Gherghilescu Daniela, PO916 Essay: What are the similarities and differences between Clausewitz and Sun Tzu,

on the concepts of war as a continuation of politics and moral forces?

Thomas Williams (2003) warns that contemporary technological advancement and the rise of asymmetric warfare pushes military and political leaders to creative thinking, building new strategies and out-thinking their fast-learning enemies. Now, more than ever before, Sun Tzu Chinese military advisor before 500 B.C and Carl von Clausewitz military officer serving the Prussian regime theories and ideas have to be analysed and new frontiers have to be opened. If thinking about the conflicts between The United States of America and Afghanistan (Zweibelson, 2010), although there was a clear unbalance of forces, the war did not turn up to be absolute or quick. Zweibelson (2010) argues that it would have been better to follow Sun Tzus advices in order to win and let aside the particularities of von Clausewitzs war. As Donald Rumsfeld said: we have to put aside the comfortable ways of thinking and planning, take risks and try new things so that we can prepare our forces to deter and defeat adversaries that have not yet emerged to challenge us (Williams, 2003).

For a better and also academic understanding of contemporary military and security issues, Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz have to be read and acknowledged, focusing upon their strenghts and weaknesses and evaluating their applicability upon contemporary problems. Although Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz have lived and wrote in two different periods of time, their concepts and theories still have major relevance today, as none-the-less, history repeats itself (Ross, 2006, p. 32) and all history is reconstruction (Paret, 1976, p. 387). Both Sun Tzu and von Clausewitz have been focusing upon the concept of war, on the beliefs and commitments of soldiers and strategies of generals, on passions and fears driving operational agendas, on brutal force and intelligence as means of accomplishing victory. The conceps of war is explained by Peter Paret (1976) as a duel on a larger scale (Paret, 1976, p. 383), a fight that aims to force the opponent or enemy to play after your owns will. War is a complex nucleum fundamented on physical force and strenghtened by moral forces, having as principal target to render the enemy powerless (Paret, 1976, p. 383). He distinguishes between two types of nations that conduct war: civilised ot savages, that are driven either by mind (intelligence) or by passion.

Gherghilescu Daniela, PO916 Essay: What are the similarities and differences between Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, on the concepts of war as a continuation of politics and moral forces? Following the words of von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, Paret (1976) underlines the fact that regardless of the typologies of the nations conducting it, war is for sure an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force (Paret, 1976, p.384), and in an ideal context, both forces have equal chances to win. Although the definition of war, as indirectly revealed from their writings, seem to be similar for both von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, the techniques and components of war they have identified may be interpreted differently. Both of them do consider and highlight the importance of the moral forces in structuring and driving a war, but they have slightly parralell impressions and opinions about the warpolitics nexus. In Sun Tzus terms, war is a matter of vital importance to the state; the province of life or death, the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied (Sun Tzu, p.63). Sun Tzu does rely heavily on studying strategies and interpreting intelligences data in order to obtain victory through mind and less through physical power. Conversely, von Clausewitz sees war as not a mere act of policy, but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means (1976, p. 87). His explanations of war are more brutal, tough and rely on sheer millitary and political power, as victory is a consequence of the ability of the general to coordinate those material powers. Although the appeal and the deployment of war today has changed considerably due to technological advancement, it has to be underlined that Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitzs concepts do not have to be applied per se, as: Rather than establishing fixed laws and principles, theory is supposed to help us think analytically. With this in mind, we should not expect to find the truth in Sun Tzus and Clausewitz writings but they should be seen as tools to recognize similar patterns of strategy in contemporary conflicts (Hardwick, 2011). As Williams (2003) explains, their theories have to be used in order to think outside-the box, to develop new horizons starting from the elegant and simple ideas of Sun Tzu or the tough and quite phylosophical approached of Carl von Clausewitz. Both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz regard moral forces as defining the military and political achievements of wars, which further influence the channels through which victory is gained.

Gherghilescu Daniela, PO916 Essay: What are the similarities and differences between Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, on the concepts of war as a continuation of politics and moral forces? Clausewitz explains the difficulties and burdens of war through friction, for the actions and dynamics of war lead to a disruption of quotidiene continuity, a fragmentation of normal values and augmentation of senses. War is the result of recirpocity between two living forces (Paret, 1989, p.384), between oneselves and their enemies. This friction has different solution in clauswitzian terms and in Sun Tzus vision. If Clusewitz states that combat is the core principle of war, that t he decision by arms is for all major and minor operations in war what cash payment is in commerce (von Clausewitz, 1976, p. 97). Conversely, Sun Tzu would argue that In war, numbers alone confer no advantage. Do not advance relying on sheer military power. [...] It is more important to outthink you enemy than to outfight him (Tzu, 1993, p.122). It is dangerous to adopt the Clauswitzian position, because, as Bevin Alexander (2003) says, no war has ever been won through brute force or impulsivity: If the general is choleric his authority can easily be upset. His character is not firm (Tzu, 1993, p.67). It is the mind and the intelligence that puts the enemy down. Sun Tzu, also approved by Corbett (1972), assures his victories through constant force multipliers and enemy deception. From a pure political perspective, probably the greater the number of the military forces, the more chances to obtain victory. The moral forces are very important into building up and sustaining physical stength and forces. Kolodziej (2005, p. 59) writes from a clausewitzian perspective and warns that states by their very claimed moral composition as sovereign and independent units of rule could not submit themselves to a Leviathan to ecape perpetual conflict. Unlike individual worriors that obey to their generals morals and aspirations, states cannot submit to one another as this would ultimately mean self destruction. From a more socio-political point ov view, Sun Tzu believes that the supreme war has no bloodshed and minimum costs. Von Clausewitz would concentrate all forces to win the battle, fight with all resources and decisively attack the center of gravity of his enemies. Schlacht, as Clauseiwtz calls it, or blitzkrieg (Mearsheimer, 1981, p. 103) is a type of concentrated war, that has all the forces of one side focused on the rapid, decisive and complete destruction of the enemy. This focus on winning the battle brings to the surface a series of dialects that make wars complex and difficult to dissolve: moral and physical forces, defence and attack, ends and means, reciprocity of action, genius and friction.

Gherghilescu Daniela, PO916 Essay: What are the similarities and differences between Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, on the concepts of war as a continuation of politics and moral forces? It is important to underline that pre-war strategies and actions plans are the ones building an ideal or absolute war (von Clausewitz, 1976). The move from abstracticism to reality is made by friction that disrupts the perfection of an ideal war on paper (Paret, 1976, p. 385; Howard, 1983, p. 53) and genius is responsible to find suitable solutions and field-inspired and applicable strategies. In reality, there is no such thing as absolute war, as real wars are limited to the conditions within wich they take place: terrain, enemys weaponry, personal and foreign strategies, weather (von Clausewitz, 1976). Both Sun Tzu and von Clausewitz do agree to the fact that the entire war relies on the historical knowledge and critical judgement of the generals, of their ability of persuading masses and gaining their respect and confidence the moral forces. For Sun Tzu, the way a wise general can achieve greatness beyond ordinary men is through foreknowledge (Tzu, 1993, p. 144), When the troops flee, are insubordinate, collapse or are routed in battle, it is the fault of the general (Tzu, 1993, p. 125). The general needs to keep his troops close, merged and unified, to fight cooperating between them and this could be done only if he knows how to hearten them to achieve success. For Sun Tzu, a general has to have five virtues to be sussessfull in his applications: he has to be wise, humane, sincere, courageous and strict. General Dwight D. Eisenhower of the USAs military troops in World War II records the following speech for livening his soldiers: I have full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty and skill in battle. We will accept nothing less than full victory! Good Luck! And let us all beseech the blessings of Almighty God upon this great and noble undertaking (U. S. Army, no date). Some could argue that Sun Tzus concepts are more valid for asymetric wars, as they involve unequal balances of forces and they need strength and power reinforcements, and also have one side that is numerically, technologically or military less fortunate then the other. A perfect example of this asymetric wars would be the invasion of Normandy, in the Second World War, as part of the Operation Overlord in 1944. The generals wisdom and courage (Tzu, 1993, p.65) or the genius as it is called by von Clausewitz, is a collboration between the coup doeil - ability to see efficient and applicable strategies - and resolution - the courage and the resoluteness to put them in practice. It is the role of the commander to give the best orders and lead the way of his soldiers advantageously.

Gherghilescu Daniela, PO916 Essay: What are the similarities and differences between Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, on the concepts of war as a continuation of politics and moral forces? Even though the Normandy invasion was a mishap for Germans, Hitler had flawless victories in 1939 against Poland, helped by the advancement of weaponrys. Linking to von Clausewitzs centre of gravity Hitler used blitzkrieg as a means of destroying Polands military lines, its objective is to disrupt the victims lines of communication and deny the defender time to reinforce weak points and regroup (Mearsheimer, 1981, p. 103). By using a single, concentrated battle against Poland, Hitler perfectly won the battle and saved the effort and losses of a series of smaller and less efficient strikes against the Polish forces. Besides knowledge about systematic military actions, although von Clausewitz does not pay that much emphasis on it except he includes it in friction, terrain has a vital role, as Sun Tzu explains, in the course of war. From a political perspective, knowing beforehand the land where one is going to fight gives high chances of being better prepared from strategic and tactic perspectives. Sun Tzu (1993, p. 109) says: When the enemy occupies high ground, do not confront him. If he attacks downhill, do not oppose him. The entire terrain accomodation is part of the complex strategic approach of knowing your enemy as much as possible, to obtain as much information about his position in war, his tactics, his amunition, the number of his soldiers and attack plans. Know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril (Tzu, 1993, p.84). In order to reach Von Clausewitz sense of locality and Sun Tzus terrain knowledge, the general has to be flexible and adapt his army to the situation experienced just as the water finds its way in the already existing channels (Tzu, 1993). This situations refers to the territoriality of the battle, the structure of the wars fighting equipment and teams, and also to the political context of the state or region involved in war. The political context of an enemy has a series of channels through which it could be decripted in order to find out all of its weaknesses and powerfull points. From a political point of view, Sun Tzu sees war as an expression of politics, a materialization of it and von Clausewitz sees war as a continuation or a tool for accomplishing political goals. There are different factors that allow building up military intelligence and political informational background: historical knowledge, technological devices, spies and battle field experience. It is difficult or even impossible to obtain valuable data without having strong and powerful connections

Gherghilescu Daniela, PO916 Essay: What are the similarities and differences between Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, on the concepts of war as a continuation of politics and moral forces? inside the enemys country or region. Sun Tzu pays a lot of emphasis upon knowing your enemy and taking advantage of his weak points (Tzu, 1993, p. 92), whereas Von Clausewitz focuses upon reassuring your own force and knowing your strength and power (von Clausewitz, 1976). By knowing your enemys weak points and battle plans, one could minimize the costs of own battle and build up deception plans. Through deception Sun Tzu explains all warfare, as building phantasmas for enemies and making them believe your strenghts as weakness and weaknesses as strenghts: when near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near (Tzu, 1993, p.66; 91). Sun Tzu believed that this disemination of truth is the key to succes. A big role of in conducting valuable information related to warfare is possessed by spies and secret agents and services. During World War Two, the United Kingdom had the best secret services network and very well trained spies to work for them. They have been able to gain a lot of

information about the German armies and this helped them build up successful fighting plans. Spies are the connectors of ones army with its enemies, of all those in the army close to the commander none is more intimate than the secret agents; of all rewards none is more liberal than those given to secret agents (Tzu, 1993, p. 147). Conversely, von Clausewitz is more circumspect about the role of agents in obtaining War information because he considers them mostly false and highly doubtful. Paret (1976) also concludes that the only true knowledge a military leader has is about his own troops and situations, as the things one could find out about their enemies is unreliable intelligence that could actually lead to ill-timed action and ill-timed inaction, and is no more conducive to slowing down operations than it is to speeding them up (Paret, 1976, p. 391). He could be considered partially right as Sun Tzu (1993, p. 148) actually wrote that you have to find the secret agents that spy on you and bribe them to serve you. In this case, how could one be sure that those agents do not spread information both to himself or herself and and to the enemy as well? Von Clausewitz was mostly relying on the sheer millitary experience and battle abilities of his generals and sees intelligence as being part of genius, it is a logical and natural tool of wise and versant generals. As stated earlier, Sun Tzu and Von Clausewitz have different approaches regarding connection between wars and their state inceptors. Although both agree that the reasons and ends of wars have

Gherghilescu Daniela, PO916 Essay: What are the similarities and differences between Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, on the concepts of war as a continuation of politics and moral forces? political connotations, Sun Tzu clearly states that generals [that] are able and not interfered by the sovereign will be victorious (Tzu, 1993, p.83). He underlines the importance of non-involvment of state sovereigns in acts of war. Political leaders do not have the proper military training and knowledge in order to take efficient decisions. They cannot and should not be in charge for all military forces available on the battle field and, as Sun Tzu explains, they should know who are the right persons to take care of those duties and should expect results from them (Tzu, 1993, p. 83). More elaborate, von Clausewitz (1976) explains war through a trinity made of the peoples forces expressed through the violent character of war against the enemies, the military commanders ability to reduce friction in war and enhance the chances of winning and the political purposes and consequences of war (Heuser, 2002, p.52). Generals have to be in constant communication and conference with their political leaders in order to find solution and to finalize their political aims. But, if we take for example the two different political and military structures of Germany and the United States of America in the Second World War, it could be concluded that the implication of political leaders in the generals decisions h ave not been beneficial at all. Hitler did not give full credibility to his millitary commanders and his involvement blurred the confidence between troops, the roles of the generals were confusing and mixed up and they cannot accomplish professionally their assignments. Besides the tangled organisation of the German Army that proved to be an advantage for Gen. Eisenhower, the latter was the only coordinator of the army, with no political leaders interfering his decisions. Paret (1976, p. 388) differentiates between the different situations where wars and political objectives become one and the situations where one could exceed the powers and applicabilities of the other. The millitary implication depends on the context and is directly proportionate with the political goal it accompanies, ranging from a war of extermination down to simple armed observation (Paret, 1976, p. 388). As stated earlier in this paper, von Clausewitz (1976) differentiate between limited or absolute war, distinquishes the simplicity of the war on paper and the complexity of the war on the

Gherghilescu Daniela, PO916 Essay: What are the similarities and differences between Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, on the concepts of war as a continuation of politics and moral forces? battle field. Michael Howard (1983) comment of the clausewitzian differentiation of wars and underlines the high historical conotations of their limitations and absoluteness. Pointing out von Clausewitzs perception of the politics-war connection, Kolodziej (2005, p. 58 - 59) writes that conflicts and wars, from societal or individual level, do affect the relationships between nation-states and, especially in modern times (probably a consequence of globalisation) require the political implication of state leaders, laws and regulations. War is strongly linked to the societies that fight it and to the cultural norms and peculiar preconceptions (Howard, 1983, p. 49) that surround it. Different to Sun Tzus perception that worriors can be build and taught, Howard (1983) suggests that although the political government could influence the thirst for fighting of their civilians, the historical changes and the intensity of the political aspiration behind wars determine the degree of implication of the people and the type of war to take place: the kind of war that is completely governed and saturated by the urge for a decision or a war of observation (Howard, 1983, p. 47). Colin Powell, George W. Bushs United States Secretary of State, says As soon as they tell me its limited, it means they do not care whether you achieve a result or not. As soon as they tell me its <surgical>, I head for the bunker (Western, 2005, p. 166). There is a common agreement in practical terms to say that absolute does not mean actually war on paper, but fighting with all your forces and means and limited would be understood as a less serious cause for that war, a war that could be reduced only to the term of obsevation. Conversely to von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu did not pay attention to the particularities of cultures and people, the differences between political regimes and future transformations. A reason for this omission could be the periods of time when the two theorists: Sun Tzu and von Clausewitz wrote, as von Clausewitz was touched by the modernization and emancipations of history (Howard, 1983, p. 48), that would have convulsed the stability and steadiness of the time of Sun Tzu. Besides the moral forces that generals have to possess, Sun Tzu also underlines the importance of deception and diversions within warfare. Both in traditional wars and also within asymetric warfares, deception is a handy tool for building personal advantages and accomplishing quicker victory. Corbett (1972) explains that war is not just military force and well planned strategies, it also means

Gherghilescu Daniela, PO916 Essay: What are the similarities and differences between Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, on the concepts of war as a continuation of politics and moral forces? distortioning the enemys appreciation so that he will believe he is playing after his own rules. Sun Tzu (1993) also acknowlesges this through saying that you have to attract the enemy, entice him with something he is certain to take, and with lures of ostensible profit they wait for him in strength (Tzu, 1993, p. 93). Regardless of their similarities and differences, both Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu will remain two of the greatest warfare minds of our epoch. Although their works were written in different timeframes, their theories could be very well applied even to contemporary problems and issues regarding war. Moreover, even though theory and practice do not always converge successfully, history has proved that if theory is followed in case of wars, serious harms, losses and defeates can be prevented, as in the example of Operation Overlord 1944. Both Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz agree upon the importance of moral forces of the commanders and their support regarding soldier affections and vibes, as well as on the fact that each war has political roots and purposes. If Sun Tzu and von Clausewitz do not pay equal attention upon some notions: such as terrain, strictness of generals it does not mean that they disagree upon the importance of such factors. They differ from the perspective of their writings: phylosophical vs military. Sun Tzu is more phylosophical in writing and his perspectives could be more easily applied in a variety of sectors: business, sports, marketing, whereas von Clausewitz is more politically and military oriented and his area of applicability is restrained only to this areas. That is why Sun Tzu is using more abstract explanations, more ideological ones, as his main offensive principle is attacking the enemys strategies and battle plans and von Clausewitz is more tangible and his offensive plans involves the vanishing of the enemys center of gravity.

Gherghilescu Daniela, PO916 Essay: What are the similarities and differences between Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, on the concepts of war as a continuation of politics and moral forces? Bibliography: Alexander, B. (2003) How Wars Are Won: The 13 Rules of War from Ancient Greece to the War on Terror. New York: Three Rivers Press

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Gherghilescu Daniela, PO916 Essay: What are the similarities and differences between Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, on the concepts of war as a continuation of politics and moral forces? Murray, W. (2001) Joint and Combined Warfare in the Twenty-first Century [online] Available at: < http://www.nids.go.jp/english/event/symposium/pdf/2001/sympo_e2001_5.pdf> December 2012 Accessed 04

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Gherghilescu Daniela, PO916 Essay: What are the similarities and differences between Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, on the concepts of war as a continuation of politics and moral forces? Williams, T. (2003) Strategic Leader Readiness and Competencies for Asymmetric Warfare [online] Available at: <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/articles/03summer/williams.htm>

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