Crespo vs. Mogul The crime of estafa was filed against Mario Fl. Crespo.

. When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice. The presiding judge, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. The CA granted while perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the DOJ finally resolved the petition for review. The Undersecretary of Justice reversed, directed the immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. SC upheld that it is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. And it is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. BUT once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. _________________________________________________________________________________________________ San Agustin vs. People SC partially granted the petition; the petitioner was illegally arrested and as such Preliminary Investigation needs to be conducted. On June 25, 2002, the petitioner received a subpoena from Ferdinand M. Lavin, the Chief of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI, requiring him to appear before said office the next day, on June 26, 2002, in order to give his evidence in connection with said complaint and to bring with him the barangay logbook for June 19, 2002. The petitioner complied with the subpoena and presented himself at the NBI with the barangay logbook. However, the petitioner was placed under arrest and prevented from going back home. The State Prosecutor conducted an inquest investigation and found the guilt for serious illegal detention. Information was filed in the RTC with the crime of kidnapping/serious illegal detention with no bail recommended. the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, this time, on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute the felony of kidnapping/serious illegal detention. He claimed that he was a barangay chairman when the private complainant was allegedly detained; hence, he should be charged only with arbitrary detention. CA rendered against the petitioner. SC upheld the decision of CA, the Court of Appeals ruled that the petitioner was unlawfully arrested; hence, he was entitled to preliminary investigation and release from detention subject to his appearance during the preliminary investigation. However, the Court of Appeals declared that the lack of preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the Information filed with the RTC. Moreover, the Court of Appeals declared that the petitioner had already been granted a reinvestigation after which the Information filed with the RTC was withdrawn. However, we do not agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that there was no need for the City Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation since the crime charged under the Information filed with the MeTC was arbitrary detention. _________________________________________________________________________________________________ George Uy vs. Sandiganbayan The SC first ruled that the Ombudsman has no authority to conduct Preliminary Investigation by stating that it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. (held in 1999) BUT the SC set aside this decision and upheld the authority of the Ombudsman to conduct Preliminary Investigation as upheld on 22 February 2000 that the investigation and prosecutorial power s of the Ombudsman relate to cases rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 ("An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and for other purposes") which vests upon the Ombudsman "primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan" And this is further buttressed by Section 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770 which emphasizes that the Office of the Special Prosecutor shall have the power to "conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan."

The authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute cases involving public officers and employees before the regular courts does not conflict with the power of the regular prosecutors under the Department of Justice to control and direct the prosecution of all criminal actions under Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules of Court must be read in conjunction with RA 6770 which charged the Ombudsman with the duty to investigate and prosecute all illegal acts and omissions of public officers and employees. The Court held in the case of Sanchez vs. Demetriou that the power of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of RA 6770 is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. Thus, Administrative Order No. 8 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman provides: The prosecution of case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct exclusive control and supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman. In cases cognizable by regular Courts, the control and supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the sense defined (therein). The law recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman and other investigative agencies of government in the prosecution of cases cognizable by regular courts. _________________________________________________________________________________________________ Rolito Go vs. CA

Rolito Go was accused for the crime of murder; petitioner voluntarily presented himself together with his two lawyers to the police upon obtaining knowledge of being hunted by the latter; however, he was immediately detained and denied his right of a preliminary investigation unless he executes and signs a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code; the petitioner question his illegal warrantless arrest and that he was deprived of his rights, including the Preliminary investigation; RTC granted and reversed by finding the petitioner guilty of murder; and, CA affirmed by upholding that the warrantless arrest is valid. The SC held that petitioner did not waive his right to have a preliminary investigation contrary to the pro secutors claim. The right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a pleas at arraignment. The facts of the case show that petitioner insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment and he, through his counsel denied answering questions before the court unless they were afforded the proper preliminary investigation. For the above reasons, the petition was granted and the ruling of the appellate court was set aside and nullified. The Supreme Court however, contrary to petitioners allegation, declared that failure to accord the right to preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the information charging the latter of the crime of murder. _________________________________________________________________________________________________ Sausi vs. Querubin

It was shown that the municipal court of Talisay Occidental Negros, after conducting a preliminary investigation recommended that the proper complaint against the accused, now petitioner, be one for serious physical injuries with permanent deformity rather than frustrated murder. It did not dismiss the case. In the information filed by respondent Provincial Fiscal of Negros Occidental, the offense for which the accused had to stand trial was one for frustrated murder. He did not conduct a new preliminary investigation. Then came a motion to dismiss by the accused before the trial could be held "based mainly on the ground that the Provincial Fiscal had no authority to file the above-mentioned "Information" against the petitioner without first conducting a new preliminary investigation of the case ... ."; respondent Provincial Fiscal alleged that there is no need for a new PI and the case was not yet dismissed by the municipal court; and, respondent judge denied the petition for the dismissal of the case. SC held that, the prevailing doctrine is that if a municipal judge, after a preliminary investigation, finds that the charge against the accused is not warranted, the prosecution for such offense is not thereby barred as long as the fiscal conducts another preliminary investigation before filing the corresponding information; and, moreover, manifests fidelity to the principle that underlies the concept of a preliminary investigation as set forth in the leading case of United States v. Grant and Kennedy, decided as far back as 1910: "The object or purpose of a preliminary investigation, or a previous inquiry of some kind, before an accused person is placed upon trial, is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from useless and expensive trials." While neither malice nor oppression could be imputed to the actuation of the provincial fiscal, still in view of the grave doubt entertained by the municipal judge, the holding of another preliminary investigation is more than warranted. BARREDO, J., dissenting:

My view is that a fiscal has no authority to file, without having conducted a new preliminary investigation in the manner provided by law, an information charging an accused with an offense different from that which the municipal judge certifies to have been probably committed by the accused. _________________________________________________________________________________________________ Budiongan vs. De La Cruz The SC affirmed the decision of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman, recommending that petitioners be charged with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 and petitioner Pedro E. Budiongan with violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019. Municipal Ordinance No. 2 was created to purchase of a road roller for the municipality with the amount of 450k but the Municipal Development Council through Resolution No. 3 recommended that the amount be realigned and used for the asphalt laying of a portion of a certain street; the Office of the Municipal Engineer prepared the program and later was noted/approved by Municipal Budget Officer Espejo and Mayor Budiongan; the project of realigned proposal commenced without an ordinance approving the realignment of the funds and as a resolution, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Ordinance No.8 approving such project; Private respondents Palgan and Nadala filed a complaint against the petitioner before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, alleging for the illegality of the project including the bidding and commencement of the work; Ombudsman found probable cause and recommended the filing of information for violation of Article 220 against the two persons who approved the said project; but upon review the charges was modified to violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code to (1) violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against petitioners for allegedly giving unwarranted benefit to Malmis and (2) violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019 against petitioner Budiongan for allegedly "directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in a contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity."; and, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the information and the Sandiganbayan granted the motion and remanded the case to Ombudsman. There was then a refusal to conduct a reinvestigation. The SC affirmed the decision because the petitioners failed to aver newly discovered evidence nor impute commission of grave errors or serious irregularities prejudicial to their interest to warrant a reconsideration or reinvestigation of the case; the right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment; and, absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any other officer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, as in the instant case, courts as a rule must defer to said officer's finding and determination of probable cause, since the determination of the existence of probable cause is the function of the prosecutor. The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred by statute. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render the same defective. It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the Information. If absence of a preliminary investigation does not render the Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case, then the denial of a motion for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the case. _________________________________________________________________________________________________ Olivas vs. Ombudsman The SC granted the petition and set aside the decision of respondent Ombudsman Investigator, requiring petitioner to submit his affidavit and those of his witnesses at the preliminary investigation of a case for unexplained wealth against petitioner, despite the fact that the Presidential Commission on Good Government, as complainant, had not reduced its evidence in the form of affidavits and submitted supporting documents. Petitioner, Major Gen. Prospero A. Olivas, was Commanding General of the PC Metrocom. He was retired from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and after wards, complaint letters were sent to the Presidential Commission on Good Governance charging him with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupts Practices Act; the issue was passed to the board for investigation against AFP personnel, whether retired or in the active service; the petitioners accounts were freeze due to the investigation, the petitioner then attended the hearings; the case against the petitioner be provisionally dismissed without prejudice to its revival should new evidence be found; the case was then filed in the Ombudsman, respondent Bienvenido C. Blancaflor, Ombudsman Investigator in the Officeof the Ombudsman, issued the assailed order, reiterating the earlier finding that petitioner had failed to file his income tax returns, petitioner failed to explain his unexplained wealth

and the case is then set for a preliminary investigation; and, petitioner then claims that the respondent abuse their power in compelling him to submit his counter-affidavit in the absence of a complaint and affidavits of witnesses against him. SC ruled in favor of the petitioner. The PCGG indorsed the case at bar to the Office of the Ombudsman. It may be assumed that the PCGG had found sufficient evidence against petitioner to warrant submitting the case for preliminary investigation. For the rationale of Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG is that the role of law enforcer must not be confounded with that of the public prosecutor who must determine whether there was probable cause for filing the case in court. In this case, the PCGG had issued a freeze order against petitioner's bank accounts and a hold order which it refused to lift despite the fact that the AFP panel had provisionally cleared him; there was no actual complaint filed; and the evidence presented by the respondent is weak and those not proved the guilt of the accused. in Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG in which we described the general power of investigation of the PCGG as consisting of two stages: the first stage, called the criminal investigation, is a fact-finding inquiry conducted by law enforcement agents, whereby they gather evidence and interview witnesses and afterwards assess the evidence so that, if they find sufficient basis, they can file a complaint for the purpose of preliminary investigation. The second stage, called the preliminary investigation stage, is conducted for the purpose of ascertaining if there is sufficient evidence to bring a person to trial. We held in that case that, having found petitioner prima facie guilty of violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, for which reason it issued a freeze order against him and filed a civil complaint for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, the PCGG could not thereafter act as an impartial judge in conducting a preliminary investigation of criminal complaints based on the same facts found by it to constitute prima facie evidence against petitioner. We there said: In our criminal justice system, the law enforcer who conducted the criminal investigation, gathered the evidence and thereafter filed the complaint for the purpose of preliminary investigation cannot be allowed to conduct the preliminary investigation of his own complaint. It is to say the least arbitrary and unjust. It is in such instances that We say one cannot be "a prosecutor and judge at the same time." Having gathered the evidence and filed the complaint as a law enforcer, he cannot be expected to handle with impartiality the preliminary investigation of his own complaint, this time as a public prosecutor. _________________________________________________________________________________________________ People vs. Grospe Manuel Parulan issued a check to the San Miguel Corporation, which was received by the latters finance officer in Guiguinto, Bulacan, and which was forwarded and deposited in SMCs BPI account in San Fernando, Pampanga. Another check was issued by Parulan as direct payment for the spot sale of beer, which was similarly received, forwarded and deposited as above. Both were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Parulan was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code. Tried jointly, the court dismissed the cases for lack of jurisdiction. While the subject check was issued in Bulacan, it was not completely drawn thereat, but in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was uttered and delivered. The place where the bills were written, signed or dated does not fix or determine the place where they were executed. What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof, as it is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation. The issuance and the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, i.e. the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it or the bearer thereof. Both estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check a transitory or continuing offense. Thus, as jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the information, i.e. San Fernando, Pampanga, the venue was properly laid. Case is remanded to the trial court for proper disposition. Deceit took place in Pampanga where the check was legally issued and delivered. _________________________________________________________________________________________________ People vs. Munar The SC upheld the decision of the Municipal Court of San Fernando, La Union and underlines the fact that the said courts properly exercise its power as regard to its jurisdiction. Lastly, the accused cannot for the first time raise the question in jurisdiction when after rendering an unfavorable judgment against her. Accused, Feliza Casuga y Manur was originally charged on July 9, 1964 with grave slander in the municipal court of San Fernando, La Union for having uttered defamatory words in calling the offended party, Erlinda Munar, an unmarried woman and a distant relative, the paramour of somebody. The municipal court rejected her defense of alibi and per its decision of September 8, 1964 sentenced her to pay a fine of P20.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. The accused then filed an appeal to La Union Court of First Instance where she was found not-

guilty, then conducted full trial de novo but later affirmed the decision of the Municipal Court, finding her guilty merely of slight slander and imposing a P50.00 fine with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and payment of costs and indemnify the offended party in the amount of P500.00 by way of civil liability. Hence, the accused immediately elevated the case to the SC and raises one important question which is jurisdiction. The SC upheld the doctrine of estoppel enunciated by the Court that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. As restated in Crisostomo vs. Reyes and a number of subsequent cases, the principle decrees that While the jurisdiction of a tribunal may be challenged at any time, sound public policy bars the petitioners from so doing after their having procured that jurisdiction themselves, speculating on the f ortunes of litigation. _________________________________________________________________________________________________ Bonifacio v. RTC

The RTC was directed by the SC to quash the Amended Information and to dismiss the case, ruling that the jurisdiction in Makati is insufficient. Upon the complaint filed by Jessie John P. Gimenez (Gimenez) on behalf of the Yuchengco Family (particularly, former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee) and the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan), 13 Informations for libel were filed with the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC) against officers, trustees and a member of the Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), and a certain John Doe, the administrator of the website www.pepcoalition.com, which provides a forum for planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. a wholly owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies to seek redress for being unable to collect under their pre-need educational plans after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments. The Informations alleged that the accused, holding legal title to the said website, maliciously published therein the following defamatory article against the Yuchengco Family and Malayan: Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x x x x x x x For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they had successfully lull us and the next time they will try to kill us na. x x x However, on appeal, the Secretary of Justice directed the withdrawal of the Informations for lack of probable cause, opining that the crime of internet libel was non-existent. On motion of the accused, the RTC, albeit finding probable cause, quashed the Informations for failure to allege that the offended parties were actually residing in Makati at the time the offense was committed as in fact they listed their address in Manila, or to allege that the article was printed and first published in Makati. The prosecution moved for reconsideration, arguing that the Information was deficient it merely needed a formal amendment. The RTC granted the motion to cure the defect of improper venue. After the RTC admitted the Amended Information, several of the accused (petitioners) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court faulting the RTC. SC held: (1) Strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts requires that recourse must first be made to the lowerranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court, but this case falls under the exception, since petitioners raised a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363. (2) The Amended Information was insufficient to vest jurisdiction in Makati. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. Venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: (a) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or (b) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. The prosecution chose the second. 5

The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To equate first access to the defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with printing and first publication would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed. Contrary to petitioners claim, the venue requirements, under Article 360 of the RPC, for libel actions filed by private persons cannot be considered unduly oppressive as they still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in which situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter was printed and first published.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ Ambil v. Sandiganbayan The SC denied the petition but modified the judgment of the Sandiganbayan by finding the petitioners Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. is, likewise, sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months. The accused, Mayor Francisco Adalim (guilty for the crime of murder) was in jail; petitioners presented three witnesses: petitioner Ambil, Jr., Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White and Mayor Francisco C. Adalim who are all connected to him; since there were threats as to his life, he was transferred to their private home for him to serve his sentence and to ensure his safety; the accused was connected with people with powerful authority in the City of Samar, despite the testimonial evidence by the accused; the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Decision finding petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The court ruled that in moving Adalim to a private residence, petitioners have conspired to accord him unwarranted benefits in the form of more comfortable quarters with access to television and other privileges that other detainees do not enjoy. It stressed that under the Rules, no person under detention by legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail. Finally, the Sandiganbayan sentenced petitioner Ambil, Jr. to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months. In favor of petitioner Apelado, Sr. (Provincial Jail Warden), the court appreciated the incomplete justifying circumstance of obedience to a superior order and sentenced him to imprisonment for six (6) years and one (1) month to nine (9) years and eight (8) months. The SC held: Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over public officers charged with violation of the Anti-Graft Law is provided under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 8249. The pertinent portions of Section 4, P.D. No. 1606; both accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt that they use their positions as to their own advantage which resulted to bad faith; and, the power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by legal process is vested in the court, not in the provincial government, much less the governor. _________________________________________________________________________________________________