INSIGHT

The Herald, November 2009

THE PRAGMATIST
People cannot be pigeonholed as being liberal or conservative in a society as complex as Pakistan

By Ayesha Siddiqa

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s Pakistan battles with militancy, part of the war is also being fought in the arena of ideas. In order to fight militancy, some argue, Pakistani society has to win hearts and minds back from extremists. It is the fundamentalist thinking in our midst that prevents us from confronting militants wholeheartedly. On the other side of the talking divide stand those who feel that liberals are forcing the state to declare a war on its own people under the guise of fighting militancy. There is, however, at least one way in which both camps are completely similar. Regardless of who is right or wrong, the two sides view each other as being incompatible binaries with

nothing in common. This is a flawed approach. No society, and especially not one as complex as Pakistan, can be divided so cleanly into two groups that do not overlap. Although on some level this is a philosophical debate, there are many examples at the individual level that prove the clear-cut division between liberalism and conservatism that such debates assume does not exist. And one person who is living proof of this is the well-known and, many would add, controversial real-estate tycoon and philanthropist Malik Riaz Hussain. Born 61 years ago in Sialkot to a lower-middle class family, Hussain never completed his education, having abandoned school before his matriculation. In the early 1970s, he joined the business of his father, who was a small government contractor. He has one son and four daughters. Hussain first stepped into the limelight after he made a deal with the Pakistan Navys Bahria Foundation in the mid-1990s to develop two housing schemes. The contract gave the foundation 10 per cent of the profit and 25 per cent of the plots without any financial investment, but by 2000 the organisation had transferred its entire shareholding to Hussain. Differences later arose and led to a legal battle; the Supreme Court ruled in Hussains favor, saying he had the right to use the Pakistan Navy logo till he voluntarily changed it. By this time the businessman had also developed a name for himself in commercial and social circles. In recent years, however, Hussain has been in the news mainly for his

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charitable works and especially for his role as the unofficial benefactor of Lal Masjid affiliates in the aftermath of the 2007 military operation that was carried out to disband and dislodge the brigade there. Since that incident, the Rawalpindi-based real-estate magnate has not only provided residence to Umme Hassan, the wife of Lal Masjid cleric Maulana Abdul Aziz, but has also set up quarters for the seminarys female students. The girls madrasah is now located in Bahria Town, Rawalpindi. Even Aziz lived in a house in Bahria Town after he was released from prison. Apparently this relationship began after the end of the military operation. Rendered homeless, Hassan, who still had 750 undeterred female students to house and educate, was advised to meet Hussain. Once he heard about her problem the businessman offered to house her and give her money to continue educating the young girls. By the grace of God the Lal Masjid issue is now resolved, he tells the Herald when asked why he is helping the seminary continue its work. Can you not testify to the current peace there? Hussain also took on the responsibility of reconstructing Lal Masjid. He says he has spent 15 million rupees on its repair and redecoration. The premises display a huge board announcing this, making it evident that he is not wary of making public his views

The Herald, November 2009

Malik Riaz Hussain straddles the ideological and political divide, and the influence he has developed will sustain his business empire and personal power beyond any shifts in the countrys governments or ideologies. One thing is clear: even if Islamabad is taken over by the most rabid fundamentalists, they will not put Hussain out of business.
on this rather controversial issue. He openly calls the 2007 military operation a gross injustice. But what about the violence of the mosques inmates, which led to the military operation? Hussain casts this as response to mistreatment. Retaliation is normal. Is it not? when you torture someone, you must expect a violent reaction. He ends by saying the operation was carried out to placate America. Probe further and it appears that he does not subscribe to the widelyshared criticism of madrasahs in general: They [the madrasahs] were created by the army. I know exactly how the army was using them, to promote their own politics of duplicity. He tells the Herald that an anonymous caller once informed him that the benefactor of a madrasah in Lahore had died; Hussain immediately instructed his manager to provide help. He also claims to be assisting another 30 madrasahs, mainly around Islamabad and Rawalpindi, run by the Lal Masjid management. The baron is good at showcasing his piety. But far more fascinating is the reaction of those at the receiving end. The Lal Masjid and Madrasah Hafsa crowd are not enthralled with their benefactor: for instance, Aziz is not too happy with the renovation plan for the mosque and the relocation of the madrasah to Rawalpindi. The new facility in Rawalpindi only accommodates 750 girls while the old madrasah had 3,000 female students, he tells the Herald. The maulana seems caught between acknowledging Hussains help and being alarmed by the fact that control now lies with his benefactor. Similarly, the caretaker of the building to which seminary students have been shifted complains that the girls chopped up their beds and handed them to her, saying that she should give them to her boss to protest his handling of the situation. Clearly Hussain is not so driven by religiosity or ideology that he yields to the clergy. In fact, incidents such as these lend support to speculation that Hussain helped Lal Masjid clergy and students in order to help his

friends in power. After all, moving the madrasah out of sight from Islamabad to Rawalpindi is tantamount to clipping its wings. People point out that Aziz is now dependent on someones munificence and will desist from making trouble for the authorities. Regardless of whether or not this is true, it is evident that Hussain controls the cleric and his troops, and not the other way around. If this makes one question Hussains worldview, other factors drive home the point that he is no traditionalist or fundamentalist. Take his general manager of marketing, Ayesha Kashif. Described by many as Hussains right hand, she is a key part of his company. Married with children, Kashif has been with the company for the past seven years. Yet this modern woman, who is often dressed in trouser suits, has been made responsible for dealing with Lal Masjid and Aziz. Both my family and I were apprehensive when I was given this task but my boss thought my nature was suited for it, she says. Besides, I would, like most of the staff, go to any extent for Malik sahib. How, then, is one supposed to define Hussain? It can only be done by not expecting people to either fit into a liberal, enlightened pigeonhole or a conservative, fundamentalist one. Hussain defies such cookie-cutter binaries. In fact, he represents the new upper class that has come of age in recent decades. With its roots in the lower-middle class, this new elite, some argue, continues to adhere to more traditional or conservative values. Hussains sense of philanthropy and charity is no different from that of small merchants and businessmen, who social scientists agree form the backbone of most conservative, rightwing movements. The bazaar in Iran supported the Ayatullahs against the Shah of Iran, a new elite made up of right-leaning businessmen led to the formation of Islamist parties in Turkey that challenged the liberal, Kemalist ideology of that state, and in Pakistan the tradesmen and merchants of Punjab form the support base of the Pakistan Muslim LeagueNawaz (PMLN). So despite being comfortably ensconced in the wealthiest strata of Pakistani society, Hussain has a good understanding of the values and religiosity of the middle and lower-middle classes, which the more traditional elite is alienated from. To think that he is defined by religiosity and traditionalism, however, would be a mistake. His employees profiles show that he hires a lot of women, especially at the middle and senior management levels, because he finds them hard-working, efficient and diligent. It is difficult to describe Hussain as nafrrow-minded or socially or religiously orthodox. With his traditional views on madrasahs, one could also presume that politically he would be close to the conservative and right-wing PMLN. Instead, he is more inclined towards Pakistan Peoples Partys Asif Ali

Zardari. Of his five Dastarkhwan projects, which provide free meals to the poor, one is established at the site of Benazir Bhuttos mausoleum in Naudero, Sindh, and it seems that, unconstrained by party affiliations or ideology, he maintains all sorts of links with the governing class. Why do you talk about the Lal Masjid, he says, when asked why he supports the Lal Masjid administration.I take care of several MNAs and MPAs from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas also. In other words Hussain straddles the ideological and political divide that we think defines Pakistan, and the influence he has developed will sustain his business empire and personal power beyond any shifts in the countrys governments or ideologies. One thing is clear: even if Islamabad is taken over by the most rabid fundamentalists, they will not put Hussain out of business. Of course such an argument could lead one to speculate that Hussain does what he does because he is savvy, and not because his personal ideology is a mix of the conservative and the liberal. Chances are, however, that his decisions are driven by both pragmatism and religiosity. Regardless, the important point is that he illustrates that Pakistani society cannot be analysed as being a battleground between liberal and conservative ideologies. It is far more complicated than that, and requires an approach that takes this into consideration. I

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The Herald, November 2009