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Federal Aviation

Administration
Cleveland Air Traffic Control Tower
Cleveland Hopkins International Airport
3rd Floor Administration Building
Cleveland OH 44135

Date: f. /<£ • of

FAX Number of pages including cover sheet: <~

From:

Phone: Phone: 216/898-2020


Fax phone: Fax phone: 216/898-2064
CC:

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DAL 1989 Order of Events

times are UCT. Subtract 4 hours for local time, e.g. 1350:41 UCT = 9:50:41 a.m.
B is Cleveland Center
wakem is the Cleveland Center Wakem Sector
HO is the handoff position at Clevland Approach
OS is the Supervisor in the Tower
ARW is the Arrival West position at Cleveland Approach
CLE is Cleveland Hopkins Airport
ETA is estimated time of arrival
LC is the Local Control Position in the tower
Italics are comments for clarification
All clearances issued to DAL1989 received appropriate responses from the pilot except as noted.

1350:41 ZOB Wakem sector (Wakem) calls Handoff (HO) and advises DAL 1989 "is confirmed hijack and
Westbound and away from your airport so for now you can disregard him."

1351:27 City Ops calls the Tower Supervisor (OS) and asks, "do we have a hijack aircraft inbound?" OS
says he can't confirm that and will call City Ops back.

1352:17 Wakem calls HO and advises "DAL's hanging a U-turn now heading back toward you. He
supposedly has a bomb on board and not a hijack." Wakem then advises DAL 1989 will be
coming in from North of Sandusky and is about 10-12 minutes out from the boundary.

1-^355:10 OS advises City Ops that DAL 1989 is inbound to Cleveland believed to have a bomb on board, is
**1 a B767, planning runway 6R. City asks if DAL is a hijack or a bomb threat. OS says he doesn't
know and advises DAL is about 12 minutes out (City Ops advises the information they had was
on a UAL93.)

1357:54 City Ops advises the fire stations will be at "quarters" until FBI arrives.

1358:34 Wakem call HO and advises that DAL 1989 will be descending to 9,000' to get under the holding
pattern going direct Wakem then direct CLE.

1358:50 OS tells City Ops that the bomb area is on the West side at Romeo, but that they're worried about
the construction guys. City tells the OS to go for Romeo, that they're pulling the construction
guys out of there now. Romeo is the taxhvay designator. TJie construction is the new rumvay.

1400:34 Wakem call HO and advises "now we're being told DAL is a hijack and may have a bomb."
Wakem then says the information "coming from the pilot has been really unreliable and shaky."
ZOB Carlton sector (CRL) then calls and tells HO that they are working DAL 1989 and that he is
going direct to the airport now and that the pilot requested it.

1401:17 Arrival West (ARW) controller calls DAL 1989. No response from DAL.

1402:02 DAL1989 contacts ARW at 9,000'. 9000 ' is the aircraft's altitude. ARW issues DAL1989 direct
•V-
<*•*
to the field.

1402:18 ARW asks DAL1989 his intentions. DAL answers "we're landing Cleveland."

1402:46 ARW asks DAL1989 "can you make in the clear communications with me?" DAL1989 responds,
"affirmative, we are not a trip sir."

1403:54 ARW issues DAL1989 heading 070.

J4:07 City Ops calls for ETA on DAL1989. OS advises 7 to 8 minutes, about 20 miles West.

1404:25 ARW instructs DAL1989 "descend at your discretion to 7,000."

1405:04 DAL1989 asks if he will use runway 24L. ARW responds yes.

1405:31 ARW instructs DAL1989 at 7,000 reduce speed to 170. 7000 is the altitude

1406:57 Wakem calls to ask if we're working DAL 1989. We tell them yes we are. ZOB then asks HO if
we can give him any information on DAL 1989. HO advises ZOB the DAL is landing here at
CLE and that we're treating him as an emergency.

1408:04 HO calls Wakem and advises "once DAL lands the City says no one else is landing" until
everything gets worked out.

1408:28 City Ops says the FBI wants to know if DAL1989 squawked this (Hijack). OS says no.

1409:09 ARW instructs DAL1989 to descend and maintain 5,000, fly heading 060.

1410:10 OS advises City Ops that once DAL gets down we're shut down.

**U1:18 ARW advises DAL1989 that he will be keeping him on ARW frequency on final.
if
1412:37 ARW instructs DAL1989 to descend and maintain 4,000, turn right 140.

1413:19 ARW instructs DAL1989 to rum right to 210, intercept the localizer, and descend and maintain
3,000.

1414:1.1 ARW clears DAL1 989 for the ILS Runway 24L approach.

1415:11 ARW advises DAL1989 to contact the tower.

1415:26 DAL1989 checks in with Local Control (LC). LC issues wind and clears DAL1989 to land.

1418:38 LC advises DAL1989 that he will be parked on the West side of the airport.

1418:41 HO advises Wakem that DAL 1989 is "on the ground at 1418." Wakem asks "very safely too I
hope?" HO responds that DAL is being taken to the bomb area for now to check.

1418:48 LC issues DAL1989 taxi instructions.

1419:05 Cab Coordinator (CC) tells HO that DAL is on the ground, that we're officially closed, and that
DAL is being taxied to the West side.
"V
1419:26 DAL1989 transmits to LC, "just to make sure we don't have any misunderstandings here, our flaps
are up, we are landing only as a precaution at the company's request, you understand that." LC -
responds affirmative, but advises DAL1989 that parking on the West side was at the City's
request.

|420:38 DAL1989 asks if they're going to get to their gate any time soon. LC responds that is the City's
«\3 call, and that he believes there will be people out to do a search of the aircraft.

DAL1989 asks if he should get the people off the aircraft. LC tells DAL that the City says to
leave them there.

1422:41 DAL1989 asks if it would help if they shut their engines down, or if they should keep them
running. LC tells DAL its his choice.

1433:09 DAL1989 asks LC for an update and if the City is going to come out. LC advises he has no
information. DAL responds that they're eager to get off the aircraft.

1436:05 LC advises DAL 19 89 to contact City Ops on 129.55.

1436:20 OS tell City Ops that AL1989 is anxious to get people off the aircraft.

1528:32 Air Traffic Manager (ATM) calls City Ops and advises we have no apparent reason to believe
DAL is a hijack, that it fit the profile for a hijack. And that we don't have any specific bomb
threats. ATM tells City Ops that he just got clearance form FAA Headquarters that we have no
reason to hold that aircraft unless the City has other information from the FBI.

U529:44 LC advises DAL1989 that they are going to be allowed to return to the gate.
«
i530:04 DAL1989 is concerned about turning around on the West side. LC advises a tug will probably be
sent out.

1530:27 LC asks DAL1989 for souls on board.

1532:35 DAL1989 responds 78 soul on board.

1533:20 LC advises DAL1989 that there is a chance the FBI will want to deplane the passengers on the
West side.

1544:16 LC asks Car 6 if they're planning on deplaning passengers on the West side or at the gate. Car 6
says at the gate, but he will verify that. Car 6 is the designator for one of the City's operations
vehicles

1544:51 Car 6 advises LC that passengers will deplane at the gate.

1545:15 City Ops advises that DAL will deplane on Romeo taxiway.

1545:50 LC tells DAL1989 to plan on deplaning on the West side were he currently sits.

-M 547:03 Car 6 confirms offloading on the West side..


^^.
1623:45 LC advises DAL1989 that the City will start to bring equipment across the field to his aircraft.
Passengers were taken to the Federal Facilities Building on the opposite side of the airfield from
the terminal far debriefing by the FBI
1528:32 entry: The Air Traffic Manager (ATM) received a call from the Operations Manager (OM) at ZOB on
the administrative phone line (898-2020, unrecorded) at approximately 1400 UCT (9:00 a.m. local). In that
^nversation the OM advised the ATM of what he knew of the situation. The OM told the ATM that they had
| >rmation that the DAL flight could be a hijack and might have a bomb on board. The OM stated that the
pilot and company both said it was a precautionary landing and there was no hijack. The OM then said that the
"Hunters" said it was a hijack. The ATM asked who the hunters were. There was a lot of confusion at the
center and the impression the ATM got was that "Hunters" were in receipt of some intelligence that indicated
the aircraft was a hijack.

The ATM gave the order to evacuate the building of all but essential personnel and to take the operational staff
to only the positions absolutely necessary to work the aircraft currently airborn.

At approximately 1515 UCT the ATM contacted the Center Manager to see if we could find out any new
information on DAL1989. In the conversation between the tower ATM and the Assistant Air Traffic Manager
at the center it was determined that DAL1989 fit the profile of a possible hijacked aircraft. It was also
determined after consultation with the original OM who communicated with the tower ATM that we, the FAA,
had no information indicating there was either a bomb or a hijack involved with the aircraft. The ATM was in
the tower and used the open line to City Operations to communicate what we knew. That is the background
behind the 1528:32 entry concerning the conversation between the ATM and City Ops.

1530:27 entry: The request for souls on board came from City Ops to the tower and was relayed by the local
controller.

ARW Communications NOTE: One anomaly that perpetuated concern by approach controllers in the face of
Constant information that there was nothing going on with DAL1989 was that the pilot never used the HEAVY
signator in his communications. Controllers used the designator but the pilot did not respond with it.

This may seem minor but should not be overlooked. The use of HEAVY in the terminal environment is of the
highest importance. Increased separation standards are required and misapplication of separation standards can
be disastrous. For pilots, not referring to a heavy aircraft as HEAVY is tantamount to calling a doctor 'Mister".
This omission along with all of the other information flying around kept everyone alert and skeptical of the
security of the flight.
Pa9eN°-iof1
U.S. Department of Transportation Daily ReCOfd Of Facility Operation Date
Federal Aviation Administration 9/11/01
|^**ton Identification Type Facility Operating Position Checked By

Cleveland, OH CLE Combined Cleveland Hopkins ATCT Air Traffic Manager


TRACONH-ower " J. Marie Rseves o.
/
Time (UTC) REMARKS '

0400 L RINGWALT ON. ILS RWY 24L IN USE. CFPL: , RWY 6L REILS AND VASI OTS, RWY 6L
THRESHOLD RELOCATED, 123.85 STBY XX BLEEDS ONTO 128.25 MAIN RX, LC IC.3S
LIGHT PANEL ERRATIC, 124.0 STBY XX BLEEDS ONTO 121.5, 128.25 STATIC C :* BOTH
MAIN & STBY RX, CAK LINE OTS
0401 MODE-S TO TWR, ASR-9 TO MCC .
0800 ILS RWY 6R IN USE.
0955 MODE-S & ASR-9 TO TRACON .
1032 D. LEPHEW ON, ABOVE NOTED.
E 1035 128.25 NORMAL, RTS .
1050 TMU GIVEN 40 RATE.
1100 WCLC. OPERATIONAL PROGRAM A 3 . 0 6 . 2 / Y / 3 .
E 1146 128.25 STATIC ON BOTH MAIN AND STANDBY RECEIVERS. DRN USING 126.55. -XICC/PEREZ
1229 ILS RWY 24L IN USE.
E 1240 ENROUTE DIAL LINE OTS, MCC (GARY) ADVISED.
1315 CLE IN SECON "DELTA".
1325 GROUND STOP ALL TRAFFIC.
1352 COA1566 MADE GO AROUND DUE TO BEING TOO HIGH.
1400 ADVISED OF DAL1989 INBOUND FROM BOS TO CLE WITH SUSPECTED BOMB ON B( ARD.
1511 NO CIVILIAN LIFE FLIGHTS ALLOWED IN THE AIR, ONLY MILITARY MEDEVAC.
1612 CLE RECIEVED CALL FROM CGF DESCRIBING THEIR FBO (EAGLE WINGS- ED BARKC ) GOT A
CALL FROM WOMAN IDENTIFYING FROM TV CHANNEL 5. SHE STATED THAT AN AIRCRAFT
LEAVING TOL HAD A BOMB ON BOARD. WHEN ED INQUIRED FURTHER WOMAN HUI-G UP.
^1617 FBI NOTIFIED AT FIRE HOUSE ABOUT TOL BOMB THREAT.
1619 ZOB WATCH DESK NOTIFIED ABOUT TOL BOMB THREAT.
1622 ATM & AATM ADVISED ABOUT TOL.
1627 ROC (FRED SOUCHET) ADVISED OF TOL BOMB THREAT.
1542 PASSENGERS NOW BEING DISEMBARKED OFF DAL1989. ALERT 4 CANCELLED. R-C
ADVISED.
1830 J. ADELMAN ON, ABOVE NOTED, SECON DELTA IN EFFECT.
1900 WCLC. OPERATIONAL PROGRAM A 3 . 0 6 . 2 / Y / 3 .
2330 CLE CITY ARPRT REQUESTS THAT TWR ONLY ILLUMINATE TXWYS TONIGHT AFTER SUNSET,
LEAVE RWY LTS AND BEACON OFF UFA, IF ANY A/C REQUEST LNDNG, COORDINATE WITH
CITY BEFORE ILLUMINATING RWY AND BEACON.
0235 L RINGWALT ON. ABOVE NOTED.
0300 WCLC. OPS PROGRAM A3. 06. 2
0359 COB.

/ CERTIFY tfiat entries above are correct; that all scheduled operations have been accomplished, except as noted, and that
all abnormal occurrences and conditions have been recorded.

^21
Watch Supeivisor(s) Signature Watch Supervisors) Signature Watch Supervisor(s) Signature

, ^ \A Form 7230-4 (1
•Irt^

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