Clarifying the Cult Author(s): Colin Campbell Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Sep.

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Britishjrournal e8 J%umber of Sociology lzolume 3 September I977

Colin Campbell

Clarifying the cult

ABSTRACT

This paper is an attempt to clarify the concept of cult and, in particular, an attempttoreplacethe presentpredominantly empirical conceptwithone whichmorecloselyresembles an idealtype.The key to sucha formulation is seen to lie in the identification of a distinctly cultic systemof beliefs,whlch possess internalcoherenceand imply a particularform of social organization. Such a systemis foundin Troeltsch's originaldescription of 'spiritual religionand Mysticism' which is here presentedas the ideal-typical cult religion.This form of belief is then shown as logically implying the existenceof the mystic collectivity,whilst the cult, as this has been conventionally described,is relegated to the category of a primarilyempirical construct.
INTRODUCTION

The need for a more adequateformulation of the conceptof cult has becomeincreasingly apparent.lAlthoughthe vagueand unsatisfactory nature of this term has long been commentedon, it has taken the renewedsociological interestin cults and culticphenomena in the late sixtes and early seventies2to highlight this deficiency.Attemptsto remedythis throughgreaterconceptual clarification have been made,3 but it is still the case, as Wallis has observed,that Canalytic effort directedat the cult has . . . issuedin little theoreticaladvance'.4 The aim of this paperis to identifythe problems whichhave prevented the successful formulation of a conceptuallycoherentconceptof the cult and to proposethat analysishas so far failedto distinguish adequately betweenthe empirical construct of the cult and the ideal typeconceptof the mysticcollectivity. In TheSocial Teaching of theChristian Churches, 5 Troeltsch distinguished three main types of Christianthought and traced both their interconnections andimplications forsociallife up to the eighteenth century. His three types were churchreligion,sect religionand mysticismor 'spiritualand mysticalreligion'.The first two he identifiedwith the dichotomous formsof religiousorganization, the churchand the sect,

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whilsthe described thethirdtypeasa formof anti-associational individualism which, althoughit did not lead to the formationof religious organizations in the conventionalsense, might be the occasion for small,informaland transient groups. However,most studiesof the cult derivetheir inspiration less from Troeltsch thanfromHowardBecker,6 whoseconceptof the cult a kind of quasi-group embodyingan individualistic search-forecstaticexperience-did not so much violate Troeltsch's usage as sever it from its close association with a particular formof religion.Whereas Troeltsch had been principally concerned with distinguishing systems of religious belief and demonstrating that each had distinctivesociological consequences,Beckerwas merelyconcernedto delineatetypes of religious organization.Thus, although there is a resemblancebetween their respective formulations, theirmannerof approach is verydiffierent. For Troeltschthe cult was merelya phenomenon contingenton mystical religion, whilst for Becker a vague mysticismbecame a contingent featureof the cult. SubsequentAmericansociologistsbroke entirely with Troeltsch's originalconception,droppingall references to mysticism and mystical religion,and indeed in some instancesto religionof any kind, being contentto specifycultic beliefsas those which were deviantfrom the perspective of religiousand secularorthodoxy.7 This usageis not only at odds with Troeltsch's formulation but also contrasts with Becker's, neitherof whommadeuseofthe criterion of deviancy.In Britain, David Martinrevivedan important featureof Troeltsch's originalperspective when he identifiedthe cult as embodying the mostradically individualisticformof religious experience8 andrecentstudies haveeitherfollowed this line of argument, stressing the principleof 'epistemological individualism',9 or have attemptedto synthesizethe Britishand American approaches to the conceptualization of the cult.l The current stateof conceptualization is thussomewhat confused and unsatisfactory. Thereis still no standard usageand no obviousmanner of reconciling the traditions of thoughtwhichstemfromTroeltschand Beckerwith the morerecenttendencyto definethe cult as a 'deviant' formof religion.Neitheris there any agreement over the sub-varieties of the cult. The distinctionproposedby David Martin betweenthe mystic-religious cult and the quasi-religious, 'manipulative' cult has not becomewidelyadopted;ll nor does it look as if Geoffrey Nelson's categorization of cults as 'Permanent', 'Centralized' and the like will find readyacceptance.l2 In addition,thereis an absenceof agreement over the questionof whethercults are necessarily non-Christian, for althoughTroeltsch formulated his conception of mysticreligionfroma study of Christianity, David Martin and BentonJohnsonhave both suggestedthat cults are essentiallynon-Christian in character.l3In view of these diXerences it is not surprising to End that there is little agreement overtheories of the origin, development anddemise of cults.l4

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thecult C;larifying
CULT AS A NON-GROUP

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There is some agreementabout the structuralfeaturesof the cult. description to endorseBecker's studieshave led sociologists Successive type of socialstrucuncondensed loose-textured, of a 'veryamorphous, ture',l5whilst it is generallyagreedthat cults are transient,tolerant, lack a clear distinctionbetween membersand nonnon-exclusive, cultic from the surrounding membersand are poorly diffierentiated has progress milieu.l6To this extentit may appearas if somevery real been madein buildinga coherentconceptof the cult. But appearances can be deceptive. overwhatthe is largelyan agreement In the firstplace,thisconsensus a as groupwhich cult is not, ratherthanwhatit is. The cultis described one does not join, which is not permanentand enduring,which is not beliefs.Although exclusiveand which does not have clearlyarticulated there are some termsused, such as 'tolerant',which are positive,the its bias of this descriptionis negative. Consequently, overwhelming one What, been. have might value is very much less than it otherwise wonders,is the actual denotativepower containedin such terms as is ? What, therefore, and 'undefined' 'loosely-structured' 'amorphous', ? terms such in cult the to define the value of a generalagreement Secondly,what is even more disturbing,is that this consensusof whichtendto negatethe conceptof uponcharacteristics opinionfocuses a socialgroup,when it is a type of socialgroupwhich is being distinis of a groupwhich lacksstructure: description guished.Becker's of all types of religiousstructureThe cult is the most ephemeral that the indeed, it is usuallyso looselyintegratedand so transitory is almosta misnomer.17 term 'structure' featureof the cult is Fromthis it wouldappearthat the distinguishing characteristics negative the Indeed, group.18 a not that it is 'almost' those convenexactly are cult the characterizing mentionedabove as membership, i.e. group, social a of concept the identify to tionallyused its lack of by identified is cult the If beliefs.19 common and structure kind of that is cult the that conclude to forced are we these, then unacceptappears conclusion This group. a not is which group religious that the consensus but it servesto demonstrate able becauseillogical,20 upon a double based is cult the of characteristics structural the over cult is that the that view the upon based is it all, of First negativity. which is not a sect,churchor denominaformof religiousorganization and secondly,that the cult understood, tion as theseare conventionally a which comesclosestto resembling is that formof socialphenomenon is boundto suggestthat cultis littlemore non-group. Sucha formulation than a residualcategory.21 of the cult in termsof It is apparentfrom this that no designation norcan any amountof attentionto structure alonewill suffice, structure
cc

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makeup forthe lackof an adequate statement of culticbelief.A formof non-sect,non-denomination, non-church, non-group(or quasi-group) is not a sufficient definition if this conceptis to have any value for the sociologyof religion.There has to be some designationof a form of religiousbelief,and such beliefshave to be clearlyrelatedto structure. Unfortunately,there has been a persistenttendency to ignore the questionof belief in mostdiscussions of the cult. This appearsto stem from the widespreadopinion that cultic beliefs are so various and fluctuatingthat they have no obvious common denominator, other, perhaps,than a certainstraintowardmysticism.22 On the one hand, there have been detailedstudiesof beliefsystemssuch as Scientology and Spiritualism,and, on the other, vague comments about the 'mystical'or 'individualistic' character of cultic belief in general.But there have been no attemptsto specify'cult religion'as such. Consequently, when it comes to definingthe cult in terms of its cultural characteristics, it hasbeennecessary to fallbackon suchnon-substantive features as deviance or individualism. Theselattercriteria, however, are quite inadequateas a basisfor distinguishing the cult fromthe sect or church,or indeedfromsecular'quasi-groups'. If the assumptionthat cult beliefs are so various as to lack any commondenominator(other than the exclusionof sect religion and churchreligion)is to be takenseriously, then one would be forced to conclude that the concept of cult is meaningless. For if there is no determinate set of religiousbeliefs,the definition of cult wouldhave to rest entirelyupon structural featuresand, althoughthis mightidentify a particularform of social organization, it would not be a concept which wouldhave any specialsignificance for the sociology of religion. If, on the other hand, the assumption is made that cultic beliefsare distinguished, not by their intrinsiccontent, but by some contingent featuresuch as devianceor an individualistic modeof adherence, then we find that thesecharacteristics are muchtoo vagueand unspecific to enableus eitherto adequately differentiate cultsfromsects,denominations and secularinterestgroups,or to demonstrate how it is that the distinctive structural features of the cult followfromtheseculturalones. What is required,in orderfor an ideal type of the cult to be constructed, is that thereshouldbe somespecification of a distinctive set of cultic beliefs.Beliefsthat constitutea systemand possessmeaningful coherenceand whilst specific enough to contrastwith those which typify sectarianismand church religion, are yet broad enough to embraceparticular beliefsystems.In addition,such a systemof beliefs shouldgenerateimplications for socialactionthat lead to a distinctive 'cultic'socialphenomenon.

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Clarifying thecult
CRITERIA OF CULT BELIEP

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Deviance, individualism and mysticism are the three criteria which have been employed, sometimes individually, sometimes in combination, to distinguish cultic beliefs. None of these, however, adequately delineate the cult from other phenomena nor account for the peculiar structural characteristicsof the cult.23 The identification of the cult as a deviant group was made by Dohrman,24whilst Lofland has adopted a similar perspective, describing cults as groups which break offfrom the conventional consensusand 'espouse very diffierentviews of the real, the possible and the moral'.25 Glock and Stark also identify cults as 'religiousmovements which draw their inspiration from other than the primary religion of the culture'.26 The deficiencies of this approach are several. Firstly, deviance and variance are particularly diScult to distinguishin the highly pluralistic cultures of modern societies as indeed is the 'conventional consensus'.Is Mormonism perhaps a cult in North America? Do the Sikhs constitute a cult in Great Britain? Is The Order of The Crossnot a cult because it does draw its inspiration from the primary religion of the culture? Clearly this negative characterization of the cult is far from helpful, stressingonce again its status as a residual category. Secondly, it fails to distinguish between cultic and sectarian forms of deviant religiosity for, as Wallis has observed, 'Deviance . . . is a distinguishingfeature of both cult and sect'.27 Thirdly, the fact that cultic beliefs are deviant is not suicient to explain the peculiar 'quasi-group' characteristicsof cultic bodies. Although one could argue that people who hold deviant beliefs feel the need to gather together for mutual reassuranceand protection in the face of a hostile or critical society, it is hard to see why they should gather in ephemeral, loosely-structuredgroups rather than in tight-knit, permanent, 'sectarian' ones. The stressupon individualism as a crucial characteristicof the cult is found in Becker's formulation as well as constituting an important ingredient in Troeltsch'smystical religion. Beckerstated that 'tendencies toward religion of a strictly private, personal character . . . come to full fruition in the cult' and that for the cult believer the 'center of his cosmos is his "I" '.28 Martin endorsesthis view declaring that 'The term "cult" indicates the most radically individualistic forms of religious experience'29and that 'the fundamental criterion of the cult is therefore individualism'.30 More recently, Roy Wallis has developed this perspective by identifying epistemological individualism as the crucial characteristicof the cult.31 This criterion has more to recommend it than does 'deviance', but it too leaves much to be desired. For example, it is far from obvious what individualism is taken to imply, other than perhaps an absence of any concern with fellowship. It may refer to the fact that cult adherents are overwhelminglyself-concerned,as Beckerimplies, or that individualism

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is a featureof eult organization and authority structures. As a eriterion of eultie belief,it is mostusuallyinterpreted to mean that thesebeliefs are ones whieh are 'prineipally eoneerned with the problems of individuals'.32 Sueha statement is elearlytoo vagueto distinguish eultiefrom non-eultie religious or seeular beliefs.Religions in generalean be saidto address themselves to the problems of individuals, espeeially tllosewhieh foeusupon suffering, death, and the path to salvation,and even if the ehurehlyand seetarianformsof religiondo on oeeasiongive greater attention to soeialandpolitiealmatters, theystillgivepersonal problems a majoremphasis. What is more,sueh a criterion does not distinguish seeularfromreligious beliefsdealingwith 'personal' problems; nor is it elear how 'individualistie' beliefslead to the formationof the 'quasigroup'structures typiealof the eult.33Indeed, tllereis somethingdisturbing about speeifying individualisul as the primary defining ellaraeteristie of a soeialgroup,forunlesssomeeountervailing principle can be invokedto showhow the straintowardindividualism is keptin eheck,it mustlogicallylead to the group'sdisbandment. The third, and last, of the criteriawhiell has been used to distinguish the cult is mysticism.In considering this as a possibledefining characteristic, one is struckby the contrast betweenTroeltseh's original treatment of tllisthemeandthatof all subsequent eommentators. Wllilst Troeltsehoutlined the characterof mysticismas a form of religionn subsequentdeseriptions of the eult llave merelyreferredto the stress upon mystiealexperienee. Beeker,for example,refersto the goal of the eult adherentas that of 'purelypersonalecstatieexperienee, salvation, eomfortand physiealhealing',34 and GeoffreyK. Nelson eclloestllis whenhe distinguishes eultsas groupsbasedupon mystieal, psyehieand eestaticexperiences.35 What was for Troeltscha complexof beliefs,is for Beckerand Nelsonmerelya stressupon mysticalexperienee. One obviousobjeetionto sueh a formulation as Beeker's is that by lumpingmystieal experienee together witheomfort) mentalandphysieal healing, the distinctionbetweenseeularand mysticcults has become obscured. The insistenee on mysticexperienee alonedoesat leasthelpus diseriminate the eult fromseeularorganizations. Unfortunately, it does not diseriminate the eult from other religiousbodies,for if the desire for mystie experieneeis made the erueial eriterionthen groups of individualswho belong to ehurehesand denominations would neeessarily be ineluded. A high valuation of religiousexperieneeis not neeessarily at odds with membership of ehurches,denominations, or even some seets. Furthermore, it is not obvious how a stressupon mysteal experieneewould, in itself, lead to the emergeneeof the distinetive, quasi-group,struetureof the eult. An emphasisupon mystieism may,in someeases,be seento lead to greatertoleration, nonexelusiveness andindividualism, but thiswill dependuponthe systemof beliefs whieh serve to 'interpret'the experienees.If that system is highly traditionalor authoritarian, then the stressupon experienee

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Clarifying tie GU/t

38I

could just as well lead to intoleranceor an elitist form of fellowship.3 This brief survey suggests that most of the criteria commonly employedare simplytoo vague and unspecificto serve adequatelyto identifytypical cultic beliefsand consequently to distinguish the cult fromotherconcepts.In addition,theirveryvagueness meansthat there is little possibility of deducingany distinctivestructural featuresfrom the cultural characteristic identified.To a considerableextent, this situationhas arisenbecausethe contentof cultic beliefshas beerloverlookedin favourof an emphasis upon some non-substantive characteristic such as deviance or tlle mode of adherence. Clearly greater specificityis required and it is Troeltsch'soriginal formulationof spiritualand mysticalreligionwhich promises to provideit.
THE RELIGION OF MYSTICISM

Troeltsch stressed that the religionof mysticism was not the samething as an emphasis upon mysticalor spiritualexperience. Mysticisnz as an ingredient of a religionhe described as 'merelythe insistence upon the direct,inwardand presentreligiousexperience'n37 an insistence which can be combined witheverykindof worship, mythanddoctrine andcan manifestitselfin manyformsand hence has no particularly distinctive sociological consequences. The religionof mysticism, on the otherhand, ariseswhen mysticismbecomes'independent in principle,contrasted with concretereligion'38 and seeksto take the place of the established rellglon:
s. -

When this happens mysticismrealizes that it is an independent religiousprinciple;it sees itself as the real universalheart of all religion, of which the various myth-formsare merely the outer garment.It regardsitself as the means of restoringan immediate unionwith God; it feelsindependent of all institutional religion,and possesses an entireinwardcertainty,which makesit indiffierent towardseverykindof religious fellowship . . . Henceforurard unionwith God, deification, self-annihilation,ibecome the real and the only subject of religion.39 As such,mystical religionconsists of beliefsaboutthe nature,originand character of such experiences and consequently 'explainsthe religious experience to itself'.40 Mysticism in this 'narrower' and 'technical' sense of the wordis a distinctphilosophy of religionwhichis concerned with the correctinterpretation of the religious process.Here mysticism is no longermerelyan aspector ingredient of religionbut a distinctreligion irlits own rightwith a distinctsystemof beliefs.AmongthoseTroeltsch mentionsare 'the unity of the divineground',Cthe divineseed'and the belief in spiritualevolution.It is these beliefsratherthan any single

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Campbell

emphasisupon religiousexperience,which marks oWspiritualand mysticalreligionfromthe churchlyand sectarian varieties. A centralbeliefis that all finite beingshave their existencewithin God,who is the groundof the soul,the 'seed'or 'spark' of all creatures. Some formof union with God (or moreproperly re-union)is thus the goal of this form of religiorl;a goal that can only be realizedby the development of the divineseedinto a powercapableof overcoming the world.Thereis, thus,a beliefin a 'scaleof spirituality' whichmarks the progression of the soul's relationshipwith the divine, a conception which is necessarily emanationist and denies dualismin favourof a spiritualmonism.There is no belief in a fundamental oppositionof 'flesh'and 'spirit'or naturallaw and Christian miraclebut merelyin diffierences in the degreeto whichthe finiteis separated fromthe divine. Consequently an ascetictemperis excludedthoughthereis an opposition to the selSsllness and materialism of 'the world'. Indeed secular concernsare regardedas unimportantand the placing of religion above ethicsleadsto Antinomianism and Libertarianism. Thisformof religionregards religious experience as a validexpression of that universal religiousconsciousness whichis basedin the ultimate divineground;a view which leads to an acceptanceof religiousrelativity as far as all specificformsof belief are concernedand to the doctrineof polymorphism, in which the truthof all religionsis recognized.Hence,not only arewidelydiffering viewsof the centraltruthsof Christianity tolerated, but all forms of religionareregarded as identical. Nevertheless, its own teachings,which emphasizethe truthsobtained throughmysticand spiritualexperience, are regardedas representing the 'purest'formof religion: This type of mysticism becomesan independent religious philosophy, which recognisesthat the religiousprocessis the same universal expression and consciousness of the metaphysical connection between absoluteand finite being, and which discovers everywhere, beneath the concreteformsof religion,the samereligious germ,which,however, only reachescompleteand pure maturityunder its fostering care . . .41 This polymorphism leads into another defining characteristic of mysticreligion,which is syncretism, especiallythe syncretism of religious and philosophical ideas.Becauseof its rejection of dualismand its indiSerenceto literal truth, spiritualand mysticalreligiondoes not necessarily lead to a positionof hostilityin relationto secularculture. It is, of course,firmlyopposedto materialism and to rationalism and to a this-worldly temper, but has an affinitywith idealisticand metaphysical philosophicalsystems. Idea-systemswhich are frequently combined with a Christian-inspired mystic religion are Buddhism, Hinduism, Sufi Islam, Neo-Platonism,Gnosticismand Romantic Idealism.42 Even scienceand naturalphilosophy can be relatedto the

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thecult Clarifying

383

inclinednatural of mysticreligionin the workof metaphysically tenets James,or Whitehead. such asJung, William philosophers By definition,mysticaland spiritualreligion cannot be identified with any one religioustradition.It is a philosophyof religionwhich sometruthin all religionsbut no specialor exclusivetruthin identifies in anyone of them. Also, althoughit does not have equal prominence formuTroeltsch's it is foundin all of them.43 tradition, everyreligious language'but the lation naturallytends to be couchedin 'Christian Christian.44 beliefswhich he identifiesare by no meansspecifically conceptionof spiritualand mystical It can be seen that Troeltsch's of a systemof beliefthat just the kindof specification religionprovides of the cult. The an ideal type construct in orderto construct is required systemof beliefsinvolvedis specificenough to avoid confusionwith are set out by churchlyor sectarianformsof religion(the distinctions with purely Troeltschhimself)whilstthereis little dangerof confusion At the sametime, the beliefsare generalenough secularorganizations. of beliefwhichmightcharacterize the specificmanifestations to subsume there is one majordrawback;the an individualcult. Unfortunately, form of social organizationlogically 'necessitated'by Troeltsch's spiritualand mysticalreligionis not the cult as this has been conventionallyconceived,but the conceptof the mysticcollectivity.
TIlE MYSTIC COLLECTIVITY

that is so mucha featureof tlle religionof mysticism The individualism stems from the statementof its primary aim as personalholiness, upon inperfectionor deification,and the consequentconcentration Neverthepotential. spiritual of the individual's andfulfilment wardness less, this does not mean that there is no concernwith relationships as relatedto are regarded merelythat individuals betweenindividuals, each other throughGod and the divine. Hence by movingnearerto beingunitedwith all othersouls.Thus is necessarily Godthe individual or even wouldbe an irrelevant to seekout or initiatesecularfellowships in the faith of action.Indeed,it couldimply a lack counter-productive heretical an reality of the spiritualfellowshipand hence constitute tendency. It is interestingin this context that Troeltschspeaks of with mysticreligionas constituting'mere organizedformsassociated in its pureformthis type of Obviously to humanfrailty'.45 concessions of any type of socialgroup, religiondoes not lead to the construction church': but acceptsa beliefin the realityof an 'invisible peculiarto this Henceat this point therearisesthe idea of fellowship Church,of the Invisible the of idea the religion': kind of 'spiritual which man about alone, God to known purelyspiritualfellowship, rulesall invisibly which but all, at himself does not need to concern of a conception The means. other or signs withoutexternal believers,

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purelyspiritual fellowship is the baekground of thissentiment, and in this the individualis therefore relievedof all obligationto organize and evangelize,and from all eonneetionwith ecclesiasticaland sectarian organization.46 It follows thatthe greater the emphasis givento thisdistinctive teaching, the more firmlywill the reality of the invisiblechurchbe accepted, with the consequence tllat all formsof socialorganization are regarded as redundant.Furthermore, this formof religion,with its stressupon first-lland experience, is hostileto dogmaand tlle 11istorical dimension of Christianity, thus eliminatingthe centre aroundwilich a religious organization can form.As a result,in reality,it tendsto be independent of)if not hostiletoward,anyformof socialorganization47 andis 'entirely unorganized' having'no desireforan organized fellowship',48 mysticism in particularbeing likely to be 'independent of all institutional religion'.49Hence tllis form of religion 'createsno communities'50 and causesthe conceptof the religiouseommunity to lose all significanee51 for 'the idea of tlle Churclland of religiousorganization is alien'.52 It is quite clear frornthese and other remarks that Troeltschneverconsideredthere was any typieal form of social organization necessarily associated with mysticreligion,but that on the contrary, logic worked againstany organized secularfellowship. Troeltsch did recognize, however, that certain forms of protoorganization might empirically be associated with spiritual and mysticalreligion,but suchformshad a purelysecularand not religious rationale: Whateverorganizedformsit does adopt are loose and provisional, mere coneessionsto human frailty, without any sense of inwar necessityand Divineinspiration.53 He addsto this by remarking that even the mysticis human,and feels the needfor the give-and-take of intimatefellowship with othersouls.54 HenceTroeltscll refers to Philadelphianism and the formation of groups round'spiritual directors and deeplyexperienced leaders'55 and it is in this context that he outlinesthe kind of looselystructured voluntary association whichhasbecomethe basisforthe conceptof cult.However, it is quite clear that these 'cultic'formsof organization cannotderive any firm legitimationfor their existeneefrom the eommonbeliefsof their 'adherents' but only fromsueh seeulareonsiderations as the need for companionship, instruction, or proteetion frompersecution. Troeltsehregardedthe absenceof any form of social organization as a principalsociological charaeteristic and coneomitant of spiritual and mysticalreligionand considered the formless and ephemeral 'cultlike' structures as merelya possibleeontingent phenomenon. Although approximating to those formsof soeial organization most frequently associatedwith this form of religion,the more spiritualand mystieal

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religionapproaches the 'puretype',the moreit will be characterized as a cultural configuration and associatedpersonalethic without any visible formal social organization.This is in marked contrastwith churchand sect religionwherethe organizational formis 'inherent' in the culturalideal type. An examination of the discussions of the cult fromBeckeronwards revealshow often the logic of the argumenthas pointed to this conclusiononly forthe sociologist to drawbackfromit at the last moment; Beckerhimselfcame as closeto anyoneto sayingthat the cult was that formof religious phenomenon whichwas not a socialgroup,but clung to his 'almost'and failedto restatehis insightin a positiveform.David Martinalsocorrectly notedthat the pureexpression of religious individualismnegatedthe very idea of a social fellowshipand hence of the social group but went on to make the doubtful assertionthat this renderedmysticism a purelypsychological pllenomenon.56 The fact that spiritual and mysticalreligioninvolvesa powerful antiassociational impulse and in its pure form 'createsno communities' does not mean that it is a strictlypsychological phenomenon,of no interestto the sociologist.For it does have definitesociological consequencesand, althoughit does not lead to the formation of groupsand organizations, it does lead to the existenceof socialcollectivities. The term, collectivity,has been used by Leopoldvon Wiese and Howard Becker,Florian Znanecki,Talcott Parsonsand Robert K. Mertonto describe thosepeople'amongthegreatest partof whomthere is no socialinteraction, although theydo sharea bodyof socialnorms.'57 Collectivitiesthereforeconsist of those people who have a sense of solidarity by virtueof shared common valuesandwhohavealsoacquired an attendant sense of moral obligation to fulEll common roleexpectations.58 Clearlythe adherentsto spiritualand mysticreligion constitute just such a collectivityin that tlley sharecommonvaluesderivedfrom a commonweltanschauung-and a commondefinitionof theirreligious'duties'.Althougllthereis little or no interaction among the majorityof the members of this collectivity,thelNe is nevertheless a commonconsciousness of membership in 'the invisiblechurch'or its equivalent.It is possiblethat some of the membersare in directcommunicationwith each other and it is from such informalgroupsthat mystic cults arise, but the majorityare probably only in indirect communication of the kind mediatedby their readership of the same booksand magazines. As Merton observes,one of the most significantcharacteristics of collectivities is that they functionas a baseforgroupformation; collectivitiesare 'potentials forgroup-formation', the commonfundof values facilitating sustained socialinteraction amongpartsofthe collectivity.59 This fact is crucialfor it helpsus to understand the processof cult formation.Since,however, the members of the mysticcollectivity mayalso be membersof conventionalreligiousorganizations, whether of the

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churchor denomination variety,this conceptmay also help to explain spiritualand mysticalmovements that arisewithin these bodies.Not that thisconceptis adequate in itselfto accountforsuchmovements but it does help explainone basisof theirsupport.
CONCLUSION

It wouldseemthat, if thereis an ideal-typeconceptto be foundin the body of sociological literature on the cult, then that conceptis not the cult itselfas this has been conventionally understood, but the concept of the mystic collectivity.This is the true counterpart to Troeltsch's mysticandspiritual religionin the way that the sectand the churchare the structural concomitants of sect religionand churchreligion.The mysticcollectivityis here understood to referto all those people who hold to the tenetsof mysticalreligionand consequently have a senseof commonsolidarityand obligation,even thoughthey do not interact. Conceived in thisway,whilstthe sectandthe churchareconventionally identifiedas differentkinds of religiousgroups (embodyingthe contrasting principles of inclusivenessand exclusiveness),the mystic collectivityis distinguished from both by the contrastbetweengroup and collectivity. The religious cult, therefore, (asopposedto the secular therapeuticcult) is to be seen as an extrusion,precipitatedin all probability by some secularconsideration, fromthe substratum of this collectivity; one whichdoesnot happento occurwithinthe confines of an existingreligiousorganization, and will, in all probability, dissolve beforelong backinto the collectivityonce again. Colin Campbell, B.SC., PH.D., Senior Lecturer in Sociology University of Sork
Notes 2. For evidence of this new interest I. This need has been commented on by Wallis and Nelson, see Geoirey K. see Daniel Bell, 'Religionin the sixties', vol. 30, no. 3 (Autumn Nelson, 'The Spiritualist Movementand SocialResearch, Marcello Truzzi, the need for a redeSnition of cult', I 97 I ), pp. 447-97; OccultRevivalin PopularCulture: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, CThe some random observationson the old vol. 8, no. I (SpringI969), pp. I52-60, Quarterly, and 'The Concept of Cult', Sociologicaland nouveauwitch',Sociological vol. I 3, no. I (WinterI 97 I ), pp. I 6-36; Review, vol. I6, no. 3 (NovemberI968), Religions, pp. 35 I-62; Roy Wallis, 'Scientology: Jacob Needleman, The JWew therapeuticcult to religioussect', Socio- Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Co., logy,vol. 9, no. X (January I 975), pp. I970, and the completeissue of iournal Culture, vol. 5, no. 3 (Winter 89-I00, and 'Ideology, authority and of Popular the developmentof cultic movements', I97I). 3. See Geoffrey K. Nelson (I 968), op. SocialResearch, vol. 4I, no. 2, (Summer cit. and Roy Wallis,op. cit. I 974), pp. 298-304.

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4. Roy Wallis, 'Ideology, Authority idealtypicalconceptof the cult it can be and the development of cultic move- disregarded. I9. For a deSnitionof the concept of vol. 4I, no. X ments', Social Research, social group, see Robert K. Merton, (SummerI 974), p. 299. Glencoe, Structure, andSocial 5. ErnstTroeltsch,EfieSocialTeaching SocialTheory GeorgeAllen and Ill., Free Press,I957, p. 284. Churches, of theChristian 20. As will be argued later, this conUnwin, I 93I, 2 vols. but 6. L. von Wiese and HowardBecker, clusionis, in fact, not unacceptable, on the Basis of the entirelynecessary. Sociolog)J Systematic of Leopold 2I. For a valuable discussionof the and Gebildelehre Beziehungslehre categories natureand functionof residual vonWiese. 7. H. T. Dohrman, CaliforniaCult: in theorizingsee Talcott Parsons, The New York, Free Action, of Social Story of MankindUnited,Boston, Structure 7Che Beacon Press, I958; John Lofland and Press,I968 (I937), pp. I6-I9. a world-saver: 22. One attemptto draw a boundary RodneyStark,'Becoming a theoryof conversionto a deviantper- around cultic beliefs is to be found in vol. Colin Campbell,op. cit., pp. I22-6. Review, Sociological spective',American 30, pp. 862-75; John Lofland,Doomsday 23. To some extent this difficultyhas N. J., Prentice- arisen because the term cult has been Cult,EnglewoodCliffis, applied to non-religiousorganizations Hall, I966. That thisshouldhappen An and movements. 8. David A. Martin, Pacifiism: enough, as many of New York, is understandable Study, andSociological Historical cults,suchas Spiritualism, the prominent SchockenBooks,I966, pp. I93-7. and Scientology,are essen9. Roy Wallis(JanuaryI975), Op. cit. Buchmanism in character,comtially quasi-religious Op. I 0. Geoffrey K. Nelson ( I 968), bining religious and secular items in Cit. instruand satisfying their belief-systems I I. David A. Martin, op. cit., pp. mental and expressiveneeds for their I 94-6. there is a clear Op. adherents.Nevertheless, I2. Geoffrey K. Nelson (I968), betweenthe religious analyticdistinction cit., pp. 358-6I. associcult properand secular,voluntary I 3. David A. Martin,op. cit., pp. I-4 and I93; BentonJohnson, 'On church ations with 'cult-like' characteristics. Review, For a discussionof this distinctionsee Sociological and sect', American David A. Martin, ( I 966) op. cit., pp. vol. 28 (AugustI963), pp. 539-49 I 93-7 and John Jackson and Ray I4. Compare,for example, the work of Wallisand Nelsonalreadymentioned, Jobling. 'Toward an analysis of contogether with the approach of Eister; temporarycults', in David Martin, ed., inBritain, ofReligion Searbook AllanW. Eister,'Anoutlineof a structural A Sociological For TheScientific London, Student Christian Movement theoryof cults', yournal vol. 2, no. 4 (December Press,I 968, pp. 97-8. of Religion, Study 24. H. T. Dohrman,op. cit. 3I9-33 pp I972), 29. John Lofland,op. cit., p. I. I5. Howard Becker, op. cit., p. 627. 26. C. Y. Glockand R. Stark,Religion I6. For a summaryof the structural of the cult and the use of and Societyin Tension,Chicago, Rand characteristics the term 'culticmilieu'see Colin Camp- McNally, I965, p. 245. 27. Roy Wallis (I975), op. cit., p. bell, 'The cult, the cultic milieu and in Michael Hill, ed., A 90. secularization', 28. Howard Becker,op. cit., p. 6X7. in Britain, of Religion Eearbook Sociological 29. David A Martin,op. cit., p. 5. vol. 5, London,StudentChristianPress, 30. Ibid., p. I94. pp. I I9-36. I972, I7. HowardBecker,op. cit., p. 627. 3I Roy Wallis (I975), op. cit. 3X. Geoffrey K. Nelson ( I 968), op. use of the term 'almost' I8. Becker's only if cult is being con- cit., p 354 has significance insofar 33. Roy Wallis (op. cit., I 975) has sideredas an empiricalconstruct; as the concern here is to arrive at an helped to account for many of the

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ColinCamj7bell

strueturalfeaturesof the eult by identi- view,for,asJacksonandJoblingobsersre, fying the crucial principleof epistemo- a highlyindividualistic mystical-spiritual Iogieal individualism. By so doing, formof religionhas been a constantelehowever,he has alsodrawnattentionto a mentin the Christian tradition. ('Toward erueial question: what are the beliefs, an analysis of eontemporaryeults' in distinetiveof cults, whieh serve to justify David Martin (ed.), A Soszological Learthis prineiple? book of Relzgzon in Brztazn,London, 34. HowardBecker, op. cit., p. 627. Student Christian Movement Press, 35. Geoff*rey K. Nelson ( 1968), op. 68, pp. 97-8. eit., p 354 44. For a discussionof the mystieal 36. It mightappearas if tlle anselerto beliefss^7hich are commonto the world's the eonundrumof eonceptualizingthe re]igionssee AldousHuxley, The Perencult would be to amalgamate someor all nzalPhilosophy, New York, Harper and of these three eriteria.This, indeed, has Row, I 944 45. Ernst Troeltscll,op. cit., p. 743. been the strategy adopted by Nelson ( I 968). Though such a eonstruct may 46- Ibid., p. 745. have some empiricalrelevenceit eannot 47. Ibid., p. 38I . meet the need for an ideal type concept 4t3-Ibid., p. 377. becausethe componentparts possessno 49. Ibid. p. 377. neeessary or lo;,ical relationshipsvith 50. Ibid., p. 7gfi. each other. 5I Ibid.,p.795. 37. Ernst Troeltseh,op. eit., p. 730. 52. Ibid., p. 800. 53 Ibid., p. 743. 38 Ibid., p. 734. 54 Ibid., p. 749. 39- Ibid., p. 734. 55 Ibid., p. 749. 40. Ibid., p. 735. 56. David A . Martin, op. cit., pp. 4I * Ibid., p. 735. I 94-742 Ibid., p. 736. 43. It is an interestingparadox that 57. Leopold von Wiese and Howard op. cit., eh. I 7; FlorianZnanecki, althoughTroeltschillustratedmysticism Becker, and spiritual religion entirely by ex- Social Actions,New York, Farrar and amples drawn from Christianity,both Rinehartd I936, pp. 364-5; Talcott ParDavid Martin(Pacifsm: AnHistorical and sons, TheSocial System, Glencoe,Ill., The Sociological Study,New York, Schocken Free Press, I95I, pp. 77-8; Robert K. Books, I966) and BentonJohnson ('On Merton,SocialTheory andSoszal Structure, Church and Sect' American Sociological Glencoe,Ill., Free Press,I957, pp. 299Review, vol. 28. (AugustI963), pp. 539- 3oo. 49) have argued that mystic cults are 58. RobertK. Merton,op. cit., p. 299. 59. Ibid., p. 299. somehowalien to the Christian tradition. There is little evidencein favourof this

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