Leibniz: Metaphysics 7.

Space, Time, and Indiscernibles

a. Against the Absolute Theory
Between 1715 and 1716, at the request of Caroline, Princess of Wales, a series of long letters passed between Leibniz and the English physicist, theologian, and friend of Newton, Samuel Clarke. It is generally assumed that Newton had a hand in Clarkes end of the correspondence. They were published in Germany and in England soon after the correspondence ceased and became one of the most widely read philosophical books of the 18th Century. Leibniz and Clarke had several topics of debate: the nature of Gods interaction with the created world, the nature of miracles, vacua, gravity, and the nature of space and time. Although Leibniz had written about space and time previously, this correspondence is unique for its sustained and detailed account of this aspect of his philosophy. It is also worth pointing out that Leibniz (and after him Kant) continues a long tradition of philosophizing about space and time from the point of view of space, as if the two were always in a strict analogy. It is only rarely that Leibniz deals in any interesting way with time on its own Newton, and after him Clarke, argued that space and time must be absolute (that is, fixed background constants) and in some sense really existent substances in their own right (at least, this was Leibnizs reading of Newton). The key argument is often called the bucket argument. When an object moves, there must be some way of deciding upon a frame of reference for that motion. With linear motion, the frame does not matter (as far as the mathematics are concerned, it does not matter if the boat is moving away from the shore, or the shore is moving away from the boat); even linear acceleration (changing velocity but not direction) can be accounted for from various frames of reference. However, acceleration in a curve (to take Newtons example, water forced by the sides of a bucket to swirl in a circle, and thus to rise up the sides of the bucket), could only have one frame of reference. For the water rising against the sides of the bucket can be understood if the water is moving within a stationary universe, but makes no sense if the water is stationary and the universe is spinning. Such curved acceleration requires the postulation of absolute space which makes possible fixed and unique frames of reference. (Similar problems made Einsteins General Theory of Relativity so much more mathematically complicated than the Special Theory.) Leibniz, however, has a completely different understanding of space and time. First of all, Leibniz finds the idea that space and time might be substances or substance-like absurd (see, for example, Correspondence with Clarke, Leibnizs Fourth Paper, 8ff). In short, an empty space would be a substance with no properties; it will be a substance that even God cannot modify or destroy. But Leibnizs most famous arguments for his theory of space and time stem from the principle of sufficient reason (the principle that everything which happens has, at least in principle, an explanation of why it happened as it did and not otherwise). From this principle, together with the law of non-contradiction, Leibniz believes that there follows a third: the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, which states that any entities which are indiscernible with respect to

their properties are identical. Leibniz is fond of using leaves as an example. Two leaves often look absolutely identical. But, Leibniz argues, if two things are alike in every respect, then they are the same object, and not two things at all. So, it must be the case that no two leaves are ever exactly alike. Leibnizs support for the principles of the identity of indiscernibles primarily derives from his commitment to the principle of sufficient reason in the following way. If any objects are in every way the same, but actually distinct, then there would be no sufficient reason (that is, no possible explanation) for why the first is where (and when) it is, and the second is where (and when) it is, and not the other way around. If, then, one posits the possible existence of two identical things (things that differ in number onlythat is, one can count them, but that is all), then one also posits the existence of an absurd universe, one in which the principle of sufficient reason is not universally true. Leibniz often expresses this in terms of God: if two things were identical, there would be no sufficient reason for God to choose to put one in the first place and the other in the second place. (Note that Leibnizs argument relates to a scholastic debate centered on the notion of Buridans Ass.) Similar considerations apply to Newtonian absolute space. Leibnizs argument against the Newton-Clarke position can be understood here as two related reductio ad absurdum arguments. The first concerns the violation of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Suppose that space is absolute. Since every region of space would be indiscernible from any other and spatial relations would be construed as extrinsic, it would be possible for two substances to be indiscernible yet distinct in virtue of being in different locations. But this is absurd, Leibniz argues, because it violates the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Therefore, space must not be absolute (see Correspondence with Clarke, Leibnizs Third Paper). The second reductio concerns the violation of the principle of sufficient reason. Suppose that space is absolute. Leibniz argues that there would then be no sufficient reason for from any other). Thus, absolute space is absurd, because it violates the principle of sufficient reason (see Correspondence with Clarke, Leibnizs Fourth Paper). (Analogous problems are thought to result from a conception of absolute time.) why the whole universe was created here instead of two meters to the left (because no region of space is discernible

b. The Relational Theory

That is the negative portion of Leibnizs argument. But what does all this say about space? For Leibniz, the location of an object is not a property of an independent space, but a property of the located object itself (and also of every other object relative to it). This means that an object here can indeed be different from an object located elsewhere simply by virtue of its different location, because that location is a real property of it. That is, space and time are internal or intrinsic features of the complete concepts of things, not extrinsic. Let us return to the two identical leaves. All of their properties are the same, except that they are in different locations. But that fact alone makes them completely different substances. To swap them would not just involve moving things in an indifferent space, but would involve changing the things themselves.

That is, if the leaf were located elsewhere, it would be a different leaf. A change of location is a change in the object itself, since spatial properties are intrinsic (similarly with location in time). Leibnizs view has two major implications. First, there is no absolute location in either space or time; location is always the situation of an object or event relative to other objects and events. Second, space and time are not in themselves real (that is, not substances). Space and time are, rather, ideal. Space and time are just metaphysically illegitimate ways of perceiving certain virtual relations between substances. They are phenomena or, strictly speaking, illusions (although they are illusions that are well-founded upon the internal properties of substances). Thus, illusion and science are fully compatible. For God, who can grasp all at once complete concepts, there is not only no space but also no temptation of an illusion of space. Leibniz uses the analogy of the experience of a building as opposed to its blueprint, its overall design (see, for example, Correspondence with Arnauld 12 April 1686 and Monadology 57). It is sometimes convenient to think of space and time as something out there, over and above the entities and their relations to each other, but this convenience must not be confused with reality. Space is nothing but the order of co-existent objects; time nothing but the order of successive events. This is usually called a relational theory of space and time. Space and time, according to Leibniz, are thus the hypostatizations of ideal relations, which are real insofar as they symbolize real differences in substances, but illusions to the extent that (i) space or time are taken as a thing in itself, or (ii) spatial/temporal relations are taken to be irreducibly exterior to substances, or (iii) extension or duration are taken to be a real or even fundamental property of substances. Take the analogy of a virtual reality computer program. What one sees on the screen (or in a specially designed virtual reality headset) is the illusion of space and time. Within the computers memory are just numbers (and ultimately mere binary information) linked together. These numbers describe in an essentially non-spatial and temporal way a virtual space and time, within which things can exist, move and do things. For example, in the computers memory might be stored the number seven, corresponding to a bird. This, in turn, is linked to four further numbers representing three dimensions of space and one of timethat is, the birds position. Suppose further the computer contains also the number one, corresponding to the viewer and again linked to four further numbers for the viewers position, plus another three giving the direction in which the viewers virtual eyes are looking. The bird appears in the viewers headset, then, when the fourth number associated with the bird is the same as the viewers fourth number (they are together in time), and when the first three numbers of the bird (its position in virtual space) are in a certain algebraic relation to the number representing the viewers position and point of view. Space and time are reduced to non-spatial and non-temporal numbers. For Leibniz, God in this analogy apprehends these numbers as numbers, rather than through their translation into space and time.

c. Objections and Replies

This, however, raises a serious logical problem for Leibniz. Recall Leibnizs theory of truth as the containedness of a predicate in a subject. This seemed acceptable, perhaps, for propositions such as Caesar crossed the Rubicon or Peter is ill. But what about This leaf is to the left of that leaf? The latter proposition involves not one subject, but three (the two leaves, and whatever is occupying the point-of-view from which the one is to the left). Leibniz has to

argue that all relational predicates are in fact reducible to internal properties of each of the three substances. This includes time, as well as relations such as the sister of or is angry at. But can all relations be so reduced, at least without radically deforming their sense? Modern logicians often see this as the major flaw in Leibnizs logic and, by extension, in his metaphysics. Furthermore, Leibniz must provide a response to the Newtonian bucket argument. Indeed, Leibniz thinks that one simply needs to provide a rule for the reduction of relations. For linear motion the virtual relation is reducible to either or both the object and the universe around it. For non-linear motion, one must posit a rule such that the relation is not symmetrically reducible to either of the subjects (bucket, or universe around it). Rather, non-linear motion is assigned only when, and precisely to the extent that, the one subject shows the effects of the motion. That is, the motion is a property of the water, if the water shows the effects (see Correspondence with Clarke, Leibnizs Fifth Paper, 53). Perhaps it seems strange that the laws of nature should be different for linear as opposed to non-linear motion. It sounds like an arbitrary new law of nature, but Leibniz might respond that it is no more arbitrary that any other law of nature; people have just become used to the illusion of space and time as extrinsic relations of entities that they are not used to thinking in these terms.