Ellsworth Final

SACRAMENTO METROPOLITAN FIRE DISTRICT
Accident Review Factual Report
Structure Fire Fall/Burn Injury May 31, 2011 Ellsworth Incident CA-SAC-11-64376
The Board of Review approved this report on July 26, 2011
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ACCIDENT REVIEW REPORT ELLSWORTH CIRCLE SAC-64376
Investigative Team
Chris Holbrook, Assistant Chief Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District Agency Administrator
Team Members
Walt White, Battalion Chief Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District Team Leader Michael Teague, Captain
Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District Lead Investigator
Rick Hudson, Captain Sacramento Fire Department Training Specialist Rodney Tateishi, Captain Sacramento Fire Department Training Specialist Clay Elledge, Captain Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District Documentation Specialist
Kevin McLean, Captain

Cosumnes Fire Department Investigator
Adam Mitchell, Captain Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District Investigator Maurice Johnson, Vice President IAFF Local 522 Labor Representative
Technical Specialists
Adam House, Captain
Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District SCBA Technician Denis Murray Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District GIS Specialist Blake Rothfuss Jacobs Associates Structural Specialist
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Board of Review
Brian Rice Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District Deputy Chief Operations Lloyd Ogan Sacramento Fire Department Deputy Chief Operations John Michelini Cosumnes Fire Department Deputy Chief Operations Jody Gossner California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection Amador-El Dorado-Sacramento-Alpine Unit Deputy Chief
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Table of Contents
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................. 7 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 9 Terminology .................................................................................................................... 10 Building Layout ............................................................................................................... 11 Report Organization:....................................................................................................... 12 Department Demographics ................................................................................................ 13 Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District............................................................................. 13 Standard Operating Guidelines ...................................................................................... 13 Review Team Process ....................................................................................................... 15 Structural Summary............................................................................................................ 21 Building Construction Features: ...................................................................................... 21 Roof Assembly ............................................................................................................ 21 Wall Construction ........................................................................................................ 21 Garage ........................................................................................................................ 22 Pre-Incident Information ..................................................................................................... 23 Pre-Incident Company Status and Location ................................................................... 23 Location .......................................................................................................................... 25 Weather Conditions ........................................................................................................ 26 Sequence of Events ........................................................................................................... 27 Injuries................................................................................................................................ 39 Personal Protective Equipment .......................................................................................... 42 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus .................................................................................. 48 Photographs and Illustrations ............................................................................................. 52 Findings.............................................................................................................................. 56 Human Findings.............................................................................................................. 56 Management Findings .................................................................................................... 57 Building Findings ............................................................................................................ 58 Equipment Findings ........................................................................................................ 58 Staffing/ Response Time Findings .................................................................................. 59 Communications ............................................................................................................. 59 Causal and Contributing Factors ........................................................................................ 62 Causal Factors ............................................................................................................... 62 Contributing Factors ....................................................................................................... 62 Lesson Learned ................................................................................................................. 66 Recommendations ............................................................................................................. 68 Appendix A Incident Communications ............................................................................. 70 Radio System Overview ................................................................................................. 70 Incident Radio Traffic Transcript ..................................................................................... 72 Appendix B - Glossary and TERMS ................................................................................... 90 Appendix C - Standard Operating Guidelines .................................................................... 98
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Executive Summary
May 31, 2011, a seemingly routine garage fire in a one story residential structure resulted in the serious injury of a Sacramento Metropolitan Firefighter. While performing vertical ventilation, a firefighter from Truck 23 fell through the roof of a residential structure into the garage area of the home, while the garage was well involved with active fire. Within seconds the Captain on Truck 23 called a May Day over the radio reporting a firefighter through the roof and into the garage. The downed firefighter was located quickly and reached by firefighters from Rescue and Medic 21 who physically assisted him out of the garage through a side man door. Once he was removed from the area of fire involvement, he was rapidly assessed and reported to be out of the structure and conscious over the radio by the Captain of Rescue 21. Although the downed firefighter was quickly removed from the hazardous area, it was not before he sustained both thermal burns and traumatic injury. The injured firefighter was transported code 3 by Medic 21 to the University of California, Davis (UCD) Medical Center for definitive medical treatment.
As a result of the seriousness of the firefighters injuries and the potential for this incident to be fatal, Fire Chief Kurt Henke directed members of his command staff to initiate a serious accident review of the incident. The goal of the review was to identify the causal factors which contributed to the firefighters injuries, and identify factors that contributed to the outcome of the incident. The purpose of this review was to develop recommendations that could be implemented in an effort to prevent future occurrences. In an effort to conduct a thorough, honest, and unbiased review, a regional Serious Accident Review Team (SART) was assembled to investigate the incident. In accordance with our regional partnerships the SART was comprised of members from: Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District (SMFD), Sacramento Fire Department (SFD) and the Cosumnes Fire Department (CFD). The team initially met at SMFD station 21 located at 7641 Greenback Lane in Citrus Heights within hours of the incident. However scene documentation and evidence collection was initiated by SMFD Captain Mike Teague, immediately after the injured firefighter was transported and prior to the teams initial meeting.
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At the initial SART meeting, SMFD Deputy Chief (DC) of Operations Brian Rice and SMFD A-Shift Assistant Chief (AC) Chris Holbrook gave direction to team members regarding the purpose and scope of the investigation. Furthermore they defined the teams level of support and authority and thanked the team members for their assistance and commitment to the review process. SMFD Battalion Chief (BC) Walt White was designated team leader. BC White assigned team member roles and outlined the teams goals, objectives and proposed timeline for completion of a final report. Immediately after the teams initial meeting, team members conducted a series of individual interviews with all firefighters involved in the incident.
The investigation revealed the causal factor that resulted in the firefighters injuries was the independent action of the firefighter moving onto a structurally unsound portion of roof. This action resulted in a partial collapse of roof and the subsequent fall of the firefighter. Several contributing factors were identified and are detailed in this report. Additionally, several recommendations were developed and are included to address identified operational issues and concerns. The key factors contributing to the survival of the fallen firefighter include the speed at which he was removed from the hazardous area and that he was wearing full personal protective equipment including Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) that was in compliance with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards for structural firefighting.
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Introduction
This Accident Investigative Report is a comprehensive and factual review of the response to the May 31, 2011 fire incident at 6736 Ellsworth Circle. Specifically, the Investigative Team was asked to:
Obtain all available incident facts/information and communicate a detailed, validated, and factual incident review report to the Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District. All information contained in the report will be factual documentation of the events leading up to the incident, the incident operation(s), and incident mitigation to include treatment and transport of the injured personnel. The results of the findings and recommendations will be used as lessons learned for the Fire Service in Sacramento County.
Personnel from the Sacramento Fire Department, Sacramento Metropolitan Fire Department, and Cosumnes Fire Department worked cooperatively to investigate the events leading up to the injuries to the Firefighter.
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Terminology
All of the times used in this document are expressed using the 24-hour clock. In December 2007, the Sacramento Operational Area adopted International Phonetic Alphabet, which assigns a word to each letter of the alphabet, as listed below:
A Alpha B Bravo C Charlie D Delta E Echo F Foxtrot G Golf
H Hotel I India J Juliet K Kilo L Lima M Mike N November
O Oscar P Papa Q Quebec R Romeo S Sierra T Tango U Uniform
V Victor W Whiskey X X-ray Y Yankee Z Zulu
These words are used whenever it is necessary to identify any letter of the alphabet over the 800 MHz radio system or refer to the sides and interior divisions of a building (Figure 1).
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Building Layout
Building layout, location, and exposures are commonly identified with a letter (alpha) and a number (numeric) to describe the location of the structure relative to the fire building. The term exposure refers to a structure that is attached or adjacent to the fire building.
B/C Corner
Charlie Side
C/D Corner
Bravo Side
Delta Side
A/B Corner
Alpha Side
A/D Corner
Figure 1: The Alpha/Numeric graphic representation of the building sides.
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Report Organization:
This Report is organized into fifteen (15) sections and three (3) Appendices. Each section is divided into various sub-sections, which include relevant background information, specific discussion pertaining to the incident on Ellsworth Circle, and, where applicable, recommendations for future action. The Appendices include a description of the radio systems used by the fire service in Sacramento County including a transcription of the radio traffic at the incident, a glossary of common terms used by the Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District and the pertinent Standard Operating Guidelines used in Sacramento County.
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Department Demographics
Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District
The Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District was created December 1, 2000 when the American River Fire District and the Sacramento County Fire District merged creating the 7th largest fire department in the State of California. Metro Fire represents 16 predecessor agencies. Metro Fire provides fire suppression, fire prevention, advanced life support transportation, technical rescue, and hazardous materials response to 417 square miles of eastern Sacramento County including the incorporated city of Rancho Cordova and Citrus Heights.
Metro Fire responds to 70,000+ requests for service each year from 37 fire stations arranged in 5 battalions. Metro Fire deploys 37 engines, 4 trucks, 1 heavy rescue, 1 hazmat, 1 ARFF and 13 advanced life support ambulances with a daily staff of 168. These stations protect over 650,000 people. The area is composed of residential, industrial, wildland urban interface and rural grass lands. Staffing on Engines is one Captain, one Engineer and one Firefighter. All engine companies have at least one paramedic assigned. Staffing for trucks, hazmat and rescue is one Captain, one Engineer and two Firefighters. Ambulances are staffed with two firefighters, one of which is a paramedic.
Standard Operating Guidelines

In 2010, the Sacramento County Operating Area began developing a set of regional Standard Operating Guidelines (SOG). The first set of SOGs including the SOG for residential structure fires were implemented July 1, 2010.
The Regional SOGs required the development of standardized naming of the riding positions on all emergency apparatus. These riding positions are identified by rank and function, with each position having a name and set of basic responsibilities on any given emergency. All company members are identified by their riding position and the company they are assigned to.
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On an Engine Company the pre-assigned riding positions are: Officer (Captain), Engineer, Nozzle Firefighter, and Back-Up Firefighter. The riding position identifiers on the Truck Company are: Officer (Captain), Engineer, Saw Firefighter, and Tools Firefighter. Medic unit positions are identified as Control and Irons (Medic 21 Control). If a department member is calling a particular company, then the Officer will answer the radio for that company. (e.g. Engine 1, Engine 2.) The Officer for Engine 2 would answer the radio). If a one member needs to talk to a particular company member, then that member is identified by their riding position and company identifier. (e.g.: Truck 1 Captain, Truck 1 Saw).
All references to members involved in this incident will be referred to by their riding positions
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Review Team Process

Ellsworth Accident Investigation Team Authority The Ellsworth Serious Accident Review Team (SART) was given authority under the direction of Deputy Chief of Operations Brian Rice, for Fire Chief Kurt Henke, to conduct a thorough, in-depth analysis of the events that occurred at a structure fire at 6736 Ellsworth Circle in Carmichael, CA. The accident occurred on May 31, 2011 at approximately 0800 hours. Team members were instructed to perform an open, honest review of the incident and to identify any factors that could have lead to the accident, its prevention, or valuable lessons learned to be passed on to the rest of the Fire Service. Also, the team was requested to review the Regional Standard Operating Guidelines and how they may have impacted the events at the fire. The goal was to produce a fact-based report that could be used for the above purposes which could be presented to SMFD.
Team Chronology
The incident occurred on May 31, 2011 at approximately 0800 hours during a residential garage fire. A firefighter from Truck 23 (Truck 23 Saw) fell through the roof of the house while performing vertical ventilation operations near the garage. The firefighter was subsequently removed from the garage by on scene resources and transported to the hospital for medical treatment.
While units were on scene of the fire, members of SMFD began gathering information relative to the incident to include PPE gathering, photos of the structure and surroundings, aerial photographs, and initial interviews with members of the public.
The request was made by the Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District (SMFD) to activate a Regional SART to document and review the incident. An initial meeting was scheduled for 1300 hours that afternoon at SMFD Fire Station 21 (St. 21) and members convened there.
SMFD Battalion Chief (B/C) Walt White was chosen as the Team Leader. Other team members were Captain Michael Teague, SMFD; Captain Kevin McLean, Cosumnes Fire
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District; Captain Rick Hudson, Sacramento Fire Department; Captain Rodney Tateishi, Sacramento City Fire Department; Captain Clay Elledge, SMFD; Captain Maurice Johnson, SMFD and Sacramento Area Firefighters Local 522; and Captain Adam Mitchell, SMFD.
May 31, 2011
After the incident occurred, personnel on scene began securing PPE almost immediately. The PPE was secured by SMFD Fire investigator Barsdale. Other SART members who were on scene began documenting the scene to include photographs, videos (prior to overhaul operations in the incident area), and homeowner interviews. Metro Fire Copter 1 made a fly over of the incident and was able to take photographs as well.
A request was made to activate the Multi-Agency SART for the incident and an initial meeting was set for 1300 hours at SMFD St. 21 in the Battalion 13 office building.
At 1300 hours, members listed above convened at St. 21 in the meeting room with SMFD Deputy Chief (D/C) of Operations Brian Rice and Assistant Chief (A/C) Chris Holbrook. Direction and authority were given by D/C Rice. A/C Holbrook was made the agency contact for SMFD for the SART members needs.
After D/C Rice and A/C Holbrook left the meeting, B/C White outlined the goals of the team and the process. Initial documentation that had been completed was discussed and Captains Hudson and Tateishi were taken to the scene for an overview. All other members had already been to the scene.
A list of questions was produced and interviews were conducted by SART members of personnel who had been on scene when the incident occurred. After conclusion of the interviews, an initial division of labor was confirmed for team members.
June 1, 2011
An incident blue sheet was produced and distributed with initial information
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June 3, 2011
Truck 23 Saw Firefighter sent out an update of his physical condition and the sequence of events as he recalled to SMFD email accounts
June 6, 2011
In the morning, B/C White and Captain Teague went to Truck 23 Saw Firefighters home and conducted an interview.
A second meeting of the SART is convened at St. 21 in the afternoon. The team is updated on the current status of information gathering. Many items were discussed at the meeting to include:
-All currently available digital media taken of the scene is combined. -Further information needs and a division of labor were discussed. -A review of the specifics of the construction of the house is ongoing. -The Standard Operating Guidelines (SOG) review is ongoing. -The Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) information review is ongoing. -Training records review is occurring and a request is made for more information. -Dispatch audio recording is made available and the review is started. -One B/C interview was still outstanding and needed to be done. -The transcripts of completed interviews were being prepared. -Initial development of data and report sections was started.
June 8, 2011
The SCBA general inspection and flow test of the mask, MMR, and SCBA are completed in the afternoon by Captain Adam House, who is a Scott and NIOSH certified SCBA technician. All components passed and are found to be in compliance with NIOSH and Scott standards.
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There are more photographs taken and an inspection is completed on the PPE ensemble by Captain Teague.
June 11, 2011
Detailed breakdown of audio transmissions and the SOG evaluation is completed by Captain Hudson and distributed to SART members.
June 13, 2011
The SART convened for a meeting at SMFD Headquarters, 2101 Hurley Way, in Sacramento. An update was given that TR23 Saw was readmitted to UC Davis Medical Center for complications resulting from his injuries. There is an initial report given to team members on the SCBA and PPE conditions. Copies of the audio and SOG review are handed out for review. The audio review was discussed and found to be accurate. The next step to complete was to match up the interviews with the audio. Interviews were previously completed and the transcription was ongoing. Some difficulty in recovering original building information was identified and the training record review was still ongoing. Some initial causal factors for the roof collapse and the injuries sustained, as well as some initial recommendations, are completed. Additional items to complete are identified and divided up.
June 21, 2011
The Serious Accident Review Team met at SMFD headquarters. An update was given on the injured firefighters condition. Video that was obtained from KCRA Channel 3 was reviewed. Captain Teague reviewed the SCBA and PPE evaluations. Captain Hudson advised that he was having difficulty getting building information as the records were not readily available. The transcript of the dispatch tapes was distributed to the team.
The review of the training records was completed by Captain Tateishi. All members met the minimum training requirements for the positions they were assigned.
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July 12, 2011
The Serious Accident Review Team met at SMFD headquarters. The team developed causal factors, contributory factors, and recommendations. The team discussed lessons learned. Captain Teague reviewed the sequence of events with the group. Captain Teague advised that the draft report should be completed by July 22, 2011.
July 23, 2011 The draft report was completed by Captain Teague. The report was distributed to the team members by email for review.
July 25, 2011 Feedback from the team members was incorporated into the draft report. The draft report was sent to the members of the Board of Review.
July 26, 2011 The Board of Review met to review the report. The report was accepted by the Board of Review after several minor editorial changes.
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Structural Summary
The Ellsworth Circle incident occurred in a neighborhood known as Carmichael, which is located in an unincorporated section of Sacramento County. The basic structural information is a follows:
One story single family dwelling built in the 1970s 3 bedroom, 2 bathroom Approximately 1600 square feet 50 wide by 60 deep Wood frame (Type V) Conventionally framed roof assembly with composition shingles Stucco exterior wall covering
Building Construction Features:

In the fire service, the term building construction refers to the type of construction of the structure, as well as the combustibility and the fire resistance rating of a building's structural elements. To classify buildings consistently, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has developed five Types of construction. The structure on Ellsworth Circle was of Type V construction, which means that its structural members consisted entirely of wood and is probably more vulnerable to fire, both internally and externally, than any other building type.
Roof Assembly
The roof was constructed from 2X8 rafters that were placed 24 inches on center. The roof was sheathed with inch plywood. There was 1 layer of compositions shingles attached to the roof. The structure members on the roof assembly over the garage were not protected by sheet rock.
Wall Construction
All interior and exterior walls were constructed of 2 X 4 wall studs that were 16 inches on center. The interior walls were covered with inch sheet rock. The exterior walls were
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covered with paper and stucco. There were no shear panels present. The exterior wall void spaces were filled with roll-in fiberglass insulation. The interior of the walls in the garage were not enclosed by sheet rock.
Garage
The structure had an attached 2 car garage. The garage had an aluminum garage door operated by a garage door opener. At the time of the fire it is unknown if the garage door was open or closed. Upon arrival of the first due engine, the garage door was already damaged by the fire allowing flames and smoke to escape out of the garage door opening.
The occupant used 2 x 8 boards to span the garage width. He placed plywood on top of these boards to create more storage space. There was a large amount of storage in this area creating a large fire load in the garage.
As stated above, the structural members of the roof assembly of the garage were not protected with sheet rock allowing direct fire impingement on the structural members.
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Pre-Incident Information
Pre-Incident Company Status and Location
At the time of the incident, all of the first alarm companies were available in quarters.
Company E 108 E 23 E 21 E 24 TR 23 R 21 Batt 7 (Sta 106) Batt 13 (Sta 21) M 21
Status* AIQ AIQ AIQ Assigned** AIQ AIQ AIQ AIQ AIQ
Staffing 3 3 3 3 4 4 1 1 2
Distance to Incident* 0.4 mi 2.5 mi 3.3 mi 3.6 mi 2.5 mi 3.3 mi 7.0 mi 3.3 mi 3.3 mi
AIQ= Available in quarters AOR= Available on radio Unavail= Unavailable for dispatch * Distances calculated using Google Earth. ** Engine 24 was reassigned from a lower priority incident.
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Location
Station 108
6736 Ellsworth Circle
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Weather Conditions
Time of incident: Temperature: Humidity: Winds:
0750 57F 67% 9 mph SE
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Sequence of Events
The development of an accurate account of the events as they transpired requires the use of multiple sources including: dispatch logs; radio transmissions; individual statements; interviews; and electronically recorded MDT transmissions. When a specific sequence of events occurred simultaneously, all attempts were made to place them in the best logical order. The names of the Department members involved in this accident have been
redacted from this report and they are referred to by their riding/assignment position. The sequences of events are described in the narrative below:
On May 31, 2011, at 07:49 AM, the Sacramento Regional Fire and EMS Communications Center (SRFECC) began receiving calls reporting a structure fire on Ellsworth Circle. From the beginning there was confusion about the location. The first caller was very excited and was having difficulty conveying the proper information. Also, he was trying to evacuate the building occupants at the same time.
The call taker at SRFECC was experiencing difficulty matching the address with the computer-aided dispatch (CAD).
07:48:28 Dispatcher 7: Spell Elsworth for me. I am getting an Elsworth Way. Caller 1: E-L-L Ellsworth Way, Ellsworth Circle. Its next to Selkirk.
07:48:47 Dispatcher 7: I'm showing an Elsworth Way. I'm not showing it a valid, I am not showing it as a valid thing. What is the actual address?
Dispatcher 7 originally typed in 6736 Elsworth. The CAD brought up the address as Elsworth way in the City of Folsom. Dispatcher 7 believed this was the wrong address because the callers cell phone was connected to a cellular tower in Carmichael. Several additional callers were able to confirm the location as 6736 Ellsworth Circle in Carmichael.
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At approximately 07:50, personnel at Station 108 received a walk in report of a fire behind the station. Engine 108 Captain reported the fire by radio to SRFECC on Fire Com Alpha 2.
07:50:01 Engine 108 Captain: Fire Dispatch, Engine 108.
07:50:02 Fire Dispatch: Fire Dispatch.
07:05:09 Engine 108 Captain: We have a structure fire behind the station. Go ahead and start an S3 for Station 108 at this point. I will get you an updated address in just a minute.
07:50:18 Fire Dispatch: Engine 108 we got the call now pending dispatch on Ellsworth Circle. SRFECC dispatched the call at 07:50:26. The first alarm assignment for 6736 Ellsworth Circle is Battalion 7, Battalion13, Engine 108, Engine 23, Engine 21, Engine 24, Truck 23, Rescue and Medic 21. All apparatus was available in quarters (AIQ) at the time of the dispatch except for Engine 24. Engine 24 was diverted from a lower priority call. Engine 108 proceeded from Station 108 eastbound on Winding Way to Dewey Orchard Ct. Engine 108 turned left onto Dewey Orchard Court and then left onto Ellsworth Circle. Engine 108 proceeded down Ellsworth Circle to the dispatched address. The involved structure was on the south side of the street. Engine 108 parked in front of the dispatched address against the north side curb.
Engine 108 arrived on scene at 6736 Ellsworth at 07:52:40. Engine 108 provided a report on conditions and began fire attack. Engine 108 arrived on scene as the rest of the assignment was going en route.
07:52:35 Engine108 Captain: Engine 108's on scene. One story house. Wellinvolved garage. We will be initiating fire attack. Second due get us a water supply and assume command.
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Engine 108 Nozzle exited the engine wearing full turnouts and an SCBA. He pulled a 1 inch hose line with a fog nozzle from the cross lay and advanced across the street to the front yard of the involved structure. Engine 108 Nozzle and Engine 108 Captain made entry into the house using the front door. Engine 108 Engineer completed the connection to the 1 inch hose line and began flowing water to it. Engine 108 Engineer then pulled a 1 hose line with a smooth bore nozzle and placed that in the front yard.
Figure 1Fire conditions at Engine 108's arrival
Engine 108 Captain and Engine 108 Nozzle entered the structure from the front and
proceed to the interior garage man door. When Engine 108 Nozzle arrived at the man door, the fire had not penetrated the door. Engine 108 Captain pulled ceiling in the area of the man door and did not see any fire in the attic.
Engine 108 Captain and Engine 108 Nozzle exited the structure just as Engine 108 Engineer placed the second line into service. Engine 108 Captain and Engine 108 Nozzle each directed a hose line onto the fire from the garage door. They flowed water for approximately 45 seconds before the fire darkened down.
Battalion 7 did not conduct a roll call on the tactical channel. Battalion 7 made several attempts to contact Battalion 13 on the tactical channel. In a post incident interview, he stated he was going to advise Battalion 13 that Battalion 13 would likely arrive first. Battalion 13 did not respond to these transmissions.
Battalion 7 made several assignments while responding. These assignments were based on the residential structure fire Standard Operating Procedure.
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07:54:25 Battalion 7: Engine 23, Battalion 7.
07:54:28 Engine 23: 23.
07:54:30 Battalion 7: Are you going to be my second in engine?
07:54:33 Engine 23: Ah, looks like it, Chief. Were coming up on Del Campo High School now.
07:54:39 Battalion 7: Copy. Go ahead and take water supply, take command, and get a two out line.
07:54:48 Battalion 7: Truck 23, Battalion 7, on your arrival I want you to go ahead and spilt. Give me some ventilation and assume a primary.
07:54:55 Truck 23: Ventilation and primary.
Engine 23 turned on to Dewey Orchard Court and stopped at the hydrant at Dewey Orchard and Ellsworth. Engine 23 Nozzle exited the engine and pulled the 5 inch supply line to the hydrant. Engine 23 Nozzle attached the 5 inch supply to the hydrant steamer connection. Engine 23 proceeded down Ellsworth Circle to the involved structure. Engine 23 Captain noted that Battalion 13 arrived and parked at Ellsworth Circle and Selkirk Way.
Engine 23 Captain went to Battalion 13 and asked if Battalion 13 had command. Battalion 13 replied that he had command. Battalion 13 stated during a post incident interview that he transmitted the transfer of command over the tactical channel. This transmission was not recorded on the tactical channel. Battalion 13 assigned Engine 23 Captain as Interior Division in a face-to-face conversation.
Truck 23 arrived at 07:57:17. Truck 23s crew split into two teams. Team 1 consisted of Truck 23 Captain and Truck 23 Saw. Team 1 went to the roof for vertical ventilation. Team
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2 consisted of Truck 23 Engineer and Truck 23 Irons. Team 2 went to the interior to perform a primary search.
Engine 21, Rescue 21, Medic 21, and Engine 24 arrived simultaneously at 07:57:40. Each unit transmitted their arrival on the tactical channel A6. Rescue 21 Captain advised that he was splitting his crew into two teams with one team going to the roof, and the other team going to the interior.
Battalion 7 contacted Engine 23 Captain on the tactical channel to remind him that he was in command. Engine 23 Captain believed that Battalion 13 was in command.
07:58:28 Battalion 7: Engine 23, Battalion 7.
07:58:28 Engine 23: 23.
07:58:33 Battalion 7: Yes, sir. Confirm that you know youre in command. You have all your units on scene.
07:58:45 Engine 23: 23 copies. Battalion 13 is also on scene.
Rescue 21 Captain and Rescue 21 Saw made their way to the front door of the structure. Rescue 21 Tools met Truck 23 Captain on the Alpha/Delta corner of the structure where Truck 23 Captain and Truck 23 Saw were placing a ladder to access the roof. Rescue 21 Tools told Truck 23 Captain he was assigned to the roof also. During a post incident interview Rescue 21 Engineer stated that he was confused about his assignment because at his last fire he was on the interior team. After donning his PPE he entered the structure instead of going to the roof.
Battalion 13 notified SRFECC that he was assuming Ellsworth Command on Command A2.
07:59:21 Battalion 13: Ive arrived on Ellsworth. Im establishing Ellsworth Command. We have a well-involved garage fire impinging onto a fence on the B side of the structure. Engine 108s interior.
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Truck 23 Captain, Truck 23 Saw, and Rescue 21 Tools ascended the ladder to the roof. Truck 23 Captain used a rubbish hook to sound the roof. They proceed to the ridge of the roof and then towards the B side of the structure. Truck 23 Captain continued to sound the roof in front of their path. In post incident interviews, Truck 23 Captain, Truck 23 Saw, and Rescue 21 Tools stated that there was no indication that the roof was unstable.
Battalion 13 requested an estimated time of arrival from Battalion 7. This was the first transmission of Battalion 13 that was recorded on the tactical channel.
07:59:59 Battalion 13: Battalion 7, whats your estimated time of arrival?
08:00:03 Battalion 7: 3 to 5.
08:00:07 Battalion 13: Copy that.
Truck 23 Captain marked the spot he wanted the first ventilation hole cut. This was on the B side of the garage. Truck 23 Saw cut a 4 foot by 4 foot ventilation hole. Truck 23 Captain used his rubbish hook to clear the hole. There was very little smoke coming from the hole as it was cut on living quarters side of the garage separation wall. Truck 23 Saw wanted to move towards the Alpha side of the garage and cut a second hole that would access the garage. During a post incident interview, Truck 23 Captain was unsure if this was a good idea. Due to the noise of having two saws running and SCBA masks in place, Truck 23 Saw and Truck 23 Captain had difficulty communicating.
During the post incident interviews, Truck 23 Captain stated he did not want Truck 23 Saw to move over the burning garage. Truck 23 Saw stated in his interview that he thought that Truck 23 Captain wanted him to initiate a second cut.
Ellsworth Command (Battalion 13) assigned Engine 24 as the Rapid Intervention Crew (RIC) during a face-to-face conversation. Engine 24 began to perform a lap of the structure.
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Rescue 21 Tools cut a ventilation hole over the living area of the house. He tried to clear the ventilation hole using his saw without success. Truck 23 Captain went to assist Rescue 21 Tools in clearing the ventilation hole. Truck 23 Saw moved about 4 feet towards the Alpha side of the structure to start another vent hole. Truck 23 Saw felt that the roof was stable at this point, and as he was getting ready to make the first cut, the roof collapsed under him. He began falling backwards. In an attempt to stop himself from falling into the garage, he threw his arms out to the side hoping to catch a structural member. The section of roof that collapsed was approximately 6 feet across so he was not successful in catching onto the structure. Truck 23 Saw had no indication that collapse was imminent. No one on the scene remembered hearing any noises that would indicate a collapse.
Truck 23 Saw fell into the garage and landed on his back. His helmet was knocked forward during the fall and
Figure 2 Fire conditions immediately after Truck 23 Saw went through the roof
displaced his face piece, breaking the seal. His SCBA began free flowing. Truck
23 Saw repositioned his face piece which caused it to reseal. Roofing material covered his legs. In a post incident interview, Truck 23 Saw stated he made Mayday transmission; however no transmission from his radio was recorded. Truck 23 Saw did not activate his Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) or the Emergency Notification feature on his radio.
Rescue 21 Tools noticed a change in the fire and smoke conditions behind him. He turned around and saw a large hole in the roof of the garage with flame venting out. He advised
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Truck 23 Captain that he could not find Truck 23 Saw. Rescue 21 Tools proceeded to the edge of the collapsed area but still could not locate Truck 23 Saw.
Engine 23 Nozzle had completed the hydrant hook up and was jogging down Ellsworth Circle towards the fire. He heard a bystander yell at him. He turned toward the bystander and the bystander told him that a firefighter had fallen through the roof. Engine 23 Nozzle ran to the front of the structure to meet with Engine 23 Captain. He advised Engine 23 Captain of the firefighter through the roof.
Truck 23 Captain transmitted the Mayday call.
08:01:25 Truck 23: Units on scene. Mayday, Mayday, We have a firefighter through the roof in the garage. Hes in the garage.
Command did not immediately acknowledge the Mayday transmission. Battalion 7 asked Command if he heard the Mayday. 08:01:45 Battalion 7: Command, Battalion 7, did you copy the Mayday? Battalion 13: I copy the mayday. RIC Team we have a firefighter through the roof.
There was no acknowledgement that the RIC team had heard the Mayday transmission or Commands transmission. Battalion 7 asked SRFECC to have the on duty Assistant Chief respond to Ellsworth. Battalion 13 requested a second alarm assignment to Ellsworth. Several units began asking questions about the downed firefighters location. SRFECC dispatched a second alarm at 08:02:21. The second alarm assignment was Battalion 14, Battalion 5, AMR108, Engine 31, Engine 109, Hazmat 109, Engine 27, and Truck 65.
Battalion 13 requested an additional tactical channel. SREFCC assigned Tactical A10 as the second tactical channel. Battalion 13 requested all units not involved in the rescue to move to Tactical A10.
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08:03:51: Battalion 13: All units on scene not actively involved in the rescue of the firefighter, I want you to switch to Alpha 10, A10. RIC Team I want you to stay on A6, I want you to stay on A6 with the firefighter in the garage. Can you locate him and do we have a name on that firefighter?
Truck 23 Saw noticed that it was getting hot and he began trying to exit. He was able to roll over and began trying to push himself free. On his third attempt to extricate himself he felt his left knee pop and become weaker. He continued to try to get himself clear of the debris. Rescue 21 Tools and Truck 23 Captain exited the roof. Rescue 21 Captain, Rescue 21 Saw, and Medic 21 Irons exit the front door of the structure and met with the roof crew in the front yard. They proceed to the garage. Rescue 21 Captain ordered Rescue 21 Saw and Medic 21 Irons to enter the garage from the front. Medic 21 Control began flowing water into the garage from the Alpha side. Truck 23 Captain followed Medic 21 Irons into the garage.
There were multiple radio calls from units attempting to get more information about the location of the downed firefighter.
08:02:22 Engine 108: Command, Interior, wheres the firefighter though the roof?
08:02:29 Engine 23: Ventilation Group, Interior. What firefighter went through the roof?
08:02:36 Engine 108: Where is he? Over the garage or over the living area?
08:02:41 Unknown: Repeat that.
08:02:43 Engine 108: Is he over the garage or over the living area?
08:02:48 Battalion 13: Copy garage or living area? Who is it?
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08:02:52 Engine 108: Command, Interior. We are trying to find where hes at so we can get him from the bottom.
Rescue 21 Saw and Medic 21 Irons reported in the post incident interviews that there was fire above and below them as they crawled over the debris. Both stated that having the hose line flowing in their direction by Medic 21 Control made the environment tenable. They made it over the debris and found Truck 23 Firefighter at the back of the garage near the rear wall.
Metro Fire Command Staff was notified. 2402, 2407, 2408, 2409, and 2417 were assigned to the call.
Rescue 21 Captain and Rescue 21 Tools proceeded to the door on the Bravo side of the structure. The door was stuck shut. Rescue 21 Tools was able to open the door slightly. He was able to see Truck 23 Saw and the other members who were trying to assist him. Rescue 21 Captain notified Command that Truck 23 Saw had been located.
08:02:57 Rescue 21: Rescue 21 is with the firefighter on the B side of the building. Were trying to get him out.
Truck 23 Firefighter became stuck on the door. Rescue 21 Saw was able to pull Truck 23 Saw back away from the door allowing it to open more. Once the door was opened farther, Rescue 21 Captain and Rescue 21 Tools were able to grab hold of Truck 23 Saw and pull him from the structure.
Battalion 7 arrived on scene at 08:04:01 and advised Battalion 13 he would assume RIC Group.
08:04:24 Battalion 7: Ellsworth Command, Battalion 7.
08:04:26 Battalion 13: This is Ellsworth Command, go ahead. I have the firefighter out of the house on the B side. I need a medic on the B side.
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08:04:36 Battalion 7: (Name redacted) move to A10. Run your fire. I will run the RIC.
08:04:40 Battalion 13: Copy that. Firefighter is out of the structure. Firefighter is out of the structure. I need a medic on the B side. And I copy you will run the RIC. I am moving to A10.
Truck 23 Saws helmet had become dislodged in the fall. However, his hood and SCBA face piece were still in place when Rescue 21 removed him. Once outside, Rescue 21s crew removed his face piece. According to Rescue 21 personnel, the SCBA free flowed for approximately 10 seconds before exhausting its air supply.
The fence on the B side of the building was making it difficult to move Truck 23 Saw. Rescue 21 Captain ordered that the fence be taken down. Several firefighters in the area began removing the fence.
Rescue 21 Captain made several attempts to transmit on the tactical channel to advise Command that Truck 23 Saw had been removed from the building. He was covered by other radio traffic each time. Finally Rescue 21 Captain was able to make his transmission.
08:06:18 Rescue 21: Break Emergency Traffic. This is Rescue 21.
08:06:26 Battalion 7: (Name redacted) give me a complete report.
08:06:31 Rescue 21: Ive got Firefighter (Name redacted) on the gurney. Were putting him into Medic 21 going to UCD. Hes conscious, alert and orientated. Complaining of knee pain. Hes got burns to his neck, elbow, and ah, looks like hes in moderate condition. Ill update you here in a minute as soon as we get him stripped.
08:06:53 Battalion 7: Alright sir, as soon as you get Firefighter (Name redacted) into the ambulance, I need you guys to reactivate as RIC and stand out front. We still have a working fire.
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Truck 23 Saw was placed on a gurney and moved to Medic 21. Medic 21 transported Truck 23 Saw to UC Davis Medic Center (UCDMC) code 3. Rescue 21 Tools placed all PPE removed from Truck 23 Saw into the cab of Truck 23.
Medic 21 arrived at the hospital and transferred care to the Emergency Department staff. Truck 23 Saw spent several hours in the Emergency Department prior to being released.
2402 and 2409 diverted to UCDMC. 2407 and 2408 responded to the incident scene.
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Injuries
Partial thickness burns to the back of the head. These burns eventually became infected with Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) requiring inpatient treatment. The MRSA infection was controlled with antibiotics, however during a subsequent surgery, the MRSA returned requiring more treatment with antibiotics
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Partial Thickness Burns to right hand.
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Left knee injury - This injury occurred when the firefighter was attempting to get out of the structure. This injury required surgical repair.
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Personal Protective Equipment

The injured firefighters Personal Protective Equipment was removed after the firefighter was rescued from the garage. The turnout coat, helmet, hood, and gloves were removed prior to transport. This gear was collected and inventoried by Captain Teague and delivered to Investigator Barsdale. Investigator Barsdale placed the gear into evidence.
The turnout pants went to the hospital where they were collected by a Deputy Chief and transported back to scene. The turnout pants were placed into evidence by Investigator Barsdale.
A visual inspection of all issued Personal Protective Equipment was performed by Captain Michael Teague on June 8, 2011 at 1345. The inspection was performed at the District SCBA Facility at 3000 Fulton Ave, Sacramento.
Helmet Model: Date of Manufacture: Lot Number: 1201 Bullard Firedome UST December 2001
The Bullard Firedome helmet was issued in 2002. The helmet had Bourke flip down eye shields. There were no face shield or goggles attached. There is no obvious heat damage to the helmet. The helmet shell was cracked on the right front brim area. The impact liner was visually intact. There was tar on much of the helmet. The chin strap was intact and
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operated normally. The helmet was placed out of service.
Cracked Brim
Hood The hood was a double layer Nomex hood. The manufacturers tag had been removed. There is no way to ascertain the date of manufacture. The hood was marked with the employees name and employee identification number.
There was tar attached to the exterior of the hood on the rear. There was a small area of discoloration on the interior side of the hood near the back. The hood was placed out of service.
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Turnout coat Manufacturer: Date of Manufacture: Serial Number: Morning Pride 09/23/2010
The turnout coat appeared grossly intact with no obvious signs of heat damage. There were multiple areas of the shell material where tar had adhered. There was no obvious damage to the thermal liner of the moisture barrier.
The turnout coat was sent to Scott PPE Recon for advanced inspection and cleaning. The coat was found to be in serviceable condition and was returned to the user.
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Turnout Pant Manufacturer: Date of Manufacture: Serial Number: The turnout pants appeared grossly intact with no obvious signs of heat damage. There were multiple areas of the shell material where tar had adhered especially around the knees. There was no obvious damage to the thermal liner of the moisture barrier. Morning Pride 09/23/2010
The turnout pants were sent to Scott PPE Recon for advanced inspection and cleaning. The pants were found to be in serviceable condition and were returned to the user.
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Boots Manufacturer: Date of Manufacture: Serial Number: Size: Pro Warrington 04/2008 310663071 10.5D
There was no apparent damage to the boots.
Gloves
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Leather work gloves
The injured firefighter was wearing leather work gloves at the time of the incident. The left glove was very dirty and had heat damage to the thumb. The right glove had heat damage on the tips of all fingers and on the side of the fifth digit. These gloves did not meet the District standard for structural firefighting.
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Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus

The Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District (SMFD) uses Scott Health and Safety AirPak 50 self-contained breathing apparatus. The Scott AirPak 50 is NFPA 1981 (2002 Edition) and NIOSH CBRN certified. The SCBA features an integrated Personal Alert Safety System (PASS), Mask-Mounted Regulator (MMR) with a head-up display (HUD) and a Vibra-Alert low air alarm. All SCBAs have an Emergency Breathing Supply System (EBSS). Each department member is issued a Scott AV2000 face piece and MMR. SMFD has established an SCBA maintenance facility. Most SCBA maintenance is performed by SMFD personnel who have received training by a Scott Health and Safety certified trainer. SCBA maintenance technicians provide inspection, repair, and testing of over 450 SCBAs and 600 MMRs. Each SCBA is tested on an annual basis using BioSystems PosiCheck 3 bench test device operated using software provided by Scott Health and Safety.
Post Incident SCBA Testing and Evaluation
The involved SCBA was secured at scene by Captain Teague and placed into evidence by Fire Investigator Barsdale. At the time it was placed into evidence, the face piece was connected to the MMR and the MMR was connected to the Low Pressure hose. Captain Teague noted at the time that the cylinder was empty. The pack was identified as Cache 21-3. This pack was being used as a replacement for the apparatus issued pack which was sent in
Photo 1 Front of SCBA Face Piece
for service. The involved SCBA was brought to the
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SCBA Maintenance Facility on June 8, 2011. At 1530 hours Captain Adam House, certified SCBA Maintenance Technician, and Captain Michael Teague, Department Safety Officer inspected and bench checked the involved SCBA.
Visual Inspection
Face Piece AV2000 Part no. 100779. Identified with a small label on the upper bezel as Wells, J.
The face piece is grossly intact. The lens is clear with no signs of crazing that would indicate excessive heat exposure. There are several scratches on the lens. The rubber face seal shows no signs of heat damage and is still pliable. The right side voicemitter has a mounting bracket for an electronic voice amplifier however the voice amplifier was not found. The head net showed damage from heat and was contaminated with a tarry substance consistent with composition shingles.
Cylinder The cylinder is a thirty minute capacity, fiberglass wrapped, aluminum cylinder manufactured by Luxfer for Scott Health and
Photo 2 Note tar on the netting.
Safety. The cylinder is designed to hold 4500 psi when filled.
This provides 45 cubic feet of air. Although the cylinder is rated for 30 minutes, the exertion of structural firefighting can reduce the usable time by more than one third.
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Upon visual inspection of the cylinder, there was no heat damage noted. The fiberglass wrapping was not damaged. There were multiple areas where a tarry substance had adhered to the cylinder. The valve was in an open position. The cylinder gauge read 0 psi (Photo 3). Upon initial evaluation, the cylinder was connected to the SCBA. The nipple coupling was hand tight
Photo 3 Cylinder gauge reading 0 PSI
on the cylinder. There was no way to leak test this connection as the cylinder was empty.
The pack and harness did not show any signs of heat damage. A rope bag was attached to the harness. All straps were able to be adjusted as designed.
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Functional Test The mask, MMR and pack were attached to the Posicheck device. Captain House preformed the testing. The PASS device activated properly with inactivity and by manual activation. The PASS device resets normally with movement. The purge valve worked appropriately. The Vibra-Alert low air alarm activated at the proper pressure. The SCBA passed all tests. It was cleaned and placed back into service.
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Photographs and Illustrations
Battalion 13 Rescue 21 Engine 108 Truck 23 Engine 23
Battalion 7
6736 Ellsworth Circle
Locations of first alarm apparatus.
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Hydrant
Water supply line - This supply is about 500 feet. There was a hydrant much closer.
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Vent hole cut by R21 Tools
Ladder placed by TR23
Vent hole cut by TR23 Saw
Location of vent holes cut by first alarm crews.
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Findings
The following are conclusions of the Serious Accident Review Team based on the chronology of events and factual data, weight of evidence, interviews, and professional judgment. Findings are grouped into the following categories: human, building construction, management, equipment, communications, staffing, and response times.
Human Findings
H-1 All department personnel met the training requirements for the position they were assigned.
H-2 Truck 23s crew split into two teams of two persons.
H-2 Rescue 21s crew split into two teams.
H-3 One of Rescue 21s crewmembers was confused about his assignment. He went to the interior instead of the roof.
H-4 Rescue 21 Tools did not wait for Rescue 21 Engineer before moving to the roof.
H-5 Truck 23 Captain did not want to move over the garage area.
H-6 Truck 23 Saw undertook independent action when he moved over the garage to start a second ventilation hole.
H-7 Truck 23 Captains focus was diverted to Rescue 21 Tools at the time of the roof collapse.
H-8 Truck 23 Captain remained calm and accurately described the position of the downed firefighter in the Mayday transmission.
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H-9 Several crews initiated a search for the downed firefighter without receiving orders from Incident Command.
H-10 Rescue 21 rapidly made access to the downed firefighter.
H-11 Rescue 21 and Medic 21 were able to rapidly remove the downed firefighter from the garage.
H-12 Medic 21 Control used a hose line to protect the rescue crews during rescue operations.
H-13 There was much confusion immediately after the Mayday call.
H-14 Battalion 13 did not appear to take control of the radio channel after the Mayday call.
H-15 The initial call taker at SRFECC had difficulty obtaining the correct address from the original reporting party.
Management Findings
M-1 Units followed the Regional Standard Operating Guidelines for residential structure fires.
M-2 Battalion 7 gave assignments to the first alarm companies while en route.
M-3 Battalion 13 did not announce his acceptance of command on the tactical channel. He did announce it on the command channel.
M-4 Battalion 13 used face to face communications for most on scene orders.
M-5 Battalion 13 had all units not involved in the rescue move to a different tactical channel.
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M-6 Battalion 13 requested additional resources in a timely fashion.
M-7 Battalion 7 assigned himself as RIC Group Supervisor.
M-8 SRFECC did not have all authorized positions staffed at the time of the incident.
M-9 It took over 2 minutes from the receipt of the initial call to dispatch of units to the incident.
M-10 All first alarm units were available at the time of the dispatch.
Building Findings
B-1 The structure was built in the 1970s.
B-2 The garage had unprotected structural components
B-3 The occupant added storage space to the garage by placing 2 x 8 and plywood that spanned the width of the garage.
B-4 The storage in the garage increased the fire load.
B-5 The rafters were 2 x 8 with a 16 foot span.
B-6 The connection between the rafters and the ridge beam failed causing the roof to collapse.
Equipment Findings
E-1 Truck 23 Saw was wearing his SCBA at the time of the incident.
E-2 Truck 23 Saw was wearing Morning Pride turnouts at the time of the incident.
E-3 The turnouts were manufactured on September 23, 2010.
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E-4 Truck 23 Saw was wearing leather work gloves.
E-5 The turnouts, helmet, and SCBA did not show any significant heat damage.
E-6 All Truck 23 Saws PPE was contaminated with a tarry substance which was likely residue from the roofing material.
E-7 Truck 23 Saw was on air for approximately 8 minutes total.
E-8 The SCBA was nearly empty when Truck 23 Saw was removed from the structure.
Staffing/ Response Time Findings

SR-1 All first alarm apparatus except Engine 24 were available at the time of dispatch.
SR-2 Engine 24 was diverted from a lower priority call.
SR-3 All first alarm apparatus met the response times recommended by NFPA 1710 except Battalion 7.
SR-4 The Sacramento Regional Fire and EMS Communication Center did not have all authorized positions staffed at the time of the incident.
Communications
C-1 Radio discipline was not maintained during the rescue.
C-2 During the response phase, Battalion 7 was unable to contact Battalion 13 on the tactical channel.
C-3 Battalion 7 gave orders to the first due units while responding.
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C-4 Battalion 13 initial report and announcement of command did not transmit on the tactical channel.
C-5 Battalion 13 gave most assignments face-to-face.
C-6 Battalion 13 did not acknowledge the Mayday transmission until prompted by Battalion 7.
C-7 Truck 23 Saws Mayday transmission was not recorded on the tactical channel.
C-8 Battalion 13 did not clear the tactical channel once the Mayday was called.
C-9 Battalion 13 did not make radio contact with the downed firefighter.
C-10 Battalion 13 did not gather more information from the person who called the Mayday.
C-11 Battalion 13 requested an additional tactical channel
C-12 Battalion 13 directed all units not involved in the rescue operation to the new tactical channel.
C-13 During the initial phase of the rescue, several units made radio transmissions without identifying their unit or who they were calling.
C-14 There was a large amount of chatter on the radio immediately after the Mayday. This likely covered the Mayday transmission of the downed firefighter.
C-15 The downed firefighter did not activate the emergency button the radio.
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C-16 Rescue 21 Captain had difficulty transmitting the information about the downed firefighter because of the amount of radio traffic.
C-17 Neither Battalion 7 nor Battalion 13 advised SRFECC of the Mayday.
C-18 The call taker at SRFECC had difficulty getting the correct address from the first caller.
C-19 Truck 23 Captain had difficulty communicating to the roof personnel due to the saw noise and SCBA use.
C-20 Truck 23 Captains Mayday transmission was clear and concise, accurately describing the situation and possible location of the downed firefighter.
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Causal and Contributing Factors

Causal Factors
Causal Factors are any behavior, omission, or deficiency that if corrected, eliminated, or avoided probably would have prevented the injuries.
Causal Factor 1:
A firefighter from Truck 23 took independent action and attempted to make a second vertical ventilation cut of a residential roof with a chainsaw during a working garage fire. In doing so the firefighter stepped onto a structurally unsound portion of roof resulting in a partial roof collapse and subsequent injury to the firefighter from a fall through the roof into active fire in the garage below. (Findings H-6, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-5, B-6)
Contributing Factors
Contributing Factors are any behavior, omission, or deficiency that sets the stage for an accident, or increases the severity of injuries. Contributing Factor 1: Staffing of the Sacramento Regional Fire/EMS Communications Center (SRFECC) at the time of the incident was below authorized levels. This resulted in a delay of dispatch, allowing additional fire growth to occur prior to fire suppression activities. SRECC dispatcher was required to function in a dual role of call receiving and dispatch processing. (Findings H-15, M-8, M-9, SR-4, C19)
Contributing Factor 2: A failure of intra crew communication on R21 resulted in only one firefighter receiving the assignment to assist with vertical ventilation and reporting to the Truck 23 Captain on the roof. (Findings H-3,H-4)
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Contributing Factor 3: The portion of roof over the garage that failed was comprised of unprotected, large open span sawed wood, stick frame construction that allowed for quick deterioration of roof supports under heat and flame impingement. 1 hour sheetrock protection of structural members was not a building code requirement at the time the home was constructed. (Findings B-2, B-3, B-4, B-5, B-6)
Contributing Factor 4: Heavy loading of combustible storage in the garage created increased fire intensity and spread resulting in early structural failure of roof components. (Findings B-3, B-4)
Contributing Factor 5: Having only one additional firefighter ascend the roof to assist with vertical ventilation required the Captain from Truck 23 to divide his attention between firefighters operating saws on the roof. This divided attention enabled Truck 23 Saw to take independent action and move to a structurally unsound portion of the roof that could not support his weight. (Findings H-3, H-4, H-6, H-7)
Survival Factors
A survival factor is an element discovered as part of the investigation that had a direct impact on fighter survival during a life threatening event. Survival Factor 1: Injured firefighter was wearing full Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) including SelfContained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) at time of fall, providing the firefighter with a survivable level of protection. (Findings E-1, E-2, E-3)
Survival Factor 2:
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Early recognition and transmission of the Mayday on the tactical radio channel by Truck 23 Captain resulted in the rapid communication to others on scene regarding the downed firefighter and his probable location. (Findings H-8, C-21)
Survival Factor 3: The situational awareness and spontaneous coordinated response of firefighters on scene to assist the downed firefighter resulted in rapid determination of his location and his successful removal from the Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) environment. (Findings H-9, H-10, H-11, H-12)
Survival Factor 4: The physical ability and skills of the rescue firefighters enabled them to perform the essential task of victim removal from the IDLH environment preventing further physical harm to the downed firefighter. (Findings H-10, H-11)
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Lesson Learned
As a result of the After Action Incident Analysis, the Serious Accident Review Team has identified some key learning points that will help prevent a re-occurrence of an event of this nature.
Face-to-face communications often ensures the message is properly received. However, it does not allow other crews to know that assignments have been given. When giving assignments face-to-face, it will help all crews maintain situational awareness if the assignments are announced over the radio.
Most successful rescues of downed firefighters are performed by the firefighters crew or crews working adjacent to the downed firefighter. All crews must be trained and ready to perform the rescue of a firefighter.
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Recommendations
The following recommendations have been developed by the Ellsworth Circle Serious Accident Review Team (SART). These recommendations are based on the causal and contributory factors the team identified in the factual report. Implementation of these recommendations cannot guarantee that a similar incident will not happen but will reduce the possibility of reoccurrence.
Recommendation 1 Develop and adopt an operational mandate requiring all personnel to don and wear full PPE including SCBA when operating on a roof or above an IDLH environment.
Recommendation 2 Sacramento Regional Standard Operating Guideline (SOG) committee should review Truck Company Operations related to splitting truck company crews on incidents involving multiple truck companies.
Recommendation 3 Sacramento Regional Standard Operating Guideline (SOG) committee should review Rapid Intervention Crew (RIC) and managing Mayday operations as it relates to switching tactical channels during the initial critical period of Mayday transmission and rescue operation coordination.
Recommendation 4 Face to face emergency scene assignments and actions should be transmitted on the incident assigned tactical radio channel to enhance communication and coordination of resources.
Recommendation 5 SRECC should staff all authorized positions at all times to minimize call processing and dispatching delays.
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Recommendation 6 Company Officers should develop and implement a crew resource management process to improve intra crew communication and ensure task level assignments are coordinated and understood. .
Recommendation 7 Training Division should provide additional awareness level training to all fire suppression personnel pertaining to residential construction.
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Appendix A Incident Communications

Radio System Overview
The Sacramento County Fire Service Agencies operate on a county-wide public safety and local government 800 MHz trunked radio system. The system consists of ten (10) different zones, with each zone assigned to a specific agency or liked agencies. Each zone contains 16 different radio channels. This system allows for county wide inter-agency communications by simply switching zones and selecting the proper channel. Each zone is formatted to fit the needs of that specific agency. However, all radios used by the various agencies operating on trunked system are programmed the same.
The Sacramento Regional Fire/EMS Communications Center (SRFECC) is the third largest fire dispatch center in the State of California dispatching over 150,000 incidents annually. They are organized as a Joint Powers Authority (JPA) and are supported by the fire agencies they serve. Together with these agencies, they provide fire protection and emergency medical service (EMS) dispatching for nearly all of Sacramento County and parts of Placer County covering over 1,000 square miles and serving over 1.3 million residents. The SRFECC provides dispatching services for eight (8) different fire agencies in Sacramento County. The county-wide trunked system has been operational since 1995.
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The Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District operates on the Alpha or A Zone of the 800 MHz trunked radio system. The jurisdiction that the incident occurs in will dictate what zone the incident will operate on. The radio programming for the Alpha zone is:
Sacramento Fire Department Radio Channel Template Channel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Display FDSPA FCOMA2 FCOMA3 FCOMA4 FCOMA5 FT A6 FT A7 FT A8 FT A9 FT A10 FT A11 FT A12 FT A13 FT A14 Dir 15 Dir 16 Description Dispatch Channel Operational Command Command Command Tac A6 Tac A7 Tac A8 Tac A9 Tac A10 Tac A11 Tac A12 TacA13 Tac A14 Direct 15 Direct 16 Use Dispatching incidents only Dispatch to Field/Field to Dispatch Command Level Tac Channel Command Level Tac Channel Air to Ground Fire ground tactical operations Fire ground tactical operations Fire ground tactical operations Fire ground tactical operations Fire ground tactical operations Fire ground tactical operations Fire ground tactical operations Fire ground tactical operations Fire ground tactical operations Non-trunked direct channel Non-trunked direct channel
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Incident Radio Traffic Transcript
The development of an accurate timeline requires multiple sources including: dispatch logs; radio transmission voiceprints; individual statements; and interviews. At the height of the incident, there were two (2) different radio channels being utilized for this incident. There are several occurrences of radio transmissions occurring simultaneously on different channels. All efforts were made to place those transmissions in the best logical order as possible. In some situations, time estimations were necessary because personal observations and radio transmissions were made without a time record/reference or source time references conflicted. When a specific time could not be determined, a best estimate of time was provided. Events that occurred sometime between established time references are indicated by asterisks (*). The time in pretences is the running time from time of dispatch
In an effort to help eliminate confusion regarding the radio transcriptions, the radio channels on the transcription table have been color coded. The assigned color code is as follows: 9-1-1 Call Taker Main Dispatcher CAD entries MDT transmissions Radio Channel A2 Radio Channel A6 (Tactical) Radio Channel A10 Radio Channel A11
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Channel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel
Time Elapsed 7:47:49 7:47:57 7:48:01 7:48:06 7:48:08 7:48:12 7:48:13 7:48:16 7:48:20 7:48:22 7:48:23 7:48:23 7:48:26 7:48:27 7:48:28 7:48:32 7:48:35 7:48:38 7:48:39 7:48:40 7:48:41 7:48:43 7:48:46 7:48:46 7:48:48 7:48:48 7:48:50 7:48:50 7:48:53 7:48:55
Unit CHP D7 D7 Caller1 D7 Caller1 D7 Caller1 D7 Caller1 D7 Caller1 D7 Caller1 D7 Caller1 D7 Caller1 D7 Caller1 D7 Caller1 D7 Caller1 D6 Caller2 Caller2 D7 Caller1 D6
Transcription CHP with a fire transfer. Go ahead sir. Fire Dispatch, What's the address of the emergency? Hi, This is the fire department what is the address of the emergency? 6736 Ellsworth. Hello! OK, you have to have to say it slower 6736 36. Your garage is on fire. Okay. What it is the address so we can get the fire department there? 6736 Ellsworth Ellsworth Circle 6736 Ellsworth Circle is this a house or an apartment It's a house, its house Okay. Is it. It's right behind the fire station on the corner of Slow down, slow down. Winding and Dewey. Spell Ellsworth for me. I'm getting an Ellsworth Way E-L-L, it is Ellsworth Way, Ellsworth Circle. It's next to Selkirk. OK and it's 6736. 6736 Ellsworth. OK Is there anyone else in there? OK slow down. OK sorry Slow down you said OK Ellsworth Circle Fire Dispatch, What's the address of the emergency? OK Ah 6725 Ellsworth Circle. It's not a my house. I see smoke coming down the street I'm not showing an Ellsworth Circle. Is it E-L-L Ellsworth E-L Ellsworth Way, Ellsworth Circle. Ellsworth way Ellsworth Circle
Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel
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7:48:57 7:48:57 7:49:00 7:49:05 7:49:05 7:49:08 7:49:14 7:49:15 7:49:18 7:49:20 7:49:20 7:49:21 7:49:23 7:49:25 7:49:28 7:49:29 7:49:30 7:49:30 7:49:30 7:49:31 7:49:34 7:49:37 7:49:37 7:49:38 7:49:38 7:49:40 7:49:41 7:49:42 7:49:43 7:49:43
D7 D6 Caller2 Caller1 D6 Caller2 D6 D7 Caller2 Caller1 D7 D6 Caller2 D6 D4 Caller2 D6 Caller3 D7 Caller2 D6 Caller2 D4 D6 Caller3 Caller2 D4 Caller3 D6 Caller3
I'm showing an Ellsworth Way. I'm not showing it a valid, I am not showing it as a valid thing. What is the actual address? 6725 Ellsworth Circle. Is it a house or an apartment? I see smoke coming down the street. I'm not sure where it's coming from. 6736 Ellsworth E-L-L-S-W-O-R-T-H. It says circle. What's the telephone number youre calling from? 863-0482. Somethings going on. We're right behind you guys. OK. I'm sorry it's in back of your address? OK 6736 we're getting a 6725 Ellsworth. Is that the same thing? Yeah. I hear people screaming. Hold on. I have to move my car. I got to move my car. Is there anybody inside the house? You're at 6725 Ellsworth Circle Yes, Yes, Oh my God. It's two house down. Maam, Maam, calm down. What's your name? Fire Dispatch, What's the address of the emergency? Bridgette And Bridgette, do you know if there is anybody in the home? Hi, There's a house fire on Winding Way at Dewey next to Winding Way Center. Sir? I don't know. I hear kids and mothers screaming. And Bridgette, what's the telephone number youre calling from? 863-0482 Do you know the address? Tell me what you see? We're at 60. Hurry up. They better get here right now. Fair Oaks We're right behind the fire station Maam, I need the address first. We're at 6713 Winding Way. I don't know the address of the house we can just see it. Tell me what you see? I see flames coming out of the garage.
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Tel Tel A2 Tel Tel A2 Tel Tel Tel A2 Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel Tel A2 Tel Tel Tel Tel A2 Tel A2 A2 A2
08/01/11
7:49:43 7:49:44 7:49:44 7:49:45 7:49:46 7:49:46 7:49:47 7:49:48 7:49:49 7:49:49 7:49:50 7:49:50 7:49:52 7:49:52 7:49:53 7:49:53 7:49:54 7:49:54 7:49:56 7:49:56 7:49:58 7:49:58 7:49:58 7:50:00 7:50:00 7:50:01 7:50:02 7:50:09 7:50:18
Caller1 D7 G59 D6 Caller2 Dispatch D6 D4 D6 G59 Caller3 Caller2 D4 Caller1 Caller2 D7 D6 Caller1 Caller3 Dispatch D4 Caller3 D7 Caller1 E108 D7 Dispatch E108 Dispatch
There's a cop here now. OK. Listen. The fire department is on their way. 6736 Ellsworth Way. Is that correct? Fire Dispatch, Grass 59. And it's from the garage. Yes. Fire Dispatch Go ahead and keep everyone out from it. OK? We have a report of a fire on Ellsworth. Is that near where you are? Don't go in the house. Don't send anyone back in. We are on the way. OK? Patient non transport. Grass 59, Medic 59 AOR. You can release 58. No Bye. We're showing Ellsworth Circle off of Winding. We have a report of a house fire It says Ellsworth Circle. I looked at the street sign. OK Just keep everybody away from it. Is there anybody inside the house? Alright Maam, bye, bye. No, I knocked on the door and got them all out. No Copy. we're on our way. Okay. Thank you. Okay. Very good. The fire departments on their way. Just keep everybody out of it. OK? OK Fire Dispatch, Engine 108. Alright. Bye, bye. Fire Dispatch We have a structure fire behind the station. Go ahead and start an S3 for Station 108 at this point. I will get you an updated address in just a minute. Engine 24 stand by for diversion. Engine 108 we got the call now pending dispatch on Ellsworth Circle.
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CAD A2 A2 A2 CAD A2 A2 A2 A2 CAD CAD CAD CAD CAD CAD CAD A2 A6 A2 A6 A2 A2 A6 CAD A2 CAD CAD A6 A2 A2
08/01/11
7:50:26 7:50:44 7:50:51 7:50:57 7:51:07 7:51:09 7:51:13 7:51:15 7:51:25 7:51:46 7:52:07 7:52:07 7:52:08 7:52:25 7:52:26 7:52:26 7:52:28 7:52:36 7:52:39 7:52:40 7:52:41 7:52:42 7:52:44 7:52:49 7:52:50 7:52:57 7:52:57 7:53:00 7:53:14 7:53:16
0:00:00 0:00:35 0:00:42 0:00:48 0:00:58 0:01:00 0:00:00 0:01:06 0:01:16 0:01:37 0:01:58 0:01:58 0:01:59 0:02:16 0:02:17 0:02:17 0:02:19 0:02:27 0:02:30 0:02:31 0:02:32 0:02:33 0:02:35 0:02:40 0:02:41 0:02:48 0:02:48 0:02:51 0:03:05 0:03:07
G58 Dispatch Dispatch E108 Dispatch M24 Dispatch M24 M21 E21 E21 TR23 E23 BC13 BC7 Dispatch E108 AMR28 E23 Dispatch Dispatch E108 R21 E24 E24 E108 BC7 BC7 Dispatch
Dispatch BC7, BC13, E108, E23, TR23, E21, R21, M21, E24 Fire Dispatch, Grass 58 copies the nontransport by Medic 59. We'll be AOR. Copy. Grass 58, Water Tender 58 AOR. Medic 259 out. Medic 24, Fire Dispatch En route Medic 24, Fire Dispatch Medic 24 Advised if you'd like a cover. Engine 24 was diverted. It will be Engine 31 from quarters. Copy En route En route En route En route En route En route En route Rescue 21 confirm response Is anyone on the tac yet? Fire Dispatch AMR28 has transport pending Kaiser Roseville 23 Copy Engine 24 responding to Ellsworth. Copy. Rescue 21 confirm response. Engine 108's on scene. One story house. Well-involved garage. We will be initiating fire attack. Second due get us a water supply and assume command. En route Show Engine 24 responding En route On Scene Battalion 7 copies that. Battalion 13, Battalion 7. Fire Dispatch, Battalion 7. Fire Dispatch.
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A2 A2 A6 A2 A2 A6 A6 A6 A6 A2 A6 A6 A6 A2 A2 A2 A6 A2 A6 A2 A2 A2 A6 A2
7:53:18 7:53:27 7:53:55 7:54:20 7:54:24 7:54:25 7:54:28 7:54:30 7:54:33 7:54:39 7:54:39 7:54:46 7:54:48 7:54:49 7:54:55 7:54:55 7:54:55 7:55:00 7:56:19 7:56:33 7:56:42 7:56:54 7:56:55 7:56:58
0:03:09 0:03:18 0:03:46 0:04:11 0:04:15 0:04:16 0:04:19 0:04:21 0:04:24 0:04:30 0:04:21 0:04:37 0:04:39 0:04:40 0:04:46 0:04:37 0:04:46 0:04:51
BC7 Dispatch BC7 E103 Dispatch BC7 E23 BC7 E23 Dispatch BC7 E23 BC7 Dispatch E103 Dispatch TR23 E103
Yes Maam, Engine 108's on scene. It sounds like they have a working fire. We're going to hold off on roll call. Copy Engine 108 on scene working fire. Battalion 13, Battalion 7. Fire Dispatch Engine 103 no emergency. We are assisting the resident with a reset. Copy Engine 103. Confirm 909 can be cancelled as well. Engine 23, Battalion 7. 23 Are you going to be my second in engine? Ah looks like it, Chief. We're coming up Del Campo High School now. Engine 103, Fire Dispatch, confirm 909S can cancel. Copy. Go ahead and take water supply, take command, and get a two out line. Copy that. Truck 23, Battalion 7, on your arrival I want you to go ahead and split. Give me some ventilation and assume a primary. Engine 103, Fire Dispatch. 103 Confirm 909S can cancel. Ventilation and primary. Affirm. Incoming units to Ellsworth, this appears to be on the court, not Ellsworth Circle. Ellsworth Court. Engine 25, Medic 24, you guys can cancel. Engine 25 AOR Fire Dispatch Engine 66. 23's arrived. Getting a water supply. Taking command and we'll pull a two out. Fire Dispatch We swung by and checked on that smoldering hay from ah, last night. Is there a way to reopen that call and reassign us to it. The dozer's going to be added or you may need to make another run the very end of Zinfandel.
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0:06:10 E23 0:06:24 M24 Ellsworth 0:06:33 Circle 0:06:45 E66 0:06:45 E23 0:06:49 Dispatch
A2
08/01/11
7:57:00
0:06:49 E66
CAD A6 CAD A2 A6 CAD A6 A6 A6 A6 A2 A6 CAD CAD A2 A6 A6 A6 A6 A6 A6 A6 A6 A6 CAD A6 A2 A2 A6 A2

08/01/11
7:57:07 7:57:09 7:57:17 7:57:19 7:57:19 7:57:24 7:57:38 7:57:43 7:57:47 7:57:57 7:58:06 7:58:10 7:58:11 7:58:15 7:58:15 7:58:16 7:58:28 7:58:31 7:58:33 7:58:45 7:58:55 7:59:03 7:59:08 7:59:10 7:59:14 7:59:15 7:59:17 7:59:18 7:59:20 7:59:21
0:06:58 E23 0:07:00 E108E 0:07:08 TR23 Dispatch TR23 0:07:15 R21 E24 E21 R21 M21 Dispatch E24 0:08:02 M21 0:08:06 E24 E66 E21 BC7 E23 BC7 E23 E23N E108E E23N E108E 0:09:05 BC13 E23 BC13 Dispatch E23N BC13
On Scene Who evers got water supply, there's a hydrant at Selkirk directly behind Engine 108. On Scene Copy, Standby. Truck 23's on scene splitting, two to the roof, two to primary. On Scene Engine 24 's going to be there in about 10 seconds. Engine 21's arriving too. Rescue 21 arrived. Rescue 21 will be splitting, two to the roof, two to the inside. Medic 21 arrived with the Rescue. E66 Fire Dispatch I will reopen your Spoto Drive and Zinfandel Drive call. Command, Engine 24's on scene. On Scene On Scene Copy, thank you. Engine 21's on scene. Engine 23, Battalion 7. 23 Yes, sir. Confirm that you know you're command. You got all your units on scene. 23 copies. Battalion 13 is also on scene. 23, you ready for water. Negative, stand by with the water. Water coming. Negative. Stand by. On Scene Negative on the water yet. Fire Dispatch, this is Battalion 13. Fire Dispatch Copy Stand by. I've arrived on Ellsworth. I'm establishing Ellsworth Command. We have a well-involved garage fire impinging on a fence on the B side of the structure. Engine 108's interior.
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A6 A2 A6 A6 A6 A6 CAD A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A6 A6 A6 A6 A6 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 CAD A6 A6 A6 A6
08/01/11
7:59:36 7:59:38 7:59:40 7:59:59 8:00:03 8:00:07 8:00:11 8:00:15 8:00:22 8:00:31 8:00:33 8:00:36 8:00:40 8:01:04 8:01:10 8:01:25 8:01:45 8:01:47 8:01:57 8:02:02 8:02:05 8:02:11 8:02:17 8:02:21 8:02:22 8:02:29 8:02:36 8:02:41
E108E Dispatch E23N BC13 BC7 BC13 0:10:02 BC13 M56 Dispatch E50 Dispatch E50 Dispatch E108 BC13 TR23C BC7 BC13 BC7 Dispatch BC7 BC13 Dispatch 0:12:12 Dispatch E108 E23 E108 Unk
Alright. Ready for water. Dispatch copies well-involved garage fire impinging on a fence B Side, Engine 108 is interior. Battalion 13 is also in command. Water coming. Battalion 7, what's your estimated time of arrival? Three to Five Copy that. Command On Scene. Medic 56 is on A3. Copy Medic 56 Fire Dispatch Engine 50 Fire Dispatch Can you change me from URC to AOR please Affirm. Command, Fire Attack. All units on scene we have a water supply. We have a water supply. We have a report of a puppy in the house. Engine 108 is interior. All inside units are answering to Engine 108. Units on scene. Mayday. Mayday. We have a firefighter through the roof in the garage. He's in the garage. Command, Battalion 7, did you copy the mayday? I copy the mayday. RIC Team we have a firefighter through the roof. Fire Dispatch, Battalion 7. Fire Dispatch Yes, Maam, advised the Metro on duty AC to respond to Ellsworth. Fire Dispatch, this is Ellsworth Command. Dispatch me a second alarm. Copy, Command Second alarm. Battalion 7, I copy your traffic as well. Second Alarm BC14, BC5, AMR108, E31, E109, HM109, E27, TR65, 2431. Command, Interior, wheres the firefighter through the roof? Ventilation Group, this is interior. What firefighter went through the roof? Where was he? Over the garage or over the house? Repeat that.
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A2 A6 A6 A2 A6 A2 CAD A6 A2 A2 A2 CAD CAD A2 CAD A2 A2 A2 A2 A6 CAD A2 A6 A2 CAD

08/01/11
8:02:42 8:02:43 8:02:48 8:02:51 8:02:52 8:02:54 8:02:55 8:02:57 8:03:02 8:03:04 8:03:06 8:03:10 8:03:16 8:03:16 8:03:17 8:03:20 8:03:23 8:03:32 8:03:40 8:03:47 8:03:48 8:03:49 8:03:52 8:03:57 8:04:01
Dispatch E108 BC13 Dispatch E108 BC7 0:12:46 BC14 R21 BC13 Dispatch BC13 0:13:01 AMR108 0:13:07 E109 M109 0:13:08 HM109 Dispatch Dispatch BC13 Dispatch BC7 0:13:39 E27 2402 BC13 Dispatch 0:13:52 BC7
Ellsworth Command, Fire Dispatch. Is he over the garage or over the living area? Copy garage or living area? Who is it? Battalion 7, Fire Dispatch. Command, interior. We are trying to find where he's at so we can get him from the bottom. Stand by En route (Unintelligible) Rescue 21 is with the firefighter on the B side of the building. We're trying to get him out. Fire Dispatch this is Ellsworth Command. Fire Dispatch I'm going to need a second tac channel for this fire for the RIC rescue. I'll need a second tac channel. En route En route Fire Dispatch, Medic 109 add us to the call with the truck and the engine please. En route Medic 109 copy. Ellsworth Command, your second alarm is on Alpha 11. Additional tac channel Alpha 10. A10. Do you have a staging location? Copy that. I want them to stage at Ellsworth and Selkirk. Ellsworth and Selkirk. Copy, Ellsworth and Selkirk for staging location. Second Alarm is Alpha 11. Additional tac is Alpha 10. Command, Battalion 7. En route Fire Dispatch, 2402, show 2402, 07, and 09 en route Selkirk. All units on scene not actively involved in the rescue of the firefighter, I want you to switch to Alpha 10, A10. Dispatch copies On Scene
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A2 A6 A2 A6 A6 A6 A6 CAD A6 A6 A2 A6 A11 A2 A2 A2 A11 A2 A2 CAD CAD A6 A11 A11 A2 A6 A2

08/01/11
8:04:04 8:04:05 8:04:07 8:04:15 8:04:19 8:04:24 8:04:26 8:04:31 8:04:36 8:04:40 8:04:53 8:04:54 8:04:55 8:04:56 8:04:58 8:04:59 8:05:04 8:05:05 8:05:08 8:05:12 8:05:14 8:05:14 8:05:15 8:05:19 8:05:20 8:05:22 8:05:23
2402 BC13 Dispatch BC7 Unk BC7 BC13 0:14:22 ARSON3 BC7 BC13 Dispatch Unk E109 BC7 Dispatch BC7 HM109 Dispatch TR65 0:15:03 BC5 0:15:05 E31 BC7 M109 E109 Dispatch E31 TR65
Also, 2401 has been made aware of the situation. RIC Team I want you to stay on A6, I want you to stay on A6 with the firefighter in the garage. Can you locate him and do we have a name on that firefighter? Copy, 2401 aware. Command, Battalion 7. Firefighter's out. Ellsworth Command, Battalion 7. This is Ellsworth Command, go ahead. I have the firefighter out house on the B side. I need a medic on the B side. En route Chris, move to A10. Run your fire. I will run the RIC. Copy that. Firefighter is out of the structure. Firefighter is out of the structure. I need a medic on the B side. And I copy you will run the RIC. I am moving the fire to A10. Battalion 5, Engine 31, 2431, Unintelligible. 109's on A11, is anybody up for second alarm roll call? Fire Dispatch Battalion 7. Go ahead. Yes, Maam, we have an update. We have the firefighter out of the house. (unintelligible) You got Hazmat 109, Adam, I've got five guys if you need them when we get there. Copy Battalion 7. Fire Dispatch, Truck 65 can you attach me to the call please. En route En route Medic 21, Battalion 7. Medic 109 is on 11. Copy that, E109 go ahead and taking a roll call, second alarm on A11. Engine 31. I have Hazmat 109 and Medic 109. Engine 31, Engine 27, and AMR108. Copy, Truck 65. Confirm your en route Ellsworth? 31 That's affirmative.
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A6 CAD A2
8:05:23 8:05:24 8:05:25
BC7 0:15:15 TR65 Dispatch
Medic 21 confirm youre going to have the tr. The car of the down firefighter? En route Copy All units on scene, the firefighter has been removed from the garage, the firefighter has been removed from the garage. Continue with extinguishment efforts. Medic 21 is taking care of the firefighter. Fire Dispatch, 2417 add me to 108's structure fire. 2417 en route. En route Command, this is interior. We have the firefighter on the B side. We have Medic 21 with him right now. He's conscious. We'll give you an update in a second. Interior, this is Command. Give me a report on conditions. En route RIC Group Supervisor, copy. Units responding second alarm structure fire at 6725 Ellsworth Circle, Engine 109 is on Alpha 11 for roll call. Engine 31, Engine 27, AMR108. Which units running RIC right now? Break. Emergency Traffic. This is Rescue 21. (Name redacted) give me a complete update. I've got Firefighter (Name redacted) on the gurney. We're putting him into Medic 21 going to UCD. He's conscious alert and orientated. Complaining of knee pain. He's got burns on his neck, elbow and ah, looks like he's in moderate condition. I'll update you here in a minute as soon as we get him stripped. Dozer 1, Engine 66. Alright sir, as soon as you get Firefighter (Name redacted) into the ambulance, I need you guys to reactivate as RIC and stand out in the front. We still have a working fire. Units responding on the second alarm to Ellsworth. Who's the first due engine? On Scene Battalion 13, this is Engine 109, I've done a roll call. I haven't got 31 on A11 yet. It should be 31, should be first up on the second alarm but they haven't come up on A11 yet.
A10 A2 A2 CAD A6 A10 CAD A6 A11 A6 A6 A6
8:05:26 8:05:28 8:05:31 8:05:34 8:05:38 8:05:43 8:05:46 8:05:51 8:05:58 8:06:07 8:06:18 8:06:26
BC13 2417 Dispatch 0:15:25 2417 E23 BC13 0:15:37 2407 BC7 E109 BC7 R21 BC7
A6 A2 A6 A11 CAD A11
8:06:31 8:06:44 8:06:53 8:06:57 8:07:03 8:07:06
R21 E66 BC7 BC13 0:16:54 AMR108 E109
08/01/11
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A6 A11 A11 A11 A6 A11 A11 A2 A6 A11 A6 A11 A2 A6 A6 A11 A6 A6 A2 A6 A11 A6 A2

08/01/11
8:07:07 8:07:09 8:07:15 8:07:22 8:07:23 8:07:28 8:07:31 8:07:35 8:07:38 8:07:38 8:07:42 8:07:43 8:07:47 8:07:48 8:07:52 8:07:59 8:08:00 8:08:01 8:08:05 8:08:09 8:08:14 8:08:16 8:08:19
E23 E27 BC13 E109 BC7 HM109 E109 2402 HM109 E27 BC7
Fire Attack, this interior. Looks like we do have fire over the garage. You guys are making progress down that hallway. Keep doing what youre doing and give me a report on conditions. I'm out front. Engine 27 is on A11 responding. Copy that. I need my first truck to come in and supplement. I've lost Truck 23. Theyre going to be transporting with their firefighter to the Med Center. I copy on Alpha 11. Hazmat you're going to be that truck. You copy that? Fire Attack, this is RIC Group Supe. You need to be on A10 for your operations. You're reporting to command. Hazmat, copies. We're rolling back over to A6. Copy, Hazmat to A6. Medic 109, I got you on Alpha 11. I don't have Engine 31, Engine 27, Battalion 5. Fire Dispatch, 2402. Command, Hazmat 109 copies. We're coming to the T. We'll be your next in truck. Engine 27. Hazmat 109, report to 11 and go to staging.
All units on this fire, this is Ellsworth Command. The fire is being run on A10 at this BC13 point. A6 is the RIC channel. Go to A10. 2402 Fire Dispatch, 2402. HM109 B7, we've been given an assignment already. BC7 I copy that sir. TR65 Staging this is Truck 65. Checking on Alpha 11. 2407 Battalion 7, are you RIC Group Supe? BC7 That's affirmative. Battalion 7 is RIC Group Supe. 2402 Fire Dispatch, 2402. You can show 2402 and 2409 will be en route UC Davis to await Medic 21. Would you also confirm for me that they're en route to UC Davis? 2407 RIC Group Supe, 2407. I need all safety gear confiscated and put aside please. 109 copies I've got Truck 65, Engine 27. I'm just missing Engine 31. He should me second, first up on the second alarm engine. I copy. Copy, 2402 .
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E109 BC7 Dispatch
A2 CAD A11 A2 A2 A10 A2 A10 A2 A10 A2 A10 A10 A6 A10 A6 A6 A10 A2 CAD A11 A11 A11
8:08:23 8:08:25 8:08:26 8:08:30 8:08:33 8:08:35 8:08:40 8:08:42 8:08:45 8:08:46 8:08:49 8:08:49 8:09:00 8:09:09 8:09:10 8:09:14 8:09:19 8:09:19 8:09:24 8:09:41 8:09:45 8:09:51 8:10:07
BC7 0:18:16 M109 M109 2402 BC7 BC13 2402 E23 BC7 BC13 2402 E23 BC13 E31 E23 BC7 E31 BC13 E66 0:19:32 E31 BC13 E109 TR65
2404, RIC Group Supe. On Scene B13, Medic 109 is staging. 2402 Yes sir, we have Firefighter (Name redacted) out. If you can meet me on 6, I can give you an update. Interior, this is Command. This is Ellsworth Command, do you copy me on tac A10? Just want to confirm the destination will be UCD Command, on A10, this is Interior, I copy you. That's affirmative, sir, ah UC Davis. Give me a situation report please. Copy, you can call my cell phone for an update please. Still looks like it is in the garage. We are making access from the interior to the garage. We do have some flame in the garage. We're going to get a line on it at this time. Copy that. I have Hazmat 109 arriving. I'm going to assign them to Roof Division since I lost my Roof Division truck. I'll get back to you with a report in a minute. Command, Engine 31's arrived. Assignment? Copy that. If they're going to split. And if we can take ah, split we'll take two with an Aframe in the interior. Engine 31, you're supposed to be on 10 not 6. Copy. Copy that. Grass 58, Engine 66. On Scene Engine 31, this is Ellsworth Command. Command, I heard them come up on Alpha 6. They might be on Alpha 10 now. He should be your next in engine, he should be staging but they never came up on Staging Truck 65 What, ah, where would you like us? All units on A6, this is Ellsworth Command, Firefighting operations have been moved to Tac A10. A10. Move your radios to A10. The firefighter has been removed from the building.
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A6
08/01/11
8:10:09
BC13
A2 A2 A2 A2
8:10:17 8:10:21 8:10:22 8:10:28
BC7 Dispatch BC7 Dispatch
Fire Dispatch, RIC Group Supe. Fire Dispatch. Yes, Maam, we have Medic 21 to UC Davis with one firefighter. Copy, Medic 21 en route UCD with one firefighter. Second Alarm units responding to the structure fire on Ellsworth, this is Engine 109 on A11. Staging is going to be at Winding Way and Dewey. Orchard Court near Ellsworth. Winding Way. Dewey. Orchard Court near Ellsworth. Medic 109, you're assigned as Medical Group. Your location is on the A side of the structure. Be prepared to receive anybody that is injured. Command, This is interior. Interior, go ahead. Likes like we got the fire knocked down (unintelligible) and will need somebody in here for salvage. Copy that. I will assign Rescue 21 to salvage group. Fire Dispatch, Mather Tower with a radio check. How do you hear me? You're loud and clear. T3 UCD (Transport Code 2 UC Davis) (Unintelligible) Staging Engine 27. All units on scene, we have a report from Interior that a primary search has been down. It is complete. Let's back that up with a secondary search. Truck 65, that will be Staging location will be right here through the intersection n your right hand side. On Scene On Scene Command, this is Interior. Just information only. This is actually has a two story. Second story on it. Has a second story. We're going to go up and check. It looks like ah, some type of small attic room. Staging, RIC Group Supe. Engine 109 will take staging. Go ahead. Engine 109, RIC Group Supe, has Command be in conversation with you at all.
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A11 A10 A10 A10 A10 A10 A2 A2 CAD A2 A11 A10 A11 CAD CAD
8:10:43 8:11:10 8:11:27 8:11:33 8:11:36 8:11:48 8:11:50 8:11:53 8:11:55 8:11:57 8:12:02 8:12:08 8:12:14 8:12:15 8:12:19
E109 BC13 E23 BC13 E23 BC13 Mather Dispatch 0:21:46 M21 Mather E27 BC13 E109 0:22:06 E27 0:22:10 E109
A10 A11 A11 A11

08/01/11
8:12:19 8:12:23 8:12:27 8:12:32
E23 BC7 E109 BC7
A10
8:12:33
BC13
I copy that. Limited conversation. We're just arriving now. We didn't get Engine 31 on the second alarm to come up. Not sure of their location. I have other units holding here on Winding and Orchard. On Scene Roof Division, this is Command. Alright Sir, I you to hold them all there. Engine 31 somehow or another made it into the fire. I believe they are working on, in. I don't know if they have an assignment yet. I don't know if we are going to be using the second alarm so, ah, I advise command that you established it. On Scene We're going to let hold Rustic and Winding as Staging. I got Truck 65, Engine 27, Battalion 14 and myself in staging. Dispatch, 51 add 51 to Grass 51's call. Alright Engine 109 thank you. Copy Fire Dispatch, Engine 66. Add Dozer 1 to E66's call. He should be aware and en route. Command, Safety. Copy. Copy that. Safety, this is Command, go ahead. This is Safety. I have been informed that utilities have been secured to your building. Dispatch, Engine 76 can you place us AOR 78 moving en route 76. Copy. Fire Dispatch add Engine 50 to Grass 50's call. Grass and Engine 50 en route. Fire Dispatch, 7120. Fire Dispatch Command, Staging. Just advising staging is established Winding and (unintelligible) Go ahead and add me to B10's call. Copy, and repeat your identifier.
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A11 CAD A10
8:12:38 8:12:40 8:12:45
E109 0:22:58 BC14 BC13
A11 CAD A11 A2 A11 A2 A2 A10 A2 A10 A10 A10 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A10 A2 A2

08/01/11
8:12:45 8:12:49 8:13:00 8:13:08 8:13:09 8:13:12 8:13:17 8:13:19 8:13:25 8:13:26 8:13:27 8:13:31 8:13:33 8:13:41 8:13:52 8:13:56 8:14:52 8:14:59 8:15:00 8:15:02 8:15:07
BC7 0:22:40 TR65 E109 G51 BC7 Dispatch E66 Unk Dispatch BC13 BC13 Unk E76 Dispatch E50 Dispatch 7120 Dispatch E109 7120 Dispatch
A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A11 A2 A11 A11 A11 A10 A10 A2 A2 A2 A6 A11 A2 A11 A2 A10 A10 A2 A2 A2 A10 A2 A10 A10 A2
08/01/11
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7120 Dispatch Copy. Dozer1 Dispatch, Dozer 1. Dispatch Fire Dispatch
7120
Show Dozer 1 responding to 66's ah incident. And also show Water Tender and Grass 58 Dozer1 AIQ at 58. Unk Staging, Safety. Dispatch Copy Dozer 1 en route and Water Tender and Grass 58 AIQ at 58. E109 Staging. You can have yourself and everyone sitting at staging go AOR. Thank you, you guys. E109 Copy that Unk Engine 31, Safety. Engine 31, Safety. BC13 Fire Dispatch this is Ellsworth Command. Dispatch Fire Dispatch. BC13 Would you dispatch me an investigator and also have the PIO call my cell. BC7 RIC, RIC Group Supe. E109 Engine 27, Truck 65, did you copy that were released? Go AOR Dispatch Affirm. Arson 3 is already en route. TR65 Truck 65 Copies. BC13 Copy, thank you. Engine 31, Safety on 10. E31 31 Dispatch 2431, Fire Dispatch. Dispatch 2431, Fire Dispatch. 2409 Fire Dispatch, 2407 is, correction, 2408 is acting as PIO. E31 Staging, 31. Dispatch Copy. 2408, Fire Dispatch. E31 Staging, 31. E109 Engine 31, this staging. BC7 Fire Dispatch, Battalion 7.
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A2 A10 A2 A10 A2 A6 A10 A10 A2 A10 A10 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 CAD A10 A2 A2
8:18:02 8:18:03 8:18:07 8:18:08 8:18:11 8:18:14 8:18:15 8:18:20 8:18:21 8:18:23 8:18:36 8:18:39 8:18:44 8:18:46 8:18:50 8:19:04 8:19:07 8:19:11 8:19:14 8:19:20 8:19:37 8:19:52 8:20:10 8:20:14
Dispatch E31 BC7 E109 Dispatch HM109 E31 BC13 2409 HM109 HM109 2409 BC7 2409 BC7 BC7 2409 BC7 2409 BC7 0:29:28 ARSON3 HM109 TR65 Dispatch
Fire Dispatch. Do you have traffic? Yes, maam, requesting an air unit to our incident. Ah, if you're still in staging and not assigned you can go available. Copy Command, Hazmat 109. Were assigned. Thanks. Interior, this is Command. Battalion 7 call 2402's cell again please. Command, Hazmat 109. Command, Hazmat 109. B7, 2408. Correction B7, 2409. Go ahead, sir. Call 2402's cell again. Copy. 2409, Battalion 7. Go ahead. Yes, sir. Can I get a confirmation that you That one of the AC's is going to UC Davis. 09 and 02 are going to UC Davis. Copy, Thanks sir. On Scene Command, Hazmat 109. Fire Dispatch, Truck 65 on Alpha 3. Fire Dispatch. We heard the request for Air 35 to respond to the structure fire on Ellsworth. If you want to contact Command. We can actually pick up Air 23 and drop it off at the scene if they like and keep Air 35 in quarters. Copy. Confirm you're just clearing the fire call? Yeah, I should show AOR. Ellsworth Command, Fire Dispatch. Fire Dispatch, Battalion 10.
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A2 A2 A2 A2 A2
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8:20:17 8:20:33 8:20:37 8:20:40 8:20:46
TR65 Dispatch TR65 Dispatch BC10
A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A6 CAD
8:20:46 8:20:50 8:21:01 8:21:09 8:21:11 8:21:15 8:21:24 8:21:35 8:21:37 8:21:51 8:21:54 8:21:57 8:22:07 8:22:12 8:22:16 8:22:23 8:22:24 8:22:34 8:22:37 8:22:42 8:22:48 8:23:00 8:23:04 8:23:11 8:23:16 8:25:53 8:26:11
Dispatch BC10 Dispatch BC10 Dispatch Dispatch Dispatch BC7 Dispatch BC7 Dispatch TR65 M73 Dispatch BC5 TR65 BC5 TR65 BC5 Dispatch BC5 Dispatch BC5 Dispatch Truck 65 BC13 0:07:48 2417
Fire Dispatch. 51 units are on scene 8945 Brown Road. They got a quarter acre grass, structures threatened. They are taking fire attack. Copy 8945 Brown Road, quarter acre grass, structures threatened. Confirm you need no additional units for structure protection? Not at this time. I advise. Copy. Ellsworth Command, Fire Dispatch on Alpha 2. Battalion 13, Fire Dispatch Fire Dispatch, Battalion 7 go for 13. Battalion 13 had requested an air rig. Air 35 is en route. 65 is inquiring if they would like If you would like them to pick up Air 23 and keep Air 35 in quarters. That's affirmative. Copy Thank you. Truck 65 did you copy. That's affirmative. Show Air 23 en route. Fire Dispatch, Medic 73. Correction, Medic 73 is code 3. Copy. Truck 65, Battalion 5 on Alpha 2. Go ahead, Battalion 5. Air 23 is being used to ferry crews to the fire so it will be there shortly. Copy that, Thanks. Fire Dispatch, Battalion 5, did you copy? Negative Repeat. Air 23 is being used to ferry crews to the fire so it's on scene now. Copy. And just confirm Air 35 can cancel? At this time yes. I'm going to check with Command. Copy. Truck 65, Fire Dispatch, did you copy that? 10-4, Dispatch Thanks. Fire Dispatch Ellsworth Command. On Scene
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Appendix B - Glossary and TERMS

2402 2407 2408 2409 2417 4680 4681 4682 9901 9903 Deputy Chief Operations Metro Fire Assistant Chief Operations A Shift Metro Fire Assistant Chief Operations B Shift Metro Fire Assistant Chief Operations C Shift Metro Fire Captain Safety Officer Metro Fire Fire Chaplain radio identifier. Fire Chaplain radio identifier. Fire Chaplain radio identifier. Communications Center Manager. Communications Center Operations Manager.
Acting Captain:
A firefighter who has taken the Captains promotional exam, but who has not been promoted to Captain and is filling in for a full time Captain on a short or long term basis. The Acting Captain has the same duties and responsibilities as a promoted Captain. Or the senior Firefighter who has not taken the exam but is filling in for the regular Captain for a short term (less than 4 hours) while the Captain is temporally out of the station or unavailable. Often referred to as Sitting in the Seat.
Agency Administrator:
Managing officer of an agency, division thereof, or jurisdiction having statutory responsibility for incident mitigation and management. Example: Fire Chief. An acronym meaning Available in Quarters. When a fire company is in quarters and available for dispatch. See SCBA. A pre-designated set of fire companies and command staff that is assigned to certain or particular situations or calls for service. As an incident escalates additional alarms can be requested.
A.I.Q.:
Air-Pak: Alarm:
Alpha side:
Geographical designation that refers to the sides of a building, clockwise from the front. The Alpha side is the front or address side of a structure. An acronym meaning Available on Radio. When a fire company is out of the station in their 1st due district and available for calls via the radio. A member of an Engine Company, whose primary responsibility is to assist the Nozzle FF with the stretch of the attack line, help with the movement of the hose, and assist with forcible entry. A secondary hose line that remains outside and is used to protect crews operating on the inside, and meets the intent of two in/two out.
A.O.R:
Back-Up FF:
Back-Up Line:
BARB:
An acronym standing for Box Area Response Builder. BARB is a computer program that is part of the CAD system that determines the district boundaries for engine companies based on such factors as: driving distance, surface street speed limits, access problems, and station locations. Although a station may be physically closer to an area, it may be slower getting to that location because of traffic patterns, speed limits, etc, so BARB will pick the next closest engine because it can get there faster. A geographical response area. A command level supervisor who oversees a geographical area in which there are engine and truck companies assigned to it. Geographical designation that refers to the sides of a building, clockwise from the front. The Bravo side is the left side (clockwise rotation) of the house if one is standing and facing the Alpha Side of the house. A situation where personnel or equipment is caught in an advancing flame front. An acronym for Computer Aided Dispatch: A combination of hardware and software that provides data entry, makes resource recommendations, notifies and tracks those resources before, during, and after alarms, preserving records of those alarms and status changes for later analysis An acronym meaning Conditions, Actions, Needs report. An update or progress report from companies operating on the scene of an emergency to the Incident Commander identifying the current conditions, what actions they are taking and if there is a need for further help. See Company Officer
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Battalion: Battalion Chief:
Bravo Side:
Burnover:
CAD:
C.A.N.
Captain:
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Causal Factors:
Any behavior, omission, or deficiency that if corrected, eliminated, or avoided probably would have prevented the injuries. Geographical designation that refers to the sides of a building, clockwise from the front. The Charlie side is the back side or the side opposite of the Alpha side of a structure. Position within the Incident Command System that is responsible for the overall management of the incident. Synonymous with the term Incident Commander.
Charlie Side:
Command:
Company Officer: The immediate supervisor of engine or truck company members and is usually a Captain or Acting Captain. The Officer is responsible for selecting the initial strategies and tactics at a working fire. Contributing Factors:
Any behavior, omission, or deficiency that sets the stage for an accident, or increases the severity of injuries. Geographical designation that refers to the sides of a building, clockwise from the front. The Delta side is the right side of a structure, or to the right of the Alpha Side.
Delta Side:
Engine Company: A fire suppression apparatus with a staffing of four (4) personnel and carries 500 gallons of water, fire hose and a fire pump whos primary mission is to, extend hose to the seat of the fire for extinguishment. The Engine Company is staffed with four (4) personnel and includes: Company Officer, Engineer, Nozzle Firefighter and Back-Up Firefighter Engineer: A member of an Engine or Truck Company whose primary responsibility is to safely drive the apparatus and operate the apparatus at the scene of an emergency. Their duties including operating the fire pump or operating the aerial ladder. A situation where personnel are unexpectedly caught in a fire behavior related, life-threatening position where planned escape routes or safety zones are absent, inadequate, or compromised. These situations may or may not result in injury. They include "near misses." A preplanned and understood route firefighters take to move to a safety zone or other low-risk area.
Entrapment:
Escape Route:
Extreme Fire Behavior:
"Extreme" implies a level of fire behavior characteristics that ordinarily precludes methods of direct control action. One or more of the following is usually involved: high rate of spread, prolific crowning and/or spotting,
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presence of fire whirls, strong convection column. Predictability is difficult because such fires often exercise some degree of influence on their environment and behave erratically, sometimes dangerously. Exposure: Refers to a structure in the vicinity of the fire building. Exposures are commonly identified with a letter and a number to describe the location of the structure relative to the fire building (e.g., Bravo-3 Exposure, Charlie-1 Exposure). Rapid oxidation, usually with the evolution of heat and light; heat fuel, oxygen and interaction of the three. The manner in which a fire reacts to the influences of the environment. The simultaneous ignition of all of the combustible contents in a space with an average temperature range of 900F to 1,200F. Any combustible material, especially petroleum-based products. An acronym for Gallons Per Minute: A unit of measurement that describes the rate of fluid flow. Typically used to refer to the amount of water flowed through a hose line or the capacity of a pump. A forcible entry tool used for prying open doors and windows. The Halligan bar has three operating features: Fork, Adz, and pike or point. An acronym for Heads Up Display. A HUD is a series of LED lights located in the SCBA mask indicating the air remaining in the SCBA bottle. 2 Green lights=Full; 1 Green light=3/4; Yellow light= ; Red light = . An acronym for Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health: An atmosphere that poses an immediate threat to life, would cause irreversible adverse health effects, or would impair an individuals ability to escape from a dangerous atmosphere. This ICS position is responsible for overall management of the incident and reports to the Agency Administrator for the agency having incident jurisdiction. A planned response to a wildfire given the fire's potential fire behavior. The objective of initial attack is to stop the spread of the fire and put it out at the least cost. This is usually accomplished with an aggressive suppression action consistent with firefighter and public safety and values to be protected. A set of tools used for forcible entry, usually consisting on a Halligan Bar and Flat head axe.
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Fire:
Fire Behavior: Flashover:
Fuel: GPM:
Halligan Bar:
HUD
IDLH:
Incident Commander:
Initial attack:
Irons:
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Jurisdiction:
The range or sphere of authority. Public agencies have jurisdiction at an incident related to their legal responsibilities and authority for incident mitigation. Jurisdictional authority at an incident can be political/geographical (e.g., city, county, state or federal boundary lines), or functional (e.g., police department, health department, etc.). An acronym for Large Diameter Hose. LDH is 4 or larger in diameter and is used to transport water from a supply (hydrant) to an engine. A radio transmission to report firefighters who are trapped, lost, disoriented, or in a life threatening situation and are in need of immediate assistance. An acronym for Mobile Data Computer. A MDC is the latest onboard computer system used to transmit the status (AOR, en route, AIQ, etc) of the company, or to send messages to another company or dispatch. Additionally, MDCs have mapping programs available for use. An acronym for Mobile Data Terminal. A MDT is an onboard computer system used to transmit the status (AOR, en route, AIQ, etc) of the company, or to send messages to another company or dispatch. MDTs are an older technologically, and have limited capabilities. An EMS transport unit that provides Advance Life Support (ALS) care to patients. Or a Firefighter/Paramedic assigned to a Medic unit.
LDH:
MAYDAY:
M.D.C.:
M.D.T.:
Medic:
Mode of Operation:
A strategic plan for the initiation of operations based on size up of incident conditions. The three modes of operation are: Investigation, Fire Attack or Command. Trade name for a fire resistant synthetic material used in the manufacturing of flight suits and pants and shirts used by firefighters. Aramid is the generic name. An acronym meaning the National Fire Protection Association. The NFPA is a national organization comprised of firefighters, private sector manufactures representatives, safety organizations, and other interested parties, that establishes guidelines the equipment used, the manufacturing specifications or equipment and testing procedures for evaluating the equipment used by the fire service. The NFPA publishes bulletins containing the information and requirements for that various equipment. For example, NFPA 1951 is the bulletin that contains the specifications for production, use and testing of fire service ground ladders.
Nomex :
N.F.P.A.:
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Nozzle FF:
A member of an Engine Company whose primary responsibility is to extend the initial attack hose line and operate the nozzle at the direction of the Officer. An acronym meaning Personnel Accountability Report. A PAR is initiated by the IC when a Mayday or other emergency exists on the fire ground to account for all company members, their location, and their status. During PAR checks, company officers report the total number and accountability of members assigned to their company, the area they are operating in, and indicate the number of people operating outside of the hazard zone and the status of their SCBA air supply.
P.A.R.:
PASS:
Acronym for a Personal Alert Safety System. A device that senses movement and is designed to automatically activate an alarm signal indicating the wearer is in need of assistance. The device can also be manually activated to trigger the alarm signal. PASS devices may be integrated into the SCBA or a standalone device.
Personnel Accountability System:
A system that readily identifies both the location and function of members operating on an incident scene. A set of tools carried in the turnout pocket of firefighters. These tools may include: Crescent Wrench; Screw Driver set; Allen wrenches; Vice-Grips, Etc. An acronym meaning Personal Protective Equipment: That equipment and clothing required mitigating the risk of injury from or exposure to hazardous conditions encountered during the performance of duty. PPE includes but is not limited to: fire resistant clothing, helmets, goggles, gloves, respirators, foot wear. A Primary Search is a rapid search of the structure for trapped or missing civilians or occupants.
Pocket Tools:
P.P.E.:
Primary:
Riding Positions: Pre-designated assignments and/or responsibilities on a fire company based on equipment type and seat assignments. On an Engine company the riding positions are: Officer, Engineer, Nozzle Firefighter, and BackUp Firefighter. No a Truck Company the riding positions are: Officer, Operator, Tools Firefighter and Saw Firefighter. Roll Call: A procedure that occurs on the radio tactical channel and is conducted by the Battalion Chief to ensure that all companies are en route. During this procedure, all Company Officers are to voice if they are responding with reduced staffing levels.
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Scan:
Refers to a mode by which personnel can monitor multiple radio channels simultaneously. An acronym meaning Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Portable air (not oxygen) tanks with regulators which allow firefighters to breathe while in toxic smoke conditions. They are usually rated for 30 minutes of service and used primarily on fires involving structures or hazardous materials. An acronym for the Sacramento Regional Fire/EMS Communications Center also referred to as: Comm. Center or Fire Dispatch.
S.C.B.A.:
S.R.F.E.C.C.
Situational Awareness: SOG:
The knowledge of being aware of a situation as it actually exists. An acronym for Standard Operating Guidelines. Standard Operating Guidelines outline general practices used on emergency incidents and special situations and outline the basic roles for Engine Company members, Truck Company members, Medics, Battalion Chiefs, and Staff Officers during fire operations. All the work of extinguishing or confining a fire beginning with its discovery. A pre-connected fire hose line with a nozzle attached, usually located in the cross-lay bed. A typical SMFD engine company has two tank lines: 1150 1 and 1-200 1 . A majority of the time, the tank line is the preferred choice by the Officer for initial fire attack.
Suppression:
Tank Line:
Technical Specialists:
Personnel with special skills that can be used anywhere within the ICS organization. These personnel may perform the same duties during an incident that they perform in their everyday job. An acronym for Thermal Imaging Camera. A TIC is an electronic hand held device that uses the infrared spectrum of light to detect heat or temperature changes in an area, and displays the readings on an LCD screen. An additional tactical channel that is used by 2nd alarm companies to conduct roll call. This channel will eventually become the staging channel. This channel keeps all unnecessary radio traffic off the primary tactical channel.
T.I.C.:
Travel Channel:
Truck Company:
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A fire suppression apparatus with a crew of four (4), and an aerial ladder. The primary mission of the truck company is to support the engine
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company during suppression operations and to search and rescue trapped or missing civilians. Truck Companies carry all of the tools and equipment for their mission including: Chain saws, Ventilation fans, forcible entry tools, and specialized rescue equipment. The Truck Company staffing includes: Officer, Engineer, Saw Firefighter, and Tools Firefighter. Type V Construction:
As defined by the National Fire Protection Association, a form of construction where structural members consist entirely of wood. An agreement between management and the local bargaining unit allowing department members, who are union officers, out of the fire station to attend to union related business or issues. The act of walking around an emergency incident to conduct a scene size up.
Union Time:
Walk Around:
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Appendix C - Standard Operating Guidelines
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SACRAMENTO METROPOLITAN FIRE DISTRICT

Accident Review Factual Report

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Kevin McLean, Captain

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A Alpha B Bravo C Charlie D Delta E Echo F Foxtrot G Golf

H Hotel I India J Juliet K Kilo L Lima M Mike N November

O Oscar P Papa Q Quebec R Romeo S Sierra T Tango U Uniform

V Victor W Whiskey X X-ray Y Yankee Z Zulu

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Figure 1: The Alpha/Numeric graphic representation of the building sides.

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Standard Operating Guidelines

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Review Team Process

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May 31, 2011

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June 11, 2011

June 13, 2011

June 21, 2011

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July 12, 2011

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Building Construction Features:

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Company E 108 E 23 E 21 E 24 TR 23 R 21 Batt 7 (Sta 106) Batt 13 (Sta 21) M 21

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