Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
lO
became
service
first
CiESAR
centurion of the
first
ARMY.
Thus the
first
cohort.
circle
{orbem) of
would be complete.*
In the
place, to the
G. pp.
222-28.
60 cen-
making a
subcenturions he calls simply centurions, just as in is commonly called merely " colonel," or a brigadier-general is usually addressed as " general." Then he makes of 120.
The
each cohort.
10 cohorts.
The
first
class (^centuriones
The second
class
i.e., one from primorutn ordinuni) would in other words, the commanders of the would be the \o pili posterior es ; and so
;
on through the 6
tati posteriores.
The seventh
class
subcenturions of ih^ pili prior es ; and in like o der to the twelfth class,
the 10 subcenturions of the hastati posteriores.
It will at
points, 3
and
above.
was promoted, he became subcenturion to the decimus hastatus posterior. As he rose in rank, he passed from cohort to cohort, but always as subcenturion to the hastatus posterior, until he
a private soldier
When
first
cohort.
and he would
{orbeni), going
circle
oi prif?iipilus.
Here
his
Riistow argues that the cohorts, as well as the centurions, were carefully distinguished in
rank; that
it is
known
Roman
less
ing the veterans for an emergency, had by the time of Caesar been quite
first
(the
first
four cohorts)
must have included the choice soldiers; and hence that the centurions would in all probability have been graded in like manner.
M.
p. 371.
Marquardt objects to the scheme of Riistow, that thereby promotion would make the commander of a cohort merely a subordinate in the
next higher cohort; an arrangement quite impossible to the military
mind.
offi-
* This
is
THE ORGANIZATION.
cers
II
and
skilled
would be grouped in the first cohort, and the least experienced would be gathered in the tenth ^- an arrangement obviously
is
unpractical.
was
not, after
all,
cohorts of a legion in point of soldiership; nor again a very wide distinction in the
privates.
The Roman organization was marked by a peculiar solidarity, very much unlike our own; and while, of course, the officers had great
influence
battle,
II, 20^
is
But the strongest point in favor of some such plan as that of Goler primi 07'dines are sometimes mentioned in such a
as to imply that they held immediate relations with all the cohorts
way
tions
in the legion.
against
Ariovistus,
Thus, after the council of war that preceded the opera- ^ the legions that had been panic-stricken
arranged
apologies to Caesar.
tribunes,
and centurions of the first class to make their This would imply that the primi ordines^ like the
all
the soldiers.
It
would be
difficult to
imagine the troops of the other nine cohorts coming for such
first.
Certainly
it
Passages of similar import are quoted by Marquardt from Livy, Hyginus, Tacitus ^'
(II, 89),
men
own commander.
and others. The scheme of Marquardt, it may be noted, is the same as Goler's, without the subcenturions. This would make but six classes, and cannot be reconciled with point 2
Frontinus,
above.
The
is
the fact
that subcenturions
seem not
to
but were more probably chosen from the ranks, each by his
turion ( 8).
classes of
own
cen-
If
we take away
these,
we
One
and
striking difference
between the
Roman
organization
X
^
modern armies is in the matter of the number In neither of officers. The Romans had far fewer than we. correof officers any trace find cohort nor maniple do we our compain one of officers sponding to the commissioned The nies, or even to our relatively numerous corporals. centurions seemed to have all the functions that we should
that of
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2007
Microsoft Corporation
http://www.archive.org/details/caesarsarmystudyOOjudsrich
GMSAR.
From a Colossal Bust
in
CAESAR'S ARMY:
A STUDY OF THE
IN
THE LAST
BY
NEW YORK
ATLANTA
DALLAS
LL
by
/
GINN AND COMPANY- PROPRIETORS BOSTON U.S.A.
PREFACE.
This
little
book
is
Army
so
and evolutions.
It is
Caesar's writings
may
The Commentaries
are military history.
for civilian readers at
They
Rome.
certain
amount of
military
knowledge that
Roman
citizens
mind
the
same idea
that
it
to the intelligent
Roman
reader to
whom
Caesar addressed
Hence
it
seems
clear that
we should
art with
which the
Roman
Many
Many
others
we can
Our
may
often be erroneous.
And
yet
is it
an?
It is
modern
Especially
many
particulars.
It
thCftruth,
and
to present
416046
IV
PREFACE.
War
is
barbarism.
The
history of war
is
the history of
human mind.
The
military science of
each age
is
And no
The
man
we understand
method of the
yet to be written.
is
Thus
far,
This work
intended as an essay
and
illustrating
CONTENTS.
I.
PAGE
THE ORGANIZATION
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6. 7.
8.
Infantry of the Legion Standards Music Baggage Train Auxiliary Infantry Cavalry Artillery Staff and Staff Troops
II.
2
13
15
16
18 19
20 26
THE LEGIONARY
1.
30
30 32 32
2. 3.
Enlistment Clothing
4.
5.
Armor Arms
Baggage
33 36
^
6.
7-
Work
Pay
Discipline
.
36
37 38
8.
III.
TACTICS OF
A.
1.
THE LEGION
40
41
41
Order of Battle
2.
B.
Order of March
1.
43 46
2.
47
49
VI
CONTENTS.
IV.
PAGE
TACTICS OF
THE CAVALRY
53
V.
ARMY
55
55
55
Offensive
2.
Defensive
57
3.
Manner of Attack
. . .
. c
B.
The March
1.
59 62
2. 3.
64
67 68
70
4.
C.
70
71
2.
The The
Site
71
Fortification
72
72
(a)
Id)
The Ground Plan The Elevation 1. The Ditch 2. The Wall 3. The Interior
4.
5. 6.
7.
..73
73
76,
78
...
81
82
...
82
II.
84 86
87
D.
The
1.
Blockade
Assault
87
2.
3.
Regular Siege
(a) Construction of the Ag^er
(6) Siege Apparatus
c
89 9
....
93 96
VI.
THE
SHIPS
AND SEA-FIGHTS
102
CONTENTS.
VII.
VU
PAGE
THE ENEMY
A. Defence of Fortified
B.
C.
109
125
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
Caesar
Fig.
I.
Frontispiece
Aquila
Signutn
13 13
2.
3.
Vexillum
Aquilifer
13
4.
5.
I4
15 i^ 15
.
6.
7.
8.
18 19
21
9.
Cavalryman
Catapulta
Ballista
10.
11.
22 24
12.
Scorpio
Legionary
ig.
30
2>Z
^tZ
13. 14.
15.
Scutum
Gladius
16.
17. 18.
Pilum Pilum
Maniple
34
,
34 42
41
19.
44
41
20.
21. 22.
23.
24.
25. 26.
41
41
44 44 5 69
7^ 74
Square
27. 28.
29.
75
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
Fig. 30.
X
PAGE
75
^-^
,
.
" "
31.
32.
33.
Camp
.
.
Oppugnatio
Horizontal Section of Agger
Vertical Section of Agger
88
" "
" " " "
....
90
92
94
97
Musculus
Vinea
Pluteus
Pluteus
97 98
98
99 99 100
loi
40.
41.
Pluteus
Caesar's Circumvallation at Alesia
42.
43. 44.
45.
Lilium
Section of Galley
102 104
105
"
"
46.
Wall
47.
The
I.
108
iii
Plan
"
Fortifications
on the Rhone
II.
112
"
III. Battle
with Ariovistus
113
114
115
"
"
116
117
1
18
"
" "
" " "
119
120
121
XL
Defeat of Vercingetorix
122
123
^ .
.
124
I.
Gaul
II.
Campaign of
ni. Campaign of
IV. Campaigns of B.C. 55 and 54. V. Britain in Campaigns of B.C. 55 and 54. VI. Campaign of B.C. 52.
ABBREVIATIONS.
A. App.
C.
Dio.
y
^
B. G.
G. Gen. Gro.
= = = = = = =
=
Albericus Gentilis,
De Armis Romanis.
Jung, Leben und Sitten der Romer in der Kaiserzeit. K. =-Krohl, De Legionibus Reipublicae Romanae. Lange = Lange, Mutationum Historia. L. = Lindenschmidt, Die Alterthiimer unser heidnischer Vorzeit.
= = Jung =
H.
Jal
La
Flotte de Cesar.
M. = Marquardt-Mommsen, Handbuch
N. N.
der
Rom. Alterthiimer,
Bd.
5, 1884-
= Nissen, Das Templum. = Histoire de Jules Cesar, pjar Napoleon IIL Notes = Notes to Allen and Greenough's New Caesar. P. = Polybius. Plut. Caes. = Plutarch's Caesar. Plut. Pomp. = Plutarch's Pompey. R. = Riistow, Heerwesen und Kriegfuhrung Casars. R. K. = RUstow and Kochly, Geschichte des Griechischen Kri^wesens. Ro. = Robertson, History of Charles V. Sch. A. = Schambach, Die Artillerie bei Casar. Sch. R. = Schambach, Die Reiterei bei Casar. Schef. = Scheffer, De Militia Navali Veterum, 1654.
'
Suet.
T. G. > U. V.
= = = =
Suetonius.
Tacitus,
De Germania. Army
CESAR'S ARMY.
THE ORGANIZATION.
Roman army was
in
I.
1.
I.
The
the
legionary infantry.
in field operations
The
number.
were used in
operations,
but very
in the
field.
The heavy
infantry furnished
by the
allies {atixilia),
though generally
Roman
for
much
important
B.G.111,25.
m
.
^^1
tt
p. 80, 81.
armor and equipped with sword, spear and battle-axe. In modern is again the main arm of the service. Unlike the
Roman
powerful
is
greatly
strengthened by a
No army
unless in partial
2.
The
tactical unit
of the
legion {legid).
Caesar
had under
his
was the
different
times a varying
number of legions.
command, by a combination of several of which a higher unit is formed. Thus in the army of the United States, the tactical unit of the army u.
is
H
365,
the corps; each corps should contain three divisions ; each division, 55i7^8,748.
each
2
re^nient,* teh
CiESAR
Wmpumvs.
^
ARMY.
is
'
The company
The
of our
is
in the
main
similar to that
own
Each
tactical unit
has a commanding
officer,
who
receives orders
unit.
company
to his brigade
commander
Each
commanding
mand by a combination
composed;
commanders of those
units.
3.
The Roman
by numbers,
The
B G.
B.G.
72.
I,
40
B.G.
II, 2I.
In the campaigns of the years 57, 56 and 55 Caesar had eight legions; the six used in the previous year, 58, and two of new levies (Legiones
B.G. V,
243.
G. 169.
(XV).
In the year 54, probably in the spring, Caesar enlisted a new legion The 14th was divided. Five of its ten cohorts were scattered,
II, 23.
XI and XII
new
legions.
number
higher than XII without having previously referred to a legion or legions newly raised. So we have little difficulty in tracing the numbers of his legions. The numbers are specifically given by Hirtius in his commentary
(commonly
THE ORGANIZATION.
the
men
being used to
fill
Thus
Caesar
had
up the depleted ranks of the other legions. and a half legions under arms. Of of Legion XV and five cohorts of Legion
XIV) were
At the opening of the campaign of 53 B.C., Pompey loaned Caesar E.G. two legions (I and III). One new one was raised, which received the ^^' ^ 32^ same number (XIV) as the one Caesar had divided, and of which five ^^^1^* cohorts were lost with Sabinus. These ten legions were used in the
operations of the year 52.
T>
/~
In the commentary written by Hirtius Pansa (de Bello GalHco, Bk. VIII) the legions are repeatedly mentioned by number; although, n,
'VTTT
*
^^es
24, 54.
VIII, unfortunately, with considerable confusion where the Mss. agree, and ^-G*
in the Mss.
If
we should
follow
^^
2, 24.
yjjj
same time:
we
no- B.G.VIII,4.
pp. 333,
where
clear
from place
enough
campaign
in Gaul, Caesar
had eleven
Very possibly
it
was numbered XV, as Goler conjectures, to take the XV that had been destroyed with Sabinus in 54 B.C.
Caesar's legions, see the disser-
De
4.
The
officers in
command
at
Rome,
partly
These by the
The
i,
39
from
political
considerations.
this
to their efficiency.
The
During
six
command
two months.
this
Roman jealousy
command,
as in the case
of the consuls.
4
centurions,
B.G. Ill,
73.
CiESARS ARMY.
and
to preside at courts-martial.
They were
They communi-
cation from the soldiers to the general. They were also summoned to councils of war by the commander of the army. The tribunes, like the staff of a modern infantry
command and
variety of duties,
better plan.
25S'
made them hardly reliable to lead and Caesar accordingly soon devised a Without displacing the tribunes, he stationed
merely
officer
472, also
way
in
which each
the
notes, p. 64;
M. v.
457.
duty, afterwards as
actual
commander
ministrative
V*
t;2-
VII
'
B.G. VI,
39.
Rustow considers the duties of the tribunes to have been mainly adand judicial; i.e., as having to do with an oversight of the rations and equipments of the troops, and with the cognizance of This is true as far as it goes. Still, we meet repeated ii^illtary offences. instances in which the tribunes undoubtedly commanded in actual battle. Their command .of detachments composed of one or more cohorts, is not infrequent.
among
a number of
officers in
The
quarterniaster
to arms,
equipments,
Courts-fnartial are and clothing. The conunissary provides food. composed of details from the various officers. Thus the whole administration of the army is systematized and made more effective.
5.
The normal
or
full
This
is
to
be
knowledge of the
fact in question
would help us
effective
to
tactics.
However, the
THE ORGANIZATION.
Strength in the field
racy.
we can
From
the experience of
effectives
that
the
falls
number of
always
again,
number on
the rolls
and
number on
by the
tactics.
And we may be
the effective strength of any legion must have varied constantly with the exigencies of the
campaign
always, how-
some of
his legions
had
2750 men.
little
over 4000.
r.
p. 3.
g.
p. 213.
Caesar in one place speaks of a detachment of two legions of infantry b.G. V, and a few cavalry as hardly 7000 strong. That would make about 3500
to the legion.
49
B.C. 55,
to land b.G.
37*
IV
36
port,
and the
soldiers
Assuming the two transwould average 150 men to a ship. Now Caesar had 80 transports and an unknown number of ^-G. IV, galleys. He lost 12 vessels in the storm. It seems likely that those 12 ^^ ^* were transports, as they lay at anchor, and hence would be more exposed to the storm than the galleys, which were hauled up on the beach.
ports to have been of about the
From
same
size, that
'
'
Then
Allowing for
officers
68 transports remaining carried 10,200 men. g q, ^Qtcs and servants, the two legions must have P* ^35*
averaged somewhat
less
civil
war, Caesar had with him at Ariminium only the XIII Legion (C.
I,
7).
But Plutarch
(^Cces.
O
So we may
fairly
CiESAR
ARMY.
strength of a legion
when
its
ranks were
full.
6.
The
each maniple
of the
two centuries
{cetituriae, oi^dines).
The
The
The term
centuria
is
at least doubtful in
is
made
maniple at
often a
We
means a rank,
or line, of soldiers;
rank among
it
officers, as prifnorufft
sometimes
The maniple,
to day of the
same men, so far as these were present. Each time the maniple was formed, it was divided, presumably according to the height of the soldiers, into two equal parts. These were the ordines. Thus it will be seen that these did not necessarily consist from day to day of the same men; as, of course, if any should be absent, the division would not be made at the same point in the line on successive days. The ordo corresponded exactly to the platoon of an American company. The
maniple corresponded to our company.
7. With Goler's estimate of 4800 men to the legion, each cohort would contain 480 men ; and each maniple, 1 60 men. Rustow's computations are based on an average
That would
and 120
to the maniple.
the
command
of two cen-
the
first
PauiusDiac.
Each centurion probably had a subcenturion {optio) to assist him. The optio was chosen from the ranks by the centurion. The centurion, Uke the line officers of our
ordo.
THE ORGANIZATION.
infantry,
7
he carried a
was on
foot.
As a badge of
his office,
power
of inflicting punishment.
9. Of
rion of the
368-374'
pilus posterior.
ceps prior,
The senior of the second maniple was pritiand the junior was princeps posterior. The senior of the third maniple was has tatus prior and the junior, has^
tatus posterior.
Thus the terms pilus, princeps, hastatus referred to the first, second, and third maniple respectively. This is plainly a survival of the old organization, in which the soldiers of the first line were called /zV^wi
(J>ili),
those of the second principes, and those of the third hastati (or
triarii').
Such
distinction
was
in the
it
new
The only
traces of
we
the
titles
We
commanded by
the epithet
by
The cohort to which a centurion belonged was indicated its number in the legion e.g., the lowest centurion in a
;
would
command
;
of the
first
ordo of
primipilus,
10.
The
com-
m. v,
371-72.
manded
of
its
the maniple.
the
command
Only the
Such an arrangement would hardly be feasible in a modern army. solidity and uniformity of the Roman array made it possible
for them.
8
R. p.
II.
CiESAR*S ARMY.
II
The
position
and
sergeants
modern army. They were chosen from the ranks, as are our and corporals, and were very rarely promoted to
However,
their responsibilities
(not
were
in
some respects
commissioned
officers.
The centurions were usually nomiThey received their appointment, commanding general.
rank of the cer.turions
in
a'
The
relative
cohort
it
is
not
difficult to learn,
and there
is
litde
doubt that
was as
of their
The order
or, in
other words,
is
We
have
no
clear
and
positive information
on the
subject,
on isolated on inferences from the general spirit of the Roman organization and from the probable course that human nature, as we know it, would take under conditions like those in which the
The
B.G.
I, 412.
C. Ill
S3,
There is constant reference to those of the first {primorum ordinum), Caesar in one place speaks of a centurion who for especial gallantry was promoted from the
ing to rank.
class
centurion of the
infer
first
We may
from
this
{ab octavis
were at
Of
:
course
there
3.
occisi
sex
primorum ordinuin
cejituriones')
we
THE ORGANIZATION.
time there were at least six centurions of the
first class.
9
As
not
much more
likely that
4.
than a century after JuHus Caesar, it seems no material change had been made meanwhile.
We
quote
quemdam per diversas scholas milites Nam promoventur, ita ut ex prima cohorte ad gradiim quempiam promotus vadat ad decimam cohortem ; et rursus ab ea, crescentibus stipendiis, cum inajore gradu per alias recurrit ad
quasi in orbem
prim am,
5
The
centurions of the
first
class
{primorum ordinuni)
b.g. v, ^^*
7^'
28'^
company with
On
nent of these theories, with a few considerations both for and against
them, are as follows
:
Riistow conjectures that the centurions of each cohort form one r^ pp^ g-n There would then be ten classes in the legion, with six in each class.
class.
The
all
the six
first
grades of the tenth cohort, then from the sixth through to the
place in the ninth cohort;
and
in
like
manner
until every
grade
to that of priittipilus.
According
those of the
first
cohort, six in
number.
It will
be seen that
The
passage in Vegetius (4 above), Rustow gives this interpretation As vacancies occurred in the ranks of any cohort, they were filled by detailing
fall to
men from
Thus
recruits
would always
it
and the
first
the legion.
became
the
made from
maniple), and he
would be assigned
hort (decimus).
Then he would
of that cohort, then through the grades of the ninth, and so on, until he
lO
became
service
first
CiESAR
centurion of the
first
ARMY,
Thus the
first
cohort.
circle
{prbgm) of
would be complete.*
In the
place, to the
G- PP222-28.
60 cen-
making a
subcenturions he calls simply centurions, just as in is commonly called merely " colonel," or a brigadier-general is usually addressed as " general." Then he makes
The
i.e.,
one from
each cohort.
10 cohorts.
The
first
The second
class
on through the 6
tati posteriores.
The seventh
subcenturions of \hQ pili prior es ; and in like o der to the twelfth class,
the 10 subcenturions of the hastati posteriores.
once appear that this theory also accords with the essential and 4, above. Goler would explain Vegetius in this way When a private soldier was promoted, he became subcenturion to the decimus hastatus posterior. As he rose in rank, he passed from cohort
It will at
points, 3
he
first
cohort.
and he would
Here
his
Riistow argues that the cohorts, as well as the centurions, were carefully distinguished in
rank; that
it is
known
Roman
less
ing the veterans for an emergency, had by the time of Caesar been quite
first
(the
first
four cohorts)
must have included the choice soldiers; and hence that the centurions would in all probability have been graded in like manner.
M.
p. 371.
Marquardt objects to the scheme of Riistow, that thereby promotion would make the commander of a cohort merely a subordinate in the next higher cohort; an arrangement quite impossible to the military mind. Moreover, as Goler says, the most experienced and skilled offi-
* This
is
THE ORGANIZATION.
cers
II
and
skilled
would be grouped in the first cohort, and the least experienced would be gathered in the tenth ^- an arrangement obviously
unpractical.
that there
RUstow remarks, however, and the remark is not without weight, was not, after all, a very great difference between the different
same regard between the centurions and the
privates.
cohorts of a legion in point of soldiership; nor again a very wide distinction in the
The Roman organization was marked by a peculiar solidarity, very much unlike our own and while, of course, the officers had great
;
influence
battle,
II, 20^
is
But the strongest point in favor of some such plan as that of Goler primi 07'dines are sometimes mentioned in such a
as to imply that they held immediate relations with all the cohorts
way
tions
in the legion.
against
the
legions that
had been
panic-stricken
their
arranged
apologies to Caesar.
tribunes,
would be
for
difficult to
such
would seem more natural for the men of each cohort to go to their own commander. Passages of similar import are quoted by Marquardt from Livy, Hyginus, Tacitus ^' (II, 89), Frontinus, and others. The scheme of Marquardt, it may be noted, is the same as Goler's, without the subcenturions. This would make but six classes, and cannot be reconciled with point 2
a service to the officers of the
Certainly
it
P* 37i
above.
The
is
the fact
that subcenturions
seem not
to
but were more probably chosen from the ranks, each by his
turion ( 8)
.
own
cen-
If
we take away
these,
we
classes of Marquardt,
One
and
striking difference
between the
Roman
organization
/^^
modern armies is in the matter of the number of officers. The Romans had far fewer than we. In neither cohort nor maniple do we find any trace of officers corresponding to the commissioned officers in one of our compaThe nies, or even to our relatively numerous corporals. centurions seemed to have all the functions that we should
that of
12
assign to sergeants.
CiESARS ARMY.
They must,
besides that, have exer-
and command
our infantry.
and lieutenants
of
such general authority over his maniple ; and each pilus prior, besides the direction of his maniple, must have had
some charge of the cohort. For the command of the legion, as we have seen, the Roman methods provided. The objection of Marquardt to Rlistow's scheme of rank applies with equal force both to Marquardt's own plan and to According to the scheme of Goler's, as well as to Riistow's. either of the two former, a centurion who had commanded maniples, e.g., primus hastatus prior, on promotion would
become second
ceps postei'ior.
in
command
of a maniple,
e.g.,
decimus prinaccording to
little
modern
military ideas as to
make make
oi
named
Then to we should
and we
of sub-
see that there must have been not less than eight (2, above).
If
we adopt
and add
six classes
we
at
by
Livy; Varro;
Festus;
his
own
centurion.
At
least, this
seems
to
fact both before and after the time of Caesar; and hence
^^^ ^
likelv
'
was not
''
Pauius Diac.
THE ORGANIZATION.
2.
13
THE STANDARDS.
its
13.
I)
,
Each
legion had as
c. 111,64.
Fig.
on a wooden
staff.
This
was entrusted
first
cohort,
and usually
to
its
senior
centurion
this officer
{primipilus)
Hence
was sometimes
same
men he
standard
carry
the
Each
ard of
cohort, also,
its
had a stand-
b.g.
il,
25
own
The
Fig. 1.
signifer.
for brevity
h.
30.
18.
in like
on a
h.
staff.
Of course
it
would
men
b.g.iv,26i
know
light
their
proper place.
The
cavalry
and
car-
This was a
little
banner,
of
Fig.
3.
wood
There
or metal
staff.
sur-
mounting the
was
another
^^^' ^*
This
b.g.
ii, 201
name
c. in, 89.
march or
battle.
14
CESAR
ARMY.
Fig. 4.
Aquilifer,
its
sigtium,
Goler thinks
B.G.
II, 252
Caesar relates
M.
p. 439.
had
fallen, the
standard
lost.
imply that the cohort had only one standard and one standard-bearer.
B.G. VI,
40^, also
in signa
manipu-
notes, p. 163.
We
THE ORGANIZATION.
ike cohorts
intervals
IS
and
maniples.
That
is,
between the cohorts {in signa), and also even into the smaller
between the maniples {in manipulos').
intervals
to
3.
THE MUSIC.
Roman army
14.
The
were the bugle (buccinaj Fig. 5), the trumpet {tuba. Fig. 6), the cavalry trumpet {lituus, Fig. 7), and the horn {cornu).
This
last
buffalo,
and provided
The
Fig. 5.
Fig. 6.
Fig.
7.
II,2oi
to have
the buccina.
modem
command amid
or
down a long
voice.
line of
human
evolutions of
trumpet,
first
command
sounded
noon, and
night-fall.
Cesar's army.
We
its
know
that
there were
its
c.
1,
8i.
^S-
B.G. v,i2.
Wagons
used by the army, were generally found only with the sutlers
A.
75.
{7nercatores)
who
16.
Riistow has
made
tity
We
follow his
as
size
may be
of the
We may
The
first
at
200
lbs.
These as described by Hyginus were on a square base, 10 feet on a side, with a wedge roof. Ten men could use such
Hy.
I.
a tent.
in a tent.
Yet he allows
at
same time.
It
seems
was 10
number
tent.
So a maniple would need 14 tents for the centuand a strength of 120 men. Allowing two for the serThat would make vants, the entire number would be 16.
one
rions
48 for a cohort, and 480 for a legion. To this number must be added those needed by the six tribunes and their
servants, or perhaps 12 more.
If tents are allowed also for
subcenturions, perhaps
we should
estimate 60 or 30 more,
THE ORGANIZATION.
1/
one
tent.
The
tents
The weight of
lbs.
One
horse, then,
could carry
that
five
such
tents.
It
seems more
likely,
however,
;
we should
i.e.,
In
way would be
supply of stakes,
For pitching camp there must have been needed a full tools, etc. As these were for general use,
So we
beasts.
To
Thus the cohorts would have at least 49 each beast should be allowed one servant icalo),
who could
the
under
The
each, a
b.g. vii,
*
greater
number of pack-animals.
We
shall
not
be
far astray if
we
and
If
five servants.
we consider
4800 men, the maniple would have had 160. This excess of 40 men over the estimate above would have required four tents and other appurtenances, and four packanimals to carry them. That would add 120 animals and the same number of servants to the baggage train, giving a However, even if this is the total of 640 beasts of burden. nearly correct number for a normal legion, we must remember that a legion very rarely had its normal force. Riistow's estimate of 5 20 animals cannot be far out of the way as the
legions to have
baggage
train of
field.
i8
CiESARS ARMY.
5.
17.
The
by enlistment, by conscription, and by treaty. Of course in no case were they Roman citizens. Among the auxiliaries obtained by voluntary enlistment
levis
a
a. Slinger.
Fig. 8.
h.
Light-anned
soldier.
c.
e.
used
movements
for
loaded legionaries were hardly adapted ( 46). Then there .were the slingers {funditores, Fig. 8), casters of stones and
leaden
skilful
;
balls,
from Crete or
Of
plied
that
it
by the
allies, little is
known
definitely.
;
We may
some
infer
but in case of
atten*
Roman
THE ORGANIZATION.
tion to their
I9
for the
improvement.
They were
most part
used
with
to
make a show
enemy
i, 51;
fear,
work.
Ill, 35.
for
actual battle.
As they were
on the wings of
jerkin,
The light-armed
a
light,
auxiliaries (Fig. 8)
wore a short
;
The
their
archers
round shield (J>arma) instead of the heavy scutum. had neither corselet, helmet, nor shield, as
quiver would prevent their carrying them.
bow and
6.
THE CAVALRY.
Roman army a body of Roman citizens, was attached
cavalry,
to
18.
Originally in the
each
Fig. 9.
legion.
infantry
manner and from the same sources as the and these were massed in a single body.
;
During
B.C.
vj's!
I, is;
Roman army
20
CiESARS ARMY.
When
were scattered to
homcs.
men
in
'
this
arm of
who remained
constantly
under
the standards.
(Fig. 9-)
They were
Gauls, Germans,
and Spaniards.
The
after the
manner of their nation ; modified more or less, by Roman customs. Contingents of from 200 to ^QQ j^gj^ were commanded by praefecti equitum, A larger body was always under a Roman commander.
doubtless,
Of
the
to
B.a
A. G.
vi,
8*.
29.
p. 229.
tactical unit was the ala, or regiment, 300 400 strong, commanded by z. praefectus equitum. The ala was divided into turmae^ squadrons, of perhaps 33 men each, The turma was including ^ the commander, the decurio.
'
Roman way. A
1 1
men
each.
7.
THE ARTILLERY.
For battles in the open field the Romans of Caeday seldom used anything corresponding to modem artillery. In defending and attacking fortified places, how 19.
sar's
were employed
for hurling
down
walls.
As such engines could not easily be improvised, and must always be at hand in a campaign involving siege operations,
it
seems quite
likely that
who
and who should underand repairing it. Possibly a detachment oiXki^fabri (36) was entrusted with this work.
should see to
it
its
transportation
stand setting
up, using,
20.
Of
Roman
artillery
of
this
period
we have no
precise accounts.
We
can only
THE ORGANIZATION.
21
infer what it was from the names applied, from its use, and from what we know of Greek military engines and of those in general use at a later time.
21.
The
missile
weapon
tormentum.
22. There seems no reasonable doubt that the Greek and Roman artillery of the same age had about the same M. 518. construction; and, further, that there had been no material change in that construction at Caesar's time for some two or M. 523. more centuries. Then we shall be quite near the truth if we examine the Greek artillery of a somewhat earlier day
than Caesar's.
Fig. 10.
Catapult,
23.
The heavy
missile
catapults {catapultae).
stones, but were
The former shot large arrows, and were called The latter kind usually cast heavy
sometimes provided with blocks of wood.
They were
called ballistae.
22
24.
CiESAR S ARMY.
Catapult and ballista alike had three essential parts
:
The
standard
(/,
unshaken by
use.
The
track for the missile {ab, Figs. 10, 11) was a stout
framework
in
which
fitted
The
missile
was
slide.
By a system of
levers the
be aimed to direct
vertical angle.
lar
the
By a
simi-
arrangement a varia-
aim
could be made.
Fig. 11.
Ballista.
The apparatus
for pro-
viding force consisted in the first place of a framework of three compartments, formed by two horizontal bars or sets of bars (^, /) and four uprights. Through the middle compartment extended the missile track {cd^. The other two compartments were fitted alike. A block {h, g) bored with a vertical hole was placed over a similar hole in the upper part (/) of the frame-
work.
the
pin,
Strands
in
holes
the frame
cross-
and back down through the holes again. The other end of these strands was passed in Hke manner around a corresponding cross-pin on the under side of the framework.
The
strands
THE ORGANIZATION.
23
and the blocks on upper and under side screwed fast. There was thus formed a strongly twisted rope or cluster of ropes. A rigid bar of wood or metal was then inserted through each cluster. These bars rested in beds cut in the
tions)
The
The
It will at
lass.
By means
The
missile
was then
laid in
the groove of the slide, and, the trigger being raised, the
its
25.
The weight
size, at
pp.sSj
according to
from 84
lbs. to
600
^^^^*
lbs.
At
est.
least
two
men would be
required to
manage
the small-
Of course each increase in the size of would demand more men. From a statement of Philo, we can estimate
purchasing power of money, at about ^200.
the
weapon
Phiio, p. 6a,
the cost of a
The
24
A.
31.
CiESAR
ARMY.
^.
The
a firm frame-
bow
of
steel.
its
arrow (18
in.
long) to a distance
Fig. 13.
26.
Scorpio,
The weight of
At
least
six
men would be
The
depend on
lbs.)
size.
ballista
The range of
the catapult.
27.
same
as that of
The weight
modern
lbs.
times.
mortar
lbs.
throwing a
ballista
lbs.
;
bomb
of 120-130
lbs.
weighs about 40
i.e.,
times as
much
as the mortar.
itself
of
field artillery
than do
modem
Then,
too, the
clumsy construction
difficult to
modem
THE ORGANIZATION.
Another objection to
their
25
in the field
employment
ready.
was
make them
28.
tified
Sch.
5.
town or camp.
In almost every
town of the
Greeks or Romans, they were kept in considerable numbers and when needed for siege operations were obtained from
such towns.
The
walls of a
camp were
often defended
by
e.g.
ii, 8.
what we might
of small caliber
and scorpions.
In attacking fortifications the
ballista
down
to
artillery, someThese were used, not merely against a hostile fleet, but often against an enemy on the land. There seems no doubt that artillery was conveyed with Caesar's army in the field. Rlistow's statement to the contrary is certainly erroneous. Quite likely a certain amount
^'^^
'
a. 31, 77;
Al. Q.
R.*p,*26.
though of
this
we have no
cer-
nent part.*
The
walls of the
camp were
yij^'^^^'g^'^
was provided with 55 carroballistae and 10 onagri. The carroballista was a small catapult, and the onager a light ballista. The onager (wild ass) was so called from the story that that animal in fleeing from its enemies cast stones against them with its hind heels. In the Austrian army, to-day, 112 pieces of artillery are attached to an
A.D.) each legion
From
this
took
artillery
same passage (B. G. VIII, 14) we must from the camp and used it in the field.
26
CiESAR's ARMY.
8.
the
the
quaestors,
the
as-
30. The legates (legati) were men who were assigned to the proconsul
greater
or less
numbers by the
senate.
lieutenants of the
commanding
But
all
Caesar
made
B.G.
1, 52.
M.
p. 457-
by placing a legate regularly in command of each legion. Such legate was afterwards known, under the empire, as legatiis legionis, by way of distinction
ment
in organization
by lot to superintend the had charge of the supplies of the army. In the execution of this duty he saw to the food, pay, clothing, arms, equipments, and shelter of the troops. To do all this, he must have had under him a numerous
31.
The
quaestor, assigned
body of men. He filled the place both of adjutant-general and of quartermaster-general in a modern army.
32. There always followed the general a number of young men as his attendants {contubernales, comites praetorii)^ who were volunteers, and who aimed to learn the art They composed the nobler part of the cohors of war.
Many
tive
of battle.
When
they were very numerous, they were formed into detachments, or sometimes joined the body-guard, and could thus
directly take part in battle.
THE ORGANIZATION.
33.
2/
was com-
The
posed of apparitores,
and
servants.
There
p. 547.
'
spies.
The speculatores were men selected for obtaining news m. and carrying despatches. They preceded a marching column, and also accompanied the flanks, at a considerable distance, so that no surprise or ambuscade might be met. There
'
'
Of course
the
commanding
number
at his disposal.
34.
By
the body-guard
legions, especially
Tenth by
in the
first
Caesar, but
of
German
cavalry,
which he used
as
a personal escort
35.
The
their
c. iii, 91.
or even
commander.
Such
privates,
priceless
who aimed at sovereignty, as did Caesar. They must have exerted much more influence on the mass of the army than could higher officers. They were on the same plane in every way as the common men, and so would more easily lead them to their own way of thinking. The evocati in Caesar's army were formed into a regular organization, divided into centuries. They enjoyed special
privileges.
march.
They could
as orderlies, to carry
commands, or
In battle the
65.
28
his person.
CiESAR'S ARMY.
In their ranks were those of the voluntarii who
were not otherwise employed, and who could have no better school in which to learn the art of war. These veterans,
to
36.
The
staff.
engineers
{fabri), at
building
bridges,
repairing
weapons.
We
Roman weapon,
;
was hurled
but
when
the
and no great
skill
make
them
G. V,
II.
effective again.
must be noted that fabri were often called from the Very likely men expert for the duty immediately at hand were thus detailed, and, when the
It
Schambach
from the
that case
infantry, as
was done
in the
main
is
men
not merely to
37.
There
is
some doubt
antesignani,
Riistow's
Each maniple
possibly
had
for
antesigna7ii,
chosen
and
efficiency.
When needed
they could
and act
valu-
THE ORGANIZATION.
able
29
and march
This
and steady
On
the
furnished
abundant
for centurions.
11.
THE LEGIONARY.
strength of a
38.
The main
Roman army
was in the
the
legionary infantry.
Of
we have
18).
most
alry
satisfactory accounts.
About the
and
infantry,
the legionary,
Of
1.
ENLISTMENT.
the able-bodied male citizens of suitacitizens
39.
compulsory levy of
ble age.
legion.
None
All
but
Roman
citizens
At the close of the campaign the troops were disbanded, and returned to their homes and their usual avocations. Thus the army was a body of citizen soldiers, or militia. But with the great increase in the number of citizens, especially after the social war, only a part were needed for military duty ; and at the same time a plenty were found who were willing to enter the service, led by hope of gain and glory. So the armies became less and less a levy of citizen soldiery, and more and more a body of mercenary
serve.
Roman
must
volunteers.
From
appeared.
As the Roman army grew to be a disciplined organization of and professional soldiers, it became all the more effective the men were the more readily attached to their chosen Meanwhile the peaceful citizens who remained at leader. home, to a great degree lost that mihtary spirit and knowledge which had always before characterized the Roman people. Thus the way was paved rapidly and surely for the coming of a military despotism.
;
The Zegionart/,
Note.
to the
To
face page
3a
THE LEGIONARY.
40.
J
in
The
enlistment of barbarians
the
legions of
Caesar, however,
We
do read
Yet
it
is
Caesar's legionaries
Roman
citizens,
and
41.
The second
Rome
who had sound bodily health, and were of suitable size. What the limit of height was in the Roman army we do not
know.
less
is
is
than 5
in.,
or
more than
rifle
10
in.
From
the fact
of modern wars,
we may
is
infer
agile than
now
size.
necessary
but
we cannot
is
infer that
little
he was of unusual
On
for Caesar
The historians always emphasized the bigness of the Germans; and Caesar expressly mentions the small stature of his troops. The Romans had learned the lesson of civilization, that victories in
f^ L,*^^'*
of scientific organization
giants
and
tactics.
Any one
;
of the
German
for
might perhaps
his
any individual of
puny
enemies
mob
of Ariovistus was
shattered
when hurled
32
CiESAR'S ARMY.
2.
CLOTHING.
43.
and equipped
skin was
this
and
Fig. 8)
worn a
sleeveless woollen
shirt
{tunica).
The
fitting
knee.
It
seems
among
7iaUa)
the
Romans
Strips of cloth
{cru7'alid).
The
in
feet
were pro-
time.
Then,
cold or wet
cloak
weather, the
military
Of
3.
ARMOR.
44.
The
and
a.
shield.
The helmet
.
That of the
officer
was distinguished by
.
The
sometimes by
ally
straps,
sometimes by
their
own stiffness.
leg, as this
advanced
r.
The
shield
THE LEGIONARY.
33
{umbo), which was merely a knob designed to strengthen and bind all together. The shield was about
Often it was 4 ft. long and 2 ft. wide. the body. encircle partially to as curved so
On
the cohort
name
number of
;
per-
For
Fig. 13.
4.
ARMS.
the sword
Fig. 14)
45.
a.
long,
and
was
The
latter,
however, was
customary use.
What
fearful
wounds could be
see from Livy,
weapon we may
30. 34.
It
belt, generally
from
right
shoulder.
side, this
Fig. 14.
was carried
cers
had no
shields, they
wore
Fig.
their
swords on the
left side,
at the right.
15)
We
as
it
was
in the
its
time of Caesar.
he mentions
use, however,
34
CiESAR S ARMY.
from
his,
and
of
some
tolerably
definite idea.
P. VI, 23.
square
The pilum of the time of Polybius had usually a wooden shaft, 4J ft. long and 2J in. thick. On
This
latter
was
also
4j
ft.
long.
One
half,
fitted into
The wood
and was sharpened at the end. At the base of the shaft there was undoubtedly an iron shoe, so that in camp or bivouac the pilum might be thrust into the ground. The length of the entire weapon appears then to have been 6 J ft., and the weight can hardly have been less than 11 pounds. Riistow considers
this (Fig. 15) to
Caesar.
The
The
little
doubt as
iron
with a distinct
The entire weapon was probably somewhat lighter than that of Polybius. It was much like a modern harpoon.
head, which produced the effect of barbs.
Caesar
makes
all
the circum-
RUstow, was
likely
seems quite as
when
as
it
the
light
somewhat reduced
This reduction
its
in weight, so
as
to
range.
Fig. 16.
In the time of Marius, the upper of the two nails which held
the iron in place was of wood.
AVhen the
would
momentum
B.G.
I, 25.
tion of the
makes no men-
THE LEGIONARY.
35
We
can hardly
infer, as
On
the
the contrary, so
many
other contri-
vances of the sagacious Marius were retained, and so few years had
when
Gallic
it
seems
that
was
quite the
same as
At any rate, had Caesar contrived, or even authorized, any material change in this most important weapon, we can hardly doubt
of Marius.
that a writer so scrupulous as
his full
he in assigning
to the
conqueror of Gaul
meed
The bending
slender and
the end.
soft.
it
Now
this
wooden
pin,
in that described
by Lindenschmidt, from the extreme slenderness of the iron as compared with the shaft; and
sible
this slenderness
sufficient size
affected itself
by the impact.
The
pihim of Marius was undoubtedly in wood; that of the \a.\.tx pilum was
get glimpses of
it
The
we
from time
to time,
certainly
fact, it
seems
held an intermediate
The
shaft
was probably round. The iron was in all likelihood fitted in a groove, and not in a socket. Where it entered the wood, the head of the shaft was probably protected. The iron was slender, easily bent, hence hardened only at the end and provided with a head. The weight need not have been more than two or three pounds less than that estimated
by Riistow.
Lindenschmidt objects to
objection
this
and
is trivial,
any distance.
musket.
And
Roman
found
little
difficulty in
distance of
many
feet.
36
CiESAR*S ARMY.
5.
BAGGAGE.
such as saws,
46.
Besides his arms and armor, the legionary was acto carry various entrenching tools,
;
customed
and cook-
spare cloth-
ments.
R.
p. 14.
^^^
'Pl^e
about
11
lbs.
On
short
expeditions,
the
soldier
must
carry his
own
provisions.
lbs.,
As many
as
17 days' rations,
amounting to 28
are
known
to have in the
been provided
form of coarse
and
carried.
The
ration
was usually
flour,
himself.
48.
for
a longer or shorter
have reached 30 to 45
49.
lbs.
all
this
baggage,
as "
name
Marin
mules"
{^nuli
Mariani),
On
the
march
a
When
it
to rest.
(Fig. 8.)
6.
-WORK.
50.
The
ness.
When
lay aside
camp.
THE LEGIONARY.
Some were
the tents,
detailed to the trench
to
37
wall,
and
some
to erect
some
When
brought
allotted task.
including
best.
7.
PAY.
pay of
his
51.
Caesar
fixed
the
legionaries
in
at
225 M.p
at
day laborer
Rome
;
day
or, in
much
as
a legionary.
Thus the
one thing
;
soldier
was better
off
For food and equipments, so far as they were provided by the state, a deduction from his pay was made. As provision, each man was allowed per month four measures (8.67
litres,
or a
little less
The measure
may be
a denarius.
for
However,
if not given outright, was reckoned at a very low and the same must have been true of clothing and
equipments.
expected an increase to
the gifts of his general.
52. We have no certain account of the relation borne by the pay of the soldier to that of the officer. But we read, on occasion of a present to the troops, that the centurion
Dit
^P' ^'^^^^
Piut. Cses.
received twice as
much
and the
g.
8, 4.
much.
On
another occasion,
we know
much
as
38
the private.
CiESAR's ARMY.
likely to
especially as
we must remem-
ber that the centurion stood in rank and duties about midway between a sergeant and the captain of a company in a modern army. In the army of the United States, the private of infantry is paid $13.00 a month; the sergeant $17.00; and a captain receives $1800 a year. All are provided with food, clothing, and shelter. A day laborer in most of our
cities
DISCIPLINE.
wars, the stern discipline of the
During the
civil
old
Roman
The
armies became
much
relaxed,
and commanders
had
Lange, pp. 26 seqq.
to resort to all
manner of means
order.
transition
more unrelenting than ever. But the best means of maintaining order
in constant
employment.
On
cation of the
camp
left
the soldier
time to think of
On
to
camp was
be further
and arranged,
and guard duty must be performed constantly. The Roman method of war made the personal activity of the man an
indispensable condition of success.
A.
71, 72.
Hence
;
constant prac-
tice in the
and
this
would
quite
fill
Then,
coin.
mere crowns of
leaves, but
Roman
mere
brutality.
When
them
far
more
license than
mere
THE LEGIONARY.
discipline
39
would warrant.
times allowed.
What
the
Romans regarded
not infre-
c. iii, 74.
trivial offences,
such as
as cleaning the
camp, or the
like.
Expedients
like
this
III.
54.
The
arrangement
their order of
for battle
and
their
movements
in
the fight,
all
evo-
lutions in passing
07'der
The
of battle
is
the other
to under-
formations are
made
all
and
we must
first
of
of that body.
MILITARY TERMS.
55*
^^
in
common
use.
English.
tactical unit
is
a body, of a
number of which a
is
larger
body
is
com-
thought of as undi;
The
of the cohort,
body of troops
is
in line
when
is
at right
in the direction in
which they are facing (Fig. 21). Troops are said to deploy when they pass from column
retaining the same facitig.
to
line,
is
marching
in
column.
and face
battle, as in
Figure 18.
is
is
Alignment
making a
said
soldier
to face
when, standing
still,
he merely turns on
They
are
often
used for
filling
a ditch.
41
2.
Latin,
Cohort (74).
Aciem Aciem
^
B
to
left).
A.
ORDER OF BATTLE.
I.
The Cohort.
tactical unit of the legion
56.
The
of
Caesar
was
^
Fig. 18.
Cohort (62).
>
( 73).
one
cohort
as
a rule remained
together,
and
all
movements of
made by
cohorts.
We may
120
ft.
57* In all estimates of extent of the legion in battle, march, or camp, we follow RUstow's figures, which are based on the average field strength of the legion, 3600 men, not on
its
nominal, or
full,
strength.
were drawn up across the top of a ridge, along which the enemy were
advancing.
He
then says that this ridge was just wide enough for
I,
45).
The
and measures just about 360 feet across. The circumstances of the fight were such as to leave no doubt that the cohorts were drawn up without any intervals between them; so that this measure gives us the actual front of the cohorts. Thus we get the estimate of 1 20 ft. for the front of one cohort. The three maniples of a cohort might have been arrayed side by side, or one behind the other. Riistow holds to the former arrangement, and Goler to the latter. The reasoning of RUstow (R. p. 36
ridge
is
42
CiESAR
ARMY.
;
and we
In that
side.
58.
to have
been arrayed
each
ft.
as the front of
maniple.
Allowing 4
EHBBBEiBEinBHe^
-
terval
HBHBBBEBBBBH
BBBBBEiBHBeiEn
B
fei
ft.
BBB
BBBBHB
^rmcd wouM bc
front
in each
As each
^^^^ ^
^^^
Maniple,
^^^^^^ ^^^^^
^.^^^j^^ ^^
files
(Fig. 17).
in a single single line,
called a rank.
The interval of four feet between the maniples would be none too much for the centurions. The officer would naturally need more room than
a private, as his attention must not only be given to the enemy, but also
to his
first
own
troops
down
left.
So
it
seems
platoon
{ordo), and the second centurion at the right of the front rank of the
second platoon.
Thus the
latter officer
men behind
be promptly
ahead should
file^ was Thus the file was 10 men deep (/>., there were 10 ranks), and the maniple would form a square of 40 ft. on a side.
60.
The
probably at least 4
man
is
taken at 22
in.,
depth at 12
in.;
and there
is
43
from heel
22
in.,
in.
is
to heel.
from breast
34
in.
{^Upton's U.S.
Army
61.
We
man
in the front
rank
the
man needed
ft.
for that
The men
and
at the
in
command
forward,
gaining the
desired
By our
would
by 40 ft. deep (Fig. 18). TJie maniple would contain 120 men, and the cohort 360,
form a rectangle,
120
ft.
front
exclusive of officers.
2.
The Legion.
may be
offensive or defensive.
63.
The order
of battle
first
When
two
64.
cohorts in each
line.*
placed in the
{acies
line
cohort (120
Behind these
The
third line
was
still
further in the
I,
83.
fitit) ;
cohortes tenebant, has subsidlariae ternae et rursus aliae totidem suae cujusque
legionis subsequebantur ; sagittarii funditoresque
gquitatits later a cingebat.
media continebantur
acie,
44
rear,
CiESARS ARMY.
and was used as a reserve for the support of the other The most experienced and rehable soldiers of the
Fig. 34.
two.
65.
the
best
first
charge.
in
Hence
front.
the
Romans put
INIarius.
their
is
men
This
arrangement
probably to be attributed to
p.
duplex and triplex quite different from this. According to his view, a triple hne of battle
contained
thre
^^S-
divisions
right
wing
{cormi dextrtwi), a centre {acies media), and a left wing {cornu sinistruni). A double hne
merely had no centre
{acies
media') ,
thus
The
centre of a triple
acies to dis-
j/iedia
^ ^' ^ ^ E^^
\^
Fig. 19.^
Fig. 19. Legion in triple line of battle.
=^l=
I^C
=V
Fig. 33.
Fig. 23. Legion marching in lines ( 82 a). Fig. 24. Legion marching
by wings
( 82 3).
tinguish
acies.
it
Each
had a legatus
in
command.
facts.
This theory
I,
One who
reads B.C.
49 with care will see that it would be very difficult to reconcile Gciler's view with Caesar's account. Further, in A. 13 we have a si?nplex
acies with both right
Ill,
and
left
wings
specifically
24 a double
line
it
From
these considerations
wing,
left
45
The
distance
between
the
lines
was probably
entire
ft.
ft.).
Thus the
this
The
front
or, if
supported by another
legion,
960
67.
of two ways
(orbis).
68.
The former was most commonly used to defend camp ( 153). Here a second line was
;
unnecessary
and
also considerable
Five
one or two,
Allowing 6
ft.
(instead of 3
ft.)
for
each
side,
man
we
by
4800
ft.,
and arraying the ordines side cohort would cover 480 ft. of allowing no intervals between
the cohorts.
69.
line
a.
13.
also
used in
meet an attempt
ing by superior numbers, and also to resist incursions of cavalry or light infantry through the intervals.
In
this
case,
their
intervals
The
circle (orbis)
was designed
in case of attack
on
all sides.
As the circumstances
for
which
this
arrangement was
in a solid square,
we may conclude
a smaller division
that a cohort
would form
in a solid circle,
and a detachment of
sev-
46
eral
CiESAR's ARMY.
cohorts in a hollow square.
been made
legion
cohorts in front, the eighth, ninth, and tenth in the rear, the
fifth
and
left.
the
and the fourth and seventh on There would then be a front of 360 ft. and a
flank of 320. The inner hollow space would be 280 ft. long and 240 ft. broad, thus making 67,200 sq. ft. This would contain more than 1000 pack-animals.
c. Ill, 89.
7i
also of a
quad-
Some
and placed in line on the right (or angles with the main line of battle.
B.
The order
of march
array.
The Cohort.
72.
of two,
column of
The
The
line of
77ianiples
73.
column
maniples
{manipulatim)
was
col-
battle
by merely facing
to the right
umn
by
(Fig. 20),
Thus the maniples, it will be seen, were in and the centuries in each maniple were
was faced
to the right, the order
side
side.
If the cohort
was
of battle was 40
ft.,
As the depth of the cohort in line of course the column of maniples was
was a loose order.
Allowing 3
ft.
40
ft.
wide.
But
this
to
each man, the column could easily have been made only
47
30 ft. wide. And again, this wide column could have been reduced to half the width by the right (or left) century-
moving
straight on,
Instead
74.
The column
natim) was formed from the order of battle merely by having the maniple on the right (or
left)
march straight forward, and the others successively follow. Thus the centuries would be arranged in column (Fig. 21) ; and the order would be pilani, principes, hastati, or the reverse, according as
the right or
left
wing moved
off
first.
The width
a maniple,
40
ft.,
75.
When
umn
then,
In
this order,
But
we know seem at
piles at
that he
made
his bridge
wide.
It
does not
all likely
As the water varied in depth, it could hardly be measured exactly, and different sets of piles quite likely had different distances on the river
the bottom of the river.
bottom.
On
Thus
in
of the maniple.
76.
If the
street less
reduced from 40 ft. to 20 ft. The right (or left) half of each century would move straight on, and the other half would fall in the rear (Fig. 22). Thus the century would
consist of 10 ranks of 6
men
men
each.
48
CiESAR's ARMY.
77.
On
to breast.
the march, we should estimate 4 ft. from Then a cohort of 360 men would reach
:
breast
to the
following length
In column of centuries
20
ft.
240 ft. In column of maniples, 144 ft. In column of maniples, with double number of ranks, 288 ft.
78.
The
line
of battle
(acies)
column of march (agmeii) as follows from column of maniples by the commands halt front (facing to the left, if the original march was to the right to the right, if the original march was to the left) from column of centuries, the leading maniple would halt, and the others successively march alongside, aHgning themselves on the right or left, as
!
!
camp
left
right.
The
still
Legion.
greater
80.
The
in
legion, or a
marched
tu7ti)
;
in
in square {agmeyi
quadratuffi).
49
march
right,
When
the legion
is
march
is
from the
so on.
march
is
from the
left,
Each cohort
in
column of
Between each two cohorts there must have been a small Suppose this to have been 20 ft. Then the length of the legion the cohorts marching in column of centuries of the usual width would have been 1400 ft.
distance.
When
number of
For the
as the
train of a legion,
we
normal strength.
In a road 40
wide, 8 animals
can
easily find
room
abreast.
Then
had 65 ranks.
would extend 650 ft. When the road is only 20 ft. wide, the pack-animals would march 4 abreast, and would extend
1300
ft.
Then a
legion
with
its
baggage
ft.
in
column of march
lines
in order of battle
is
of two kinds,
by
many
a.
legion marches by
lijies,
there are as
Thus
in Cae-
army
first
In the
5-7
in
column are cohorts i -4 in the second, cohorts and in the third, cohorts 8-10. Each cohort marches column of maniples. So by simply facing to the right or
;
left,
the legion
is
b,
by wings forms
of
In the
first
of the centre,
the
left,
4, 3,
and 8. In the second are the cohorts In the third are the cohorts of 2, 6, and 9. The columns must be as far apart 7, and 10.
i, 5,
50
as the distance
CiESAR^S ARMY.
between
when
in line
of battle.
83.
Each cohort
in
column of
centuries.
The march
in square (Fig. 25) was employed for a similar purpose for which the orbis was formed. One division of troops, in colcenturies, leads.
umns of
Then
follows
and then a second division of troops in column of centuries. On either wing marches a body in column
the baggage train,
of maniples.
ploying of the
i^egion in
Thus by a simple facing of and left, and devan and rear, the square is
84. These are conservative estimates. To compare the Roman army with one of modern days, we quote a very comprehensive calculation from the New York Evening Post. It must be remembered that an American brigade of four regiments corresponded very nearly with
the
Roman
legion.
"A
company of
will
infantry
moving
t,2>
in
column of
march-
y-'^rds
of depth.
regiment of ten
companies
yards,
require
and a
battalion of four
330 yards, a company of cavalry about 100 companies about 450 yards. A six-gun
column of
sections,
From
these figures
we
column moving on a
single road.
An
infantry
mule wagons
700 yards.
The baggage, including ammunition, will to each regiment. Each wagon with
for the entire brigade
team requires
will
the
depth
be over
1350 yards, and we have nearly 2100 yards, or a mile and a quarter for the depth of the column. If we allow but
this to
Add
we can reduce
to different headquarters
we must
we have
But when
we take up an army
and
cavalry, extra
corps,
we have
to
make
trains.
Suppose we take as a
all
told of 42,000
men.
It
has four divisions of infantry, eight to twelve batteries, and at least four
regiments of cavalry.
with
all
its
Were
it
able to
march
close up,
it
on a single road,
out, at
supplies,
would stretch
it
But
is
impossible for a
column of
as
it is
this length to
technically termed,
keep from stretching, or " lengthening out," and so the best authorities make an allow-
ance of 25 per cent, which, added to the 18 miles, makes 22 J miles, or a distance which would take a mounted messenger moving from the
to the rear, if
no obstruction,
at least three
'
If I
had marched
the entire army, 100,000 men, in one column, instead of on five different
roads, the column, with
its trains,
it
was found that a Prussian army corps of 42,512 men, 90 guns, 13,800 horses, and 1300 vehicles took up on a single road 27 miles, 18 miles occupied by the troops and 9 miles by
In the Franco-Prussian war
the trains.
" If roads were
all
could march with a far greater front, and the depth be vastly reduced.
few roads where there is room column of greater width than a set of fours to move and leave sufficient space for the unimpeded progress of orderlies and staff
in this country, at least, there are
But
for a
officers,
go in an opposite direction. It column cannot be kept closed up, why it has to Sometimes a wagon breaks down. It is hauled to one
the
and the others pass on. But to haul it to one side consumes some time, mayhap only a few moments, and a few moments again when repaired to re-enter the column. The consequence is a
halt of everything in the rear. steadily without a halt
Neither
men nor
the column, or in
head of
all
of time to
is
lost
by the
It
breaking of step,
or,
.of
formation.
is
Perhaps a
met
in the road.
must be remembered
plished in marching,
accom-
many
He
on
52
the march, or arriving at
over,
CiESAR'S ARMY.
camp he has
to sixty to collect fuel
he
carries a
heavy load,
fifty
rations, averaging
from
pounds.
able to calculate
as
all
we
much
miles of road."
IV.
85.
Roman
cavalry, or of
that
formed on the
Roman
plan,
in rank
of 8 horses.
This was probably arranged in 4 ranks Allowing 5 ft. front room to each horse, the turma would have a front of 40 ft., equal to that of the
file.
and
maniple.
the
Taking 10
also
ft.
depth
ft.,
for
turma would
be 40
maniple.
this
be formed from
order of battle.
86.
turmae.
The
lines,
would very
likely
between
the
turmae.
regiment of 12 turmae in
;
6 in each line
and the
if it
front,
440
vals
ft.
Of course,
the
enemy with
momentum
If the
larger
tactical
would be
desirable.
regi-
ment
{ala) of
88.
up
in the front
{turmatim) to
foe.
54
89.
CiESARS ARMY.
Of
largely
upon
upon
their
numbers.
If
for attack.
good
kept by each turma. The ala, not including the train, would extend 480 ft. The train must have been considerable, and would ha\^e added at least a half to the length of the line. A column of 10 alae, or 4000 men, which Caesar sometimes had, would have extended 7200 ft.
column a breadth of only turma would march with a front of 4 horses and a depth of 8. The ala would fhen need 960 ft., without baggage, and with it 1440 ft. A columiL o.^ lo ^lai would
92.
ft.,
20
the
require 14,400
ft.
V.
THE BATTLE.
93. The core of the Roman army was the legioiio Hence we see that in describing the battle array of the legion, we have very nearly explained the mode of battle of the army as a whole.
I.
Offensive.
normal order with the Romans
that
94.
was the
(acies
offensive.
triplex).
The
by
legions
composed
lines.
the
line
of
side,
each in three
The third line was designed as a reserve for the other two. The Roman method was to hurl the first Hne against the
enemy.
line
Should
this
first
retired
between the
intervals
up and
Thus
line
was in
this
was deployed
meet
it.
If
at
or
if auxiliaries
were
no such hand to
crisis
of the battle.
charge.
Then
it
was hurled
at the
enemy
in a decisive
Often, also, the third line was busied in fortification, while b.g. the
first
i, 25,
*
.
o^* _
'
9>94-
95.
56
c.
1, 83.
Cesar's army.
lines {acies duplex).
two
in
On
In
this
line
was held
guard
the flanks.
For
third,
this
last
service, the
behind the
of
it
sometimes
fourth
line
main
line of battle.
The
and
96.
We
dependence on
this
And
it is
significant, in
line
three,
97.
The
cavalry, in
an offensive
battle,
was used
for
and
for hurling
to
complete
B.G. Ill,
his destruction.
c lY'ni ^^
88,89,93.
For these purposes, the cavalry was commonly placed ^^ flanks of the legions. Sometimes it was placed
line.
Thus the
which
latter
could receive an
Roman
gQ
J
in
turn.
Often
It
the
cavalry was
drawn up behind
the
24, 25.
legions.
first cohorts, as
more
easily pass
charge.
C.I, 83; A.
13, 60, 81.
98.
The
and
slingers
were either
Of
57
was divided into
sinise.g.
i,
99.
The
52;
.
and
left
^^'li{ 5
(acies
a.
60, 81.
c. iii, 89;
'
on the wings
the best of
' ^^*
all.
Roman custom
onset.
much
to the
impetus of the
first
loi.
When
the line
of battle was
formed
11,
20
^' ^"'^o-
He
was
own
When
moment
arrived,
he ordered
{signutn).
down
the line.
^'
^^*
made by
reserve
The
on the
enemy
The
point.
at every critical
broken enemy
vanced
to
overcome renewed
resistance.
Romans
light
camp.
2.
Defensive.
were, to
The fundamental ideas of the Roman defensive make use of ground that would cause as much weariness to the enemy as possible, to delay their approach.
102.
S8
to
Caesar's army.
right
weaken them meanwhile by missiles, and then, moment, to assail them at their weakest point.
103.
at
the
Modern armies
are
much
better
provided
for
Romans.
Our troops
are
armed with missile weapons which are not useless as soon and which are still effective for hand to hand work. The vast improvement in the modem arms of precision is An excellent illusdaily making this truth more emphatic. tration of a collision between the modem power of resistance and the ancient power of attack is afforded by the battles at Teb and vicinity between the British troops under General Graham and the Arabs of Osman Digma, in 1884. The Arabs, armed with spear and shield, and inspired with franBut tic courage, rushed in crowds upon the British squares.
as used
rifles
many
At a few
points,
where the
was
for a
moment
;
but
rifle
104.
The
had any great range, capable of being used in the field, were bow and sling. But the Romans never had many archers and slingers. These were of no use for hand to hand fight, and the legions were of no use for anything else.
Hence great care was exercised in the choice of Whenever it could be done, the army was drawn up where approach was possible only on one side and this side difficult on account of a swamp, a watercourse, or some If necessary, and time was afforded similar natural barrier. for the work, approach was further hindered by ditches,
105.
ground.
chevaux-de-frize,
pitfalls,
59
Manner
of Attack.
1,22,
106.
The Roman
on the
Their favorhill,
^4,25; n,8;
vi,'46; vii',
jj|^'
position was
so that
the
ii, 23,
i.e.,
25 to
^7'.
^r. v,
45.
50
ft.),
the initiative.
If,
were
howhad set
c.i,
out to climb
it,
then the
Romans rushed
against them.
i, 87.
'
107.
to
an enemy
120 paces to
'
'^
moved forward
.
at a walk,
probably at an equal
distance,
e.g. viii,9.
ranks with spears raised in the right hand ready to hurl {puis infestis).
At a distance of 10
to
20 paces, the
first
cm, 93.
e.g.
i,
25;
enemy into confusion, inflicting numerous fearful wounds. The dead and wounded fell, and thus gaps appeared in the Here and there a pilum remained sticking in hostile array.
a shield, and thus embarrassed
its
^^'^^'^'^^
bearer
or in the thick
Roman
weapons.
108.
short b.g.
i, 52.
distance,
is
enemy would
have passed,
lins
moment would get near too soon, and the Romans must then drop
the right
their jave-
clear that
and engage with the swords. But usually the heavy spears preceded the use of the sword.
volley of
60
B.G. II, 23; VII 88' C
iii,'46.'
CiESAR's ARMY.
109.
As soon
as the
first
of the confusion and gaps in the enemy's Hne. The odd numbers of the first rank spring forward to gain room ; the even numbers and the entire second rank follow as a
support.
Along the
combats.
to aid their
fall,
now a
series of single
The
and
fifth
comrades and to take the places of any who and meanwhile throw their spears over the heads of the
The
fast,
as a reserve.
110. The
B.G.vi,
c.
II, 93.
45;
guished in
military
parlance.
Advancing
to
attack was
Then
enemy
last resort,
if
hurled
R. pp.
49, 50.
five
At
Ilerda,
at least
20 minutes.
112.
be noticed.
their
B.G.
1, 25.
We
ground was a
hillside,
must remember that their favorite vantagedown which they could rush against
fall
enemy.
.
ranks could hurl the pila^ and also these weapons would
with more force.
113.
.^,
Of
fell
course
if
cast too
soon, they
likely, in the
be made.
the
6
the
Should the
latter
receive
onset
Pompey's men
might
c. 111,92.
be
ineffective.
114.
Running
But
men would
and
would be more
hillside
onset to be
gentle
slope.
made on The
momentum
more
men
against the
Also, the
enemy were
mass
become demoralized
at sight of this
would make
it.
it
less
a charge to meet
116. The rush was usually made by a line at once ; or, b.g. i, 52; the cohort on one wing would begin, and the rest of the ^'"^'9^'
line
it
up.
The second
(about 200
line folft.),
lowed the
and
became engaged.
line
117.
of
the enemy,
would impinge on that line and there was danger that the enemy
would pour
especially
in flank,
b.g.
1, 25;
on the
right
side,
(latus apertuni).
^^' ^3;
C-
ond
or,
line,
the
rear
ranks of the
first
line
could be deployed to
find in fact that the
right
and
left into
the inter\^als.
We
second
line
could
retire,
and behind
which
it
could re-form.
62
CiESAR's ARMY.
ii8.
it
How
the fight
before
knowledge.
But we may easily conjecture that it could hardly have been more than 15 minutes in general. Then the second line would advance to the attack, the first would assemble behind it, re-form, rest, and be ready in turn again to take up the
fight.
119.
two.
We may
line into
enemy
to break.
Thus the
120.
third line
was a
last reserve.
We
see that
cohorts in battle
lines are hurled
no
rest,
and
When
the
enemy were
way
to follow
up a beaten
foe.
Hence
his
victories,
like
B.
122.
THE MARCH.
{itinera).
rule,
Every long distance was divided into day's marches After each two or three days of marching, as a
Each
B.G. VII,
36.
march
{iter)
to another
camps
means a
five days'
march.
123.
own
camp.
* If
When
no such
I,
rest
See B.G.
cum
iter
63
21,
part of their
fortifying.
men
employed
in Jg"'
'^"
^'
124.
v. 1,9.
march
in five
summer
hours, at
(rnilitari
gradu), 40,000 steps (of 2^ ft.), and at quick step 48,000 Five summer hours are equal to about 6| of our steps.
hours.
Then
in
Upton's Tactics,
now
revised,
common and quick time, and a cadence of 100 minute for common time and 120 steps for quick actly the Roman standard.
125.
steps per
time, ex-
The
step {gradus) of 2^
(Roman)
feet,
was the
dis-
This
latter
was the
full
heel leaves the ground to the point at which the same heel
(Roman)
probably
It
Roman
feet
126.
The Roman
day's
march
p. 93.
rest, it
seems hardly
would
127.
is
The average
to
army
from 15
750.
that we cannot be far out of the way in our estimate of the Roman march; especially when we consider what an amount of work had to be performed in fortifying the camp. Of course forced marches were often made, continuing sometimes
even
all
night.
64
128.
Caesar's army.
We
march forward,
must distinguish three forms of march, to the rear, and to either flank.
I.
the
The Advance.
column
is
129.
When
the
BG.
B.G.
i/iV.
II, 19.
1, 15,
the
van (^privmrn
copiae,
body
{exercifus,
omnes
aginen
130.
{a)
The van may hav^eK)ne of three objects. The first is to engage the rear of the enemy
his plans.
so as to
delay their march, and give time for the main body to
For
this
1, 15,
{h)
{loci
The second
object
is
to
reconnoitre the
,
country
and
to bring
news
of the enemy.
To accomplish
this,
special detachments of
who scoured
To
these
staff-officers,
accom-
B.G.
II, 17.
(e)
The
third object
was
to select
and
stafl".
usually
131. At a fixed distance after the van marched the main body, and close after it the rear-guard. This last, during a march to the front, had only police duty to perform ; i.e., to pick up stragglers, and the like.
132.
in
a.
baggage
65
c.
In column,
all
army together ;
In
line of battle.
We
133.
a.
11,17.
friendly country, or
when
there
appeared no immediate
The
legions are
single or double
number of
legion
is
it
the road.
Each
followed immediately by
its
bag-
The
last
the baggage.
A
40
column of
ft.,
requires 10,250
sixth legion
steps
{gradus) in length.
this
column so
as to join in
ranks,
if
the
Of course if the march was with double number of so much more *me would be taken.* It is clear that enemy could make a vigorous attack in force on the
t
throw
head of the column, they would. have a good chance to it into confusion and entirely prevent it from properly
deploying.
The
by
its
134.
b.
When
if it is
not desirable to
b.g. 11,19,
"^^^
column is formed as in a, but the baggage of the whole army is assembled. The greater part of the legions, usually three-fourths of the entire num-
march
^^'
ber,
Then
followed the
usually
collected
fourth of
The remaining
legions,
one-
brought up the rear {daudunt agmen), as guard for the baggage and rear-guard for the army. In this
* See antey 84.
66
B.G.11,19;
4o;^c7/^64.
CiESAR's ARMY.
much more
^^y
we cannot
Although the legions can readily be brought into action, consider them as actually ready until the indi-
made
their preparations.
On
the march,
was
{insignia), plumes,
and the
Then
march
able to
B.G. 1, 24; VII, 18; A. bIg. II 21. B.G.
II, 21;
,
attacked in the
being
legionaries
must
first
pile their
baggage (sarcmae in
acenmm
fi^unttir),
scutis
draw the
badges {insignia
their weapons ready {arma expeaiuntur, legio Of course time was needed for all this, and time must be won by the vanguard. An enterprising enemy, knowing these facts, would seek to attack the Roman army
and get
armatur).
B.G.
II, 17;
i^66^*A^'
adoriri, ifnpeditos in
agmine
as
little
to resist.
The advance
for
We
find
it
made on
two occasions
hours* time.
in
a distance of
the
immediate
ground was
suitable.
in order of battle, the legions
When
legion.
E.G. VIII,
^^'
marching
marched
in columns, as has
tactics of the
And when
is
men
must
all
instructae).
6/
be
left
camp.
2.
The Retreat.
enemy
in
is less
136.
con:
was usually
The
retreat in
b\
The
re-
treat in square
a.
{agmine quadratoi)
137.
For the
as
sent out of
camp
retreat in column, the baggage wasc. m, soon as possible, under escort of a de- ^^*
75,
This body With them marched a detail of centurions and men whose business was to stake out the new camp. Then followed the main body, the cohorts in column of
infantry, often of
tachment of
an entire legion.
centuries.
last
to delay the
enemy, thus
if
giving the
army time
to
the attack
b.g.
i, 24.
should be
made
in force.
The
rear-guard was
composed of
and
slingers.
When
necessary, they
would be supported by troops from the legions. Sometimes the anfesignani, and again legionary cohorts ready for battle
(expeditae) , or even entire
legions,
c, ni, 75;
^^'
marched between
the ^'
main body and the rear-guard. Often the legions did this duty by turns (legiones invicem ad extrefmim agnien
evocabai)
a.
70.
(agmen quadratuni) was B.G.vn,67 ; for instance, on a march through a rebellious country, and also when the enemy had numerous cavalry. A single square could be
138.
b.
The
retreat in square
formed from
all
army
itself,
in the centre
or,
with
its
baggage within.
68 when
on
the
CiESAR*S ARMY.
army was
originally
marching
in
column with
front suddenly
make
But
one square of
The
the
cavalry, supported
antesigna7ii,
it
mished around
3.
by the archers and slingers and by remained outside the square, and skiron all sides.
139.
a short dis-
tance,
C. in, 67;
iii
3,
and always
The
legions
marched
column of
B.C.
I, 49.
parallel
a.
67.
140.
The baggage
its
train
followed by
own pack-animals.
The
latter
mode might
the side
;
some considerable
stance,
when
to
traverse
for in-
^'^6^^^'
army was marching in the valley of a stream, so that the water was on the flank towards the enemy, and hills and woods on the other flank. In such case as last mentioned, no guard of light troops would be necessary between the army and the enemy. But in open ground such a detachment would have to be made, and would perform the same duties as the vanguard during an advance, and the rear-guard during a retreat.
the
141. To form line of battle from a column of march by the flank was a simple matter, unless the baggage was between the legions. It was done simply by facing right or
left,
when
P. VI, 40.
142.
69
PONS A CitSARE
IN
RHINO EACTUS.
bb. trabes bipedales. cc. fibulae. a a. tigna bina sesquipedalia. dd. directa materia, longuriis cralibusque constrata. e e. sublicae ad inferiorem partem fluminis pro ariete oblique actae. f f. sublicae supra pontem immissae.
g. castellum
Fig. 26.
JO
CiESAR's ARMY.
first
camp.
4.
Crossing Streams.
cross deeper fords than we, as they
dry.
143.
had
to
keep
times an
artificial
when
the current
was strong, a
line of cavalry
saved any
When fords were not available, bridges had to be These were of many kinds. The simplest were to cross a mere ravine, and consisted of long tree trunks covered with branches and earth. The most elaborate of
144.
built.
which we know was the footway 40 ft. wide with which A river in Spain he Caesar twice spanned the Rhine.
H.
5.
filled
boats.
A
it,
when
26)
it
was desired
.
Caesar's bridges
on the Rhine
(Fig.
were of
this
^*
description.
ing,
military engineer-
Germany.
C.
THE CAMP.
:
145.
field,
the
The Romans distinguished two kinds of camp or summer camp {castra aestivd), made at the
abandoned the next morn-
which the
We
in the
this
time of Caesar.
subject,
in fact,
is
Whatever
is
com-
r.
p. 75.
mon
to
both
may be
set
down
Where
the authorities
differ,
army
in the
more from
However, Caesar
I.
The
Site.
always placed on had before it still a portion of the descent, and its rear lay on the summit. Thus the legions could pour from the gates and form against an approaching enemy in readiness to make their favorite
147.
When
possible, the
hill,
camp was
its
so that
front
onset
down
hill
declivity
was
all
was some obstruction, as a stream or a morass, it At any rate, there should be before the the better.
for the
Jh^'^'
camp room
accustomed order of
Therefore
the
If
army had
it
either side.
placing
But the conditions were usually best met by on the hither side. Much wood, too, was needed,
for cooking,
and
the fortifications.
which it was put in But yet the camp must not be so near a
enemy
to collect in
numbers under
its
onset.
72
148.
It is
CiESARS ARMY.
evident that
all
and often a camp must be pitched where necessity demanded {iii loco necessario). But to place the camp on low ground instead of on a hill was considered
always be
fulfilled,
B.G. VIII,
36.
f
'/
^''o
=^
'4
'j
2,
>^
1
>.^
X X X
1
2.
Th
0.^
^^
"
^=0
Porta Principalis i
Sinistra.
\
Ifga/Trib.
tS
ItgatTrib.
^
1
Via
jtrindpalis
'*
)
5**
XX
X X
.^
4^
*^
Vi g- qitint arvct
^^
-^r
-i^
Aua..
t^*^
Au^,
Auz.
*?
^^
5^
^
tr
k
-L
'i
fr
\=
Porta Decumana.
Fig. 37.
T/<e
J
5 legions,
Note.
Summer Camp,
This camp is planned for
I2
2.
R. pp. 75 seqq.
T/ie Fortification.
a.
149.
The
Roman camp.*
The
and
73
was
also
the prevailing,
if
among
the
as
or
little
camps.
We
tion of towns
under
siege,
connected by
The
easily
The
were rounded, so
as to afford
more room
for defence.
150.
The
gates of the
camp were
ings,
by a
{tilulmn)
reaching to
a corresponding distance.
Very
on the inside was a corresponding traverse. When it was neces- B.G.v,5a Usually the gates were not closed up. sary to defend the camp, one or more of these might be
likely
closed,
however.
In
small
redoubts
this
{castella),
only a
might
easily
have had
left
fortifications,
openings must be
b.
The Elevation.
fortification consists
151.
of a wall
e.g. v, 39.
on which the defenders place themselves; and before it a ditch {fossa), from which comes most of the material for the wall, and which keeps the enemy from approaching and stops them at the distance of a good spear
{agger, vallum), cast (Fig. 28).
I.
The Ditch.
v. 1,24?
*
'
152.
more like those found in Caesar, he speaks of a ditch whose width at the top was 9 or 1 2 ft., and whose depth in the first case was 7 ft., and in the latter was 9 ft., vertically downward {sub linea)
In the one which
.
74.
C^SAR
ARMY.
75
divisible
i.
We
and
is
in
each case
by
3,
divisible
by
b.g. vii,
ft.,
ft.
for instance
in the c'i^\^^
works
20
He
ditches only
when they
a camp,
7.
fortification of
ft.,
seems
follows
ad
Figure 28
be interpreted as
is
is
dc
is
the bottom.
is
cd
the counterscarp.
^c ox fb
153.
Fig. 39.
Fig. 30.
and
ver'^^'
counterscarp.
i.e.,
{lattcs
inferius)
{latus exterius)
at
were
vertical.
bottom as
at top.
We may
infer that
the
named but one dimension because the other was and that that uniform depth was most hkely 9 ft., because more than that would render it difhcult to cast up the earth. But we must remember that the Romans relied much on baskets for carrying earth, rather than on the shovel alone.
* Goler thinks that he
;
J^
CiESAR's ARMY.
of
But the
fortifica;
had
little
to fear
from missiles
so
it
that the width ^^is always divisible once seems Hkely that one-third the width is to be reckoned for af, one-third for dq, and the remaining one 155.
Remembering
by
3, it at
its
equal, ^^.
Then
the depth qc
is
equal to
2X^^ + 1.
is
The
2cb (2^^4-1)
^^by
abed
of
X,
qc= (2^-|-i) ft., and the area of the = 2^(2:^+1) sq. ft. Thus for each
vertical section
running foot
in the
ft.
2^(2^+1)
cu.
2.
The Wall.
156.
We
of the enemy.
was quite
Romans.
They had
little
need
for shelter
from
missiles.
What
was a high
157.
The
section
of such a wall
we may consider
to give
and width.
room
moving backward and forward to Six feet would do. The height should be hurl the javelins. as great as possible, though of course this would be limited by the fact that the earth which formed the wall came from
for standing firmly,
the ditch.
latter
had
to
Of course if towers were placed on the wall, the be made wider. The usual height seems to
']^
b.g. 11,5.
and the
like.
158.
The
outer slope
mz could be made
very steep, as
to
there was no
fire
of cannons to withstand.
But
keep the
material.
For
;
this
also timber
and brush.
call
was put up
in bundles, in the
form that we
fascines.
159.
I
ft.
Romans
cut
sods \\
ft.
y.
m, g.
long,
such sods,
ft.
Two
i
Every 3
ft.
in the
Then from a
ditch 9
ft.
wide
could be cut 6 sods to the running foot, or 3 ft. in height of facing. With these sods one-half the height of the wall
could be faced, leaving the other half to be strengthened
with sod cut elsewhere, or with fascines.
160.
When
it
made
161.
Then
For
the inside.
were of brush, or at
also
that the section of the wall was greater than the section of
yS
CiESAR's ARMY.
162.
The
ft.
in height
and
ft.
56
sq.
ft.
The
ft.
wide and
That gives 49
ft.
sq.
ft.
sec-
for
brushwork.
Of
6 sq.
ft.
must be
RG.
V, 40;
163.
When
top was
,
(z/^///)
with
and
cast their
it,
2 or
ft.
high,
164.
wall,
from point
to point,
B.G. V. 40;
VII, 72.
wooden
towers.
ditch
had
to be wider.
At such points both wall and Sometimes there were two ditches
at such places.
165.
Caesar at his
camp
had two
ft.
wide.
If these
were 11
ft.
wall 12
a width of 24
ft.
On
16 to 20
8 to 4
ft.
on a
round them of
wide.
left
3. 166.
The
Interior,
whose
T\\^ front was the sides were as 2 to 3 (Fig. 27). side towards the enemy, or towards which on the following
79
of course
left to
one
167.
The depth
of the
camp was
Beginning at the
front,
These
The
former ends at each side of the camp with a gate, the porta
principalis dextra
likely in large
and the porta principalis sinistra. Very camps there were gates at the ends of the via
quintana
also.
^j'/^'
168.
;
is
ii, 24;
toria
and opposite,
^^'
^*
169.
From
the porta prae toria to the via principalis via prae toria.
is
extends a
street, the
Opposite
this, in
the
c. iii, 82.
altars,
and the
the middle of
middle
line.
170.
Here were the quarters of the administrative staff, here hostages and prisoners were kept, and forage and booty
torium.
were placed.
Outside of the camp, back of the porta decumana, were the booths of the sutlers {niercatores) who
b.g. vi,
37.
171.
So
CiESAR's ARMY.
the wall, by the tents of the legati and tribuni, and by the
encamped one-fourth of the cavalry and one-half of the archers and slingers. Thus in the entire praetentura were quartered one-half of the cavalry and all
via principalis, were
move from
a line of cohorts
ber in
riuvi,
wall, was on each side one-tenth of the entire numNext the prcetothe army, or one -fifth altogether.
On
along both
its
stafl",
except,
Between the
cohorts that were along the wall and the staff troops, were
encamped on each
via quintana.
B.G. V,
5^50,
tonum and
the wall
equally divided by
all
it,
about one-half of
in the
army.
on the flanks and rear. Enclosed by these, by the quaestorium, and by the via quintana, was the place for the auxiliary infantry, excepting the archers and slingers.
173.
tended a broad
allow
and would
Polybius
room
for
moving troops
and Hyginus,
as 60.
The
1 ;
8
energetic
movements of an
defence.
laid
As we know
on
in defending the
this street
120
ft.
4.
Arromgement of
in
the Cohorts.
174.
The order
It
camp
naturally
to
depends on the
this
order of march.
seems reasonable
conclude that
was usually
in
column of
centuries.
arrangement of a cohort of
six centuries.
175.
in a space of
120
ft.
front
and 180
for
depth.
by 30
ft.
Each of
these was
one century.
the length of the front, 12
ft.
From
are to be deducted
ft.
As each tent is 10 ft. square, the length actually covered by would be 80 ft. This leaves 28 ft. for the 7 intervals between the tents, or 4 ft. for each interval. The 3 first centuries of the 3 maniples had their front towards the wall, and the 3 second their front from the wall. Thus the 2 centuries of one maniple would be stationed back to back. The second of one maniple would face the first of the next, divided from it by a street 1 2 ft. wide, parallel to the wall.
tents
176.
From
ft.
the 30
ft.
century, 6
must be allowed
;
10
ft.
ft.,
behind the
ft.
stacking the
weapons
and,
finally,
for
the
pack-animals.
The
c. iii, 76.
lines.
82
CiESAR's ARMY.
Arrangei7ient of the Cavalry in Camp.
there would suffice for each turma a by 30 ft., the same as for a century of Then one ala of cavalry would take the same
5.
177.
In
camp
ft.
space of 120
infantry.
Of
arm
6.
R. pp. 90,91.
the
Camp.
178.
be 9 ft. wide and 7 ft. deep. Of course a part of the men must be under arms. We may suppose that, under all
to
of one cohort could be used for each 240 In digging a ditch of 9 ft. wide, in 240 ft. length not more than 60 men can conveniently work. Then
legions, the
ft.
men
of wall.
in the
'
same space
allot
30
men
to the wall,
and 30 men
to
make
equal
we
see that an
go on
work on wall and ditch, and the two As 120 men compose the normal strength of the maniple, and as there are three maniples, it
are at
at
number
an equal
rate.
is
be three
reliefs.
it
rehef of the
would hardly be so with the rest. Remembering that there were always some soldiers who were exempt from such work {i7?wiunes, beneficia?i{), there
might be
in a
maniple 100
men
disposable
for the
work of
fortifying.
Then
men
to spare.
179.
skilful digger,
who works
is
ft.
(Roman)
above
all
in that time.
But the
Roman
As
legionaries were
83
4^
sq.
ft.,
ft.
each
man
rehef,
168 cu.
ft.
to throw out.
if
3 to 4 hours.
Then,
the
84
CiESAR*S ARMY.
7.
Camp
Duties.
180.
ing-ground selected,
towards
Strong details of
army reacned the campwas immediately formed with front the enemy to cover the work of fortification.
the van of the
it
When
cavalry
reconnoitred
in
all
directions,
allotted place,
in the space
site
cm,
76.
The
cohorts
proceeded
E.G.
II, 19.
1,
Baggage and arms being marched to the wall street, and were there told off, some for work within the camp, some for fortifying. The latter work, having been already measured (opere dimenso), was begun at once {castra poni/ntur,
at
once
to their posts.
E.G.
I
49;
'
muniuntur).
.When
the
baggage
train
arrived,
the
ani-
8^1*.'^
The
tents
only pitched
when
the
completed.
When
not near
would be pitched
As soon
the
few
,
II, 11;
'
'^'
left on picket without {equites in statione) and these sent scouts {exploratores) in all directions. Any special duty of gaining information was performed by spies
squadrons were
E.G.
II, II
\speculatores)
V,
49-
182.
One
at
on guard
E.G. IV, 11: the VI, 37; c.
In
(loubtless
gate,
and
Of
85
Be-
was strengthened.
at least
one cohort
was detailed
183.
As soon
in the
as the fortification
For
purpose the
staff
assembled
nightfall. Livy,
The
^^^"^^^
At
nightfall, also,
army assembled
to
sound the
tattoo.
Llvy,
The
XXX '^* c
e.g.
ii,
cavalry pickets were drawn into camp, except a few single The guard horsemen as outlying sentries {speculatores) cohorts were probably changed at the tattoo, the new guard
.
h.
The
night sentries
{tituld)
and
b.g. viii,
from sunset to sunrise, was divided into 4 Each cohort on guard was divided equal watches {vigiliae)
wall.
.
The
accordingly into 4
reliefs,
The
could
rest,
of
on their arms. If the cohort contained only about 300 men, it will readily be seen that 70 men could compose one rehef. This number, for 2100 ft. of wall, would give one
reliefs
were signalled
c. 11, 35.
184.
reveille.
If the
drew
less
numerous
At
Livy,
The
noon
this cavalry
and sent out their scouts {exploratores) ' guard was relieved.
XL,
33; V. Ill, 8
185.
sentries
were
occa-
probably
made by
On
86
sion, also, the
CiESAR's ARMY.
tribunes on duty,
himself,
i86.
If
in the presence of a
threatening
B.G.
^'
1,
vanguard
would
not
be
49;
enough
One
^* ^^'
and a
third
fortifying.
187.
leave the
camp
left
either to attack
In the
were
gage remained in
B.G. Ill, 26;
II, 8;
place,
charge.
c.
I,
legions.
The
latter
likely to
occur when
These would
doned.
c. Ill, 85.
At the
;
first
were struck
and the
c.111,37,75.
co?i
daman fur)
Yet
it
at
march began.
To
was
deemed
it.
II. 188.
B.G.
Ill, I.
them together in winter camps When a portion of a town was needed, {castra hiberna) for strategical or other reasons, then the inhabitants had to leave, as we see in the case of Galba at Octodurus.
soldiers in towns, but kept
.
189.
The
and
streets.
But doubtless
8/
winter
against
in
huts which gave better protection wind and weather. The arms were doubtless kept the huts, and the pack-animals in sheds. Also more
in the field.
camp
THE
SIEGE.
to assail strong- r. p
s^^^-
holds
in three
by
^^^
b.g. vii,
especially
and
further
if 3^' ^9.
cm,
80.
weak
fortifications,
and
Of
Formal
siege
was resorted
were strongly
fortified
and
against positions that b.g. vii well provisioned, so that neither "*
to
avail.
Blockade.
b.g. vit,
^^*
191.
circumvallation {circumvallatio)
The blockade was accomplished by means, of the The besieged place was
.
surrounded by
of wall
fortifications.
redoubts {castella) at
c. in, 43;
and ditch {munitiones, brachia),^ Outside of these 69. If b.g. vii, lines lay the camp, or camps, of the blockading army. an attempt at relief from without was to be feared, another 41.' line of works must be created, outside the first, and facing
'
outwards.
is
called the
circumvallation,
and the inner one the contravallation, Caesar does not use the latter term, and applies the former as has been explained.
* See Fig.
42.
88
CiESARS ARMY.
S^
0)
I
8
-i
.11 ^.S
":
I
CO
^1
*2
1^
iS
89
must be given
to the fortifications
relative strength of
besiegers
and besieged.
The redoubts
These
{castella)
b.g. vii
^9; c, iii,
{praesidia).
in the
of sentries {stationes),
daytime merely threw out a line which they were ready to support
At night strong pickets {excubitores) occuIn the redoubts were always ready the means of making signal smoke by day, and fire by night
immediately.
c. iii, 65.
in case of attack.
lest at
any
made by
2.
the enemy.
Assault.
article
194.
The
principal
scaling-ladder.
c. iii, 80.
/
used.
built
These were
wall.
and
of strong materials, to
showers of missiles
rollers,
from the
and
under their shelter battering-rams ( 213) were brought to bear on the wall.
195.
As soon
as the ladders
and hurdles were made ready for proand slingers.* These troops were then
pushed forward, thus protected, in order to clear the walls of Behind the missile troops were formed the the defenders. Thus the attention legionaries, usually in several columns.
of the
enemy would be
distracted,
and
at
At the head of each column was a body of laborers with ladders and fascines. As soon as the archers and slingers had cleared the wall, the facines
of attack success might follow.
were
set up,
and the
* Also see
28.
90
legionaries
CiESARS ARMY.
mounted
to
the
attack.
If a
it
to their
3.
Regular
Siege.
siege
R.
p. 142
ig6.
The
principal
work of a regular
at a distance
was the
very
ii?lo; VII,
24; c. II, I,
mound
^,-.>^.^ ^^
from the
wall,
the
the top
higher.
When
this
its
mOUUd waS
top to the
moved on
197.
The
height of the
it
Before Avaricum
was 80
It
ft.,
The
length of course
missile
weapons.
would not have been very long. The least distance from the enemy at which the construction could have been begun was from 400 to 500 ft.
assaulting the Gallic towns
198.
for a
If
we
ft.
The
sides
might be quite
ft.
steep, as
ft.
we
fabric
ft.
80
high and 50
wide
9I
199.
To
it
must be rememfirst
By way
of preparation for
its
construction,
of
all
the
This could be
done by workmen protected by vineae ( 211), stout movaThen the workmen, both those building the agger and those providing the material, must be guarded from the missiles of the enemy. The former were protected by plutei ( 214), large standing shields, which could be advanced
from time to time.
ered galleries.
reaching to the
R.K.
p. 310
c. 11,
2.
The
Also, the
artillery,
^*
'
J|^'^^'
and
to
The
archers and
artillery b.g.
11, 30;
moving towers.
These
parallels
must
j"j8!'(7n'
^4.
lines of huts.
Under
{cohortes
sorties.
expeditae),
cover the
operations
and
camp, ready
to support.
b.g. vii,
24.
200.
The
Usu-
work.
had
to
201.
Sometimes towers
to
{turres
ambulatoriae)
were
b.g.
'
was designed
be a smooth roadway
for the
ii, 30,
'
needed only
elevation.
to
be enough
as
it
column of
attack.
As a
rule,
93
side
and served
enemy
from the
wall,
and
a.
202.
we do know the following facts That it contained much woodwork (a\ because the agger was frequently set on fire by the enemy, and {F) because Trebonius was compelled to build a stone agger, for the reason, as he expressly states, that there was no more
of building the agger,
1.
:
RT)
p- 147
seqq.
/"<
VTT
^^'
22*,
24.
'
'
wood
2.
in the region.
That That
this
was not
solid,
draft.
This
is
inferred because
it
was
G. vii,
24.
on
it.
fire
a mine beneath
4.
That
it
workmen, meanwhile, were protected from missiles. Thus it must have been erected one story at a time. e.g. vii, From these facts and necessary inferences, we may draw ^ *jj up a scheme of construction which cannot be far from the
truth.
203.
Figure 34
is
is
agger,
ab
directed.
The
It
when completed
is
abcefhnda.
The remainder, abed, is so near enemy that it must be filled up with a rush at the last moment. We speak first of the part that is constructed
structed with regularity.
the
regularly.
204.
The
enemy
at
some point
CiESAR'S ARMY.
Fig. 35.
A B C D.
Hostile wall, s s. Testudines aggesiitiae , irotecting those levelling the ground, h k. A^ger. x x, x x', &c. Plutei^ prctecting those working on the <^gger. efg. Line of plutei, manned with archers and ^lingers. 1 1. Turres, also manned with archers and slingers end provided with tormenta. r o.
ttgger.
nnUf
Sec.
95
is moved forward so as make a safe gallery through which to convey material. Then at a distance of perhaps 30 ft. in advance of this point
to
is
placed a
x) at right angles to
the line of huts, and longer than the width of the agger.
must be strong enough to turn the hostile and high enough to protect the space of about 30 ft. between them and the huts. In this space thus protected
These
shields
missiles
the
workmen
set
The
long,
and
These are
piled, cob-
In the middle
is
left
passage
{mn)
is
10 or
12
ft.
wide.
covered
to
carried the
The
and
earth.
ft.,
When
the struc-
a course of logs
{op)
is
This at the
and serves
first
This completes 30
{glutei) are
ft.
of the
ft.
story.
The
shields
and the work continued, material being brought through the line of huts and
farther,
now pushed on 30
is
pushed
on by successive
stages of 30
each.
205.
Meanwhile
second story. When the advanced perhaps 100 ft., a transverse row oi plutei {k) is placed on its flat roof, and a second story is begun and pushed on in like manner as the first. The beginning of the second story is far enough forward of the
made
so as to
mount
first
story has
beginning of the
first
96
Caesar's army.
{/g)
leading to the
entrance
(;/)
206.
on, story
length,
its
We come now
to that
part
wall,
skelter.
When
four stories,
is
enemy
as
workmen, then a great quantity of rubbish, wood, bundles of straw, stones, sod, and the Hke, are brought through the various galleries and cast out through the openings (w), until the space between the agger and the wall is quite filled up.
consistent with the safety of the
208.
The
is
enough
to
show
too,
that
wood was
is
largely used in
construction.
Then,
wood
on the average only one-third as heavy as earth. It can and transported more easily. Also, the side walls of a wooden agger can be much steeper than if of earth. An agger of earth, 50 ft. wide on the top and 80 ft. high, should be 210 ft. wide at the base, and therefore
therefore be gathered
at the
One
of
wood
ft.
An
long,
an average width of only 55 ft. agger of earth of the above dimensions and 600
to have
would require 6,240,000 cu. ft. of earth. The mere excavation of this mass would take 1000 workmen at least
20 days.
b.
Siege Apparatus,
209.
The
principal
safe
work of a regular
siege
was the
agger,
by which
97
-
and
offence.
210.
hut,
on
rollers, for
the protection of
workmen from
of the besieged.
Fig. 36.
a.
The
first
form (Fig.
t,^)
in levelling
up the
enemy's ditch.
built of strong
Fig. 37.
would glance
off.
98
CiESAR
ARMY.
b. The second form (Fig. 37) was used by pioneers who attempted to dig out the foundation stones of the hostile
wall.
As
it
came
it
had
to
be very
the bat-
down from
Fig. 38.
tlements.
C. Ill,
10.
20
ft.
long, 5
thick.
Those used in the siege of Massilia were probably ft. high, and 4 ft. broad, built of timbers 2 ft. Besides, the roof was covered with bricks and clay,
fire,
to guard against
all,
Fig. 39.
211.
The
vineae (Fig.
2i^^
As they
99
By
the description
1
ft.
long, 8
ft.
high,
and
^^i^iffilF^^
v. iv,
15.
connected by vaulted
It
was
more
roomy than
the
Fig. 40.
the
the
212. The testudo (Fig. 32, b) was a hut, much like mus cuius from the front of which, however, projected battering-ram {aries) The ram
y
.
of
men
213.
The
battering-ram* (^r/<fj-,
Fig. 32, b)
wood, the
end of which
Suspended
although
*^* its
force
is
small
momentum
of a
compared with that of a cannon shot. ram 28 in. in diameter and 180 ft.
* See
The
long,
222, at end.
lOO
CiESAR
ARMY.
weighing
41,112
lbs.
is
and
only
sieges.
rested
on
rollers,
was
several
stories
shape,
and
constructed
of
heavy timbers.
the
side
The
stories
were connected by
stairs
at
remote
from
floor
the
was
There were openings through which the archers and slingers could
send their
missiles.
constructed
out of range of the enemy, and then advanced on rollers, preceded by musculi containing
the
road.
upon the
soldiers
and
'
ID!
215.
The
40,' :^t)'
was a movable
shield,
in the middle.
osier
work covered
with hides.
fig. 43.
JAlixitn,
VI.
5.G. III,
t3-i5; IV,
216.
12-26,28, 29;
the
Roman
V, 10, II.
o. II, 3-7-
A
B C
A,
B,
etc.
etc.
C, etc.
D,
etc.
Keel.
Fig. 44.*
Section of Galley with five
217.
The Roman
by
sails
and oars. For the war-ships, however, the latter were the main reliance. The rowers (slaves) in a ship of any size sat under the deck, on benches arranged in tiers (Fig. 44) Each
.
From
Scheffer,
De
IO3
bench during
slaves to
The
liefs,
manage the
and enough
in regal-
The
said,
having usually
con-
as
above
218.
The
With
this it
down and
ment of
artillery.
and archers on board, and a supply of Towers were sometimes raised on the deck, so as This was espeto send missiles down among the enemy. cially the case when a low ship was attacking a higher one. When two ships grappled, the legionaries boarded with
slingers
shield
and sword.
galleys were of so light draft that they could be drawn up on the beach. Of course the largest ships of the Romans would be very small to modern eyes.
The
219.
The
distinction
is
of
Even
That staunch old Puritan admiral, Blake, who made the arms of the
commonwealth as much feared on the sea as Cromwell did on land, was originally an officer of cavalry, thus being a veritable " horse
marine."
* For a vivid modern description of slave
Wallace's Ben Hur, Bk. III.
life
in
an ancient
galley, see
VII.
A.
THE ENEMY.
220.
conducted were
of the
more elaborate works that defended haunts of Graeco-Roman civihzation, hke Massilia.
Gauls, as Alesia, and the
B.G.
II, 12.
usually without
c. II, 1-15.
The former were comparatively simple, and fell much difficulty before the resources of Roman military science. The defences of Massilia, how
221.
ever,
assailed them,
had been planned by the same engineering skill that and the town was supplied with every appliart of the day.
The
B.G.vii,23.
was a grapple of
giants.
222.
Logs are
laid
Fig. 45.
end of each log is turned withThese smaller ends are then fastened together by cross-timbers some 40 feet long, and Between the large ends are placed earth is piled on them.
large
The
THE ENEMY.
great stones,
IO5
is
remaining space between the large stones and the earth at the smaller ends of the logs. Then a second course of logs
is
laid in like
this
second
first
course.
effective.
quite
why
an
RUstow
is
p. 146.
This statement
error, as reference
made
in
^l;
^^' ^^'
VII, 23.
On
Fig. 46.
223.
known
to the
In the
that
first
the besiegers
had
to
push on
their
works under a
set
b.g. vii,
darts.
Every
effort
was made to
n^"
^^^^
At Massilia this at one time succeeded, and all the offensive works were consumed.. Fire-balls, made of tow soaked in pitch and kinto the agger
and
Mines were
run, beginning
Through
get
If the
made sudden
sorties, trying to
fire.
ram
I06
CiESAR's ARMY.
was brought to bear on the wall, fenders were let down from its top by ropes to protect the stonework ; and it was sought by great hooks to catch the ram and draw it from its fastenings. As the agger and towers increased in height, the town wall and towers were often carried up to correspond.
If the wall
ble,
all
was
and began
to
crumIf
and
at last a clear
way was
made
B.
224. The Macedonian phalanx had a front of about 500 men and a depth of 16. That of the Gauls and Germans was doubtless of similar form, but of varying numbers.
The men stood close together, forming a compact mass. The shields of the front rank formed a vertical wall, and
those
of the
rest
on
its
the
momentum
mass.
outer edges could use their weapons, while the rest were
practically imprisoned in the crowd.
a great advantage
battle, nearly
for,
every man sooner or later was in action. Hence, although they might be greatly inferior in number, they could bring into use more swords and spears at a given
point than could their enemies.
At the
battle
of the
Alma (fought
old phalanx.
the
British
seemed that
if
the
huge two
men
The
THE ENEMY.
broken, their
10/
momentum
and
p.
finally retreated.
114 seqq.)
Such a defence in line against an opposing mass can only be made by troops of considerable individual self-reliance. Such was the case undoubtedly with the British regiments at the Alma. Such was the case with Caesar's legionaries. And so the open order of battle of the Romans, bringing every soldier to bear on the enemy, was possible, and was much more economical of force than the crowded
successfully
It
should be noticed, in
in missile
lost one-third
of
its
fire
of the Chassepot
rifles,
although
at
The
manned by
it is
infantry
reliance.
more
will
made
in the use of
dynamite
last possibility
of mass formations.
Thus the experience of the Romans is repeated in our own day. Modern discoveries and inventions applied to military science demand a more open order of battle, and tend steadily to replace the brute
force of a
It is
mob by
now
scientific skill.
plain
is
enough from
this that
Upton's Tactics
is
already obsolete.
Board
sitting to devise a
new system
for the
army of the
United
States.
225.
The
Gallic
long and 6 to 8
in.
wide,
As
missile
weapons, light
io8
CiESAR S ARMY.
long,
This
last
C.
E.G. IV,
33.
226.
The
custom was
to
charge
fiercely,
hoping by the rush of their horses and the clatter of their wheels, as well as by the spears hurled by
the essedarii, to throw their
into confusion.
Fig. 47.
Legions. B B B. British Cavalry. a a a. Post o{ essedarii,
enemy
the
A.
Roman
returned to a position
among
bb
spearmen
MAPS
OF THE PRINCIPAL CAMPAIGNS
AND
PLANS
OF THE MOST IMPORTANT BATTLES AND SIEGES OF THE GALLIC WAR.
ADAPTED FROM
B.G.
Kilometer
L.
12
=
1
.6!ii;]7
_L.
of a mile. 3 4
,1
5
!
Scale of Miles.
Plan
The
I.
Fortifications
on the Rhone,
;
B.G., Bk.
I.
Chap.
8.
the dotted squares^ redoubts. In the dotted lities indicate wall and trench lower corner at the right is a vertical section of tnurus and Jhssa. From Geneva to Pasde-I'Ecluse (or Pas-d'Ecluse), 185 (English) miles by the river, is only half that distance
in a straight line.
Ill
1 Kilometer
= .62137 of a mile.
Battle with the Helvetians, B.G., Bk. I. Chap. 24-26. 1. The new legions and auxiliaries. 3. The Helvetians' baggage, parked, 2. Caesar's camp. 4. The Boii and Tulingi. The heavy lines show the first position of the two armies. The mountain to whi
II.
the Helvetians fled lies immediately west of the modern village of Las. Just south that village, the light dotted lines show the position of the Helvetians at their seco attack, and, facing them, the second position of the first two lines of the Romans, third line has wheeled to the right, to meet the flank attack of the Bon and Tuhngi.
Plan
Plan
III.
Sattle tvith
A.riovi8ttis,
E.G., Bk. I. Chap. 42-53.
1 kilometer
.62137
of a mile.
3
Scale of Miles.
a. First
b. c.
camp
of Ariovistus.
held.
Hill on
Caesar's smaller
camp.
/.
line of battle.
Roman
line of battle.
German
"3
kilometer
= .62137 of a mile.
Scale of
JSIiles.
Flan IV.
E.G., Bk.
II.
Chap. 5-10.
Romana.
114
1 kilometer
= .62137 of a mile.
Scale of Miles.
(Sabis).
B.G., Bk.
II.
Chap. 19-27.
Castra Romana.
c. b. Castra Belgica.
"5
Scale of Miles.
B.G., Bk.
II.
Chap. 29-33.
116
Greenwich
\S
Loire R.
Scale of Miles.
Plan VII.
The
Campaign against
the Veneti,
dotted line shows the course of the two fleets from the Loire and the
respectively.
Auray
117
ISKlotrutcr
I'll!'
Plan VIII.
I* ^SS^'f^i
12
5
Scale of Miles.
Siege of
Avaricum,
Roman camp.
2. First position
3.
4.
agger according
^
to
RUstow.
118
Scale of Miles.
Plan IX.
r-
Siege of Gergovia.
2.
Caesar's large
4.
camp.
The double
5.
The
small camp.
Gallic fortifications.
Gallic wall.
Detached legion.
Gallic camp.
119
tb.TILo>59.s9t
Scale of Miles.
B.G., Bk.
VIL
Chap. 59-62.
120
12
I
I
f 3
I
f 4
I
f
5
L
B.G., Bk. VII. Chap. 66-67.
Scale of Miles.
Plan XI.
121
Plan XII.
Siege of Alesia.
122
Plan XIII,
Campaign against the Bellovaci, C. Rom = Roman camp. b = Camp of the Bellovaci. c = Roman army. d = Army of the Bellovaci.
123
ABC
Roman camps.
'Romzn agger.
"4
auriga, 226.
auxilia,
i.
aciem dirigere,
55.
instruere, 55.
acies, 78.
auxiliares, 17.
ballista, 23, 24, 28.
balteus, 45 a.
beneficiarii, 178.
braccae, 43.
brachia, 191.
buccina, 14.
buccinator, 14, 183.
calcei, 43.
^<?^.,
223.
carroballista, 28.
cassis,
agmen,
72, 78.
44 a.
agmen extremum,
129.
legionum, 129.
hiberna, 188.
centuriatim, 74.
Alauda, 40.
antesignani, 37, 90, 137, 138.
apparitores, ^^.
aquila, 13.
aquilifer, 13.
centurion, 8.
cervi, Fig. 41.
cippi, 41.
circumvallatio, 191.
arbores, 202.
aries, 212, 213.
cohortatus, loi.
126
cohortes disponere, 55.
concursus,
INDEX.
impedimenta, 15.
impeditos in agmine adoriri, 134, impetus gladiorum, 1 10.
in agmine, 134.
no.
consistere, 55.
contubernales, 32.
comu,
crista,
14.
44 a.
iter
cruralia, 43.
cognoscere,
accommodantur, 134. 1 30 b.
cursus, 107.
jumenta, 14.
latera praetorii, 167.
latus apertum, 79, 117.
decuria, 18.
decurio, 18.
emissio pilorum,
eques, 18.
no.
1
exterius, 153.
interius, 153.
81.
excubitores, 193.
exercitus, 129.
armatur, 134.
legiones armatae et instructae, 135.
explicare, 55.
ex
itinere, 123.
[137, 199.
feminalia, 43.
fossa, 151.
loci
naturam perspicere,
30
punica, 153.
funditores, 17.
furca, 49.
galea,
44^.
gradu
certo, 107.
militari, 124-
ocreae,
44 b.
immunes, 178.
INDEX.
omnes
copiae, 129.
127
1
scutum,
7,
44 c.
1
onager, 28.
signa inferre,
signifer, 13.
10.
signum, 13,
speculator,
1 01.
profectionis, 1873.
^-^^^
ordinatim, 74.
ordo,
6.
parma,
subcenturion,
8.
passus, 125.
pelles, 16, 189.
phalanx, 224.
pilani, 9, 73, 74, 79.
})ilis
infestis, 107.
b,
pilum, 36, 45
pilus, 9.
61, 112.
pinnae, 163.
pluteus, 199, 204, 205, 215.
fabrum, 36.
praesidia, 144, 193.
tubicen, 14.
tunica, 43.
turmatim, 88.
turres ambulatoriae, 201, 214.
primum agmen,
princeps,
129.
umbo, 44 c.
valli, 163.
pugio, 45 a.
quaestor, 31.
vallum, 157.
vasa conclamantur,
vexillum, 13.
via praetoria, 169.
89 b,
rostrum, 218.
sagittarii, 17.
71, 172.
sagum, 43.
sarcina, 15, 49, 134, 135.
vigiliae, 183.
conferuntur, 134.
in
acervum comportantur,
34.
vifis, 8.
Scorpio, 25 a.
voluntarii, 35.
Jt
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