T-754 P.

01/04 F-249

Office of -the Regional

Administrator, AEA-1
Tel. 718-:5S3-3001
I
Fax 718-995-5636

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To: Ruth Leverenz Fax: 817-222-5943

From: Manny Weiss Date: 09/14/01

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CC:

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Ruth

Procedure for notification once ROC is notified is to notify all Regional LOB'3 thai are Involved

as well as headquarters ROC and NTSB if applicable.

Attached are ROC logs for 9/11 and RANS notification log. First notiJIcation to ROC is of

possible highjack at 1250 GMT (8:50 local) from N90 (NY TRACON). Message put on Regional

Automated Notification System almost immediately.

From its log, messages received by locations 1-11 between 8:55 and 9;07, Messagfi to

headquarters ROC while dialed between 8:55 and 9'.2L3, was not picked up due to constant busy

signal.

The Region's ROC does not contact the DOD.

If yoii need more, please call.

Manny
 Eastern Region Operations Center
Emergency Notification Process
September 11, 2001

Background

FAA Order 1990.1, FAA National Command and Control System, establishes policies
and procedures and assigns responsibilities for the FAA Command and Control System.
The system provides FAA Authorities, at all levels, with timely, accurate information, to
enable the planning, directing, and controlling of significant events that could adversely
impact the FAA mission. Paragraph 2-13, Critical Information Notification and
Reporting Actions, outline events and occurrences required to be reported. These include
aircraft accidents and suspected, forcible seizure of aircraft.

Events of September 11, 2001

At 1250 UTC (0850 local), the Regional Operations Officer (ROO) received a telephone
call from the New York TRACON (Terminal Radar Control facility) of the possible
hijacking of American Airlines Flight 11, a Boeing 757.

Upon receipt of a preliminary notification of the possible hijacking, the Operations

Center made notification in accordance with the attached Operating Guidelines.
In preparing the notification message, the Operations Center observed local news stating
an aircraft had struck one of the World Trade Center Towers. This information was
included this in the notification message. Notification was made at 1254Z/8:54E utilizing
the Regional Automated Notification System (RAMS). The following offices
successfully retrieved the notification message: AEA-1, 3, 5, 6, 470, 600, 700, NY
FSDO, NTSB, Leesburg MCC, and NY SECC. The following offices did not retrieve the
notification message: Washington Ops Center, AEA-230, and AEA-505. (jte.usfjULi~. tfu</
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At this point, personnel from the LOB's, arrived at the Regional Operations Center for
additional information and a decision was made to activate the Regional Crisis Command
Center.

At 1255Z/8:55E, the Regional Administrator, in consultation with Security, declared

Security Condition (SECON) Level Charlie.

Shortly thereafter, while setting up Command Control Communications to support

activation of the Command Center, the Operations Officer observed, on local news, a
second aircraft striking the World Trade Center.

A review of the Operations Center Daily Record of Facility Operations indicates no

notification was made to the Regional Operations Center of a second aircraft striking the
World Trade Center.
At 1359Z/9-59E the Operations Officer received a call from the New York State Police
reporting a passenger on board United Airlines Flight 93 from Newark to San Francisco,
called his mother on a cell phone that hijackers were rushing the cockpit. The __
information was immediately relayed to the Regional Administrator in the Crisis
Command Center.

At this point, a heads-up was given, by telephone, to the Washington Operations Center.

At 1520Z/11:20E, Somerset, PA, Police Department called advising that an aircraft had
crashed.
At 15SOZ/11:50E, the Allegheny FSDO advised there was report of a downed aircraft in
Somerset County and dispatched inspectors. Regional Crisis Command Center already
had information.

At 1600Z/12:OON, the Regional Operations Center advised the Washington Operations

Center of the above.

Between the hours of 1600Z and 1700Z, numerous calls were made to the Allegheny
FSDO, local law enforcement, to confirm and obtain additional information, of the
possible downed aircraft.

At 1719Z/13:19E, notification of an aircraft accident was made via the Regional

Automated Notification System in accordance with the attached Operating Guidelines.
The following offices successfully retrieved the notification message: AEA-300, 470,
600, 700, PIT CASFO, AGC FSDO, NTSB, Leesburg MCC, and NWS. The following
offices did not retrieve the notification message: PEMA, AEA-200, and 230.

At 1800Z/14:OOE, in the Operations Center's continuing efforts to obtain information

concerning the above events, contacted American Airlines and was able to determine the
identification of the American Airlines aircraft that crashed into the World Trade Center
and the identification of a second aircraft that crashed but it was not clear where. Crisis
Command Center already aware.

Summary

During this period of time, the Operations Officer was experiencing difficulty contacting
FAA field facilities and local law enforcement due to telephone circuit saturation.
Additionally, there was a large influx of incoming calls from various elements looking
for information on the above incidents.
. Once .the Crisis Command Center was established and operational, information flow
normally processed through the Operations Center in accordance FAA Order 1990.1, was
processed directly to the Crisis Command Center. This included the following:

Notification of a second aircraft striking the World Trade Center

Notification of an aircraft striking the Pentagon

The national ground stop of the National Airspace System

Possible hijacking of United Flight 93

It should be noted, as in any crisis situation, in addition to notifications already annotated,

additional telephone and verbal information was continually exchanged with Washington
and appropriate lines of businesses.