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Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Inteltigence)

Warfighter Analysis and Integration

5000 Defense Pentagon, Rm 3C281
Washington, DC 20301-5000
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UNCLASSIFIED

DoD Comments on Staff Statement No. 17

"Improvising A Homeland Defense"

# ORG/ Pg# Paratf Line# Comments

REVIEWER
JS Statement: "NORAD was, and is, responsible for the air defense
of the continental United States."

Recommendation: Change to reacL/TQORAD was, and is,

responsible for the air defense of tHe continental United States.
NORAD has the dual missioivof aerospace warning and
aerospace control. On thexfay of 9/11, NORAD's focus was
out ward-looking, addressing the threat of an external attack
from a foreign military

Rationale: As written, understates the NORAD mission, and is

also misleading as it does not note the threat that NORAD was
tasked to address.
NORAD Statement: 'They assumed the fighter escort would be discreet,
vectored to a position five miles direeuy behind the hijacked
aircraft, where it could perfornufsrnission."

Recommendation: Chap£e to read, ".. .where it could perform its

mission to monitor tbe flight path of the aircraft."

Rationale: Correctness. The statement as re-written more

correctly defines the role of the fighter escort.
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NORAD Statement: 'The nine minutes notice..."

>
RecoiriknendatipHf^Add wording to clarify that notification was
probablyVlpser to six minutes considering the phone was
answecpdxaXp837 and the call completed at 0840.
\: Completeness.

NORAD 11 Statement: Tfae communication betweenJFAA and NEADS that

followed is referenced as beginning al^21 (reference ID Op,
Channel 7, at 09f21:10, NEADS^vSce data recording.)

Recommendation: :harfge to read,/At 9:22JXEADS received a

report from FA A."

Rationale: curacy. >, ChanneL4, has this communication

between FAA and NEAPS ^ginning/at 09:22:24.
NORAD 12 Statement: "The Mission Crew Commander (MCC) at NEADS
issued an order at 9:22: Okay...sc/ambleLangley. Head them
towards the Washington DC arc

ecommendationNChange to read, "....issued the order at

9:23:.^ Then add the following statement: " That order was
processed and transmitted fo Langley at 9:24, and the Langley
fighters were airborne ar

Rationale: Accuracy. The MCC statement was made at 09:22:32

according to MCC Op, Ch 2, NEADS voice data recording.
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Rounding to the nearest minute, as was done in the rest of the

report, makes the time 9:23 vs. 9:22. The NEADS Air
Surveillance Technician (AST) confirms the Langley scramble
time as 9:24 on AST, Channel 15, at 09:24:33: "Scramble time
24, 24 LF1 [Three-letter identifier for Langley] 1324, did you get
that?"
NORAD 13 Statement: "Boston Center called NEADS at 9:39 and identified
Delta 1989, a 757 jet that departed Logan Airport destined for Las
Vegas, as a possible hijack."

Recommeni : Change to read, " Boston Center called

NEADS ai
"— j

Rationale: Consistency, accuracy. ID Op, Channel 4, documents

the time as 09:41:08.
NORAD 14 Statement: ".. .NEADS soon learned that the aircraft was not
hijacked..." The footnote referenced, "MCC Op, Ch., at
13:42:08," is incorrect.

JUeoinmendation: The correct reference is: ID 2, Channel 8, at

09:45:22 fromFAA.

Rationale: Accuracy.

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8 NORAD 16 Statement: NEADS first received a call about United 93 from the
military liaison at Cleveland Center, at 10:07." No footnote
reference was cited.

Recommendation: CJiaage^p read, "...the military liaison at

Cleveland Center

Rationale: Accuracy, consistency. Reference footnote should be

ID 1, Channel 4, 10:06:28.
NORAD 18 1-6 Statement: "Yet this response to a phantom aircraft, American
11, is not recounted in a single public timeline or statement issued
by FAA or DoD....to an actual hijacked aircraft."

Recommendation: Reword paragraph to read, "Yet this response

to a phantom aircraft, American 11, has not been widely
disseminated by the FAA or NORAD. Early official timelines
indicated the scramble of the Langley fighters was a response to
the reported hijacking of American 77, or United 93, or some
combination of the two. This inaccurate account created the
appearance that the Langley scramble was a logical response to an
actual hijacked aircraft."

Rationale: Correctness. Original timelines incorrectly identified

the notification of American 77 to coincide with the Langley
fighter scramble. That information was not corrected until
Commission interviews and NORAD review of tapes clearly
indicated the inaccuracy. While NQRAD did not issue a public
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announcement of corrected timeline, NORAD did freely share the

corrections with Commission staff in 2003 and 2004.

10 OUSD(I) 19 Statement: Referencing NORAD's initial timeline inaccuracies:

"They also had the effect of deflecting questions about the
military's capacity to obtain dmely and accurate information from
its own resources."

Recommendation: Delete quoted sentence above.

Rationale: The meaning of the sentence is not clear. As written,

statement seems to imply that NORAD may have purposely
misled the Commission to deflect other criticism concerning the
military's handling of events. Based on the Commission's
interviews with NORAD/NEADS personnel, Commission staff
has acknowledged that the inaccuracies were not intentional.
11 OUSD(I) 21 Statement: "As one witness described, "[It] was almost like
there were parallel decisionmaking nrocesses going on; one was a
voice conference orchestrated byfne NMCC.. .and then, there was
the [White House video cWfcrence].. .in my mind they were
competing venues for o>mjnand and control and decisionmaking."

Recommendation": For accuracy, add a sentence after current

final sentenceto clarify the point that "competition" between
venues was for the time of participants rather than control of
C2/decisionmakmg.
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Rationale: Although this statement was made by an officer on

duty in the NMCC on 9X11, as^uoted, the statement is
misleading. It is more acWrate to say that the concurrent
communication venuegxreated competition for the time of the
participants and should nottmply that there were two command
and control/decisionmaking venues.
12 JS 21 8 Statement: "Inside the National Milit Command Center, the
director of operations... "

Recommendation: Change Deputy Director for

Operations (DDO) . . . "

Rationale: Correct duty title.

13 JS 22 Statement: "He recommended transitk ung the call into an Air
Threat Conference call."

Recommendation: Chan; directed the transition to an

Air Threat Conference call."

Rationale: More accurate

14 OUSD(l) 22 Statement: "But the highest level Defense Department officials
relied on the NMCGI's Air TJjieat Conference alone, in which
FAA did not meaningftUlypaiticipate."
*^^^^ w m. 1.

Recommendation: Re-write sentence to read: "But the highest

level Defense DepartmentNofficials, acting on established
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protocol, relied on the NMCC's Air Threat Conference alone, in

which FAA did not meaningfully participate."

Rationale: As written, this statement is technically correct.

However, the conclusion derived is misleading because it is not
fully explained. NORAD's commanders and staff followed
internal DoD guidance per CJCSI6130.01 A, "Aircraft Piracy
(Hijacking) and Destruction oft)erelict Airborne Objects" dated 1
June 2001, on the moniuSg/oi 9/11. This instruction directs that
"The DDO, NMCC, is designated as the DOD coordinating
authority between the^AAand operational commanders." DoD
and Joint Staff directives, instructions, and policies are developed
and adapted over years with careful consideration and
measurement of best-odds options for the Wa^ighter and National
Defense.

15 JS 22 Statement: "At 9:39, the NMCC s director, . . .

Recommendation: Chan 9:39, the NMCC's Deputy

Director for Operations . .

Rationale: Correct duty title

16 NORAD 22 2-3 Statement: "[the commander of] NO is not declaring air
defense emergency at this point.

Recommendation: Add clarififcajj-on to explain the implications

of NQRAD declaring "Air Defense Emergency."
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Rationale: Completeness and clarity. Air Defense Emergency is

a DoD term that triggers national defense responses not suitable to
the events of 9-11-01.

17 JS 22 Statement: 'C director . . .

Recommend Change to "the NMCC's Deputy Director

for Operation

Rationale; Correct duty title

18 JS 23 Statement: "The NMCC direct

Recommendation: Ch the NMCC's Deputy Director

for Operations . . . "

Rationale; Correct duty title

19 JS 23 Statement: "At 9:52, NORAD suggested he director of
operations. . . "

Recommendation: Change to\"At^f52, NORAD suggested to

the Deputy Director of Operati

Rationale; Correct duty title

20 JS 23 Statement: " At 9:58, the director of operations stated that the
Vice Chairman, General Richard Myers, was recommending
evactuating the.Sears Tower in Chicago...."
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Recommendation: Change to "At 9:58, the Deputy Director for

Operations and the Vice Chairman, General Richard Myers,
discussed the possibility of evacuating the Sears Tower

Rationale: Correct duty title\for DF9O. Also, Gen Myers was told
by the DDO that other agencie\rex5ommended evacuating the
Sears Tower. Gen Myers agreed with the recommendation but he
did not initiate the recommendation as the statement currently
implies. '
21 OUSD(I) 27-28 Beginn Statement: Draft quotes the Vice President and the Secretary of
ing line Defense from the ATCC directly.
x S J

4
Recommendation: Textus classified. Permission to declassify or
quote these passages direc^y from the ATCC resides with the
White House.
22 JS 28 Statement: "The first of the Andrews fighters was airborne at
10:38."

Recommendation: Change to " .. airborne at 10:33."

Rationale: NORAD's best timelines indicate a take-off time of

10:33 (unless the Commission staff has a better citation, but none
is provided). /
23 AF/XOH/ 29 Statement: "There was only one set offigJHfersorbiting
NORAD Washington....the Langley F-15s." \

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Recommendation: Change to read, "., .the LangJey F-16s."

Rationale: Correctness. The alert fighters from Langley were F-

I6s permanently assigned to the 119FW at F
24 NORAD 29 6-7 All Statement: "Once the target was known and identified, NEADS
needed orders to pass to the pilots. Shoot down authority was
first communicated to NEADS at 10:3 1 . Given the clear attack on
the United States, it is also possible—though unlikely—that the
NEADS commander could have ordered the shoot down without
the Vice President's authorization.

NORAD Officials have maintained in the past that they were

tracking United 93 and would ha^e intercepted and shot down the
aircraft. We are. not so sure."

Recommendations Reword/to read:

"Once the target was knowij and identified, NEADS needed
orders to pass to the pilots/ Presidential shoot down authority
was first communicateij to NEADS at 10:31. Given the clear
attack on the United States, it is also possible that the NEADS,
CONR, or NORAD Commanders could have ordered the
shoot down without specific Presidential authority. Each
commander would have first pursued authorization from the
President, but without Presidential authorization in time,
NORAD would have defended the Washington, D.C. area
from attack. "

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Rationale: NORAD leaders believe there would have been

actions attempted to gain shoot down authority had UA93
continued in to Washington, DC.

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