1

Comparative analysis of ECOWAS/ECOMOG activities in military conflicts within its regional group

By

Stephen B. Clark
Copyright 2009

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission.

2 Abstract

The necessity for Militarism in regional integration arises out of the fact that countries with strong military alliance tend to promote economic integration. An atmosphere of relative security and stability enhances opportunities for trade to prosper hence the establishment of military organisations to protect regional integration. In light of this, we shall examine how a recognised sub-regional organization was conceived to foster economic growth and development through maintaining regional integration. How it has had to adopt militarism and put in place legitimate structures in order to maintain regional integration. This paper will draw a comparative analysis of the geo-political interests and influence of hegemonic state(s) on decisions to adopt militarism to ensure regional security, prevent, or resolve inter or intra state conflicts.

Introduction
The region of West Africa consist of 16 countries, of the 16 countries of the sub-region, 9 are francophone (Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Guinea, Cote dIvoire, Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger and Togo), 5 anglophone (the Gambia, Nigeria, Liberia, Ghana and Sierra Leone), and 2 lusophone (Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau).1 In no other sub-region are there so many countries with such a mixture of colonial experiences; a situation which in the postcolonial era dictated the nature of regional multilateral co-operation and institutions.2 Nigerian leaders among others initiated attempts to foster postcolonial growth, development, economic integration, and unity within the region. Concern about the dominance of Nigeria in any sub-regional mechanism for co-operation surfaced in the consideration in the mid 1960s of the first proposal by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) for the creation of an Economic Community of West African States.3 The Nigerian civil war, which raged from July 1967 to January 1970 with estimated fatalities of 1-2 million lives,4 interrupted the ECA's initiative on the economic integration of West Africa.5 At the end of the brutal civil war, Nigeria began to forge a revival of the ECAs initiative on the economic integration of West Africa. It had become apparent that strength in unity and integrated economic ties with neighbouring countries would be vital to maintain peace, growth, and development. Cisse6emphasized the importance of regional integration as the viable space within which small economies can better organize themselves to survive economically and politically in a highly competitive world.7 To demonstrate that a small, poor country and a large, rich country, one francophone, the other anglophone, could be linked in a
Ambassador Olu Adeniji, Mechanism for Conflict Management in West Africa: Politics of Harmonization, http://jha.ac/articles/a027.htm
1

2
3 4

ibid Adeniji

ibid Adeniji Richard Jackson, Africas Wars: Overview, Causes and the Challenges of Conflict Transformation in Oliver Furley and Roy May (eds.), Ending Africas Wars Progressing to Peace (Ashgate publishing limited, 2006) p18, table 2.1 5 ibid Adeniji 6 General Lamine Cisse, Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations in the Central African Republic, Political Economic and Security Issues in the West African Sub Region, a speech delivered at the Woodrow Wilson Internation al Centre for Scholars, Washington DC, Wednesday October 27th, 2004 7 ibid Cisse

4 mutually beneficial economic co-operative relationship, in 1972 Nigeria and Togo signed a bilateral economic agreement, as 'an embryo' West African Economic Community.8 Following the joint initiative of Nigeria and Togo and consensus of Member States of the sub-region, at a meeting in Lagos, Nigeria, May 1975 a Treaty was ratified. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) a sub-regional group currently consisting of 15 member countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote dIvoire, Cape Verde, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo, was founded by the 1975 Treaty of Lagos.9 Under the 1975 Treaty, ECOWAS main aims were to promote co-operation and development in industry, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial issues and in social and cultural matters.10

The region of West Africa now had an established sub-regional policy making body. In the era in which ECOWAS was being created, economic development, and state security were considered as two distinct issues, unrelated to one another.11The 1975 Treaty set out the substructure for regional multilateral co-operation, economic integration, and stability. Under Article 2 of the Treaty co-operation was designed to raise the living standard of the people in the Community, maintain economic stability, foster closer relations among Communitys members, and contribute to the progress and development of Africa.12 Governance was entrusted in Article 4 of the Treaty to the Authority of heads of State and Government (AHSG) established as the paramount organ of the Community with the ultimate responsibility for the Communitys executive functions.13 Over the years since the establishment of ECOWAS, economic integration within Member States brought about relative stability within the region despite internal political instability and coups in several member states.

Ambassador Olu Adeniji, Mechanism for Conflict Management in West Africa: Politics of Harmonization, http://jha.ac/articles/a027.htm 9 The ECOWAS Commission, www.ecowas.int 10 Kofi Oteng Kufour, The Institutional Transformation of the Economic Community of West African States (Ashgate publishing limited, 2006), p23 11 ibid Adeniji 12 ibid Kufour p23 13 Kofi Oteng Kufour, The Institutional Transformation of the Economic Community of West African States (Ashgate publishing limited, 2006), p23
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5 In spite of that, at a Summit Meeting of the AHSG in Lome, Togo, 1976, the Protocol on Non-Aggression (NAP) was adopted to guarantee regional peace, seen as essential for rapid integration and development.14 Member States were under an obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force or aggression in their relations with one another or allowing its territory to be used as a base for destabilizing other Member States.15 At a meeting in Sierra Leone in 1981, the Members signed the Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD), which deepened military institutions and elaborated on the commitments binding on the Member States.16

These two Protocols (NAP and PMAD) by which ECOWAS ventured into the field of security arose out of a later realisation that for sub-regional economic co-operation, an atmosphere of peace and stability must pervade the area, and that unresolved disputes between member states could escalate into armed conflicts.17 Under Article 16 of the protocol, it was established the AHSG would decide the expediency of military action upon receipt of a written request submitted to the current Chairman, with copies of request also sent to other Members.18 Under Article 17 of the Protocol, Community intervention was required when there was a conflict between two Member States of the Community.19 However, Article 18 of the Protocol provided that military intervention and assistance would also be required where internal conflict in a member state is actively maintained and sustained by outsiders.20 In the case of armed intervention, the Defence Council assisted by the Defence Commission was to supervise with the authority of the State or States concerned, all measures taken by the ECOWAS Force Commander and ensure that all necessary means for the intervention are made available.21

According to Cisse, NAP and PMAD mainly addressed the issue of interstate conflicts while not dealing with intra state conflict and some aspects of conflict prevention and
14 15

ibid kufour p24-25 ibid kufour p24-25 16 ibid kufour p24-25 17 Ambassador Olu Adeniji, Mechanism for Conflict Management in West Africa: Politics of Harmonization, http://jha.ac/articles/a027.htm 18 Funmi Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa, Conceptual and Legal issues in ECOMOG Operations, Kluwer Law International, 2000, p113 19 ibid kufour p24-25 20 ibid Olonisakin p110 21 Kofi Oteng Kufour, The Institutional Transformation of the Economic Community of West African States (Ashgate publishing limited, 2006), p24-25

6 resolution, humanitarian and peace-building issues.22 In contradiction to Cisse, Aning23 is of the view that PMAD sketched the outlines for tackling internal armed conflict within any member state engineered and supported actively from outside likely to endanger the security and peace in the entire community.24 However, both commentators accede to the ideology that the true intentions of NAP and PMAD were to set a legal framework for the commitments binding on Members to promote peace within the ECOWAS region, within or among member states.

ECOWAS as a regional body continued to adopt measures and legitimate structures to maintain regional integration and stability. At the 13th summit of ECOWAS Heads of State in the Gambia in May 1990, the Community adopted a proposal for the setting up of an ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC).25 The SMC was to act prima facie based on the framework of the Defence Commission. The ECOWAS member states on the SMC included The Gambia (as chair nation), Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo.26 At a meeting of the SMC in the Gambia on the 7th of August 1990 the Economic Community of West African States ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was established.27 Reaffirming the 1975 Treaty the current revised ECOWAS Treaty was adopted on the 24th of July 1993 in Cotonou, Benin28 and conferred the status of supranationality on ECOWAS.29 On the 31st of October 1998, ECOWAS declared a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation, and Manufacture of light weapons to facilitate conflictsensitive development through preventive disarmament initiatives.30 However, the Moratorium has since June 2006, been converted into a binding instrument the Convention of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related

General Lamine Cisse, Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations in the Central African Republic, Political Economic and Security Issues in the West African Sub Region, a speech delivered at the Woodrow Wilson Internation al Centre for Scholars, Washington DC, Wednesday October 27th, 2004. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/ACFAE9.doc 23 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, From eco-pessimism to eco-optimism ECOMOG and the West African integration process, 1027 0353 @ 1999 African association of Political Science archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/political%20science/volume4n1/ajps004001003.pdf 24 ibid Aning 25 Funmi Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa, Conceptual and Legal issues in ECOMOG Operations, Kluwer Law International, 2000, p100-101 26 ibid Olonisakin p101 27 ibid Olonisakin p101 28 Treaty of the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) [Revised], available at www.ecowas.int. Also reprinted in 8 African Journal of International and Comparative Law/RADIC (1996) 189 29 Regulation 34, Regulation MSC/REG. 1/01/08, The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), www.ecowas.int 30 Regulation 35, Regulation MSC/REG. 1/01/08, The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), www.ecowas.int
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7 Materials.31 It is vital to reduce the availability and access to inexpensive weapons, their ammunition, and other related to minimise the possibility militant activity. On the 10th of December 1999, ECOWAS adopted the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security.32 This Protocol constitutes the most normative framework for confronting the threats to peace and security in the region on a more permanent basis by boosting the conflict prevention capabilities of ECOWAS to pre-empt potential outbreak of violence, resolve conflicts when they occur and to engage more effectively in post-conflict reconstruction in places, where peace has been restored.33

Conflicts
The relative stability within the ECOWAS region was adversely threatened when actions and decisions of corrupt, narrow-minded, oppressive leaders beyond usual negligible internal political instability and military coups and led to ethnic violence, and some of the most brutal internal conflicts. On the 24th of December 1989 a group of armed dissidents known as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor invaded Liberia via Cote dIvoire and started what has been acknowledged as the first Liberian civil war that lasted up to seven years of genocidal conflict. The initial objective, which was the fundamental reason for support of the NPFL invasion, was to oust the government of Samuel Doe. Another faction known as Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) led by Prince Yomie Johnson broke away from the NPFL and added to the warring parties of the Liberian conflict. The conflict started with Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) against NPFL as the war raged INPFL and the Central Revolutionary Council (CRC) joined the battlefield, followed by the emergence in 1991

31 32

Regulation 35, Regulation MSC/REG. 1/01/08, The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), www.ecowas.int Regulation 36, Regulation MSC/REG. 1/01/08, The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), www.ecowas.int 33 Regulation 36, Regulation MSC/REG. 1/01/08, The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), www.ecowas.int

8 of the United Movement for Democracy and Liberation in Liberia (ULIMO).34 ULIMO later divided into ULIMO-J under Roosevelt Johnston and ULIMO-K under Alhaji Kromah and by 1995; there were at least eight major factions as well as many more minor ones.35 After prolong clashes between ECOWAS/ECOMOG forces and the Liberian rebels a settlement was reached in 1997 to cease-fire, disarmament of rebel factions, and establishment of political parties and the conduct of elections. The result of the elections ultimately brought to power Taylor, a transformation from warlord to elected civilian president.

Across the Liberian border dissidents where involved in a similar conflict, the Sierra Leonean civil war began on the 23rd of March 1991 when the main rebel group the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by Alfred Foday Sankoh (deceased), invaded eastern Sierra Leone at Bomaru in the Kailahun district, and the Mano River bridge linking Liberia and Sierra Leone.36 Conflict intensified when dissident forces from the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF) formed themselves into the Armed Force Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and launched a coup against the government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah on 25 May 1997.37 After prolong clashes between ECOMOG forces and the Sierra-Leonean rebels, the path to settlement, cease-fire, disarmament of rebel factions and the return to civil government began with the signing of the Lom peace agreement in July 1999, the establishment of the United Nations Mission in SierraLeone (UNAMSIL), exit of the ECOWAS/ECOMOG troops and finally the Abuja Agreement.

Conflict in Guinea-Bissau broke out on 6 June 1998 between the army and the government after President Joo Bernado Nino Viera sacked his army chief, Brigadier Ansumane Man. President Viera had accused Man of trafficking in arms with the rebel

34

Tuck, Christopher. 2000. "Every Car or Moving Object Gone". The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia. 4(1): 1. [online] URL: http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v4/v4i1a1.htm 35 ibid Tuck 36 Comfort Ero, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London, ECOMOG: A model for Africa? Published in Monograph 46, Building stability in Africa: Challenges for the new millennium, February 2000, http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No46/Ecomog.html 37 Comfort Ero, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London, ECOMOG: A model for Africa? Published in Monograph 46, Building stability in Africa: Challenges for the new millennium, February 2000, http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No46/Ecomog.html

9 secessionist force, the Forces dmocratiques de Casamance (MFDC) in the Casamance region of neighbouring Senegal.38 Support for the Senegalese/Guinean intervention and the futile ECOMOG operation came to nothing the Junta and its Casamance allies came to power.39

Necessity and Intervention

Regional conflicts claimed very many lives, which apart from indigenes of the country involved, included indigenes form neighbouring countries and foreign nationals. There was extensive destruction of property and infractures. The security instability within the region led to deterioration of trade between member states and economic downturn. Regional conflicts spiralled out of sovereign boundaries of initial war torn countries with the mass exodus of its citizens seeking refuge in neighbouring countries. The migration of refugees had its toll on the living standard of the people in the community and with limited resources quality of life gradually diminished. Rebels in warring countries fought for control of resources, with economic reliance on captured resources maintained the conflict for motives beyond political. The financing of NPFL army was largely dependent on the NPFLs control of the port of Buchanan, as well as territory rich in natural resources.40 The other warring parties scrambled for what resources where available to the further detriment of the civil population caught in-between. Acquisition of weapons achievable from a strong financial base and a supply route strengthened the NPFLs position militarily.41 Sophisticated arms and ammunition where also obtained with the gains from plundered resources and rebel leaders with chosen subordinates enriched themselves. In Sierra Leone, rebel factions developed a clandestine regional trading

38 39

ibid Ero Simon Massey, Multi-party Mediation in the Guinea-Bissau Civil War, Chap 6, p94, in Ending Africas Wars Progressing to Peace, OLIVER FURLEY and ROY MAY, (eds), African Studies Centre, Coventry University, UK, ASHGATE, 2006 40 Funmi Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa, Conceptual and Legal issues in ECOMOG Operations, Kluwer Law International, 2000, p90 41 ibid Olonisakin p91

10 network based on the capture of diamond-rich regions.42 The worldwide attention to blood diamonds and the extent to which rebel factions where willing exert terror in other to maintain these resource rich territories highlighted the humanitarian need for intervention. Furthermore, rebel factions controlled access to rations of food available and this was used as bait to recruit survivors displacement from their homes to join these rebel factions as a means to continued survival.

The civil war in Liberia initiated by a civilian to oust a sitting government was the first time within the ECOWAS region such would happen, the human and material cost, the extent to which terror, brutal violence and the atrocities to human rights where being perpetuated could not be overlooked. ECOWAS regional stability was threatened by an internal armed conflict in a member state, highlighting the vital link between economic development, peace, and stability; this changed the role of ECOWAS on regional security especially concerning intervention and assistance in regional conflicts. However, it is pertinent to note that ECOWAS Heads of State also recognised that their own countries were vulnerable to a Liberia-type crisis and the need for self-preservation partly underlined their decision to respond.43

ECOWAS as the regional organisation with the capacity to intervene but with no prior experience engaged in the process of peacemaking. Peacemaking is fundamentally a diplomatic exercise aimed at achieving a settlement or resolution of a conflict and it begins on a bilateral level.44 Significant to reiterate before further discussion, the

founding purpose of ECOWAS as a regional body was that of economic integration hence deviation to a peacemaking role was not with the mandate from a full summit of ECOWAS members, reasons pertinent to this paper discussed much later. ECOWAS intervened on four major grounds, namely: (i) military-humanitarian considerations; (ii)

Comfort Ero, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London, ECOMOG: A model for Africa? Published in Monograph 46, Building stability in Africa: Challenges for the new millennium, February 2000, http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No46/Ecomog.html 43 Funmi Olonisakin, ECOWAS and Civil Society Movements in West Africa, IDS Bulletin Volume 40, No 2, March 2009, Transforming Security and Development in an Unequal World, http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/documentos/72_GCSTECOWASandCivilSocietyMovementsinWestAfricaREVISED.doc 44 ibid Olonisakin p2
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11 the provisions under NAP and PMAD; (iii) the peace and security of the region; and (iv) response to the invitation of the recognised government of Liberia.45

Intervention of the Liberian conflict comprised of the ECOWAS mediation committee attempting to achieve a cease-fire, negotiate settlement with the warring parties, and obtain consent to the deployment of a peacekeeping force. NPFL delegates withdrew from peace talks, rejecting proposals for a cease-fire and a peacekeeping force.46 Taylor and his men expressed their determination to fight any intervening force unless it was a force to which they consented.47 The SMC with no agreement between the warring parties and no peace to keep deployed to Liberia a prima facie peacekeeping force as part of a peace plan, with the brief of monitoring an immediate ceasefire.48 Following the criteria set out by Olonisakin49, ECOMOG was deployed as an impartial military force to provide humanitarian assistance to Liberian citizens affected by the conflict supported with adequate resources and strength to combat the warring parties, with or without the full consent of the warring parties.50

ECOMOG peacekeeping force was primarily to monitor and maintain a cease-fire while adhering to peacekeeping rules. Peacekeeping is essentially a third party activity, which plays a limited but important role in the peacemaking process, to keep a peace that has been arranged, or about to be concluded.51 ECOMOGs initial deployment of peacekeeping force encountered severe NPFL resistance upon landing at Monrovia; the NPFL upheld their determination to fight any intervening forces and declared war on ECOMOG. The controversy of the legitimacy of ECOMOGs intervention served as a useful propaganda for the rebel forces. The Mediation Committee readjusted ECOMOGs mandate given instructions to enforce a cease-fire, clear the Liberian capital of all threats of attack, prevent further acquisition of arms and ammunition by the rebels, establish and
Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, From eco-pessimism to eco-optimism ECOMOG and the West African integration process, 1027 0353 @ 1999 African association of Political Science archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/political%20science/volume4n1/ajps004001003.pdf 46 Funmi Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa, Conceptual and Legal issues in ECOMOG Operations, Kluwer Law International, 2000, p102 47 ibid Olonisakin p102 48 ibid Olonisakin p103 49 Funmi Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa, Conceptual and Legal issues in ECOMOG Operations, Kluwer Law International, 2000 50 ibid Olonisakin p11-12 51 ibid Olonisakin p6
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12 maintain an effective buffer.52 Peace enforcement is employed to bring about peace by literally forcing the adversaries in a conflict to the negotiating table when the diplomatic option has been exhausted via political, economic, or military means. 53 The task of ECOMOG force clearly shifted to that of peace enforcement. To create an atmosphere of non-violence where negotiations for a settlement can occur became a daunting task for the ECOMOG forces, as the negotiating table had to accommodate new demands several warring factions while trying to resolve the original cause of disagreement. ECOMOG in the process of purportedly attempting to interpose itself between various warring factions to keep the peace supported and armed other rivals of Charles Taylor inevitably compromising its supposed neutrality that a peacekeeping force should have.54

Rebel groups of the Sierra Leonean conflict frequently crossed borders and used neighbouring states as launch pads for their insurgency; ECOMOG found itself responding to instability on various borders: Sierra Leone-Liberia, Guinea-Liberia, Guinea-Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau-Senegal.55 The status quo of ECOWAS overall objectives was now that of peace creation. Peace creation constitutes of peacekeeping and enforcement, along with other strategies as part of an overall peacemaking process, designed to resolve or a least manage violent conflict.56

Funmi Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa, Conceptual and Legal issues in ECOMOG Operations, Kluwer Law International, 2000, p106 53 ibid Olonisakin p10 54 Comfort Ero, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London, ECOMOG: A model for Africa? Published in Monograph 46, Building stability in Africa: Challenges for the new millennium, February 2000, http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No46/Ecomog.html 55 Comfort Ero, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London, ECOMOG: A model for Africa? Published in Monograph 46, Building stability in Africa: Challenges for the new millennium, February 2000, http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No46/Ecomog.html 56 ibid Olonisakin p1
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Hegemonic State(s)
ECOMOG has become an important factor in managing violence and disorder in West Africa, but not without the forceful and aggressive tactics of the regional hegemon, Nigeria.57 There has been open antagonism and protest by most francophone countries against anglophone countries alleged to implore subversive activities against other member states through adopted regional integration schemes. Political divisions and tension within the ECOWAS often attributed to the anglophone / francophone divide inter alia undermined the effectiveness of ECOWAS/ECOMOG in conflict prevention and resolution within the region. AHSG needed to decide if the case for armed intervention by ECOWAS military institution had arisen, what necessary means for intervention had to be put in place for effective resolution to the conflict while instigating peace building.

The AHSG consisted of anglophone / francophone leaders with divergent contrivance of resolving the conflict. Nigeria, with its cautious foreign policy of maintaining friendly relations with all its neighbours, and advocacy of a functional systematic approach to African unity, was not fully trusted among the francophone countries.58 The crux of the divide within AHSG was the conviction by some francophone countries that the Liberian conflict was an opportunity for Nigeria to establish a hegemonic stance. Further evidenced when some of the anglophone countries with Nigeria in the lead adopted a hard-line military intervention policy and where willing to contribute available military man-power and resources to the intervention without compromising their national security. On the other hand, some francophone countries with Cote DIvoire in the lead, Nigerias rival in the struggle for hegemony, opposed military intervention; Cote DIvoires influence on other francophone states in the Liberian crisis was cloaked with the prima facie assertions on the legitimacy of ECOWAS intervention. Among notable
57 58

ibid Ero Ambassador Olu Adeniji, Mechanism for Conflict Management in West Africa: Politics of Harmonization, http://jha.ac/articles/a027.htm

14 commentators, Ero59 pointed out that Burkina Faso and Cte dIvoire, interpreted the ECOMOG intervention as an anglophone exercise in regional domination, while Nigerias forceful intervention was seen as the countrys desire to flex its muscles further in the region, hence supported Taylor and the NPFL.60 From a different perspective, Olonisakin pointed out that the Ivorian leaders personal interest and deep-seated resentment for Doe was because of Doe reneging on his promise not to harm HouphouetBoignys son-in-law A.B.Tolbert.61 Influencing Compaore, also a son-in-law to Houphouet-Boigny, Taylor and NPFL were allowed to use Burkina Faso as a base to train and invade Liberia while allowing supplies to reinforce Taylors men to flow through Cote DIvoire.62

Article 16 of the ECOWAS Protocol required a member state under attack to write to the current chairman with copies to other members. Following these requirement, Doe addressed a letter to the SMC requesting assistance in finding a constitutional and reasonable resolution to the crisis engulfing Liberia.63 Opposing Member states where quick to point out that Doe did not directly request assistance from ECOWAS but rather requesting assistance from Nigeria, it was Nigeria that took the issue to ECOWAS for consideration.64

In the absence of a unanimous consent amongst ECOWAS members, and as previously noted without the consent of the warring parties, ECOMOG force was deployed. The two Member states constituting the core of ECOMOG force where Nigeria, with a population of over 100 million people and a standing army and air force of 71,500 men, inevitably had the greatest capacity to project a regional security presence and Ghana, a country of

59

Comfort Ero, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London, ECOMOG: A model for Africa? Published in Monograph 46, Building stability in Africa: Challenges for the new millennium, February 2000, http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No46/Ecomog.html 60 ibid Ero 61 Funmi Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa, Conceptual and Legal issues in ECOMOG Operations, Kluwer Law International, 2000, p119-120 62 ibid Olonisakin p120 63 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, From eco-pessimism to eco-optimism ECOMOG and the West African integration process, 1027 0353 @ 1999 African association of Political Science archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/political%20science/volume4n1/ajps004001003.pdf 64 Tuck, Christopher. 2000. "Every Car or Moving Object Gone". The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia. 4(1): 1. [online] URL: http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v4/v4i1a1.htm

15 18 million, had its own well trained army but of much smaller dimension.65 Every country, which contributed troops to ECOMOG or played a distinct role in the Liberian crisis either did so on the basis of direct self-interest or was compelled to act in support Nigeria or Cote DIvoire.66 Persuaded by Cote DIvoire, Togo, and Mali, which were members of the SMC and had initially promised to send a contingent each to Liberia as part of ECOMOG, withdrew their promises.67 The Nigerian army provided most of the senior command structure for ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone68 hence exacerbating the existing francophone ideology of anglophone dominance within the region. ECOMOGs intervention in Liberia was shrouded by the open desire of Nigeria to challenge, dominate and dictate the outcome of the conflict, but more importantly, to prevent Taylor from seizing power in Liberia.69 However Tucks analysis of Nigerias interest was that Taylors actions killings of up to 1,000 Nigerian nationals in Monrovia in 1990, and his close links with Nigerias regional rival Cote DIvoire, was a direct threat to Nigerias hegemonic stance.70 Retrospectively relations between Nigeria and Cte dIvoire have tended to be fraught with tensions, especially when the latter called for the recognition of Biafra during the Nigerian civil war in 1967.71 However, the tactics employed by Nigeria backfired, resulting in major clashes between ECOMOG and the NPFL and substantially prolonging and widening the conflict.72 The end of which Taylor did seize power at the polls and was transformed from a warlord to a civilian president. Suffice to say that at the cost of human lives and already scarce resources within the region, the ECOWAS/ECOMOG intervention in Liberia was illogical to traditional

John L. Hirsch, Sierra Leone, Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series, 2001, p61 66 Funmi Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa, Conceptual and Legal issues in ECOMOG Operations, Kluwer Law International, 2000, p120 67 ibid Olonisakin p120 68 ibid Hirsch p72-74 69 Comfort Ero, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London, ECOMOG: A model for Africa? Published in Monograph 46, Building stability in Africa: Challenges for the new millennium, February 2000, http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No46/Ecomog.html 70 Tuck, Christopher. 2000. "Every Car or Moving Object Gone". The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia. 4(1): 1. [online] URL: http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v4/v4i1a1.htm 71 ibid Ero 72 Comfort Ero, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London, ECOMOG: A model for Africa? Published in Monograph 46, Building stability in Africa: Challenges for the new millennium, February 2000, http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No46/Ecomog.html
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16 peacekeeping objectives and ineffectual to maintaining economic integration within the region.

Reciprocal to the francophone ideology of anglophone dominance is the anglophone conviction that the francophone members never really committed to regional economic integration. The language barrier created by the pattern of colonialism and the perpetuation of the vertical link with the former imperial power at the expense of the horizontal link with neighbouring states discouraged much meaningful relations across the anglophone / francophone divide.73 Most of the francophone countries have maintained vertical socio-economic co-operation, language, and cultural ties with their former imperial power thereby restricting them to a certain extent the adoption or implementation of regional integration schemes. Burkina-Faso and Cote-DIvoire despite being signatories to NAP and PMAD repudiated these protocols with the invasion of Liberia via Cote dIvoire and the training of rebel troops carried out in Burkina Faso, which for a long time constituted the supply route for arms and ammunition.74 Furthermore, the impulsion by Cote DIvoire on Togo and Mali to withdraw its promise to send troops indicted cogent affinity to its francophone coalescence.

On the other hand, the initial approach to the Sierra- Leonean conflict by the Nigerian-led ECOMOG force clearly favoured a military solution, not convinced the situation could be reversed by force Ghana and Cote dIvoire urged negotiations however, the inability to attain a decisive combat victory at the outset forced ECOMOG to change their strategy.75 The proposition of anglophone / francophone divide was inverted when Ghana an

anglophone country with some degree experience in peacekeeping expressed adoption of negotiations as opposed to hard-line military measures of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG force. The ineffectiveness of ECOWAS/ECOMOG force in its military intervention as a viable process for maintaining regional stability can be analysed out of the context of geo-political tension between anglophone / francophone countries. From a typically
Ambassador Olu Adeniji, Mechanism for Conflict Management in West Africa: Politics of Harmonization, http://jha.ac/articles/a027.htm 74 Funmi Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa, Conceptual and Legal issues in ECOMOG Operations, Kluwer Law International, 2000, p91 75 John L. Hirsch, Sierra Leone, Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series , 2001, p61
73

17 African ideology, with ECOMOG forces inevitably entwined as one of the warring parties and the giant of Africa overreaching its capabilities trying to maintain a hegemonic stance, the Nigerian-led force refused to acknowledge that peace enforcement wasnt as effective as it would have been imagined.

With Nigeria at the helm of ECOWAS/ECOMOG intervention, ECOMOG was deprived of adequate resources and logistic support as a result of Nigerias strained relationship with the British government and Nigeria could not in all its might cope with the cost of the conflict alone. The British government resolutely opposed to providing financial or material support to ECOMOG as long as Sani Abacha (then-Head of State) remained ECOWAS chairperson.76 At the November 1995 Commonwealth Conference in New Zealand, the British had played a key role in passing a strong condemnation of Abachas harsh human rights record at home and in Nigerias suspension from the Commonwealth itself.77 The United States was prepared to separate its bilateral and regional policies, London insisted on a total ban on assistance to Nigeria and as a result, Sierra Leones plight was understood with sympathy but with Nigeria as the regional head, little material support. The initial intervention to the conflict in Guinea-Bissau was lead by Senegal and Guinea which jointly sent forces to support President Viera, with Senegal contributing 3 000 troops partly to counter the support that the MFDC were reportedly receiving from Man,78 later followed by the arrival of ECOMOG force. The intervention by Senegal and Guinea in the Guinea-Bissau conflict was justified on humanitarian basis, but also by invoking supposed secret mutual defence pacts between the three states. 79 The ECOMOG operation was largely led by Francophone countries in the region (Benin - 150 troops trained under the US peacekeeping training programme, African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), Niger, Mali 120 troops and Togo 150 troops) and one Anglophone

John L. Hirsch, Sierra Leone, Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series, 2001, p64 77 ibid Hirsch p64 78 Comfort Ero, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London, ECOMOG: A model for Africa? Published in Monograph 46, Building stability in Africa: Challenges for the new millennium, February 2000, http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No46/Ecomog.html 79 Simon Massey, Multi-party Mediation in the Guinea-Bissau Civil War, Chap 6, p84, in Ending Africas Wars Progressing to Peace, OLIVER FURLEY and ROY MAY, (eds), African Studies Centre, Coventry University, UK, ASGATE, 2006
76

18 country, The Gambia.80 According to Massey, the geographic proximity of the GuineaBissau conflict to Gambias southern border, about 40 miles, engendered fears of crossborder violent contagion and the possibility of serious refugee flows was the Gambias prime motivation for an overarching interest in sub-regional security.81 The President Yahya Jammeh government recognised the interconnectedness of the Bissau war and the Casamance rebellion.82

The use of West African troops in Guinea-Bissau, trained under American and French peacekeeping exercises introduced another dimension to ECOMOG operations.83 Neither private military companies nor Nigerias aggressive military tactics were features of the operation.84 The absence of the Nigerian contingent allowed the francophone countries a disproportionate say in formulating policy.
85

The assistance provided through RECAMP

and ACRI exposed the fact that, beyond Nigeria, many West African states were militarily weak and consequently unable to launch the force necessary to quell the tide of conflicts like that of Guinea-Bissau.86 On the contrary, the absence of Nigerias hegemonic stance through aggressive military tactics, led to a shortened conflict with the general will of the majority of people surpassing the disingenuous hard-line stance against military takeovers adopted by ECOWAS/ECOMOG.

With ECOWAS unviable, the conflict escalating, the responsibility for mediator standing was taken over by the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP). 87 The CPLPs involvement weakened the prevailing orthodoxy that ECOWAS had the pivotal role of conflict management within the sub-region.88 However, Nigerian officials under
80 81

ibid Ero Simon Massey, Multi-party Mediation in the Guinea-Bissau Civil War, Chap 6, p88, in Ending Africas Wars Progressing to Peace, OLIVER FURLEY and ROY MAY, (eds), African Studies Centre, Coventry University, UK, ASGATE, 2006 82 Simon Massey, Multi-party Mediation in the Guinea-Bissau Civil War, Chap 6, p88, in Ending Africas Wars Progressing to Peace, OLIVER FURLEY and ROY MAY, (eds), African Studies Centre, Coventry University, UK, ASGATE, 2006 83 Comfort Ero, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London, ECOMOG: A model for Africa? Published in Monograph 46, Building stability in Africa: Challenges for the new millennium, February 2000, http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No46/Ecomog.html 84 Comfort Ero, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London, ECOMOG: A model for Africa? Published in Monograph 46, Building stability in Africa: Challenges for the new millennium, February 2000, http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No46/Ecomog.html 85 Simon Massey, Multi-party Mediation in the Guinea-Bissau Civil War, Chap 6, p93, in Ending Africas Wars Progressing to Peace, OLIVER FURLEY and ROY MAY, (eds), African Studies Centre, Coventry University, UK, ASGATE, 20 06 86 ibid Ero
87 88

ibid masser p93 ibid masser p93

19 the auspices of ECOWAS brokered a breakthrough in the conflict on the sidelines of the ECOWAS meeting held between 1st and 2nd of November 1998 in Abuja, Nigeria with the signing of a peace agreement between Viera and Man.89 The peace agreement inter alia called for a weapons amnesty for both sides; the immediate formation of a unified government; elections set for no later than March 1999; the withdrawal of foreign troops (that is, Senegalese and Guinean troops) from Guinea-Bissau; and the introduction of a buffer force of ECOMOG peacekeepers.90

Conclusion
The Liberian, Sierra-Leonean, and Guinea-Bissau conflicts in light of adversity brought forth African pride and a sense of unity, irrespective of motive or method of intervention. The ECOWAS region was destabilised by conflict from within the region and intervention was sought from within the region. ECOWAS established to promote economic integration however, recognising the disruptive effect that conflict situations will have on the ultimate ECOWAS goal of a harmonious and united West African society, ECOWAS sought ways to manage and resolve these conflicts and ensure that an environment conducive to the implementation of its economic programmes was maintained.91 ECOMOG consisted of forces drawn from neighbouring African countries; in spite of difficulties, the composition of the force portrayed true integration, which is part of the main establishment of ECOWAS. Military co-operation had existed between countries in West Africa before the creation of ECOMOG however not at the level of full-scale co-operation ECOMOG commanded. At the launch of its Liberian operations ECOMOG operated on an ad hoc basis, allowing states either to exploit its weakness (e.g. Nigeria), or use war and instability as a means of expropriating the resources of another country (e.g. Liberia), guidelines, principles or rules of engagement for managing internal

89 90
91

ibid ero ibid ero

General Lamine Cisse, Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations in the Central African Republic, Political Economic and Security Issues in the West African Sub Region, a speech delivered at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Washington DC, Wednesday October 27th, 2004.

20 conflicts had not been established.92 The Liberian conflict demonstrated that employing peacekeeping and peace enforcement is sometimes unavoidable.93 The military requirements for both peacekeeping and enforcement are very different but not irreconcilable.94

The Militarism and integration concept may be theoretically feasible and practically workable within a regional body where members fully acknowledge treaty provisions. In my opinion, the predominance of the ECOWAS/ECOMOG forces in the Liberian, SierraLeonean and Guinea-Bissau conflict did not to establish, maintain or enhance regional integration policies of ECOWAS but added to the warring factions and prolong the conflict in Liberia and Sierra-Leone, while exposing the actual vulnerability of the region in absence of its hegemon in conflict intervention. The revised ECOWAS Treaty emphasised democracy and the rule of law as a new framework within which the economic integration and development agenda would be pursued. 95 With more democratically elected heads-of-state, implementation of alternate dispute resolution mechanisms rather than hard-line military stance may achieve a more effective resolve to conflicts. Furthermore, Paragraph 2 of Article 58 commits members to co-operate with the community for the purpose of reinforcing the appropriate mechanisms to ensure the timely prevention and resolution of inter and intra state conflicts.96 Appropriate mechanisms I would suggest would involve civilian or military manpower and definitely resources.

It was partly due to a mixture of force and diplomacy utilised by ECOWAS / ECOMOG that West Africa did not see the outbreak of regional interstate conflicts. 97 The aggressive military tactics adopted brought warring factions to the negotiating table, Olonisakin
Comfort Ero, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London, ECOMOG: A model for Africa? Published in Monograph 46, Building stability in Africa: Challenges for the new millennium, February 2000, http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No46/Ecomog.html 93 Funmi Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa, Conceptual and Legal issues in ECOMOG Operations, Kluwer Law International, 2000, p29 94 ibid Olonisakin p30 95 Funmi Olonisakin, ECOWAS and Civil Society Movements in West Africa, IDS Bulletin Volume 40, No 2, March 2009, Transforming Security and Development in an Unequal World, http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/documentos/72_GCSTECOWASandCivilSocietyMovementsinWestAfricaREVISED.doc 96 Regulation 34, Regulation MSC/REG. 1/01/08, The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), www.ecowas.int 97 Comfort Ero, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London, ECOMOG: A model for Africa? Published in Monograph 46, Building stability in Africa: Challenges for the new millennium, February 2000, http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No46/Ecomog.html
92

21 pointed out that a great limitation of peace enforcement is its inability to generate real peace; its sole function is the termination of violence.98 The termination of violence was a fait accompli earnestly sought after by majority of the population within the conflict region. What was prevalent where cease-fire situations important to enable access to medical supplies and humanitarian aid, but providing the rebels opportunity to recoup and attempt to regain territories. However, Ero99 commented that, each operation by ECOMOG has not seen a substantial improvement on its previous attempt, nor any credible peace left in the countries it entered.100 Rather, ECOMOG stumbled from pursuing aggressive military tactics in Liberia to collaborating with mercenaries in Sierra Leone to enforce peace and finally, to mandating a force that did not have the capacity to respond to a complex internal conflict in Guinea-Bissau.101 The change in heads of state of rival power brokers ushered fresh diplomatic approach to resolving regional conflicts.

The question of the possibility that member states would not engage in interstate conflicts is difficult to approach. There were various accusations that could have exploded into full-scale fighting between member states, examples are; the training and support of the NPFL by Felix Houphouet-Boigny (deceased) of Cote DIvoire and Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso.102 I dare say, if the outcome of the Liberian conflict had not resulted in Taylor ascending to power but a bitter, vengeful victim of NPFLs atrocities, the repercussions might have extended beyond sovereign borders probably with military support of a sympathetic rival to either Cote DIvoire of Burkina Faso.

On a different note within the context of probabilities, President Kabbah of Sierra Leone accused Taylor of providing training camps, a network of mercenaries, as well as weapons and money to the RUF.103 In return, Taylor successfully exploited links with the
98 99

ibid Olonisakin p12 ibid Ero Comfort Ero, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London, ECOMOG: A model for Africa? Published in Monograph 46, Building stability in Africa: Challenges for the new millennium, February 2000, http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No46/Ecomog.html 101 ibid Ero 102 Funmi Olonisakin, ECOWAS and Civil Society Movements in West Africa, IDS Bulletin Volume 40, No 2, March 2009, Transforming Security and Development in an Unequal World, http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/documentos/72_GCSTECOWASandCivilSocietyMovementsinWestAfricaREVISED.doc 103 Comfort Ero, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London, ECOMOG: A model for Africa? Published in Monograph 46, Building stability in Africa: Challenges for the new millennium, February 2000, http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No46/Ecomog.html
100

22 RUF and developed a clandestine regional trading network based on the capture of diamond-rich regions by the RUF.104 Post-war Sierra Leone is struggling to recover from the carnage and exploitation of its resources but what is imbedded in the recovery process is distrust of its sovereign neighbours harbouring veteran rebels, training or facilitating a new set of dissidents. There was also the question of Sani Abacha of Nigeria who in the early 1990s had supported Taylor, but the two men had fallen out when it became clear that Taylor had his own aspirations for regional leadership.105 The extent of Abachas support for Taylor also brings to question the commitment/ineffectiveness of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG force to peacekeeping/enforcement during Abachas regime.

The anglophone / francophone tension and struggle for hegemony has not gone anywhere, its resolve is probably submerged intrinsically in ECOWAS policies. The present and future stability and military relations across the anglophone/francophone divide would be largely influenced by the commitment to legitimate structures of ECOWAS to maintain regional stability and economic integration by anglophone / francophone Member States. Nigeria amongst other ECOWAS has had its share of government instability as a result of military takeovers or coups saw the need for intervention due to the scale humanitarian degradation. ECOWAS needs to adopt and effectively carry out punitive measures against member states, which sign up to Treaties and Protocol but actively participate in what such instruments are adopted to prevent. It is important to ensure that the leaders consolidate the achievements of ECOWAS, by assuring a peaceful environment, so that each progress achieved becomes irreversible, bringing us ever closer to our final objective of a unified West African economic and political entity.106 Regional West Africa needs to resolve age-long anglophone / francophone political differences that clearly inter alia influenced ECOWAS involvement in regional peacekeeping.

104 105

ibid Ero John L. Hirsch, Sierra Leone, Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series , 2001, p61 106 General Lamine Cisse, Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations in the Central African Republic, Political Economic and Security Issues in the West African Sub Region, a speech delivered at the Woodrow Wilson Internation al Centre for Scholars, Washington DC, Wednesday October 27th, 2004

23
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