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Terms APPROACHES TO HAZARD AVOIDANCE

PM DR. WILFREDO HERRERA LIBUNAO

Hazard- A source or a situation with a potential for harm to humans, property and damage of environment or a combination of these. Danger- Relative exposure to hazard. Risk- A combination of likelihood of occurrence and severity of injury or damage. Safety- being relatively free from harm, danger, damage, injury

Classification & Potential Sources of Hazards


Classification Example of Hazards Mechanical - Sharp points & edges, overload. Electrical - Insulation damaged or cover broken Biological - Exposed, airborne/blood borne microorganism. Chemical - Expose to carcinogens chemical Ergonomics - Expose to unnatural postures Psychological- Stress or violent at workplace.

Accident Theories
Domino Theory Energy Theory Single Factor Theories Multiple Factor Theories

Domino Theory (Heinrich)


1. Injury is caused by 2. Accidents which are caused by 3. Unsafe acts or conditions which are caused by 4. Undesirable traits (e.g., recklessness, nervousness, temper, lack of knowledge, unsafe practices) which are caused by 5. Social environment

Domino Theory Cont.


Stop the sequence by removing or controlling contributing factors Strong emphasis is placed on the middle domino: unsafe acts or conditions

Energy Theory (Haddon)


Accidents & Injuries involve the transfer of energy, e.g., fires, vehicle accidents, projectiles, etc. Transfer of energy from a potential to kinetic Attack problems in parallel rather than serial (as is presumed in Domino Theory)

Energy Theory Cont. 10 Strategies to Prevent or Reduce


1. Prevent the marshalling of energy - dont produce the energy - substitute safe substances for dangerous ones - dont produce gun powder 2. Reduce the amount of energy marshaled - keep vehicle speeds down - reduce chemical concentrations - dont let kids climb above 3 feet

3. Prevent the release of energy


- elevator brakes; prevent flammables from igniting

6. Separate the energy being released from a structure or person that can suffer loss by interposing a barrier
- safety glasses, highway median barriers

4. Modify the rate at which energy is released from its source or modify the spatial distribution of the released energy
- reduce the slope on roadways

7. Modify the surfaces of structures that come into contact with people or other structure
- rounded corners, larger surface areas for tool handles

5. Separate in space or time the energy being released from the structure that can be damaged or the human who can be injured
- separate pedestrians from vehicles

8. Strengthen the structure or person susceptible to damage


-fire or earthquake resistant structures, training, vaccinations

9. Detect damage quickly and counter its continuation or extension - sprinklers that detect heat - tire tread wear bands 10. During the period following damage and return to normal conditions, take measures to restore a stable condition - rehab an injured worker - repair a damaged vehicle

Single Factor Theories


Assumes that when one finds a cause, there is nothing more to find out Weak theory, there can be so much more to learn!

Multiple Factor Theories


Accidents are caused by many factors working together The theory and the analysis is more complex, but more realistic than Single Factor Theory Primary Consider the Four Ms:
management, man, media, machine And their interactions
Cause

Concepts of Hazard Avoidance


Approaches
1. 2. 3. 4.
Secondary

Enforcement Psychological Engineering Analytical

Cause Contributin g Causes

To be successful you must have top management support!

1. Enforcement Approach
Your approach to hazard avoidance is entirely predicated upon avoiding regulatory fines. Many companies establish their safety programs to meet OSHA requirements thinking that is adequate. This is a bare minimum approach. While it may seem cost effective, it likely is not in the big picture.

2. Psychological Approach
Your approach to hazard avoidance is based on a psychological (or behavior-based) approach. The behavioral approach has been popular and widely used.
DuPont STOPTM (Safety Training Observation Program)
http://www2.dupont.com/Safety_Products/en_US/products/pro grams_training/index.html

To be successful, this approach needs to be ever vigilant, and must be infused with some engineering and analytical components

3. Engineering Approach
The engineering approach to hazard avoidance utilizes controls measures starting with engineering (then administrative, then PPE) Consideration of (see next slides)
Safety Factor Concept Fail-Safe Concept Design Principles Design for Safety

Safety Factor Concept


Since there is a chance element in safety, we can improve our chances by implementing a safety factor
Scaffolding 4:1
Designed to withstand 4 times the intended load

Be careful to avoid a false-sense of security from engineering and technology

Overhead crane hoists 5:1 Scaffold ropes 6:1

Why not use 10:1 as a standard?? $$$$$ Beware when using field tables or computer programs. Are the safety factors applied or not??

FailFail -Safe Concept


1. General fail-safe principle
The resulting status of a system, in event of failure of one of its components, shall be in a safe mode. A critically important function of a system, subsystem, or components can be preserved by alternative parallel or standby units. The design of a system should consider the worst situation to which it may be subjected in use. Murphys Law: If anything can go wrong, it will.

Engineering Design Principles


Eliminate Substitute Guard Barriers Warn with alarms (auditory, visual) Labels Filters Exhaust ventilation Human Interface

2. Fail-safe principle of redundancy

3. Principle of worst case


4. Analytical Approach
The analytical approach to hazard avoidance utilizes various qualitative and quantitative tools
Accident Analysis System Safety Techniques (see next slide) Loss Incident Causation Models
Proximal and Distal Causes (McClay)

System Safety Techniques


Preliminary Hazard Analysis Hazard Tracking Log Subsystem Hazard Analysis System Hazard Analysis Operating Hazard Analysis Change Analysis Accident Analysis Time-Loss Analysis Event and Causal Factor Charts Process Safety Management Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Energy Trace & Barrier Analysis (ETBA) Failure Mode & Effects Analysis (FMEA) Project Evaluation Tree (PET) Management Oversight & Risk Tree (MORT) Software Hazard Analysis Common Cause Failure Analysis Sneak Circuit Analysis

Toxicology Epidemiology Cost-Benefit Analysis

How Safe is Safe Enough?


Can absolute safety be achieved? Remember the concept of risk. What is acceptably safe? Remember the Risk Assessment Matrix: Severity versus Frequency

Hazard Identification
To keep workplace safe and healthy. -employers should make sure there are no hazards to which employees could be exposed. Employers should look for hazards in advance as part of their risk management plan to prevent potential hazards.

Actions & Recommendations


All related statements should be made With no cost restrains Should be reviewed every 4 months Need management support

Risk Assessment
Is the process of evaluating the risk to safety & health from hazards at work Types - Qualitative - Semi-quantitative - Quantitative

How To Assess Risk


1) Look for the Hazards 2) Decide who might be harmed & how 3) Evaluate the risk and check what is done to prevent it from happening 4) Record finding 5) Review assessment and revise it if necessary

Qualitative Risk Assessment

Qualitative risk assessment involves making a formal judgement on the consequence and probability using:

Risk = Severity x Likelihood

Qualitative Risk Assessmentcontd

Qualitative Risk Assessmentcontd

Example:
The likely effect of a hazard may for example be rated:
1. Major Death or major injury or illness causing long term disability 2. Serious Injuries or illness causing short-term disability 3. Slight All other injuries or illnesses

The likelihood of harm may be rated


1. High Where it is certain that harm will occur 2. Medium Where harm will often occur 3. Low Where harm will seldom occur

Qualitative Risk Assessmentcontd

Qualitative Risk Table


Risk = Severity of Harm x Likelihood of occurrence
This simple computation gives a risk value of between 1 and 9 enabling a rough and ready comparison of risks. In this case the lower the number, the greater the risk, and so prioritises the hazards so that control action can be targeted at higher risks.

Likelihood Severity High (1) 1 2 3 Medium (2) 2 4 6 Low (3) 3 6 9

Major (1) Serious (2) Slight (3)

SemiSemi -Quantitative Risk Assessment

SemiSemi -Quantitative Risk Assessment


Likelihood Occurrence

Severity Categories 1. First Aid 2. Less than 4 days M/C 3. More than 4 days M/C 4. Fatality & Permanent Disability

1. Yearly 2. Monthly 3. Weekly 4. Daily

SemiSemi -Quantitative Risk Table


LIKELIHOOD S E V E R I T y
Yearly 1 First Aid < 4 Days MC > 4 Days MC Fatality & Permanent Disability 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Monthly 2 2 4 6 8 Weekly 3 3 6 9 12 Daily 4 4 8 12 16

Quantitative Risk Assessment


In cases where hazards are numerous and complex e.g.; Chemical process plant, chemical laboratories Should have Job Safety Analysis (JSA)

Advanced Risk Assessment Techniques


Quantitative Risk Assessment
QRA is most commonly used in the process industries to quantify the risks of major hazards. QRA used in the offshore oil and gas industries, the transport of hazardous materials, the protection of the environment, mass transportation (rail) and the nuclear industry.

Quantitative Risk Assessment (1)


Individual Risk is defined as the frequency at which
an individual may be expected to sustain a given level of harm from the realisation of specific hazards.

Societal Risk

Usually expressed as risk contours:


VILLAGE 0.3*10-6/year risk contour

Failure Modes and Effect Analysis


The system is divided into sub systems that can be handled effectively. It involves:
Identification of the component and parent system. Failure mode and cause of failure. Effect of the failure on the subsystem or system. Method of detection and diagnostic aids available.

Site for proposed developmen t 10-5/year risk contour

10-6/year risk contour

CHLORINE INSTALLATION

1 km

Failure Modes and Effect Analysis


A typical format:

Failure Modes and Effect Analysis


For each components functions, every conceivable mode of failure is identified and recorded. It is also common to rate the failure rate for each failure mode identified. The potential consequences for each failure must be identified along with its effects on other equipment, components within the rest of the system. It is then necessary to record preventative measures that are in place or may be introduced to correct the failure, reduce its failure rate or provide some adequate form of detection.

Component

Function

Failure Mode

Failure Rate

Failure Effect

Criticality

Detection Method

Preventative Measures

Hazard & Operability Studies

Hazard & Operability Studies


The process is as follows:
The system is divided into suitable parts or sub-systems, which are then analysed one at a time. For each sub-system each parameter (flow, temperature, pressure, volume, viscosity etc.) that has an influence on it, is noted.

HAZOP is a team approach, involving a team of people representing all different functions in a plant. They identify all the deviations by brain-storming to a set of guide words which are applied to all parts of the system.

Guidewords are applied to each parameter in each subsystem. The intention is to prompt creative discussion of deviations and possible consequences For each significant deviation, possible causes are identified.

Hazard & Operability Studies


Example
Consider the simple process diagram below. It represents a plant where substances A and B react with each other to form a new substance C. If there is more B than A there may be an explosion.
V3 V4

The HAZOP sheet for the section of the plant from A to C will be as follows:
Guide Word NO, NOT Deviation No A Possible Causes Tank containing A is empty. V1 or V2 closed. Pump does not work. Pipe broken Pump too high capacity Opening of V1 or V2 is too large. V1,V2 or pipe are partially blocked. Pump gives low flow or runs for too short a time. V3 open air sucked in Consequences Not enough A = Explosion Proposed Measures Indicator for low level. Monitoring of flow Indicator for high level. Monitoring of flow See above

MORE

Too much A

C contaminated by A. Tank overfilled. Not enough A = Explosion Not enough A = Explosion Not enough A = Explosion A is contaminated Not enough A = Explosion

LESS

Not enough A Other substance Liquid pumped backwards A boils in pump

AS WELL AS

B A
V2 V1 V5 A < B = Explosion

Flow monitoring based on weight Flow monitoring

REVERSE

Wrong connector to motor

OTHER THAN

Temperature too high

Temperature (and flow) monitoring.

Example from Harms Ringdahl L (1995), Safety Analysis: Principals and Practice in Occupational Safety, Elsevier Applied Science.

Example from Harms Ringdahl L (1995), Safety Analysis: Principals and Practice in Occupational Safety, Elsevier Applied Science.

Fault Tree Analysis

Fault Tree Analysis


The first stage is to select the hazard or top event that is to be analysed. The tree is structured so that the hazard appears at the top. It is then necessary to work downwards, firstly by identifying causes that directly contribute to this hazard. When all the causes and sub-causes have been identified, the next stage is to construct the fault tree.

A fault tree is a diagram that displays the logical interrelationship between the basic causes of the hazard. Fault tree analysis can be simple or complex depending on the system in question. Complex analysis involves the use of Boolean algebra to represent various failure states.

Fault Tree Analysis


Symbol Designation EVENT / CAUSE Function Causes or events that can be developed further Basic or Root Causes or events that cannot be developed further Causes are not developed due to lack of information or significance. Output event occurs only if all input events occur Output event occurs if any one of the input events occurs
+ -

Fault Tree Analysis


Example
Consider the simple circuit diagram shown below:
LAMP

BASIC EVENT/CAUSE UNDEVELOPED EVENT/CAUSE AND gate OR gate

POWER UNIT BATTERY

FUSE

SWITCH

Example from Harms Ringdahl L (1995), Safety Analysis: Principals and Practice in Occupational Safety, Elsevier Applied Science.

Fault Tree Analysis


The corresponding fault tree for the above circuit, with the top event (or hazard) being the lamp not working is as follows:
Lamp does not light

Fault Tree Analysis


Make a fault tree analysis, with the top event (or hazard) being the welding machine not working properly:

Welding machine not working properly

No current through the lamp

Faulty Lamp

No power supply to the lamp

No power feed

Broken circuit

No Power from battery

No Power from unit

Broken Circuit

Defective switch

Defective fuse

Example from Harms Ringdahl L (1995), Safety Analysis: Principals and Practice in Occupational Safety, Elsevier Applied Science.

Practical Risk Assessment


Classify Work Activities
Classify work activities Identify hazards

Possible ways of classifying work activities include:


Geographical areas within/outside the organisation's premises. Stages in the production process, or in the provision of a service. Planned and reactive work. Defined tasks (e.g. driving).

Determine risk

Decide if risk is tolerable

Prepare risk control action plan (if necessary)

Review adequacy of action plan

Identify Hazards
Broad categories of hazard To help with the process of identifying hazards it is useful to categorise hazards in different ways, for example by topic, e.g.:
Mechanical. Electrical. Radiation. Substances. Fire and explosion.

Hazards prompt-list
During work activities could the following hazards exist?
Slips/falls on the level. Falls of persons form heights. Falls of tools, materials, etc., from heights. Inadequate headroom. Hazards associated with manual lifting/handling of tools, materials, etc.. Hazards from plant and machinery associated with assembly, commissioning, operation, maintenance, modification, repair and dismantling.

Hazards prompt-list
Vehicle hazards, covering both site transport, and travel by road. Fire and explosion. Violence to staff. Substances that may be inhaled. Substances or agents that may damage the eye. Substances that may cause harm by coming into contact with, or being absorbed through, the skin. Substances that may cause harm by being ingested (i.e., entering the body via the mouth). Harmful energies (e.g., electricity, radiation, noise, vibration).

Hazards prompt-list
Work-related upper limb disorders resulting from frequently repeated tasks. Inadequate thermal environment, e.g. too hot. Lighting levels. Slippery, uneven ground/surfaces. Inadequate guard rails or hand rails on stairs. Contractors' activities.

Determine risk
The risk from the hazard should be determined by estimating the potential severity of harm and the likelihood that harm will occur.

Severity of harm
Information obtained about work activities is a vital input to risk assessment. When seeking to establish potential severity of harm, the following should also be considered:
Part(s) of the body likely to be affected; Nature of the harm, ranging from slightly to extremely harmful:
1) Slightly harmful, e.g.: Superficial injuries; minor cuts and bruises; eye irritation from dust. Nuisance and irritation (e.g. headaches); ill-health leading to temporary discomfort.
BS8800:1996

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Severity of harm
2) Harmful, e.g. Lacerations; burns; concussion; serious sprains; minor fractures. Deafness; dermatitis; asthma; work related upper limb disorders; ill-health leading to permanent minor disability. 3) Extremely harmful, e.g. Amputations; major fractures; poisonings; multiple injuries; fatal injuries. Occupational cancer; other severely life shortening diseases; acute fatal diseases.

Likelihood of harm
When seeking to establish likelihood of harm the adequacy of control measures already implemented and complied with needs to be considered. Issues considered:
Number of personnel exposed. Frequency and duration of exposure to the hazard. Failure of services e.g. electricity and water. Failure of plant and machinery components and safety devices. Exposure to the elements.

BS8800:1996

Decide if risk is tolerable Likelihood of harm


Protection afforded by personal protective equipment and usage rate of personal protective equipment; Unsafe acts (unintended errors or intentional violations of procedures) by persons, for example, who:
1) May not know what the hazards are. 2) May not have the knowledge, physical capacity, or skills to do the work. 3) Underestimate risks to which they are exposed. 4) Underestimate the practicality and utility of safe working methods.

One simple method for estimating risk levels and for deciding whether risks are tolerable. Risks are classified according to their estimated likelihood and potential severity of harm.
Slightly harmful Harmful Extremely harmful

Highly unlikely

TRIVIAL RISK

TOLERABLE RISK

MODERATE RISK

Unlikely

TOLERABLE RISK

MODERATE RISK

SUBSTANTIAL RISK

Likely

MODERATE RISK

SUBSTANTIAL RISK

INTOLERABLE RISK

Actions & Recommendations


ELSLISECAC PPEEliminate Substitute Isolation Engineering Control Administration Control Personal Protection Equipment

Actions & Recommendations


Eg; EL - stop work, cover hazard SL - use other route, other material.. IS - put up temporary barrier, EC - construct permanent wall,.. AC - put up notice, job rotation, PPE - gloves, respirator,

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END OF SESSION

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