Shugart II - An Analytical History of Terrorism, 1945-2000

An Analytical History of Terrorism, 1945-2000 Author(s): William F. Shughart II Reviewed work(s): Source: Public Choice, Vol. 128, No.
1/2, The Political Economy of Terrorism (Jul., 2006), pp. 7-39 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30026632 . Accessed: 30/11/2012 16:14
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Public Choice (2006) 128:7-39 DOI 10.1007/slll27-006-9043-y ORIGINAL ARTICLE
An analyticalhistoryof terrorism,1945-2000
William F. ShughartII
Received: 5 September2005 / Accepted: 15 October2005 C SpringerScience + Business Media B.V. 2006
from the end of the Second Abstract This papertracesthe historyof modem terrorism WorldWarto the beginningof the twenty-first century.It divides that historyinto three in theserviceof national liberation andethnicseparatism, stylizedwaves:terrorism left-wing andIslamist terrorism. a constitutional the terrorism, Adopting politicaleconomyperspective, is rootedin the artificial nation-states createdduring the interwar paperarguesthatterrorism in liberalfederalist constitutions new and,perhaps, periodandsuggestssolutionsgrounded for the Middle and other Central Asia terrorist homelands. East, politicalmaps contemporary - Nationalliberation - Ethnicseparatism - Left-wingterrorism Keywords Terrorism 0 Islamistterrorism Rational choice Constitutional politicaleconomy . Thatcouldverywell havehappened, becausewhatdid not happenbackthen? - FyodorDostoevsky([1872] 1994, p. 3) 1. Introduction of 8 May 1945mostof the worldwas celebrating On the morning V.E.Day.The boulevards of Paris,LondonandNew Yorkwere filledto overflowing withjubilantcrowdsawakening to news thatthe Nazis had capitulated at long last. So, too, were the streetsof the Algerian markettown of S6tif, wherethe colons were gathering to join in spirittheircompatriots in France in theendingof themother metropolitan rejoicing country's five-year-long nightmare of surrender to Hitler's collaboration andmassivedestruction atthehands armies, occupation, of the liberating Allied forces(Home, 1977,p. 23). toward auxmorts,wheretheyintended to lay a commemoraMarching S6tif'smonument tivewreath, thecolonswereconfronted a in Muslim mob from theoutskirts of town by pouring withsomething in different mind. Some 8000 the altogether strong, carrying green-and-white
W. F. ShughartII Departmentof Economics, The Universityof Mississippi, P. O. Box 1848, University,MS 38677-1848 USA e-mail: shughart@olemiss.edu Springer
Public Choice(2006)128:7-39
resistance to French colonialismandunfurling banners flagsymbolizing bearing provocative

slogans such as "Forthe Liberation of the People, Long Live Free and IndependentAlgeria!",
the Muslimshad seized the day markingEuropean releasefrom the ThirdReich's grip to demonstrate in favorof Algerianindependence (ibid.,p. 25). Withonly twentysmall-town available to maintain the inevitablesoon order, gendarmes a shotrangout, fromthe handsof a Muslimdemonstrator, someonetorea banner happened: andbloodalready hotonbothsidesboiledover.Ittookfivedaysforpeaceto berestored. By the andrushed to Sdtif,scoresof womenhadbeenbrutally timeFrench hadbeenmobilized troops hadbeen murdered, and manyof theircorpsesmutilated horrifically, raped,103 Europeans another hundred hadbeenwounded. By a laterofficialcount,between1020and1300 perhaps Muslimsdied in the vigilantismand indiscriminant the massacreprovoked; Cairo reprisal radioimmediately claimedthat45,000 nativeAlgerianshad been killed (ibid.,pp. 25-27). ordersto inaugurate Truman's the Thus,even beforetheEnola GayhadsortiedunderHarry hadbegun. nuclearage at Hiroshima, the postwar era of terrorism at Sdtifto December fromthe bloodbath This papersummarizes the historyof terrorism wavesof terrorism thatsuccesaround threeoverlapping 2000. The discussionis organized the end of the Second World War.The have taken in world affairs since center sively stage of American firstof thesewaves,whichstarted at Sdtifandendedwiththewithdrawal troops fromthejunglesof Southeast Asia, saw terrorism placedin the serviceof ethnicseparatism of the FrenchandBritishempires,and andnationalliberation. Unleashedby the shrinking colonialpeoplesin emboldened by the self-determination languageof the AtlanticCharter, PalestineandCyprussought,often by violentmeans,to Algeria,CochinChina(Vietnam), nation-states. The second ridthemselvesof foreignruleandto createtheirown independent to avengeEgypt'sdefeatin the 1967 wavebeganon 22 July 1968,whenPalestinian terrorists, waselevated to theinanEl Al flightfromRometo TelAviv.Terrorism Six DayWar, hijacked
ternational stage over the next two decades as ethno-national movements in the Netherlands, Turkey and elsewhere attemptedto duplicate the Palestine Liberation Organization's success in galvanizing popular opinion. Fueled by opposition to the Vietnam War, conscription and
andNorthAmerican, such anti-Americanism in general,left-wingterrorist groupsin Europe as the Red Brigades,the Red Army Factionand the Weathermen, occasionallyaided and of politicalassassinations, abettedby the PLO,wagedcampaigns bombingsandhijackings that continueduntil the fall of the Berlin Wall, at which time the thirdwave of postwar This last wave,mostlyMuslimin origin,was set in motion terrorism was underway. already in Central Asia by the Iranian Revolution in 1979, and is still ongoing,pushedforward by of to American thecollapseof the SovietUnion,in theMiddleEastby animus support Israel, - fromAlgeriato Chechnya, the Philippines and inspiredeverywhere Indonesia, Kashmir, Muslimstates,freed from dreamsof unitingfundamentalist and beyond- by pan-Islamic westerncultural underCaliphate contamination, hegemonyandShar'ia law. andconfor the discussionis one of cartographic framework The overarching analytical nation-states failure.Terrorism is seen as a predictable stitutional responseto the artificial when the colonialpowers,presidingat the autopsy createdat the ParisPeace Conference, muchof Europeandthe MiddleEast withoutregard of the Ottoman Empire,reconfigured of trade(Fromkin, ethnichomelands or customary for traditional 1989;Macmillan, patterns national bor2002; Shughart, 2004). Someclose-knitgroupsweredividedby new,unwanted controlledby irreconcilably ders;otherswere marginalized politicallyundergovernments ethnicor religiousfactions.In the interwar different conflicts,neverfarfrom period,internal at arm'slengthby the the surface,wereforthemostpartheldin checkby autocrats supported who ruledindirectly imperial powers,by colonialadministrators through puppetregimes,or forcesweakened at the Soviethegemony. Oncethe firsttwo of thesestabilizing by repressive
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Second WorldWar'send, ethnicnationalists activelybeganto seek the self-determination Woodrow Wilson. Becausethese groupscouldnot successhad first been by they promised war the better armiesfieldedeither conventional against larger, equipped standing fully wage or bent on rulers local autocrats control of the leversof distant colonial by by maintaining becamethe strategy of choice. politicalpower,terrorism 2. Terrorismdefined Each of the activegroups,while proselytizing and spreading its side-branches to infinity,has as its task, by a systematicand denunciatory propaganda, ceaselessly to of the local powers,to producebewilderment undermine the importance in communities, to engendercynicismand scandal,completedisbeliefin anythingwhatsoever, a yearningfor the better,and, finally,actingby meansof fires as the popularmeans at the prescribed moment,if need be, even into parexcellence,to plungethe country, despair. -Fyodor Dostoevsky([1872] 1994, p. 547) of the camp.Then when we soundthe call to arms,they They strikeat the outskirts vanish.This is the most demoralizing kindof warfare. -Gore Vidal([1964] 1986,p. 428) Terrorism is theater.
Brian Jenkins'
Itis conventional to startanydiscussionof terrorism to defineit (e.g., Hoffman, by attempting the same thingas guerrilla warfare? 1998, pp. 13-44; Pillar,2001, pp. 12-18). Is terrorism Does it includekidnappings andassassinations of politicalleaders? Canthe termbe applied to a state'smethodical of its own citizens,as in the cold-bloodedpurgesof the repression Stalinistera, in the depredations of PapaDoc's Tonton Macoutes,or in the horrorof Pol Pot'skillingfields?Mustit be transnational, in one country buttargeting another, originating or can terrorists be home-grown, as were TimothyMcVeighandhis accomplices? What,if a terrorist froma "revolutionary", an"insurgent", a "freedom anything, distinguishes fighter", a "martyr" or an ordinary criminal? 2.1. Orthodox of terrorism definitions Title22 of the UnitedStatesCode, S2656f(d),definesterrorism as violenceperpetrated premeditated, politicallymotivated againstnoncombatant targets subnational or clandestine intended to influence an audience. by groups agents,usually for Counterterrorism, (Officeof the Coordinator 1997,p. vi) That is the definitionadoptedby the US Department of State. The FederalBureauof andtheDepartment of Defensebothgiveslightlydifferent to theterm, Investigation meanings the terrorist's use of force or violence"(emphasisadded),explicitly highlighting "unlawful bothpeopleandproperty aspotential andcrediting terrorism withfurthering including targets,
1Quotedin Coll (2004, p. 139).
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social, religious,or ideologicalgoals, in additionto politicalones - objectiveswhich are coercionor intimidation (Hoffman,1998, p. 38). through pursued on terrorism hasevolved,thedefinition of thetermprogressively hasbeen As theliterature at attributes least four distinctive characteristics to it. embellished. scholarship Contemporary forpoliticaleffect(ibid.,p. 15;Sandler, Firstandforemost, terrorism is violence(orits threat) is "a planned,calculated,and indeed systematicact"(Hoffman, 2005). Second,terrorism are not boundby establishedrules of warfareor codes of 1998, p. 15). Third,terrorists is "designed conduct(ibid.,p. 35), and,fourth,terrorism to havefar-reaching psychological victimor target" (ibid.,p. 43).2 repercussions beyondthe immediate Whiletheseembellishments haveidentified andclarified important aspectsof theterrorist the conceptremainsunavoidably subjective,especially so in the case of antienterprise, as the colonialterror. helpful.Definingterrorism Resortingto legalismsis not particularly as terrorists the Americans forces one to use of for "unlawful violence", example, classify of King GeorgeIII. One man's who rebelledagainstthe lawfullyconstituted government man'sfreedomfighter. terrorist will alwaysbe another ConorCruiseO'Brien,for example, label to anyoneresistingan authoritarian refusesto attachthe terrorist regime(Crenshaw, andthe betweenthe revolutionary 1990,p. 13). Accordingto YassirArafat,"thedifference terrorist lies in thereasonfor whicheachfights.Forwhoeverstandsby ajust causeandfights the settlersandthe colonialists, of his landfromthe invaders, for the freedomandliberation cannotpossiblybe calleda terrorist..."(quotedin Hoffman,1998,p. 26). blocks, the US State stumbling Althoughit does not steerclear of all of the normative of terrorism, that definition a comprehensive comesclosestto supplying provided Department butalsoits to includenotonlyactualviolencedirected atnoncombatant it is expanded targets, in short,seek to achievetheirgoals, whatever threat. Terrorists, theymaybe,3by disrupting a senseof insecurity generating people,intentionally dailylife andcreating amongst ordinary a key elementin the terrorist is therefore fear"(Cooper, "massive 2001, p. 883). Uncertainty group'sbrutalcalculus:"A man can face knowndanger.But the unknownfrightenshim" (Heinlein[1966] 1994,p. 75). Or,to put it in termsmorefamiliarto economists,"thereare violence- which,in essence, is why few incentivesmorepowerfulthanthe fearof random terrorism is so effective"(Levitt& Dubner, 2005, p. 62). Creatinga climateof fear requiresfosteringthe belief that everyoneis a potentialtarobserved lexicon",as the 9/11 Commission get - "collateraldamageis not in [terrorism's] Attacksuponthe UnitedStates2004, p. xvi; emphasis (NationalCommissionon Terrorist - and,as one of this section'sepigraphs in original) suggests,realizingthatobjectivein turn extensivemediacoverage. trade in to terrorists their bloody ways thatattract requires ply do not in generalaim to effect because terrorist to terrorism is essential groups Publicity causes. Indeed,terfor their even to elicit or sympathy policy changedirectly necessarily turnpublicopinion deathanddestruction, indiscriminant roristviolence can, by producing its abilityto operthe 1990, p. 17), compromising against responsiblegroup (Crenshaw, ate clandestinelyand to raise neededfunds,both of which reduceits chancesof success.
2The lasttwo distinguishing in theproclamation of the areexemplified of modemterrorism characteristics Muslim revolt of full-scale issuedon theeveof thelaunching Nationale Front de Lib6ration (F.L.N.), against thatit a decadeafter in 1954,nearly French colonialism V.E.Day'seventsat S6tif.TheF.L.N.announced to "action abroad to realize its goalof Algerian means" woulduse"every including independence, necessary world" fortheentire a reality maketheAlgerian (Home,1977,p. 95). problem haveno clearlyarticulated as we shall see later,sometimes 3Terrorists, goals.The lack of well-defined the terror thatplagued of thewaveof left-wing rolein ending animportant during Europe objectives played halfof thetwentieth second century.
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Terrorists insteadchoreograph theirattacksmainlyto intimidate, to panic an alarmed citiinto that national leaders somehow the zenry demanding putright perceived wrongsthatserve, at least to the terrorists for theirmurderous themselves,as justifications campaigns(ibid., 18). p. 2.2. Terrorists as rational actors No matterhow terrorism is defined,however,it is increasingly clearthatmanyof its facets can be understood as rationalactors.Until very recently,the scholby modelingterrorists on terrorism was dominated arly literature by psychologistsand sociologists,who looked for psycho-socialreasonsunderlying behavior that,at least on the surface,seems absurdly irrational. The outward aberrations of terrorism includenot only the terrorist's willingness to takeinnocentlives but,mostspectacularly in the case of suicidebombers, his readiness to die for a cause.4 Scholarsadoptingthe psycho-socialpoint of view soughtto locate terrorism's origins in character traitspredisposing individuals to rebelliousness andviolence, in conditionsof andpoliticalpowerlessness anddisengagement fromsocietyat poverty leadingto disaffection large,andin the socialdynamicsof terrorist groupsthemselves(e.g., Post, 1990).5Attempts to develop a compositepersonality have by and large been profileof the typicalterrorist however. havebeen young,some very young",and unsuccessful, Although"mostterrorists "the vast majorityhave been male"(Laqueur, 1999, p. 80), no common threadsof race, or social statusrunthrough the individuals and ethnicity,education,income, employment activities,eithernow or in the past. Nor, apparently, groupswho have engagedin terrorist does terrorism have systematiccausesrootedin "geneticfactors,psychologicaldifficulties in early childhood,a disturbed with the underclass" (ibid.,p. family life, or identification a As the terrorist does notexist;"there neverwas 79). uniquepersonality type, representative sucha person" (ibid.). Therational choiceperspective & Cauley,1983; Tschirhart, (e.g., Landes,1978;Sandler, Crenshaw, 1990; Enders& Sandler,1993, 1995; Frey,2004), by contrast,treatsterrorists and terrorist groupsas deliberateactorswhose behaviorcan be modeledwithinthe same framework actionin moreordinary developed by economiststo studyhuman settings.Within that framework, like Homo economicus,are assumedto be motivated terrorists, primarily, but not solely, by self-interest. They maximizeutility,broadlydefined,not simply income or wealth.As such, decisionsto join a terrorist in terrorist action groupand to participate evaluation of theprobable benefitsandcoststo himpersonally, both hingeon theindividual's The potentialgains fromparticipation includethe expectedpayoffsto suitablydiscounted. members(wealth,power,fameandpatronage) if the groupis successful;the potential costs of becominga terrorist includethe possibilitiesof arrest,imprisonment, and death. injury decisionsalso turnon the individual's evaluation of the relativebenefitsand Participation costs of joining the opposition,a choice whichmay providesalientrewards if terrorism is but which also increaseshis visibility as a terrorist suppressed, target,as well as those of
4A terroristact carrying with it certain death may not be irrationalat all in an evolutionaryperspective:
"the minimum requirementfor a suicidal altruisticgene to be successful is that it should save more than two siblings (or children or parents), or more than four half-siblings (or uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces, or more than eight first cousins, etc. Such a gene, on average, tends to live on grandparents, grandchildren), in the bodies of enough individuals saved by the altruistto compensate for the death of the altruistitself" (Dawkins [1976] 1989, p. 93). 5 See Reich (1990) and Turk(2004) for additionalanalyses in the psycho-social tradition.
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inactive. Therational-choice calculusinforming the lastoptiontakesinto account remaining suchfactorsas the costs the individual will incurif his failureto act increases the likelihood will thattheterrorist succeed and his of a counted group expectation being amongthestatistics of collateral damage.6 The fruitsof terrorism are somethingof a public good. Because the benefitsof a successful terrorist campaignwill be sharedby everyonebelongingto the groupas well as who are sympathetic to its cause, selectiveincentives,includingpecuniary reby outsiders to group wards;access to education, job trainingand social servicesotherwiseunavailable membersor theirfamilies (Zakaria, to relatives 2003, p. 142); promisesof compensation in the event of disablement or death;and even the assurance of a martyr's paradiseoften will be necessaryto elicit optimalindividual effortandto overcomethe free-riding thatin& Rowley,2003, evitablyplaguescollectiveaction(Olson, 1965;Tullock,1974;Rathbone p. 559). to explaRationalchoice modelingyields insightsinto terrorist behaviornot amenable acts are comparanationby other social science methodologies.Althoughmost terrorist of participants andinexpensive tively cheap,involvingas they generallydo smallnumbers relativeto the the resources at a are limited terrorist group'sdisposalnecessarily weaponry, a terrorist its As a and varied for available result, many options accomplishing purposes. both of allocating cost-effectively, moneyandmanpower groupfaces the economicproblem across potentialtargetsand over time, so as to maximizethe expectednet returnsto its in the sense of economicsgenerrational violentcampaign. as primarily Viewingterrorism ates testablepredictions abouthow terrorist groupswill go aboutsolving thatoptimization benefitsand how theywill respondto changesin the anticipated problemand,in particular, modelhavebeenof Thetheoretical of therational-actor costs of terrorist predictions activity. of publicpoliciesdesignedto parry terrorist theconsequences distinctvaluein understanding threats. It is important to recognize,in thatregard,that terrorists enjoy a numberof strategic of over government and tacticaladvantages chargedwith the responsibility policymakers the of is chief attacks. selection their homelands terrorist among Target against protecting thesecomparative Becausenationscannotsafeguard everypeopleandproperty advantages. remain feeble.Terrorist where,terrorist groupsare groupscan strikewherecountermeasures becausetheytypicallyarebetterinformed to exploitexistingvulnerabilities well-positioned are thangovernments andweaknessesof a nation'sdefensivemeasures aboutthe strengths are and aboutthe sizes, locationsand effectivenessof terrorist cells, they organizationally in moreindependent less hierarchical, and,hence,morenimbleandinnovative operationally in are counterterrorism law enforcement and than (Hirshleifer, reacting agencies public acting 1991;Sandler, 2005). furtherin their reare constrained Governments, especially democraticgovernments, in addition to creatinga clithe force of to terrorism Indeed, public opinion. by sponses their to achieve be able mateof fear,terrorist governments goals by provoking groupsmay civil libertiesor simply disrupt that undermine into adoptingrepressivecountermeasures themselves, daily life so much so thatthe citizenryturnsits ire, not againstthe terrorists but againstthe governingregime.Extensivesecurityprecautions may also serve a terrorof its power(Crenshaw, to the public'sperception ist group'scause by contributing 1990, p. 19).
6A
more formal exposition of these ideas, applyingrational-choicethinkingto revolutionsand coups d'etat, is containedin Tullock (1974). Springer
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Terrorists search out"soft" in predictable andconsequently rationally targets respond ways to antiterrorist measures.7 Consistent with rational-choice the historical recordsugtheory, andassassinations of foreign-service gests thatterrorist groupssubstituted kidnappings personnelforembassybombings whenstepsweretaken to protect embassies againstsuchthreats. terrorist of commercial aircraft declinedin favorof otherhostage-taking Similarly, hijackings missionsafterairport metaldetectors to screenboarding securitywas tightened by installing defensiveactionstaken terrorism, passengers(Landes,1978).8In an age of transnational to transfer theirattacksto less-securevenues by one countrymay merelyinduceterrorists abroad(Sandler, evidencelends support to these and 2005, 2006). The availableempirical otherpredictions of the theory(Enders,Sandler& Cauley,1990;Enders& Sandler,1993, 1995, 2004). it is important to emphasize, does not arisein a vacuum. It emergesfrominterTerrorism, over or conflict land other of over control the leversof political resources, group physical and so on. "Gain(or avoidanceof loss) is the commonreason power,includingpatronage, for undertaking warfare" differsfromwar in means (and (Tullock,1974, p. 87); terrorism realorimagined, conflict,whether scale),butnotin ends.Inter-group perhaps maysupplythe for overcoming conditions RussellHardin necessary by terrorist free-riding groupmembers. "self-interest can often successfullybe matched (1995, p. 5), in fact, arguesthatindividual with groupinterest"(i.e., collective actionis easier to organize)when a group's"benefit comes fromthe suppression of another group'sinterest." 2.3. Terrorist "waves" Terrorism is age old, goingbackas faras theJewishZealots(sicari),who wereactiveduring Rome's occupationof Palestine(Laqueur, 1999, pp. 10-11). In morerecenttimes, it was given impetusby Robespierre's regimede la terreur(June 1793-July 1794) and, indeed, Edmund Burkehas beencredited withaddingthe wordterrorist to the Englishlexiconin his
Reflections on the Revolution in France, which railed against the "thousands of those Hell
houndscalled Terrorists ... let loose on the people"by the Jacobins,regularly assistedby Dr.Guillotin'sfamousinvention(quotedin Hoffman,1998, p. 17).9
7The IRA, "forexample, cleverly changed its methods for detonatingbombs, using devices rangingfrom radarguns to photographic flash equipment,to stay aheadof the Britishuse of electronicmeasuresto prevent .... detonations"(Pillar,2001, p. 39). 8In contrast,Landes (1978) found that, owing to their anonymity,the placing of federal sky marshals on commercial aircraftdid not significantlydeter terroristhijackings.More recent tests of the effectiveness of sky marshals have likewise produced insignificant results, perhaps because their deterrenteffects, if any, cannot be disentangled empirically from the many other security upgrades implemented in the wake of 9/11. may have been coined by Burke, Thomas Hobbes used its root more than a century 9Although "terrorist" earlier.Because Hobbes did not think that a mutuallyagreed to covenant elevatinghumankind from the state of naturewould be self-enforcing, "therebe somwhat else required",namely, "a Common Power, to keep them in awe, and to directtheir actions to a CommonBenefit."Moreover, the only way to erectsuch a CommonPower ... is, to conferreall theirpowerandstrengthuponone Man, or upon one Assembly of men, thatmay reduce all theirWills, by pluralityof voices, unto one Will.... This is the generationof thatgreatLEVIATHAN ... to which wee owe ... ourpeace anddefense. Forby this man in the Common-Wealth, he haththe use of so muchPower Authoritie,given him by everyparticular andStrengthconferredon him, thatby terrorthereof,he is able to conformethe wills of themall, to Peace at home, and mutuallayd againsttheir enemies abroad.(Hobbes ([1651] 1996, pp. 120-121; emphasis added). Springer
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students of the historyof terrorism tendto trace Despiteits murky origins,contemporary its modem beginningsto the founding,in 1878, of NarodnayaVolya("People'sWill"or to replacethe "propaganda the firstgroupsystematically "People'sFreedom"), apparently reorientation attributed to CarloPisacane, of ideas"with "propaganda a deed", strategic by ItalianrevoltagainstBourbon rule who perishedfortyyearsearlierduringan unsuccessful didnot,however, 2004, pp.50-52). Narodnaya (ibid.;Rapoport, Volya engagein a campaign before it, Narodnaya of indiscriminant violence. Like the Thermidorian Reign of Terror in selectingits victims,mostof whomwere deliberate andmethodical Volyawas organized, in the assassination of TsarAlexander Russiangovernment officials,culminating prominent II on 1 March1881 (Hoffman,1998, pp. 17-18). in the identities,objectivesandtacticsof the manyterrordifferences Despiteinevitable for one, nevertheless ist groupsthat wouldcome afterwards, David Rapoport, arguesthat the four waves of modem terfirst what he identifies as launched the of NarodnayaVolya and the Balkans wave"that spreadfrom Russiato Western rorism,an "anarchist Europe, Asia, reachingits "highpoint... in the 1890s, sometimescalled the 'GoldenAge of Asterrorism foundits sassination"' 2004, p. 52). The wave of anarchist eventually (Rapoport, WilliamMcKinleyfell to an 1901, President way to the UnitedStates,where,in September assassin'sbullet. waves to organizethe In what follows, I adoptRapoport's useful conceptof terrorist or"anti-colonial" withthewaveof "post-colonial" since 1945.Beginning historyof terrorism fortwodecadesbeyondtheSecondWorld thatoriginated in the 1920sandcontinued terrorism thatswepttheglobe War'send,the discussion moveson to thewaveof "NewLeft"terrorism from and thereto the wave of the twentieth the middle of the second half century, during Revolution. the the Iranian of "religious", terrorism Arranging ignitedby mostly Islamist, one time that active at in meant to of terrorism this is not any everygroup history way imply "NewLeft"and formedaround worethesamelabel.Historyis messy.Groups "anti-colonial", in all threeterrorist waves;the cycles of violence overlapone "religious" ideologiesappear overtime in ways distinctive Terrorism nevertheless has changedcharacter another. enough treatment. to warrant separate in section6 below,muchof the terrorism As argued Thereis a unifyingtheme,however. in the grievancesof ethnic andreligious of the post-SecondWorldWarperiodoriginated nation-states createdby the colonialpowersin groupsmarginalized politicallyin artificial Nationalist andethnicseparatist centuries. thelatenineteenth andearlytwentieth movements, roles and self-determination, aimed at achievingindependence certainly playedsignificant waves to have emergedin the periodsince in motivating the firstand thirdof the terrorist with of the secondwave claimedsolidarity 1945. To the extentthatthe left-wingterrorists the arbitrariness of the World other Third of Palestine and the "oppressed nations, peoples" bordersimposedon CentralAsia, the Balkansand the MiddleEast,reinforced by illiberal anddespoticrulers,can be saidto be rootcausesof all threewavesof modern constitutions terrorism. Thereareexceptions,of course.The eventsof 1914-1922 do not explainthe activitiesof manyof whom are involvedheavilyin drugtrafficking. today'sLatinAmericanterrorists, AumShinriyko and to do withtheviolenceperpetrated Nor do theyhaveanything by Japan's or the Sudanese likeminded terrorist "cult" People's groups,the TamilTigersof Sri Lanka, Liberation thatthehistoryof terrorism since Army.In whatfollows, it is nevertheless argued 1945 is in largeparta consequenceof the decisionstakenimmediately in the wake of the FirstWorldWarand of the unkeptpromisesmadeby the superpowers boththen andforty yearson.
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3. Terrorismin the service of national liberation andnationhoods - it's all too old to be new. [A]ll thesepanslavisms -Fyodor Dostoevsky([1872] 1994,p. 36) TheSecondWorld War or"anti-colonial" waveof terror that gavenewlife to a "post-colonial" in the was 1920s. It lasted for 20 war's waned end, already underway roughly yearsbeyond for a briefperiodduringwhichleft-wingterrorist groupsheld centerstage,andreemerged with a vengeancein the last decade of the twentiethcentury. This firstpost-warwave of terrorist andethnicseparatism, activitysawterror placedchieflyin the serviceof nationalism Ireland andIsrael,among decisivelyso in the creationof the new statesof Algeria,Cyprus, others(Rapoport, 2004, p. 53). 3.1. Beginnings The origins of terrorism motivatedby nationalistgoals, or at least that of the twentieth secondhalf, canbe traceddirectlyto the decisionstakenby the victorsat theParis century's Peace Conferencethatconcludedthe FirstWorldWar(Rapoport, 2004, p. 52). Woodrow who had and the United in European States affairs Wilson, reluctantly belatedlyentangled and miredAmericantroopsin the mud of Belgium and France,naively thoughtthat the "Warto End all Wars"had, by smashingthe OttomanEmpirebeyondrepair,supplieda for nation-building underthe principleof "self-determination", a term golden opportunity he may have coined. Sailingaboardthe GeorgeWashington with the Americandelegation to the peace conference,Wilson proclaimed, "Wesay now that all these people have the which they themselveschoose to set up" right to live theirown lives undergovernments in the president's famous 2002, pp. 3, 11). Thatcredohad been memorialized (Macmillan, "Fourteen Points",which framedthe positionAmericawould take at Paris.Point number five sweepinglycalledfor a free, open-minded, andabsolutelyimpartial of all colonialclaims,based adjustment all such questionsof upon a strict observanceof the principlethat in determining the interests of thepopulations concerned musthaveequalweightwiththe sovereignty, claimsof the government whosetitle is to be determined. in ibid.,p. equitable (Quoted 495) Wilson'sotherpointsaddressed morespecificissuesthatwouldvex theconfereesin clearthe of of ing politicalwreckage globalconflict.Theseincludedappealsfor "areadjustment the frontiers of Italy... alongclearlyrecognizable lines of nationality"; "thefreestopportufor the peoplesof Austria-Hungary; "therelationsof the nity of autonomous development" severalBalkanstatesto one another determined...alonghistorically established lines of alof the states'"political legianceandnationality", accompanied by "international guarantees" andeconomicindependence andterritorial for the Turkish "securesovereignty" integrity"; OttomanEmpire,but also "an undoubted portionsof the prostrate securityof life and an unmolested of autonomous forothernationalities then absolutely opportunity development" underTurkish Polishstate" createdfrom"theterritories inhabited rule;andan "independent Polish populations...."Wilson'snew worldorderwas to be supervised by indisputably by "a generalassociationof nations ... formedunderspecific covenantsfor the purposeof mutualguarantees of politicalindependence andterritorial affording integrityto greatand smallstatesalike"(ibid.,p. 496). As partof its responsibility, thisLeagueof Nationswould
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for managing the affairsof peoplesnot yet readyfor full sovereignty, but accept"mandates" for them counsel" eventual statehood. preparing "byfriendly In the event, unwillingto compromise, weakenedby illness - the Spanish'flu, not, as a minor stroke believed, (Barry,2004, p. 387) - and unable to slake French commonly thirstfor vengeanceagainstthe Hun, an exhaustedWilson returned home from Paristo serveout his presidential termand,aftera brief flurryof domesticpolitickingon behalfof American in the Leagueof Nations,to watchin nearsilenceas theRepublicanparticipation dominated US Senaterefusedto ratifytheTreaty of Versailles (ibid.,pp.487-492). Crippled fromthe worldstage andfulfillingthe termsof the secretSykesby America'swithdrawal Picot Agreement in the non-European of 1916, the League'smandates partsof the defeated andOttoman German, Austro-Hungarian empiresweredividedbetweenBritainandFrance. theformer Thelatter wasgranted assumed mandates mandatory powersin SyriaandLebanon; forEgypt,whereshehadruled"temporarily" fordecades(Fromkin, the 1989,p. 415), Sudan, and much of the territory now Palestine,Transjordan, Iraq(thenknownas Mesopotamia) the States. Gulf comprising In a previewof thingsto come afterthe SecondWorld localresistance to themandaWar, tory powers surfacedin short orderas formerimperialsubjects,aggrievedby unbidden administration fromLondonor Paris,begandemanding thehomeruleWilsonhadpromised to them.Disorder BritishfantasyabouttheMiddleEast beganin Egypt,where"theprincipal - thatit wantedto be governedby Britain,or with her assistance- ranup againsta stone wall of reality"(ibid., p. 420). Apparently "unaware of the implicationsof the profound that aboutby the war;the new classes andambitions social andeconomicchangesbrought had emerged,the new interests,the new resentments, and the new sourcesof discordand andcivil servants becamethehuman Britishmilitary disaffection", targetsof antipersonnel in murder of "on 18 March the colonialsentiment, [1919] eight of them- two culminating from Aswan to Cairo"(ibid., of on a train five and an soldiers, officers, inspector prisons 418-419). pp. The assassination Rebellionagainstthe mandatory powersalso envelopedAfghanistan. of the Emiron 19 February 1919 triggereda roundof tribalinfightingthatin due course pulledBritaininto a ThirdAfghanWar(ibid.,pp. 421-423). By 1920,violencehaderupted across virtuallyall of the MiddleEast and CentralAsia. "In the summerof 1919, three Arab in Kurdistan"; beforethe next springarrived, young Britishcaptainswere murdered and executed two officers had had killed six British in (Iraq) raidingparties Mesopotamia the overrun British were officials taken as throughout region; hostages. outposts political in newspaper and,in an act condemned jihad was proclaimed againstBritainin Karbalah Leachman's Colonel Gerald a sheikh as headlinesas "Arab serving legendary Treachery", him to release him shotin thebackafterpersuading host at a meetingof tribalallies, ordered on 7 August 1920 (ibid., p. his armedescort. "Howmuch longer",The Timesdemanded 452), "arevaluablelives to be sacrificedin the vain endeavorto impose upon the Arab whichtheyneveraskedfor anddo not an elaborate andexpensiveadministration population want?" of 1917, which expressedthe Britishgovernment's Rousedby the BalfourDeclaration of a Jewishnational on proposals leadingto the establishment willingnessto look favorably homeland,the interwar periodalso witnessedthe beginningsof the bloodshedthatwould of the centuryand beyond. and Lebanonfor the remainder engulf Palestine,Transjordan Menachem The IrgunZvaiLe'umi,led by futureIsraeliPrimeMinister Begin, was bornin Revisionist Palestine"inthelate 1930sas the armed wing of theright-wing Party" (Laqueur, 1999, p. 22). Othergroupsactivein the yearsfollowingthe FirstWorldWarincludedthe IrishRepublican organization Army,foundedin 1916, althoughnot initiallyas a terrorist
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whichengagedin a terror cam2004, p. 48); Russia'sso-calledBlackHundred, (Rapoport, the small the German bands of students and former paign against Bolsheviks; Freikorps, soldiersformedfor similarpurposes,whose most prominent victims were, in 1919, Rosa and Karl two of heroes that abortive socialistrevolution, Liebknecht, country's Luxemburg andthe Ustasha,a terfollowed,in 1922,by the German Rathenau; foreignministerWalter roristgroupsupported of Croatian nationalindependence by BenitoMussoliniin its pursuit andresponsible of King Alexander for the doublemurder of Yugoslavia and Frenchprime ministerBarthou 1999,pp. duringtheirjoint meetingin Marseillesin April 1934 (Laqueur, 21-22). Nationalismand ethnic separatism also were the primemotives underlyingthe terrorism thatemergedin the immediatewake of the SecondWorldWar.The promisesof selfdetermination containedin Woodrow Wilson'sFourteen Pointshad been reaffirmed before PearlHarbor in aneight-point document Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill signedby whentheymeton a warship off thecoastof Newfoundland in 1941.Pointtwo of theso-called AtlanticCharter "declared that Britain neither northeUnitedStatesdesiredto unequivocally wishesof thepeoples 'see ... territorial changesthatdo not accordwiththefreelyexpressed concerned"' bothcountries to "respect (Hoffman,1998, pp. 46-47). Pointthreecommitted therightof all peoplesto choosetheformof government underwhichtheywill live"(ibid.,p. were includedin the Declaration of the UnitedNations, 47). Thoseprinciplessubsequently 1942, andlatersignedby all countriesat warwith acceptedby the two allies on 1 January (ibid.). Germany Colonialsubjectsonce againweregivenreasonto expectthereturn of peaceto atthevery least initiateprocessesto terminate rule and to the foundations for transitions foreign lay to nationalindependence. It turnedout, though,that the promisesmade by some of the signatoriesto the AtlanticCharterand to the UN Declarationwere promises"they had no intentionof keeping"(ibid.). WinstonChurchill, for one, nevermeantthe principleof self-determination to "applyeitherto Asia or Africa,especiallynot to IndiaandPalestine, but only to those peoples in hithertosovereigncountriesconquered by Germany, Italy and been (ibid.).But,as BruceHoffman(1998, p. 47) observes,"thedamagehadalready Japan" done." Whatfollowed was a renewalof the anti-colonial wave of terrorthatmarkedthe early interwar advances in weaponry yearsin the MiddleEast.Owingto the technological spurred the terrorists werebetterarmed this timearound. Emboldened War, by the SecondWorld by the weakening of theEuropean colonialpowersas warshiftedthelocus of globalsupremacy towardWashington, in the serviceof nationalliberation terrorism extendedits reachacross NorthAfrica,the Mediterranean andAsia. On the last of these continents at least,the great Basil LiddellHarttracesthe emergenceof nationalist to the movements militaryhistorian British on 15February 1942:"Itseasycapture ... wasshattering Army'scollapseatSingapore to British,andEuropean, ... Thewhitemanhadlosthis ascendancy withthedisproof prestige. of his magic.Therealization of his vulnerability fosteredandencouraged thepost-war spread of Asiatic revoltagainstEuropean domination or intrusion" (LiddellHart[1971] 1999, p. 233). 3.2. Algeria The postwar waveof terror beganin Algeria,as we haveseen.By 1954, V.E.Day's violence at Sdtifhadevolvedinto full-blowncivil waras local aspirations for nationalindependence ran head-longinto the strongoppositionon the partof Algeria'sconsiderable European its authority populationto any thoughtParismight have of abandoning 2004, (Rapoport,
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in Northern Ireland,where the p. 53). Similarconflictingaspirations producedterrorism of for British clashed with the Catholic Ulster's preferences Anglicanmajority remaining in wish union with the and where the Turkish for South, minority's Cyprus, republican the the aim of did not want to be ruled from which was Greek terrorist Athens, community group,EthnikiOrganosisKyprionAgoniston(EOKA),and where the British wantedto maintain basesto support in the MiddleEast(ibid.). operations military terrorist concampaign Duringthe firsttwo yearsof Algeriancivil war,the anti-colonial had been non-lethal.It ductedby the Frontde Lib6ration Nationale(F.L.N.)deliberately offices and principallytargetedsymbols of colonial rule - bombingFrenchgovernment thanhuman facilitiesandpolice stations- rather buildings, beings(Hoffman,1998, military few tangibleachievements to the middleof 1956, however,with "precious p. 62). Towards show for its efforts",and in reactionto the growingeffectivenessof France'scountermeatheF.L.N.changed in the executionby guillotineof two of its operatives, sures,culminating in of urban terror. favor mass strategies to the Within72 h of announcing that 100 Frenchmen wouldbe killed for everymartyr F.L.N.cause, 49 European civilianshad been gunneddown. In August,the grouporchestratedthe coordinated by the colons (orpieds bombingsof threepublicvenuesfrequented noir, as they were by then often called):a seaside milk bar,an Algiers cafeteriapopular Threepeople andthe downtown Air Franceterminus. students, amongEuropean university were killed and some 50 injuredin the attacks,the first lethal roundin what would beFrenchrepression. come an ever-more-vicious cycle of terrorist outrageandheavy-handed On 28 December1956, the Frenchmayorof Algiers was assassinated by F.L.N. cadres. in a new anti-Muslim and The mayor'sassassination that, turn,provoked triggered rioting roundof F.L.N.killings. One monthlater,the F.L.N.declareda generalstrike- timedto coincidewith the conveningof a UN GeneralAssemblydiscussionof the Algerianconflict - and launcheda two-weekcampaignof bombing,expandingits targetsto includepopcrowdedcity streetsand sportsstadiums,killing 15 people and ularbars and restaurants, wounding105 othersin whatwouldbecomeknownas the "Battleof Algiers"(ibid.,pp. 57, 62-63). in thecity under theleadership hereffortsto maintain order Inresponse, France redoubled Division and a veteranof of the 10th Parachute of GeneralJacquesMassu, commander "won"the battlefor controlof Algiers,his strategy Indochina. AlthoughMassueventually for doing so, which relied on gatheringintelligenceto identify and trackdown terrorist of bothterrorists "Torture Abu Ghraib: abusesthatwouldforeshadow leaders,encouraged in andsuspectedterrorists becameroutine" 63; (ibid.,p. emphasis original).The normally into the arms of the F.L.N. Arab was driven "street" Army'sbrutality; by theFrench apathetic of colonialrule. in France turned sharplyagainstcontinuation publicopinion metropolitan from Algeriaand granted Massu'svictorywas Pyrrhic.Five years later,Francewithdrew (ibid.,pp. 63-64). independence 3.3. Cyprus A seriesof similareventsplayedout in Cyprus,where,by 1955, the EOKAhad succeeded in throwingthe island into completechaos. Never more than400 active terrorists strong, tacticsagainstthemuchlargerBritish the GreekCypriot employedhit-and-run organization securityforce deployedon station,managingto kill over the next fouryearsan averageof two soldiersor policeman everyweek.The Britishneverwerereallyin the game,constantly militarystrength effectivelyto bearin kept off balanceand unableto bringtheir superior but not seek a cohesive that did victory, "torelyon dramatic, outright countering small, group
-
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andappropriately timedactsof violenceto focus international well-orchestrated attention on

the situation in Cyprus and ... the demand for enosis - unification with Greece" (ibid., pp.
its attackson the island'surbancenters, 57-58). Like the F.L.N.,the EOKAconcentrated immediate whereincidentswouldcommand mediaattention and whereit could hamstring Britishresponsesby forcingtroopsto be dispersedcitywideon staticguardduty missions at scoresof potentialterrorist none of whichwouldbe hit on anygiven day targets, perhaps
(ibid., p. 58).
Theasymmetry betweenthetarget-rich EOKAandthetarget-poor, nearly40,000-member forcestationed onCyprus British worked in theformer's favor.10 Foreshadsecurity ultimately laterforgedbetweentheIRAandSeinFein,theEOKA's of owingtherelationship campaign violencealso benefitedsignificantly fromclose coordination withArchbishop Makarios III, who simultaneously the goal of enosisthrough channels.Britain reacted pursued diplomatic to the terrorists' to strike and to the "apparent ability anywhere, anytime" growing"public frustration causedby disruption to daily life" by interning andthenexiling Makarios to the in He was 1956. allowed to return to two fulfill to a later, however, Seychelles Cyprus years GreekCypriot conditionfor participation in multilateral talks. Those talks peace eventually in February if not unification. 1959, grantingCyprusindependence, producedagreement, Makarios becamethe new nation'sfirstpresident (ibid.,pp. 59-60). Archbishop 3.4. Israel Celebrated by LeonUrisin his novel,Exodus,andin DavidLean'sfilmof the sametitle,the anti-British violencethataccompanied the birthof Israelis perhaps the most well-known of the terrorist thatfollowedAlliedvictoryin the SecondWorldWar. The campaign campaigns was spearheaded firstappeared on the Palestinian by the Irgun,which,as notedpreviously, scene in the 1930s.It recommenced Britain's operations against securityforces,charged by Londonwith the ultimatelyfutile task of controllingimmigration of by tens of thousands Jews fleeing Nazi Holocaustand war-devastated 1944. MenEasternEurope,in February achemBegin, who had assumedcommandof Irgunthreemonthsearlier,recognizedthat his groupwas hopelesslyoutgunned. He thereforeaimed"notto defeatBritainmilitarily, butto use terrorist violenceto undermine the government's prestigeandcontrolof Palestine the end of its by strikingat symbols of Britishrule"(ibid., p. 50). The Irgunannounced wartime of hostilitiesagainstBritainwith coordinated suspension bombingsof immigration TelAvivandHaifa.It followedthatannouncement officesin Jerusalem, up overthenexttwo with a series of years carefullyplannedattackson Britishlandregistryoffices as well as on the securityforcesthemselves. The apogeeof theIrgun'sterrorist was reachedin campaign when the in succeeded the under 1946, July group placingexplosives wing of Jerusalem's secretariat andthe headquarters for KingDavidHotelhousingboththe Britishgovernment's Britain'ssecurityforcesin PalestineandTransjordan. died and 45 others Ninety-onepeople wereinjured in whatstill ranksamongthe twentieth most lethalterrorist incidents century's
(ibid., pp. 50-51). A radical offshoot of Irgun, known by the acronym Lehi (Lohameni Herut Yisrael,
or "Freedom Fightersfor Israel"),which the Britishcalled the Stem Gang (ibid., p. 28; 2004, p. 54), brokewith Begin's statedpolicy, the King David Hotel bombing Rapoport,
10As the EOKA'smilitaryleader,George Grivas,concludedin hindsight,the Britishcommander"underrated his enemy on the one hand, and overweightedhis forces on the other.But one does not use a tank to catch field mice - a cat will do the job better"(Hoffman, 1998, p. 59). Springer
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of notdeliberately future Israeli Prime civilians.Ledby another targeting notwithstanding,11 in a of Yitzhak Lehi Shamir 1999, p. 23), Minister, engaged strategy political (Laqueur, assassination. Both groupsin time achievedtheirgoal of a separate Britain Jewishstateby provoking terrorist a into adoptingincreasingly countermeasures. Each outrage produced repressive as exemplified freshroundof retribution andreprisal, by theIrgun'shangingin July 1947 of Jewishterrorists two Britishsergeants (Hoffman, followingthe executionof threeconvicted of hearingson the country'sfuturebeing 1998, p. 54). Takingplace againstthe backdrop conductedthat same summerby the UN's Special Committeeon Palestine(UNSCOP)hearingsbefore which Begin was twice called to testify - the hangingsinflamedBritish of the two corpses suppliedgraphicevidence,if public opinion.Newspaper photographs morewas neededafterthreeyearsof violenceandthedeathsof some 150 Britishsoldiers,of numerical the securityforce'sinabilityto maintain orderdespiteoverwhelming superiority. And so, the gamemay already havebeenup by the time the UN committeeissuedits report theimmediate endof British ruleandPalestinian independence. unanimously recommending would 1947thatBritain Arthur in September thecolonialsecretary, announced Creech-Jones, no longertakeresponsibility for governing on May 15thof the nextyear,the State Palestine; of Israelwas proclaimed (ibid.,pp. 52-56). 3.5. Lessons is thatterrorism can The mainlesson of the firstpost-Second WorldWarwave of terrorism the the EOKA forces The succeed. violence directedagainstoccupyingcolonial F.L.N., by for Algeria,Cyprusand in securingnationalindependence andthe Irgunwas instrumental Israel.Thesethreehistorical guerillas, examplesshowhow relativelysmallgroupsof urban and overmanned great by regulararmieson the ground,can demoralize though outgunned leftpregnable attacks ontargets of carefully inevitably planned empires by wagingcampaigns do not have to defeat againstthem.Terrorists by the larger,but less flexibleforces arrayed theiropponents militarily; they only haveto avoidlosing (Hoffman,1998,p. 52). A secondlessonis thata terrorist causecanbe advanced considerably by repressive group's the countermeasures. Combinedwith the "psychological impact"producedby tarnishing can shift terrorists a unable to maintain order (ibid.p. 53), publicopinion imageof government - by goadinglocal governmental towardtheir cause - or turnit againsttheir adversaries the normal intoresponding officialsandsecuritypersonnel daily disrupting heavyhandedly, with an even livesof thecivilianpopulation andmeetingeachterrorist atrocity greater outrage. Exploitingpublic opinionon both marginsrequirespublicity.Success in choreographing violence so as to gain the attentionof externalaudienceswas one of the most significant wave of the late 1940s and 1950s,who werethe of the leadersof the terrorist achievements firstto recognizeits potential (ibid.,p. 65). It was a lessontakento heartby theirsuccessors. 4. Left-wing terrorism Oh, my friends,... you cannotimaginewhatsorrowandangerseize one's whole soul when a great idea, which one has long and piously revered,is picked up by some bunglersanddraggedinto the street,to morefools like themselves,andone suddenly
was Irgun'scommon Warningsto evacuatethe hotel were issued (Hoffman, 1998, p. 51) in what apparently 11 practice(Rapoport,2004, p. 55). Springer
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meets it in the flea market, unrecognizable, presented,without dirty,askew,absurdly without a for children! harmony, toy stupid proportion, -Fyodor Dostoevsky([1872] 1994,pp. 25-26) a waveof "NewLeft"terrorism, to the Vietnam Warproduced Duringthe 1960s,opposition LatinAmericaandtheUnitedStates,oftenaidedandabetted as radicalgroupsin Europe, by of politicalkidnappings, the PalestineLiberation undertook assasOrganization, campaigns of vagueMarxist-Leninist-Maoist sinationsand bombingsin furtherance politicalagendas of these groupsby undercover andwoolly headeddemandsfor "socialjustice".Penetration leadersand the collapse of the Soviet agents,the captureand arrestof key terrorist-group which to the radicals' Union, put paid purposes,combinedto never-very-well-articulated the second wave of terrorism to an Its remnants end. nevertheless survivein bring post-war of Central and South America as well as in South Asia. parts - "foolish" children" term- wereoff atuniversity is perhaps a better Dostoevsky's "stupid in the 1960s. Radicalized in Vietnamand schooledin by America'sgrowinginvolvement the values of a drug-lacedcounterculture the halls of academefrom the that permeated to Berkeley, Sorbonne menandwomensuddenly manyyoung,mostlywhiteandmiddle-class discovered in fellowfeeling,first,fortheVietCongand,later, forthePalestinians, themselves, to be "thevanguard of the exploitedand oppressedThirdWorld"(Laqueur, 1999, p. 27). The most committedof these progressivecadresturnedtheirpacifistsympathiesfor the downtrodden into rageagainstthe imperialist thatoppressed them. "system" 4.1. Germany andItaly Baader andUlrikeMeinhofin theWestGermany of thelate 1960s,the by Andreas Organized RedArmyFaction(RAF)- an"army" whosestrength atmostnumbered threedozen perhaps 1999,p. 27) - was the firstof the left-wingterrorist (Laqueur, groupsto surfacein the postwar era. Also knownas the Baader-Meinhof carried Group,the self-styledrevolutionaries out a seriesof bankrobberies, burned severaldepartment a number of stores,andmurdered andjudges,theirmostprominent industrialists victimsbeingthe Attorney bankers, General, Hans-Martin andSiegfriedBuback,the headof the BerlinSupreme Court(ibid.p. Schleyer, mostnotorious, actualterrorist act 28; Rapoport, 2004, p. 57). The RAF'sfirst,andperhaps was to bombthe officers'mess of the US FifthArmyCorpsat Frankfurt, killingone person andinjuring13 others.Thatattackwas laterjustifiedat the trialof one of the RAF'sleaders as befitting retribution forthe miningof theNorthVietnamese harbor at Haiphong by theUS Air Force(Hoffman,1998,p. 81). Terrorist in Italy,Belgiumand soon appeared groupswithsimilarideologicalmotivations France. TheItalian RedBrigade in 1970.Itwasmuchmoreactive Rosse)wasformed (Brigate thanthe RAF,engagingin some 14,000 terrorist attacksin its firstten yearsof existence. Like the RAF,the Red Brigademainlytargeted prominent publicofficials,including judges andjurors, its attacks in Romeandin Italy'sindustrial 1999, concentrating regions(Laqueur, was one of the group's pp. 28-29). Frequently applyingnon-lethalforce - "kneecapping" favoredtactics- the Red Brigadenevertheless nearlysucceededin bringingItaly's legal to a standstill The then its list of overreached, first,by expanding (ibid.,p. 29). system group to include and labor union officials and and,second,by kidnapping killing targets journalists theItalian PrimeMinister, AldoMoro,afterwards his bodyin the street(ibid.,p. 29; dumping Moro's brutal becausehe refusedto enter 1979 committed 2004, p. 57). murder, Rapoport, in turned 2004, p. 57), particular hostagenegotiations(Rapoport, public opinionstrongly againstthe Red Brigade,eliciting outrageeven from the ItalianCommunist Party,which Springer
22
concluded that terrorism was undermining its political prospects. That widely condemned act backfired doubly by energizing the government's counterterrorismefforts. As a result of the post-Moro crackdown, by 1982 some 1400 members of the Red Brigade had been arrested, many of whom, promised leniency in return for cooperation (Ferracuti, 1990, p. 62) and christened the pentiti, disavowed their former comrades and assisted the police in identifying the group's leaders, only one of whom still remained at large in 1984. The Red Brigade soon passed into history (Hoffman, 1998, p. 29). 4.2. Palestinian complicity Although both Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof likewise had been arrested (and both had committed suicide while in prison),12 the RAF soldiered on under new leadership, as did its sister German terroristorganization, the Second of June Movement, infamous for its attack on a Jewish synagogue on the anniversary of Kristallnacht (Rapoport, 2004, p. 59). Left-wing terrorism in Europe and Japan was kept alive during the 1970s and 1980s in part owing to Palestinian assistance. Indeed, from the late 1960s onward, terroristgroups routinely have shared personnel, intelligence, logistics, training camps and resources (Alexander & Pluchinsky, 1992; Hoffman, 1998). As early as 1968, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a group operating under the umbrella of the PLO, fresh from its successful hijacking of an El Al commercial aircraft, had begun inviting terrorist groups from other nations to its Jordaniantraining camps (Hoffman, 1998, pp. 67, 82). West German terrorists accepted the PFLP's invitation for the first time in 1969; the following year another group of Germans, including the RAF's two founders, made its way to Jordanvia Beirut (ibid., p. 82). The training and indoctrination the Palestinians provided to the West Germans paid off handsomely for both parties, especially so after the Vietnam Warcame to ignominious end in 1975 and the PLO replaced the Viet Cong as the chief object of left-wing sympathies (ibid., pp. 81-82). German terrorists reportedly furnished logistical support to Black September, assisting that terroristgroup in its massacre of Israeli athletes in their dormitory at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games - a drama played out before the cameras of ABC Sports, whose televising of occasional and tensely anticipated balcony appearances by a shadowy figure wearing a white hat riveted the world's attention and transformedMunich into a "spectacular publicity coup" for the Palestinians (ibid., p. 73).13 Yassir Arafat's al-Fatah organization in turn supplied the RAF with weapons. Operations conducted by combined teams of German and Palestinian terrorists were responsible for disrupting an OPEC meeting in Vienna in 1975 and kidnapping some of its ministers, as well as for the hijackings of two commercial airliners, one an Air France flight to Entebbe, Uganda, the next year, the other a Lufthansa jet en route to Somalia in 1977 (ibid., p. 83). 12 committed suicide thefollowing herself in 1976;Baader Meinhof hanged 1990,p. 196). year(Merari, 13 of 5 September Black September, eight strongon the morning 1972,killedtwo of the Israeliathletes for236 Palestinians to exchange its hostages Thegroup offered andtooknineothers immediately hostage. in Israelandfiveotherterrorists jails,amongwhomwereAndreas beingheldin WestGerman imprisoned the Aftera dealwasstruck, of safepassage to anArab Baader andUlrike Meinhof, country. plusa guarantee ata nearby 747waiting to a Lufthansa ontwohelicopters andtheir weretransported terrorists Boeing hostages to serveas thesiteforthehostage whichinitially hadagreed to be flown to Cairo, airbase. Expecting military wereinstead metby a prearranged thehelicopters decided to refuse butsubsequently exchange landing rights, OneGerman rescue a contingent of fiveWestGerman policesharpshooters. policeman including operation, andall butthree of theBlackSeptember terrorists werekilledin theensuing So, too,wereall nine firefight. intoone of thehelicopter's tossedby a terrorist Israeli the victimsof a handgrenade hostages, apparently cabins 1998,pp.71-72). (Hoffman, Springer
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theJapanese RedArmy(JRA),whichaftera brief alsohelpedsustain Palestinian assistance in Lebanon. found JRA committed buteventfulterrorist murders, career, asylum operatives a oil a and Shell commercial aircraft, sabotaged refineryin Singapore hijacked Japanese in The Hague.They linkedup fromtime to time with and the Frenchembassycompound andjoined forces with theirPalestinian benefactors to participate in Carlos("TheJackal") at Tel Aviv'sLod Airport the massacre 1999,p. 30). (Laqueur, betweenthe Germans andthe Palestinians had flourished so By 1985, the collaboration leftistterrorist muchso thattheRAFjoinedforceswithActionDirecte(AD), its counterpart in France. The leadersof the two groupsenvisioned formingan umbrella organization group RedBrigadeandBelgium'sCommunist on the PLOmodelthatwouldincludea resuscitated Combatant Cells (CCC)for the purposeof launchinga wave of "Euroterrorism" targeting NATOinstallations andpersonnel.Thatvision neverbecamereality,however.As it had in members of theFrench effectivepoliceworkleadingto thearrests of leading andBelgian Italy, the terrorists' as monumental events grandstrategy.Perhaps important, groups crippled behind the Iron Curtain Gorbachevian and the rise of the takingplace glasnost perestroika, in Poland,andso on - progressively labormovement undermined the ideological Solidarity foundations of the European left-wingterrorist groups.Thosefoundations collapsedfully in 1989 when the BerlinWallcame down,not least becauseGerman reunification eliminated in the East. The RAF disbanded for good in 1992, the terrorists' ready-to-hand sanctuary the group'strue-believing in a dead thattheywere"stuck holdouts,acknowledging although end",did not announceits demise officiallyuntil April 1998 (Hoffman,1998, pp. 83-84; Pillar,2001, p. 42). 4.3. The Americas in the middledecadesof thepostwas not confinedto Europe andJapan Left-wingterrorism Warperiod;it was a globalphenomenon. In the UnitedStates,the 1960sgave SecondWorld rise to, amongothers,the Weathermen, the BlackPanthers andthe SymbioneseLiberation the Maoistdictumthat"powergrowsout of Army(SLA). The last two groups,embracing the barrelof a gun",adopteda modusoperandi for carryingout theirracist"armed strugfrom thatof ordinary criminals,robbingbanksand committingthe gle" indistinguishable occasionalmurder so in the SLA'scase with 1999, pp. 29-30), most notoriously (Laqueur, the assistanceof kidnapped andconverted heiress,PattyHearst.Morelike their newspaper terrorist theWeathermen, a splinter factionof the Students for comrades, left-wingEuropean a DemocraticSociety (SDS), pursuedan anti-imperialist in agenda,specializing bombing institutional "estabsymbolsof whatthey viewed as the capitalist,fascist, war-mongering lishment".Over the course of a four-yearcampaignof terrorin the late 1960s and early on 7 October1969by blowingup a police monument in Chicago(Sprinzak, 1970s,launched laternamedthe Weather then the Weather 1990, p. 65), "theWeathermen, Underground, offices, New YorkCity People",were responsiblefor 19 bombingincidentsat corporate the US Capitol,the Pentagon(Gurr,1990, p. 88), militaryinduction police headquarters, centers(Sprinzak, research centerat the University 1990,p. 77), anda DefenseDepartment of Wisconsin.However,the group'smost deadlyterrorist "incident" occurred when "three leaders of theorganization blewthemselves townhouse whilemanufacturing upin a New York a bomb"(ibid.). Often modeledon Cubanrevolution- or directlysupported by Fidel Castro'sregime - leftist terrorism also swept acrossmuch of LatinAmericain the late 1960s and 1970s. In Uruguay, the Tupamaros robbedbanksand kidnapped politicalfigureswith the aim of thefunctioning of civil government. Thegroup's mosteffectivestrategy disrupting apparently
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was to intimidatethe Uruguayan some of its officers,including police by assassinating the headof the force's specialcounterterrorism and theirfamilymembers unit, kidnapping 1974, (Tullock, pp. 56-57). Similar terrorist buton a muchmoremassivescale,werewagedby twoArgencampaigns, tineterrorist the whoannounced theirpresence Peronist Montoneros, groups, by assassinating ex-President Aramburu in May 1970, and the moredoctrinally left-wingERP.The firstof these groups,for whichbombswere the weaponof choice, initiallytargeted foreigners(or its victimlist butgradually Argentinians foreigneconomicinterests), representing expanded to includethe army,the police, politiciansandlaborunionleaders,alongwith any innocent who happened to be withinrange.At its campaign's zenith,in 1975-1976, the bystanders in a numcommitted and attacked Montoneros 646 politicalmurders militaryinstallations takeovers of civilian ber of provincial cities. In bothcountries,terrorism military triggered the meaand eventual of terrorist generals.Repressive government activityby suppression in terrorist launched the suresalso endedthe three-year Brazilian "urban campaign guerilla" who was gunneddown by police in an ambushin Sdo Paulo 1960s by CarlosMarighella, in November1969. Venezuelaand Columbialikewisewitnessedwaves of left-wingurban nations(Laqueur, terror the sameperiod,as didmostotherLatinAmerican 1999,pp. during
25-27).
4.4. Turkey outof univerandotherSovietsatellites,left-wingterrorists operating by Bulgaria Supported in major assistance struck Turkish cities.Right-wing groups receiving sity safe-havens targets in local from and their own sanctuaries mosquesquicklyemerged Syria finding principally terrorist movementof the the terrorists of the left. Both wings of the Turkish to counteract andwestto the democratization 1970sseem to havebeenanimated hostility by generalized end of Turkish since the Ottoman ernization institutions (ibid., Empire's p. 31). underway thatthe terrorism it is to the grievances of Turkey's Armenian Aboveall, however, minority of the time can most directlybe traced.Two suchterrorist Armyfor groups,the Armenian of the Armenian of Armenia(ASALA)and the JusticeCommandos the SecretLiberation Genocide(JCAG),emergedfromthe rubbleof Lebanesecivil warin 1975. Also schooled in Palestinian suppliedwitharmsand training campsand,in the ASALA'scase, generously aided in otherways by the PFLP,the two groupshad threesharedgoals: (1) to exact retraditional venge for Turkey'sexpulsionof theirforebears,in 1915, from the Armenians' which million soulsare an 1.5 in eastern to and homelands Turkey Syria Iraq, episodeduring to Turkish to force the to have (2) responsibility government acknowledge thought perished; to the survivors andtheir of reparations for Armenian genocide;and(3) to compelpayment descendants (Hoffman,1998,pp. 76-77). the police's inability terrorist Evenbeforethe Armenian groupsbecameactive,however, to imposemartial law in 1971. violenceprompted Ankara to cope with widespread terrorist Orderhad for the most partbeen restoredthreeyears later,martiallaw was lifted and a in Walter "That turned out to be a costly mistake", Laqueur's generalamnestywas declared. (1999, p. 31) judgment.Terrorist activitysoon resumedwith a vengeance.In 1978-1979, in the The threatof open warfare were committedin Turkey. some 2400 politicalmurders 1980.Rounding thearmyto againtakecontrolin October streets up75,000terrorist prompted in returning succeeded Turkey suspectsandseizingmorethan730,000weapons,thegenerals withina few days (ibid.). to a stateof comparative normalcy did not fully put an end to the wave of violence The army'stough countermeasures terrorists, though.Adheringexplicitlyto a Marxist-Leninist perpetrated by the Armenian
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to the identitiesof its targets.It bombed ideology,the ASALA was by andlargeindifferent the Turkishairline'sticket counterat Paris'sOrly Airportin July 1983, killing seven and 78 othersin an 56. Onemonthlater,thegroupkilledninemorepeopleandwounded injuring an ASALAassaulton Istanbul's Grand also in attackat Ankara's Bazaar, EsenbogaAirport; two dead.TheJCAG, a 29 casualties, including by contrast, pursued August,claimedanother of spreading terror Turkish moreconventional by assassinating strategy nationalist-separatist withnon-lethal forceat symbolsof Turkish All officialsandstriking hegemony. government civil servants andmembers of their terrorists murdered morethan40 Turkish told,Armenian familiesin the decadeafterthe two groups'founding(Hoffman,1998,p. 77). andIreland 4.5. Spain,the Netherlands Muchthe same blendsof leftist ideology and ethnicseparatism at least initially, animated, the terrorist activitiesof Spain'sEuskadita Askatasuna as "Basque (ETA),whichtranslates andLiberty", the militantSouthMoluccan in the NetherNation(or Fatherland) expatriates lands,and the IrishRepublican Army,all of whichwagedcampaignsof violence fromthe late 1960son. Franco,although Effectivelysuppressed theydid manageto deraila Spanish by General trainin 1961 whilehe was still in power,thehigh tide of ETAterrorism camein 1978-1980. in the injusticesfelt by Spain'sBasqueminority, Grounded aggrieved by being ruledfrom Madridand yearningfor the creationof a separateBasque state, the ETA succeededin Franco'ssuccessor,AdmiralCarrero to Blanco, andthen addedconsiderably assassinating its victimlist overthenexttwo yearsby committing another 170politicalmurders (Laqueur, 1999,p. 35). The 15,000 SouthMoluccanswho had emigrated to the Netherlands in 1951 aftertheir hadforciblybeenincorporated Indonesia by Indonesia, becomingthestateof Negara republic Fed up with the lack of progresstowardreestablishment Timur,nursedsimilargrievances. of their nationalhomeland,in June 1977 splinterelements of the Free South Moluccan a Dutchpassenger trainandoccupieda nearbyschoolhouse. Organization hijacked Hostages were takenin bothincidents,butthe terrorists were thwarted by RoyalDutchMarines,who managedto regaincontrolof the trainand the schoolhousewith minimalloss of innocent life (Hoffman,1998,p. 79). The IrishRepublican itself into a terrorist old, transformed Army,alreadya half-century in a the late time of for "Troubles" Ulster that was at its 1960s, organization initiating bloodiest duringthe five years spanning1972 to 1976. The IRA's body count declined thereafter in the latterpartof thatdecade, 1999,p. 33), butbeginning significantly (Laqueur, thegroup'schangeof focushelpedrevivethe"Golden IRAoperatives Age of Assassination". the Britishambassador assassinated to Ireland in 1976 and,threeyearslater,murdered Lord retired of theroyalfamily(ibid.;Rapoport, Mountbatten, 2004, Viceroyof Indiaandmember who died as a resultof a hunger p. 57). On 12 October1984, avengingninejailed terrorists strikeprotesting theirtreatment as ordinary criminals 2004, p. 57), an IRAbomb (Rapoport, detonated at the Grand Hotel in Brightonnarrowly missedkillingPrimeMinisterMargaret Thatcher. for the failedassassination Claiming responsibility plot,the groupreleaseda letter home the fundamental between terrorists and theirhigh-profile driving asymmetry targets: we were But remember we have to be "Today, unlucky. only luckyonce. Youwill haveto be luckyalways"(quotedin Mickoluset al., 1989,vol. 2, p. 115). The IRA was not the only group to resurrect the strategyof assassinating prominent as the second wave of terrorism washedits way around the globe. politicalfigures post-1945 A yearbeforeMunich,Black September assassinated the Jordanian PrimeMinister,and it
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killed the American ambassadorto the Sudan in 1973 during an attack on the Saudi embassy compound in Khartoum. Spain's Prime Minister was murdered by the ETA, also in 1973. The next year, Black September tried to assassinate Jordan's King Hussein (Rapoport, 2004,
p. 57).14
4.6. Lessons Although the second terrorist wave has been characterized here as primarily left-wing in origin, the three decades running from 1960 to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 also were marked by the internationalization of terrorism. The PLO, as we have seen, played a major role in elevating terrorism to the global stage, not only as a result of the network of ideologically diverse terrorist groups it assembled in Europe and elsewhere by supplying training, money and weapons, but also by virtue of the terrorist acts carried out on its own account: the Palestinians "were more active in Europe than on the West Bank, and sometimes more active in Europe than many Europeangroups themselves were" (Rapoport,2004, p. 58). If the late nineteenth century was the "Golden Age of Assassination", the middle of the twentieth century's second half must have been the "Golden Age of Hijackings". Seven hundred of those incidents occurred during the ascendancy of the Palestinian-supported left-wing groups. Commercial aircraft were hijacked to gain media attention for terrorist causes, to secure hostages for use as bargaining chips in negotiating terrorist demands, and to tarnish the images of western governments. Other hostage events, such as the storming of the Nicaraguan Congress by the Sandinistas in 1978, the seizure of the Columbian Supreme Court by the terroristgroup M-19 in 1985 (ibid., p. 57), and the South Moluccan occupation of a Dutch schoolhouse in 1977, had similar purposes and effects. Kidnappings, also rampant during the second wave, occurring in 73 countries, especially so in Italy, Spain and Latin America, usually were motivated by a more pedestrian consideration - ransom. It has been estimated that terrorists collected $350 million dollars in the 409 international kidnapping incidents (yielding a total of 951 hostages) that took place between 1968 and 1982 (ibid.). In contrast to the first post-1945 wave of anti-colonial terrorism,the left-wing terroristsof the second wave were by and large unsuccessful in achieving their goals. Their failures were due in part to an inability to articulaterealistic objectives,'5 in part to the commission of acts, such as Aldo Moro's murder, that resulted in the loss of public support, and in part to the gradualundermining of their ideological foundations as the Soviet Union unraveled, and then finally collapsed. But left-wing terrorismalso ebbed because of the effectiveness of countermeasures, including routine police work leading to the penetration of terroristnetworks and the arrest of key terroristleaders.16Perhaps more significantly, embarrassed by the botched
14 forassassination in 1971bothweretargeted murdered andthePrime Minister KingHussein by Palestinian of thatgroup's of thePLOin 1970,following in retaliation for theirnation's terrorists hijacking expulsion to Jordan aircraft British andAmerican commercial 2004,pp.57, 59). (Rapoport, 15 in Western of the current "Theyarebenton thedestruction system,.... buttheyarenotreallyinterested nihilistsof the previous whatshouldcome afterthatdestruction" (Kellen,1990,p. 55). Likethe Russian forreplacing to wreck the"system", buthadnopractical theNewLeftterrorists wanted it, other plans century, in a andharmony" all-human socialrepublic thanwith"universally [1872]1994,p. 53). Living (Dostoevsky from outof books,andevenat thefirstrumor world" 1999,p. 28), "they got everything "fantasy (Laqueur, whatsoever outthewindow, to throw in thecapital wereprepared corners ourprogressive provided anything Hardin to throw it out" (1995,p.41) observes, [1872]1994,p. 31).As Russell (Dostoevsky theywereadvised will sooncollapse." without clearenough "Coordination purpose 16 in themodern era terrorism to Walter against Laqueur (1999,p. 45), "theonlyeffective weapon According theimportance Pillar of their ranks andtheuseof informers." Paul hasbeentheinfiltration agrees, emphasizing Springer
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at the Munich attemptto rescuethe nine Israeliathletestakenhostageby Black September the moved to create GSG-9 West Neun), (Grenzschutzgruppe Germany quickly Olympics, unit of the nationalborderpolice. Franceand Britainfollowed suit, a special anti-terrorist the Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale(GIGN) establishing, respectively, Thesecounterterrorism out andthe SpecialAir Services(SAS) Regiment. specialistscarried overthenextfew years,forexample,rescuing,in 1977,all of successfuloperations a number 86 passengers on a Lufthansa to Mogadishu teamof Palestinian flighthijacked by a combined terrorists andWestGerman and,in 1980, saving 19 of the 21 hostagestakenduringa siege Hadthe UnitedStates of the Iranian embassyin London,killing five of the six terrorists.17 done the same, the events shortlyto play out at its embassyin Teheran mighthave ended (Hoffman,1998,pp. 72-73).18 differently 5. Islamist terrorism has six privilegeswith God. He is forgivenhis The Messengerof God said:"Amartyr he sins on the sheddingof the firstdropof blood;he is shownhis place in paradise; is redeemedfrom the tormentsof the grave;he is made securefrom the fear of hell and a crownof glory is placedon his head of whichone rubyis worthmorethanthe worldandall thatis in it; he will marryseventy-two of the huriswith blackeyes; and will be acceptedfor seventyof his kinsmen." his intercession - Al-Khatib TheNiches of Lamps19 Al-Tibrizi, It's a continuation of the Crusades. The crescentversusthe cross.Comesdownto that, wouldn'tyou say? - PhilipCaputo(2005, p. 25) The thirdwaveof "religious", in the wakeof the 1979 Islamist,terrorism emerged primarily Iranian It is still ongoing. Revolution. 5.1. Theologicalorigins The genesis of what the American9/11 Commissioncalls the "new terrorism" (National Commissionon Terrorist Attacksupon the United States, 2004, p. 47) are complex and less relevant herethantheiroutward elementof the background expression.One important that arose early in Islam'shistoryover the properline of story centerson a controversy
to counterterrorism efforts of "cell-by-cell, terrorist-by-terrorist disruptionof terroristinfrastructures, mainly accomplished throughraids, arrests,interrogations,and other measures by ... police and security services S. ." (Pillar,2001, p. xli). If the top leadersof terrorist groups,like dictators,have incentivesto hold on to their positions of power by weakening or eliminatingpotential rivals (Tullock, 1974, pp. 72-73), then capturing or killing high-profileterroristkingpins, such as Osama bin Laden, promises to advance the war on terror considerablyinsofaras their successors will tend to be less able. 17Already having established such a force, Israeli commandos stormed the Air France aircrafthijacked to Entebbe in June 1976, killing all of the terroristsand rescuing all but one of the 105 hostages (National Commissionon Terrorist Attacksupon the United States, 2004, p. 96). America's Delta Force was not created until the late 1970s. Its first test, during the Iranianhostage crisis 18 in April 1980, was the disastrous"DesertOne" operation,in which five airmen and threemarines perished Attacks uponthe United States, 2004, p. 96). (NationalCommissionon Terrorist 19Quotedin Rapoport(1990, pp. 117-118). Springer
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successionto the ProphetMohammed as Caliph,or leaderof the Ummah,the community of Muslim faithful,a position combiningboth spiritualand temporalauthority (Zakaria, 2003, p. 147). Followingthe Prophet's death,successorsat firstwere chosenfrom among his contemporaries, but as those too passed away,thatmethodof selectionwas rendered One impractical. group,who became the Shi'a, arguedthat the Caliphateshouldremain lineal descendants. in the handsof Mohammed's Anothergroup,who becamethe Sunni, contended thattheCaliphate couldbe heldby anymanmeetingcertain standards of faithand A seriesof bloodystruggles a positionit generally led to Sunniascendancy, retains learning. to this day.20 of fundamentalism woveninto Islamictheologyin A secondelementinvolvesthe strand ibn Abd al-Wahhab cleric the eighteenth (1703-1787), an Arabian centuryby Muhammad was to return "acampaign of purification andrenewal. His purpose theMuslim who fathered Islam of the Prophet, worldto the pureand authentic removingand,wherenecessary,deandits own lateraccretions, (Lewis,2001, p. 59). Wahhabism, stroyingall lateraccretions" Muslim Brotherhood in the a member of the executed of represented writings SayyidQutb, on Commission in 1996 on chargesof treasonagainstthe Egyptiangovernment (National to disdainaboveall Terrorist AttacksupontheUnitedStates,2004, p. 51), leadsits adherents who havestrayed fromthe truefaithand,hence,merittreatment "falseMuslims", imposters the of the Ummah(Coll, 2004, p. 203; Zaas kaffir(or kufr),unbelievers beyond protection of President AnwarSadat motivated the assassination karia,2003, p. 125). Suchsentiments knownas in 1981 by a groupcallingitself "TheIslamicGroupof Egypt",morepopularly to the Shar'ia (Rapoport, Al-Jihad,becauseof his failureto governthe countryaccording 1990,pp. 104, 106).21 of Islamwithintheirown rankshelps explainthe late Yassir for the betrayers Contempt with Hamas,"a de facto branchof the MuslimBrotherhood" Arafat'suneasyrelationship foundedin December1987 (Laqueur, 1999, p. 138):his desireto establishan independent, to beinglabeledun-Islamic. statemadehimvulnerable secularPalestinian So, too,doesscorn their careers theirown forfalse Muslimsexplainwhy manyIslamistterrorists fighting began and of the Middle East are "The Arab rulers autocratic, corrupt, heavy-handed." governments: andpluralistic" thanthe truebelieverswouldprefer Buttheyarealso "moreliberal,tolerant, of betraying the true 2003, pp. 120, 125). Buyingprotection (Zakaria, againstaccusations faith,"hopingto gain legitimacyby association" (ibid.,p. 145), also may explainwhy the fundsfundamentalist Wahhabism andgenerously Houseof Saudopenlyembraces religious hatred theregion.22 andterrorist schools(madrasas) Last,fundamentalist groupsthroughout
Iranoften is identifiedas the only nationwithin the modem Middle East where Shi'a comprisethe majority (National Commission on TerroristAttacks upon the United States, 2004, p. 50; Keegan, 2004, p. 43), but 60% of Iraq's25 million souls are Shi'a (Zakaria,2003, p. 261). Iran,to be sure, was the only Muslim nation where Shi'a dominatedthe institutionsof governmentpriorto SaddamHussein's overthrowby "Operation IraqiFreedom". 21Assassination is far from new in the Muslim world. Some 35% to 40% of the caliphs following in the Prophet'sfootsteps met thatfate (Rapoport,1990, p. 125). Indeed,the worditself originatedin the name given to a Shi'a Muslim sect of "hashisheaters"("assassins")that operatedagainst the Crusadersin present-day Syria and Iran between 1090 and 1272 (Hoffman, 1998, p. 89; Laqueur,1999, p. 11). The Caliphatewas extinguishedin 1925 at the behest of Turkey'ssecularruler,MustaphaKemal Atatiirk(Keegan, 2004, p. 91). 22Owing to its cooperationwith the international coalition assembledby PresidentGeorgeH. W. Bush during the Gulf War,allowing US troops to be stationedon Saudi soil in 1991 - and reactingperhapseven more strongly to Saudi attemptsto silence him that same year (National Commission on TerroristAttacks upon the United States 2004, p. 57) - Osama bin Laden alreadyhas called for taking up arms against the Saudi government.In his 1996 declarationof jihad, bin Laden pronouncedthat King Fahd's "regimebetrayedthe ummahandjoined the kufr,assisting and helping them againstthe Muslims"(Zakaria,2003, p. 125). Springer
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fortherepressive, Muslim regimeof ShahMohammad insufficiently staunchly pro-American, Khomeinifromexile in Paristo Iran'shighestoffice. Reza Pahlavipropelled the Ayatollah The Iranian Revolution of 1979was whollyunexpected 2004, p. 62). Nor was (Rapoport, the UnitedStatesat all prepared fortherevolutionaries' seizureof its embassyin Teheran, an eventwhichplunged into a crisis that wrecked his Carter protracted Jimmy hostage presidency and catapulted RonaldReaganinto the White House.23AyatollahKhomeini'ssuccessful into powerin Iran(NationalCommissionon topplingof the Shahswept a Shi'a theocracy Terrorist Attacksupon the UnitedStates,2004, p. 52), subjectingthe Iranians to a "dour, andreligiouscommissars" faith,policedby pettytheocrats 2003,p. 145). (Zakaria, puritanical The Iranian Revolution also laid the foundations for the thirdpost-1945wave of terrorism. Khomeini'sregime "inspiredand assisted"Shi'a terrorist groups in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwaitand Lebanon,most notoriously in the last of these whereHisballah(the "Party of soon came into existence Terrorism had a new "able and 2004, p. 62). God") (Rapoport, activestatesponsor", a roleIranplayedthroughout the 1990s (Pillar,2001, p. 46).24 5.2. Afghanistan andthe collapseof the SovietUnion The foundations for the thirdwave of terrorism were laid in Afghanistan, simultaneously invadedby the Soviet Unionthe same yearto put down a Muslimrevoltagainstits puppet in Kabul.The waragainstthe mujaheddin was to last a decade,endingin 1989 government withthewithdrawal of Soviettroops bloodiedby irregular "Arab drawn fromacross Afghans" the SunniUmmahto participate "in whatwas the most important jihad of theirlifetimes" weresubsidized bothby SaudiArabia 2001,p. 46). The"freedom (Pillar, fighters" generously and the UnitedStates.Conducting one of the Cold War'seleventh-hour conflictsby proxy, Americasuppliedthe mujaheddin with some $4 to $5 billion worthof modernweaponry 900 Stinger missiles(ibid.,p. 44), whichit funneled 2000,p. 18),including (Rashid, covertly to themthrough Pakistan's Interservices Directorate (ISID). Intelligence The Afghanwar contributed to the rise of Islamistterrorism in severalways. Firstand "it skills and terrorist-related foremost, provided experience(in the use of firearmsand explosives) to large numbersof non-Afghanmilitants" (Pillar,2001, p. 46). Secondly,it launchedOsamabin Ladento prominence as a terrorist Bin Laden,who for a entrepreneur. time servedas the mainconduitof Saudiassistanceto the mujaheddin (to which he added some of his own considerable skills to bear in wealth) and who broughthis managerial helpingto set up training campsfor newly arrived fightersand to organizeand strengthen Afghaniresistance,established Muslims,making personalcontactwith manylike-minded connectionsthat would soon serve him well in creatingthe al-Qaedaterrorist network. in the Afghanwar drew from the Third,the flotsamof the Arabworld who participated SovietUnion'shumiliation on thebattlefield "thelessonthatviolenceandIslamcoulddefeat Satan" the"Great left standing as the world'ssole remaining anyone", including superpower after1989 (ibid.).Fourth, followingthe Sovietexit (andthe collapseof its puppetregimein was left awashin money,guns andidle, battle-hardened Arabveterans, 1992), Afghanistan animmensestockpile of resources available forredeployment in support of Islamist providing terrorism wherever knocked. opportunity
23 Fifty-threeAmericanswere held hostage. That event, the 9/11 Commission observed laconically, "ended the State Department's Attacks upon the (National Commission on Terrorist leadershipin counterterrorism" United States, 2004, p. 94). 24Endersand Sandler (2000) reportvery strong statistical supportfor the conjecturethat the thirdterrorist wave began in 1979. They also find that terrorist incidentshave on averagebecome more bloody since then. Springer
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Public Choice 128:7-39 (2006)
A finalmotivating force behindthe thirdwave of terror, at the startof alreadyunderway the 1980s,canbe foundin thecollapseof the SovietUnionitselfin thedecade'sfinalyear,an eventas stunning andas unanticipated as the Iranian Revolution hadbeen.Theend of Soviet in and Asia the Eastern Central door to a hostof ethnicorreligiously hegemony Europe opened basedconflictsthathad previouslybeen repressed by authoritarian power.Althoughmany of these conflictshave local causes,the terrorism thatemergedin now-defunct Yugoslavia and in manyof the formerSoviet republics,includingAzerbaijan, Chechnya, Georgiaand has transnational dimensions as well (ibid.,p. 43). Moreover, otherMuslimstates Tajikistan, withinthe Sovietorbit,especiallyso Albania, havebecomesafehavensforterrorist formerly andnetwork-building (ibid.p. 44). training 5.3. Beirutandbeyond to theevents Althoughmostscholarstracetherootsof the thirdpost-1945waveof terrorism also has an old friend,the Palestinian Liberation of 1979 in Teheran, the "newterrorism" 40 from around the the more than different terrorist 1980s, early groups Organization. By in the PLO'scampsin Jordan, LebanonandYemen(Hoffman, worldhadreceivedtraining miredin civil warsince Hisballah, Lebanon, 1998,p. 84). Reinforced by the Iranian-backed base of operationsfor terrorist 1975 (Laqueur,1999, p. 135), had become an important on other,mainlyLebanese on neighboring Israel.Hisballah attacks initiallyfocusedits terror its attention south.As it hadin 1978(andas Syriahadalso Christian butit soonturned targets, some of Hisballah's Lebanon in 1982,abducting donein 1976),Israelretaliated by invading leadersand killing others.That invasion,which lasted three years, is creditedby Walter and otherscholarswith drawingthe LebaneseShi'a (andIran)into the anti-Israel Laqueur well beyondthe end to the cycle of terrorist violencethatcontinued campandcontributing of Lebanesecivil warin 1989 (ibid.;Hoffman,1998,p. 97). of thethirdwavewasHisballah's eventatthestart FortheUnitedStates,thesignalterrorist in More lives were lost in that incident in Beirut 1983. of Marine barracks the bombing (241) than the Americanarmedforces sustainedon any othersingle occasion duringthe withits otheractions,taking in 1980 (Pillar,2001, p. 20). Combined two decadesbeginning baseand,in a French US andFrench western soldiers,attacking military hostages,murdering in forcingthe succeeded Hisballah theBeirutembassiesof bothnations, April1983,bombing in early 1984 (ibid.,pp. 36-37; Laqueur, to pull out of Lebanon multinational peacekeepers 1999,p. 137). the 1980s,claiming4684 terrorist incidents All told,therewere5431 transnational during lives (Pillar,2001, p. 42). Partlyas a consequenceof the Soviet Union's collapse which, decline of to the precipitous along with the inwardturningof ethnic conflict,contributed work off an result of effective as a terrorism by shutting police alreadyunderway left-wing fewer terrorist witnessed far the 1990s for those of external source groups, support important were3824 incidentsand2468 events.The figuresfor thelastdecadeof the twentieth century fatalities(ibid.).25 of terrorist incidentshas beenfallingoverthe past20 years,terrorism Whilethe number has become increasinglylethal. There were 19%fewer events in the second half of the Thenew,largelyIslamist withthe firsthalf,butdeathsmorethandoubled. 1990s,compared & Sandler, hasbeendesignedto inflicthighcasualties terrorism 2000). Islamist (ibid.;Enders
25 In terrorist incidents addition,morethan31,000 people sustainednon-fatalinjuriesas a resultof transnational over the last two decades of the twentiethcentury(Pillar,2001, p. 19).
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to "collateral terrorism also is distinguished bin Ladenhimself by its indifference damage": has said that,"Wedo not haveto differentiate betweenmilitaryor civilian.As far as we are Commission on Terrorist Attacksuponthe United concerned, (National theyareall targets" is notjust theater States,2004, p. 47). Terrorism any longer.26 A smallsampleof the terrorist eventsthatrounded out the twentieth centuryincludesthe following.27 * The hijacking on 14 June1985,of TWAFlight847 while en by LebaneseShi'a terrorists, routefromRometo Cairo. * In 1986,the explosionof a bombat a Berlindisco, killingtwo American soldiers. * The destruction, Scotland,in December by bomb,of PanAm Flight 103 over Lockerbie, andcrew,plus 11 peopleon the groundat the crashsite. 1988, killingall 259 passengers * Thebombing, in December1992,of twohotelsin AdenwhereUS troopsroutinely stopped while awaitingdeployment to unitsin Somalia,killingtwo persons,butno Americans. * The murder of two CIA agentsby Mir Amal Kansi,a Pakistani Islamicextremist,at the mainentrance to the CIA'sheadquarters in Langley,Virginia, on 25 January 1993. * Thebombingof New YorkCity'sWorld Trade on 26 February Center 1993,killingsix and than more 1000. injuring * A series of 13 nearlysimultaneous car and truckbombsdetonated in Bombay,India,in in for the destruction of a Muslim 1993, shrine, February reprisal killing400 andinjuring 1000 others. * TheFebruary 1994massacre, in a Hebron of 29 Palestinians Goldstein, by Baruch mosque. * The release of sarinnerve gas into a Tokyosubwayby Aum Shinrikyoin March1995, thousands. killing 12 andinjuring * Thebombing of theAlfredP.Murrah Federal Buildingin Oklahoma Cityon 13 April1995, killing 168. * The attempted in June1995,of Egyptian President HosniMubarak assassination, duringa visit to Ethiopia. * TheOctober1995assassination, in Malta,of FathiShiqaqi, leaderof thePalestine principal IslamicJihad,by Israelioperatives. * Theexplosionof a carbomb,in November1995,outsidea joint Saudi-UStraining facility for the SaudiNationalGuard in Riyadh,killingfive Americans andtwo Indianofficials. * The assassination of IsraeliPrimeMinister Rabinin November1995 by a Jewish Yitzhak intended to disrupt the peaceprocess. extremist, * A seriesof strikesby HamassuicidebombersduringFebruary andMarch1996, intended to disrupt Israel'snational elections,killing60 altogether. * In April 1996, an attack,using machineguns and handgrenades,on a groupof western touristsoutsidetheirCairohotel,killing 18. * The truckbomb detonated, in June 1996, in the KhobarTowers,a residentialcomplex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia,housing US Air Force personnel,killing 19 Americansand wounding372.
26During the 1990s, less than 0.01% of the terroristattackscaused 70% of the terrorism-related injuriesand 19%of the deaths(Johnson2001, p. 905). 27The sources for the list are Hardin(1995, p. 216), Hoffman (1998, pp. 18, 92-93, 132), Pillar (2001, p. Attacksupon the United States (2004, pp. 59, 60, 62, 70, 71, 98, 121) and National Commissionon Terrorist 100, 180, and 190). For additionalexamples, see US Departmentof State, "SignificantTerroristIncidents, 1961-2003: A Brief Chronology",accessible at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902pf.htm. Springer
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* The massacre, in November1997,of 58 foreigntouristsandfourEgyptians at the Temple in Luxor. of QueenHatshepsut * The coordinated bombings,on the morningof 7 August 1998, of the US embassiesin andinjuring and201 others(mostlyKenyans) 5000 Nairobi, Kenya killing 12 Americans - andDares Salaam, another but no Americans. Tanzania, 11, killing * On 3 January 2000, the attempted bombingof the USS TheSullivansin the portof Aden. * Thebombing of theUSS Cole on 12 October 2000, againin Aden,killing17 andwounding at least40. The last decade of the twentiethcenturyalso broughtterrorback to Algeria. Spurred by an Islamic revivalthat began there in the late 1970s, the Muslimpolitical partyFIS elections.Theruling victoriesin the 1991national Front)won impressive (IslamicSalvation middle on the more secular whose base rested class,responded Algerian political government, andbanningits to electoraldefeatby nullifyingthe results,declaringa stateof emergency TheMuslimside of thatwarhasbeendominated Civilwarsoonerupted. Islamicopposition. or so veterans of whosecoreconsistsof a hundred IslamicGroup), GIA(Armed by thebrutal of its victims,the GIAhas killedindiscriminately, Partial to cuttingthe throats Afghanistan. and street and government workers,includinglettercarriers teachers, journalists targeting 1994 for all foreignnationalsto leave the country sweepers.It set a deadlineof 1 January of those who did not heed its aboutone hundred and,over the next two years,slaughtered of priests, French 12 a which were Croat technicians, bishop,anda number among warning, in 1995,killingeight France its terror to metropolitan TheGIAcarried nunsandpensioners. civiliansin theParismetroandotherpublicplaces(Laqueur, 1999,pp. 130-133);morethan whichranfromJulyto October. 180 otherswere woundedduringthatbombingcampaign, By century'send, as manyas 100,000people are thoughtto haveperishedin the Algerian thatbeganin 1992 andis still underway bloodbath (Pillar,2001, p. 19). 6. The constitutionalperspective andthereby of possessingthe controlof thepowersof the government, The advantages exclusiveof all otherconsiderations, of its honorsandemoluments, are,of themselves, into two greathostileparties. ampleto divide... a community -John C. Calhoun28 in Cairo. with the strokeof a pen on a Sundayafternoon I created Transjordan
-
Winston S. Churchill29
The therecanbe no singlecauseof terrorism. Justas thereis no uniqueterrorist personality, between the differences varied as are and are as for terrorism many possible explanations andTurk, Shi'aandSunni,Kurd andAnglican, andMuslim,JewandArab,Catholic Christian at of and But in the andTimothy Baader or Andreas terrorism, bloodyhistory long McVeigh. If thereis one commonthread. leastas it has evolvedsincetheendof the SecondWorld War, in time,it endsin theeventsof 1914-1922, whenthemodern backwards is traced thatthread Asia was beingdrawn. mapof the MiddleEastandCentral orin thecolonies Ottoman of wrecked No onethenlivingwithintheboundaries suzerainty of the defeatedGermanand Austro-Hungarian empireswas presentwhen decisionswere
28Quoted in Hardin (1999, p. 276). 29Quoted in Collins and Lapierre(1972, p. 83). Springer
33
andAmericans were being takenaboutthe area'sfuturegeopoliticallandscape: "Europeans the only ones seatedaroundthe table ..." (Fromkin,1989, p. 17). As a resultof the victoriouspowers'ignoranceof the ground,the pressureof time, a hungerfor vengeance,an to maintain andevento expandcolonialspheresof influence,and,withoutdoubt, inclination newnational werefabricated countlessotherfactors, frontiers withlittleregard forcustomary tribaland ethnicterritorial claims or existingtradepatterns and social networks.In consequence,the map that emergedfrom the ParisPeace Conferenceand from the events that followedoverthe nextfew yearswasby andlargeimposedarbitrarily introducby outsiders, statesysteminto the MiddleEast [the Balkans,Central Asia andbeyond] ing "anartificial thathas made it into a region of countriesthathave not yet become nationseven today" (ibid.) 6.1. Afghanistan borderwas firstdrawnin the late nineteenth Afghanistan exemplifies.Its southern century Sir Mortimer the colonial of India'sforeignsecretary, Durand, by government expresslyto dividethe Pashtun tribe'shomelandin half, therebycreatinga bufferzone againstRussian on northwest frontier. Whenthe Pashtunis who foundthemselveson India's expansionism the Indianside of the Durandline failed to integrate themselvespeaceablyunderthe Raj, the North-West Frontier Provincewas sliced off fromthe Punjabto createa second,inner buffer. Thesetwo "tribal belts"wereincorporated of Pakistan formallywithintheboundaries when thatnationseparated fromnewly independent Indiaunderthe Partition Planeffective 14 August1947 (Hilton,2001). northern borderwas drawnby Josef Stalin. Formalized in the so-called Afghanistan's Settlement of 1922, a seriesof treatiesbetweenthe SovietUnionanda number of its neighandPersia(Fromkin, bors,includingTurkey 1989,p. 559), carvedup a region,"comprising moderndayTajikistan, southern andnorthern thathadbeen"one Uzbekistan, Afghanistan", for centuries" Like Sir Mortimer Durand before 2001, p. 146).30 (Rashid, contiguous territory Stalin to intended create his own buffer zone the Pashtuns him, (andthe apparently against sizeable and Uzbek in that thenceforth became Raj)by stranding Tajik populations territory partof Afghanistan. 6.2. The MiddleEast Much the same forces shapedfrontiersin the Middle East: "Iraqand what we now call
Jordan, for example, were British inventions, lines drawn on an empty map ..." (Fromkin,
boastadoptedas an epigraph aboveso well illustrates. 1989, p. 17), as WinstonChurchill's "the boundaries of Saudi Arabia [and]Kuwait... were established Similarly, by a British civil servant in 1922,andthefrontiers betweenMuslimsandChristians weredrawn by France in Syria-Lebanon andby Russiaon the borders of Armeniaand Soviet Azerbaijan" (ibid.). The sequel to the FirstWorldWaris as significant for what it did not do, as it is for what it did do. On the agendafor settlement in 1921, the issue of independence or autonomy for the Kurds"somehow from in the Kurdistan was not to be 1922"; disappeared agenda (ibid., the Kurds, p. 560). As a resultof thatnon-decision, mostlySunniMuslimsthoughtto be of
30 Turkestan alreadyhad been carved out of the previously independentMuslim CentralAsian world by the czars (Fromkin,1989, p. 477). Springer
34
the borders of Iraq, descent,now inhabitthe mountainous regionstraddling Indo-European and Armenia Russian Iran, (ibid.,p. 503).31 Turkey for muchof the terrorism of the twentieth thatof The foundations century(andcertainly in boththefirstandthirdpost-1945terrorist were laid thus the 1914-1922. waves) (To extent thatthe left-wingterrorist and cause with common declared received substantial groups of the in Palestinians from the Third the so too World, particular, support oppressed peoples werethe secondwave'sfoundations.) decisionseparating Churchill's haphazard Transjordan - "adisordered areaof tribalconflict" Palestine (ibid.,p. 442) - fromthe balanceof Britain's the view stillpersistsin Israel,especiallyso in theranks echoesdownto thisday:32 Mandate state" of theHerut eitheris or shouldbe anArabPalestinian that"Jordan (ibid.,p. 528). Party, in exercisingthe the policiesadopted andFrance The colonialattitudes informing by Britain to themby the Leagueof Nationsalso contributed to the rise of mandatory powersgranted to displace"thebasis of politicallife Fortheirpart,the Britishattempted modemterrorism. in the MiddleEast- religion- [with]nationalism or dynasticloyalty"(ibid.,p. 17). On the whichin the MiddleEastdid allow religionto be the otherhand,"theFrenchgovernment, one sect [theChristians] basis of politics- even of its own - championed againstthe others ever Lebanon foster the civil has that since strife (ibid.,p. 17; ravaged ...", therebyhelping in emphasis original). And thenthereis Iraq,where,in 1922, "Kurdish, Sunni,Shi'ite, andJewishpopulations
had been combined into a new ... country ... under the rule of an Arabian prince ..."
Bell, hadalreadybeenput on noticeby an (ibid.,p. 528). Britain,in the personof Gertrude wasanimpractical to unitetheMesopotamian thatattempting American provinces missionary goal: of historyif you tryto drawa line around Youareflyingin the face of fourmillenniums call it and a politicalentity!Assyriaalwayslookedto the west andeast andnorth, Iraq unit.You'vegot to andBabyloniato the south.Theyhave neverbeen an independent it mustbe donegradually. of taketimeto get themintegrated, Theyhaveno conception nationhood yet. (ibid.,p. 451) In the event,afterdrawinga line around proIraqandcallingit a politicalentity,Britain rule arosealmostimmediately. to Britishmilitary ceededto fumbleits mandate. Opposition Large-scale during1919 grew,by June 1920, into openrevoltin the protestdemonstrations north.The Britishresponded Sunnicenterof the new state,the Shi'a southandthe Kurdish atthecost of 500 deaths the the witharmed force,eventually quelling revolt followingmonth, The lives. bruntof the British Indian and 6000 British and the Iraqi Armygarrison among fromtheirSunniMuslim theirdisaffection was borneby theShi'a,heightening counterstrike brothers (Keegan,2004, pp. 14-15). Britainsought to redressthe grievancesthat led to revolt by appointinga council of in the hope thatthe councilwouldbe more whichto rule indirectly, Iraqiministersthrough administration. than to the direct inevitably, military "Perhaps population general acceptable since they of the appointees were ... chosenfromthe Sunniminority, however,a majority than Shi'a or Kurds. and experienced were identifiedby the Britishas more dependable
Sunni domination was particularly evident in the new Iraqi army . . ." (ibid., p. 15). Hard
31Otherborderquestions remainedunresolved:"Turkey'sfrontierwith Syria, for example, was established only at the end of the 1930s" (Fromkin,1989, p. 559). 32C. D. Brunton,a Britishofficer serving in wrote prescientlythat "thepeople here do not form Transjordan a homogeneouspolitical entity.... You cannotexpect them to form a governmentfor theircommon country" (Fromkin,1989, p. 443). Springer
35
So werethey by Britain'sselectionof a Sunniprince,Amir further. feelings were inflamed Faisal,to serve as the sovereignof the embryonicIraqistate (ibid., p. 17). Hence, it is to the artificial nationalgroundprepared by the Britishundertheirmandatethatwe owe the hostilitiesevidentin post-Saddam Iraq,betweenSunniandShi'a andbetweenMuslimsand bothof whichareoverlaid territorial ambitions in thatcountry's northern Kurds, by Turkey's oil-bearing provinces. 6.3. Lessons The geopoliticaldecisionstakenin the aftermath of the FirstWorld Warhavehaddisastrous for the MiddleEast and for CentralAsia, as similarlyarbitrary consequences mapmaking also hadfor sub-Saharan Africa(Rowley,1999).Members of some close-knitethnicgroups nationalborders; others suddenlyfoundthemselveson oppositesides of new, unasked-for werecompelledto shareground withtheirenemiesof old. Ethnicviolenceandtribalwarfare were the predictable outcomesof thatunhappy stateof affairsas rivalgroupscontestedfor controlof theleversof local,regional ornational who"placed their Autocrats, politicalpower. on preserving the elite's gripon nationalwealth" on highestpriority (NationalCommission Terrorist AttacksupontheUnitedStates,2004, p. 53), wouldrise andfall as theirsupporting coalitionsgainedthe upperhand- only to be displacedby some otherstrongman. Political would be exercisednot by sharingpower with othergroups,but by repressing authority them. Shortof wholesalereconfiguration of the maps of the MiddleEast and CentralAsia, as has been proposedfor sub-Saharan Africa (Kimenyi, 1999), liberalconstitutions offer a republican cure for the factionaldiseases plaguingthe failed statesthat were createdin 1914-1922 andhavebeen the incubators of post-1945terrorist activity.Federalsystemsof that shift most government politicaldecision-making authority awayfromthe centertoward combinedwith a representative regionshavinga high degreeof local autonomy, legislature to resolvetightlydefinedquestionsof nationalpolicy, are time-tested empowered ways of the diverseinterestsof an ethnicallyor religiouslyheterogeneous accommodating polity (Frey& Eichenberger, 1999).33 The writingandratification of liberalconstitutions the ruleof law, securing establishing privatepropertyrights and civil liberties,and, above all, limiting governmental powers, on a particular requirea society's politicallyeffective groupsto coordinate political (and sometimeseconomic)order, to thosegroups'mutualadvantage 1999,pp. vii-viii). (Hardin, It is an open questionwhethersuch coordination is possiblein Afghanistan, Iraqandmany of the otherpseudostatesin thatpartof the worldwhereterrorism has raisedits ugly head. Whatis clear,however,is thatfor democratic reformsto have a chance,constitutionalism mustprecedepopular alonedo not producedemocracy" voting."Elections (Zakaria, 2003, of liberalpoliticalinstitutions p. 259) and,in fact, if votingcomes beforethe establishment - the very reasonfor havinga constitution in the firstplace - one risks domination of the factionsthatcontrolled constitution-writing stageby the very samewell-organized powerin the preceding autocratic electedpresident, Vladimir regime.Russia,whosepopularly Putin, rulesautocratically, tale. suppliesa cautionary Those who are impatient for democracy in the MiddleEast andCentral Asia as well as doubtfulthatnew constitutions to mitigate and, perhaps,new politicalmaps are required
as a way of reducinga nation's 33Frey (2004, pp. 85-92) recentlyhas extolled the virtuesof "polycentricity" attacks.A polycentricpolitical system would, in my view, make terrorism less likely vulnerabilityto terrorist in the firstplace. Springer
36
anda half shouldremember that"it took Europea millennium the rootcausesof terrorism to resolve its post-Roman crisis of social andpoliticalidentity:nearlya thousand yearsto andnearlyfive hundred formof politicalorganization, settleon the nation-state yearsmore whichnationswere entitledto be states"(Fromkin,1989, p. 565). Indeed,"it to determine of Germany withthe creation andItaly,thatan was only at the end of thenineteenth century, of western some after the old Romanmap 1,500 years Europe finally emerged, accepted map anda halfbeforethe millennium started to becomeobsolete" (ibid.).It maywell takeanother and forcesset in motionby the SovietUnion'scollapse,the defeatof the Taliban centrifugal the topplingof SaddamHusseincoalesce into some semblanceof sustainable geopolitical order. 7. Concludingremarks War fromtheend of the SecondWorld terrorism Thispaperhas tracedthehistoryof modern into waves: It that three divided to the beginningof the twenty-first stylized history century. terrorism in the service of nationalliberationand ethnic separatism, left-wing terrorism, the paper and Islamistterrorism. Adoptinga constitutional politicaleconomyperspective, but not rootedin of is the terrorism 1945-2000 that certainly exclusively, largely, argued War'svictorsfromthe carcassof the fashioned the artificial nation-states by the FirstWorld madein turnby Ottoman by the unkeptpromisesof self-determination Empire,reinforced the to the AtlanticCharter. Wilsonandthe signatories Woodrow Largelysuppressed, during the interwar period,by the colonialpowers,andfrom 1945until 1989by Soviethegemony, end. forcesof ethnicandnational century's identityboiledoverby the twentieth centrifugal Islamist terrorism. since 1979by theriseof a new,virulent Thoseforceshavebeenmagnified not be allowed to obscure terrorism's of that movement should overtones The religious commonorigins- includingthatof the European leftists,who wouldnot have predominant - in the failed statescreated Palestinians the of the as without survived support nearly long in 1914-1922. in the second half of the twentiethcenturywould have been The historyof terrorism to be, beenmadea Palestinian as it was intended hadTransjordan, homeland; quitedifferent had not been mysteriouslyoverlookedin the Settlementof 1922; if a line if Kurdistan had insteadbeen dividedalong its had not been drawnaround Iraq,but thatMesopotamia and andif Armenians, internal threenatural Uzbeks,Pashtuns, boundaries; Punjabis Tajiks, of two or more the borders across marooned had not been ethnic other populations many with Arabchieftains contrived nation-states. imaginethat,insteadof rewarding Alternatively, and France Britain Muslim over or Sunni over Shi'a monarchial Christian, powers,elevating substantial had imposedfederalistconstitutions, providingfor weak centralgovernments, of the Middle on the nations of anda recognized local orregionalautonomy, secession, right Whatmighthavebeen? Eastas then(andnow) configured. areon the andethnicseparatism ironicthat,at the sametime nationalism It is somewhat thathas been their rise in the MiddleEast andCentral Asia, accompanied by the terrorism toward centralization itselfis movingin theopposite historical direction, handmaiden, Europe fullerpoliticalandeconomic in Brussels.In orderto implement of governmental authority forratification waswritten andsubmitted a newEuropean constitution unionontheContinent, by votersin France by the Union'smemberstates.The decisiverejectionof thatdocument and the Netherlands in the springof 2005 provedthat,for very different reasons,national sovereigntyis not to be sold cheaply by Europe'spolitical elites. Constitutional design also ought to be Europe's(and America's)top evidentlystill matters.It, not democracy, for dealingwith the threatof modernterrorism. priority
Springer
37
for detailedcommentson an earlierverAcknowledgements I thankMichael Reksulakand HilaryShughart in the Conference sion of the paper.CharlesRowley, GordonTullock,RonaldWintrobeandotherparticipants on the Political Economy of Terrorismheld at George Mason University Law School on 24-25 May 2005 helped improvethe paperconsiderably.So, too, did ToddSandler,who generouslyread the penultimatedraft and provideda numberof very helpful suggestions. All of these friendlycritics are hereby held harmlessfor the final product.The financial supportof the Critical Infrastructure ProtectionProgramand the James M. BuchananCenterfor Political Economy is gratefullyacknowledged.
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An Analytical History of Terrorism, 1945-2000 Author(s): William F. Shughart II Reviewed work(s): Source: Public Choice, Vol. 128, No.

Public Choice (2006) 128:7-39 DOI 10.1007/slll27-006-9043-y ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Received: 5 September2005 / Accepted: 15 October2005 C SpringerScience + Business Media B.V. 2006

resistance to French colonialismandunfurling banners flagsymbolizing bearing provocative

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andappropriately timedactsof violenceto focus international well-orchestrated attention on

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