Syllabus for Philosophy 650: Advanced Topics in Epistemology SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY Alvin Goldman Spring, 2012 Wednesdays, 9:50-12:50

Resources Principal text: Goldman & Whitcomb, eds., Social Epistemology:Essential Readings [G&W] (Available at NJ Books.) Most other readings will be found either on the course sakai site or by going directly to the RU Libraries electronic journals lists. January 18: Foundations of Social Epistemology (SE) Targets of SE evaluation; criteria for SE evaluation; "classical" and "anticlassical" conceptions of SE. (1) Goldman, "A Guide to Social Epistemology", G&W, chap. 1 (2) Longino, The Fate of Knowledge, chap. 2, "Taking Social Studies of Science Seriously" (sakai site) January 25: Testimony (part I) Reductionism vs. anti-Reductionism and other disputes in the theory of testimony. (1) Fricker, "Telling and Trusting " Mind 104: 393-411 (1995) (2) Lackey, "Testimony: Acquiring Knowledge from Others", G&W, chap. 4 (3) Goldberg, "If That Were True, I Would Have Heard it By Now," G&W, chap. 5 February 1: Testimony (part II) Who is an expert? How should laypeople decide which experts' testimony to trust? (1) Hardwig, "Epistemic Dependence" J of Philosophy 82: 333-349 (1985) (2) Goldman, "xperts: Which Ones Should You Trust?" G&W, chap. 6 February 8: Peer Disagreement (part I) The problem, its assumptions, and its rival solutions. (1) Feldman, "Reasonable Religious Disagreements" G&W, chap. 7 (2) Elga, "Reflection and Disagreement", G&W, chap. 8 (3) Kelly, "Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence", G&W, chap. 9 February 15: Peer Disagreement (part II) Second-generation reflections on P.D. (1) Christensen, "Higher-Order Evidence", PPR 81(1): 185-215 (2010) (2) White, "On Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers", Episteme 6: 233-249 (2009).

February 22: Collective Epistemology (part I) Can groups have beliefs? Can group beliefs be rational or justified, much as the beliefs of individuals presumably can? How are group beliefs related to beliefs of their members? Are they reducible to them? (1) Pettit, "Groups with Minds of their Own," G&W, chap. 11 (2) Lackey, "Group Belief: Lessons from Lies and Bullshit" (sakai site) (3) Thagard, "Explaining Economic Crises: Are There Collective Representations?" Episteme 7(3): 266-283 (2010). February 29: Collective Epistemology (part II) Assuming that group beliefs are the products of an aggregation procedure, which procedure would satisfy appropriate epistemic desiderata (rationality, e.g.)? (1) List, "Group Knowledge and Group Rationality: A Judgment Aggregation Perspective", G&W, chap. 10 Branden Fitelson will present new ideas about the coherence of aggregated judgments. March 7: Social-Epistemic Dimensions of Science Debunkers of the epistemic merits of science tend to hold that "social factors" undercut the epistemic credentials of science. More "positive" SE theorists tend to think that social factors can make helpful epistemic contributions. They explore how this might take place. (1) Kitcher, "The Division of Cognitive Labor," J of Philosophy 87(1): 5-22 (1990) (2) Strevens, "The Role of the Priority Rule in Science," J of Philosophy 100(2): 55-79 (2003) March 21: Epistemic Properties of Alternative Trial Systems (and other Legal Practices) Legal practices for determining guilt or liability are social practices that aim at accurate judgments. Which practices are better at fostering accuracy? (1) Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World, chap. 9 ("Law"). Also on sakai site. (2) Laudan, "Thinking about Error in the Law," G&W, chap. 12 March 28: Epistemic Approaches to Democracy (part I) There are two dominant currents of thought about the role of the epistemic in a good (or legitimate) democracy. One stems from the Condorcet jury theorem. A second focuses on the process of "deliberation". What are the prospects and limitations of each method from an epistemic point of view (assuming that democratic deliberation really is an epistemic method -- which is questionable). (1) List and Goodin, "Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Journal of Political Philosophy 9: 277-306 (2001). Skip the appendices. (2) Richardson, "Democratic Intentions" (sakai site) April 4: A Semi-Epistemic Approach to Democracy (part II) A new theory of democracy assigns its historical allure to its relatively egalitarian distribution of political power, but there is an essential role for knowledge in power possession. Power imbalances are partly a function of epistemically

deficient communication practices. So a strong democracy requires social knowledge-dissemination, or knowledge-pooling, practices. (1) Goldman, "Democracy, Power, and Knowledge: A Semi-Epistemic Approach" (once it is written, it will posted on the sakai site) April 11: Computer Simulations of Knowledge Networks (part I) Computer simulations are widely used in social science, to study assorted network dynamics. Topics include information cascades, epidemics, economic markets, voting, etc. Recently philosophers have begun to construct computer simulations to model the flow of belief and knowledge in ways of interest to social epistemologists. Several samples of such articles are the readings for these two sessions, including models of scientific exploration and peer disagreement. (1) Weisberg & Muldoon, "Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of Cognitive Labor" (sakai site). (2) Douven, "Simulating Peer Disagreements" (sakai site) April 18: Computer Simulations of Knowledge Practices (part II) (1) Goldman, [A Veritistic Framework for SE] Knowledge in a Social World, chap. 3 (on sakai site) (1) Olsson, "A Simulation Approach to Veritistic Social Epistemology" (sakai site) April 25: Student Draft Papers Circulated and Discussed