defence "No"
By James Fergusson

olitics is a strange business most of the time. It is even stranger in the case of Canada and many of the decisions successive federal governments have made in the fields of foreign policy and national defence. This is particularly pronounced in strategic considerations which relate to, or are influenced by, Canada's relationship with the United States, and is no more exemplified than by the case of ballistic missile defence (BMD) over the past several decades leading up to the government's 'no' to participation announced on February 24, 2005. Pierre Pettigrew's announcement was complete with the usual rhetoric that attends such decisions. Referencing Canada's significant commitment to North American defence cooperation, he harangued opponents for not acting rationally, even though the Minister provided no 'rational' explanation for the decision or the timing of the announcement. He also made the typical vague reference to Canadian values, implying ironically that leaving the defence of Canadian cities to a foreign nation is one of these values. Since then, no explanation had been forthcoming. The issue simply disappeared, as these issues always do in Canada, from the public agenda. The only notable exception to official silence has been two editorials penned by individuals linked to the Liberal Party, and these in

10 JAMES FERGUSSON

turn reflect the standard critiques of missile defence laid down over the past many decades.1 These, in turn, concentrate upon international security considerations, suggesting of course that Canadian behaviour one way or another significantly affects the state of international security affairs. With regard to more immediate or direct national security concerns, which by their nature are continental, critics simply assert that the decision will have no impact whatsoever. The Americans need Canada for effective continental defence and the interdependent nature of the larger relationship ensures immunity. The national security case has been examined in a variety of different ways, and does not need to be reiterated here.2 The international case, however, has not, especially the underlying assumption that Canada's 'no' matters internationally. In this regard, Canada is demonstrating international leadership, which in turn will embolden others and enhance Canadian prestige and influence; goals which are at the heart of the recent International Policy Statement (IPS).3 One could simply dismiss this idea simply on the grounds that actions by the weak are of little relevance in a complicated system dominated by the Great Powers. International security, in this view, is a function of the decisions and actions of Great Powers. Missile defence may undermine international security, but the Canadian decision is not going to stop the United States from pursuing defence as part of its strategic New Triad. Thus, the Canadian 'no' may be the principled decision, but it is also an irrelevant one. However, the fallacy of Canadian leadership is much deeper. It stems from the underlying arguments that negatively link missile defence to international security. These consist of three postulates: missile defence is an American-only project and others involved are unwilling participants; missile defence will ignite an arms race leading to the collapse of the arms control and non-proliferation regime; and missile defence will lead to the weaponization of outer space, with all the negative consequences that flow there from. However, each of these postulates is either incorrect or tenuous

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AMERICAN STRATEGIC PRIMACY

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enough to be of dubious value as a basis for policy, such that they will undoubtedly have little effect on other states. Certainly, some countries for a range of political reasons may find solace in the Canadian position. Unfortunately, these states are likely to be either acting for domestic reasons, or are potential strategic adversaries or challengers of the West, thus making Canada a veritable 'dupe.' It is difficult to know whether the Martin decision was informed by these critiques, or as most editorials have suggested simply a function of crass domestic, Quebec and party politics. Regardless, if the government expects that this decision will have significant positive payoff internationally, it is solely mistaken. Rather, the decision simply reinforces the irrelevance of Canada on the world stage and defence in the domestic venue. An American-only Project Critics of missile defence generally begin with two unspoken assertions. First, any and all new military or defence programmes are inherently bad, whereby they place the onus on proponents to justify a positive contribution to international peace and security.4 Second, they possess an anti-American bias, which becomes even more pronounced when dealing with a Republican administration.5 Combined, any and all new American military developments are immediately suspect, if not outright wrong. Given these two assertions, it is not surprising that the United States is, in many ways, singled out as the root of all evil. This is nowhere more evident than in the treatment of ballistic missile defence. It is true that for the last decade, missile defence has been led by the United States, and its investments outweigh all other states combined. The United States also leads the world in new military technologies and military investment, and certainly it is the exemplar which drives the actions of others, whether they are friends, adversaries or neutrals. However, its prominence does not negate the interests and investments of other states in missile defence. Being the

12 JAMES FERGUSSON

dominant military power does not by definition make a nation the only military power. If critics (and by silence the Martin government) are to be believed, only the United States is interested in missile defence. However, the Soviet Union also gave priority to ballistic missile defence. It had to be convinced by the United States of the 'dangerous' qualities of missile defence in a relationship of mutual assured destruction (MAD).6 It possesses the longest active missile defence system, deployed in 1970 around Moscow, and contributed to the revival of American interest in the 1980s, not least of all due to its violations of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Finally, Russia has continued to invest in and promote its missile defence capabilities, by offering the Europeans, for example, a cooperative development programme for the defence of Europe and seeking to market its theatre system, the SA-12. Similarly, critics are silent about the operational Israeli programme, and the host of cooperative and national programmes amongst Canada's friends and allies.7 Certainly, the United States is the main partner in most, if not all of these programmes. In addition, most of the programmes focus on tactical and theatre defence systems, leaving the strategic to the United States (and Russia). Thus, it may be suggested that the American-only argument follows from the US interest in strategic defences, and that only these are 'dangerous' to international peace and stability. Other, non-strategic systems are irrelevant to the debate. Unfortunately, such an assertion hinges upon a very narrow view of strategic, which defines such systems with reference to one particular state (the United States), and one relationship (United States and the Soviet Union/Russia/China) drawn from one point in time (the Cold War). However, differentiating a strategic from a non-strategic system depends upon the context in which it is deployed or employed. During the Cold War, where the term strategic emerged, its meaning related directly to the American-Soviet relationship in relation to

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nuclear weapons. As the ability to threaten each other directly followed from the development of long-range delivery systems, strategic weapons, and thus strategic defences, related to long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).8 The weapons themselves were also strategic in the sense that their employment alone could decide the outcome of a clash of arms, regardless of all else in a war. The ABM Treaty, which until its demise in 2002, stood at the heart of the definitional problem, and in fact never clearly defined a theatre system, concentrating instead upon limits on the existing antiballistic missile plans in terms of number and location of systems, number of interceptors and radars, including an emphasis on testing radars in an ABM mode. Both parties were naturally concerned with the possibility that the other could quickly breakout of the limits detailed in the Treaty and Protocol.9 In 1997, in light of the Clinton administration's division of missile defence into a theatre and national component, Russia and the United States negotiated an agreement defining theatre systems. At the heart of the agreement (which never came into affect), was interceptor speed. Simply, the probability of a successful intercept significantly depends upon the speed of the interceptor relative to the speed of the incoming warhead, especially when employing a kinetic hit-tokill vehicle. Interceptors need to a be as fast as or faster than an incoming warhead. As speed of warheads increase relative to distance, the speed of ICBMs could be used to define a speed limit for an interceptor. Any warhead traveling slower, such as an intermediate-, medium- and short-range missile, could be dealt with using slower interceptors. Hence, the relationship between speed and distance could delimit strategic from non-strategic defence systems.10 All of this is fine if the adversarial relationship is a long-distance one, as in the case of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and the case of the United States and Russia, China, North Korea and Iran today, notwithstanding the possibility of using

14 JAMES FERGUSSON

a slower interceptor to strike a missile target in the boost or very early mid-flight phase. If, however, the relationship is local or regional, then strategic as defined by interceptor speed makes no sense. Instead, strategic should be understood as a function of the ability to defend national territory against the types of 'war-winning' threats that exist. Israel, for example, faces no long-range ICBM-capable adversary. Instead, its adversaries today and into the foreseeable future are regional and capable of threatening Israel with intermediate and shorter range missiles. It does not need ICBM speed interceptors for an effective defence. Instead, slower interceptors are sufficient to provide a strategic defence, and the combination of the Arrow and Patriot theatre and tactical systems respectively serve this function. In short, Israel has a strategic defence because of its own national interests. A similar logic obtains for Europe, albeit not as temporally pressing as Israel. During the Cold War, most targets were within range of the Soviet short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs/MRBMs/IRBMs). Although Europe largely rejected missile defence during this period, such defences would have not been considered strategic under the operational definitions at the time. Like Israel, a theatre defence system would have been sufficient. Today, Europe faces no immediate missile threats, except for the Iranian ballistic missile development programme, which receives much less public attention than its suspected nuclear weapons programme. Nonetheless, having successfully tested MRBMs, it is only a matter of time until Iran operationally fields an IRBM capable of targeting most of Europe, and further down the road an intercontinental ballistic missile. An IRBM from Iran represents a strategic threat to Europe. In so doing, a European response (national or collective) does not necessarily demand a system as capable as the American land-based midcourse system in Alaska. Rather, a very advanced theatre system would suffice. For now, Europeans are not currently investing in such

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systems. Instead, their investments have primarily been into tactical systems for force protection. But concerns are rising about an emerging Iranian threat, which may well lead to more sophisticated missile defences. Moreover, investing in tactical systems can be understood as developing the technology base for future more capable systems in a careful calculation of available time. Alongside Russia, Israel and Europe, similar considerations face Japan, Taiwan, and India, among others that have led all of them to become engaged in missile defence. All are driven by the same national defence logic as the United States. Thus, one is left with a puzzle. If the list of missile defence players is relatively long and includes many of Canada friends, allies and 'like-minded' nations, it is the Canadian government that appears to be 'out-of-step.' Perhaps, some Canadians believe that stopping the US programs will stop all others. Again, this is simply counter-intuitive, because the interests and investments of others are not determined solely, if at all, by the United States. If Canada is out-of-step, it is difficult to see how these nations will take the Canadian decision seriously. It's the Arms Race 'Stupid' In side stepping political-strategic reality, the concentration on the United States is related to the de-stabilizing arms race argument. Simply, the American deployment of strategic defences capable of defending its territory (including Alaska and Hawaii) will generate an arms race, thereby negating future prospects for nuclear, if not, general and complete disarmament. Putting aside the macro conceptual, theoretical and empirical problems that attend the arms race idea, this seminal critique posits that the response to defence is to build more offence, igniting a chain reaction among all the actors.11 Like the other two elements of the critique, it is Cold War in origin, and drawn directly from the academic and Soviet political response to Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The Soviet Union could and would deal with missile defence by overwhelming it

16 JAMES FERGUSSON

with numbers. As reflected in the Nitze deployment criteria, this was a rational response. As long as a unit of offence costs less than a unit of defence, then it made sense to respond to missile defences by building more missiles to overwhelm the defences. With offence missiles a proven technology and production facilities in-place, the Soviet Union's threatened response makes sense, at least on the surface.12 Similarly, as Nitze suggested, as long as this ratio obtained, missile defence deployment made no sense. Today, critics simply take this ratio for granted and assert its contemporary relevance. Like the Soviet Union of the past, the Russians still raise the spectre of such a response, as most recently found in statements surrounding the deployment of their next generation ICBM, the SS-27 Topol, and the investment in a new generation ballistic missile nuclear submarine (SSBN) and submarine-launched ballistic missile.13 Several problems confront this specific critique. First of all, the Cold War is over and there is no strategic deterrent relationship to sustain, let alone de-stabilize. Strategic (read international) stability as understood during that era makes no sense today, and for the foreseeable future.14 One is hard pressed to think of a reasonable situation where the prospect of war between the United States and Russia would bring into play strategic nuclear weapons. That Russia would be concerned in a generic sense about missile defence is not surprising. That it is modernizing its land-based strategic forces is also not surprising. That the motive for modernization is American missile defence would be surprising according to the missile defence logic of critics. For the next decade and more, Russia faces only a technologically immature, very limited first generation defence. Not only can this defence be overwhelmed by existing forces which possess multiple warheads and a range of sophisticated penetration aids, it can also be defeated by much smaller strategic forces than envisioned in the Moscow Treaty. Under these circumstances, the very logic of the Cold War cri-

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tique explains why Russia wouldn't expand its forces. If so, modernization must be driven by some other consideration, and this is likely modernization itself. Weapons degrade over time and new technology emerges which combine to drive the process. Modernization imperatives make more sense than missile defence, even though any strategic force modernization is going to consider defences, existing and planned. But this does not mean an arms race or an unstable relationship. Critics might suggest (they don't though) that Russian decisionmakers are irrational, and thus not behaving according to the logic. They are paranoid of American plans and thus responding in an arms race mode. If this is the case, it speaks volume to images of Russian elites. Moreover, the entire strategic stability-arms race argument becomes moot if it is based upon a rationality assumption. It suggests that what the United States does or doesn't do, short of liquidating its entire missile defence infrastructure, is irrelevant. If so, the problem really lies with Russia. Forget Russia, the arms race critique is actually related to China. It is the growing challenger to American domination. Its small strategic arsenal is vulnerable to a limited ground-based defence as envisioned by American planners. It is developing its first generation of solid-fuelled, multiple warhead ICBMs, and it will expand this arsenal in lock-step, if not quicker, than the United States develops its defences. As the two engage in this offensive-defensive race, any prospect of engaging China in the strategic arms reduction process will disappear. This new reality will subsequently trap Russia and India and then others down the chain. Thus, the new arms race will doom any chance of disarmament and with it the non-proliferation regime. This focus is also problematic. From its own internal logic, it is first assumed that China (and all states) will act accordingly and second that the cost ratio in all cases will always favour the offence. Concerning the first, the limited evidence available suggests that China has not behaved according to the arms race-strategic stability

18 JAMES FERGUSSON

argument, raising the issue of why Chinese behaviour would suddenly change; a point not addressed by the critics.15 The de-stabilizing condition feared by missile defence opponents actually existed in the Soviet Union-Chinese relationship for at least two decades. The Soviet point defence surrounding Moscow created an incentive according to the stability logic for the Soviet Union to launch a disarming first-strike against China in the case of a crisis, knowing that its limited defence of Moscow might prove sufficient to defeat one or two warheads missed in the attack. In this situation and according to the logic, China should have directed large scale resources into expanding and improving its strategic forces as quickly as possible. China, however, did no such thing. Instead, it accepted its strategic vulnerability, and only thirty years later has it begun to expand its forces. If China did not act as expected then, one wonders why it would do so now. Of course, China may have relied upon an implicit American nuclear umbrella then. But China could well rely on a future implicit Russian umbrella as well. Perhaps, Chinese caution on military investment may be thrown to the wind as it continues to develop economically. However, demands from all sources are likely rise and it is difficult to known which are likely to be successful. Regardless, China might now act as it is supposed to under the arms race logic. That China is concerned about missile defence should not surprise anyone. However, China's response by expanding its strategic arsenal is not inevitable. In fact, it is more likely to be concerned about Taiwanese missile defence interests, which could negate its ability to threaten Taiwan with its missile forces, as has been overtly done in the recent past. The Taiwanese are of significance here. China's willingness to threaten Taiwan anytime it perceives Taipei flirting with independence is deeply problematic for Taiwanese security. Reliance on the American defence umbrella, especially in the absence of a theatre missile defence for its forward deployed naval assets and a Chinese denial strategy, raises doubts about the American guarantee.16 Defence for

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the American umbrella and Taiwan is essential. In its absence, Taiwan may well be driven into an offensive nuclear response to create a strategic deterrent relationship similar to the French relationship with Moscow during the Cold War. One might suggest that Taipei and its guarantor will simply accept China's local predominance. But such a suggestion is more hope than reality. Alternatively, one may argue that a tactical or theatre missile defence for forward deployed forces is sufficient to offset Taiwan's incentives to develop its own defences (strategic in this context) or to acquire nuclear weapons in order to practice deterrence. However, there is a vertical element to offence and defence, such that the value and utility of a tactical or theatre missile defence system is partially dependent on the nature of defence and offence at the theatre (in the case of tactical) and strategic level. As found during the Cold War, there is a web of inter-acting forces among the levels of deterrence and defence that impacts upon national calculations. Furthermore, if one does separate out the levels, and suggests that tactical and theatre are not problematic, but rather essential to affect Taiwan and its relationship with Beijing as mediated by the American guarantee (note this same logic applies to Japan), a simple political problem arises. No American president will last very long following a policy whereby it can defend others, but not the United States. Finally, the problem is a dagger at the heart of the arms race/proliferation argument. In the absence of defences in an unfavourable strategic situation, states are driven to acquire nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems. Now, one might prefer security based upon nuclear deterrence, but of course this is not the intent of the critics of missile defence. Nonetheless, it is of significance to proliferation considerations, especially given the current strategic balance of forces. With no major strategic obstacle to United States' intervention on the periphery, states perceiving a threat from the United States, such as Iran and North Korea, are driven to acquire

20 JAMES FERGUSSON

nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to deter the United States, even as friends such as Taiwan and Japan are also driven in this direction. It is this very problem that reverses the arms race logic when it is placed in the context of proliferation. Here, the ratio of offence to defence changes such that missile defences act as a barrier to proliferation. As noted above, the calculation of this ratio is neither easy, nor straightforward. Certainly in 1985 if one compared the costs of developing any of the SDI proposals with the costs of building ICBMs with nuclear warheads, then offence wins; the accepted wisdom of the critics. However, this calculus ignores the development costs of nuclear warheads and ICBMs and treats them as sunk costs. But, calculations on the defence side of the equation implicitly include these development costs. A reasonable calculation is either to include these costs, or exclude them for both offence and defence in favour of the actual production costs of a unit of defence and offence. Intuitively, defence is likely still to appear more expensive because of the range of sensors required for launch identification, tracking and interceptor cueing. Offensive missiles, once the guidance systems are developed, do not need such support. However, system components for offence and defence are never straightforward. Sensors designed for strategic early warning purposes are essential for missile defence. Tracking and cueing sensors for intercepts have significant value for evaluating the nature of an attack and making calculations about retaliation. In addition, these sensors also serve a range of other military functions, such that attributing their costs solely to missile defence is misleading. Finally, once these are in-place and the costs absorbed, the comparison largely becomes one of interceptor versus ICBM, with results hard to predict. Most importantly, the cost ratio becomes particularly problematic when Russia and China are removed from the equation, and proliferators such as Iran and North Korea are the focus of concern. Proliferators face all the major costs of developing, engineering, and

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deploying a strategic deterrent force. These, in turn, must be compared to the costs and burden missile defences places upon the United States. Here the ratio is more likely to favour the United States because it can access and adapt, rather than create new technology. Simply, the United States is the leader and thus has a comparative advantage.17 Furthermore, as a much richer society, the investment burden is much less than in the case of a developing (Iran) or closed (North Korea) society. The United States spends less than two percent of its defence budget on missile defence, which has a relatively minor impact on overall defence spending and society as whole. The same cannot be said for most other states, where such investments represent a significant burden and sacrifice. If the ratio in the proliferation case favours defence, then it is irrational for states to pursue strategic offensive forces. It is further irrational because the payoffs, a strategic deterrent, become problematic. If the goal is to acquire a means to deter American intervention, defence negates the utility of using missiles to do so. This does not mean that incentives to acquire nuclear weapons will evaporate by this negation of the ballistic missile delivery system. States seek nuclear weapons for a variety of reasons beyond deterrence, and there are alternative delivery methods, albeit problematic, for an effective deterrent strategy. Nor is it necessarily the case that ballistic missiles will be entirely eschewed, due to their nature as status symbols. But defences are likely to dampen the proliferation process, and building large numbers of offensive missiles will simply be too costly relative to their actual value. In other words, the very arms race logic of the critics likely works in the opposite direction in the case of proliferation. Recognizing this alternative raises two other problems for critics. First, it suggests that the linear chain reaction from Russia to China and beyond is unlikely to occur. In this regard, consideration also has to be given to the unspoken way in which critics perceive the motives behind state adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) itself.

22 JAMES FERGUSSON

They assume that non-nuclear adherents to the NPT signed only because of the commitment by the nuclear powers to eventual disarmament. Yet, the logic of the NPT, notwithstanding its roots in a USSoviet Union deal, is derived from the security dilemma. In a state of anarchy, every state sees itself as inherently peaceful, and arms to defend itself in an uncertain world. Arming, however, creates fear on the part of other states (neighbours), leading the others to arm as well. The process is an action-reaction one, in which the search for security creates insecurity for all. The NPT can be understood as a means to deal with this dilemma. States legally commit themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons, and in so doing seek to re-assure their neighbours. If everyone in the neighbourhood signs on, then one motive for acquiring nuclear weapons, namely fear, disappears. This is not to suggest that any or all of the non-nuclear weapons states had or have any intention to acquire nuclear weapons. Rather, states without the intention could avoid being driven into acquiring nuclear weapons out of fear of what others might do. In other words, states signed the NPT because it was in their interests to do so, and there are several other interests (such as status, potential political and economic payoffs, and an inability to develop these weapons) as well that would have to be significantly affected before a decision to withdraw occurs. Second, missile defences are more likely to support the process towards nuclear disarmament. Defence, in this context, is conceived as an alternative strategy to deterrence. Effective defences, especially if they are disseminated among all the nuclear powers (successive US administrations' statements to share missile defence technology), can support deeper and deeper reductions. The logic of defence as a means to escape from nuclear deterrence is relatively straightforward. Recognizing that nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented, the existing knowledge becomes ever more problematic for reductions as they move closer to zero. In a world of thousands of nuclear weapons, adding ten or more that violate the limits set out in a Treaty

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has little actual impact. However, in a world of few or none, acquiring ten or even one has great significance. Cheating has potentially great payoffs. Missile defences act as a hedge, by eliminating the payoffs. As such, it is essential if the goal is disarmament. In this regard, the relative success of the Chemical Weapons Convention stems from the ability of states to defend against their use, which undermines the political and military value of these weapons. Of course, the relationship between missile defence and nuclear disarmament is much more complicated than space allows for discussion here. Moreover, missile defence deals only with the delivery system (arguably the most effective for nuclear deterrence), and negating it does not necessarily negate nuclear weapons. Finally, breaking out of nuclear deterrence also raises questions about a security environment in which war reacquires meaning. Nonetheless, the relationship between offence and defence is a complicated one, which is never truly engaged by critics (or the government) in Canada. Not only is their arms race argument logically and empirically suspect, it leads one to endorse nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence; a very strange position for the critics and the Canadian government. Certainly, defences will impact on strategic calculations. But the simple linear arms race argument is more ideology than clear analysis. Outer Space Doom and Gloom Like the arms race argument, the outer space weaponization case is drawn from the SDI experience. As SDI unfolded, attention focused upon exotic space-based weapon systems, particularly Brilliant Pebbles; a constellation of satellites which would propel objects (pebbles) at a bus and/or warhead transiting through outer space. The kinetic energy produced from the collision of the objects and the bus/warhead at speeds of around eight kilometers per second, or approximately mach 23 would destroy both. Alongside Brilliant Pebbles, and at times conflated with it, was the idea of space-

24 JAMES FERGUSSON

based lasers whose energy beam would somehow also destroy the bus/warhead. Attention on these proposed systems or architectures also fed from the Reagan administration's interpretation of the ABM Treaty, which placed them outside the Treaty and only liable for discussion as per Agreed Statement D.18 This interpretation was only necessary if SDI was moving into the testing phase, as research was permitted by the Treaty. If testing was near and a draft space-based architecture present, operational deployment could not be far behind. The fears of rapid movement from research to testing to operational deployment have not materialized. Roughly twenty years later, the testing envelope of space-based weapons remains rudimentary to say the least. Funding for space-based lasers has been in and out of the defence budget throughout the period. Even US Space Command's Long Range Plan (LRP), which critics see as further evidence of weaponization, recognizes that the technology to put their vision into practice is at least twenty more years into the future.19 The LRP further notes that the decision to move in this direction is "out of their lane," a political one, and has not yet been taken. Even the most recent USAF request to obtain a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) opening space to weapons has not met with a formal response.20 Concerning technology, advancements have certainly been made, but the overall missile defence development process speaks volumes to premature over-selling, even though it has convinced most critics that the 'end is nigh.' Deadlines for an operational capability have regularly slipped many years, if not decades, into the future. Even the replacement for the Defense Support Program (DSP) infra-red warning satellites in geo-synchronous orbit, the Space Based Infra-Red System High (SBIRS-High), has slipped many years, and its partner, SBIRS-Low designed for cold tracking and target discrimination, remains plagued with problems.21 The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) may plan to deploy a space-based interceptor test-bed in 2008,

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but past evidence puts the likelihood in doubt.22 Beyond ideology driving perception, too many observers tend to confuse political reality for operational reality. Architectures and operational deadlines are driven in many instances by the dynamics of the budgetary process (e.g. easier to get funds for a well-defined architecture with an operational date) than a set of technologies and components, as particularly found in the SDI case noted above.23 They also lose sight of the technical complexity of missile defence, whether land-, sea-, air- or space-based.24 Technical complexity with regard to space, because of the harsh nature of the environment, presents significant cost barriers. The most recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report clearly lays out the problems related to cost based upon current technologies, of which the problem of energy or power generation is paramount.25 Easy access to and from space to place constellations of weapon satellites in orbits and to service them remain very costly.26 On-orbit energy generation, essential for directed energy weapons, as well as manoeuvering, also remains prohibitive. Until the energy problem is resolved, among others, space-based weapon systems necessary for an effective defence will remain developmental, and even when space can be exploited as air is today, weaponization is not inevitable. It will greatly depend upon the politics of the day. The reality of space weapons decades into the future is confirmed by the current concentration on ground- and sea-based systems, of which the mid-course ground-based system is the only one of relevance to Canada relative to the February decision. There would be little need for a mid-course system designed to intercept warheads in outer space if space weapons were around the corner.27 With constellations designed for boost-phase and mid-course phase intercepts on-orbit, at best the ground based system would be either redundant or provide a terminal phase capability.28 In the former case, significant intercept coordination issues emerge. In the later, there is no need for the more advanced capabilities of a mid-course system, and more

26 JAMES FERGUSSON

consideration arguably would be given to an explosive intercept system, rather than a kinetic kill. However, if space systems are well into the future, and the threat more immediate, then a more capable ground system is needed, and this partially explains the current American effort. If space weapons are not just around the corner, then the critique simply links the ground and space together, presuming that committing to the former will bind one eventually to the latter. For this to have some actual meaning, however, and thus weight internationally, one must demonstrate how this linkage exists. In other words, if all the world (except the United States apparently) is opposed to weapons in space, somehow saying no to a ground based system is equivalent to saying no to weapons in space, to which others will follow suit. Besides being hard pressed to see Canada leading a public, international crusade against its closest ally and this ally's groundbased missile defence in order preserve space as a sanctuary, the linkage between the two systems or deployment environments is very problematic, even though defending space and land assets from missile attack can take the same form. Certainly, at least in theory, the best location for intercepting missiles is a capability able to strike at missiles during the boost phase, when they are most vulnerable. Space as the ultimate high ground remains the most attractive for this mission. Ground, sea or air platforms are limited because of distance relative to the size of the state involved and possible deployment points around the state. Thus, independent of ground systems, the logic of space-based missile defence remains. In other words, whether one does or does not engage in ground-based defence, space will remain an attractive location for missile defence. Conversely, ground-based systems pose a direct potential threat to space-based ones as a function of orbital dynamics. An interceptor capable of striking at a warhead in mid-course phase is also capable of striking at a satellite in a predictable orbit.29 It is by definition an

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anti-satellite weapon (ASAT). Similarly, any ballistic missile capable of launching a warhead thousands of kilometers to target is also capable of launching the same warhead against satellites. Any nation capable of placing a satellite in orbit also has a rudimentary capacity to strike at a satellite in orbit. Today, no states possess a dedicated ASAT, but many possess the basic technology that would enable them to practice a denial strategy, and turn space into a battleground. With space already home to a range of vital Western military and economic assets, it is logical that adversaries would target them if possible, especially if they are undefended. As such, potential strategic competitors or future adversaries of the West and the United States would naturally oppose active space-based defences because they would serve to negate their ability to practice a denial strategy through their existing missile capabilities, and in so doing link ground-based defences to space-based ones. The relative merits of passive versus active defence for satellites are complicated, and beyond the purview of this analysis. The key point is that space weapons, designed to intercept missiles, serve to defend space-based assets from ground-based systems. But the ability of spaced-based systems to defend space assets, as distinct from missile defence for the protection of terrestrial assets, is not necessarily the same thing. Much depends upon the type of system and its orbital deployment. For example, one can envision an active defence in geo-synchronous orbit to defend satellites in this orbit, but incapable of intercepting surface-to-surface ICBMs. Of course, this is still weaponization, but one can weaponize without doing missile defence. Perhaps what critics truly mean by opposing ground-based missile defence is opposition to an ASAT system, and such opposition is designed to eliminate the incentive to weaponize space. This is an interesting argument, which unfortunately, neither critics nor the Canadian government make. Of course, such an argument amounts to the idea of a ban on missiles and rockets, and raises the age-old problem of dual-use technology. Regardless, the strategic rationale for

28 JAMES FERGUSSON

space-based weapons transcends the narrower rationale for missile defence. In other words, incentives to weaponize space exist whether one engages in ground-based missile defence or not. It is in this sense that the two are ostensibly independent. As noted above, the strategic calculations and issues that emerge governing space as a security environment related to weaponization is extremely complex. Saying no to ground based defences is not going to have impact upon these because they are driven by strategic considerations that go beyond direct missile defence. Moreover, the underlying assumption that the two are connected in the case of Canada is perhaps the most spurious argument of the debate. In fact, the evidence is entirely opposite. In 2001 as part of the last major command re-structuring under the biennial review of the US Unified Command Plan (UCP), US Space Command (SPACECOM) was merged with Strategic Command (STRATCOM). In so doing, the organic link as a function of the commander of Space Command also being the commander of the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) was severed, and with it the possible link between space- and groundbased missile defence. In fact, the United States created the opportunity, whether intentional or not, for Canada to accept the latter without committing to the former, and thereby avoid violating its longstanding opposition to the weaponization of space. NORAD became linked to Northern Command and the ground-based system was assigned to it. Moreover, with the assignment of the early warning mission for missile defence to NORAD, the longstanding Canadian relationship to US strategic forces was replicated.30 But, such a link then did not amount to participation in the American strategic deterrent. In effect, critics possess certain hubris about Canada in the world and in its relationship with the United States in assuming that the Americans 'want us and need us.' Yet, ideas of space control as articulated in the United States and by critics speak to an American goal

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of the unilateral domination of space. Even more, critics in general raise concerns about American unilateralism and American empire, but then suggest that they need Canada and allies to provide legitimacy to American plans. Certainly, this perspective is open to wide debate. However, if critics fear US plans in light of beliefs of American unilateralism and empire, it is hard to accept the view that a Canadian rejection will have any impact whatsoever on plans to weaponize space, never mind deploy missile defences. It might be a principle in the sense of standing up to the United States as the new 'evil empire,' but it is unlikely to affect anyone in Washington, particularly with a Republican administration and a public consensus that no foreign nation has a veto on United States' security. If their general perspective is correct, rejecting any engagement with the United States is not going to have any substantive impact, even if Canada were to stand with Moscow, Beijing and others in a global campaign against missile defence as the means to block space weaponization. Indeed, the Canadian no is ultimately self-defeating, except as a principled 'feel good' policy, not least because it forecloses most, if not all, of Canada's access into the space dimension. Here, ironically resides the actual missile defencespace linkage. Groundbased missile defence participation requires access to space-based assets beyond early warning, and such access requires links with Strategic Command, which is tasked with space dimension of defence. This is not to suggest that the linkage ensures that Canada will be able to push or influence the United States away from weaponization of space if an administration decides to proceed. Canada would be only one of many voices in a debate dominated by a range of domestic voices. But at the very least, there would be a voice as a function of participation in the ground-based North American missile defence programme. Instead, Canada has opted to eliminate its voice by saying no to a system which doers not entail any commitment to space weaponization.31

30 JAMES FERGUSSON

Conclusion It has long been suggested that Canadian debates about international peace and security have a strange quality. The missile defence debate, at least from the critics' perspective (and by default the government's), fixated upon the larger issues of international peace and security and presumed that Canada's decision would truly matter in an international issue area dominated by the Great Powers. In other words, Canada engaged in the American debate long after it had concluded in favour of missile defence. Its decision also placed it in step with the Russian and Chinese perspectives on missile defence; a strange place for a country like Canada to reside. Regardless, the idea that the Canadian decision will have some international impact is very difficult to sustain, even if one assumes that Canada has a significant level of international influence in strategic defence and security issues. The three core arguments of the critique are so problematic and divorced from strategic-political reality as to raise doubts about the foundation of Canadian strategic thinking itself. Of course, the government may simply have been driven by domestic political imperatives. If so, this also raises doubts about the foundation. In the end, it is likely that most nations, especially Canada's allies, will remain puzzled by the Canadian decision because it makes such little sense from whatever perspective one takes. It is simply strange, but perhaps to be expected in a country whose actions over the past decade and more with regard to defence and security have only served to further marginalize it, despite the rhetoric. Notes:
1 Paul Hellyer, "BMD: the right way but not the right wing way," Globe and Mail and Warren Kinsella, "On missile defence, Martin was right," Globe and Mail, March 3, 2005. It is interesting that critics see missile defence as a personal priority of the President, such that 'no' is a direct message to the President, but then believe that this personal message to an ideologue President will not affect Canada-US relations. For discussions of the nation2

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al/continental case in light of the decision, see James Fergusson, "Shall We Dance: The Missile Defence Decision, NORAD Renewal, and the Future of Canada-U.S. Defence Relations," Canadian Military Journal, vol. 6, n. 2 (Summer 2005), pp. 13-22. For an overview of the positions, see James Fergusson, Douglas A. Ross, J. Marshall Beier, Frank Harvey, and Ann Denholm Crosby, "Round Table: Missile Defence in a Post-September 11th Context," Canadian Foreign Policy, vol. 9, n. 2 (Winter 2002).
3

Government of Canada, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Canada's International Policy Statement (Ottawa, April, 2005).

4 The idea that the status quo is sacrosanct and change must be justified in the missile defence debate is found in David Mutimer, "Good Grief! The politics of debating NMD: A reply to Frank Harvey," International Journal, vol. 56, n. 2 (Spring 2001). 5

There is also an implicit tendency to attribute missile defence (and all that is evil in American policy) to the Republicans, thereby conveniently ignoring the bipartisan nature of support as signaled in the 1999 US Congressional legislation and other aspects of missile defence during the Clinton administration.

At Glasboro, New York in 1967, President Johnson and Secretary of Defence McNamara sought to alter the positive view of missile defence held by Soviet President Kosygin, and lay the ground work for a treaty on missile defences. Gregg Herken, Counsels of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 196-197. James Fergusson, "The European Dimension of Ballistic Missile Defence," in David Rudd, Jim Hanson and Jessica Blitt, eds., Canada and National Missile Defence (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2000). Ironically, the systems at issue in the ABM Treaty context did not have the capability to defend all of the United States or the Soviet Union. Instead, they could only provide a limited area defence due to the available technology. For detailed information, see Matthew Bunn, Foundation for the Future: The ABM Treaty and National Security (Washington, D.C.: The Arms Control Association, 1990).
10 9 8 7

In addition, but outside the still-born agreement, speed also affects defensive coverage relative to the relationship between the location of the interceptor, the launch point of the missile and the intended target. Basically, the earlier one engages a warhead, the greater the territory defended (known as the defence footprint). While a critic of the arms race argument, Colin Gray does provide a valuable overview of these general problems. See Colin Gray, Weapons Don't Make War: Policy, Strategy and Military Technology (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1993).

11

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The other response is to confuse the system with decoys; another point that critics in general raise which is outside the scope of this analysis as it relates to the Canadian debate.
13 12

They also said if the United States moved forward, then Russia would withdraw from the Strategic Arms Reduction (START) process, hinged upon the sanctity of the ABM Treaty. Yet, shortly after the United States announced its withdrawal from the Treaty, the two agreed to the Moscow Treaty (effectively START III) on further reductions to their strategic forces, contrary to their rhetoric and wide-spread academic predictions.

14 For four perspectives with similar conclusions, see Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Strategic Stability Reconsidered (Ottawa: International Security Research and Outreach Programme, 2001). 15

Inversely, the argument that controls on missile defences would produce arms reductions also did not obtain during the Cold War. After the signing of the ABM Treaty, both the United States and Soviet Union continued to increase their strategic arsenals.
16

A denial strategy rejects the need to control an environment and sets as its goal the ability to deny an environment to an adversary. The classic example is the German U-Boat campaign in both World Wars.

It was in this sense that the French were concerned about SDI; not as a defence programme but as a programme whose investment in technology would propel the United States far ahead of all others. Arguably, this appears to have been the case, even though the American technology lead, especially in the military sector, cannot be entirely attributed to SDI. Agreed Statement D refers to "ABM systems based on other physical properties subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty." As found in Bunn, Foundation for the Future: The ABM Treaty and National Security (Washington: Arms Control Association, 1990), p. 168. This source also provides a relatively balanced discussion of the debate itself as it hinged upon the phrase "currently consisting of" in Article II of the Treaty. Proponents of the Reagan interpretation or 'broad' view argued that the ABM Treaty was limited only to the system components laid out in Article III, and that this explains the meaning of Agreed Statement D. Opponents, following the 'narrow' interpretation, argued that this was not a de-limitation at all, but rather covered any future system components which might emerge and could not be predicted. The most interesting constitutional position was offered by Senator Nunn, who argued that at the time the Treaty was submitted to Senate for advice and consent, the Nixon administration had communicated on the basis of the negotiating record the narrow interpretation. If the Reagan administration sought to reverse this, then the Treaty would have to return to the Senate for advice and consent.
18

17

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19

US Space Command, The Long Range Plan: Implementing USSPACECOM Vision for 2020 (Peterson Air Force Base: Director of Plans, 1998). The highly selective interpretation of this and other US documents is central to Mel Hurtig's misleading doom and gloom analysis of missile defence. Mel Hurtig, Rushing to Armageddon: The Shocking Truth about Canada, Missile Defence, and Star Wars (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2004).

20 The request amounts to an attempt to repeal PDD-49, which prohibited the indiscriminate

militarization of Outer Space.

21

Space Based Infra-Red System Low is designed as a constellation of approximately 24 satellites in low earth orbit which will provide more precise tracking of warheads and the discrimination of warheads from decoys; it was originally scheduled for initial deployment in 2001. In its 2004 Budget submission, 2007 is the target date for launching two space-based sensors, including an infrared one, in low earth orbit to validate space-based concepts and support a space-based test bed. See Missile Defence Agency, Fiscal Year (FY) 2004-05 Biennial Budget Submission Estimates (Washington: US Missile Defence Agency, 2004). Ibid.

22 23

See Francis Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2000).

Even more ironic, the same critics who fear space weaponization is around the corner also argue that missile defence will not work, in part by assuming that such defence must be perfect in order to be viable. For a discussion, see Frank Harvey, "The international politics of national missile defence: A response to critics," International Journal, vol. 55., n.4 (Autumn, 2000).
25

24

In their comparison, a surface-based boost phase system would cost between $16 and $37 billion USD and a spaced-based between $27 and $78 billion USD employing a kinetic energy kill system. See Congressional Budget Office, Alternatives for Boost-Phase Missile Defence (Washington: Congress of the United States, 2004). On more technical considerations see American Physical Society, Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defence (Report of the American Physical Society Study Group, 2003).

For a general discussion of the environment and the problems, see Everett Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age (New York: Frank Cass, 2001). Ballistic missiles and their warheads travel through three phases: the boost-phase which lasts from launch until the bus or warhead separates from the various stages of the missile as it leaves the atmosphere; the mid-course phase, when the bus and/or warheads transit through space; and the terminal phase, when the warhead re-enters the atmosphere and falls to target. Importantly, there are also two key parts to the mid-course phase when dealing with
27

26

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a bus which would carry several warheads and decoys; the early phase when the bus is a single target, and the later phase when it opens and releases the warheads and decoys.
28

A full mid-course system also raises issues about coordinating ground and space attacks simultaneously. It should be noted that the original Safeguard in North Dakota and the Galosh system around Moscow are terminal systems. It is unclear if Galosh remains a nuclear intercept system.

The same holds for directed-energy weapons which could be ground-based, as demonstrated in the MIRCL laser test in 1997.
30 Like the weaponization of space, Canadian policy-makers rejected nuclear weapons, and have been an ardent advocate for nuclear disarmament (even though Canada is a member of a nuclear alliance, NATO, and stored US nuclear weapons on its soil, to be deployed on Canadian air defence assets in the case of war, for roughly a decade from the mid 1960s). At the same time, NORAD assumed the role of early warning for US strategic forces, such that a Canadian officer could have been tasked to inform the American President of a nuclear attack, and thus a decision to launch a retaliatory strike. In other words, Canada participated without participating. 31

29

Strangely enough, when the Chrtien government announced it would begin discussions with the United States on possible Canadian participation, the Defence Minister, John McCallum, made these very arguments regarding the weaponization of space dimension. John McCallum, "Statement to the House of Commons," Hansard (Ottawa: Government of Canada, May 29, 2003).

AMERICAN MISSILE DEFENCE, GRAND STRATEGY AND GLOBAL SECURITY

By Douglas A. Ross

he Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 'debate' has been part of the Canadian-American strategic relationship on an intermittent basis for five decades. The conceptual paradigm of strategic defence has had episodic levels of high support among American leaders and officials, but until quite recently it has only very rarely attracted expressions of Canadian political support usually only from the far right. Prime Minister Paul Martin's clear movement toward endorsement of, and direct participation in, American ABM systems for the protection of the continent from late 2003 until late 2004 was just as authentic as it was anomalous in light of previous Canadian aloofness. Martin's reversal of direction in February of 2005 ultimately was not surprising; both popular and elite opinion in Canada have been persistently and appropriately suspicious of American motives in developing strategic defences, concerned that their principal allies have been driven by an imprudent longing for 'nuclear escalation dominance,' 'space dominance' or, latterly, permanent global military 'primacy' rather than a modest and some would say 'natural' desire for self-protection. American advocates of ABM defences, from Herman Kahn to Keith Payne, have never inspired confidence because they have lacked any deep commitment to diplomacy, conciliation, dtente or containment.1 Missile defence has always been seen,

36 DOUGLAS A. ROSS

quite appropriately, as a preferred instrument in the nuclear 'warfighter's' tool kit a policy preference of those who endorsed rollback of the communist bloc, who harboured deep suspicions about deterrence and strategic parity with other major powers, and who see US security being far better met through doctrines premised on 'full spectrum' military superiority, credible extended deterrent guarantees and credible options of nuclear 'first use' and, in private discussions, 'firststrike.' In the near term there is little practical consequence arising from Martin's rejection of active participation in the deployment of a thin ABM 'shield' for North America. Indeed, another 'no' from Canada (even an impolite 'no') is strategically irrelevant, as Jim Fergusson has asserted elsewhere in this volume. Iran is more than a decade away from a viable regional nuclear deterrent, and perhaps two from an ability to field accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). To be sure, aggressively paranoid North Korea is the most dangerous of the remaining two 'axis of evil' states. But the North Koreans live in an impoverished, stagnant, famine-ridden, Stalinist prison that is many years from attaining an ability to strike North America or even Hawaii or Alaska by nuclear-armed ballistic missile attack.2 Moreover, American ABM interceptors now deployed in Alaska and California do not need to fly over Canadian territory to engage any future missile launch ordered by Pyongyang, should they some day acquire a capacity to target western North America.3 Lastly, the testing program for these interceptor missiles has produced very poor results (the last three tests failed in December 2002, December 2004 and February 2005). The best that the head of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) can say about the current deployment effort is that there is "a better-than-zero" prospect of intercepting an attacking missile from Northeast Asia.4 With no authentic 'rogue' threat in sight, with such damningly faint praise in support of the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) mid-course ABM system, with Iraqi and Afghan intervention costs devouring the Pentagon budget, and

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with an exploding federal deficit, ABM advocacy has been waning across the US government.5 In this context a continuation of Canadian non-participation makes much more sense. Contributing to Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) research or even Boost-Phase ABM interceptor research would raise no deep concerns about the maintenance of strategic stability among the US, Russia and China, because any deployment of such regionally confined systems would in no way threaten their central nuclear systems. Exploring possibilities for collaborative research on these topics with both American and European partners might be one avenue of constructive compromise that defence planners in Ottawa could usefully explore.6 Canadian ABM Policies in Historical Perspective In the late 1960s during the first major public American ABM debate, Liberal governments under Lester Pearson and Pierre Trudeau disassociated Canada from any American ABM deployment. At Canadian insistence, the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) treaty renewal of March 30, 1968 added an interpretive clause stipulating that the renewal "will not involve in any way a Canadian commitment to participate in an active ballistic missile defence." Washington did not react adversely to this declaration. As John Clearwater recently noted: "Trade, diplomatic contact and military cooperation increased annually. The sky did not fall. And neither did NORAD."7 The ABM clause was removed at American request in 1981 when the new Reagan administration came into office with much more aggressive 'nuclear warfighting' plans espoused by the then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Notwithstanding the considerable American interest in rebuilding and modernizing much 'thicker' air defences (with new Forward Operating Locations at interceptor bases across the Canadian high Arctic so as to be able to 'kill the archer' [Soviet bombers] before they released their 'arrows' [air-launched cruise missiles or ALCMs]), the Mulroney government gave a "polite no" to the US request to participate in the research

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stage of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in September 1985. The third rejection of American missile defence plans that occurred in February 2005 thus followed well-established precedents, and decades of deep Canadian skepticism contrary to some attempts to portray this recent rejection as a major precedent. This latest repudiation is strategically sensible, as were the previous two decisions, but it too is probably reversible if Prime Minister Martin should gain a parliamentary majority in the next election. Canadians are not in the strategic situation facing citizens of Israel, Taiwan, South Korea or Japan, all of whom need Theatre Missile Defence to cope with short-range missile threats and actual or potentially hostile neighbours. Canadians are in a fundamentally different strategic context in which they must try to influence Washington not to deploy too much 'strategic defence' lest it provoke an offsetting expansion of the nuclear threat to North America from the Russians and Chinese in the form of either growing nuclear arsenals, or the adoption of nuclear alerting measures and Launch Under Attack (LUA) nuclear use doctrines that are profoundly risky. During the Cold War, few Canadian defence analysts supported American missile defence advocates, largely because most Canadian observers were convinced that the policy premises of deterrence theory were essentially sound. No one wished to contribute to an escalation in the Soviet-American nuclear arms rivalry by furthering military systems that the Russians saw unambiguously as a key part of an American bid for unilateral strategic advantage if not clear-cut nuclear warfighting 'superiority.' An only too plausible fear of reactive Soviet offensive missile deployments to American ABM initiatives was at the heart of Canadian caution. A desire to avoid a costly 'defence-defence' dimension to the East-West arms rivalry may also have been a factor, because it would have made Canadian territory much more strategically consequential and might have led to a much more intrusive American military presence. The logic of strategic defence and the frequently heated

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American debates about it have often generated suspicion and mistrust among Canadians about American strategic nuclear intentions. This mistrust fed a deep undercurrent of Canadian concern about the wisdom of American alliance leadership, in particular the continuing interest in first-strike nuclear options by American conservatives. Throughout the Cold War, the Canadian attentive public on defence and arms control issues invariably preferred to support dtente with the Soviet bloc and treaty-based arms control and disarmament arrangements, in multilateral instruments such as the atmospheric Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963 and the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970.8 Canadian political leaders supported the adoption of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty in 1972, and saw it as a critical foundational element of the nuclear arms control landscape. No one doubted that this treaty made possible the arms control measures implemented in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I and II, that set the stage for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) cuts of the last years of the Cold War and the Yeltsin era that followed.9 Mutual restraint in defensive deployments and mutual consent to strategic parity (loosely defined) made big cuts to the American and Russian arsenals practical. Canada's unconditionally supportive attitude towards the ABM Treaty continued through the Clinton years, even while Republicans in the US Congress pressed the administration for missile defence deployments. Most Canadian observers were quietly satisfied that the Clinton leadership did everything possible to stall the neo-conservative drive towards ABM treaty repudiation and the effort to create a new era of American strategic nuclear superiority over all potential 'peer competitors.' Canadian and NATO European opinion was distressed, but not surprised, by passage of the National Missile Defense Act in 1999 that called for the deployment of an effective ABM system at the earliest possible date. Western Europeans were prepared, for their part, to develop so-called TMD systems that would be able to stop short-

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to medium-range ballistic missiles that might come from countries like Libya, Iraq or Iran a development process that has continued to the present. But no NATO government wished to support any scheme for an 'area defence' of continental North America that carried a great risk of disturbing great power nuclear relationships. Fears of both Russian and Chinese perceptions of new nuclear vulnerability that might in turn lead to compensatory offensive deployments fuelled allied opposition and may have helped Clinton in his footdragging campaign on missile defence. That rearguard resistance was finally overwhelmed as American conservatives gained the presidency in 2000 and an ever firmer hold on the Congress in 1998, 2000 and 2002. The election of George W. Bush and the events of 9/11 altered American behaviour considerably. In early 2001 President Bush and his principal advisers Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice and Powell were all determined to pursue ABM Treaty abrogation at the earliest opportunity; 9/11 gave them that opening and sent demoralized and leaderless Democrats into mute passivity. Arguing that arms control treaties were only for adversaries, the Bush team claimed that Russia was now virtually an ally and certainly no longer an enemy. With rogue states acquiring missiles of ever greater range, they said, it was essential to be able to neutralize any threat to the US before it emerged full blown. Strides towards adoption of a doctrine of preventive war on rogue states came quickly through the adoption of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2001 and 2002 respectively (see essays by Huntley and McDonough in this volume). Canadian diplomatic efforts at the UN to head off the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003 failed, and the Chrtien government then refused to play any role in the 'coalition of the willing'; Canada's Afghan deployment that began in 2002 was declared to be a sufficient commitment to the 'war on terror.' The Canadian federal election of June 2004 came only a year after the invasion of Iraq, by which time conventional journalistic wis-

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dom had decreed that Saddam had possessed no weapons of mass destruction.10 The election reduced the federal Liberals to minority status in Parliament, and suddenly made explicit cooperation with Washington in the deployment of a continental missile defence for North America much more difficult. The NDP under Jack Layton strongly opposed American ABM plans, and the party was equally adamant that Ottawa should in no way support the imprudently aggressive elements embedded in the American NSS released by the White House in September 2002. The Bloc Quebecois was just as opposed to missile defence as the NDP, and given the public mood of deep skepticism towards Bush, even Stephen Harper's Conservative Party refused to endorse Canadian participation in American continental missile defence. Because the continued existence of Martin's minority government depended on sustained NDP or Bloc support and because both were so wholly negative on missile defence, those in the federal Liberal caucus who opposed Martin's pro-ABM stand were thereby empowered. The present Canadian ABM 'debate' may be said to date from when the unilateral American abrogation of the ABM Treaty took effect in June 2002 during the waning months of Jean Chrtien's tenure as Prime Minister. The debate evolved in the context of considerable popular distaste for President George W. Bush, who has become perhaps the most disliked President of the modern era.11 Polls have shown that a large majority of Canadians hold favourable views of Americans even though they fear the President's adventurist, bellicose proclivities. The ABM debate also occurred in the context of a highly unpopular American intervention in Iraq that fed public distrust of Bush and his closest advisers. In early 2004 Prime Minister Martin clearly was getting ready to endorse and probably participate in some role that would have been supportive of continental missile defence. Talk of satellite-based information and communications contributions circulated. A few commentators raised the possibility of X-band radars being deployed

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in Labrador or Quebec or elsewhere (with concomitant aerospace subcontracting benefits for Canadian firms). Martin as well as his then Minister of National Defence, John McCallum, and his then Foreign Minister, Bill Graham, all spoke out in favour of participation in principle and of securing a 'seat at the table' for any strategic discussions that might have an impact on Canada. But a year later with only minority government status, Martin felt compelled to retreat completely from his previous support. Unremitting NDP and Bloc opposition to approval or participation, coupled with rising antagonism to the idea within the Liberal Party itself, led to a public reversal of government policy, much to the surprise and annoyance of the then American Ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci.12 Popular and elite Canadian perceptions of American duplicity in making the case for the invasion of Iraq have continued to make support for Washington on missile defence very difficult. Bush's re-election in November 2004 seems to have led American officials to believe that allied governments might be more inclined to cooperate once Bush's own electoral legitimacy was more convincingly established. But mounting difficulties with an intractable insurgency in Iraq and little strategic or economic progress in Afghanistan, left many foreign observers doubting the competence of Bush's principal international security policy advisers. By mid-2005, Ottawa was back to its historically typical refusal to participate in continental missile defence, despite an August 2004 decision to allow existing NORAD personnel to fully cooperate with American missile defence tactical warning, attack assessment and tracking functions.13 Discussions with American authorities continued on ways of expanding NORAD's ability to help deal with 'homeland security threats,' including the possible establishment of a 'maritime wing' to NORAD crisis management capacity, but strategic missile defence cooperation was at that point out of the question.14 Contrary to unduly pessimistic fears expressed by some observers, the Pentagon was in no way inclined to terminate NORAD because of Ottawa's

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ABM rejection.15 Pentagon patience should have been expected given the continued strategic value of a cooperative, bi-national approach to the air defence of North America against manned aircraft and longrange cruise missiles threats that expensive ABM deployments cannot mitigate in any way, and worse, that are likely to aggravate them in the long term. Strategic Defences and Nuclear Stability During and After the Cold War Over the course of the Cold War, 'strategic'16 ABM defences appeared to many analysts to be intrinsically destabilizing. A unilateral advantage in missile defences by either the Soviets or the Americans would have threatened the relative 'stability' of mutual assured deterrence (MAD) between Moscow and Washington by feeding illusions of a disarming first-strike capacity on one side, while creating pressures for the preventive destruction of the vulnerable elements of ABM defences in the early stages of any crisis.17 MAD's structural strategic stability, uncertain and dangerous though it may have been, was premised on largely invulnerable and therefore mutually offsetting nuclear retaliatory capacities deployed on long-range bombers, ICBMs and sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). A breakthrough for either side in the deployment of defences against long-range offensive missiles during the four decades of the Cold War threatened to cause a vastly accelerated arms race in deployed offensive nuclear weaponry. The logic behind such thinking was simple: whichever side feared the neutralization of its offensive force would be driven towards expanding its offensive missile arsenal by at least the number of ABM interceptor missiles deployed by its technologically more accomplished and richer adversary. 'Saturation' of enemy ABM systems was a reasonable first response because offensive missiles have always been cheaper and technically easier to build and deploy than defensive interceptors and their associated highly expensive

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radars, tracking-cueing-guidance systems, and hyper-accelerating rockets. A cost-exchange ratio favouring offensive forces still holds true today just as it did in February 1985, when one of the most 'hawkish' American nuclear strategists of the entire Cold War, Paul Nitze, invoked the idea to implicitly criticize the expenditure of vast sums of money on ABM defences that were both vulnerable and more costly than offsetting offensive deployments.18 To Canadians such logic seemed impeccable. From the 1960s to the 1980s, few analysts had any doubts about the probability of offensive build-ups in response to even the most remotely credible defensive deployments. Defensive deployments seemed almost certain to trigger 'arms races' in offensive (as well as defensive) systems. Secondly, any ballistic missile defence 'revolution' threatened to provoke still further the development of new means for surprise 'decapitating' attacks on nuclear command and control systems by feeding 'first-strike'/surprise-attack anxieties. In the language of deterrence theory, such an outcome entailed a threat to 'crisis stability.' If one side feared that an adversary's new ABM defences might be capable of defeating what was left of one's retaliatory force, after the adversary had struck first, it might well consider surprise attacks of its own very early on in any developing crisis. Such preemptive or preventive attacks using nuclear-armed, stealthy cruise missiles, stealth bombers or depressed trajectory SLBMs from ocean deployment zones as close as possible to the adversary state would virtually eliminate any opportunities for practicing successful crisis diplomacy. The resort to smuggled, 'prepositioned' nuclear bombs delivered by rented cars or trucks also cannot be ruled out.19 Any such 'preventive' strikes against political and military leadership or on the adversary state's large, fixed site, 'soft' (i.e., unprotected and inherently vulnerable) ABM and anti-bomber radars, would be executed on receipt of signals from 'strategic' warning systems (for example, convincing intelligence from spies or communication inter-

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cepts that the adversary was about to launch nuclear attacks) rather than more reliable 'tactical' warning systems (satellite- or groundbased infra-red sensors or radars that had clearly identified a missile launch in progress by the adversary). Because Russian (or Chinese) central nuclear forces would be operating under greater psychological pressure in any such crisis, given their quantitative and qualitative force inferiorities vis--vis US nuclear forces, they would be far more likely to initiate such preventive or 'preemptive' attacks. Too great a degree of perceived American superiority might well drive them to a panicked crossing of the nuclear threshold. In some future geo-strategic dispute, American fears about Russian (or Chinese) intra-crisis anxiety levels might in turn stimulate US determination to preclude possible adversarial preemption especially if Washington's leaders feared an attempt at decapitation of American political and military leadership.20 Such scenarios of preemptive or preventive war are deeply disturbing so much so that many conservative advocates of missile defence simply try to deny that they are plausible. They also try to deny that this risk is likely to be greatly increased by any American effort to secure a unilateral strategic advantage by deploying a global, multi-layered ABM system that no other great power could match. The risk of a 'false' retaliation based on incorrect intelligence that an attack was about to be launched is a troubling aspect of the current Russian-American strategic relationship because of possible Russian activation of their version of a 'Launch Under Attack' 'fail deadly' command and control system for their nuclear forces. Starting evidently in 1985 (and continuing to the present day) the Russians devised and deployed the so-called 'Dead Hand' launch system, which when activated would direct a massive retaliatory strike on North America with no further human intervention provided there was loss of communications between Moscow and the computer 'brain' of the system (remote from the Kremlin), as well as thermal and seismic indications of a nuclear detonation in Moscow. Unfortunately there is

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no way for the Dead Hand launch computers to differentiate among the detonation of an American Trident warhead, a nuclear missile fired by a third country, a device detonated by Chechen terrorists who have gotten hold of a nuclear warhead, or a detonation caused by the crash of a nuclear-armed Russian aircraft. According to Bruce Blair and John Steinbruner the Russians continue to rely on this system,21 largely because of continuing very serious gaps in their own early warning coverage.22 Since 2000 the inability to replace 'Oko' infra-red Early Warning satellites has left several attack 'corridors' available for American Trident II D5 SLBMs that Russian officials fear could decapitate the country's civilian and military leadership. This puts great pressure on Russian leadership to 'turn on' the Dead Hand, any time that their intelligence tells them that the Americans might be gearing up for a disarming first-strike. NORAD typically has scores of false alarms per year, and Russian and Chinese warning systems have probably been similarly afflicted both during the Cold War and afterward. Furthermore, any attack on either side's leadership, its so-called 'command and control' systems, could well lead to a very rapid escalation of the conflict to a completely uncontrolled nuclear exchange. Such warfare would likely to leave the northern hemisphere "in total ruins and agony."23 The third way in which missile defences can erode strategic stability is by feeding the illusion of the side holding any putative strategic defence advantage that it might be able to execute successfully a disarming nuclear first-strike, and thereby largely escape any retaliatory damage. This was one of the main objections to the deployment of strategic missile defences by Andrei Sakharov, the chief designer of the Soviet H-bomb. Sakharov thought that most military leaders would do what they could to avoid nuclear conflicts, but he was not at all sure that civilian leaders would show the same circumspection especially if military officials could plausibly brief them on a scenario for 'victory' in a major nuclear exchange, a scenario heavily dependent on the illusion of competent (but inherently complex, untestable and

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unreliable) strategic missile defences. For these reasons, missile defence has typically been viewed as a natural complement to 'nuclear warfighting' strategies, something to be shunned by those who have both strategic and ethical objections to the actual use of nuclear weapons. While many advocates of missile defence have argued that such defences are inherently moral because they will save lives rather than threaten to exterminate millions,24 critics have denounced the deployment of ABM systems as creating a slippery slope towards accidental/inadvertent nuclear warfare, or a crisis-driven gamble on a complete disarming first-strike . While ABM defences were thought to be inherently provocative, they were also thought to be something of a mirage. ABM defences might be made effective against small nuclear arsenals held by states with limited defence budgets, who could not react to a layered defensive system deployed against them. But against major adversaries they would almost certainly provoke offsetting qualitative and quantitative improvements in the existing means of nuclear weapons delivery, such as: short-warning, depressed trajectory SLBM deployments; expanded deployment of air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles and bomber aircraft that would necessitate a major expansion of American air defences; or even resort to covertly introduced nuclear weapons, prepositioned to inflict maximum damage on American command and control of nuclear forces.25 Some American analysts have suggested that deploying ABM defences under a new treaty-defined framework (or even just under a declared understanding with Russia and China) with a cap on numbers deployed (fewer than 200 GBIs and no space-based interceptors or anti-satellite weapons [ASATs]) and with a full area defence capability specifically excluded from the deployment configuration would be minimally provocative and stability enhancing.26 ABM interceptors deployed about Washington, Moscow and eventually Beijing might buy additional time for crisis decision-making and lower the risk of panic-driven false retaliations. Limited ABM deployments are not

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intrinsically bad for deterrence-minded analysts who have been willing to concede that they might actually enhance and not degrade crisis-stability by inhibiting 'limited nuclear war' skirmishing. So too would the deployment of a limited number of ABM interceptors to protect offensive missile silos or bomber bases that constitute part of the retaliatory forces of each of the major nuclear weapon states. Not knowing which segment of a missile field was going to be preferentially protected would force an attacker to multiply any attacking salvo to a level that would be utterly impractical, given the vagaries of warhead 'fratricide.'27 Thus such limited deployments to protect retaliatory forces would actually make any planning for counterforce nuclear attacks quite impractical. A 'thin' area defence might also help to mitigate the effects of an accidental or unauthorized launch of a few great power ICBMs or SLBMs, as well as provide a measure of protection against rogue state regimes.28 But layered ABM systems for a determined defence of the entire national territory, such as the Bush administration has proposed, are another matter altogether. The Bush plan is likely to involve close to 2000 interceptor missiles when all the technologies reach deployment not 200.29 The GBI mid-course portion of the system will depend on large, easily identified, fixed sites and therefore highly vulnerable radars to function (some of the new X-band radars will be transportable but are too slow to be considered 'mobile'). The Aegisequipped destroyers for the Navy's Theatre Wide ABM contribution are more mobile but they are not immune to cruise missile or torpedo attack. All ground-based ABM defence components for the GBI and Theatre High Altitude Air Defence (THAAD) systems will have to be protected by extensive anti-bomber and anti-cruise missile defences whose cost would be at least as great as what has been spent on ABM systems. Anti-bomber defences deployed by NORAD would require extensive perimeter belts of fixed land-based radars (like the North Warning System) or expensive look-down airborne radars constantly on patrol whose forward operating bases would be

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quite vulnerable to SLBM attack, bomber/cruise or submarine/cruise missile attack, or even simple commando raids. The very vulnerability of ABM early warning and tracking radars as well as 'thick' air defence radar networks during the Cold War made them provocative and destabilizing. Any limited or 'precursor' cruise missile attack by the adversary could neutralize them by destroying the tracking and cueing radars. Relatively simple nuclear-armed ASATs could destroy most of the space-based defensive 'architecture' before it could be used with a few high altitude detonations. But these same area defence radars and tracking systems, both ground-based and space-based, might work very well if the government possessing them went first in a surprise counterforce attack, and left its enemy able to retaliate only in a ragged and intermittent fashion with a much reduced offensive force. In that context, a 'thick,' multi-layered area defence of North America might be able to destroy a far higher percentage of surviving retaliatory systems, precisely because Russian or Chinese missiles could not be fired in a coordinated fashion to overwhelm American defences. By deploying a thick set of defensive systems that will only have a strong likelihood of success if the US starts any nuclear war, the US government will in fact be creating great pressure on future American decision-makers to 'preempt' in crisis, or to engage in preventive war attacks with no clear legitimate casus belli in play at all. This pattern is not new. It happened earlier in the 1950s when both the Soviets and Americans deployed thick but vulnerable air defences, and again in the 1980s when the Reagan administration began to rebuild continental air defences that had been dismantled in the 1960s and 1970s as part of its 'Air Defence Initiative' auxiliary to the ABM-focused Strategic Defense Initiative. Vulnerable 'thick' defences of any sort require a doctrine of first-strike if they are ever to serve any useful strategic purpose. For those thinking within a deterrence paradigm, it was especially troubling to observe that all proposed ABM systems and thick antibomber defences simply could not survive a coordinated enemy first-

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strike once ICBMs had been incorporated into the superpower arsenals. If the anti-bomber defences were far larger than what might be justified for peacetime 'sovereignty enforcement' missions (and an ability to identify and block small 'precursor' bomber missions), then logically they were probably intended to be part of the putative 'defender's' own first-strike planning.30 So too would any essentially vulnerable ABM systems. The inexorable logic of deterrence thinking leads to one conclusion: if these ABM and anti-bomber systems could not play any credible role whatsoever in retaliatory, secondstrike planning, because they would not survive a comprehensive firststrike, then they must have a primary role, by logical inference, in American (or Soviet) first-strike planning even if political leadership adamantly denied any such intent and swore passionately in public that they believed in 'stable deterrence' (or 'peaceful coexistence'). In the present context, perception of such aggressive American 'defensive' investments will also cause pressure on any future adversary regime, either Russian or Chinese in the present case, or both, to put their own strategic forces on a 'hair-trigger' alert and to mimic, where economically feasible, the Americans' investments in strategic missile and bomber defences. If financial constraints were to preclude an imitative response, then other options would be explored such as adopting a Launch on Warning (LOW) or Launch Under Attack posture.31 But as noted above with respect to false strategic warnings based on inaccurate information from spies or misinterpreted secret communications, adopting such 'prompt launch' procedures also would heighten the risk of inadvertent and accidental war considerably by raising the spectre of false retaliation caused by technical malfunctions such as computer or sensor errors. Any major investment in layered ABM defences threatened to instigate offsetting countermeasures that still appear to be considerably cheaper than investment in a 'matching' complex ABM network itself: (1) deployment of additional offensive missiles (both ICBMs and SLBMs); (2) deployment of MIRVs (Multiple Independently-tar-

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getable Re-entry Vehicles)32; (3) deployment of scores of multiple metallized balloon decoys as well as wire chaff with each warhead that would effectively prevent any mid-course interception; (4) the deployment of 'space mines' intended to destroy key space-based command and control sensors and or the communication relay satellites of any layered ABM system so that it would be partially or wholly blinded; (5) development of specially designed, rapid-burn anti-ABM ballistic missile boosters that would defeat boost-phase attack systems; (6) the development of specialized Anti-Satellite rockets with rapid-burn boosters and large nuclear warheads for detonation in space with yield sufficient to destroy all American missile defence and communications relay satellites (as well as all commercial satellites in line of sight as collateral damage) through electro-magnetic pulse, X-rays and other nuclear weapon effects; (7) the deployment of additional longrange bombers armed with long-range, stealthy ALCMs; and (8) the development of Manoeuvring Re-entry Vehicles (MaRVs) for ICBMs and SLBMs. All of these options are once more 'on the table,' and there is mounting evidence that in both Moscow and Beijing steps are being taken to compensate for any potential American ABM 'breakout.' Strategic Defences in the post-Cold War Period The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet state was said by many American advocates of strategic defences to have 'changed everything.' No longer was there a global competitor able to match American spending on strategic defences on a ruble for dollar basis. By the late 1990s Russian nuclear weapon capacities were said to be contracting in a 'budgetary death spiral' that would lead 'inevitably' to an arsenal of fewer than 1000 deployed warheads. While China might be a great power rival of the future, it certainly was not going to constitute a nuclear rival of the United States any time soon, given its meager deployment of fewer than 30 ICBMs (and no long-range bombers or credible SLBMs of sufficient range) able to hit

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the continental United States, and given its general across-the-board inferiority in aerospace technologies. Throughout the 1990s, the Republicans secured annual passage of legislation calling for the deployment of ABM technologies as soon as possible. The Clinton administration did its best to slow or block this process by insisting that all ABM research had to be conducted within the confines of what the Soviet-American ABM Treaty of 1972 would allow. This meant that only ground-based ABM interceptors could be developed for engagement with enemy ICBMs near the end of their flight paths. Research on 'boost phase intercept' measures was banned. So too was investigation of satellite-based defensive systems. Trying to build an ABM defence based on terminal and mid-course interception was far and away the most technically difficult path to take. Progress was painfully slow and quite expensive. By 2000 American defence scientists had spent nearly $90 billion and had literally nothing to show for it, except a rather uneven record of prototype testing. In the 2000 presidential election primaries, Republican candidate Steve Forbes bluntly suggested that any new Republican administration should build a defensive shield of sufficient 'thickness' that it would render all Chinese ballistic missiles obsolete. A 'thin' ABM shield had been proposed in the late 1960s as an anti-China system; Forbes was now proposing to revive the concept, perhaps even seeing the anti-China system as a way station towards a more comprehensive system that would eventually be able to challenge the retaliatory credibility of the Russian nuclear arsenal too. Forbes lost the nomination to George W. Bush, but Bush came to power with his 'Vulcans' who were all in agreement that the ABM Treaty had to be abrogated as soon as possible, and that missile defence research should be broadened quickly to include space-based sensors and kinetic-kill anti-satellite weapons, forward-based boostphase intercept sytems, sea-based mid-course interceptors and spacebased, ABM tracking and cueing systems as well. In December 2001,

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with the momentum of 9/11 hysteria behind Bush, the President gave the treaty-prescribed six months' notice for treaty abrogation. In June 2002 the ABM treaty was formally declared dead. Strategic defensive research and development budgets were more than doubled to about $10 billion per year. As a sop to President Vladimir Putin, Bush signed the so-called Moscow Treaty that set distant targets for offensive force reductions by 2012 below 2200 'strategic' warheads for each side. This toothless, vague and unverified agreement did not have to be implemented according to any schedule prior to 1 January 2012. Many warheads removed from operational ballistic missiles were simply put in a 'hedge' stockpile rather than being dismantled and destroyed. American arms control critics rightly declared the treaty to be an empty charade; not surprisingly, the Russians correctly saw it in a similar fashion and revised their own nuclear deployment plans upward accordingly.33 As a result there are some 2000 additional Russian warheads on intercontinental nuclear missiles and bombers aimed at North America that would not have been deployed had Bush not abrogated the ABM Treaty. On 25 February 2005 Paul Martin announced that Canada would not be participating in American development of missile defences. This announcement came seven months after the government had approved an amendment to NORAD operations under which early warning and tracking data flowing through NORAD would be conveyed immediately to US Northern Command. The recently created Northern Command was assigned the responsibility for the tactical operation of American ABM interceptors in Alaska and California.34 American commentators close to the Bush Administration but lodged in think tanks outside the bureaucracy, denounced what they saw as Martin's abject failure to campaign earnestly on behalf of missile defence cooperation. For American conservatives, Martin's turnaround signalled an end to the undertaking given by former Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King's commitment of 20 August 1938 at Woodbridge, Ontario. King then declared that Canadians

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would do everything that could "reasonably be expected" to prevent "enemy forces" from making their way "either by land, sea or air to the United States, across Canadian territory."35 American conservatives and Canadian Liberals clearly had quite divergent ideas about what could "reasonably be expected" on the missile defence issue. Many anti-missile defence members of the Liberal caucus no doubt listened to Jonathan Dean (former US arms control negotiator, and adviser to the Union of Concerned Scientists) who was quoted in a speech in Ottawa as saying the new American ABM capabilities would have de facto anti-satellite weapon capacity. Deployment of the ABM exo-atmospheric interceptors might thus spark an arms race in ASATs with other major powers, putting aside for the moment its potential impact on offensive nuclear force levels. Moving ahead with ground-based missile defences, even if only on a limited scale, might well lead "unavoidably" towards the weaponization of space.36 Dean's advice to Canadians followed on the heels of President Bush's late November visit to Canada and the President's vain effort to persuade the Prime Minister of the merits of missile defence. Martin's advisers were surprised at this 'lobbying' effort by the President since they claimed to have been given assurances that the subject would not be raised. Bush stated publicly: "I hope we'll also move forward on ballistic missile defence cooperation, to protect the next generation of Canadians and Americans from the threats we know will arise." Both the Globe and Mail and the National Post supported Bush's proposal and were rather perplexed by Martin's formulaic but evasive response, rich in echoes of the long tradition of Canadian disinterest in any missile defence role. Martin replied to Mr. Bush: "Whatever decision we make will be in Canada's interests. First of all, we are a sovereign nation and we will make our decision about our airspace. Secondly, we are fundamentally opposed to the weaponization of space." Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew told the House of Commons that no decision would be made without a vote in Parliament. He later said too that Bush's expression of

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"hope" did not constitute an actual invitation in a specific missile defence program. The Case for Canadian Collaboration in ABM Defences To sum up the arguments posed by supporters of ABM defences one must begin with their claim that the rogue state threat is qualitatively different from the Cold War Soviet threat. This is true. It is also true that these states might supply weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) to terrorist organizations with catastrophic results for the US and its allies. They also argue that no Canadian federal government should oppose a twice-elected President who is determined to act (and will act) in light of what he sees as American vital security interests, regardless of any Canadian dissent. Accordingly, Canadians should be politically realistic and adapt to the demands of the White House and Pentagon. Missile defence has been a priority for the Republicans for well over twenty years, and that party seems likely to control the Congress for quite some time yet. From the perspective of what might be called the Canadian 'tactical accommodationists,' any failure to participate will lead to Canada's progressive marginalization and possibly to the eventual "end of NORAD." Should that occur, then the Pentagon with its armada of satellites and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) observation platforms will know more about what goes on in Canadian airspace and 'near Earth' space than Ottawa will.37 In that context they would have no reason to share such information, and the Canadian claim of Arctic sovereignty would seem hollow indeed. Secondly, Canadian ostracism of continental missile defence is likely to worsen Congressional intolerance of 'unfair' export trade by Canadians into American markets. In a climate of anger and mistrust in Washington towards Canadian 'free riding' on defence, trade relations are likely to deteriorate further. Third, the Department of National Defence (DND) should have at least some input in the shape of these deployments because

56 DOUGLAS A. ROSS

American ABM ambitions may grow. The shape of missile interception engagement zones are of potentially great significance to Canadians. Ground Based Interceptors GBIs now being deployed in Alaska and California have no risk of engaging enemy warheads over Canadian territory. But that situation could change in years to come. Future intercepts from GBIs based in the central US might occur above Canadian territory and Canadian cities. Proximity fuzing of Russian, Chinese or 'rogue state' warheads could lead to large nuclear detonations over or near Canadian population centres. Ottawa should avoid a repeat of the BOMARC affair when American officials threatened to deploy those anti-bomber missiles (with 400 kiloton warheads) close to the Canadian border, if Ottawa did not permit their deployment north of Canadian cities. Fourth, Canada's actual influence and its reputation as an influential international security policy actor will grow in proportion to Canadians' access to senior American politicians and defence policy decision-makers. Canada has no significant role now within NATO. Without a role in continental ABM defences, both influence and reputation will shrink near zero in Washington. Fifth, the defence industrial benefits to Canadian firms, especially in the aerospace field, might be substantial if Ottawa endorses even 'limited' missile defences. The employment effects for companies like Bombardier and MDA could be considerable in high-tech aerospace. The US will make its decisions on ABM deployments with little or no regard to Ottawa's views. Hence it makes sense to let economic advantages shape Canadian policy. A sixth argument that is often made concedes that missile defences are too complex, expensive and prone to failure, and thus future American governments are unlikely ever to build thick, multilayered ABM defences. Decoys and other countermeasures will limit American deployment, just as they did in the 1970s. The American ABM system is thus unlikely ever to be more than a relatively modest deployment, although it will become more than the "scarecrow

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defence" now deployed. Thus deferring to American plans is unlikely to cost much in the long run. Seventh, to the extent that a 'thin' area defence of North America will give some protection against accidental launches from major nuclear powers, or unauthorized launches from nuclear states that may be stricken with civil war, an American missile 'shield,' even if it is somewhat porous, really might be valuable.38 Some protection against 'last gasp' rogue state retaliation is a good thing on its own merits as well. Helping the Americans to confront Iran and North Korea is sensible, not destabilizing. Eighth, the 'weaponization' of space, while regrettable, cannot be stopped. Space is already de facto 'militarized' via the sensor revolution. While there may not yet be rockets or lasers in space that can destroy targets in space or targets on Earth, satellites are already an integral part of the American war-making apparatus. Space-based sensors are now a vital part of American counter-insurgency operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. USAF Space Command has long harboured desires to place advanced ASAT weapons in orbit (both kinetic-kill and laser-based). Recently it has advocated the deployment of hypervelocity, GPS-guided metal 'arrows' (so-called 'Rods from God').39 Deploying weapons in space is not illegal; only the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in orbit contravenes international law. Ninth, American missile defences will not block the creation of a nuclear-free and WMD-free world; political and strategic realities have already done that. Russian and Chinese nuclear force modernization will occur with or without American defensive deployments. A world without nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction is an idyllic but unrealizable dream. The UN is incapable of enforcing a ban on WMDs. Collective security regimes like the UN and the League of Nations have invariably failed when they were most needed. The inability of the international community to sustain sanctions on Iraq in the late 1990s, and to keep it free of WMDs illustrated yet again that collective processes are inherently weak and

58 DOUGLAS A. ROSS

likely to fail because of great-power divisions and opportunism. Hegemonically imposed limits to WMD proliferation may be, de facto, the only real alternative to accepting uncontrolled proliferation and the near certainty that cataclysmic WMD warfare would occur soon thereafter. Tenth, missile defence is an essential component of any plausible plan to perpetuate American military primacy. American military primacy is also necessary for the establishment of its liberal imperialist project. If the US becomes the 'last Empire' prior to the complete democratization of the world sometime toward the end of the 21st century, then its dominion over the Earth will have been beneficial not calamitous. It is in Canada's interests that the Americans succeed in this grand transformational project. Canadians' choice in fact may be between a Pax Americana or no Pax at all. Playing a small but important role in the erection of limited missile defences by the US government will help considerably in shoring up the ability of the US to play the role of global catalyst for liberal democratic reform both effectively and confidently.40 The Realist Case against Canadian Participation in American Missile Defence The arguments outlined above by the tactical accommodationists are powerful, but they are not conclusive. Opponents of missile defence have reiterated Canadian hostility to the "weaponization of space" as a deeply destabilizing measure that will sooner or later create a new arms race among the 21st century great powers. Clearly any comprehensive system of multi-layered missile defence by the US will require interceptors in orbit, something like the Airborne Laser aircraft that can be forward deployed near 'rogue' states to hit enemy missiles in their boost phase, and additional terminal missile defences deployed on the North American perimeter to cope with the 'leakers' that are able to get through the other 'filtering' layers. Only the US at the moment has the resources to contemplate such massive expendi-

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tures, but even American pockets are not bottomless. The costs of a labour-intensive counter-insurgency war in Iraq and Afghanistan are crippling Donald Rumsfeld's effort to accelerate 'transformational' technologies for the Pentagon. Multi-layered missile defence has far too high a price tag to be realized in the foreseeable future. But the articulation of the goal has spawned mistrust in all the capitals of the major powers. Such distrust is likely to lead to European, Chinese, Russian and Indian responses in terms of enhanced space deployments for military purposes first in command and control improvements for assisting conventional military operations on earth and building their own 'network centric operations,' and ultimately in the acquisition of ASAT capabilities (as Jonathan Dean noted). The deployment of orbiting weapons able to strike American satellites or even targets on Earth is likely to become a strategic option for them too. In the meantime, the prospects for widening and deepening cooperation through the UN system are likely to be ruined, permanently. Neither India nor China will accept a Russo-American control of near-Earth space. In China's case, given deep suspicions about American missile defence plans, their national nuclear striking capacity against continental North America is likely to multiply far beyond the present 20 to 25 warheads that they now possess driven in large measure by the open-ended character of the American quest for an impenetrable missile shield. In the wake of the American abrogation of the ABM Treaty, the Russians have stopped cutting their nuclear forces per START I and II and have retained many 'heavy' SS-19 ICBM warheads for the indefinite future. New much more accurate Russian cruise missiles are under development as well as MaRV warheads for its newest ICBM. Russian Bear-H bombers and the supersonic TU-160 'Blackjack' aircraft will eventually be equipped with far more stealthy, long-range ALCMs. Russian authorities have been absolutely steadfast in their refusal to even discuss inventories of tactical nuclear weapons, let alone ways

60 DOUGLAS A. ROSS

to secure them under Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) measures. Russian tactical nuclear weapons are arguably the most dangerous part of the Russian nuclear arsenal because they are the least secure and the most poorly managed. Nuclear terrorists thus have a far better opportunity to steal such weapons than if the ABM Treaty were still in place and CRT assistance had been greatly expanded. Had the Bush administration not abrogated the ABM Treaty in 2002, and had the arms control measures entered into by Bush the elder and Clinton been fully implemented, there would now be roughly 2000 fewer long-range nuclear warheads aimed at North America. The Bush team's arms control 'product' has been, in this respect, an unmitigated fiasco. Bush's mania for ABM protection has produced a Russian nuclear threat to North America that is roughly 150% worse than it would have been had Clinton-era policies been followed. Bush's ABM policies when coupled with a public assertion of the need for nuclear 'bunker busters' poisoned the waters for the 2005 NPT review conference in New York which ended in complete disarray. Delegates could not even agree on an agenda for discussion. Canadian non-involvement will not risk the continued existence of NORAD. Pentagon planners are prudent. Even the most ardent supporters of missile defences know that they must have a capable anti-bomber defence perimeter or the missile defence investment would be a waste of effort. The USAF is therefore unlikely ever to put the NORAD arrangements in jeopardy. They have served both countries well by providing for effective peacetime air control of northern North America while respecting Canadian sovereignty. The integration of operations for any crisis has proven to be quite effective and would still be able to ensure that American bomber forces would be able to get airborne before any surprise attack could catch them on the ground. That is an appropriate deterrence-enhancing function to which Canadians have long contributed and something of which they should be proud. Canadian leaders should be careful not to become entrapped in

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any premature and ill-advised endorsement of the American missile defence project. The entire program is a huge misallocation of scarce strategic resources. Endorsing it and participating in it for some prospective economic benefits would be strategically short-sighted. Continued Canadian sceptical aloofness is entirely sensible, until such time as Washington is prepared to exercise self-restraint in its strategic ambitions, to scale back its plans for a global system of missile defences to a less threatening scale, and to adopt a more cooperative approach to global security rather than its recent drive for permanent primacy. Notes:
1 See Keith B. Payne, "The Case for National Missile Defense," Orbis, (Spring 2000), pp. 187-96. Since the lone test of a 3-stage Taepo Dong 1 IRBM (intermediate-range ballistic missile) in 1998 that cannot reach any US territory, the only new missile developments concern a suspected but unconfirmed deployment of several missiles with a 4,200 kilometer range that may have been derived from an old Russian SLBM design, the SSN6. See Thom Shanker, "Korean Missile Said to Advance; U.S. Is Unworried," New York Times, August 5, 2004. A very small payload of biological agent might possibly reach US territory on a 3 stage Taepo Dong 1 (which is yet to be tested).
3 Any North Korean attack on west coast American cities would fly over water all the way to San Diego, Los Angeles or San Francisco. An attack on Seattle, however, would likely pass over Vancouver Island. Any attempt to hit Chicago, Detroit, New York or Washington most definitely would pass over Canadian territory, arcing over northern Alaska, the Northwest Territories and northwestern Ontario. 4 2

Lt. Gen. Henry 'Trey' Obering also noted in July 2005 that total US expenditures on missile defence since 1983 amounted to $92.5 billion; see Patricia J. Parmalee, "Industry Outlook: Upping the Odds," Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 1, 2005.

5 Missile Defense Agency personnel were said to have told a Senate Appropriations sub-com-

mittee that the current Ground-Based Interceptor will see only marginal improvements in years to come and that there will be no follow-on system. MDA has "essentially decided that the first generation GBI will be the last generation GBI". See Steven Young, "Living in Limbo," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, at: www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1746.

62 DOUGLAS A. ROSS
6 On the differing strategic consequences and roles of

TMD and Boost-Phase Intercept technologies compared with GBI mid-course or space-based interceptors/lasers, see Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, "National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy," International Security, vol. 26 n. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 40-92. For a highly critical commentary on Bush administration plans, see also Steven E. Miller, "The Flawed Case for Missile Defence," International Security, vol. 43 n. 3 (Autumn 2001), pp. 95-109. John Clearwater, "Little Lost Canadians: Thinking About Missile Defence," Winnipeg Free Press, March 3, 2005. Canadian elite opinions on nuclear issues from 1957 to 1989, see Erika Simpson, NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders Confront Critics (Montreal, Kingston, London, Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001). For early misgivings about dangerous bellicosity in American nuclear strategy over the course of the Cold War, see James M. Minifie, Peacemaker or Powdermonkey: Canada's Role in a Revolutionary World (Winnipeg: McClelland and Stewart, 1960), chapter 8, esp. pp. 159-63 that address 'preventive war' and 'first-strike' options; Douglas A. Ross, "American Nuclear Revisionism, Canadian Strategic Interests, and the Renewal of NORAD," Behind the Headlines, vol. XXXIX n. 6 (CIIA: 1982); David Cox, Canada and NORAD, 1958-78: A Cautionary Retrospective, Aurora Papers 1 (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1985), esp. pp. 34-343 on the American retention of first-strike options through 'damage limitation' goals in both the 1960s and 1970s; Charles-Philippe David, Debating Counterforce: A Conventional Approach in a Nuclear Age (Boulder: Westview, 1987), a sustained critique of nuclear warfighting concepts in the American debate; and latterly, Mel Hurtig, Rushing to Armageddon (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2004).

8 For a helpful dissection of

9 For a concise review of the arms control treaty record, see Thomas Graham, Jr., Commonsense on Weapons of Mass Destruction (Vancouver, Toronto: UBC Press/Eisenhower Institute, 2004), chapters 3, 4. 10

The American invasion force was far too small to secure Iraqi weapons depots and research facilities which were systematically looted after the invasion. Thus it is impossible to say with any degree of confidence that there were no biological or chemical weapon stocks or weapon 'labs' just prior to the invasion. They may well have been removed. In the rush to condemn Bush and Cheney, the press also skated quickly over the fact that had Saddam stayed in power and had the sanctions regime been lifted, as France and Russia wished, there is little doubt that covert WMD development efforts would have resumed.

A survey taken in October 2005 indicated that while 68% of Canadians had a favourable opinion of Americans, 73% had an unfavourable opinion of President Bush, with 38% saying that he was more dangerous to world security than Osama bin Laden. See Adrian Humphreys, "Bush disliked by 73% in Canada," National Post, November 12, 2005.

11

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See Mark Kennedy and Mike Blanchfield, "PM Reneged: Cellucci," National Post, March 7, 2005. Prime Minister Martin's sudden decision to allocate all defence spending to 'beefing up the military' rather than support some specific Canadian role in missile defence left the US government "surprised" and "perplexed."
13

12

Agreement was reached in the first week of August 2004 when the two governments expanded NORAD's mandate "to permit missile-warning functions performed by" NORAD "to be used for US ballistic missile defense." Canadian Ambassador to the US, Michael Kergin, wrote at that time to Secretary of State Colin Powell informing him that the NORAD decision "is independent of any discussion on possible cooperation on missile defence." David Bond, "Expanding NORAD," Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 9, 2004. See William B. Scott, "Expanding NORAD: Terrorist threats are reshaping the decadesold command," Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 13, 2004. Christopher Sands, a Canada specialist at the influential Center for Strategic and International Studies, suggested that because of the rejection "NORAD could disappear." See Clifford Krauss, "Divergent Paths: Canada Breaks With U.S. Over Missile Shield," New York Times, February 27, 2005.

14

15

the word 'strategic' in American discourse on military affairs has been a permanent feature of the Cold War and afterwards. So far as American analysts are concerned, 'strategic' refers to weapons systems possessed of intercontinental range (typically more than 5500 kilometers) and doctrines that purport to advise on the use, and threats to use, weapons of mass destruction against major geopolitical rivals in the international system. In American parlance, ABM interceptors deployed in a 'strategic' role would be used to destroy long-range ICBMs and SLBMs coming from major adversaries. Colin Gray provides a far more sensible definition, noting that 'strategic' properly refers to the use of, and threats to use, force to achieve the ends of policy. Any given weapon cannot be more 'strategic' than any other weapon.
17 As the British historian Michael Howard noted during Reagan-era nuclear debates, Mutual Assured Deterrence is a far more appropriate way of expanding the acronym 'MAD,' compared with the original version: 'mutual assured destruction.' No sane strategist would ever endorse mutual destruction as an acceptable 'nuclear end state' for any conflict in which nuclear weapons are used. Approval of mutual deterrent capabilities and a consequent strategic stalemate, while offering a prospective outcome far less ambitious than 'victory,' nonetheless held out the hope that nuclear holocaust could be avoided. The point of stabilizing such a stalemate is to provide as much time as possible for an eventual political resolution of the outstanding differences between antagonistic, heavily armed political systems.

16 The misuse of

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18

See Richard Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma, 3rd edition (New York, Toronto etc.: McGraw Hill, 1993), p. 247. As Smoke phrased it, a favourable cost-exchange ratio for the US would mean that once a defensive system was deployed, "it must not be cheaper for the Soviets to find ways to penetrate or circumvent it than for the United States to find ways to stop those Soviet moves." For an earlier statement of the concept, see Donald Brennan in "The Case for Missile Defense," Foreign Affairs (April 1969), p. 435.

There is unambiguous evidence that toward the end of the Cold War, when Soviet military planners were feeling greatly exposed by American progress in advanced missile defence technologies, explored the option of prepositioned nuclear devices close to Washington, D.C., for decapitation purposes. See Joseph C. Anselmo, "Defector Details Plan To Plant Nukes in U.S.," Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 17, 1998. At the same time, we know, courtesy of another defector, Ken Alibek, they were also fabricating massive quantities of the 'India 1' strain of smallpox virus for loading on a selected portion of their Strategic Rocket Forces. See Ken Alibek, Biohazard (New York: Delta/Random House, 1999). These are two major examples of fear-induced 'asymmetric' response to a perceived American ABM and IT breakthrough.
20

19

See Tim Weiner, "Air Force Seeks Bush's Approval for Space Arms", New York Times, May 18, 2005; also, "Weapons in Space" (editorial), New York Times, May 24, 2005.

Steinbruner to author, 2002. See also Bruce G. Blair, Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 51-56. a map of the two main attack corridors leading from the western Pacific and the north Atlantic outward from the coast of Portugal, see David Hughes, "Perilous Nuclear Shadow," Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 30, 2003. These gaps were first detected by Theodore Postol of MIT and were later confirmed by an analysis done by four RAND researchers. Bruce Blair, "Iran and the Rogues: America's Nuclear Obsession," in 'Nuclear Issues' (Center for Defense Information, Washington, D.C., September 19, 2005); see www.cdi.org. See for example the classic argument on behalf of ABM defences given by Brennan in "The Case for Missile Defense," pp. 433-48.
25 24 23 22 For

21

See Stan Erickson, "Nuclear Weapon Prepositioning as a Threat Strategy," Journal of Homeland Security (web-based); at http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Erickson.html.

26

James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O'Hanlon, "Missile Defense after the ABM Treaty," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, n. 3 (Summer 2002), pp. 174-75. For a full length treatment of the subject, see James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense (Washington: Brookings, 2001).

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27

'Fratricide' is the term used when a given missile warhead detonates and its effects destroy or massively degrade the accuracy of any other warheads arriving seconds or minutes later.

28

For discussion of such concerns see Douglas A. Ross, Coping With 'Star Wars': Issues for Canada and the Alliance, Aurora Papers 2 (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1985). With only 200 interceptor missiles however, such a thin defence would not be able to cope with the unauthorized launch of one submarine's complement of SLBMs or a single squadron's inventory of ICBMs. Lindsay and O'Hanlon, "Missile Defense," p. 165.

29 30

On the implications of air defence vulnerability for adversary perceptions of aggressive intent, see Ross, "American nuclear revisionism, Canadian strategic interests, and the renewal of NORAD"; John Barrett and Douglas A. Ross, "The air-launched cruise missile and Canadian arms control policy," Canadian Public Policy, vol. 11 (December 1985); also Douglas A. Ross, "SDI and Canadian-American Relations: Managing Strategic Doctrinal Incompatibilities," in Lauren McKinsey and Kim Richard Nossal, eds., America's Alliances and Canadian-American Relations (Toronto: Summerhill Press, 1988). Prompt launch techniques were thought acceptable by Richard Garwin, one of the foremost critics of missile defence (and one of the key designers of the first American thermonuclear bombs). Garwin, unlike most other American supporters of traditional deterrence theory, thought that adequate technical safeguards could be built into such systems so that 'false retaliation' would not occur. Installing remotely controllable self-destruct mechanisms on all American offensive missiles would allow the American military to halt an erroneous 'retaliation' in mid-flight. Most military leaders, however, have been strongly opposed to such 'command destruct' systems, fearing that the codes could somehow fall into the hands of adversary governments.

31

32 Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles were first deployed by the United States

in the early to mid-1970s, to ensure penetration of the ABM system deployed by the Soviet military around Moscow.
33 Since the American abrogation of the ABM Treaty in 2002, Russian nuclear forces that were scheduled for destruction under START II were kept active (most notably many 'heavy' SS-19 ICBMs). Long-range bombers were upgraded and new standoff cruise missiles were developed to give them both high-accuracy conventional and nuclear striking power. By the autumn of 2005 flight testing of qualitatively new, rapid-boost, manoeuvreable missile reentry vehicles for the SS-27 'Topol' ICBM had begun. See "Topol missile warhead" ITARTASS News Agency, November 1, 2005, available at www.itar-tass.com (accessed 3 Nov. 2005). On new Soviet air-launched cruise missile developments see Douglas Barrie, "Popular Cruise," Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 22/29, 2005, p. 43; also Douglas Barrie and

66 DOUGLAS A. ROSS
Alexey Komarov, "Seeing Red," Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 22/29, 2005, p. 38.
34

Michael Den Tandt and Paul Koring, "Opposition rakes Liberals over missile-defence coals," Globe and Mail, February 24, 2005. Minifie, Peacemaker or Powdermonkey, p. 91.

35

36 David Pugliese, "Missile shield runs risk of weaponizing space" National Post, December 6, 2004.

'Near Earth space' is defined by USAF generals as between 65,000 feet and 180 miles, too high for sustainable jet operations but too low for sustainable satellite orbits. See remarks by Gen. John Jumper at David Bond, "Persistent Perspective," Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 20/27, 2004.
38

37

For an elaboration of this argument in the American debate, see Lindsay and O'Hanlon, Defending America.
39 See Tim Weiner, "Air Force Seeks Bush's Approval for Space Arms," New York Times, May 18, 2005; also, "Weapons in Space" (editorial), New York Times, May 24, 2005. 40

For an elaboration of this grand strategy option, see Jim Garrison, America as Empire: Global Leader or Rogue Power? (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2004).

TECHNOLOGY

AND

STRATEGY

WHERE NO BOMB HAS GONE BEFORE:

US Space Weaponization Planning and Its Implications
By Wade L. Huntley

his chapter first reviews U.S. military planning for space dominance, already well underway in the 1990s, as an aspect of its wider plans for global military dominance. The chapter then considers how the Bush administration, while not initiating such planning, has expanded it and built upon it by embracing the military vision in the context of a broader concept of American grand strategy in the post-Cold War world. The chapter concludes that this strategy is unrealistic; but also that the issues at hand are not solely about realistic responses to foreseeable challenges to US and/or global security, including space security. For Canada, meeting the challenge to prevent the weaponization of space will require not simply making the case on realistic grounds, but also challenging and overcoming the underlying vision of dominance/domination now driving US military policymaking at both policy and institutional levels. Dominance: USSC and USAF Visions The United States Air Force (USAF) and United States Space Command (USSC) visions for the "dominance" of military uses of outer space precede the advent of the Bush administration (Space Command itself was formed in 1985). Moreover, these military agen-

70 WADE L. HUNTLEY

cies have been quite public in articulating these visions. Consider US Space Command's widely-circulated document, Vision for 2020. Released by Space Command in 1998, the vision portrays the militarization of space as resulting from natural historical progression. Just as air power developed first to support land and sea military operations and eventually became a domain of warfare in its own right, space power has equivalently developed in recent decades in support of terrestrial operations and is now set to "evolve into a separate and equal medium of warfare."1 The notion that militarization of space is not inevitable is flatly (if implicitly) rejected. Thus, the report identifies "a critical need to control the space medium to ensure US dominance on future battlefields. Robust capabilities to ensure space superiority must be developed just as they have been for land, sea, and air Included in that planning should be the prospects for space defense and even space warfare."2 General Lance Lord, commander of US Space Command, has subsequently stated the point more bluntly: "The term 'space superiority' has to roll off our tongues just like air superiority. We would never try to engage an enemy without first establishing air superiority. And it's no different for space."3 That the militarization of space will necessarily entail the weaponization of space is articulated fully. Vision for 2020 presents four "operational concepts" providing the "conceptual framework to transform the Vision into capabilities." The "Control of Space" includes space protection and negation functions (including "D5" capabilities) its "robust negation systems" might necessitate space-based weapons. The "Global Engagement" concept is more explicit: USSPACECOM will have a greatly expanded role as an active warfighter in the years ahead as the combatant command responsible for National Missile Defense (NMD) and space force application. Global Engagement

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combines global surveillance with the potential for a space-based global precision strike capability NMD will evolve into a mix of ground and space sensors and weapons. Existing land, sea, and air missions will be enhanced by space systems. Current sea and air strategic attack missions will be augmented by the deployment of space force application systems.4 The four "operational concepts" of the vision are gathered under the banner purpose: "Dominating the space dimension of military operations to protect US interests and investment." Space Command's Vision for 2020 was followed in early 2001 by the more infamous and more inflammatory Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, chaired by soon-to-be US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Warning of an impending "Space Pearl Harbor," the report recommends that the United States develop a space-based "military capability" to defend its space "assets," and prepare to fight in space in order to maintain strategic dominance on Earth. The report regards ground-based missile defense as merely the first step to deploying space-based weaponry, on which subject the commissioners' conclusion is clear: The Commissioners appreciate the sensitivity that surrounds the notion of weapons in space for offensive or defensive purposes. They also believe, however, that to ignore the issue would be a disservice to the nation. The Commissioners believe the U.S. Government should vigorously pursue the capabilities called for in the National Space Policy to ensure that the President will have the option to deploy weapons in space to deter threats to and, if necessary, defend against attacks on U.S. interests.5

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The full-scale effort to prepare for space warfare anticipated in the report does not entail simply the weaponization of space. The report also recommends, for example, that the President declare space a national security priority and that a Space Advisory Group report directly to the President, and it anticipates that soon a "Space Corps" within the Air Force and eventually a "military department for space" will be necessary to implement the vision.6 Shortly after taking office as Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld moved to implement some of these recommendations, placing a four-star Air Force general in charge of space operations and undertaking other Pentagon reorganization intended to facilitate space weapons program development.7 Pertinently, the Rumsfeld space commission report repeatedly emphasizes the US goal of preserving the "peaceful uses of space," yet explicitly portrays expectations of the weaponization of space as consistent with US obligations under the UN Charter and the Outer Space Treaty: To protect the country's interests, the U.S. must promote the peaceful use of space, monitor activities of regulatory bodies, and protect the rights of nations to defend their interests in and from space. The U.S. and most other nations interpret "peaceful" to mean "non-aggressive"; this comports with customary international law allowing for routine military activities in outer space, as it does on the high seas and in international airspace. There is no blanket prohibition in international law on placing or using weapons in space, applying force from space to earth or conducting military operations in and through space.8 US military leaders have not been shy in reaffirming the plans for space warfare indicated in these documents. Gen. Joseph Ashy, for-

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mer commander-in-chief of the US Space Command, commented directly, "It's politically sensitive, but it's going to happen."9 This certitude emerges from the consistent assumption that space is a natural medium of international conflict no different from land, sea and air, and that the eventual extension of warfare into this medium is a natural if not inevitable expectation in human evolution: [W]e know from history that every medium air, land and sea has seen conflict. Reality indicates that space will be no different. Given this virtual certainty, the U.S. must develop the means both to deter and to defend against hostile acts in and from space. This will require superior space capabilities.10 The contemporaneous private report on US defense needs from the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), whose project participants included soon-to-be Bush administration officials Paul Wolfowitz and Stephen Cambone, offered even more definitive conclusions about the need for weaponization of space. "No system of missile defenses can be fully effective without placing sensors and weapons in space." The current US military, commercial and civil dominance of space is soon and inevitably to be challenged; "the unequivocal supremacy in space enjoyed by the United States today will be increasingly at risk." Thus, "control of space must be an essential element of [US] military strategy": [O]ver the longer term, maintaining control of space will inevitably require the application of force both in space and from space, including but not limited to antimissile defenses and defensive systems capable of protecting U.S. and allied satellites; space control cannot be sustained in any other fashion, with conventional land, sea, or airforce, or by electronic warfare.11

74 WADE L. HUNTLEY

These documents are not emerging from a vacuum. The planning they depict is embedded in a far-reaching effort to anticipate and plan for the kinds of military engagements the US military may face in the coming decades. This effort is epitomized by the Air Force 2025 Study, a wide-ranging and copious effort "to look 30 years into the future to identify the concepts, capabilities and technologies the United States will require to remain the dominant air and space force in the 21st century." The study, concluded in 1996 and consisting of a collection of works totaling more than 3,300 pages of text, evaluated 25 emerging technologies and 40 separate systems through the lens of six "alternative futures."12 Several of the priorities and technologies most highly evaluated in this comprehensive study, such as the vitality of information flows, the potential role of high-energy lasers, and the pressing need for space-based strategic strike capabilities, are familiar from the later, summary documents noted above. Several aspects of this study are worth noting in more detail. One is the recurring conviction that an information/space arms race is already underway, with the inevitable erosion of the current US lead driving future military needs: [A]s more actors, state and nonstate, become capable of launching and building satellites and using space-based assets for increasing their own global awareness, the US margin of superiority which now exists in this arena will likely diminish Satellites ours and others will increase in quality and quantity, and space-based sensors will become increasingly important. Many of the alternative futures and the individual papers describe uninhabited air vehicles for reconnaissance and strike and space planes (transatmospheric vehicles) with multiple functions. High-energy lasers whether atmospheric or spacebased are seen as a weapon of choice for the future.13

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A second key aspect is the conclusion that US security will depend on "integration of information technologies with air and space capabilities." Both "space" and "cyberspace" are emerging as new frontiers of military preparation and battle, qualitatively no different than the emergence of military air power: "The USAF must pursue the exploitation of information and space with the same fervor with which it has mastered atmospheric flight." This holds particularly for space, which is "more than a place. It is a set of opportunities, a new dimension of warfare, a final frontier By 2025 it is very likely that space will be to the air as air is to cavalry today." Additionally, a further recurring theme was also to view all these as highly interactive spheres: "Airpower has atmospheric, exoatmospheric, and infospheric components."14 A third prominent aspect of the Air Force 2025 study is the unquestioned premise that US retention of aerospace dominance is the principal objective. "[T]he half-life of the 'world's last remaining superpower' may be rather short. We will have to work smarter and harder to maintain an advantage in these areas." These last two aspects are combined to form the core conclusion: The US has an opportunity to achieve integrated dominance to oppose strength with strength to impose strength on weakness. The key to achieving and maintaining lasting superiority that cannot easily be duplicated by others lies in the integration of information, air, and space. The successful integration of information, air, and space will provide increased capabilities by enhancing the capabilities of each individual area as well as the combination of them. Utilizing them will allow the US to achieve dominance in air and space to protect the nation, its assets, and its citizens around the globe. Integrating these capabilities will provide the capability for achieving and maintaining superiority.15

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Of the various systems the study assessed in the alternative futures of 2025, the final report identified ten "with the highest value for their contribution to achieving air and space dominance in 2025."16 In terms of potential for weaponization of space, the priority placed on space-based high-energy lasers is particularly noteworthy. Both the chemical- and solar-powered laser systems would be capable of attacking ground, air and space targets, as well as serving active and passive imaging roles at lower power levels. High-energy laser technology is also envisioned as one of three elements of the intriguing "Global Area Strike System": The Global Area Strike System (GLASS) consists of a high energy laser (HEL) system, a kinetic energy weapon (KEW) system, and a transatmospheric vehicle (TAV). The HEL system consists of ground-based lasers and space-based mirrors which direct energy to the intended target. The KEW system consists of terminally guided projectiles with and without explosive enhancers. The TAV is a flexible platform capable of supporting maintenance and replenishment of the HEL and KEW space assets, and could also be used for rapid deployment of special operations forces.17 The Global Area Strike System consists of a continental US-based laser system which bounces high energy beams off a constellation of space-based mirrors. Inherently precise, megawatt-class, light speed weapons can potentially act within seconds or minutes to impact on events in space, the atmosphere, or the earth's surface. The combined system has near instantaneous response capability, a full range of lethality, and global reach and adequate flexibility. Although it can strike from space, no actual weapons are based in space.18

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Obviously, the argument that a high-powered directed-energy system depending on precision mirroring satellites does not constitute weapons "based in space" is contentious. Foreign Affairs Canada's Space Security Index uses a more complete definition of "space-based strike weapons," which includes not only "systems operating from earth orbit with the capability to damage terrestrial targets," but also "terrestrially launched objects passing through space, via the projection of mass or energy."19 The inherent potential for conflict and ambiguity as to the threshold of "weaponization" versus "militarization" of spaces raises questions concerning the achievability and feasibility of any international agreement that would seek to draw that line in the face of emerging new technologies. The contention is also deeply ironic given the empirical and moral certitude with which the studies underlying the most preferred space strike weapons systems anticipate the weaponization of space: In order to protect vital interests in space, ensure freedom of space navigation, and achieve information dominance, the US will eventually require weapons in space. The need to counter future space threats and minimize US space vulnerabilities will drive the American people to accept the inevitable-weapons in space.20 Lest one think that planning for such systems is still in the realm of science fiction, as recently as the budget requests for fiscal year 2005 the numerous US government programs funding research on high-energy lasers included at least two programs also funding work on "technologies for lightweight primary mirrors applicable to bifocal relay mirrors," used for receiving and re-targeting laser beams in space, and relay mirrors "to advance global strike" capabilities.21 A new presidential directive nearing finalization in 2005 after three years of development will explicitly ratify the concept of sustaining US space "superiority" and put the United States on track for eventual

78 WADE L. HUNTLEY

deployment of weapons in space, as called for in the Air Force's now established "Global Strike" strategy. Weapons systems envisioned in this strategy include lasers aimed with satellite based mirrors, a "Common Aero Vehicle" (CAV) capable of striking anywhere in the world in 45 minutes, and a system launching metal cylinders from orbit (nicknamed "Rods from God") that would strike ground targets with kinetic forces equivalent to small nuclear weapons.22 All this planning by the Air Force for extending military capabilities into "exoatmospheric" and "infospheric" realms is itself embedded in broader trans-service long-term planning represented by the "Joint Vision" publications. Space Command's Vision for 2020 was selfconsciously conceived as a step toward implementation of the Joint Vision 2010 plan:

The Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics are enabled by information superiority and technological innovation. The end result of these enablers and concepts is Full Spectrum Dominance. Information superiority relies heavily upon space capabilities to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while denying an adversary's ability to fully leverage the same. The emerging synergy of space superiority with land, sea, and air superiority, will lead to Full Spectrum Dominance.23 Joint Vision 2010 was superseded by Joint Vision 2020 in 2000. This updated blueprint for the US Defense Department retains the central US military planning objective of "full-spectrum dominance," meaning "the ability of US forces, operating alone or with allies, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the range of military operations."24

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In Space Command's thinking, from this overarching intention flows an ever-increasing imperative to sustain US dominance in space. This imperative was given greater urgency by Saddam Hussein's attempt to jam US GPS satellite signals supporting precision guided munitions at the outset of the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 in the words of General Lance Lord, commander of US Space Command, "The war in space began during Operation Iraqi Freedom."25 As noted at the outset of this section, military agencies have not been shy in articulating these visions. Indeed, the Air Force 2025 study explicitly sought wider input through internet connectivity. The volume of public material, however, is only the tip of the iceberg; indeed, as planning has evolved from the conceptual to the more concrete, it has also become increasingly classified. All the planning reviewed above preceded the election of the Bush administration. So, are this administration's new strategic initiatives, including space weaponization, merely taking the wraps off Pentagon planning well developed in the preceding decade? Is all the consternation over the administration's own innovations misdirected? The answer is, in part yes, but in part no: for the Bush administration has added crucial elements of its own. From Dominance to Domination: The Bush Administration As described above, anticipating and planning for the weaponization of space as an integral dimension of a wider-ranging effort to sustain US military dominance has been underway in the Pentagon and the services since the end of the Cold War. The Bush administration did not initiate this planning, but it has significantly advanced it by elevating the ambitions to the level of national policy, moving forward aggressively with research and development of the identified key technologies, and building a strategic rationale based not merely on dominance, but domination. This last element is not merely rhetorical. "Dominance," as artic-

80 WADE L. HUNTLEY

ulated in military planning documents in the 1990s, essentially represented the ambition to meet and counter any and all anticipatable threats to key US interests for the foreseeable future. "Domination," as a moniker for the Bush administration's grand strategy, represents an abandonment of even a pretense that military planning and capabilities acquisition responds "realistically" to current or foreseeable threats. The Bush administration evoked this transition in strategic thinking in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which brought to US national policy the fundamental qualitative conceptual shift from a "threat-based" to a "capabilities-based" approach to strategic planning presaged in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) a year earlier.26 The NPR and QDR portray this shift as a response to the postCold War need to "extend America's asymmetric advantages well into the future" in order to prepare for the new prospect of "unexpected developments." But this open-ended "capabilities-based" approach implicitly acknowledges that there exist no current or foreseeable threats sufficient to justify the military prowess the administration now plans to sustain. The open embrace of such unbounded planning for military development pervades the Bush administration's strategic policy documents. A similar shift soon began dominating Pentagon planning.27 This shift is not merely a means to justify dramatic US rearmament willy-nilly; nor does it represent a simple surrender to militaryindustrial interests. Rather, "capabilities-based" planning also enables the more proactive, idealistically-driven international agenda that has become central to the administration's world view. The Bush administration's National Security Strategy (NSS) articulates these ambitions, reflecting a determination to maintain unequaled US power and influence indefinitely as the basis to promote governmental transitions favorable to US interests throughout the rest of the world.28 This vision harkens to a nineteenth century conception of US international activism underpinned by the security of broad oceans. This idealist thinking rejected European style international diplomacy,

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which it saw as cynical and corrupt. Instead, it sought to remake the world, albeit in varying ways: one favoring pure power (e.g. "speak softly and carry a big stick"), another favoring reconstitution of international society on ethical terms (e.g. "the war to end all wars"). The Cold War, presenting an implacable ideological foe which could not be met decisively on the battlefield due to the advent of nuclear weapons, imposed sobriety and prudence in a word, "realism" on US decision-makers. For forty-five years, this circumstance repressed both veins of American idealism and, less noticeably, obscured the stark differences between them. The end of the Cold War lifted these constraints, and the Bush administration now seeks to take advantage of the emergence of the United States as the world's preeminent military power to restore a nineteenth century vision to constitute a safer world through virtuous exercise of American power: [W]e do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent The United States welcomes our responsibility to lead in this great mission.29 This vision represents the ascendance of idealists over realists in shaping US grand strategy. However, within the idealist tradition this particular vision also represents a triumph for unilateral militant idealism over multilateral liberal idealism the "big stick" idealism of Theodore Roosevelt over the "end wars" idealism of Woodrow Wilson. Sustaining US military unassailability or "primacy" is a prerequisite to carrying forth this neo-imperialist vision. The Bush administration now aims to sustain a level of primacy so overwhelm-

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ing other states will give up even competing: "America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge, thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace."30 The vision itself must also be global: the loss of the nineteenth century idea of the "security of broad oceans" necessitates unilateral militant activism far beyond the implicit limits of the Monroe Doctrine.31 Thus the Bush administration has taken the impulse to dominance emanating from US military thinking in the 1990s one giant step further, by fitting it as the engine to power a militarily-active but ideationally-driven US global role.32 Conclusion This vision was always part myth. In the globalizing world of the twenty-first century, generating novel asymmetric threats against which military power alone is no protection, this vision is more illusory than ever before. A messianic foreign policy premising "Fortress America" offers false promise instead of real preparation for these new challenges, and impedes practical efforts that might more successfully cope with them. More fundamentally, this vision ignores the basic lessons of "realpolitik." Military buildups that go beyond meeting clear and present dangers are inevitably taken by others as signals of more aggressive intentions. Such aggressive military posturing by the world's most powerful state, justified by strategic policies aiming to reconstitute other nations and reconfigure global international society unilaterally, are inherently threatening to other countries, and cannot help but be perceived as such. Allies will grow uneasy, adversaries will respond in kind to the extent that they are able, and new challengers will emerge this is basic international realism. Hence, this vision of US "primacy" clearly departs from the "realist" tradition in US foreign policy and the "neorealist" school of US international relations scholarship.33

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The Bush administration's neo-imperial grand strategy to remake the world in the image of US ideals that others don't necessarily embrace relies on a military primacy that must ultimately prove quixotic.34 Following this path, US security policy will be unable to reckon the complex power configurations that characterize the globalizing world, within which the US position is simultaneously preponderant and exposed. Down this road, tragically, also lies eroding international security, and human security, worldwide. Insofar as the weaponization of space represents the "cutting edge" and highest ambitions of military primacy, it also represents the height of this folly. Canada already opposes the weaponization of space unambiguously, and the Canadian government's decision in February 2005 not to participate fully in US missile defence planning was in part due to the role of some missile defence technologies in facilitating space weaponization. The foregoing assessment of the role of US plans for space weaponization in the Bush administration's emerging neoimperial grand strategy suggests that Canada's opposition to space weaponization should impel Canada to resist that grand strategy as well. If, as argued above, the Bush administration's neo-imperial grand strategy also is misbegotten and imperils all nations (the United States included), then Canada's stake in resisting that strategy is all the more direct. A stark example concerns terrorism: if a sustained militant US "war on terrorism" with crusading overtones breeds resentment and animosity among disaffected and violent non-state actors worldwide, then the United States and its allies will be increasingly subject to attacks on their "soft targets" and civilian populations.35 Canada would be serving its direct security interests by urging the United States to adopt anti-terrorism strategies that better address the underlying sources of terrorism that the Bush administration itself has identified.36 The point from this example holds for the Bush administration's unilateral militant idealism more broadly. Canadian resistance to such

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a grand strategy would not only serve specific current Canadian interests including opposition to weaponization of space and protecting the country from terrorist attacks but also its wider aims to promote cooperative security and improved global governance worldwide aims Canada has long and often successfully pursued. But Canada should go further and actively engage US governmental and civil society audiences to promote an alternative US grand strategy capable of both responding more realistically to emerging twenty-first century threats and evoking shared ideals and aspirations for a better world. Such a strategy would aspire not only to sustain the sanctuary of space, but also to promote genuine progress toward peace and security here on earth. Notes:
1 United States Space Command, Vision for 2020, http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/visbook.pdf.
2 3

p.4.

Available

at

United States Space Command, Vision for 2020, p. 7.

General Lance Lord, Speech on December 14, 2004, as quoted in Mike Moore, "Space war-now we're jammin'!" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 61, n. 2 (March/April 2005), pp. 6-8. United States Space Command, Vision for 2020, p. 11. (emphasis added)

4 5

Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, January 11, 2001, Executive Summary, p.12. (emphasis added). The full report is available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/space20010111.html.
6 Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, January 11, 2001, Executive Summary, p.33.

James Dao, "Rumsfeld Seeking an Arms Strategy Using Outer Space," The New York Times, May 8, 2001.
8 Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, January 11, 2001, Executive Summary, p.17. 9

Aviation Week & Space Technology, 1996; as cited in "Arming the Heavens," Editorial, San Francisco Chronicle, March 18, 2001, available at http://www.mindfully.org/Nucs/ArmingHeavens.htm.

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10

Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, January 11, 2001, Executive Summary, p.10. "Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century," A Report of The Project for the New American Century, September 2000, pp. 54-6. Available online at the organization's web site: http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf. The report adds, "This eventuality is already recognized by official US national space policy, which states that the 'Department of Defense shall maintain a capability to execute the mission areas of space support, force enhancement, space control and force application.'"(Emphasis added in citation.)

11

"Executive Summary," Air Force 2025 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, August 1996; http://www.au.af.mil/au/2025/index2.htm), chpts 2, 3 & 6; c.f. "A Quick Look at Air Force 2025," available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/2025/quicklk2.htm.
13 14 15 16

12

"Executive Summary," Air Force 2025, chpt. 3. "Executive Summary," Air Force 2025, chpts. 3 & 4. "Executive Summary," Air Force 2025, chpt. 4. (Emphasis original) "Executive Summary," Air Force 2025, chpt. 6. The ten systems are:
z z z z z z z z z z

Global Information Management System Sanctuary Base Global Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting System Global Area Strike System Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicle Space High Energy Laser Solar High Energy Laser Reconnaissance Unmanned Air Vehicle Attack Microbots Piloted Single Stage Space Plane

17 18 19

"Executive Summary," Air Force 2025, chpt. 6. "Executive Summary," Air Force 2025, chpt. 8. (Emphasis added)

"Space Security 2004," workbook for the Government Consultations with Civil Society, Ottawa, Canada, 8-9 March, 2005, p.164. Robert H. Zielinski, et. al., "Star Tek Exploiting the Final Frontier: Counterspace Operations in 2025," Research Paper Presented To Air Force 2025, August 1996, p.6 (Emphasis added), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/2025/volume3/chap09/v3c920

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1.htm. This work then proceeds to a discussion of how, in the advancement of this end, to overcome the obstacles presented by "international space treaties, policy, and the space sanctuary illusion." Jeffrey Lewis and Jessy Cowan, "Space Weapon Related Programs in the FY 2005 Budget Request," Center for Defense Information, available on the organizations website: www.cdi.org.
22 21

Tim Weiner, "Air Force Seeks Bush's Approval for Space Weapons Programs," New York Times, May 18, 2005.

23 United States Space Command, Vision for 2020, p.5 (emphasis original). See also "USSPACECOM Long Range Plan Summary," available at http://www.fas.org/news/usa/1998/04/lrp-fs.htm.

Jim Garamone "Joint Vision 2020 Emphasizes Full-spectrum Dominance," American Forces Press Service, June 2, 2000. Available online at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2000/n06022000_20006025.html.
25 General Lance Lord, Speech on December 14, 2004, as quoted in Moore, "Space war--now

24

we're jammin'!" pp. 6-8. The claim is hyperbolic in that the terrestrially-based jamming attempt had little effect and was easily neutralized. The claim is also hypocritical when contrasted to the assertion, noted earlier, that US projection of terrestrially-generated lethal laser pulses through space would not constitute space weaponization. The NPR was first publicly summarized at a Department of Defense briefing on January 9, 2002. The classified review was subsequently obtained by The Los Angeles Times and The New York Times. Substantial excerpts of the NPR are at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm. The QDR is available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf.
27 26

Cirincione, Joseph, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 16, 2002, available at http://www.ceip.org.

In the language of the NSS, US power will be deployed to "create a balance of power that favors human freedom" and "extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent." The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, White House, September 2002, p.1. For a discussion of the provenance of this thinking, see Douglas A. Ross and Christopher N.B. Ross, "From 'Neo-Isolationism' to 'Imperial Liberalism': 'Grand Strategy' Options in the American International Security Debate and the Implications for Canada," in this volume.
29

28

President Bush, "Preface," The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, White House, September 2002. Note that "balance of power that favors human freedom" in this

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context means unchallenged US military supremacy. The wooly term recurs throughout the 31-page document. President Bush, Speech at West Point, June 1, 2002, available online at http://www.white house.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html. Colin Dueck argues that, while "primacist" ambitions were well represented and exercising influence in the Bush administration from its outset, they did not become dominant over "realist" inclinations until after the September 11 terrorist attacks. See Colin Dueck, "Ideas and Alternatives in American Grand Strategy, 2000-2004," Review of International Studies 30 (2004), pp.511-535, esp. pp. 526-7.
31 Indicatively, President Bush repeatedly portrays his administration's security policies as answering September 11's wake-up call to the nation and him personally that "oceans" no longer protect US security; see, for example, "President's Remarks at Ask President Bush Event," Lakefront Park, Hudson, Wisconsin, August 18, 2004 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040818-11.html). This rhetoric is factually absurd thousands of nuclear tipped missile have been able to reach US territory from the other side of the planet for decades and so explicable only as an effort to associate the vision with its historical context. 32 For an elaboration of this argument, see Wade L. Huntley, "Threats All The Way Down: US Nuclear Initiatives in a Unipolar World," Review of International Studies (forthcoming, January 2006). 33 30

See, for example, Stephen M. Walt, "Keeping the World 'Off Balance': Self Restraint and US Foreign Policy," and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural realism after the Cold War," both in G. John Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivaled: The Future Balance Of Power (Cornell University Press, 2002).

For a contrary assessment, see William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security, vol. 24, n. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 1-41. Wohlforth's self-consciously realist analysis concludes that so long as US primacy is "clear and comprehensive," other states will see counterbalancing as "a costly and probably doomed to venture until they observe fundamental changes in the capability of the United States to fulfill its role." But this analysis does not delve into previous "realist" theory on "balancing" versus "bandwagoning," nor does it reckon with twenty-first century opportunities to effectively balance with selective asymmetric capabilities.
35

34

In one scenario, allies like Canada might be targeted for an attack before the United States. See Ross and Ross, "From 'Neo-Isolationism' to 'Imperial Liberalism'," in this volume.

To its credit, the Bush administration's anti-terrorism strategy recognizes the multi-faceted sources of terrorism, and the need to address the key transnational socio-economic roots terrorist ambitions. The strategy identifies a pyramidal "Structure of Terror," whose base is con-

36

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stituted by "underlying conditions such as poverty, corruption, religious conflict and ethnic strife." The next layer is an international environment of "freer, more open borders;" only thirdly is the role of states themselves, which may, "through ignorance, inability, or intent," provide the physical and/or virtual havens from which terrorists can work. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, White House, February 2003, p.6. Unfortunately, these fundamental aspects of the problem have gotten lost in the administration's increasingly conventional and military approach to the now literally defined "war on terrorism."

THE NEW TRIAD, BUNKER BUSTERS AND 'COUNTERPROLIFERATION WARS':

Nuclear Primacy and Its Implications for Canadian Security Policy
By David S. McDonough

he Bush administration has proposed some very significant revisions to American nuclear strategy. These revisions were first introduced in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), a classified document that envisions a "New Triad" military doctrine consisting of offensive strike systems (nuclear and conventional), defences (active and passive), and a revitalized defence infrastructure, which would be bound together by a sophisticated command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) system.1 This document, while ostensibly a blueprint for the US nuclear arsenal, provides the basis for a significant transformation of the wider US military architecture. This point is reiterated by Keith B. Payne: "Despite its title, the scope was much broader than nuclear matters. It was a strategic posture review, the Pentagon's first strategic policy initiative to depart fundamentally from a Cold War-era policy orientation."2 Nuclear weapons are, however, incorporated as a central element of this strategic military posture. This is not merely hypothetical. In fact, these modifications have been further codified in National Security Presidential Directive 17 (NSPD-17)3, and many are in the process of being implemented in US nuclear war plans and operational policies. While not a radical departure from previous administrations, the New Triad does represent the most recent mani-

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festation of a little noticed trend in post-Cold War US nuclear strategy the incorporation of "counterproliferation" as an integral mission for the US nuclear arsenal. The rationale for much of these developments is the predominant US perception of the threat posed by the horizontal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to adversarial or revisionist "rogue states." This threat perception is not limited to Washington. In fact, many countries including Canada are beginning to recognize that such proliferation will be a critical challenge in the 21st century. However, it should also be recognized that the current administration's plans to increase reliance on nuclear weapons as a response could potentially have detrimental consequences, not only to the strategic stability among the established nuclear weapon states (NWSs), but perhaps more importantly, to the strategic stability between the US and its rogue state adversaries. The dangers posed by this example of "vertical" nuclear proliferation, which is essentially what the US is pursuing, have not received much attention in Canada. This is certainly understandable. For the most part, interest in these issues has declined in the post-Cold War period, when the threat posed by such arsenals was perceived (falsely) to have been reduced. Moreover, Canada is not a nuclear power, nor is it directly involved in the formulation of US nuclear strategy. As a "middlepower," and an increasingly marginalized one at that, Canadian policy has frequently focused on alternative, and often less strategic, concerns.4 Despite such preoccupations, American nuclear strategy particularly under this administration is not an issue that should be dismissed lightly. Canadian international influence may have indeed deteriorated in recent years, and our attention has been justifiably focused on domestic and continental security, but our security interests are still very much international in scope. American nuclear strategy cannot be disassociated from either Canada's long-standing support for multilateral non-proliferation measures, nor from its prefer-

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ence for international and regional strategic stability. Canadian policy-makers who ignore these developments may inadvertently find their influence even further limited, at a time when the international environment has become far less amenable to Canadian security and interests. Historical Context The Bush administration's nuclear strategy, while featuing some elements that are novel, is not a radical departure from the policies of previous administrations. Much of the foundation for the New Triad actually originated as early as the Cold War, when US nuclear planners were intent on mitigating the importance of a Soviet nuclear deterrent.5 "Counterforce" targeting of an opponent's military capabilities and command and control infrastructure, which are featured quite prominently in the New Triad's emphasis on counterproliferation missions, were originally conceived as a necessary component to the US deterrence of its Soviet adversary. In the post-Cold War period, the emphasis on targeting of Third World and rogue state adversaries has only increased the necessity for even more specialized (e.g. counterproliferation-based) counterforce capabilities. A common public misperception is that, during the Cold War, the US emphasized "countervalue" targets against Soviet cities, for example and unusable nuclear weapons. It was during this period that the US had publicly accepted the mutually assured destruction (MAD) doctrine: if one side decides to initiate an attack, the other side would have sufficient second-strike nuclear forces to inflict an unacceptable degree of destruction on the initiator. This doctrine stemmed largely from the development of a Soviet nuclear deterrent, and later, the seemingly inevitable development of nuclear parity between the two superpowers. Indeed, this may be one reason why so many people were surprised by this administration's very explicit emphasis on counterforce targeting in the Nuclear Posture Review and its concept of the New Triad.

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However, this perception of US Cold War nuclear strategy is false. In fact, despite an official adherence to MAD, the US had consistently emphasized a mixture of both countervalue and counterforce targeting against the Soviet Union. Nuclear counterforce options against the Soviet nuclear arsenal and later, its political and economic foundations were an integral if often unrecognized part of American nuclear war plans since the Eisenhower administration's fixation on nuclear overkill during the 1950s.6 The Kennedy administration did attempt to reject the overkill features of its predecessor, preferring instead "flexible" nuclear options, based on preemptive counterforce nuclear capabilities and the ability to withhold attacks on several categories of targets (the "no cities" version of counterforce).7 But despite initially accepting the idea of MAD and its need for second-strike forces and countervalue targeting, it would continue to emphasize such potentially destabilizing first strike targeting options. Subsequent administrations would expand on this proclivity towards counterforce weapons and flexible targeting. The Nixon administration emphasized the need to maintain "sufficiency" in nuclear capabilities, to reinforce the US ability to deter the Soviet Union, and therefore promulgated Single Integrated Operating Plan 5 (SIOP-5) which featured selective nuclear options, and enshrined the Soviet recovery economy as a central "withhold" option in US nuclear war plans. Such withhold options would be critical in any American attempt to achieve intrawar deterrence and war termination during a protracted nuclear exchange. Following a Nuclear Targeting Policy Review, the Carter administration introduced the "countervailing strategy," the goal of which was to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving any definition of victory in the event of a nuclear war. The administration's Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59) codified this doctrine, while the Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy 80 (NUWEP-80) followed through on this strategy, by emphasizing a more survivable command, control and communications system for the United States to allow it to bet-

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ter survive a protracted nuclear war and expanding the target list to include political as well as economic and military targets.8 The Reagan administration was particularly attached to this "warfighting" role for its nuclear arsenal, to achieve "escalation dominance" or the ability to "contain or defeat the adversary at all levels of violence with the possible exception of the highest."9 The need for such a doctrine was particularly acute, given the growth in Soviet nuclear capabilities and the perceived arrival of nuclear parity. The National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) of October 1981 even had the goal of "prevailing" in a nuclear war of up to 180 days. To achieve this goal, there have been six revisions to the nuclear war plan (SIOP-6A to SIOP-6F), and yearly NUWEPs to guide these revisions. In turn, this led to an emphasis on decapitation strikes against the Soviet leadership and military capabilities (e.g. mobile or relocatable targets) by such hard target kill weapons as the new MX intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and the Trident II D-5 sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), and the potential for damage limitation capabilities inherent in such programs as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).10 The New Triad may advocate new nuclear capabilities, but this merely reflects the long-standing American fascination with counterforce, as opposed to countervalue weapons. The nuclear capabilities advocated by the current administration are geared towards counterproliferation missions,11 and as such, represent specialized counterforce weapons for the destruction of an adversary's military forces (especially those related to chemical and biological capabilities). That the targets for these counterforce weapons were often non-nuclear Third World countries is also not a new development, but rather has its origins with the fall of the Soviet Union, when much of the policies developed to achieve escalation dominance over the Soviet Union were shifted to the newly recognized rogue state threat. The post-Cold War period while witnessing the end of the Soviet Union, the primary rationale for the US nuclear arsenal also

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saw the growing American fixation on rogue states. "Horizontal" proliferation to these "states of concern" had replaced the Soviet Union as the primary strategic threat facing the United States.12 This change in threat calculation was reinforced in two key incidents in the early post-Cold War period. First, there was the 1990-1991 Gulf War and the implicit danger of chemical or biological weapons use by Iraq. This led the US not only to undertake active and passive defences for its troops, but also to attempt conventional strikes to pre-empt possible Iraqi use of WMD.13 This was followed by the 1994 Korean nuclear crisis and the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by North Korea. While the development of a couple of nuclear weapons was considered a real danger, the possibility that the regime might develop a dozen weapons made this incident an even more serious crisis this number of weapons could potentially be sold to other countries or lead to the nuclearization of other regional countries. Reports even indicate that the US briefly considered pre-emptive military action against Pyonyang between 1993 and 1994.14 With the seemingly inevitable horizontal proliferation of WMD, the Defence Department introduced the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI), a new proposal that envisioned using US military force as a means to address the threat posed by rogue states and WMD. As pointed out by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, the CPI accepts that proliferation could still occur despite the best efforts of non-proliferation: "At the heart of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, therefore, is a drive to develop new military capabilities to deal with this new threat."15 While introduced as a conventional doctrine, counterproliferation would be incorporated as an integral part of American post-Cold War nuclear planning. Both the 1990 Military Net Assessment and the Reed Panel recommended the incorporation of Third World targets into US nuclear war plans. These recommendations would be formalized in SIOP-93. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) even attempted

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to further reinforce this new counterproliferation role with what has been termed the "Silver Books," classified documents with "plans for military strikes against WMD facilities in a number of 'rogue' nations."16 This controversial initiative was eventually terminated, but counterproliferation would be a feature of American nuclear policy throughout the 1990s. This was made abundantly clear in the process leading up to the 1994 NPR, when despite Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Ashton Carter's early efforts to reduce the number of nuclear targets and therefore the nuclear arsenal, STRATCOM was, by and large, successful in codifying such expanded mission requirements for the US nuclear force structure.17 In the post-Cold War period, the United States has expanded on its traditional counterforce emphasis on nuclear weapons; the missions have become more specialized, for purposes of counterproliferation, while the targets are now spread throughout the Third World. Counterproliferation has, indeed, become a central rationale for both the existing nuclear force structure, as well the development of new nuclear capabilities. This has taken place despite public adherence to negative security assurances, which are assurances to non-nuclear weapon states (NNWSs) that they would not be targeted by nuclear weapons, provided that they are not allied to a nuclear power. The Implementation of the New Triad The 2002 NPR expanded on many of these historic developments in its concept of a New Triad. Offensive strike systems, which include nuclear and conventional weapons, constitute the first leg of this strategic triad. Conventional weapons would be emphasized in order to reduce collateral damage and conflict escalation. However, as the NPR goes on to note, "Nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack, (for example, deep underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities)."18 The strike element of the New Triad would be supplemented with two other integral components. The development and deployment of active and

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passive defences would be emphasized, in the event that offensive capabilities fail to deter an adversary's attack. In addition, both offensive and defensive legs would be enhanced with a responsive defence and especially nuclear infrastructure. The NPR also outlines a number of defence policy goals that the New Triad would help to achieve, including (i) the assurance of security partners and allies, which refers to US positive security assurances as well as extended deterrence guarantees; (ii) the dissuasion of potential adversaries from even pursuing threatening (e.g. WMD) capabilities; (iii) the reinforcement of the credibility of US nuclear deterrence; and (iv) the provision of greater military flexibility in order to defeat adversaries.19 Based on the Bush administration's frequent emphasis on its pre-emptive/preventive doctrine, enshrined in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) document and demonstrated in the 2003 Iraq War, one can also argue that a hidden goal of the New Triad is to reinforce the American ability to preempt potential adversaries.20 New nuclear capabilities are advocated in order to deal with a number of potential threats and problems. According to the Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hardened and and Deeply Buried Targets, "structures ranging from hardened surface bunker complexes to deep tunnels" can be used by adversaries to house WMD as well as command and control facilities, and are therefore seen as a growing danger in the post-Cold War period.21 The US estimates that there are over 10,000 underground facilities (UGFs) worldwide, many of which constitute hard and deeply buried targets (HDBTs), and that this number will no doubt increase.22 The need to deal with mobile and relocatable targets, which can be weapon systems armed with WMD, is a second justification for new capabilities, and places a need to further develop intelligence collection and tracking capabilities. The third justification is the threat posed by chemical and biological weapons (CBWs). New capabilities are necessary to both identify agent production and storage facilities, and to deny access to, immobilize, neutralize or destroy such agents.

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Lastly, the US also perceives a need to develop new capabilities in order to improve the accuracy of and, in the event that the US has to defeat an adversaries capabilities, reduce the collateral damage caused by its nuclear weapons. The NPR is a congressionally mandated review of the "policy, strategy, plans, stockpile, and infrastructure for US nuclear forces,"23 and as such, is only a blueprint for the US nuclear arsenal. One must therefore examine how this blueprint is operationalized and implemented. The devil is in the details, as they say. In that regard, it is clear that the New Triad is not some hypothetical concept, but has already had a very real impact on operational policy in a number of areas. First, the NPR advocates a planned force structure composed of between 1700-2200 warheads by 2012, which would entail the elimination of the MX Peacekeeper missile force, a reduction in the number of Trident II ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and the removal of a number of warheads on the existing ICBM and SLBM force. This number has since been agreed to and codified by the US and Russia in the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), better known as the Treaty of Moscow. This treaty seems to reflect the Bush administration's ambiguity towards arms control agreements, as well as give both countries a great deal of flexibility in implementing the proposed nuclear weapon reductions. For instance, not only are verification protocols conspicuously absent from this "anti-arms-control arms control treaty,"24 but it is also notably silent on warhead stockpiles, tactical nuclear weapons, the elimination of multiple-warhead land missiles and the destruction of delivery systems. Implementation of the NPR's proposed force structure has already begun; this has reduced the operational nuclear warheads in the US stockpile to an estimated 5,300, down from an estimated 10,600 in 2002 (and 7,000 as early as a year ago). Only 10 MX missiles are still on alert, out of a total force of 50 the remaining 10 missiles were deactivated in mid-2005. Four Trident II SSBNs have also been removed since 2002.25 Furthermore, in 2004, the US announced that

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"almost half" of its total stockpile would be retired by 2012, and eventually dismantled this would make the total stockpile consist of an estimated 6,000 warheads. This, it should be noted, is a departure from both the NPR and previous Bush administration statements, which had initially wanted a much larger stockpile as part of its "responsive nuclear force" hedge and "inactive stockpile." Second, following from the NPR's emphasis on HDBTs and WMD facilities, the Bush administration appears intent on developing new nuclear capabilities for the destruction of such targets. The US is studying (i) the development of "bunker busters" or earth penetration weapons (EPWs) that would be capable, hypothetically, of destroying HDBTs; and (ii) using nuclear weapons as agent defeat weapons (ADWs) for the destruction of chemical and biological weapons and their facilities. These weapons are envisioned to have kinetic earth penetration capability, as well as a low-yield warhead to minimize fallout (or potentially large-yield warheards for deeper facilities). The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), which is the Bush administration's EPW project, is studying possible modifications that would give an existing US nuclear warhead some degree of earth penetration capability (beyond the B61-11 kinetic EPW nuclear warhead, which is only capable of pentrating to a depth of 30 feet).26 The development of smaller-yield, minature nuclear weapons of less than 5 kilotons, which would eventually require nuclear testing, is still only hypothetical the majority of the funding for the administration's nuclear plans has gone to the RNEP project (a modification of an existing nuclear warhead that does not require testing) rather than to the Advanced Concepts Initiatives examination of new lowyield weapon concepts.27 But given the work being done to revitilize the US nuclear infrastructure, their development remains a distinct possibility in the near future. Third, the US is implementing a number of modernization plans for its nuclear delivery systems. The Minuteman has a $6-billion modernization program, which would improve the missile's accuracy as

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well as extend its service life. The Air Force has already begun seeking conceptual designs for a missile to replace the Minuteman in 2018. What is more, since the START II Treaty is no longer in force, both Russia and the US will be maintaining (and perhaps expanding) those missiles with Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology. The NPR has placed the fleet of Trident SSBN and its SLBM force, which represents 48 percent of the existing operational strategic weapons, at the center of the US nuclear deterrent. The retirement of the MX missile force has only increased its importance, as the SLBMs have taken over many of the targets previously covered by the MX missile. Not surprisingly, the SLBM's D-5 missile, which has an already impressive hard-target kill capability, will soon have a much more lethal accuracy due to the Navy's three year Enhanced Effectiveness Re-entry program to provide the Mk-4/W76 re-entry vehicles with GPS-like accuracy. Another modernization program, to replace the re-entry vehicle's fuze, will lead to re-entry vehicles (designated Mk-4A/W76-1) with increased lethality. Furthermore, the Navy has plans for an eventual Trident SSBN replacement, as well as to develop a new submarine-launched intermediate-range ballistic missile (SLIRBM) for these submarines (with plans to test this missile in 2005).28 In the long-term, the US is also studying new types of "global strike" delivery systems for its conventional and nuclear armaments, such as the Manoeuvrable Non-Nuclear Re-entry Vehicles (MNNRVs) and/or the Common Aero Vehicles (CAVs). The MNNRV would rely on manoeuvres and a high re-entry rate to evade defences, and would allow for precision attacks against HDBTs and hard surface targets. The CAV would combine high manoeuvrability and an ability to deliver an assortment of advanced munitions that are currently only deliverable by aircraft. The possibility that the CAV, and even the more explicitly non-nuclear MNNRV, would be used for nuclear strikes cannot be dismissed.29

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Fourth, the emphasis on HDBTs and the destruction of biological and chemical agents represents another rationale for the incorporation of non-nuclear rogue states in US nuclear targeting. The NPR does explicitly mention North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya as countries that could be involved in immediate, potential and unexpected contingencies. Proactive counterproliferation, it should also be remembered, has become a dominant component of the US national security strategy. As the 2002 NSS makes clear, "Counterproliferation must also be integrated into the doctrine, training, and equipping of our forces and those of our allies to ensure that we can prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed adversaries."30 This was further elaborated in the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the classified version of which states: "The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force including potentially nuclear weapons to the use of [weapons of mass destruction] against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies."31 In response, the Bush administration has placed a renewed emphasis on "adaptive planning" for the rapid generation of nuclear war plans32, as well as on "crisis action planning" for limited strike options against unexpected contingencies; such developments would help to ensure increased, flexible, and selective nuclear options against rogue states.33 The Strategic Warfare Planning System (SWPS) had already undergone a major modernization, which was finally completed in 2003, and which gave the ability to formulate limited options within 24 hours. The Bush administration seeks to expand this capability, and has therefore initiated a new modernization plan (SWPS-M, later renamed the Integrated Strategic Planning and Analysis Network [ISPAN]) that seeks to develop even quicker and more adaptive nuclear planning through greater reliance on computer models. That being said, the Bush administration also released in October of 2003 a very traditional SIOP, which emphasized the counterforce

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targeting of Russian and Chinese nuclear forces, as well as decapitation strikes against the command, control and leadership of those countries.34 (This incidentally should be the last SIOP, as the US has formally changed the name of its nuclear war plan to Operations Plan or OPLAN 8044.35) Fifth, the NPR advocates a blurring between nuclear and conventional weapons as part of the offensive strike leg of the New Triad. For example, the Navy has plans to transform its four recently retired Trident II SSBNs into conventional cruise missile and special forces platforms. The US has also been looking at the potential development of conventional ICBMs, and particularly at the conversion of the now almost entirely deactivated MX ICBM force. As pointed out in the 2004 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Future of Strategic Strike Forces, the MX ICBM still has a long service life, would be capable of very large conventional missiles, and would give the US a prompt strike capability against buried, time urgent targets.36 The report also offers a number of other recommendations, including the development of a non-nuclear intermediate range missile for the Navy, as well as the conversion of a number of Advanced Cruise Missiles (ACMs), and their prospective replacements, for conventional missions. This blurring between conventional and nuclear weapons can also, perhaps most importantly, be seen with the merging of US Space Command (SPACECOM), which had responsibility for missile defence, into STRATCOM. The new STRATCOM, which traditionally dealt with nuclear policy, has been assigned four missions: (i) global missile defence; (ii) global strike, or the ability to quickly hit any target on earth37; (iii) Department of Defense Information Operations; and (iv) C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance). What impact this will have on operational US nuclear policy, on its nuclear force structure and targeting plans, remains to be seen. But it does appear to further conflate conventional and nuclear weapons, as well as formally place

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missile defence into a command that has traditionally overseen US nuclear policy. As such, it represents a move towards incorporating defensive systems into the US nuclear posture a goal that was enshrined in the first- and second-leg of the New Triad. While missile defence is ostensibly a defensive system, its potential to provide damage limitation capabilities in support of US nuclear forces, as well as the need to connect such defensive systems into the US offensive battle management system, makes its integration in the new STRATCOM a very real and, to an extent, logical possibility. Theatre nuclear planning has not been exempt from these developments. According to a recent draft of the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, the "Use of nuclear weapons in a theatre requires that nuclear and conventional plans be integrated to the greatest extent possible and that careful consideration be given to the potential impact of nuclear effects on friendly forces." Geographic combatant commanders are also given the authority to request Presidential approval for use of nuclear weapons in a wide variety of first-use and pre-emptive situations, including for use against overwhelming conventional forces; for the purpose of war termination; for pre-emptive attacks against an adversary's WMD facilities; and even "to demonstrate US intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary's use of WMD."38 This doctrine has an expansive view on the utility of nuclear weapons, and stands in sharp contrast to previous doctrines, which placed greater emphasis on "nuclear policy constraints"39 as opposed to nuclear weapons utility. Lastly, a critical foundation for the Bush administration's vision of nuclear weapons is a revitalized nuclear infrastructure. Despite the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), which relies on computational and simulational experimental facilities and "virtual testing/virtual proto-typing," numerous problems with the current infrastructure are identified. Not only are improvements deemed necessary, but the administration seems keen to have a revitalized capability to develop new warheads and to resume nuclear testing. As the NPR states, there

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is the need for a nuclear weapons complex that will be able to "design, develop, manufacture and certify new warheads in response to new national requirements; and maintain readiness to resume underground nuclear testing if required."40 Following from this perspective, the US seems intent on re-establishing a significant pit production capability. Plutonium pits are a hollow shell of plutonium in every nuclear warhead surrounded by chemical explosives, these "pits" are a necessary trigger component for a nuclear explosion. In 2003, a plutonium pit was completed the first new plutonium pit since the closure of the pit facility at Rocky Flats, Colorado in 1989. This seems to be part of a much larger goal, since the Bush administration has proposed a Modern Pit Facility that would cost $2-4 billion in construction and up to $300 million in annual maintenance, and would be capable of producing between 125 and 450 pits annually. The Bush administration is also continuing with its efforts to reduce the readiness time for nuclear testing, down from its current 24-36 months to 18 months. The Nevada Test Site is the focus of the Enhanced Test Readiness program, and has already received up to $24.9 million in 2004 and $22.5 million in 2005. Of course, one can argue that some improvements need to be done for the maintenance of the US nuclear stockpiles. However, these changes to the US nuclear infrastructure do seem excessive and, it should be remembered, associated with a policy that envisions new nuclear capabilities and potentially smaller-yield mini-nukes. As John Gordon, the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) points out, "it may be appropriate to design, develop and produce a small build of prototype weapons both to exercise key capabilities and to serve as a 'hedge,' to be produced in quantity when deemed necessary."41 While the Spratt-Furse amendment banned research on nuclear warheads of less than 5 kilotons, the administration has successfully repealed part of that law the Warner amendment passed on a 59-38 vote, and permits research on, but not development of, low-yield nuclear weapons.42

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This is not to say that these developments are irreversible. In November of 2004, the US Congress took the unprecedented step of cutting and/or reorienting funding for many of these programs for FY2005. Specifically, the request for $27 million for the RNEP project has been cut, while the $9 million request for new nuclear weapon concepts has been re-oriented towards increasing the reliability of existing nuclear warheads as part of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program. Furthermore, only $7 million will be released for the construction of a Modern Pit Facility and $22.5 million for the reduction of the nuclear test preparation period, as opposed to the Bush request for $30 million for each respective program.43 However, it remains to be seen whether this Congressional opposition will continue. The Bush administration is already pushing Congress to support a $4 million Department of Energy request for the RNEP project, alongside $4.5 million of complementary funding for the Pentagon (and $22.5 million over the next two years). The $9 million for new nuclear weapon concepts may now be a part of RRW, but there are continuing questions regarding whether this program will simply be "a back door for the administration to circumvent congressional opposition to new warhead designs for new and destabilizing nuclear strike missions."44 The Bush administration appears, despite these recent Congressional setbacks, intent on pursuing its drive for developing new nuclear capabilities during its second term. Implications for Canadian Security Policy Canada is a self-professed middlepower, a classification which denotes a countrys inability to wield much influence when acting alone, but ability and often interest in working with like-minded powers on various issues, as a means to multiply its influence. This can be seen in this country's integral role in the development of the United Nations; as a peacekeeper, in order to eliminate potential AmericanSoviet flashpoints; its place in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

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(NATO); and most recently, as part of its involvement in NATO peace enforcement activities as well as in various multilateral security initiatives. Working through multilateral institutions is therefore Canada's preferred approach for dealing with security issues, as opposed to acting alone or even working in ad hoc coalitions. Given that the defence capabilities and, therefore, foreign policy influence of Canada has eroded in recent years,45 the importance of such institutions has only increased. However, while Canada may prefer multilateral solutions, geographical and geopolitical realities must also be accepted.46 This is especially true for Canada, which occupies a critical and, in the post9/11 security environment, increasingly ambiguous strategic position beside the United States. The US interest in working at unilateral solutions for dealing with the threat of terrorist organizations and rogue states, and of ignoring or dismissing traditional multilateral solutions, has never been greater. A grand strategy of "primacy," whereby the US seeks to preserve its "supremacy by politically, economically, and militarily outdistancing any global challenger," appears to guide the policies of the current administration.47 The Bush administration's revisions to US nuclear strategy represent the most explicit manifestation of the post-Cold War emphasis on unilateral "nuclear counterproliferation" against rogue states. This requires new strategic strike capabilities and more flexible and adaptive nuclear war plans, and represents an American attempt to not only develop specialized capabilities against rogue states, but in fact to outdistance any potential nuclear adversary. It should be remembered that dissuasion, explicitly mentioned in the NPR as a goal of the New Triad's strategic posture, represents the concept of of fielding a military force so dominating that it prevents adversaries from contemplating resistance.48 This goes to the very heart of the Bush administration's drive towards strategic primacy. In the words of President George W. Bush, America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge.49

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The New Triad is therefore a critical component of this highly ambitious grand strategy. With its emphasis on sophisticated strategic capabilities, spearheaded by offensive nuclear strike systems and incorporating conventional offensive and defensive capabilities, the New Triad offers a vision of American strategic dominance or, to put it squarely in the context of its grand strategy, "nuclear primacy."50 This provides the fundamental guidance for the Bush administration's force structure and policies. The impact of this development on the international security environment is uncertain but, in all likelihood, potentially detrimental in a number of areas: on the non-proliferation regime; the strategic stability between the established NWSs; and the strategic instability between the US and its rogue state adversaries. As such, it touches upon various aspects of Canadian international security policy. First, the Bush administration's revisions to American nuclear strategy challenges one of the basic precepts of Canadian international security policy, namely that multilateral non-proliferation measures are the foundation for dealing with the threat of WMD proliferation. Like most middlepowers, Canada has been an ardent supporter of the non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) regime, and the norms and institutions underlying this regime, which are embodied in a number of international treaties, including the NPT, BTWC, CWC, CTBT and various fissile and missile regimes.51 In contrast, the Bush administration viewing the growing WMD programs of its adversaries seems highly dismissive of such measures, preferring instead unilateral or ad hoc means for dealing with this post-Cold War danger. As implied throughout this paper, counterproliferation provides a guiding force for the Bush administration's nuclear strategy, and in many ways, for its entire national security strategy.52 Counterproliferation is not, however, non-proliferation. To some extent, these are mutually exclusive concepts. The non-proliferation regime seeks to prevent the proliferation of WMD, while the coun-

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terproliferation doctrine accepts that proliferation will indeed take place, and seeks to prepare military forces sufficient for dealing with such a threat. Of course, counterproliferation can be seen as a necessary and prudent adjunct to non-proliferation, as was the case for the most part with the Clinton administration. The Bush administration seems, however, far less inclined to rely on multilateral nonproliferation measures, preferring to place its bet on unilateral, proactive counterproliferation. While the Clinton administration's 1999 National Security Strategy detailed a number of multilateral initiatives, including the NPT and the CTBT, "the Bush document outlined nonproliferation activities in one paragraph that only mentioned a recent Group of Eight agreement to assist with weapons disposal in Russia."53 A good example of the disdain that the current administration has for multilateral non-proliferation can be seen with its treatment of the NPT, long regarded as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. For example, by explicitly targeting NNWSs, the US has effectively ended the negative security assurances that were first given out by President Carter in 1978. These assurances are commonly considered an integral if not codified NWS obligation arising out of the NPT. "They have been viewed by NNWSs as one of their major requirements for achieving an adequate balance between their obligations and those of the nuclear weapons states."54 It is true that the US, like many NWSs, has not always followed its negative security pledges. A good example of this is the "calculated ambiguity" doctrine, which seeks to give uncertainty on whether the US would indeed attack a NNWS adversary with nuclear weapons in the event of retaliation.55 But this ambiguity is dramatically clarified by the growing incorporation of such states in US nuclear war plans; the US may still retain a doctrine of public ambiguity, but there is nothing ambiguous about its operational nuclear plans. Relatedly, by explicitly maintaining the nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future, the Bush administration nuclear strategy seems to

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be contrary to the goals enshrined in Article 6 of the NPT, which states that Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.56 The dismissal of Article 6 is further evident in the apparent need to begin nuclear testing. This would not only effectively destroy any chance of resurrecting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and therefore give China, India and Pakistan a possible excuse to resume testing themselves, but would also reinforce the impression that the US has no intention in pursuing what the NPT terms "effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms raceand to nuclear disarmament." This change in US emphasis will likely have a detrimental impact on Canada's stated goal of dealing with horizontal WMD proliferation in a multilateral framework. While both Canada and the United States do indeed share similar threat perception, their respective views on the means for dealing with that threat may only widen in the future. The impact that this will have on the Canada-US strategic relationship is unknown. However, one should not be optimistic on this front. There is a distinct possibility that the recent bilateral acrimony evident during Canada's refusal to join the US coalition of the willing to undertake regime change in Iraq, and its refusal to formally approve US plans for national missile defence may not be foreign policy aberrations, but rather an ominous prelude for things to come. Second, the Bush administration's nuclear strategy may have an uncertain, but potentially detrimental impact on strategic nuclear stability among the great powers, particularly among such established

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NWSs as the United States, Russia and China. Stability between these powers is an important prerequisite for an international system based on multilateral cooperation and normative institution-building, and is therefore very much in the Canadian national interest. To put it simply, when such stability is lacking, the possibility for a middlepower like Canada to be ignored, and even stepped on, is substantially increased. The argument that the New Triad will have a detrimental impact on the strategic stability between the established nuclear powers follows closely on criticisms of missile defence. According to such criticism, missile defence will lead to both Russia and China initiating countermeasures to compensate for any US missile shield, and raise the spectre of a renewed and cascading arms race.57 The New Triad's incorporation of offensive and defensive systems increases the strength of such an argument, since the nuclear policy planners of both countries will have to take into account the threat posed by US counterforce capabilities, as well as the damage limitation capabilities inherent in missile defence, on their respective arsenals. For example, earth-penetrating counterforce weapons that are meant to hit the HDBTs and mobile and relocatable targets in rogue states would also be ideal weapons for first-strike counterforce attacks against China and Russia. On one hand, China has long maintained a "minimum deterrent"58 against US forces, composed of a small number of liquidfuelled ICBMs that, given their lack of mobility and small numbers, would be very vulnerable to a US first-strike. China is suspected of having only 18 ICBMs (the DF-15) that are capable of reaching the continental United States (CONUS).59 While it does have an additional 12 ICBM-classified missiles (the DF-4), this delivery system is generally not considered capable of reaching CONUS. Not surprisingly, the Chinese nuclear deterrent, an integral component of any feasible Chinese military attack on US-allied Taiwan, has been undergoing a modernization program. This could potentially see its nuclear

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forces expanded to include up to 100 ICBMs capable of hitting the United States (based on the DF-31 and DF-31A missile), as well as improved accuracy, lighter warheads, a more robust C3I system and new solid-fueled and potentially MIRVed ICBMs. This modernization program, which would exist irrespective of US nuclear developments, will likely accelerate as a result of the growing emphasis on American counterforce capabilities.60 On the other hand, Russia has a declining number of strategic warheads,61 and would be very keen to maintain its deterrent in the face of the growing sophisitication of the US strategic arsenal. This would necessitate a robust command and control infrastructure that would be more capable of surviving a US decapitation strike evident in the development of the key leadership and nuclear command system facilities deep in the Yamantau and Kosvinsky mountains62 and in the development of advanced weapon systems that would be better capable of mitigating any US damage limitation capability. Russia has already indicated that it would maintain its inventory of MIRVed ICBMs, and has recently announced progress in the development of the Bukavu SLBM and the mobile Topol-M ICBM, the latter of which is a hypersonic and manoeuverable ballistic missile that would be "capable of penetrating any missile defense system that could conceivably be developed in the next several decades."63 One could also conceivably expect a renewed "launch on warning" posture for the Russian strategic arsenal, in order to better prevent a US first-strike capability.64 That being said, strategic stability between these powers is based on a more substantive footing than during the Cold War.65 Modifications to their arsenals may be necessary, to better secure the viability of their respective nuclear deterrents, but a renewed arms race is by no means a certainty. However, the Bush administration's fixation on strategic primacy provides a problematic environment for the pursuit of such strategic nuclear capabilities. While primacists may assume that other countries would acquiesce to perpetual US pre-eminence, it is more than likely that one will see increased balancing

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behavior on the part of both Russia and China. As noted by Posen and Ross, "States coalesce against hegemons rather than rally around them."66 This increases the possibility that the US relationship with both countries will deteriorate, perhaps to the point of featuring stark adversarial characteristics. If so, the potential for arms races and strategic instability will undoubtedly increase.67 Third, there is also the potential for the deterioration of strategic regional stability between the US and its rogue state adversaries. In sharp contrast to the stability commonly associated with the established NWSs, the relationships between the United States and various rogue states are rarely if ever characterized as stable, even at the best of times. It is also fair to say that these adversarial relationships have only increased with the current administration. As the 2002 National Security Strategy makes clear, "We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends."68 The US invasion of Iraq, and its continuing tensions with Iran, Syria and North Korea, are indicative of this fundamental instability. Strategic instability therefore provides a necessary and, potentially, worrisome context for the New Triad's emphasis on new nuclear capabilities for counterproliferation missions against these states. As mentioned earlier, the stated goals of the Bush administration's New Triad include making the US deterrent more credible against these adversaries, and increasing the US ability to dissuade hostile states from even pursuing WMD programs. This creates an impression that strategic stability between the United States and its adversaries will be enhanced. Unfortunately, this impression is also misleading. Nuclear targeting of rogue states armed only with suspected chemical and biological weapons, rather than deterring or dissuading them from pursuing such programs, may simply make WMD, and especially a nuclear deterrent, even more tempting. As Scott Sagan makes clear, a strong reason (and the dominant explanation) for the acquisition of

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nuclear weapons is the need to increase national security against foreign threats.69 One can equally apply this rationale for the acquisition of various kinds of CBWs. Relatedly, the Bush administration's nuclear strategy also envisions the need to defeat rogue states armed with WMD. Given the possibility that the US attempt to deter and dissuade such states from even acquiring WMD will have the opposite impact, to actually abet the horizontal proliferation of WMD, the need to defeat such states may become something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Unfortunately, the New Triad may also give the US a false sense of security in its ability to deal with the WMD of rogue states, and increase the temptation for it to undertake regime change campaigns against these states. This represents a vision, not of reinforced strategic stability among these the US and its potential adversaries, but rather of US-led "counterproliferation wars." For example, the US may believe that its more credible nuclear capabilities can be translated to the intrawar deterrence of a rogue state's WMD capabilities (e.g. in the midst of a regime change campaign). Alternatively, such weapons could be seen as a feasible means to retaliate in the event that WMD are employed by its adversaries, or even as a means to pre-empt such capabilities.70 As such, the New Triad is a means to eliminate the possibility, however remote, that the US might itself be deterred from intervening against a rogue state due to the latter's WMD capabilities.71 Does this mean that US nuclear developments, accelerated under the Bush administration, will automatically lead to strategic instability? Fortunately, no it is possible that such blatant nuclear primacy may lead to a rogue state being deterred from ever brandishing and employing their weapons and even dissuaded from seeking such asymmetrical counters. However, this outcome cannot be guaranteed, and it is equally possible (and in this authors opinion, more likely) that strategic instability between the US and these countries will continue to deteriorate.72 Of course, one should not overstate the impact that these nuclear developments will have on the threat perception of

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rogue states the existing power imbalance between the US and its rogue state adversaries is more than sufficient to justify WMD deterrent capability. But the New Triad, with its emphasis on damage limitation and specialized counterforce capabilities (the necessary ingredients for a pre-emptive, first-strike posture), may lead already insecure rogue states to adopt ever more destabilizing employment strategies for their own WMD deterrents. The possibility for conflicts which could escalate and feature the use of WMD, by rogue states and/or the US, should not be discounted. As can be seen with this admittedly brief analysis, the Bush administration's emphasis on nuclear primacy, as an integral part of its wider goal for grand strategic primacy, provides for an uncertain and potentially dangerous international security environment. This should be a concern for Canada, as it affects not only our support for the non-proliferation regime, but our vital interest in a cooperative international security environment. It is not necessarily in Canada's interest that the 21st century be defined by unilateral American strategic dominance, the gradual deterioration in relations between the established nuclear powers, and periodic US-led counterproliferation wars, which may even feature the use of WMD. Unfortunately, Canada's ability to have any real impact on these developments is minimal. To put it simply, vertical nuclear proliferation by the United States may be of concern for the international community including Canada but this community is largely impotent to discourage such developments. As a marginal middlepower, with a long history of free-riding on our Southern neighbour, it would be hubris to think that this country's arguments and policies would have any impact in the corridors of Washington. That being said, the divergence of interest on means for dealing with rogue states can also be seen as an opportunity to improve and supplement multilateral non-proliferation measures. While one can be critical of its current policies, the US does have cause for concern over the utility of the non-proliferation regime; the ability of this regime to stop determined

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proliferators can certainly be questioned. Fortunately, Canada does seem to have partially recognized this reality, as evident in its belated decision to take part in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). It is true that such an arrangement may not be perfect, and may require some compromises on Canada's part. However, the potential role for an innovative middlepower should not, and must not, be underestimated. Conclusion The nuclear strategy of the Bush administration is centered on a New Triad that envisions new nuclear and conventional counterforce capabilities for flexible and selective "global strikes" against rogue states, supplemented with active defences for purposes of damage limitation. By incorporating and expanding on the policies of its predecessors, the Bush administration has indeed made some significant revisions to American nuclear strategy, and placed it squarely as an integral component of its wider vision for strategic primacy. The impact that these revisions will have on Canada is a little more ambiguous. It is true that these revisions affect, and should be a concern for this country. But they do so in a primarily indirect way by having an impact on strategic stability and the international security environment, and therefore, on Canadian national interests. Perhaps more importantly, it remains to be seen what a middlepower like Canada can do to mitigate these policies. These changes are largely the result of a shift in US perception of what constitutes strategic threats, and Canada should not fool itself that arguments to the contrary will have an even minimal impact on this threat perception. Despite such limitations, it would be prudent for Canada to renew its emphasis on dealing with the threat posed by the horizontal proliferation of WMD for Canada's own security interests; to show the United States that its neighbour is indeed serious about this threat; and as a means of eliminating the rationale for continued US emphasis on nuclear weapons. It is true that Canada's ability to deal with US

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vertical proliferation is minimal to non-existent. However, continuing efforts to deal with horizontal proliferation could conceivably reduce a central rationale for the expansion of the US nuclear arsenal. Notes:
1 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington DC: Department of Defense, January 8, 2002) (hereinafter the Nuclear Posture Review). Excerpts of this document are available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm.
2

Keith B. Payne, "The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record Straight," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 28, n. 3 (Summer 2005), pp. 135-151.

3 NSPD-17 has also been codified under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 4 (HSPD4). While the classified document has yet to be released, the public version (National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction) can be found at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-wmd/pdf. 4 This has been a constant critique of Canadian international security policy in the 1990s, which has, under the leadership of Lloyd Axworthy, often focused on issues of "soft power" while ignoring or dismissing traditional "hard power" concerns. For good examples of these kinds of critiques, see Fen O. Hampson and Dean F. Oliver, "Pulpit Diplomacy: A Critical Assessment of the Axworthy Doctrine," International Journal, vol. 53, n. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 379-406; Kim Richard Nossal, "Pinchpenny Diplomacy: The Decline of 'Good International Citizenship' in Canadian Foreign Policy," International Journal, vol. 54, n. 1 (Winter 1998-99), pp. 88-105. For an interesting defence of the Axworthy Doctrine, see Joe Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, "Lloyd Axworthy's Legacy: Human Security and the Rescue of Canadian Defence Policy," International Journal, vol. 56, n. 1 (Winter 2000-01), pp. 1-18.

This argument can be found in David S. McDonough, "Nuclear Superiority or Mutually Assured Deterrence: The Development of the US Nuclear Deterrent," International Journal, vol. 60, n. 3 (Summer 2005). pp. 811-823.
6

See David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," International Security, vol. 7, n. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 3-71 and Marc Trachtenberg, "A 'Wasting Asset': American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 19491954," International Security, vol. 13, n. 3 (Winter 1988/89). See Fred Kaplan, "JFK's First-Strike Plan", Atlantic Monthly, vol. 288, n. 3 (October 2001). For an interesting critique on the flexibility, if not the pre-emptive basis, of Kennedy's nuclear strategy, see Francis J. Gavin, "The Myth of Flexible Response: American Strategy in Europe during the 1960s," International History Review, n. 23 (December 2001), pp. 847-875.

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8 This strategy, while also featuring weapons development, placed the primary importance on

the need to develop a sophisticated and robust C3 capability. See Walter Slocombe "The Countervailing Strategy," International Security, vol. 5, n. 4 (Spring 1981), pp. 18-27.
9 Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 131. Escalation dominance has its intellectual roots in the work of Herman Kahn at Rand in the 1950s, specifically his idea of the escalation ladder and the need to control and dominate the escalation process. 10

See Desmond Ball and Robert C. Toth, "Revising the SIOP: Taking War-Fighting to Dangerous Extremes," International Security, vol. 14, n. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 65-92. For a good look at the threat of decapitation, see John D. Steinbruner, "Nuclear Decapitation," Foreign Policy, n. 45 (Winter 1981-82), pp. 18-28.

11 For instance, both counterproliferation and the New Triad focus on shallow buried targets,

advanced energetic materials (i.e. extreme heat, chemical reaction or thermobaric effects), hard and deeply buried targets, special operations forces, and capabilities against mobile missiles. For further information on counterproliferation, see Center for Counterproliferation Research (CCR), The Counterproliferation Imperative: Meeting Tomorrow's Challenges, CCR Report (Washington, DC: National Defense University, November 2001), Chp. 5.
12

See Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's Search for a New Foreign Policy (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995). See Barry R. Schneider, Future war and counterproliferation: US military responses to NBC proliferation threats (Westport, Conn.; London: Praeger, 1999). For more on the threat posed by Iraq's WMD capabilities during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, see Avigdor Haselkorn, The Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons, and Deterrence (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999) and Amatzia Baram, "An Analysis of Iraqi WMD Strategy," The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 8, n. 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 25-39.

13

For a detailed account of the 1994 North Korea crisis, see Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Non-proliferation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995).
15

14

While no White House factsheet was presented on the CPI, Les Aspin's remarks has been posted on the Federation of American Scientists' website, at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd18.htm.
16

British American Security Information Council (BASIC), "Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy," BASIC Research Report (February 1998), p. 15. Silver Books stands for Silver or Strategic Installation List of Vulnerability Effects and Results. While this project was terminated, a Silver Book was developed for European Command, and one was in development for Pacific Command. See Hans

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Kristensen, "Targets of Opportunity," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, vol. 53, n. 5 (September/October 1997), pp. 22-28. For more on the disproportionate role and influence of STRATCOM in the formulation of US nuclear forces, see Hans Kristensen, The Matrix of Deterrence: US Strategic Command Force Structure Studies (Berkely, CA: The Nautilus Institute, May 2001), pp. 1-23. This report details numerous STRATCOM studies such as the Phoenix Study, the Sun City Study and the Sun City Extended Study that heavily influenced the US government's nuclear policies throughout the 1990s.
18 19 20 17

Nuclear Posture Review, pp. 12-13. Nuclear Posture Review, pp. 12-14.

See Roger Speed and Michael May, "Dangerous Doctrine," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 61, n. 2 (March/April 2005), pp. 38-49.

21

Department of Energy and Department of Defense, Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hardened and Deeply Buried Targets (Washington DC: Department of Energy and Defense, July 2001), p. 8. The Report identifies two types of facilities: (i) the shallow "cut and cover" design, which would have a concrete structural overburden of less than 10 feet of thickness to protect tactical facilities; and (ii) the much harder facilities with strategic functions, which could have a concrete overburden equivalent to 70 to 300 feet, redundant ventilation, power, and communications systems, and sophisticated camouflage, concealment, and deception techniques. A slightly modified HDBT classification scheme is outlined in Michael A. Levi, "Fire in the Hold: Nuclear and Non-nuclear Options for Counter-Proliferation," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Paper, 31 (November 2002).

22

This figure is from Defense Science Board Task Force on Underground Facilities, which is quoted in Nuclear Posture Review, p. 46. The NPR goes on to note that, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency, 1,400 of these UGFs are known or suspected of housing strategic facilities, many of which are deep underground. Kurt Guthe, "The Nuclear Posture Review: How Is the 'New Triad' New?" Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessements (2002), p. 1. The NPR became a a congressional requirement due to Section 1041 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-398), October 30, 2000.

23

Philippe Lagasse, "The SORT Debate: Implications for Canada," IRPP Working Paper Series, No. 2003-01 (October 2003).
25

24

Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "US nuclear forces, 2005," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 61, n. 1 (January/February 2005), pp. 73-75.

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The RNEP project is officially a Phase 6.2/6.2A feasibility and cost study, intended to examine the possibility of increasing the earth penetration capability of the B61 and B63 nuclear bomb. However, the Bush administration's FY2005 request did specify a five year plan that went into cost estimates for Phase 6.3 on development engineering, and Phase 6.4 on production engineering. See Jonathan Medalia, "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Budget Request and Plan, FY2005-FY2009," CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report to Congress (January 10, 2005,) available at http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL32347.pdf.
27 26

For example, in the FY 2005 budget request, the Bush administration asked for $27.6 million for the RNEP program, and an additional $9 million for the study of new nuclear weapon concepts. See Karin Yourish with Matthew Johnson, "Proposed Energy Department Budget Would Boost Funds for Nuclear Weapons,"Arms Control Today (March 2004). For these developments, see Norris and Kristensen, "US nuclear forces, 2005" and Robert S. Norris, Hans M. Kristensen, and Christopher E. Paine, Nuclear Insecurity: A Critique of the Bush Administration's Nuclear Weapons Policies (National Resources Defense Council, September 2004), pp. 9-15.

28

29 See Western States Legal Foundation (WSLF), "The Shape of Things to Come: The Nuclear Posture Review, Missile Defense, and the Dangers of a New Arms Race," WSLF Report (April 2002) and WSLF, "The Military Space Plan, Conventional ICBMs, and the Common Aero Vehicle: Overlooked Threats of Weapons Delivered Through or From Space," WSLF Information Bulletin (Fall 2002). Both weapon systems seem to be based on the Reagan administration's research on a nuclear Manoeuverable Re-entry Vehicle (MARV).

The National Security Strategy of the United States (September 2002), p. 14. This document can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
31 See Nicholas Kralev, "Bush Approves Nuclear Response," The Washington Times, January 31, 2003.

30

This can be differentiated from "deliberative planning," which emphasizes large pre-existing nuclear war plans in the form of the Single Integrated Operating Plans. These plans will still continue, in the form of OPLAN 8044, but with a more rapid production time.
33

32

Crisis action planning has been codified in CONPLAN 8022-02, which is a pre-emptive "global strike" contingency plan against unexpected imminent threats, such as in Iran and North Korea, involving precision kinetic (conventional and nuclear) and non-kinetic effects. Under this plan, nuclear weapons would be given a prompt strike capability (minutes to hours) against targets not included in the pre-existing nuclear plans, in order to destroy an enemy's launch of a nuclear strike or to destroy a critical HDBT. See Hans Kristensen, "Nuclear Mission Creep: The Impact of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation on US

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Nuclear Policy and Planning," Presentation to The Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University (May 11, 2005), available at http://www.nukestrat.com and William Arkin, "Not Just a Last Resort?" Washington Post, May 15, 2005, p. B01.
34

Norris and al., Nuclear Insecurity, pp. 1-8.

35 The name was formally changed at a conference in 2003, though OPLAN 8044 has been used throughout the 1990s to refer to the SIOP's implementation plan. It remains to be seen whether this name change will become permanent. See Hans Kristensen, "US Changes Name of Nuclear War Plan," Nuclear Brief (December 21, 2004), available on The Nuclear Information Project website, available at http://www.nukestrat.com/us/stratcom/siopname. htm. Interestingly, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Richard B. Myers has recently used the term "strategic deterrence response plan" to describe the US nuclear war plan this has a strong resemblance to the unsuccessful proposal by former STRATCOM commander General George Lee Butler to use the term "National Strategic Response Force" See General Richard B. Myers, "Written Posture Statement to SASC, HASC amd HAC-D," (February 16 and 17, 2005), at http://www.nukestrat.com/us/jcs/Testimony_Myers0216-1705.pdf. 36

Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Future of Strategic Strike Forces (Washington DC: Defense Science Board, February 2004), pp. 5-13.

The US attempt at operationalizing "global strike" can be seen in Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's approval of a top secret "Interim Global Strike Alert Order," which in turn led to CONPLAN 8022-02 and the incorporation of nuclear weapons in this pre-emptive contingency plan. See footnote 33. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, Joint Pub 3-12 (Final Coordination [2] draft, March 15, 2005) p. III-2, available at http://www.nukestrat.com/us/jcs/JCS_JP312_05draft.pdf.
39 See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, Joint Pub 3-12 (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 15, 1995), p. III-2. It remains to be seen whether the new document gives any greater authority to the combatant commanders in terms of release authority. As the old document notes, "Each commander with a nuclear planning capability identifies and requests authorization to strike any targets necessary to accomplish the mission." (p. III-4). 40 41 38

37

Nuclear Posture Review, p. 30.

John A. Gordon, Statement to the Senate Committee on Armed Services (February 14, 2002), available at http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/congressional/2002/2002-02-14-TESTI MONY-US_Armed_Services_NPR.pdf.

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Christine Kucia, "Congress approves research on new nuclear weapons," Arms Control Today (June 2003). Wade Boese, "Congress Axes Funding for New Nukes," Arms Control Today (December 2004). Daryl G. Kimball, "Replacement Nuclear Warheads? Buyer Beware," Arms Control Today (May 2005). Also see Wade Boese, "US Weighing Nuclear Stockpile Changes," Arms Control Today (May 2005) and William J. Broad, "US Redesigning Atomic Weapons," New York Times February 27, 2005.
45 44 43 42

For a good overview, see Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2003). Numerous reports from academics and nongovernmental organizations reiterate this point. For a good overview, see Barry Cooper, Mercedes Stephenson and Ray Szeto, "Canada's Military Posture: An examination of Recent Civilian Reports," The Fraser Institute Critical Issues Bulletins (January 2004), available at http://www.stratnet.ucalgary.ca/publications/pdf/cooper_CanadaMilitaryPosture_jan04.pdf mass destruction: A medium-power

46 This argument is reiterated in Ko Colinj, "Weapons of

concern," International Journal, vol. 59, n. 2 (Spring 2004). Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy," International Security, vol. 21, n. 3 (Winter 1996/1997), p. 32. A blueprint for such a grand strategy was first brought to light in 1992, with the leak of then Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz's controversial Defense Policy Guidance (1994-1999). For further information on this document, see Patrick E. Tyler, "US Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," New York Times, March 7, 1992. For a good discussion on the writing of this controversial document, see James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 2004). War with Iraq: The New US National Security Strategy," Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Public Interest Report, vol. 55, n. 5 (September/October 2002), pp. 3-4, available at: http://www.fas.org/faspir/2002/v55n5/v55n5.pdf George W. Bush, "Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy," Office of the Press Secretary, June 1, 2002.
50 49 48 Carl Kaysen, John D. Steinbruner, Martin B. Malin, "Behind the Prospect of 47

This does not mean that the non-nuclear elements are not an integral component of the New Triad. However, such components are featured in what is formally a review of the US nuclear posture, and are seen in a context that has traditionally been dominated by US strategic nuclear weapons capabilities. For these reasons, and despite its wider strategic nature, this author has chosen to use the term "nuclear primacy."

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51 The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC);

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Other non-proliferation agreements include the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), the Australia Group, on chemical and biological materials, as well as the most recent Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
52 See Jason D. Ellis, "The Best Defense: Counterproliferation and US National Security," The

Washington Quarterly, vol. 26, n. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 115-133.

53 Christine Kucia, "Counterproliferation at Core of New Security Strategy," Arms Control Today (October 2002). Other treaties mentioned in the 1999 document include the BTWC and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreements. It should also be noted that the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction does outline these multilateral non-proliferation measures (though with the conspicuous absence of the CTBT). 54

George Bunn and Roland M. Timerbaev, "Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States," The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1993), p. 11. Such assurances are commonly seen as being a necessary condition for Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to relinquish their nuclear weapons in 1994, and for the NNWSs to support the 1995 NPT Review Conference. Also see George Bunn, "The Legal Status of US Negative Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon States," The Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer 1997), pp. 1-17.

Calculated ambiguity was coined by former Secreatry of State James A. Baker, who used it to describe US policy during the 1990-91 Gulf War. As Baker writes, "I purposely left the impression that the use of chemical or biological agents by Iraq could invite tactical nuclear retaliation." Quoted in William Arkin, "Calculated Ambiguity: Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf War," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 16, n. 4 (Autumn 1996), 3-18. Also see Scott D. Sagan, "The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks," International Security, vol. 24, n. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 85-115. Article 6, The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (July 1, 1968), at http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.html.
57 56

55

For a good example of the critique on missile defence, see Ernie Regehr, Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, Report of the Simons Centre for Peace and Disarmament Studies (December 2003). Also see the contrasting arguments by Fergusson and Ross in this volume. According to one author, minimum deterrence has shifted towards a more robust "limited deterrence" strategic concept. See Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking': The Concept of Limited Deterrence," International Security, vol. 20, n. 2 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 5-42.
58

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While it does have an additional 12 ICBM-classified missile (the DF-4), this delivery system is generally not considered capable of reaching CONUS. For a recent sober assessment of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, see Jeffrey Lewis, "The Ambiguous Arsenal," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 61, n. 3 (May/June 2005), pp. 52-59. The NPR does also explicitly point to China as a country that could be involved in an immediate or potential contingency. The immediate contingency is regarding a military confrontation over the status of Taiwan. The potential contingency consists of plausible but not immediate dangers, which can include "the emergence of a new, hostile military coalition against the United States or its allies." See Nuclear Posture Review, pp. 16-17. For more on the impact that the NPR has had on China, see Joanne Tompkins, "How US Strategic Policy is Changing China's Nuclear Plans," Arms Control Today (January-February 2003).
61 60 59

For more information on the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal, see Robert S. Norris and Hans Kristensen, "Russian nuclear forces, 2005," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 61, n. 2 (March/April 2005), pp. 70-72.

The Yamantau facility is a leadership relocation facility, while the Kosvinsky facility houses the Russian nuclear command system. As such, it is a critical link to the 'Dead Hand' communications network for semi-automatic retaliation in the event of a decapitating strike. See Bruce G. Blair, "We Keep Buiding Nukes for All the Wrong Reasons," Washington Post, May 25, 2003, available at http://www.cdi.org/blair/new-nukes.cfm.
63 Nikolai Sokov, "Military Exercises In Russia: Naval Deterrence Failures Compensated By Strategic Rocket Success," Center for Non-Proliferation Studies Research Story (February 24, 2004), available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040224.htm. It should be noted that in the 2004 exercise that featured both weapon systems, the Bukavu SLBM failed to launch. 64

62

For more on the Russian 'launch on warning' nuclear posture, see Bruce G. Blair, Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995). Also see Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1993).

65 See Frank P. Harvey, "The future of strategic stability and nuclear deterrence," International Journal, vol. 58, n. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 321-346. 66 67

Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy," p. 43.

For this argument, see David S. McDonough, "The 'New Triad' of the Bush administration: Counterproliferation and escalation dominance in US nuclear strategy," International Journal, vol. 59, n. 3 (Summer 2004), pp. 613-634.
68

National Security Strategy of the United States, p. 14.

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See Scott Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons: Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International Security, vol. 21, n. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 54-86. While Sagan does accept the importance of what he terms the 'security model' for nuclear proliferation, he also accepts the role of domestic politics and norms as explanatory variables. This author takes a more sanguine view on the possibility that nuclear weapons would be used as part of a first-strike pre-emptive attack against a rogue state. A 'commitment trap' may have been created on nuclear pre-emption. However, one should also recognize that such a trap is based on public communication of such threats, and such pronouncements, on the issue of nuclear as opposed to conventional pre-emption, has not been a feature of the Bush administration. For more on the commitment trap, see Sagan, "The Commitment Trap," pp. 85-115. Of course, while not part of the official US doctrine, nuclear pre-emptive strikes appear to have been incorporated into operational planning, as seen in the crisis action planning and prompt strike capability of CONPLAN 8022-02.
71 70

69

The fear of a rogue state deterrent, and the need to counter such a deterrent with enhanced nuclear capabilities, has be raised by a number of prominent analysts. See Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (New York: Lynne Rienner, 1999) and Keith B. Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2001). Interestingly, both authors are prominent members of the National Institute of Public Policy, and were involved in writing the influential document, Rationale and Requirements for US Nuclear Forces. This document is acknowledged to have heavily informed the 2002 NPR, and many of its authors, including Keith Payne, would go on to hold positions in the Bush administrations Pentagon. For the opposite perspective, see Payne, "The Nuclear Posture Review," pp. 135-151.

72

BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION

A REVOLUTION
By Alexander Moens

IN

FOREIGN POLICY:

The Values and Strategy of George W. Bush

he George W. Bush administration did not form any type of grand strategy for its foreign policy until a few months after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The strategy that gradually evolved combined a revamped homeland security, an international network of overt and covert action against Al-Qaeda like organizations, an offensive war in the 'heartland' of the Middle East, and a soft-power approach to foster democracy in the entire region.1 Assisted by his team of foreign policy advisers, called the Vulcans2, Bush had formulated a set of values for American policy during the 2000 campaign. However, Bush's strategy in January 2001 was to concentrate on domestic policy. Most of the White House efforts went into tax and education reform plans. The time that was devoted to foreign affairs was largely taken up by one key initiative: building a missile defence capability and negotiating changes to or the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. As in domestic politics, Bush defined his foreign policy in terms of values. These can best be summarized as a type of conservative American internationalism or moral realism.3 He is not a traditional realist who looks at the balances of interests among states and manoeuvers US foreign policy through a narrow channel of relative gains sought in the short run. But he is also not an international insti-

128 ALEXANDER MOENS

tutionalist, as many Europeans have become, who seeks new collaborative interests through regional or global organizations by means of conventional treaties. Bush is both more traditional and more idealistic than either of these approaches. His vision is of sovereign states engaging in limited partnerships to achieve specific values.4 These values of course became quite controversial in 2001, as Bush explained that he would not pursue a "crime pays" policy vis-vis North Korea5 or negotiate with Yassir Arafat if the Palestinian leader was not going to clamp down on terrorist groups under his control. Bush also rejected many recent multilateral efforts advanced by European countries and Canada, including the Kyoto Protocol on climate control and the International Criminal Court. Amidst these controversial pronouncements, it is important to remember two things. For most of his first year in office, Bush had values and objectives in mind, but the administration was not ready with concrete policy plans to act on any of these. No wonder that an early assessment of Bush's foreign policy concluded that it looked like a "Just say no" policy.6 Secondly, when the policy plans did arrive, such as the Road Map for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the six-country talks on North Korea, Bush stayed true to his values. Prior to the Al-Qaeda attacks, the Bush team defined the combination of hostile rogue states such as North Korea and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as the most urgent threat to America. Bush's short term plans to deal with this threat was missile defence, while his long-term plan was military transformation. In a key address on national security at Charleston, South Carolina in September 1999, Bush called "a strong, capable and modern military" the "foundation of our peace." Swiftness, information, and stealth were the goals for transformed military power. The best way to keep the peace, Bush noted, was to redefine war on our own terms.7 In his inaugural address, Bush promised to build "defenses beyond challenge." Bush is not a doctrinaire unilateralist, but is best described, to coin a new term, as 'missionlateral.' In some ways, Bush's view of

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multilateralism is akin to Margaret Thatcher's view of the European Union. As a device to further British economic benefits, she was all for it. But as an alternative to British values she opposed it with all her heart. Bush has no quarrel with the United Nations in any dogmatic sense. But when other states begin to use the UN and its multilateral conventions as a way to replace or substitute for American values and foreign policy interests, Bush is turned off. Bush certainly has no desire to be unilateralist. Speaking at the Reagan Library in November 1999, he said, "Let us reject the blinders of isolationism, just as we refuse the crown of empire."8 An Emerging Strategy The Al-Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington flipped Bush's agenda. Now security and foreign policy dominated. Before the attacks, Bush had not bothered 'selling' his foreign policy much as he was preoccupied with domestic changes. Again, after 9/11, the administration did not take much time and effort to explain the big picture of what they were doing, because it was now intensely focused on getting it done. In a very charged atmosphere, Bush made a series of decisions that set the direction for his 'war on terror' strategy.9 During the operation in Afghanistan in late 2001 and early 2002, Bush and his inner circle continued a fundamental revamp of the American threat assessment, objectives and strategy. It was an atmosphere in which many expected further Al-Qaeda attacks. The nation was nervous about a string of anthrax letters killing people in different cities. Bush received intelligence about the possibility of a dirty nuclear bomb being set off in a major American city. Troops in Kandahar were finding the blueprints and videos of an Al-Qaeda trying to learn how to make weapons of mass impact. Osama bin Laden instructed his followers that it was their sacred duty to use WMD against the United States. In the summer of 2002, as the administration was finalizing its regime change policy in Iraq, it added further elements to the strategy,

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including the ambitious design of reforming the entire Middle East. In the fall of 2003, as Bush was battered by the insurgency in Iraq, the White House refined and sharpened some of its ideas, especially the notion of 'freedom' as the antidote to terror and the catalyst for transforming the region.10 What followed was a set of controversial and, befitting Bush's character, very risky policies. Yet, hiding behind the risk was more strategy and more vision than people at first realized. Bush added radical Islamic Militantism to the combination of rogue states and weapons of mass destruction in the American threat assessment. Just as Bush and Rumsfeld had changed the assessment in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in early 2001 from a threat based on the specific intent of rogue states to the wider overall capability of such regimes, so Bush now took a second look at this confluence of threats. What came out was a very pessimistic and maximalist threat scenario. Bush basically took three 'hostiles' and combined them into a single 'nexus' threat calculation. The new threat became the most hostile rogues (Iraq was the only state that celebrated on September 11) plus the most hostile means (weapons of mass impact) plus the most hostile actors (Al-Qaeda and like-minded groups). Given the capabilities that a combination of the three could muster, the United States had to be both preemptive and lower the burden of proof before it should act. The maximum threat setting of the late fall of 2001 is a crucial backdrop to the changes that have since followed. Bush challenged the existing ideas about national security, imminent threat, war and preventive war. Bush declared war on terror so that it would not be a process of seeking international justice or even just a 'fight.' 'War' opened all avenues of action, giving the flexibility the administration sought. When Bush declared his 'war on terror,' many thought he meant war on certain means. Critics concluded dismissively, that Bush was ignoring the root causes of terror and falling headlong into donquichottery by storming off in all directions to battle the windmills of terror.

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Bush actually did the opposite; he went to the root cause without saying so. He wiped out the conventional ideas of 'faceless' and 'stateless' terror.11 He imposed a strong face on the terrorists, identifying them as a branch of Islamic militants who took the religion of Islam out of context in order to further their narrow political aims. AlQaeda and affiliates, Bush said, stand for a new type of armed totalitarian ideology that aims to win the hearts and minds of people in the region, and that seeks to capture a major religion and ultimately control the states of the Middle East. The Bush administration later called this armed ideology or "pseudo-religious tyranny," the heir to fascism and communism.12 What Bush meant by 'heir' was the notion of totalitarian ideas that deny the worth of an individual. These were mixed with brutal force, in this case terrorism, to achieve traditional state power. When Baathists and Al-Qaeda-led Jihadists joined forces in the Iraqi insurgency, more people accepted Bush's definition.13 Bush also declared war on the havens of terror, going after both the "rattlers and the ranchers," as he put it. It was the 'ranchers' who could allow the terrorists to gather people or weapon ingredients, stay hidden and thus avoid a return address. If one accepts the nexus as the real forward-leaning threat assessment, and a necessary step to make sure that the smoking gun would not come in the form of a mushroom cloud, as Condoleezza Rice put it, the conclusion calling for aggressive treatment of havens is logical. Because terrorists cannot be deterred or contained, you don't expect to see evidence first that Al-Qaeda set foot in a certain place before you would launch an attack. On the other side, because the burden of proof becomes so thin and even speculative, the administration opened itself up to extensive second-guessing about what its 'real' motives were. Bush did get to the root cause of terrorism but it was a different root than most had in mind. The root cause of Al-Qaeda-like terrorism for Bush was not American foreign policy in Saudi Arabia or towards Israel, but more profoundly the prevalence of political

132 ALEXANDER MOENS

repression and lack of economic opportunity in the region. Thus Bush set a new and ambitious goal for his overall policy: freedom and democracy for the entire Middle East. In setting the new goal, Bush rejected both an isolationist turn for American foreign policy and the status quo. Likely, most politicians would have chosen to only tinker with American policy towards the Middle East after the attacks of 9/11. Rather than waging a narrow war against certain terrorist groups while leaving the region otherwise to its own fortunes, Bush blended the two. No doubt, Bush was inspired by Ronald Reagan's hard stance against the 'evil empire' in the early 1980s. Reagan became the catalyst for change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. He did so by rejecting the status quo. He did so while Western European allies scoffed and urged him not to rock the boat with Moscow. It was Mikhail Gorbachev who caught the ball thrown by Reagan.14 Likewise, Bush had to inspire, hoping that empowered Arab democrats would step forward. Bush did not need to be persuaded by so-called neo-conservatives such as Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, about the good that American ideals could do in the world. He had believed that all his life. There is a direct relationship between Bush slowly moving towards this enormously ambitious goal in his presidency after 9/11 and his value presidency in domestic politics before. Compassionate conservatism was not about tinkering a bit with existing ideas about how to improve schools or deliver welfare. It was revolutionary in its dismissal of the status quo. You can see how the values link together. For Bush, the Western approach towards Arabs and Muslims as defended by realists would let them remain undemocratic and continue 'the soft bigotry of low expectations'. By making the Al-Qaeda cause entirely political, Bush, the faith president, could embrace Islam and democracy at the same time and confound the critics who feared he was embarking on a clash of civilizations. The new nexus threat, the new war on terror, and the new goal of freedom in the Middle East led to a four-pronged policy, which

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gradually unveiled itself and hardened in its resolve. Today it is Bush's prime foreign policy. The first prong is homeland defence. The Patriot Act brought together various aspects of intelligence and crime prosecution that previously had been 'stovepiped' and nearly wiped away the fine line between foreign and domestic operations. It removed legal prohibitions, which had precedent in the fight against the Mafia and the war on drugs. The Department of Homeland Security, at first opposed by Bush because it would create more big government, is the symbol of the first prong. This new mega department coordinates the efforts of all agencies involved in protecting the air, land and sea approach to the United States, the flow of people, and the combined tasks of preventing and responding to terrorist threats at home.15 The 9/11 Commission Report called for the reorganization of all the intelligence agencies reporting to a new Director of National Intelligence.16 The second branch of Bush's new security policy is an international network of overt and covert intelligence operations against AlQaeda and like-minded groups. This is a multinational and ongoing series of intelligence, crime, and financial operations to capture AlQaeda operatives and prevent future attacks. Upwards of sixty countries are working with US authorities on a wide variety of operations. Contrary to popular thought, the war in Iraq in 2003 did not halt this second prong. In fact, that same year, the United States, in close cooperation with France, Germany and Britain set up the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which focused on intercepting weapons or weapon materials on the high seas destined for hostile rogue states or terrorist organizations. It is not easy to find out how much success this policy has enjoyed. The second shoe has not dropped. There have been no further terrorist attacks in the US since 9/11. Radical Islamic assaults have been mounted only in Bali, Indonesia and Madrid, Spain. The absence of successful attacks in the US may be primarily attributable to such second-prong initiatives. Is it because of the thorough clean up this prong accomplished?

134 ALEXANDER MOENS

No doubt the riskiest and most controversial part of Bush's policy was Iraq.17 If you declare you are in a war, you have to ask whether you can win with only defensive strategies and with only intelligence network efforts. The Bush team concluded that it had to create an offensive front and that it should be in the heart of the cauldron, the Middle East. Nor should it be only words, but you actually have to kick in the door so the entire region accepts that you mean business and adjust their own expectations and approach. If you accept the nexus threat assessment, the most dangerous places in early 2002 were Iraq, Iran and possibly Syria. Pakistan and North Korea are both dangerous and in an entirely different league. In a way, Bush changed the regime in Pakistan in the first days after September 11. The United States was either coming to Afghanistan and Pakistan or just to Afghanistan. The intense pressure put on General Musharraf to switch on a dime produced immediate results. To put any more demands on Pakistan would backfire. A tight embrace, including the lifting of sanctions and new military aid, could buy cooperation. Two nuclear-armed and veto-holding members of the United Nations Security Council flank North Korea. There are only two ways of dealing with Pyongyang: multilateral carrots or multilateral sticks. Iran had a vibrant but suppressed opposition and though disagreeable, a rational government. There were better ways to influence its policies than the threat of military force. Iraq was the ideal front. It had enough hostility to risk participation in the terrorist agenda, it had a track record in weapons of mass destruction and it was isolated. Saddam Hussein was the 'rancher' to be removed. Regime change was the policy set by Bush in early February 2002. Bush was not doctrinaire about the method. If real diplomatic pressure or covert intelligence operations could topple the regime and create a new government that would cooperate in the fight against terror and the removal of WMD, he would have gone for it, and so would Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair, Bush's closest ally in the campaign.

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Bush and Blair did not lie about weapons of mass destruction. They simply accepted the 1998 report card by the last UN inspectors and the general consensus among Western intelligence agencies in the late 1990s that Hussein had chemical weapon stockpiles, likely was working on biological weapons and wanted to have nuclear weapons. Tiny bits of intelligence confirming these suspicions were more than enough.18 If a burglar has been convicted three times of break and enter, and one night you find him standing near the window of a house, you simply conclude he is at it again. Saddam never left the window; hence there was no need to launch a fresh inquiry into his weapons of mass destruction designs. Towards the end of the buildup of diplomatic and military pressure against Saddam Hussein in late 2002, this story got a more complicated twist. In part it was Bush and Blair meeting their own Frankenstein.19 In early 2002, Blair had insisted that the regime change decision had to be articulated in public as, foremost, a campaign against weapons of mass destruction. He needed that to keep his own Labour Party on board and to persuade the British public. Powell's success in the summer of 2002 in persuading Bush to channel the end game into an UN-led coercive diplomacy campaign further narrowed Bush's options. Now the public face of Bush's original decision to change the regime in Baghdad had to meet two tests: it had to be sufficient in terms of WMD and it had to be sufficient inside the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1441. In strict legal terms, Bush and Powell did not do badly on 1441. They built in two triggers to 'rule' Saddam Hussein in violation of the measure and thus in material breach: failure to provide a complete disclosure and failure to provide unfettered access to the team led by UN inspector Hans Blix. By mid-January 2003, Saddam had tripped both triggers. At the same time, the gap between the old assumption about Saddam's weapons of mass destruction and the minuscule findings of Blix turned the entire public relations blitz back on Blair and Bush. Why would reluctant allies such as France and Germany go with the

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narrow terms of 1441 if Saddam apparently no longer had the capacity for weapons of mass destruction? If he did not, the whole regime change decision would become unhitched. Bush and Blair resorted to bolstering their WMD argument and retreating to the narrow legal terms of 1441 as well as the pre-1441 arguments about how evil the regime of Saddam really was.20 The war was executed in brilliant fashion. Rumsfeld managed to speed up his military transformation process during both the Afghanistan and Iraqi operations.21 Still, the diplomatic contention going into the final push for regime change had created an atmosphere in which Bush and Blair were isolated in the insurgency war that followed. The aftermath of the invasion became a bloody battle with American casualties going way out of the bounds of what had been expected for the reconstruction phase. Now American authorities were in a race to set up Iraqi governing structures while a potent mix of old Baathists with stockpiles of conventional weapons and new Jihadists with an eagerness to die, joined in an unholy alliance to deny Bush the ability to show progress. A lesser leader than Bush would have hung his head, given up and left the scene in late 2003 to try to change the agenda for the next election.22 The least understood part of Bush's policy is the carrot to the whole enterprise of changing the Middle East. The first ideas of soft power showed up in the administration's Middle East Partnership Initiative in 2002. The plan was to fund teacher education programs, strengthen a free media sector, set up regional banks to provide loans for small businessmen, help local non-governmental organizations educate the publics about elections and how to organize for them. In the Greater Middle East Initiative, which was leaked in early 2003, Bush wanted to set aside some $1 billion for these civil society, democracy, and economic development projects. The plan was to launch the idea in the G-7 meetings and to get the other G-7 partners to add another billion dollars.23 The very negative reaction of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to the idea of fermenting democracy inside their

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borders clipped European enthusiasm for the project and forced the Americans to scale back. The concept is still there in the 'Forum for the Future' project. Watering down the plans in the G-7 did not mean backing off. In the fall of 2003, Bush intensified his drive for accountable government and economic opportunity in the Middle East. By early 2005, the administration had spent nearly $300 million on these civil-society building projects; some in conjunction with other governments, others with the private sector or non-governmental organizations (NGOs).24 After Bush's election victory in 2004, freedom in the Middle East became the central plank of his second-term foreign policy. Conclusion The severity of the 9/11 attacks and urgency of a response would likely have caused serious changes by any president, Republican or Democratic. However, the centrality of Bush's value-based approach and his personal propensity to take risk led to a revolution in American foreign policy. The United States went from what Henry Kissinger termed a 'status quo' great power in the 1990s to a revolutionary great power in the first five years of the new century. The debate over how costly or beneficial this sudden change has been will go on for a long time. It is also too early to speculate whether Bush will continue in a revolutionary mode in his second term or if he will shift to a more reconciliatory mode. The latter is not inconceivable as it happened to Ronald Reagan who is closest to a model of George W. Bush we have.25 Reagan called the Soviet Union the 'evil empire' in the early 1980s and overthrew the dtente mode as practiced by Nixon and Carter. Despite pleas from Western Europe to be more realistic, Reagan insisted on being a catalyst for change in both the USSR and Eastern Europe. It was Mikhail Gorbachev who engaged Reagan on substantive change. As a result, Reagan's tone softened in his second term. The beginning of political reform that turned into a tide of democracy vindicated Reagan's

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controversial push for freedom. Bush is certainly inspired by Reagan's example. However, it is too early to tell whether his revolutionary changes will push the Middle East in the direction of more freedom or more violence. Notes:
1 See Alexander Moens, The Foreign Policy of George W. Bush: Values, Strategy, Loyalty (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, November 2004).
2

See James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 2004).

3 Bush's own campaign biography, co-written with Karen Hughes: George W. Bush, A Charge

To Keep (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1999) gives a brief account of Bush's main values in foreign policy. Colin Powell, "A Strategy of Partnerships," Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, n. 1 (January/February 2004); Condoleezza Rice, "Remarks by the National Security Adviser to the Reagan Lecture," Office of the Press Secretary, February 26, 2004.
5 4

The "crime pays" quote is from James Baker, III, "No More Caving on North Korea," Washington Post, October 23, 2002, p. 27. Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p. 66. "A Period of Consequences," The Citadel, South Carolina, September 23, 1999.

7 8

George W. Bush, "A Distinctly American Internationalism," Speech at Ronald Reagan Library, November 19, 1999.

For a sense of the atmosphere, see Bill Sammon, Fighting Back: The War on Terrorism from Inside the Bush White House (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc, 2002); and Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster), 2002.

10

Carla Anne Robbins and Jeanne Cummings, "New Doctrine: How Bush Decided That Iraq's Hussein Must be Ousted," Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2002, p. 8; see also Nicholas Lemann, "The Options," The New Yorker, October 1, 2001.
11

The trend setting address is, "President's Address to a Joint Session of Congress," September 20, 2001.

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12 13

Rice, "Remarks by the National Security Adviser."

Two examples are: Claus C. Malzahn, "Could George W. Bush be Right?" Spiegel Online, February 23, 2005; and Fouad Ajami, "A Sudden, Powerful Stirring," US News & World Report, March 14, 2005. Ronald Reagan (New York: Viking Press,

14 Peggy Noonan, When Character Was King: A Story of

2001), see especially p. 279. An excellent overview of both the strengths and weaknesses of the new department can be found in "On Guard," National Journal, March 6, 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004).
17 16 15

The best account of decision-making leading up to this decision is found in Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004).

Even the most recent information about decision making on Iraq indicates that Bush and Blair were operating from the assumption that Iraq had a small WMD capacity, though in July of 2002, the British believed that Saddam's capacity was smaller than that of Libya, Iran and North Korea. See David Manning, "The Secret Downing Street Memo," The London Times, May 1, 2005.
19 20

18

"The U.N. Trap," The Weekly Standard, November 18, 2002, pp. 9-12.

For a discussion of 'bolstering' see: Alexander George, Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), p. 38.

21

See Tommy Franks (with Malcolm McConnell), American Soldier (New York: ReganBooks, 2004).

22

For a critical assessment see James Fallows, "Bush's Lost Year," The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 293, n. 3 (October 2004).

23

Wayne Washington, "At G-8, Bush Unveils Mideast Democracy Plan," Boston Globe, June 10, 2004 Neil King JR, "Democracy Drive by America Meets Reality in Egypt," Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2005. See, Richard Brookhiser, "Close Up: The Mind of George W. Bush," Atlantic Monthly, vol. 291, n. 3 (April 2003); and Bill Keller, "Reagan's Son," New York Times Magazine, January 26, 2003.

24

25

STUCK

IN THE

MOMENT:

Prospects for United States Stability Operations in Iraq1

By Karen Guttieri

We and the Iraqis are stuck. But I think the symbolism is important. Paul Wolfowitz, May 18, 2004 2 resident George W. Bush seized America's moment of primacy, but appears now to be stuck in it, no where more so than in the sands of Iraq. Having ended Iraq's decades-old dictatorial rule by force, Bush now aims to stabilize a new indigenous government and, by all indications, bring substantial numbers of American troops home before the mid-term elections. Indeed, in November 2005, the Pentagon announced a substantially lower troop rotation of 92,000 Army troops in 2006.3 The United States, more than a year after the conclusion of formal occupation, sustains over 130,000 troops in Iraq. Insurgents and foreign infiltrators aim to thwart progress toward Iraqi self-governance. At the moment, a temporary Iraqi government its third since the 2003 regime change is attempting to develop a permanent governance framework. A constitutional referendum in October and an election in December 2005 require additional security. The United States appears to be in need of friends in order to stabilize Iraq, but what are the prospects for success and allied cooperation?

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The Bush strategy of transformation, discussed below, sets the goals or definitions of success that the US hopes to pursue with the aid of its allies. In this article, I discuss what is at stake in this strategy for the United States, outline possible futures, and conclude with a brief look at some of the implications for America's allies. Transnational terrorists and neighbouring Iran have exploited the power vacuum produced by regime change in Iraq, and pose threats of different kinds not only to US leadership, but to international peace and security. Transformation Strategy The September 2001 attacks on America by religious fanatics provided a focusing event around which to develop a new American consensus on the use of force. The Bush administration seized this moment to shift America's military strategy in the Middle East from a strategy of containment to a strategy of transformation. The US and allied invasion of Iraq was an important element in that new strategy. Despite references to a "New World Order" as the United States first fought against Iraq in 1991, that engagement was not transformative.4 It contained Iraq and that strategy of containment persisted for ten years. However, some in government were then recognizing the extraordinary relative power position the United States would enjoy after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. There was potential for an American strategy shift on a grand scale. As the 1992 strategy credited to Paul Wolfowitz stipulated, the US would strive for a more robust hegemony, including preventing the rise of a peer competitor.5 This notion was new and so diplomatically sensitive at the time, that it did not survive from draft to final document.6 The draft Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) embraced unilateralism in part because it worried about friends and foes each in their measure.7 Expanded American global reach would be needed in part to provide security guarantees and extended deterrence to keep allies in check.

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The notion of American hegemony is certainly not new it is arguable that the US has been seeking "preponderance" throughout the post-war era.8 American policy continued, as during the Cold War, to encourage democracy and free markets, and to selectively address threats to such specific interests as access to Persian Gulf oil. President George W. Bush continued, as did William Jefferson Clinton before him, to rely on relative advantages in US military power. But significantly, Bush abandoned Clinton's method of multilateralism for a more unilateral, nationalistic and militaristic strategy that Barry Posen has called "primacy."9 This new vision of power brought with it new aspirations for global transformation. The transformation turn is reflected in the extension of US power into Central Asia, but is perhaps most evident in the Middle East. Surprising US policy shifts included distancing from important regional partners, downplaying involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace process, and removing the Iraqi dictator who had previously served American interests.10 Bush exploited innovations in war-fighting (now also called "transformation") and new infrastructure in the region to wage a campaign in Iraq with a lighter force, and presumably with a lighter social cost. No powerful alliance such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and no legitimating power such as the United Nations supported the effort. This new vision of power troubled America's allies (and potential rivals) because it removed a vital check on American ambition its own liberalism.11 Despite its military prowess, America has not yet realized the victory envisioned in Iraq.12 Critics commonly blame political and military planners. They seemed focused enough on war-fighting but short-sighted about the requirements of peace-making. The US troops that had appeared to conquer Iraq with great speed and ease in March and April of 2003 were clearly unable to secure the streets when widespread and devastating looting followed.13 In the political vacuum left by the deposed regime, insurgents gained momentum and conducted attacks on occupying troops, contractors, Iraqi security

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forces and the United Nations. Today US troops, including large mobilizations of reservists, are stretching thin on extended deployments. Not since the Korea War have so many reservists been called to active duty, and not since 1973 has the United States continually rotated so many troops. Over 1.2 million have served in uniform in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan or Operation Iraqi Freedom, with 316,000 of these having served more than one tour.14 According to a Pentagon source, it is anticipated that in March 2006, active duty Army divisions will have pulled two tours of duty, and all Marine divisions will have pulled three. Ironically, the administration sustains troop levels its officials had dismissed as "wildly off the mark" when the Army Chief of Staff provided his estimate before the war. The majority of United States military casualties in Iraq have occurred after May 1, 2003, the day President George W. Bush declared major combat operations over. By May 2003, the administration was obviously looking for ways out. Symbolically, Stanford Professor Larry Diamond, who served as an advisor to the occupation authority in Iraq, returned home to Stanford on leave in April 2004 but did not board his return flight. In Diamond's excuse that he had "hit an emotional brick wall," was a public admission, by a prominent expert on democracy, of disillusionment.15 Photographic images of American abuses of detainees shocked the nation. A majority of Americans polled stated that it was not worth going to war in Iraq.16 The Iraqi Governing Council, appointed by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), had failed to secure legitimacy, and it was unclear to whom the CPA would "transfer sovereignty" in June. There was even talk of a pending civil war in Iraq. The legitimacy of the war itself had been problematic. It was conducted amid failed appeals for support in the United Nations Security Council and street protests against the pending war worldwide. It was justified as a defensive move against Iraqi nuclear

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weapons that did not materialize. The violent messiness of the aftermath of major combat operations and the degradations of the occupation compounded problems. "Washington now has the worst of both worlds," Fareed Zakaria opined. "It has neither enough power nor enough legitimacy."17 US choices in 2004 reflected a new pragmatism about its power deficit. The US accommodated problematic Shiite forces personified by Muqtada al Sadr and Ali al Sistani, while the military focused counterinsurgency efforts on the Sunni insurgency. This pragmatism led to a new conception of success in Iraq, as explained below. Success and Stabilization Speaking before Congress, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld defined success in terms of the character of Iraq as "free, democratic and peaceful."18 The nation would moreover abstain from certain behaviours, specifically that Iraq "will not provide aid to violent extremists; it will not plot the assassination of American presidents; it will not invade or fire missiles at its neighbors; and it will not use chemical weapons on its neighbors or its own people."19 Success in Iraq is subject to multiple definitions, but the most problematic is to measure success as achieving normalization of daily life in Iraq. Stabilization, the ability to manage a single event like an election, is more a manageable goal. This distinction is critical to the prospects for allied cooperation. To ask allies to provide a set number of troops one month before an election is one thing; to ask allies to join the US in a seemingly open-ended effort to subdue an insurgency is another. For this reason, the current window of opportunity for stabilization in terms of the current electoral process in Iraq is particularly significant. Great hopes for Iraqi stabilization have been pinned on electoral processes.20 The January 30, 2005 vote that chose a constitution-writing Transitional National Assembly (TNA) created a moment of great euphoria. The people of Iraq participated in their first open election

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in fifty years. President George Bush promptly claimed victory, pronouncing the problematic outcome a "resounding success." Since the level (or effect) of the violence was much lower than expected, the US dollar rallied on world markets.21 The participation rate was quickly compared favorably to American elections, in reports that failed to mention that the figure included few Arab Sunnis.22 The January 2005 election success is mostly due to the low expectations for them. A senior official conceded beforehand that they would be "messy at best."23 Iraqis voted amid confusion, persistent and escalating violence, and a boycott by key players the Sunni Arabs who had dominated Iraq under Saddam Hussein.24 On the other hand, as a high-security event to be managed, the January plebiscite truly was a success. Shiite and Kurdish voters were eager to participate, and could provide the voter turnout numbers needed to placate the American public. But it had to be safe for them to do so. The coalition forces solved this problem when they shut down vehicle traffic, limiting the bomb-delivery capacity of insurgents. The outcome of that January vote was, by definition, temporary Iraq's third temporary government since March 2003.25 The elections do signify a significant step toward self-governance, but it is selfgovernance without a monopoly on the use of force. Despite efforts to promote an inclusive, consensual democracy, the name of the game is identity politics. The Arab Sunni minority that dominated Iraq under Saddam Hussein had the most to lose in a democratic contest, and they sought to spoil it in January. Under the proportional representation formula with the entire nation as its district, the boycott created disproportionate under-representation for the Sunni Arabs. Iraq's Shiites turned their demographic weight (something like sixty percent of the population) into governing power. The Kurds (at about twenty percent of the population) united their lists and initiated a referendum on secession in a side vote. Attempts were later made to draw Sunni Arabs into the constitution writing process by means

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of side negotiations to participate in the drafting of the constitution, but they were insufficiently organized among themselves and inadequately engaged in the constitutional process by others. Despite efforts by the US Institute of Peace and the American Bar Association to draw in Sunni Arab representation in June 2005, Iraq's constitutional negotiations moved to a separate forum, "the kitchen" (matbagh). The Kurdish/Shia Leadership Council met separately and presented Sunni Arab negotiators with "a fait accompli constitution," largely due to pressure from the US and, in particular, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad to meet the August 15 deadline.26 What happens next between these groups and the Sunnis is vital to the next phase of Iraq's post-conflict transition, regional power balances and American options in Iraq. The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) of 2004 developed by Iraqis with the occupying Coalition Governing Authority theoretically set the rules for a new Iraq until a permanent government is seated in December. This now appears overly optimistic. Despite the TAL's expressed intention to proscribe power sharing based upon identity, this is precisely how power sharing in Iraq is playing out today. The vision for the new Iraq, as articulated in Article 4 of the TAL, was as follows: The system of government in Iraq shall be republican, federal, democratic, and pluralistic, and powers shall be shared based upon geographic and historical realities and the separation of powers, and not upon origin, race, ethnicity, nationality, or confession.27 A republican vision is the most easily achieved, since all it requires is that the head of state is not a monarch, leaders serve a limited term, and successors are chosen by electoral process. Federalism is more problematic. The term here specifically refers to power shared "between the federal government and the regional governments, gov-

148 KAREN GUTTIERI

ernorates, municipalities, and local administrations." Federalism works best with other elements that are lacking in Iraq: strong bicameralism in the legislature (a strong Senate to match a strong Congress), a rigid constitution, and strong judicial review.28 Federalism is the most hotly contested dimension of the new constitution. Disaggregating power and resources is most dangerous to the Sunni Arabs, as they have lost the former and do not have the oil resources of the other political groups. Democracy, as articulated in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, means "the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government."29 The role of religion as a basis of law in Iraq was a significant topic of contention in the constitution recently drafted, and is related to debates about legitimacy of government itself. The radical Sunni Islamist group Ansar al-Sunnah, for example, posted an anti-democratic notice that "rule of the peopledenies the belief in one God."30 They warned that un-Islamic laws could be the product of democracy. They even warned that their opponents could be leading the people on a path to religiously unacceptable laws, including laws permitting homosexual marriage. Iraq is a society that must accommodate pluralism, to create a framework that respects differences in political interaction. In societies divided by ethnic and religious cleavages, as in Iraq, how can divergent groups coexist without conflict on the one hand or assimilation on the other? Diffused power and decision-making, so that more people affected by decisions participate in them, are common approaches to encourage people to develop more commitment to society at large. The federalist vision and the electoral formula designed for Iraq reflect efforts to accommodate differences. Arend Lijphart would call this a consensus as opposed to a majoritarian approach to governance.31 The first general type, majoritarian government, concentrates power in the hands of a bare majority possibly only a plurality. It relies upon good losers who will return to fight another day. Consensus

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government seeks to maximize majorities by creating a framework for broad participation and agreement. Electoral formulas in majoritarian democracies commonly give the election to the candidate with the most votes this may or may not be the same as a majority (over 50 percent), according to the plurality rule. This formula tends to produce gaps in representation, rewarding those with the plurality with a disproportionate number of seats. Proportional representation (PR), as an electoral formula, aims to represent both majorities and minorities.32 This was the formula used in Iraq's January 30 election. There are some obvious advantages to a PR system with maximum district magnitude in the Iraqi TNA election. As noted, PR in theory is more inclusive and representative. It encourages alliances. It is also less expensive to run, and more secure because no one has to campaign where it is most dangerous. Making the entire nation the district avoided the problem of having to appoint representatives of Mosul and Falluja if voting was impossible in those cities. It also most easily accommodates out-of-country voting. On the other hand, this formula favors parties and, despite the existence of some long-standing parties, party development in Iraq is in its infancy. Because it is easier to fund a party list than to buy off voters in each district, Michael Rubin argues, this formula favors external influence.33 The district magnitude means that representatives will not be beholden, and thereby responsible to, particular communities of people. Because the Transitional National Assembly was chosen by Iraqis, it did improve on its two predecessor interim regimes as a step toward a permanent government in Iraq. However, despite the best intentions of the election's designers for an inclusive, consensual democracy in Iraq, the TNA was chosen by an incomplete number of Iraqis. This election may therefore have led Iraq away from the vision of Iraqi government pluralistic, unified, and at peace with its neighbours America hopes to see.

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The Stakes Much is at stake in Iraq's transition. First, there is the matter of increasing demands for Middle Eastern oil in Asia and North America. Second is the problem of transnational terrorism. The Bush administration has shifted its language on the global war on terror several times over the summer of 2005, at some points suggesting that it will be limited to radical (Sunni) violent extremists. Third, a dissolution of Iraq would likely draw in Iran, Turkey, and other regional powers. Fourth, the US is in a showdown with Iran over its nuclear program. In short, US leadership, including its international legitimacy and freedom to pursue its own interests, are at stake in Iraq. US President George W. Bush has called the January 2005 election of a constitution-writing assembly a "historical marker for our Iraq policy."34 Some, including the current Iraqi Interim Government's (IIG) Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, saw this as a possible marker for American troop withdrawal.35 Likewise, discussion on the October 2005 constitutional referendum also presented the event as a marker for partial withdrawal to an anticipated 60,000 troops, in a year's time. If the country breaks apart, there will be more than one entity with whom the United States would have to negotiate the matter. Scenarios What follows America's withdrawal? One unlikely scenario is the rise of another Iraqi strongman a kinder, gentler version of Saddam Hussein, perhaps. The substitution of the tyranny of one prince for another would have been much simpler than a democratization project. However, the US had searched for many years for such a solution, and failed to find it. The exile leader Ahmed Chalabi was no saviour for Iraq as Hamid Karzai was for Afghanistan. The Iraqis themselves rejected the closest approximation of a strongman in January 2005

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when they did not endorse the US administration's supposed choice, current Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, running on a slate called the Iraqi List.36 The outcome instead was dominance of the constitutional assembly by the religious Shiite slate United Iraqi Alliance, sanctioned by the cleric Ayatollah Ali Sistani. A second scenario is a break up of Iraq leaving an implicit client system. Large street demonstrations in Iraq at the time of this writing, in September 2005, show opposing intentions. Shiites are out demonstrating their support for the new constitution; Sunni's demonstrating their opposition. Some Sunni insurgent groups have even promised not to target US troops on October 15, because this time they do want to vote. Unfortunately, they want to vote in order to defeat the constitution.37 What happens if Iraq breaks apart? Saudi Arabia has been increasingly worried about the prospect of Iraqi disintegration. "There is no dynamic now pulling the nation together," Prince Saud al-Fiasal, the Saudi foreign minister, said on his visit to Washington in late September. "All the dynamics are pulling the country apart."38 The Saudis, Jordanians and Turks fear Shiite dominance of Iraq, but are all likely to look after their own particular interests in Iraq. Syria has its own concerns about spillover effects of radicalized Sunni populations.39 As Kenneth Pollack warns, Iran's decision about civil war in Iraq could be the single most important decision in post-Saddam Iraqi history. If the Iranians decide to move, it will become a self-fulfilling prophecy they will kick off a the civil war they are trying to win because the moment they move, the Sunnis have to move, the Kurds have to move and all of Iraq's neighbors have to move immediately.40 Iran, Syria and other regional powers would need to figure out a way to coexist in order to sustain the fragments of the Iraqi state. The United States could not itself negotiate such a system, but would have

152 KAREN GUTTIERI

to signal its acquiescence. Along with Syria, Turkey and Iran possess the heavy land armies that are conceivably capable of occupying large swaths of Iraqi terrain if the US military pulls out and Iraq breaks apart. This scenario is most dangerous for the Kurds, as Turkey is considered likely to send troops if they declare independence. The Kurds in the north and Shiites in the south are allied in advocating a federal structure for Iraq. Kurdish parties constructed a united list in January 2005 in order to assure strong ethnic representation in the constitution-writing assembly. Kurds seek autonomy, but successfully negotiated with the Shiite groups to achieve their aims in the new constitution: control over their own 60,000 man militia; lawmaking powers; control over new oil and gas discoveries; and the return of tens of thousands of Kurds expelled from oil-rich regions by Saddam Hussein's forces.41 Although Kurdish leaders act as if independence is inevitable, the federal solution for now placates neighbouring Turkey and Iran. Those nations are also are home to large Kurdish populations and want Iraq's Kurds to participate in the constitutional process within Iraq, rather than seek autonomy outright. US and coalition troops might consider repositioning forces to Northern Iraq, in order to safeguard the population, but would not be freed of entanglements with Sunnis, particularly as Kurds and Sunnis contest the oil-rich Kirkuk region. A third scenario is a unified democratically governed Iraq, dominated by Iran. Iran had anticipated its neighbour's moment of democracy, preparing shadow governments to take control in Shiite areas after the war.42 In February 2004 the occupation authorities suspended local elections held in the south because they mobilized Islamic parties and, according to my CPA sources, would seem to legitimate Sistani's call for elections at the national level. Those days were obviously over when the US embraced the outcome of the January 2005 elections. Iran provided sanctuary to the Iraqi group that dominates the winners in the January 2005 election, the Supreme

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Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Today the town of Najaf is controlled by the Badr Corps, a militia trained by Iran that serves as SCIRI's armed force. Iranian influence and organization throughout southern Iraq had been a stabilizing factor, since the conclusion of the war gave Iran incentive to act as a status quo and not a revisionist power. This helps to explain why British troops experienced comparative peace in the south (as compared to American experiences in central Iraq). Recent British shoot-outs with local police forces in the town of Basra erode that myth, as well as another that standing up indigenous Iraqi police and other armed forces is the key to peaceful transition. In September, British forces in armoured vehicles stormed an Iraqi police station in an effort to free two of their own special operations forces and were met by a closely coordinated crowd of 1,000-2,000 armed with hand-made bombs, some of whom doused soldiers inside armoured vehicles with gasoline. A sectarian force known as the Jameat dominates the Basra police. One police commander said, "The people who like to murder and torture come from Internal Affairs. They get police uniforms, police vehicles and police identification."43 In October, British Prime Minister Tony Blair accused Iran of providing technology and explosives to its allies in southern Iraq.44 This scenario would see Iraq likely draw away from Saudi Arabia and Jordan, nations that are largely Sunni. Jordanian King Abdullah caused a stir in December 2004 when he alleged that a large number of Iranians crossed into Iraq before the election. He raised the spectre of a "Shiite crescent" from Iraq through Iran to Azerbaijan that might even include Syria and Lebanon. This would destabilize nations with large Shiite populations: "Even Saudi Arabia is not immune from this," he said. "It would be a major problem. And then that would propel the possibility of a Shiite-Sunni conflict even more, as you're taking it out of the borders of Iraq."45 Increased Iranian influence in Iraq might be an inevitability, but it is not a favourable scenario for the US. In late September, diplo-

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mats from the European Union observing a march in Tehran marking the anniversary of the 1980 Iran-Iraq War walked out on the parade after ballistic missiles rolled past with anti-Israel and anti-US banners on them.46 The nuclear game with Iran that intensified in 2005 is a dangerous one, and Iran's willingness to compromise on the nuclear issue appears to be related to the success of the US campaign in Iraq and has eroded with it.47 The nuclear tension is worse than many Americans may appreciate. General John Abizaid, Commander of US Central Command, even rattled a nuclear sabre in late November, 2004: Why the Iranians would want to move against us is beyond meIf you ever even contemplate our nuclear capability, it should give everybody the clear understanding that there is no power that can match the United States militarily.48 Electoral Events and Troop Numbers The elected Iraqi Transitional National Assembly in August 2005 submitted, after three delays, a problematic draft constitution for vote in October. This is to be followed by an election of a permanent assembly in December. A permanent government of Iraq according to this schedule will be seated on December 31. If two-thirds of the voters in any three provinces reject the constitution, it will go back to the drawing board for another attempt in October 2006.49 These represent more electoral events to manage. In January the US and coalition partners increased forces to 150,000 and benefited from the element of surprise when they shut down traffic against insurgent attacks. The challenge now is how to stabilize the upcoming events. The constitutional process in this third scenario will require substantial forces to cover electoral events. General McCaffrey's report to the Senate in 2005 referred to "progressive deterioration of Army and Marine manpower. (In particular, the expected melt-down of the

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Army National Guard and Army Reserve in the coming 36 months)."50 Although the US military planned to increase troop levels from 138,000 to 160,000 for October's referendum, officials recently announced changes. Due to demands of Hurricane Katrina and Afghanistan (facing provincial elections September 18) the US presence increased by 2,000 rather than 20,000. American forces would be grateful for help from other nations, but little help is available. America's neighbour to the north, for example, has contributed to the war on terror and specifically to NATO forces in Afghanistan, but has not deployed to Iraq. The Bush administration does not publicly complain too much about this, perhaps because Canada has contributed in Afghanistan and elsewhere, or perhaps because it draws attention to a failure of coalition-building. If Canada's abstention is noted, the American people might also begin to consider why a nation would not go to Iraq. A United Nations commitment seems unlikely for many reasons, not the least is the lack of substantial presence since the bombing of its headquarters in August of 2003. Already 17 of NATO's 26 member nations have contributed forces.51 In 2005, all 26 member nations were "contributing" to training Iraqi security forces. "A line has been drawn over the differences of the past, and there is a common consensus on supporting the new Iraqi government, whenever that is formed," NATO chief Jaap de Hoop Scheffer announced in February.52 Unfortunately, with 10,000 troops engaged in an expanding NATO mission in Afghanistan and extensive European troop commitments in the Balkans, large numbers of troops are simply not available.53 The most favourable scenario is one that puts an Islamic face on the external security forces, but does not draw in Turkey or Iran. Algeria, Indonesia, Malaysia and Egypt, for nations that are closer to the problem and culturally better-equipped to manage Iraq. Pakistan before a horrific earthquake struck in October might have been in a position to contribute as much as a division of force, should the US

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help negotiate security guarantees that India will not exploit such a large commitment of its rival's forces elsewhere. A bigger recruitment problem is the hazard to any troops attempting to stabilize Iraq. As Paul Wolfowitz told Congress, "I don't think anybody is going to want to put a lot of troops into Iraq until the killing stops."54 Conclusion The elections in January were an important step in Iraq's externally-forced transition from authoritarian rule and its post-conflict transition to self-governance. However, no matter how much the outsiders invest to keep Iraq together, a sub-regional balance of power may be the eventuality. Rather than shaping the region in terms of a grand transformative vision that favours America's interest, American policy reacts to forces within Iraq and the interests of regional states. The October referendum can make a big difference in America's prospects to exit with dignity. America's allies have a strong interest in the fate of the US strategy in Iraq. If the US is badly hurt, will Americans become more or less engaged advocates of international liberal values like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? If the US is badly hurt, will it translate into an erosion of American leadership and thereby, the extended nuclear deterrent? The peaceful referendum in October is promising since other troop contributing states may be more likely to contribute in the future, and with greater numbers. A deployment to improve the numbers for a specific event, such as December's founding elections, as opposed to an open-ended counter-insurgency deployment, provides a limited commitment that is more feasible for many of our allies. Notes:
1 The views expressed here are those of

the author and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.

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2 3

US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Iraq: The Way Ahead, May 18, 2004.

Bryan Bender, "Concern Voiced on Multiple Tours of Duty," The Boston Globe, November 11, 2005.

The first Persian Gulf War was very different from the recent engagement. It was a response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and so it garnered international support for a grand alliance. The war itself was limited to the restoring the borders, or status quo ante, rather than transforming regional power structures. See the discussion of war termination in Alexander George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington: US Institute of Peace Press, 1993).

Paul Wolfowitz had illustrated the architecture of this grand strategy over a decade before he implemented it as Deputy Defense Secretary in the current Bush administration. In February 1992, a draft of the then-overdue Defense Planning Guidance was leaked to the New York Times. The document by Wolfowitz, then Undersecretary for Policy to Dick Cheney's Secretary of Defense, featured both predominance and unilateralism. The US would "maintain mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role." Furthermore, the US would be postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated." (Quoted in Patrick E. Tyler, "US Strategy Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop" New York Times, March 7, 1992, available online at http://web.lexis-nexis.com, load date March 9, 1992). The Washington Post described the prevention of a rival power, "a diplomatically sensitive subject that has not been prominent in public debate." (Barton Gellman, "Keeping the US First," Washington Post, March 11, 1992 available online at http://web.lexis-nexis.com). The New York Times called the document "the clearest rejection to date of collective multilateralism, the strategy that emerged from World War II"
7 In particular "European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO" (cited 6

in Tyler, "US Strategy Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop") and in general efforts by allies to provide their own security.
8 This is Christopher Layne's characterization in "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing," International Security, vol. 22, n. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 86-124. 9

Barry Posen, "Command of the Commons: Military Foundations of US Hegemony," International Security, vol. 28, n. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 5-46. James A. Russell, "Strategy, Security and War in Iraq: The United States and the Gulf in the 21st Century," Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 18, n. 2, July 2005, pp. 283301.

10

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11

On the institutional and normative constraints of the post-war order, see John Ikenberry, After Victory (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). For a specific argument that "second-tier major powers" are engaged in "soft balancing" against the United States due to alarm over the Iraq war, see T. V. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," International Security, vol. 30 n. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 46-71.

12

US Defense Science Board, "Transition to and from Hostilities," (Washington, DC: 2004); James Fallows, "Blind into Baghdad," The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 293, n. 1 (Jan/Feb 2004). See Robert Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger when we need him? : America's search for a postconflict stability force (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003).

13

14

Bryan Bender, "Concern Voiced on Multiple Tours of Duty," The Boston Globe, November 11, 2005, p. A10. Diamond also blamed the US military for providing too few troops. James Sterngold, "Stanford Expert Says Iraq Spinning Out of Control," San Francisco Chronicle, April 25, 2004, p. A7. David W. Moore, "Bush Job Approval Drops to Record Low," May 11, 2004, at http://www.gallop.com.

15

16

17

Fareed Zakaria, "An Absence of Legitimacy," Washington Post, January 20, 2004, Editorial; p. A19. Armed Services, Testimony of Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Progress of Iraqi Security Forces," June 23 2005.
19 20 18

Iraq: The Way Ahead.

Some of the observations here have been previously posted in Karen Guttieri, Elections in Iraq: Managing Expectations, February 2005. Available from http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/feb/guttierifeb05.pdf].

"Dollar, Global Stock Markets Boosted by Smooth Iraqi Elections," Agence France Presse -English, Jan. 31 2005.
22 American pollster James Zogby warns that the Iraq election compares to the 1860 US elec-

21

tion and Abraham Lincoln's victory just before South Carolina's secession. Robin Wright, "President Hails Election as a Success and a Signal," Washington Post, January 31, 2005. Warren Strobel, "Poll Finds Most Iraqis Plan to Vote, Many Optimistic About the Future," Knight Ridder, December 22, 2004.
24 23

In a survey taken just one month prior to the election, as many as 41% of Iraqis asked

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"what will Iraqis be voting for on January 30?" indicated incorrectly that they'd be voting for a president. The correct answer, that the main election is for a Transitional National Assembly (TNA), was chosen by fewer than 29%. The poll excluded Falluja, Ramadi and Mosul, as these areas were too dangerous for polling. See International Republican Institute IRI, Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion November 24 December 5, 2004 (2004 [cited January 18, 2004]; available from http://www.iri.org).
25

The first was the Iraqi Governing Council, appointed by L. Paul (Jerry) Bremer in July 2003; the second was the Iraqi Interim Government, chosen by Bremer and United Nations envoy Lakdhar Brahimi with Iraqi advice. Known as a "caretaker government," the IIG filled the gap between the "transfer of sovereignty" at the end of the period of acknowledged military occupation June 28, 2004. It was dominated by major Shiite Islamist, Kurdish and established parties and led by Prime Minsiter Iyad Allawi.

26 Iman Mona, "Draft Constitution Gained, but an Important Opportuntiy Was Lost," USIPeace Briefing (2005). 27

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority and Governing Council of Iraq, Transitional Administrative Law 8 March 2004 (2004 [cited 8/8/2004]; available from http://www.cpairaq.org/cgi-bin/prfriendly.cgi?http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL_exsum.html.) (Emphasis Added.)

28

Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999). pp. 186-188. In a unitary and central government in the United Kingdom or Iraq under Saddam Hussein, by way of contrast, local governments are "creatures of the central government" and are financially dependent on them (p. 17). Christophe Wilcke's extensive interviews weave a story about a how an early occupation decision by L. Paul Bremer of the Coalition Provisional Authority not to hold local elections cut short the possibility of robust federalism, and even legitimacy, in Iraq. With a deficit of rule-making and organization at the local level, pragmatic accommodation by military leaders and "politics behind closed doors" emerged instead. One observer has called the US approach an unseemingly combination, and the resulting governance deficit "castles built of sand." Christoph Wilcke in "Castles Built of Sand: Us Governance and Exit Strategies in Iraq," Middle East Report, n. 232 (Fall 2004). Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (1948).

29 30

Nick Wadhams, "Democracy Is Un-Islamic, Say Extremists: Vow to Attack Voters," Associated Press, December 31, 2004. "Anyone who accepts to take part in this dirty farce," they warn, "will not be safe." Lijphart provides a useful distinction among democracies according to how they answer the simple question, "who should govern?" Some answer "the majority of the people;" others reply, "as many people as possible." A tendency toward federal as opposed to unitary gov31

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ernment, and proportional representation as opposed to majoritarian voting formula, are but two of ten features that distinguish consensus from majoritarian democracies. See Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy.
32

In a PR system, parties nominate lists of candidates and voters cast their ballot for one list or another. Seats are then allocated in proportion to the votes collected. A list including 275 names that receives twenty percent of the vote would send the top fifty-five names on its list to fill seats in the Assembly. In order to promote better gender representation, every third candidate on each list submitted for the Iraqi election must be a woman. Proportional Representation requires multimember districts, so that several voices can be selected from a given constituency (the size of the district is the district magnitude). In Iraq, the district magnitude is the maximum the entire nation plus out of country voters. This magnitude might be consistent with the vision of a federal Iraq if parties and coalitions in Iraq were wellorganized federally, but they are not.

Michael Rubin, "CPA, R.I.P.: The US Hands over Iraq to Iraqis," National Review Online (2004). David Stout, "Bush Dismisses Growing Concerns over Elections in Iraq," New York Times, January 7, 2005. Roula Khalaf and Steve Negus, "Election Hopefuls Pay Lip Service to Idea of US Troop Withdrawal," Financial Times, January 19, 2005. This slate is ethnically and religiously diverse, and is most importantly is fronted by a perceived "strongman." Mariam Fam, "Symbolism in Election Ads Reflects Rise of Religious Power in Post-Saddam Iraq," Associated Press, January 23, 2005. Ellen Knickmeyuer, "Big Hike in Troops for Vote Canceled," San Jose Mercury News, September 3, 2005, p. 14A.
38 Joel Brinkley, "Saudi Minister Warns US Iraq May Face Disintegration," New York Times, September 23, 2005, p. 6. 37 36 35 34

33

Syria is about seventy-four percent Sunni, but that majority is ruled by minority Allawites, an offshoot of Shiism.
40

39

Kenneth Pollack, cited in Courtney Rustin, "A Critical Triangle: Iraq, Iran and the United States," USIPeace Briefing (2005).

Dexter Filkins, "Ex-Rebel Kurd Savoring Victory in Iraq's Politics," New York Times, September 2, 2005, pp. A1; A10.
42

41

Abd al-Aziz Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq,

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associated with the Badr Corps militia, and Ali Sistani both have Iranian connections.
43 Richard A. Oppel Jr., "In Basra, Militia Controls by Fear," New York Times, October 9, 2005. 44

Rory Carroll, "Iraqi Police are among 12 Seized by British Forces in Basra Raid," The Guardian, October 8, 2005, p. 19.

45

Most Muslims in the world are Sunni, but Iran is 89% Shiite, Iraq is 60-65%, Bahrain is 70%, Azerbaijan is 67%. Shiites form a major sect in Lebanon, and Hezbollah is a Shiite political party. Robin Wright and Peter Baker, "Iraq, Jordan See Threat to Election from Iran; Leaders Warn against Forming Religious State," Washington Post, December 8, 2004.

46 Steven R. Weisman, "West Presses for Nuclear Agency Rebuke to Iran, Despite Russian Dissent," New York Times, September 23, 2005, p. 6. 47

Geoffrey Kemp in Courtney Rustin, "A Critical Triangle: Iraq, Iran and the United States," USIPeace Briefing (2005). Tom Squitieri, "Top General Warns Iran Not to Underestimate US Military," USA Today, November 29, 2004.

48

49

This provision is controversial, because it gives the Kurds (who control three provinces) an effective veto.

50 General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret.) "Memorandum For: Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Subject: Trip Report Kuwait and Iraq Saturday 4 June through Saturday, 11 June 2005" (June 2005). 51

In May 2003 the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation agreed to support a Polish-led multinational division in Iraq.

52 "NATO Trumpets All Allies on Board for Iraq Mission," Agence-France Presse English,

February 22, 2005; Warren Hoge, "NATO Reports All 26 Nations Are Aiding Iraq With Training," New York Times, September 22, 2005, p. 6. It has been easier to recruit assistance in Afghanistan, because domestic publics are more understanding of that war and national militaries see training benefits of participating in a "special operations Olympics."
53

Troop data from Paul Ames, "NATO forces in Germany hold exercise to prepare for expansion of Afghanistan mission," Associated Press, November 16, 2005. Iraq: The Way Ahead.

54

THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY OPTIONS

FROM 'NEO-ISOLATIONISM' TO 'I MPERIAL L IBERALISM ':

'Grand Strategy Options' in the American International Security Debate and the Implications for Canada
By Douglas A. Ross and Christopher N. B. Ross

trategy may be succinctly defined as "the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy."1 Colin Gray's definition sums up the essence of the Clausewitzean conceptualization of human efforts to ensure the security of state and nation. Strategy is not battlefield tactics, nor is it the setting of political objectives: it is the "bridge" between them. Within the broad and ever more complex domain of strategic thought (Gray identified seventeen 'dimensions' of strategy), there is also a subset of concepts pertaining to the 'highest' level of analysis: 'grand strategy.' Grand strategy may be defined as the formulation of feasible, long-term, security-enhancing political goals in conjunction with the coordination and management of national and allied resources and capabilities so as to promote the achievement of those goals.2 This definition reflects the approach of Britain's greatest twentieth century strategic analyst, Basil H. Liddell Hart, who observed more than a half a century ago that "the realm of grand strategy is for the most part terra incognita still awaiting exploration, and understanding."3 It should be noted that there is nothing in the definition of grand strategy which specifies the type of state able to engage in such planning. Neither Liddell Hart nor Gray suggested that it is a domain solely for great powers. State actors of any size should be able, in theory,

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to engage in such planning: even middlepowers. Whether middlepowers situated adjacent to superpowers can execute grand strategy effectively is, to be sure, a question of considerably greater uncertainty. But what all state leaders should reflect upon deeply is the character and range of the threats their countries must confront. For smaller powers it is appropriate, indeed essential, to be conversant with the strategic options in play in the policy debates of far larger allies, whose unwise or ill-informed policies may attract or magnify threats to the smaller ally's national security. Without such understanding, any efforts at constructive influence by smaller allies are likely to fail. Ultimately, a strategy premised on the cultivation and exercise of effective persuasion and influence vis--vis allied great powers is the only substantive option for lesser powers in the international system if they wish to contribute meaningfully to the international security order. A strategy of influence, to be effective, must feed into the existing categories of strategic thought already in play in the larger polity and work to strengthen those schools of thought on international security that are most likely to enhance, directly or indirectly, the security of the smaller power. We do not assume that future governments in Ottawa will necessarily develop a coherent 'American policy' intended to try to influence American grand strategy choices (however marginally). But we do think it would be a good idea to attempt it. If politicians and officials in Ottawa continue to follow a reactive, passive policy of accommodation of American security policy pressures (while 'free riding' to the maximum extent possible), as has been the case for the past twenty years at least, then this paper will be little more than an extended academic exercise. Influence may involve only an ability to say 'no' to American requests. But casting such a 'vote' on American actions by explicitly withholding validation is of some consequence even if one only achieves a certain moral or political satisfaction from having 'done the right thing.' Knowing when to say 'no' to unwise or poorly thought out strategies requires an understanding of the stakes and

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goals in play in the American grand strategy 'debate.' If nothing else, we hope to expose Canadian readers to the range of American thinking on global security issues and thereby to sharpen their ability to pass judgement on the wisdom of specific US actions and goals. The purpose of this paper is to review just how the 'grand strategy' debate in the US has been altered by the coming to power of George W. Bush and the events of 9/11. The paper will assess some of the most probable implications for Canadian policymakers. In the latter vein, it will explore some of the most important consequences for American allies who now are saddled, like it or not, with an openended 'War on Terror' (hereafter referred to as the WOT) and an antiWeapons of Mass Destruction (hereafter anti-WMD) counterproliferation campaign mounted against 'rogue states.' Both these campaigns stretch out to all horizons indefinitely. Both campaigns are linked inextricably to a quasi-imperial drive for status and global strategic control that vastly exceeds in geostrategic ambition any previous American national security strategy. So much so in fact, that American analysts from across the political spectrum are regularly employing such terms as 'empire,' imperium, 'Pax Americana,' and the 'new Rome' to describe the current American ambitions. Criticism of such 'imperial liberalism,' destructive unilateralism, and hegemonic military adventurism has been intense.4 But the terminology of empire which for decades was confined to left-wing analysis of international affairs has now been imported into mainstream and conservative discussion without in many cases the automatically negative connotations inherent in social democratic, post-modernist or neoMarxist discourse.5 During the Cold War, George F. Kennan's doctrine of anti-communist containment held sway over most of the American foreign policy establishment. The doctrine's popularity with American allies helped to cement it as the official declaratory policy of six presidencies from Truman to Carter.6 Its very success, coupled with wellfounded fears that any alternative would probably be far more bellicose,7 effectively precluded the study of grand strategy for most of

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the Cold War era. The speed of the collapse of the Soviet state in the months prior to December 1992, and the surprise across the Western world at this geopolitically cataclysmic development, meant that little if any grand strategy thinking had been carried out anywhere on broader international security issues for the post-Cold War period with the exception of a few offices of senior Pentagon officials close to the then American Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney. In late 1989 Cheney set up two groups to explore post-Cold War long-term strategic options for the United States. One group led by Colin Powell produced a report which apparently vanished onto the security bureaucracy's shelves. The second headed up by Paul Wolfowitz (the Deputy Secretary of Defense from 2001 until his recent appointment as head of the World Bank) formulated a package of proposals that were built around a highly activist future international security policy that would try to 'shape' the geopolitical environment deeply and permanently. Wolfowitz proposed that the US should attempt to perpetuate military preponderance over all other potential challengers indefinitely. Such military preponderance by its very extent, sophistication and cost would preclude indefinitely the emergence of any rival for global power and influence with the United States through war if necessary. According to Nicholas Lemann's account, the '5/21' document (Wolfowitz's draft was delivered to Cheney on 21 May 1990) failed to attract much attention when its key ideas were delivered in a speech by President George H. W. Bush on the day Iraq invaded Kuwait.8 Thereafter, work continued on successive versions of it. Eventually in the spring of 1992, one of them was leaked to the New York Times in the form of a draft of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) for 1994-99. The "Defense Strategy Objectives" are worth noting in verbatim and at length: Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or

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elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed by the former Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territories of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia. There are three additional aspects to this objective: First, the U.S. must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role. The second objective is to address sources of regional conflict and instability in such a way as to promote increasing respect for international law, limit international violence, and encourage the spread of democratic forms of government and open economic systems.While the U.S. cannot become the world's 'policeman', by assuming responsibility for righting every wrong, we will retain the pre-eminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations. Various types of U.S. interests may be involved in such instances: access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles; threats

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to U.S. citizens from terrorism or regional or local conflict, and threats to U.S. society from narcotics trafficking.9 [italics added] The document caused a flurry of activity. Leading Democrats denounced it as a plan for a 'Pax Americana' (Sen. Joseph Biden) and as being "myopic, shallow and disappointing" (Sen. Robert Byrd). Senior State Department and White House officials quickly denied that the document in any way reflected government policy and noted that it had not been considered by the NSC or even read by National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft or Secretary of State James Baker.10 James Chace termed it a "superpower fantasy." With such prompt high-level disavowals of the document, most international security specialists tended to dismiss it as a speculative trial balloon whose central concepts would never gain traction. John Steinbruner of the Brookings Institution treated it more seriously and said it reflected an effort to "preserve very stark superiority" that will "raise fears of American hegemony all over the world."11 Canadian commentators termed the document "arrogant ruinous folly" and "an evil delusion" because it clearly rejected traditional internationalist values and a growing role for the UN in the post-Cold War world. One Canadian general was quoted as saying in disgust that it was "typical just what you'd expect from the Pentagon."12 The chorus of criticism inside the US led to the public release two and one-half months later of a bowdlerized version dated 16 April that was intended to mollify foreign governments all of whom had remained quite tight-lipped about the draft.13 The Wolfowitz proposals for perpetual unipolar military preponderance and liberal-democratic crusading by the US, languished untouched and widely scorned by the Democrats after Clinton's victory in November 1992. Even a few Republican-aligned officials, such as Richard Haass, eventually went on record denouncing Wolfowitz's call for hegemonic military dominance as "not doable."14

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Despite the rapid and apparently decisive repudiation of the document, several American scholars and foreign policy commentators nevertheless felt impelled to respond to the implicit quite radical intellectual challenge that had been issued by Wolfowitz with Cheney's blessing. American structural realist analysts were clearly troubled by the appearance of this novel policy current at the highest levels of the US military's planning bureaucracy. Christopher Layne in particular wholly rejected the feasibility of the supremacist (i.e., primacist) thrust of the 1992 DPG document.15 Writing in 1993, he suggested that any drive for sustained unipolarity would sooner or later induce balancing against the United States. The amity among the Western allies during the Cold War was the positive consequence of global military bipolarity. Bipolarity "removed the security dilemma and the relative gains problem from the agenda of relations among the Western powers." The end of bipolarity would mean the end of such fraternal bliss. Moreover, Japan and Germany would emerge as independent great powers sooner than would have been the case had American officials never mentioned the possibility of an American drive for open-ended hegemony. Russian leaders would react similarly. Layne thought that a new era of multipolarity would almost certainly be in place by 2020. Even a "benign hegemony" was bound to fail because it would facilitate "the diffusion of wealth and technology to potential rivals."16 Key technologies of war would diffuse, other states would take advantage of their low defence spending to catch up economically, and they would soon become imitative of American assertiveness, rather than leaping collaboratively onto the American 'bandwagon.' With a massive governmental deficit and slow economic growth, American unipolar leadership was destined, Layne thought, to be a rather brief, transitional affair. Any effort to establish a Pax Americana would sooner or later degenerate into a "Pox Americana." It would be far better for the US to retrench: "US military commitments in Europe and Asia should end; maintaining them will not stop Germany and Japan from becoming great powers. By forcing them to

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finance their security, we can compel them to forego trading-state policies that have enriched them at our expense. Our relative power can also be indirectly enhanced if the new great powers are contained by rivalries with regional neighbours that will arise without outside provocation. The US cannot achieve the absolute security that advocates of unipolarity seek."17 Other leading American international relations scholars, such as Robert Jervis and Samuel Huntington, also attacked any idea of a quest for preponderance in the months and years that followed.18 The most analytically helpful writing on this new but still for most observers rather arcane debate came several years later by Barry Posen and Andrew Ross.19 In this brilliantly distilled theoretical comparison of American grand strategy options, the main cost-benefit and risk calculus of the major strategic choices were spelled out in detail; they are still worthy of careful reflection. It is almost a decade since Posen and Ross sketched out their commentary. Writing in the middle years of the Clinton administration, they saw minimal strategic coherence or long-term planning in the international security policies of the day. Instead they saw a rather intellectually distressing amalgam of conceptual goals that were not necessarily complementary.20 Neither did they detect any imminent radical transformation in the character or activism of American national security policy. If the world was turbulent and unpredictable, it seemed at least to hold out few direct or imminent threats to American national security. The election of George W. Bush and the events of 9/11 would change that state of affairs considerably, and would usher in a new era of both greatly increased apprehended risk and unprecedented interventionism and 'unilateralism' abroad by Washington. The American menu of choice in grand strategy instruments for Posen and Ross was confined to four 'schools of thought': neo-isolationism (NI: "the least popular," least expensive and most cautionary option); selective engagement (SE: a realist, balance-of-power main-

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taining, proliferation containing approach); cooperative security (CS: the most expansive, neo-liberal institutionalist, idealist, democratically transformational, WMD-suppressing, human security-oriented approach); and finally, primacy (P: a military preponderance maintaining, 'peer competitor' suppressing approach). Each of these broad options were seen as potentially implementable by future American governments. For present purposes, not least the fostering of a more complete dialogue, we are adding a fifth grand strategy choice, whose content and prospects we will discuss below: an explicitly acknowledged regime, per Robert Cooper,21 of imperial liberalism (IL). Neo-Isolationism (NI): NI was thought to be the least likely choice because at root, according to Posen and Ross, its adoption would "trade away considerable international influence for a relatively modest improvement in domestic welfare" by achieving a modest saving of perhaps only 2.0 to 2.5% of gross domestic product (GDP).22 Liquidating most American military bases across the world, and withdrawing alliance guarantees from countries in Europe and Asia, would certainly stimulate further nuclear proliferation and thereby heighten the risk of regional nuclear wars. In the event that any hegemonic power did arise and threaten to consolidate control over most of Eurasia, reconstituting American military force projection capability and alliance relationships then would be an extremely difficult if not impossible task. In an uncertain, rapidly evolving world, to cast aside such powerful foreign policy instruments would be imprudent because it would leave the US vulnerable to technological, economic or environmental 'surprise.' Most American NI advocates were Realists of one sort or anoth23 er. The starting point for their analysis is the belief that no other major power is a threat to the US for the foreseeable future. A "rough balance of power" exists across Eurasia and is unlikely to break down. Three oceans and weak hemispheric neighbours insulate the US from

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any meaningful threat of attack. A spillover effect from regional nuclear wars was an acknowledged risk, but such wars would be an even greater risk to Americans if the US stayed heavily involved in all the globe's hotspots so it would be better simply to disengage and get out of the potential nuclear crossfire. Military commitments abroad "ensure that when a future great power war erupts, the United States will be in the thick of things. Although distant great power wars are bad for America, the only sure path to ruin is to step in the middle of a faraway fight."24 More optimistically, NI thinkers suggested that a slow, 'managed' proliferation of nuclear capabilities seemed likely to inhibit or block altogether any bids for Eurasian continental hegemony. NI thinkers tended to agree with Robert Jervis that nuclear weapons had 'taken a lot of the sting' out of the security dilemma. And they have made American isolationism more viable and logical than at any time in the twentieth century. Humanitarian intervention to promote democracy or respect for human rights, however, was seen by NI advocates as profoundly misguided and unworkable; political values cannot be forcibly exported except at great cost and risk in an age of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The idea of waging preventive wars to perpetuate military hegemony and geopolitical primacy is for NI advocates simply incredible on "moral, human and financial" grounds. As Gholz, Press and Sapolsky argued, "a policy of primacy, even without a preventive war, will breed anger and resentment around the world. It will turn allies into neutrals and neutrals into enemies."25 Counterproliferation to forcibly disarm 'rogue states' was thought to be unworkable because it would require permanent intolerably expensive occupation and would likely provoke some nuclear use. For NI realists, multilateral nuclear deterrence, uncertain though it may be, will have to suffice but it will be more than adequate to ensure American security. Attempting to export liberal democratic practice to unstable, divided societies would merely embroil the US in unwinnable conflictual quagmires.

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Posen and Ross rejected NI (as did both administrations under Clinton and Bush the elder) because it seemed likely on balance to lead to a more war-prone world: "Weapons of mass destruction might be used in some of these wars, with unpleasant effects even for those not directly involved."26 'Unpleasant effects' indeed. Supporters of both primacy and selective engagement tended to believe that the US government really should remain active in trying to suppress the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other WMDs. In subsequent years, the NI approach came to be supported by political actors such as Patrick Buchanan27 and Ralph Nader, publicity-seeking presidential aspirants whose political marginality was mirrored in the negligible appeal of their NI advocacy. The lack of resonance for NI advocacy in American public opinion, or even among the academic intelligentsia over the past decade may, however, change if disenchantment with the war in Iraq deepens (or if it is followed by further costly and destructive military forays into Iran or North Korea). While its widespread popularity may wax and wane over time, the isolationist strain in American foreign policy can always draw on at least a core group of high profile supporters. As Walter Russell Mead posited in his acclaimed work Special Providence, this 'Jeffersonian' school attracts proponents from across the domestic political spectrum and has included, inter alia, John Quincy Adams, George Kennan, Charles Beard and Gore Vidal.28 In the present Canadian political context, an American administration's choice of NI would be seen initially as an appallingly retrograde development that threatened most Canadians' hopes for an evolving and ever stronger global community built on the principles of liberal internationalism and cooperative security. Such an orientation would be seen as undermining any hope of realizing an authentic global community anchored by the UN and its associated institutions. But a distinctly Canadian case for endorsing NI can be made. The world has become a far more dangerous place because of the diffusion of WMD technologies. It is certainly a debatable proposition

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that global institutions will be able to contain and effectively ban the use of WMDs for all time. UN reform is highly unlikely, and even a reformed UN with a more representative Security Council is unlikely to take effective action against 'illegal' nuclear proliferators. Even with strong American support, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency (NPT/IAEA) regime was not able to detect Iraqi and North Korean duplicity in covertly developing nuclear arms. Nor was that regime able to address the acquisition of nuclear arms by Israel, South Africa, India and Pakistan, all of whom remained outside of the NPT structure while assembling their respective arsenals.29 The problem of 'loose nukes' in the territories of the former Soviet Union is far from solved and many credible analyses suggest that without radical preventive measures, it is a question of when, not if, a nuclear weapon will be detonated in a major North American or Western European city.30 For Canadians the risk of becoming collateral damage in 'catastrophe terrorism' attacks on the US may be small but it is not zero. That terrorists wishing to attack the US might choose to demonstrate their nuclear capability on a Canadian city, in order to establish the credibility of a threatened attack on several other American cities, is unfortunately a real, if highly remote, possibility. Depending on how one views the risk of WMD use, and the range of scenarios available to terrorists (or, it must be admitted, other governments fearful of American military supremacy and primacist domination) who may want to 'pre-position' a number of nuclear devices in North America, anti-American nuclear blackmail strategies could potentially involve Canadian cities. Ultimata to Washingon (perhaps to withdraw militarily from all Middle Eastern countries or sever all financial support for Israel) in such scenarios would be given after inflicting horrible damage to Canadian society. To the extent that this threat is recognized, Canadians might well come to think the world is simply far too dangerous for the US to try to manage or democratically transform. The goal is too ambitious and the Americans lack the necessary skills to attain it.

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Many Canadian politicians already lack confidence in the wisdom of American judgment when it comes to WMD issues and the logic of the WOT. Why should Canadians risk 'drawing fire' unnecessarily, by continuing to back American primacist or liberal imperialist policies that not only do little or nothing to enhance the direct national security of Canadians, but in fact may provoke catastrophic terrorist assaults that conceivably might start on Canadian territory? A deeply incompetent but geopolitically ambitious US may prove to be the worst possible scenario from the perspective of Canadian national security. Geoeconomic realities also suggest that endorsing NI may not be so farfetched an idea. With almost 90 percent of Canada's trade and socio-cultural interactions occurring continentally, and with trade with both Europe and Asia declining as a percentage of total Canadian trade, it can be argued that the continuation of an internationally activist policy by the US is increasingly prejudicial to Canadian security interests. Better it would be, Canadian NI supporters might say, to tighten up immigration and refugee acceptance drastically and to spend all defence budgets on a 'hard perimeter' security system that will protect Canadian-American trade from terrorist disruption, than to continue an irrational championing of liberal internationalist or social democratic ideals. Furthermore, it is arguable that Ottawa's political elite has been voting de facto for neo-isolationism since the middle years of the Cold War when it began to cut defence spending as a percentage of GDP, and especially since the end of the Cold War when it cut both defence and international development aid budgets. Why not go all the way and explicitly endorse NI as the wisest of American grand strategy options in an increasingly dangerous world? Humanitarian aid could be continued on a generous basis, but an NI approach would definitely rule out support for 'the responsibility to protect' endangered civilian populations through humanitarian intervention, and it would certainly counsel a far tighter prohibition on the export of advanced

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military technologies to any other countries. NI, of course, has little intrinsic appeal to what Michael Ignatieff has termed the nave and narcissistic Canadian mentality that is premised on an empty, toothless and utterly rhetorical support for world order through multilateral institutions.31 For quasi-pacifist Liberals, supporting the institutions and procedures of international law is enough: why worry about enforcement issues in international law? Why not just leave such tough issues to the Permanent Five (P5) even if that means no action at all? A catastrophic terrorist attack on Canadian territory, or the detonation of a single improvised nuclear device in an American city, might well change this state of affairs and trigger an outburst of panic and isolationist sentiment in Canada not seen since the 1930s. At the time of writing it seems unlikely that Liberals, Conservatives or New Democrats would ever think seriously about adopting an NI approach to foreign policy (it would be labelled something entirely different, of course, perhaps 'Canada first' or 'Fortress North America'). The Bloc Quebecois, however, just might decide to put some variant of NI on the national political agenda just prior to the next sovereignty referendum. A BQ NI initiative framed in American terminology for an independent Quebec then might catalyze interesting reactions from the other national parties. Selective Engagement (SE): Growth in American support for SE has apparently suffered from the lacklustre psychological appeal of classical balance of power theory.32 How many Americans are ever likely to be willing to die to preserve regional power balances? More ambitious than the 'minimal realism' of the NI school, the SE advocates (such as Christopher Layne,33 Robert Art, Stephen Van Evera and Ronald Steel) have argued that the US would not be able to stay out of major wars on the Eurasian continent (i.e. World Wars I and II, and the 'virtual' World War III34 of the Cold War allegedly have 'proved' this premise).

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Therefore Washington should try actively to manage future instability by playing the role of external balancer state in various regional theatres of rivalry distributed about the Eurasian rimlands: China/Korea/Japan; South Asia; the Persian Gulf; and the European peninsula. With nuclear weapons held by some eight or more states, the risk of miscalculation leading to a 'small' nuclear war has become grave. The US has always had a big stake in the prevention of all nuclear wars and in a continued universal respect for the 'taboo' on nuclear use of any kind. With the world's most sophisticated nuclear deterrent arsenal and a geographical position that is the least vulnerable of all the major powers, the American state is in the most favourable position from which to apply a strategy of SE and 'offshore balancing' (OSB).35 Any American regional 'balancing,' it has been argued, is more likely to deter anti-status quo states if it were done early in any expansionary challenges, rather than well after the challenge had been launched. The goal of SE intervenors would be to shore up status quo states by demonstrating whenever necessary that the US possessed "sufficient military power to deny victory to the aggressor" in all potential theatres of conflict.36 While proliferation of WMD to states like North Korea, Iraq and Iran was seen as a problem, few SE advocates were prepared to think about preventive war or regime change given 'their sensitivity to costs.'37 Traditional alliances and containment diplomacy were seen by SE advocates as the way to deal with potential regional wars. Iraq and Iran could both be 'contained' and denied any opportunity to consolidate centralized control over all the energy resources of the Persian Gulf region, thus ensuring the stable delivery of oil exports to international markets and forestalling potential European, Russian, Chinese and Indian military interventions in the region. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) would be preserved but not expanded by SE advocates, so as not to provoke Russian insecurities, and indeed to help welcome Moscow into an emerging global concert of great powers.

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In subsequent years, especially after 9/11, writers such as Benjamin Schwarz, Christopher Layne and Stephen Walt reiterated their call for SE and an OSB approach to world affairs. For Schwarz and Layne the US would be far less prone to attacks like 9/11 if only it would reverse its presently 'primacist' course and accept multipolarity by encouraging the geopolitical maturation and autonomy of allies like France, Germany and Japan, while accommodating the legitimate security concerns of potential rivals or neutrals such as Russia, China and India. The time for "adult supervision" of the Western Europeans and Japanese is long gone. Making them responsible in the first instance for their own national security would force them to be far more militarily capable or suffer the consequences in terms of unwanted refugees, crime, narcotics, etc. This more explicitly selfinterested approach to alliances would see the US engage in "burden shifting," not its traditional and almost always vain attempts at "burden sharing."38 SE advocates have argued that NATO should not have been expanded because it menaced Russia and blocked progress in nuclear weapons reductions the greatest cost being Russian obstructionism in controlling their 'loose nukes' and an immense stockpile of poorly guarded fissile materials.39 For SE analysts, if an American layered anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system were to go ahead, then it should be accompanied by deep cuts in American long-range offensive nuclear capacity to reassure both Russia and China that the US missile defence system would not in due course be aimed at them. Strategic missile defences are not benign because their impact must be assessed in light of prevailing offensive nuclear force relationships. They are especially menacing to potential enemies when deployed by a state with a dramatic counterforce nuclear superiority such as the US currently possesses. Without the reassurance of unilateral cuts to American offensive first-strike capabilities, Russian rejection of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) reduction goals and Moscow's current retention of some 5,000 intercontinental range

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nuclear warheads with several hundred able to be launched at North America in 12 minutes,40 is entirely logical. So too is it logical to envisage a tripling or quadrupling in Chinese deliverable warheads (perhaps on MIRVs [Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles] with decoys) aimed at North America in the next generation of nuclear force deployments. Moscow and Beijing should be permitted to exercise control over their own spheres of influence, according to SE thinkers, since "America's direct sphere of influence embraces the area from the Canadian Arctic to Tierra del Fuego and from Greenland to Guam."41 Taiwan should be abandoned forthwith, and all meddling talk in support of human rights and democracy in China should be ended. Notice of termination of the mutual security treaty with Japan should be given soon and all American troops should be withdrawn from the Balkans. Even the Persian Gulf should see a gradual disengagement by American forces. It should be left to Russia, China, Japan and Western Europe to "pacify Central Asia and the Persian Gulf." Working quickly toward energy independence domestically is a far more practical, and security-enhancing goal. Involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan should also end as quickly as possible. In recent years, SE advocates such as Stephen Walt have felt that their cautionary warnings about intervention abroad have been borne out. Bush administration policies that sought to enshrine American military and economic hegemony have aroused suspicion and resentment across the globe. The attempted rollback of the "axis of evil" has led to a "quagmire in Iraq" and greatly accelerated efforts to build and deploy nuclear weapons in North Korea and Iran. Preventive war, SE analysts say, will never work the way it was intended. Instead it will trigger balancing against the US because no major state will willingly allow its national survival to fall into the hands of foreign leaders however 'benign' and democratic they may appear to be. Even humanitarian interventions are likely to backfire and they certainly are not worth the cost. Only the judicious and

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restrained use of military power will keep allies on board and calm neutralist anxieties. A multilateral containment of Iraq was eminently practical, while the forced "regional transformation" and democratization of the Middle East is not.42 Nationalism is too powerful, according to SE advocates, and it will invariably prevail against primacist or imperialist liberal interventionism. In the contemporary SE perspective, the current American government remains "a remarkably immature great power."43 For Walt, "nuclear terrorism is the most worrisome danger that the world's only superpower now faces, and a grand strategy centered on American national interest would focus on the biggest problems and subordinate other goals in order to address them."44 Unconditional support for Israel when fissile materials are still 'on the loose' internationally, and thus potentially available to radical Islamist terrorist groups, is profoundly misguided if not criminally negligent. The US government should give the Israelis ultimata to settle reasonably with the Palestinian leadership and then take steps towards either imposing regional denuclearization or withdrawing American support.45 In effect, without a reliable perimeter defence of American territory, there is no other policy approach that is truly consistent with core American national security interests. In the long term, the US needs to play 'hard to get' with current allies, to shift the burdens of regional defence onto their shoulders (and taxpayers) just as the Nixon doctrine's strategy did in the early 1970s, the last time a truly realist set of principles guided American foreign policy. The future is uncertain and dangerous and Bush administration policies of "ill-defined globalism" are likely to be a recipe for disaster. Nearly every leading Realist thinker in the American international relations academy opposed the invasion of Iraq, and, Walt argues, they were correct to do so. Too many liberal idealists and neo-liberal institutionalists were persuaded to support 'democratic transformation' across the Middle East. For Walt, one of the greatest dangers

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now facing the American polity is its apparent inability to speak rationally about Israel. The Iraq campaign is, he implies, very much a by-product of an irrational and dangerous attachment to Israeli security interests: "When we get bogged down in places like Iraq, when we alienate potential partners with our arrogance, and when we waste billions of dollars on follies like national missile defence, we are left with fewer resources, less political capital and less political will" to deal with the environment, diseases, international development and the global economy.46 For Canadians, an American SE choice may be attractive because, like NI, in theory it will draw less WMD fire toward North America. The realpolitik core of SE and offshore balancing would certainly conflict with traditional popular Canadian aspirations for a world with an ever stronger UN, but humanitarian assistance could still be provided by Ottawa to ease the Canadian 'conscience' (haphazard, intermittent and deeply hypocritical as it tends to be). The more fundamental question is whether SE would be a safer strategy in the long term, since it would see the Americans give up on their counterproliferation 'crusade.' Even 'free riders' like Canada have a stake in the positive resolution of the global proliferation 'crisis.'47 To have some influence on American policy choices, Canadian elites would have to decide to become at least semi-serious about defence cooperation with the United States and regain some measure of credibility as marginal but still attentive and thoughtful players in international security affairs. SE thinking is, in its core doctrine, quite alien to traditional Canadian idealist aspirations in foreign policy. Given this school of thought's deep skepticism toward international institutions, as well as the privileged status it accords great power prerogatives and diplomatic initiatives, it is unlikely ever to attract a considerable intellectual following in the Canadian polity. It is, nevertheless, a potentially attractive fallback for Canadian foreign policy thinkers who must deal with an ever more stressed and fractured global polity that is patently unable to summon the collective will to create an enforcement

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capability for a greatly strengthened NPT/IAEA regime. An SE approach adopted by the US would seemingly permit a much less activist (and expensive) international security role for the Canadian military. The future cost of deployments abroad would be less because the US would be venturing forth much more rarely, and hardly ever in support of international 'community' norms. Money saved on the Canadian Forces then could be diverted to modestly increased foreign aid and other domestic goals. Cooperative Security (CS) CS advocates represent the most activist and in some respects (rather paradoxically) the most 'aggressive' of all the grand strategy schools of thought according to Posen and Ross. American CS devotees during the early 1990s (such as William Perry, John Steinbruner, Randall Forsberg, Janne Nolan and Ashton Carter) saw the global peace (and especially the WMD peace) as "indivisible." Typically, they have been motivated by liberal beliefs and subscribed to the view that humanitarian intervention (not merely occasional humanitarian assistance) can and should be part of American foreign policy, along with its traditional support for international law and a credible and useful United Nations. While they may not be sanguine that democracy and markets can be 'exported' by coercion, they are generally hopeful that a spreading zone of democratic peace ('engagement and enlargement') holds out hope for the eventual eradication and permanent suppression of all weapons of mass destruction. On this point, they differ fundamentally from the other four schools of thought being treated in this paper and become almost Canadian in their hopeful conviction that common sense and armed altruism can cure the world of its worst man-made afflictions. CS advocates see the proliferation of WMDs as a vast continuing crisis that must be arrested and reversed promptly. The 'enemy' is just as much the diffusion of dangerous technologies to unstable subnational groups as it is the acquisition of such capabilities by 'states of

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concern.' Authoritarian regimes are a danger, but so too are terrorist groups such as Aum Shinrikyo or Al-Qaeda. In its zeal to contain and suppress the spread of WMD technologies, the US might very well end up in conflict with traditional allies such as Israel and Pakistan or with neutralist states such as India countries which have resisted American anti-proliferation crusading. With WMD proliferation occurring inexorably "any arms race or war can produce a world-class disaster."48 Casually contemplating the loss of 20 million Indians and Pakistanis in a 'small' nuclear exchange, as Richard Burt did when briefing Bush's transition team in the autumn of 2000, is not something that any rational liberal can accept. Obviously the UN and the 'collective security' system that it provides have proven to be incapable of organizing a denuclearized world. The US and its major allies will therefore have to overcome the deficiencies of the existing order, according to CS supporters. Under CS logic, to be a serious agitator and catalyst for global WMD disarmament the US will have to forego its position as nuclear hegemon. American leaders would have to subscribe sincerely to, and fully implement, the goals of the NPT, the CTBT and the FMCT.49 All research on nuclear weapons should therefore cease. Serious plans for the liquidation of the nuclear arsenal must be devised. And any schemes for ABM defences for the major powers would need to be made part of a carefully negotiated, treaty-defined consensus by the existing nuclear weapon states, so that such missile defences would support a global nuclear weapons ban (perhaps protecting retained 'virtual nuclear arsenals'50) and not feed fears about covert emerging first-strike capabilities. For CS advocates, peace is 'indivisible' because globalized information systems and imitative behaviour threaten to stimulate the rapid spread of WMD use, genocide and 'ethnic cleansing' once the norms against these acts are violated initially and then reports of such transgressions are flushed through the global media. Prevention of regime breakdown everywhere is therefore crucial. That is to be

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accomplished through regional alliances such as NATO taking on wider mandates and becoming instruments for reassurance and conciliation as much as deterrence, via reform and strengthening of the UN, and through a dramatic expansion of the instruments of arms control and confidence building. Expansion of NATO was undertaken by the Clinton administration ostensibly for CS purposes. While US force deployments were moving steadily towards the Russian border as the enlargement process went on, Clinton made every effort to reassure Russia by setting up parallel consultative bodies for Russia and the other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), while pursuing bilateral nuclear arms control with Moscow. At the same time, Clinton's team did everything they could to stall Republican demands to accelerate ABM defence deployments. For CS advocates, the use of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) technologies51 are to be reserved for the few 'rogue state' troublemakers who refuse to join a reformed international community that has invested in 'defensive defence,' military transparency measures, and a host of Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs). "War to prevent new nuclear powers from emerging would be reasonable in some circumstances."52 But it would certainly not be sought; it would be very much a last resort. US aerospace dominance in precision strike, stealth and information warfare would be harnessed to joint international peace enforcement, WMD-suppressing interventions.53 For Posen and Ross, the CS approach to world affairs is unlikely to be peaceful. A world in which the US was moving towards complete nuclear disarmament would require a robust NPT enforcement regime. Any and all suspected cheaters would have to be dealt with promptly and effectively. But is such a capability ever likely to be attainable? The advocates of CS are certainly closest in spirit to the preferred grand strategy approach of most American NATO allies. The CS premise that global security is best attained through an evermore elaborate and fully verified regime of arms control and disarmament

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fits well with declared Canadian doctrinal preferences for building and sustaining international order. So too does the CS commitment to humanitarian intervention. In the mid-1990s many American CS thinkers were headed towards endorsement of a 'responsibility to protect' by the international community. But most importantly for Canada's consistent anti-nuclearists, CS advocates in the US have been prepared to look seriously at complete denuclearization, not merely at cutting the American nuclear arsenal back to a 'minimum deterrent' level of between 200 and 1,000 warheads.54 The congeniality of the CS perspective to the declaratory goals of Canadian liberal internationalist idealism is marked. The fate of American CS advocacy, however, was far from kind to Canadian dreams. For Posen and Ross the "armed altruism" of CS seemed implausible. Defectors and 'free riders' in the international community are likely to be common (Canadians being a prime example of the affluent but irresponsible majority within NATO). Regional wars would have to be handled with a very disproportionate share of the costs being borne by the US military. How useful in retrospect were the American humanitarian interventions in Somalia and Haiti? If the US had attempted to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing in Rwanda, Congo or the Sudan, would American allies have contributed responsibly and meaningfully? Or would they have been as militarily marginal as the other coalition members who participated in the invasion of Iraq? The answer to such questions is unfortunately all too clear. If allies are as militarily hopeless in humanitarian interventions as they have been up to now, how can one expect them to line up to enforce a global nuclear arms ban if and when some states attempt to defect from a zero tolerance, zero-WMD regime? Have too many American allies already surrendered to what French nuclear strategist Pascal Boniface termed a "will to powerlessness,"55 or to what Michael Ignatieff refers to as "post-military, post-national cultures and identities"? The martial components of identity and culture seem to be

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dying across the Western world. Only in the United States do they seem to live on as a vital part of national character and individual identity.56 And some analysts on the right, such as Edward Luttwak, have suggested that even American public opinion, not just allied NATO publics, has become progressively 'de-bellicized' during the post-Cold War period.57 As a result American citizens may also resist being drafted for a democratic crusade to rid the world of WMDs. Finally, arms control and disarmament verification measures would be very costly and might not work with very much reliability in any case. The great extent and diversity of Iraq's WMD programmes came as a great surprise to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in the early 1990s, after a decade of regular inspections by the IAEA had failed to raise questions. And the 1995 revelations of a still retained biological weapons (BWs) capacity by Iraqi authorities (a discovery made possible only by a senior Iraqi defector) also suggests that even an occupied country overrun with inspectors can successfully hide critical WMD materials and programmes. The inability of the United States to persuade NATO allies, France and Germany, as well as other P5 governments in Russia and China, to confront Saddam Hussein forcefully through UN-authorized military action in 2002-03 also underscored yet again the extreme difficulty of making collective security systems work effectively.58 Developing a consensus among the great powers on threats to international peace and security is typically just as difficult as it is to identify 'aggressor' states in various regional conflicts. For Canadian analysts of international security affairs, CS is prima facie the 'right' model for the Americans to follow in trying to deal with an intractable world. But the implications for responsible Canadian participation in such a process are daunting. Ottawa would have to face up to serious 'burden sharing,' perhaps on the order of 3 to 4% of GDP to be able to create and maintain armed forces that would be able to participate in international peace enforcement operations, international WMD-suppression campaigns, and internation-

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al disarmament verification missions. In other words, defence spending would have to be tripled or quadrupled. This would be a very labour-intensive role as well and might well result in very high casualties during the transition years to a stable, denuclearized world. Nor would the anti-WMD crusade be the only mission of the CS regime; all regional conflicts would be dealt with in light of a declared international 'responsibility to protect.' In Haiti, Rwanda, the Congo, Sudan and Myanmar, Canadians would potentially be on call. Short of a catastrophe on Canadian territory, it is highly unlikely that any such ambitious participation would be supported by any federal political party. Primacy (P): In 1997 Posen and Ross presented primacy advocacy as conceptually innovative, but unlikely to succeed. As a grand strategy, its advocates were unreceptive to Realist logic and premises. P advocates felt that the surest route to peace was the possession of a preponderance of power by the US which could then act as the world's 'benign hegemon.' The American track record during the Cold War as a nonterritorially acquisitive "leader" would inspire confidence and thus preclude 'balancing against' the US. The attainment and perpetuation indefinitely of military superiority would inevitably translate into global control of the international security agenda. From such a position the US leadership would be able to block the emergence of would-be 'peer competitors' and thereby keep the risk of war between major powers as close to zero as possible. On the face of it, the immensity and sheer provocativeness of this self-appointed task seems quite bizarre. Why should the US expose itself to regional disputes all across Eurasia with nuclear arsenals now in the possession of British, French, Russian, Israeli, Pakistani, Indian and Chinese armed forces? Is the road to peace among the great powers likely to be better achieved by attempting to freeze the existing distribution of military capabilities and American

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supremacy? Or is the quest for P a fool's errand, something that no great power has been able to accomplish in history? Are the SE and NI critics right in declaring this to be a 'mission impossible'? On the other hand, is it at all possible that P advocates are correct in fearing that the age of WMD proliferation has created something new under the sun, something requiring a radical, historically unprecedented response? A postmodern empire that will act to transform the world into an enduring, peaceful, sustainable family of liberal democracies: a permanent Kantian zone of democratic peace? Is it possible too that P advocates privately share perhaps the nightmares that may have driven the CS advocates during the Clinton years, but being more 'realistic' they do not believe that democratic publics will ever be able to mount a sustained, coordinated, responsibly shared management of world security issues? In other words, should the world be treated the way NATO members were during the Cold War: to be consulted but always 'led' and pressured to the correct collective response as defined by American National Security Council and Pentagon planners? Are P advocates like Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney in effect only acting in light of the deep skepticism that most analysts of international relations share with respect to the deep inadequacy of existing international institutions? Some NI skeptics (and a legion of traditional left-wing, anti-militarist skeptics) have proposed that the entire primacist agenda is really best explained by the enormous inertia of the American MilitaryIndustrial Complex. It was the prospect of massive cuts to the DoD budget that first drove the Pentagon planners under Cheney to try to devise some sort of scheme to justify retention of the vast majority of the American military capability that it possessed at the end of the Cold War. And even Posen and Ross reached the conclusion that: "Ultimately, primacy is probably unsustainable and self-defeating. Primacy is little more than a rationale for the continued pursuit of Cold War policy and strategy in the absence of an enemy."59 Primacy, however, did become the core strategic doctrine for the current Bush administration.

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The constant push by primacist thinkers through neo-conservative groups such as the Project for a New American Century (PNAC),60 and via the writings of William Kristol, Robert Kagan, Zalmay Khalilzad, Charles Krauthammer and others culminated in the incorporation of its central concepts in the Bush administration's National Security Strategy (NSS) of September 2002. According to PNAC figures, the Clinton years saw defence spending fall from 5.7% of GDP in 1992 to under 3% by 2000.61 They see it as essential, therefore, to raise spending to some 3.8% of GDP, to pursue the RMA transformation of American forces with vigour, to fund new initiatives to be able to dominate both space and cyberspace, and to "deter the rise of a new great power competitor."62 Just as Michael Ignatieff has feared the incompetence and ephemerality of 'empire lite,' so too do PNAC sympathizers fear the consequences of 'primacy lite.' By 2000 the new feared peer competitor for P advocates had become China, not Japan, Germany or Russia. Offensive nuclear forces were to be 'reconfigured' (halting an alleged "erosion by design" by the Clintonite CS moles); layered missile defences added ("Even ifenemies are merely able to threaten American allies rather than the United States homeland itself, America's ability to project power will be deeply compromised."63); nuclear weapons testing and development resumed; a "space service" created separate from the Air Force64; and counterproliferation measures taken promptly. So-called 'roadblock' weapon systems such as the Army's Crusader gun system, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and new carriers were all to be cancelled so that the RMA transformation, airlift restoration, and the purchase of much less expensive but more numerous aircraft could be carried out, along with the creation of a far 'lighter' more 'agile' and greatly restructured land force. The Bush administration came to office determined to implement much of the PNAC agenda. Primacy as a grand strategy had arrived in the White House. Missile defence research and development was accelerated; plans to abrogate the ABM treaty were set in

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motion; and a counterproliferation campaign against Iraq was made the focus of defence planning. But primacy in action seemed dangerously blind to the needs of territorial defence. The Bush administration lagged badly in recognizing that it had to combat the threat of international terrorist attacks at home. Richard Clarke's insider's account of anti-terrorist planning is a lengthy litany of the administration's failure to take warnings seriously.65 The events of 9/11 came and went, and curiously the impact of the attacks gave the administration far more latitude in its policymaking than it would have had if they had never occurred. Nor did congressionally mandated inquiries into intelligence failures damage Bush or his policy team. Indeed, Bush's re-election was not imperilled. Clarke's criticism was if anything exceeded in its intensity by former CIA official, Michael Scheuer. He indicted the failure to treat the conflict in Afghanistan seriously, and the failure to understand the depth of the radical Islamist threat to the US and its allies. Scheuer was also distressed by the administration's failure to realize the counterproductive nature of American intervention. Both Clarke and Scheuer stressed the failure of Bush, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Cheney and Rice to take the threat of Al-Qaeda seriously. The Bush team was obsessed with bringing about regime change in Baghdad, regardless of the evidence and the intelligence information available.66 More than three years after the 9/11 attacks, Clarke remained despondent that so little had been done to actually improve American 'homeland defence' aside from amalgamating too many departments into an unwieldy organizational nightmare called the Department of Homeland Security. He was also categorical in his condemnation of Bush's "needless, counterproductive, deceitful invasion of Iraq."67 The war to depose Saddam was launched with inadequate preparation against possible BW retaliation by Iraq (thought by some in the administration to have access to Soviet supplied smallpox virus). The invasion proceeded with no adequate planning for an effective occu-

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pation and, as a result, there was no effective control imposed over the more than 120 major weapons and ammunition depots scattered across a country the size of California. Many of them were ransacked and pillaged, possibly with the intent of removing WMD materials outside of Iraq. The onset of the anti-occupation insurgency guaranteed that the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) would not be able to conduct a thorough search of the country for WMDs that might have been hidden. David Kay resigned when he found his translation staff was being rapidly depleted by the urgent needs of the counter-insurgency campaign. From May 2003 to November 2005 over fourteen times as many US soldiers were killed in Iraq, as died during the invasion's 'major operations' (over 2000 in total at time of writing). More than 15,000 other US troops were wounded or maimed.68 Estimates of the numbers of dead Iraqis killed incidental to the fighting and acts of terror range from 15,000 to over 100,000, but as a matter of policy the US military does not try to track such casualties. Public criticism of the American invasion and occupation has been intense, and support for the US has plummeted dramatically in virtually every allied country since January 2002. Across the Arab-speaking world, anger and hatred of the US are pervasive and growing. In terms of grand strategy, the 9/11 attacks allowed the Bush team to revive the key primacist aspects of the 1992 DPG document when it issued its National Security Strategy document in September 2002.69 In the last chapter the document declared that the US government would "build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge." The American military would be enabled to "dissuade future military competition," "ensure access to distant theaters," and to "protect critical US infrastructure and assets in outer space." In arguably the most important and overtly primacist sentence in the document, NSS drafters asserted that: "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing or equaling, the power of the United States."70

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In perhaps the most peculiar and thought-provoking passage in the document, it is stated baldly that the requirement to retain an open society will take precedence over perimeter security screening and other anti-terrorist measures: The characteristics we most cherish our freedom, our cities, our systems of movement and modern life are vulnerable to terrorism. This vulnerability will persist long after we bring to justice those responsible for the September 11 attacks. As time passes, individuals may gain access to means of destruction that until now could be wielded only by armies, fleets and squadrons. This is a new condition of life. We will adjust to it and thrive - in spite of it. This assertion suggests that experiencing some level of WMD attack on the American homeland is both inevitable and tolerable, and that Americans will cope with the consequences of such an attack with their characteristically indomitable spirit. Such a cavalier attitude toward such a grave threat suggests either exceptional naivet or a calculated strategic blindness that is counting on turning any future act of 'catastrophe terrorism' to good account in terms of domestic politics. It seems to have happened with 9/11, so why not with a 'dirty bomb' too or worse, a low yield nuclear explosion?71 In addition to calling for the promotion of democratic transformation in foreign countries and open markets wherever possible, the document also laid out the case for "proactive counterproliferation efforts" (or preventive war) against non-deterrable enemies with WMDs (a need for "acting preemptively"); preventive war against any states that "knowingly harbor or provide aid" to terrorists ("our best defense is a good offense"); efforts to mediate conflict in Israel and Palestine and South Asia, as well as diplomatic efforts to put together regional 'coalitions of the willing' to stifle Africa's various regional

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wars. In chapter VIII of the Bush NSS, a call for close coordination and joint operations with NATO allies suggested a high priority for encouraging interoperability of forces. It also noted that there was a risk of the reappearance of "old patterns of great power competition" in Russia, China and India. With respect to Russia, the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty, the continued use of the NATO-Russia Council, and American efforts to facilitate Russian entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO) were thought to be enough to encourage cooperative behaviour. Counterterrorism work with India and trade development initiatives would keep India cooperative, and that left only China to deal with. Unlike the PNAC 2000 document, the administration calls for a strong, peaceful, prosperous and increasingly democratic China. It notes more ominously: "In pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its neighbours in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path, that, in the end, will hamper its own pursuit of national greatness." The Bush team's policies have been criticized roundly across the North Atlantic community as arrogant, unilateralist, illegal and immoral. Worse, they have been condemned as deeply incompetent. Declaring a war on Islamist terrorism and then invading and occupying Iraq was seen by many observers as a profound strategic blunder that has alienated most of the publics of the Arabic-speaking countries and had the effect of stimulating thousands upon thousands of new recruits to the ranks of suicide bomber squads. But when viewed from the perspective of those seeking to establish enduring primacy for the United States, it may rather seem to be a gamble that could not be passed up. Middle Eastern oil is too important to the world economy to have it controlled by a single regional hegemon, whether Saddam or a Saudi monarch. It is the business of the hegemon to 'order' the vital but unstable parts of the international system: failure to protect the vital security interests of American allies and other potential peer competitors who need con-

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tinuous access to that oil would stimulate the rapid creation of global military reach (or some approximation thereof) in China, Russia and India or Western Europe. A decision to remake the Middle East states and forcibly catalyze democratic governance, even at the risk of destruction of the Iraqi state, really could not be avoided if one is determined to secure a broadly acknowledged and tacitly accepted hegemonic position. American credibility as a capable hegemon is now 'on the line.' Where the would-be primacists may have made a grievous blunder is in not covering their strategic flanks. Just as they tried to do the invasion and occupation of Iraq 'on the cheap' with far too few troops, so too are they attempting to impose primacy on far too small a national defence budget. 'Running the world' on less than 3.5% of GDP just may be an impossibility. But perhaps the architects of this administration do not think there is sufficient national will to up the ante to 5 or 6% of GDP until and unless another catastrophe far worse than 9/11 is visited upon the American, or a highly visible allied, public. At this point in our analysis, it seems appropriate to warn Canadians again that they are not 'off the map' of international terrorism far from it. Any terrorist network seeking to drive the US out of the Middle East, while forcing it to suspend all economic and strategic support of Israel, might decide that the prospects for success of a campaign of nuclear terrorism might be greatly improved if not one but several nuclear weapons were smuggled into the continental United States. But the first explosion could be detonated in a suitably densely populated city in a country closely allied to the US the UK, Australia or Canada would suffice. Then the threat to detonate several others in American cities could be delivered publicly on the web or through Al Jazeera. The prospect for American compliance might be thought to be much greater in such a scenario, without the mentally clouding effects of an American public opinion enraged and demanding urgent vengeance. In light of even the remote possibility of such

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a scenario, the choice of grand strategies by the American elite can hardly remain an academic and 'theoretical' issue for Canadians. The risks may in fact be only too substantive and urgent for American friends and neighbours. Imperial Liberalism (IL): The final grand strategy that is under consideration here is not in fact acknowledged as a formal option by the participants in American policy debates. Critics can of course respond that if there are no authoritative advocates of the approach within the foreign policymaking establishment, it cannot really be considered an option. Nevertheless, the theme of 'Empire' may yet return to declaratory American grand strategy once more after a century's absence. While members of the Bush administration and those associated with the Project for the New American Century have been extremely reluctant to employ the term 'imperial' when describing current American power, there are a number of prominent academics who in recent years have echoed Kipling's exhortation for America "To take up the White Man's burden."72 Several of the most prominent voices championing the merits of an explicit US imperium are those of the British historian and iconoclast Niall Ferguson, the Council on Foreign Relations fellow Max Boot, the well known Indian economist Deepak Lal, senior British diplomat Robert Cooper, and a prominent journalist-academic and liberal internationalist, currently Director of the Carr Center of Human Rights Policy at Harvard, Michael Ignatieff. Among this diverse group of commentators, Ignatieff is of particular interest, given his liberal background and, more recently, rumours of his possible candidacy for the leadership of the Liberal Party after Prime Minister Paul Martin's retirement. Throughout the Cold War, the literary classes of Western countries had no trouble referring to 'American imperialism.' For decades the term has been used as a matter of idiomatic convention by the

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social democratic left. Throughout the latter half of the Cold War, the ideologues of the Reagan administration railed against left-wing commentators in allied countries who in their view had illegitimately proclaimed a 'moral equivalence' with respect to the American and Soviet spheres of influence, referring to them as 'imperialist' and 'socialist-imperialist' respectively. The post-Cold War world has not been all that different for those literati who see foreign affairs as a spectator sport. But, while commentators of the political left such as Gore Vidal have never had qualms with labelling the United States an 'Empire,' only recently have those with more right-of-centre sympathies opted to embrace what is clearly an incredibly loaded term.73 Arguably the most vehement conservative supporter of an explicit American imperium is former Oxbridge Don and fervent neo-Thatcherite, Niall Ferguson. His latest work, Colossus: The Price of America's Empire, posits that the United States ought to assume the imperial role history has dealt it and to cease acting as a mere "empire in denial."74 Ardent in the belief that empire is more of a necessity in the twenty-first century than it ever has been in the past, Ferguson trumpets the virtues of a new "liberal empire": that is to say, one that not only underwrites the free international exchange of commodities, labor and capital but also creates and upholds the conditions without which markets cannot function peace and order, the rule of law, noncorrupt administration, stable fiscal and monetary policies as well as provides public goods, such as transport infrastructure, hospitals and schools, which would not otherwise exist.75 Thus, Ferguson is adamant that a new overt American imperialism would prove equally beneficial for both rulers and ruled alike. In fact, he explicitly asserts that it makes perfect sense from both the per-

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spective of pure national self-interest as well as that of altruism.76 When evaluating contemporary exhortations for America to take up the burdens of empire, however, it seems pertinent to define what has become an increasingly illusory term. Indeed, the fact that many observers on the left would characterize American foreign policy as imperial since at least the close of the Second World War is consistent with their broad view of what constitutes empire and imperialism. Those on the right of the political spectrum, however, have traditionally defined empires in a far more conventional and narrow fashion; according to this school of thought, the United States may exhibit the traits of a hegemon, but certainly not those of an empire. To help determine whether George W. Bush's United States can yet accurately be labeled an empire state, it is helpful to examine the definition of empire developed by the distinguished Harvard political scientist Karl Deutsch. An empire is a kingdom of kingdoms. It is the largest area, the largest unit, under central political control that we find in history. It involves also a central political power which is not necessarily equally responsive to all the territories under its jurisdiction. It is rather responsive to at least one central need and one central area. The empire is an area under central political control in social, political, economic, and cultural terms. That is to say that empire implies a substantive domain where power has both a wide scope and a significant weight. It includes very often areas which do not directly fall into the empire - they used to be called politely spheres of influence, nowadays one speaks of allies.77 Not surprisingly, the current American leviathan appears to fulfill the bulk of Deutsch's criteria. As a number of scholars have pointed out, however, when compared with empires past, the American strain

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is especially peculiar. While it possesses unparalleled military might and cultural sway, it nevertheless struggles to impose its will in situations where lesser empires achieved rapid success.78 Perhaps the US's rather unique brand of imperialism then has made it a sui generis empire fundamentally different from all those which have gone before it. Ultimately, however, the debate over classification is of less consequence than the type of grand strategy the increasingly imperial US administration finally opts to pursue. While the primacists have clearly been in the ascendant for the past four years, this is not to say that those favouring a more explicitly imperial grand strategy will be forever relegated to op-ed pieces in the Los Angeles Times or The National Interest.79 Indeed, if the stigma associated with empire continues to wane as indicated by the widespread popularity of counter-revisionist works which trumpet the virtues of past empires80 there is a real possibility that Uncle Sam could formally take up the imperial mantle he was offered by an exhausted Britannia in 1945. In consequence, it seems pertinent to be aware of some of the major proposals put forward by proponents of an explicit American imperium. The first prominent call for an explicit Pax Americana did not emanate from the new imperial capital on the banks of the Potomac, but from the metropole of the world's last great worldwide empire on the Thames. Writing in the British newspaper, The Observer, Robert Cooper, a career diplomat at the Foreign Office and a former adviser to Prime Minister Tony Blair, courted great controversy with an article he penned shortly after 9/11 entitled "Why We Still Need Empires."81 Asserting the need for a "new kind of imperialism, one compatible with human rights and cosmopolitan values," Cooper makes the case for a form of voluntary imperialism or "cooperative empire" as a means of providing order and stability in the world's worst failed states. While such statements garnered an immediate and vocal backlash from the left on both sides of the Atlantic, on the whole Cooper's vision of empire is one of the more moderate ones within the pro-imperialist camp.

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The more hardline proponents of an American Empire such as Ferguson, Lal, and Boot while still favouring an imperial model because of the alleged order and stability it offers, are clearly less preoccupied with issues like human rights. Indeed, Ferguson and Lal, both classical laissez-faire liberals in the mould of Adam Smith, are most concerned with promoting the growth and spread of capitalism through economic globalization. Moreover, the hardliners within the pro-imperial camp seem far less worried about the optics of empirebuilding in the twenty-first century and in fact favour the explicit adoption of the major trappings of empires past. Max Boot has gone so far as to advocate the establishment of an American Colonial Office, while Niall Ferguson for his part has proposed the creation of a colonial service akin to the Indian Civil Service (ICS) of the British Raj.82 While some international affairs commentators might dismiss such suggestions off-hand, they are not as outlandish as they initially might sound. Indeed, coming from a Harvard professor like Niall Ferguson who was recently named by Time Magazine as one of the '100 Most Influential People in the World' such views have clearly entered mainstream policy debates. From a Canadian perspective, however, arguably the most important advocate of a modern imperium is another Harvard scholar, Michael Ignatieff, who also recently produced a meditation on the 'new' American empire. In Empire Lite: Nation Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan Ignatieff sketched out what he has perceived as a de facto emergent imperial order. His concept of 'empire' is briefly summed up as "an attempt to permanently order the world of states and markets according to[a country's] national interests."83 The United States has long pursued policies of regional and since World War II, global hegemony. It achieved global reach in its military capabilities with the era of nuclear weapons and long-range bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). But global military reach is not the same thing as global hegemony. The latter requires the creation of institutions and norms that all states would agree to respect.

202 DOUGLAS A. ROSS AND CHRISTOPHER N. B. ROSS

The US achieved hegemony in its sphere of influence during the Cold War, but now it really is confronted by a perceived strategic need to do to the whole world what it did to the West from 19451990. For Ignatieff and others of the modern liberal imperialist school, such as Robert Cooper, what American leaders have been engaged in since the death of the Soviet state is the creation of a type of a global imperial order even if they refuse to refer to it as such. But for Ignatieff the American 'empire lite' is inherently fragile, truncated, underfunded and ultimately too shallowly rooted to be able to impart a lasting stability to the spreading zones of anarchy on the planet. The new imperial reality is the product of the creeping anarchy of the 1990s in the Balkans and Africa, and most importantly, the by-product of the attacks of 9/11. Where the low-level irritants of unwanted refugees, disease, crime and narcotics led to small steps towards "humanitarian imperialism" by the mid-to-late 1990s in Bosnia and Kosovo, Al-Qaeda's attacks drove Washington into its new retaliatory imperial mode: "The American empire discovered that, in the Middle East, its local pillars were built on sand. It remains to be seen whether a successful operation in Iraq will end up strengthening these pillars or sweeping them away."84 American Middle East policy is in tatters and needs major 'revisions,' according to Ignatieff. Israel's "unjust and illegal settlements" must be closed down by American pressure. The Israeli political leadership must be coerced into offering a tolerable compromise to a new Palestinian leadership so that the Palestinian people have some credible chance to overcome 'incompetent and corrupt' leaders, lawlessness and a lifetime of terror and disorder. The US, as the new imperial would-be hegemon, will have to impose a tolerable peace on the parties, separate them, and then "police the border between the two states with its troops." In one of the central thematic refrains of the book he adds: "Nobody likes empires, but there are some problems for which there only imperial solutions."85

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To date the Bush team has shied away from this imperial mission. They are, in Ignatieff's view, trying to accomplish "imperial domination on the cheap." This, he submits, is a form of "hubris." Given the spreading zones of anarchy in many parts of the world, the US is going to have to bite the bullet and build a "new humanitarian empire," to lead a new "condominium" with London, Paris, Berlin and Tokyo trotting along in its train. Eventually, Moscow, Beijing and New Delhi may be induced to 'play the game' in subordinate positions too. If the new American empire sets firmly as a mode of foreign policy, the alleged calculated insults of appointing John Bolton as UN Ambassador and Paul Wolfowitz as head of the World Bank will come to be accepted as inevitable. In time they may even be praised. In the new imperial mode, writes Ignatieff: "US policy choices are unsentimental. It is multilateral when it wants to be, unilateral when it must be, and it uses its power to enforce a new international division of labour in which America does the fighting, the Canadians, French, British and Germans do the police patrols in the border zones and the Dutch, Swiss and Scandinavians provide the humanitarian aid."86 The new imperium will avoid all the institutional ties that Stanley Hoffmann termed 'Gulliver's troubles.'87 It will selectively use international law and international institutions to suit its strategic requirements; it will ignore or subvert what it finds inconvenient. But the new American empire will be very much concerned with exporting liberal democratic governance and the rule of law to the troubled regions. In what he sees as the central paradox of the early 20th century, Ignatieff declares that "imperialism has become a precondition for democracy" and "while the only form of empire that is compatible with democracy is temporary empire...it is empire nonetheless."88 For Ignatieff, the entire American 'war on terror' is "an exercise in imperialism." It is a self-interested drive to impose order on the barbarian hordes. But 'nation-building lite' will not work anymore than will 'empire lite,' he fears. American Special Forces with a small

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footprint on the ground backed up by "lethal coverage from the air" may be a good start in many locales, but the inhabitants of disordered lands will wonder how long the Americans will stay. Will they keep the warlords in check? Will they be able to keep the humanitarian aid flowing for more than three or four years? American officials are always looking for 'exit strategies,' as are its most loyal allies (viz. the recent departures from Iraq of Italy and other formerly 'willing' allies). Pentagon planners know that nationalism is a powerful force and they cannot defeat it; they must rather coopt it and deflect it into new national institutions and new civil society structures. But Americans get bored easily and want to move on, while leaving the peace-building to other allies. Indeed, as Niall Ferguson has asserted, one of the most formidable challenges to the American imperium is its lack of political will or what he has aptly termed its "attention deficit disorder."89 Clearly most of America's allies are suffering from the same debilitating disability, as evidenced by the fact that both their politicians and publics have been woefully uncommitted to the rebuilding of Afghanistan. Progress in the Balkans is not much better. And few want to become stuck to the Iraqi tar-baby. If Ignatieff et al. are correct that an unspoken imperial project has taken hold in Washington, what might a more fully formed if not explicit 'imperial' grand strategy look like? How might it differ with the 'primacy' option already discussed? Will it prove a seamless evolution from primacy to out and out empire? One key difference might pertain to what would be an acceptable management structure in the long-term. True primacists do not wish to ever allow a peer competitor to emerge. If they decide to embrace empire, however, they might well be forced to confront the fact that they are not to be the ultimate empire; indeed, it is an iron law of history that no empire lasts forever, and just as the nearly seventy empires90 before it have declined and fallen, so will the American. Thus, in a truly imperial mode, a new bi-polar or tri-polar global con-

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dominium may eventually come to be seen as a tolerable option. Sharing the burdens of managing global 'order' in a fractious, overpopulated, underfed, environmentally stressed world may be unavoidable if only for reasons of cost. In the short term, Washington might well decide to harness the UN more effectively as an instrument for legitimation. Indeed, international institutions would likely be exploited selectively by the new imperialists. From the perspective of a shared responsibility of managing the planet, the UN Security Council may yet prove to be a useful forum for at least announcing the coordinated decisions of the US and either a greater China or a more unified EU. Moreover, an imperial America is not likely to put up with ongoing frustrations in the Middle East. Indeed, it might be even more ruthless than a primacy-driven administration and feel much less inclined to have any close Middle Eastern allies at all. Conclusion: This paper is intended to raise some fundamental questions for debate by American allies, especially by those Canadians who think and write about foreign policy and international affairs. A number of troubling questions are presented by both the primacy and the imperial paradigms, questions that are not easily answered but which must be thought through before giving active or tacit endorsement to one American grand strategy or another. A turn towards cooperative security does not seem likely under President Bush during his second term, even if the more assertively unilateral elements of his first-term primacy are buffered away by Condoleeza Rice in her new position as Secretary of State. Neither does it seem likely that the Bush team will consider calls for an explicitly 'imperial' approach to world affairs, complete with the establishment of a new Colonial Office. Indeed, any new Pax Americana is more likely to be created under a Democratic rather than a Republican presidency in the name of human rights and democratization. A more likely forecast for the remainder of Bush's term in office is some mix-

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ture of primacy and selective engagement. As Washington's trade and budget woes continue to worsen and as the bills from Iraq continue to accumulate, it seems plausible that the Bush 'hawks' will have to learn to accept the 'containment' of Iran and North Korea. The continuing indigestibility of Iraq is only too likely to arrest the grand schemes for regional political transformation and denuclearization. Such impediments may stimulate still further thinking in the American grand strategy debate. Figure 1 summarizes the various positions of the five broad approaches we have reviewed in this paper. The critical points of division concern more than a dozen issues: the choice of liberalism or realism as a guide to international politics; attitudes to the balance of power and the threat of international terrorism; the importance accorded to international law and humanitarian intervention; the role envisaged in American policy for nuclear weapons, missile defences and weapons in space; attitudes towards preventive war and support for Israel; and finally thinking about alliances, the risk of great power war and the importance of the RMA. Both NI and SE/OSB are very traditional in their approach to world affairs because they reject the possibility of international political transformation towards a democratic transcendence of the 'war system.' The last three strategies (CS, P and IL) all share the belief that a global democratic revolution can be achieved, and that with the globalization of markets and liberal democratic governance the risk of major war will be reduced near zero. Such 'democratic transformationalism' obviously overlaps with Fukuyama's end of history thesis even if many P and IL thinkers remain intensely skeptical about the prospects for achieving such a state in our lifetime. For Canadians attracted to the idealism and optimism of CS and IL, there is much to commend a Canadian international security policy that seeks to encourage precisely this sort of behaviour from the American security policy elite. In fact, given the apparently deeply seated drive to 'free ride' among Canadian politicians who are only too

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Figure 1: US Grand Strategy Options Table

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likely to continue their starvation of the Canadian Forces, a policy of IL may finally be most appropriate. CS would allow American decision-makers too many opportunities to shame Ottawa for its lacklustre contributions to the management of global security, whereas an approach premised on globalizing, cooperative IL probably would allow Canadian governments fearful of 'body bags' coming home from foreign wars to concentrate on 'peacebuilding' and 'civil society reconstruction' efforts. IL would place far more of the burden of 'peace enforcement' on American shoulders as Ignatieff has recognized. NI and SE/OSB thinkers are in some sense deeply pessimistic about the state of the world and the ability of the forces of globalization to prevail in all regions of the planet. In a world in which WMDs are spreading inexorably and in which defensive technologies are not thought to be able to seal continental borders effectively, the sensible approach they feel is to pull back and disengage from the world's most troublesome conflicts. CS, P and IL thinkers, by contrast, do not seem to believe that retrenchment to Fortress North America is in any way practical or possible. The essence of the transformational process entails a global revolution in openness, free trade, free capital movements and eventually the free movement of labour all of which are antithetical to the rather crude 'lifeboat ethics' approach of the continental insularity mentality. Four key questions flow from the analysis we have presented so far, and we present them now in lieu of a detailed recommendation of the options we find most appealing. 1) Can the global political system cope with the aftermath of any 'limited' nuclear war in which tens of millions of people might be killed? Would such conflicts open the floodgates to WMD proliferation of all kinds leading to the risk, among others, of 'designer' BW agents and the complete disintegration of global order and civilized

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life? Are primacy, cooperative security and imperial liberalism all inherently flawed by excessive optimism about the speed of change abroad and the ability of societies in transition to police their own societies and block the spread of WMDs to radical subnational groups? Are SE or NI therefore to be preferred by default? 2) Alternatively, one may ask whether the NI and SE strategies are far too optimistic about the prospects for being able to disengage from the dangers that lie across the three oceans separating North America from the troubled lands of Eurasia and Africa? Has the creation of a globalized economy led to a situation in which both NI and SE/OSB are simply not 'doable' because a trade-based, 'non-territiorially based' American 'imperialism' (per Susan Strange) will always be inherently vulnerable? Is the American NSS of 2002 correct in asserting the claim that 'the best defense is a good offense'? Is a fully reliable perimeter screen of North America utterly impractical because the vast number of holes and gaps will always defy attempts at effective control? And finally is the external threat so serious that ultimately neither CS nor a cooperative IL is up to the task of WMD suppression and control: is P, despite its egregious human rights failings (incident to the way the US has prosecuted the WOT in Iraq and Afghanistan) the only policy that can logically be supported in our present state of inherently limited perimeter defence? 3) Is the hope of CS proponents that an overlapping set of regimes for controlling and eliminating all WMDs inherently implausible? Does the real lesson of the two Iraq wars indicate that arms control and disarmament capabilities are not likely to ever be up to the task set by the CS grand strategy paradigm? Are the 'hiders' always destined to prevail over the 'seekers,' the 'cheaters' over the 'police'? Is the problem and risk of 'free riding' in collective security systems inherently insoluble?

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4) Finally, what strategic paradigm is most likely to advance Canada's short- and long-term security interests? Are Canadians vulnerable to 'demonstration' attacks, or is this a far-fetched, improbable scenario? Should Canadian governments attempt to make a difference in international security affairs or should they adopt an NI policy of their own, one that consciously devotes far more resources to a national perimeter defence and virtually nothing to military force projection, precisely because of our geographical proximity to the US and the chronic tendency of American leaders to engage in strategic risk-taking? Notes:
This paper is dedicated to the memory of Michelle Lynn Rosa, 1980-2004.
1 2

Colin Gray, Modern Strategy (New York, Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999), p. 17.

This definition is a modified version of the elements brought together by Basil H. Liddell Hart. See B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Signet/New American Library, 1974), p. 322. Ibid.

3 4

For example see John Newhouse, Imperial America: The Bush Assault on the World Order (New York: Vintage/Random House, 2004); Benjamin R. Barber, Fear's Empire: War, Terrorism and Democracy (New York, London: Norton, 2004); Jim Garrison, America as Empire: Global Leader or Rogue Power? (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2004); Gwynne Dyer, Future Tense: The Coming World Order (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2004); or Anonymous (Michael Scheuer), Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror (Washington: Brassey's, 2004).
5

The works of Niall Ferguson and Michael Ignatieff are most closely identified with this neo-imperialist thinking,. One of the earliest proponents of this school of thought, however, was the British policy adviser and analyst, Robert Cooper, who wrote a number of newspaper and journal articles which exhorted the benefits of modern imperialism. See for instance, Robert Cooper, "Why We Still Need Empires," The Observer, April 7, 2002. Available online at: http://observer.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4388915-110490,00.html. And for his most recent contribution to this debate see "Imperial Liberalism," The National Interest, n. 79 (Spring 2005), pp. 25-34. The most useful commentary on the origins and evolution of the practice of containment

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may be found in John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York, Oxford: Oxford UP, 1982). Such fears were more than justified. For indications that alternative policy currents were surging through the military and national security bureaucracies in Washington, see Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power (New York: Random House/Pantheon, 1974). Retrospective validation of Schurmann's analysis is provided by Fred Kaplan, "JFK's FirstStrike Plan," Atlantic Monthly, vol. 288, n. 3 (October 2001). See also details on Eisenhower era nuclear adventurism in James Bamford, Body of Secrets (New York: Random House/Anchor, 2002), pp. 35-38 and 82-91. Project Homerun from March to May 1956 entailed the dispatch of dozens of SAC (Strategic Air Command) bombers across the length of Siberia to gather electronic and photo-intelligence. 'Operation Northwoods' drawn up by the Chair of the JCS, Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, and approved by the other service chiefs, sought to create public support for an invasion of Cuba by orchestrating terrorist attacks on US cities, American navy ships and civilian aircraft and ships. According to former Ambassador Thomas Graham's recounting of a conversation with former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Gen. Curtis LeMay (then Chief of Staff of the Air Force) told President Kennedy at the end of the Cuban missile crisis that he was "a traitor" because he had failed to take advantage of the opportunities that occurred during the crisis to attack and destroy the Soviet state and its nuclear arsenal. LeMay had sent American SAC bombers up to the Soviet borders, well past their failsafe points hoping to provoke fire from anti-aircraft missile units that would 'justify' nuclear 'retaliation' that could be quickly escalated to a fullscale attack. Graham in lecture at the Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, April 20, 2005.
8 Nicholas Lemann, "The Next World Order," New Yorker, April 1, 2002, pp. 42-48. The study 7

produced by the second group, under Gen. Colin Powell's presumably more moderate leadership, did not receive any public coverage.
9

See "excerpts from the Pentagon's Feb. 18 draft of the Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994-1999," New York Times, March 8, 1992 (italics added).
10 Patrick E. Tyler, "Senior US Officials Assail a 'One Superpower' Goal," New York Times, March 11, 1992. 11 12

Ibid.

John Hay, "The Pentagon's plans are perilous nonsense," Ottawa Citizen, March 16, 1992; and Tom Harpur, "Why new global manifesto by US is an evil delusion," Toronto Star, March 15, 1992. Patrick E. Tyler, "Pentagon Drops Goal of Blocking New Superpowers," New York Times, May 24, 1992.
13

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14 15

Haass quoted in Lemann, "Next World Order," p. 45.

See for example, Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, vol. 17 n. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51. See also his later article extending his critique of policies seeking primacy, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing," International Security, vol. 22 n. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 86-124. Layne, "Unipolar Illusion," p. 34.

16 17

Christopher Layne, "Pox Americana, Not Pax Americana," New York Times, March 18, 1993.

18 Robert Jervis, "International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?" International Security,

vol. 17 n. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 52-67. For Samuel Huntington's denunciation of preponderance seeking administrations, see "The Lonely Superpower," Foreign Affairs, vol. 78 n. 2 (March/April 1999), pp. 35-49. It is noteworthy that Huntington was prepared to support a defensive "primacy" (maintaining a foremost military and economic status), but he was not at all willing to endorse any campaign for global hegemony. Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy," International Security, vol. 21 n. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 5-53.
20 Probably with tongue in cheek, they refer to the Clinton era grand strategy as one of 19

'selec-

tive (but cooperative) primacy'; see Posen and Ross, p. 44. See for instance Cooper, "Why We Still Need Empires," or his latest contribution to the grand strategy debate in Cooper, "Imperial Liberalism." Posen and Ross, p.16. National security expenditures in an NI mode would hover between 1.0 and 1.5% of GDP. American analysts writing in the NI vein cited by Posen and Ross include Earl Ravenal, Partrick Buchanan, Doug Bandow, and most importantly Eric Nordlinger. Nordlinger's analysis is, however, more shaped by liberalism than realism; see Nordlinger, Isolationism Reconfigured (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1995).
24 23 22 21

Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America," International Security, vol. 21 n. 4 (Spring 1997), p. 31. Ibid., p. 37. Posen and Ross, p. 16.

25 26 27

See for example Patrick Buchanan's book in which he argues that American participation in World War II was strategically unnecessary, that the pro-Israel lobby in Washington has

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grossly distorted American foreign policy in the Middle East, and that the military industrial complex continues to run amok in promiscuous commitments across the globe while creating a garrison state at home: Patrick J. Buchanan, A Republic Not an Empire (Washington: Regnery, 1999).
28

Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World (New York: Knopf, 2001), p. 88. For Mead, Kennan's containment concept was a grudging acceptance of the need for a long-term but still temporary deviation from his broader preference for 'no entangling alliances.'

29 The South African arsenal was dismantled unilaterally in 1993-94 by the last apartheid gov-

ernment prior to the country's democratization under Nelson Mandela. The Israeli military retains to this day what is thought to be a technically sophisticated arsenal thought of between 100 and 200 nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan both carried out multiple warhead tests in 1998 and have several score warheads each that can be delivered either by bombers or missiles.
30

See Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: the Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (Washington: Brassey's, 2004); and Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., Commonsense on Weapons of Mass Destruction (Vancouver: UBC Press/Eisenhower Institute, 2004). For a more skeptical and accordingly more optimistic assessment on the risks of nuclear terrorism, see Robin M. Frost, "Nuclear Terrorism Post-9/11: Assessing the Risks," Global Society, vol. 18 n. 4 (October 2004), pp. 397-422.

31

See Michael Ignatieff, "Canada in the Age of Terror Multilateralism Meets a Moment of Truth," Policy Options (February 2003), pp. 14-18, and esp. pp. 14-16.

SE was rooted in the balance of power thinking pioneered by Hans J. Morgenthau in the multiple editions of his Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993). But SE lacked "a certain romance" according to Posen and Ross, p. 22.
33

32

Posen and Ross in fact saw Layne's position as leaning more toward neo-isolationism. We do not concur with that assessment. References to the Cold War as a 'virtual' World War III can be found in Gray, Modern Strategy, pp. 9-11.

34

35

In the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan and Bush junior's declaration of the 'war on terrorism,' an updated call for an SE approach of "offshore balancing" by Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne advocated an end to the grand strategy of military preponderance that had guided American foreign policy since World War II. See "A New Grand Strategy," Atlantic Monthly, vol. 289, n. 1 (January 2002), pp. 36-42.

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36 37 38 39

Posen and Ross, p. 18. Posen and Ross, p. 19. Schwarz and Layne, p. 39.

See Graham, Commonsense on Weapons of Mass Destruction. Graham noted that as recently as 1997 guards tasked with securing highly enriched uranium were stealing "hockey-puck-like wafers" from storage facilities as they left work each day, and that "an implosion of five such wafers of HEU could devastate a major city" (p. 15).

40 To make matters worse, the Russian early warning system is still in serious disarray because

of their inability to maintain their satellite warning network. According to one of the authors of a RAND study in 2003, huge gaps in coverage of the approaches to Russia mean that "we have a blind, vulnerable Russia that might be compelled to launch very quickly in a crisis based on very little, if any, early warning information." The study itself declared that "today the greatest threat from Russia comes not from its strength but its weakness." See David Hughes, "Perilous Nuclear Shadow," Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 30, 2003.
41 42

Schwarz and Layne, p. 40.

Stephen M. Walt, "A new grand strategy for American foreign policy," Boston Review, February-March 2005, pp. 6-9. Ibid., p. 12. Ibid., p. 11. Ibid.

43 44 45 46

Stephen M. Walt, "Every American president since Roosevelt," Boston Review, FebruaryMarch 2005, p. 23. Left-wing critics usually dismiss the 'rogue state' proliferation threat as a propagandistic creation of Pentagon media and public relations strategists. For analysis in this vein, see Nicholas Guyatt, Another American Century? (London/Blackpoint, Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing/Zed Books, 2003), chapter 3.
48 47

Posen and Ross, p. 25.

49 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968; the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996; and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty that is yet to be concluded. 50

A 'virtual nuclear arsenal' can be envisaged as a small arsenal kept in a disassembled form, with the various components stored in many separate, well-hidden locations. Countries which

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have nuclear power industries with large stockpiles of fissile materials in the spent fuel bays of their reactors as well as the scientific and industrial capacity to reprocess this waste are also said to possess a 'virtual' arsenal that is, in effect, a few years from 'assembly.'
51

The Revolution in Military Affairs involves dramatic increases in speed and accuracy of delivery (enhanced precision strike technologies), networked sensors, weapons platforms and operational commanders and stealth technologies that improve prospects for preemptive decapitation of command and control, and greatly improved means of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Posen and Ross, p.28. Posen and Ross, p. 29.

52 53 54

Cutting to a few hundred is the floor below which most American nuclear strategists will not go. Robert McNamara, for example, falls into this category. Oddly enough Paul Nitze did not; he was prepared to endorse American participation in a complete nuclear arms ban because it would widen American conventional force advantages.

55

Pascal Boniface, "The Will to Powerlessness: Reflections on Our Global Age," Queen's Quarterly, special issue (n.d.).

56 See Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (Toronto: Penguin/Pearson, 2003), p. 15 57

Edward Luttwak, "Where Are the Great Powers?" Foreign Affairs, vol. 73 n.4 (July/August 1994), pp. 23-29; also Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy," Foreign Affairs, vol. 75 n. 4 (July/August 1996), pp. 33-44. For a careful summary of the problems with collective security guarantees, see Richard K. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War?" International Security, vol. 17 n. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 5-43. Posen and Ross, p. 43 (italics added).

58

59 60

For a sample of PNAC thinking that kept the flame of primacy alive during the Clinton presidency, see "Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century," A Report of the Project for a New American Century, September 2000. Available online at the organization's web site, http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf.

61

In more recent estimates, PNAC authors say 4.8% of GDP was spent in 1993 and 3.4% in 2003, after a decline to under 3.0% in the last years of the Clinton era rust-out in which the military had to live off the capital spending of the 1980s.

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62 63 64

PNAC, "Rebuilding," p. 2. Ibid., p. 12. Ibid., p. 13.

65 Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004). 66 67 68

Anonymous (Michael Scheuer), Imperial Hubris. Clarke, Against All Enemies, p. xvii.

These statistics can be found at the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count website, available at http://icasualties.org/oif/

69

President of the United States, "National Security Strategy of the United States," (Washington: White House, September 2002). Available online in pdf form at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html NSS, 2002 document, pp. 30-31 of the pdf version.

70 71

For a persuasive demand that the US and its allies undertake far more active measures to close down the threat of a terrorist nuclear attack on the American homeland, see Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times Books, 2004). Rudyard Kipling, "The White Man's Burden," 1899.

72

73 It seems crucial to point out that the term has been employed far more frequently and con-

siderably less pejoratively since the events of 9/11. Indeed, as the deputy executive director of the Project for the New American Century declared in August 2001, "There's not all that many people who will talk about it [empire] openly. It's discomforting to a lot of Americans. So they use code phrases like 'America is the sole superpower'." Since, September 11, 2001, however, the American public has arguably become significantly more accustomed to thinking about their country as an empire state. Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America's Empire (New York: Penguin, 2004), p. 4.
74 75 76 77

Ibid., p. 6. Ibid., p. 2. Ibid., p. 27.

Karl W. Deutsch, "Imperialism and Neocolonialism," The Papers of the Peace Science Society (International), vol. 23, (1974), p. 1.

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78 79

Ferguson, Colossus, p. 286.

See for instance Max Boot "In Modern Imperialism, US Needs to Walk Softly," Los Angeles Times, July 15, 2004 and Niall Ferguson and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, "Going Critical: American Power and the Consequences of Fiscal Overstretch," The National Interest (Fall 2003), pp. 22-32.
80 See for example Deepak Lal, In Praise of

Empire (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) and Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2003). Robert Cooper, "Why We Still Need Empires."

81 82

Max Boot, "Washington Needs a Colonial Office," Financial Times, July 2, 2003 and Niall Ferguson, Colossus, p. 211. Ignatieff, Empire Lite, p. 2. Ibid., p. 8 Ibid., pp. 10-11. Ibid., p. 18.

83 84 85 86 87

Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968).
88 89 90

Ignatieff, Empire Lite, p. 24. Ferguson, Colossus, p. 293.

According to one estimate, the American Empire is only the sixty-eighth in recorded history. Ferguson, Colossus, p. 14.

CONTRIBUTORS

Dr. James Fergusson is the Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, and an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Manitoba. He teaches a range of courses in the areas of international relations, strategic studies, and foreign and defence policy, with an emphasis on Canada. In addition to his extensive academic publications record, Dr Fergusson has been commissioned to write several reports for the Department of National Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs. He lectures to a wide range of military audiences, including Canadian Forces College, and the Air Force Staff Course in Winnipeg, and has testified on several occasions to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran's Affairs on a variety of issues. He is also a member of the Defence Science Advisory Board and the Defence Industrial Advisory Committee, and was recently appointed a Fellow at the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. Dr. Karen Guttieri is Assistant Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and

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Affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford. She teaches in the graduate program in Stabilization and Reconstruction at NPS. Her focus is military operations in civilian environments, in particular, issues of effectiveness, military organizational learning, and civil-military relations. Dr. Guttieri has published works on stability operations, homeland security, and political psychology. She has participated in United Nations peacekeeping games and pre-deployment education for US military officers going to Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq. She completed the Civil-Military Cooperation in Modern Peacekeeping Course at Canadas Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Training Centre; the Joint Civil-Military Operations Course at the US Joint Special Operations University; and World Vision's Level II Security Management Training Course. Dr. Wade L. Huntley is the Director of the Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research, housed in the Liu Institute for Global Studies, University of British Columbia. Previously he was Associate Professor at the Hiroshima Peace Institute in Hiroshima, Japan, and Director of the Global Peace and Security Program at the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development in Berkeley, California. He received his doctorate in political science from the University of California at Berkeley in 1993 and has published a number of works on US nuclear and missile defense policies, East and South Asian regional security, and international relations theory. Col (Retd) Brian S. MacDonald is the President of Strategic Insight Planning and Communications, Chairman of Defence Studies and Acting Executive Director of the Royal Canadian Military Institute. Previously, he has has been President of the Atlantic Council of Canada an NGO which is the Canadian constituent of the international Atlantic Treaty Association, Vice-Chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations, President of the Royal

THE DILEMMAS

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Canadian Artillery Association, an Honorary Aide-de-Camp to Governor General of Canada, an Honorary Governor of Canadian Corps of Commissionaires, and a Member of Consultative Group on Arms Control and Disarmament to Ambassador for Disarmament.

the the the the

David S. McDonough is the Communications and Programmes Officer at the Royal Canadian Military Institute (RCMI). Prior to that, he was the Research Officer at the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS), funded by the DND Security and Defence Forum Internship Award. He holds a BA (Hons.) from Simon Fraser University and an MA in Political Science from the University of British Columbia. Recent works include three co-edited volumes of conference proceedings, and a number of articles, including in the CIR Working Paper series, the CISS Strategic Datalinks series, RCMI Commentary, SITREP and International Journal. His current research interests are on American nuclear strategy, the non-proliferation regime and Canadian-American defence cooperation. Dr. Alexander Moens, Professor at Simon Fraser University, teaches international relations, and specializes in American Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy as well as in the Politics and Foreign Policy of the European Union. He is the author of The Foreign Policy of George W. Bush: Values, Strategy and Loyalty (Ashgate, 2004) and Foreign Policy Under Carter (Westview Press, 1990). He is co-editor of Nato and European Security: Alliance Politics from the Cold War's End to the Age of Terrorism (Praeger Publishers, 2003) and Foreign Policy Realignment in the Age of Terror (Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2003). In 1994 he edited Disconcerted Europe: The Search for a New Security Architecture (Westview Press, 1994). In addition, Moens has published in numerous Canadian, American and European journals, and periodically contributes to US, Canadian and Dutch newspapers. He was the first Cadieux Fellow in the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa in

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1992 and was a visiting fellow at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., in the Spring of 1999. He is also a researcher with the Council For Canadian Security in the 21st Century, and a Fellow of the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute. In 2002, he was appointed Senior Fellow in American Policy at the Fraser Institute in Vancouver, BC. Christopher N.B. Ross, a graduate in History and Political Science from the University of British Columbia, is a Commonwealth Scholar pursuing postgraduate studies in History at the University of Cambridge. His MPhil studies will examine the geostrategic writings of Lord George Nathaniel Curzon of Kedleston, Viceroy of India (1899-1905) and British Foreign Secretary (1919-1923). His dissertation is titled, Learning to Play the Great Game: Lord Curzon and the Making of an Expert on Asiatic Affairs. His research interests include diplomatic and international relations history, particularly the history of the British Imperial period. Dr. Douglas A. Ross has been Professor of Political Science at Simon Fraser University since 1988. His major research interests include Canadian foreign and defence policies, strategic studies and arms control and approaches to grand strategy. He was a founding director of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament in 1983, and served on the national policy advisory group for the Canadian Ambassadors for Disarmament from 1986-93. Dr. Ross is currently the Executive Director of the Canadian-American Strategic Review that is also operated through SFU (see www.sfu.ca/casr). He is the author of a major study on Canada's involvement in the Vietnam War and many other works on Canadian international security relations. He has published in International Journal, Canadian Foreign Policy and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. The article on missile defence is adapted from his current research on the CanadianAmerican aerospace defence relationship.