Modern Theology 25:2 April 2009 ISSN 0266-7177 (Print) ISSN 1468-0025 (Online)

SIMONE WEILS CONCEPT OF GRACE1

BARTOMEU ESTELRICH
This article aims to explore three models used by Simone Weil to describe the concept of grace. These models, though apparently different, share a common characteristic: all of them depict reality as divided into two opposing plans, and are separated from each other by a metaphysical barrier that Weil calls distance. The rst modelwhich has as its starting point Weils criticism of the social structures of her timehas to do with her interpretation of the great beast that appears in Book VI of The Republic, and in her explanation of the absolute difference that exists between the essence of necessity and the essence of good. The second modelwhich depicts Weils cosmological conceptionhas to do with her explanation of the gap that exists between the reality outside the world (ralit hors du monde) and the reality here below (ralit dici-bas), and the centrality that human consent has in connecting both realms. And the third modelwhich rests upon her theological interpretation of the Trinityhas to do with her assertion about the absence of God in Creation, and the supernatural force of afiction to transform the disruptive distance that sets apart God from creatures into a mediating separation. In these three models grace has three main functions: to persuade the human soul to look for the transcendent unity behind contradiction and lift it up to the good; to redirect human attention to the reality outside the world, making the soul consent to Gods will, and forcing it to descend to this world to care for the basic needs of human nature; and to transform the human soul through a process of passivity and waiting. Thanks to these three functions grace becomes a supernatural dimension absolutely necessary to build a bridge between the two realities and a way for God to encounter human beings.

Bartomeu Estelrich Boston College, The Jesuit Institute, 140 Commonweath Ave., Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 USA tomeuestelrich@gmail.com
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240 Bartomeu Estelrich I Simone Weil lived in a convulsive time. Socialism, Communism, Capitalism and Totalitarianism shaped the social-political geography of the western world during the early years of the twentieth century, transforming its traditional bases: new perspectives in Science, Philosophy, and Theology arose; matter took the place of God; materialism became the predominant philosophical current; and religion was removed from the center of society.2 Even though all these changes were made on behalf of progress and individual freedom, the unhappiness of the human condition never disappeared. In fact, the pervasive social instability, the unjust condition of the proletariat, the permanent threat of war, and the afiction of thousands of human beings, proved that something wrong was hidden behind these social-cultural changes, and was, in fact, the cause of them. In her tireless search for truth, Simone Weil found out that the fundamental cause of that situation was the unsolved confusion between the essence of necessity and the essence of good. But, how did she reach this conclusion? Weil, analyzing a passage from Book VI of The Republic in which Plato describes the relationship that exists between a great, and powerful beast and his keeper,3 discovered that the kind of relationship that human beings currently have with their society is not essentially different from the one depicted by Plato twenty-ve hundred years ago. As in ancient times, modern societies tend to exert a powerful though invisible force upon the individuals in order to dominate them. They control human beings through a subtle strategy that progressively converts free individuals into submissive servants. For Weil, Plato best explained this subtle strategy when he described the inverse master-slave relationship that exists between the beast, which symbolizes the power of society, and the keeper, who symbolizes the individual. In his account, Plato wanted to make clear, rst of all, that the beast is the one that is holding the baton in that uneven relationship. In fact, for Plato, it is the keeper (the individual) who is subjugated to the beast (society) and not the other way around. It is the keeper who needs to know [the beasts] angers and desires, how best to approach him, from which side to touch him, at what moments and for what reasons he becomes irritable or gentle, what calls he customarily makes in such and such a humor, [and] which words are apt to soothe or excite him.4 Second of all, Plato also wanted to make clear that society, even though it has an appearance of meekness and mildness, is what determines the behavior of the individuals, and that it even decides the kind of existence in which to live. In fact, for Plato, the worst long-term consequence that the inverse master-slave relationship implies is that individuals become accustomed, and even conform to it. When this process of conformation concludes, the individuals not only believe that nothing is wrong in that unequal relationship with society, but also rationalize that process and
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Simone Weils Concept of Grace 241 come to believe that what they are doing is the best and the only thing that they can do. Then, the basis is settled for the last and most amazing consequence of that perverse process of reciprocal adjustment. For the keeper not only resolves to make a theory about how best to approach the beast, but also to construct a method for it, to use it as subject-matter for his teachings. Finally he calls this process wisdom. When that happens, a system has been created and the keeper becomes not only a submissive servant of the social beast, but also an unwary slave who has sold his soul, unconsciously but effectively, to the great beast. And without a soul, stripped of personal judgments, the keeper is reduced to a simple puppet in the beasts hands, a half-witted individual without a realistic understanding of the world. For he, according to Plato, knows nothing in reality of what among those opinions and desires is beautiful or ugly, good or evil, just or unjust. Whatever pleases the animal he calls good, whatever annoys him he calls bad, and he has no other criterion. Things that are necessary he calls good and beautiful, for he is incapable of seeing or showing to others to what degree the essence of necessity is in reality different from the essence of good.5 As we infer from Platos account, society has to be regarded as the main obstacle that impedes human beings from becoming who they really are, and also the barrier that prevents them from having an accurate understanding of reality. But, why is this so? Why does society have such a power on individuals? Because, according to Plato, society has the ability not only to distort but also to mix up the two poles from which reality is made: good and necessity. By mixing up these two poles, society destroys the noetic distance which keeps them separated and in a constant tension, thus eliminating any possibility for human beings to start moving towards the good. In that situation, in which the difference between the essence of good and necessity is suppressed, human beings reach the maximum degree of existential confusion. However, if by a supernatural impulse, the individual can overcome that confusion and go to the root of the problem, then that person is able to discover that the essence of human nature is not embedded in a misleading state of perpetual confusion but in a perennial state of salvic contradiction: The essential contradiction in human life is that man, with a straining after the good constituting his very being, is at the same time subject in his entire being, both in mind and in esh, to a blind force, to a necessity completely indifferent to the good. So it is; and that is why no human thinking can escape from contradiction.6 According to Weil, the process of overcoming confusion, discovering contradiction, and being able to differentiate good from necessity, is absolutely crucial for human beings because after going through that process they can fully perceive that (1) the only place where human existence can take place is in an in-between realm dominated by the constant tension of necessity and good; (2) the fundamental characteristic of human nature is no other than a life under the sign of contradiction; and (3) the very
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242 Bartomeu Estelrich essence of humankind is nothing else than a continuous and perpetual straining after an unknown good. Once this philosophical model is settled, now the question remaining is: What is the function of the grace in it? Weil gives four main approximations to that question. The rst depicts grace as a supernatural gift that enables human beings to recognize the confusion between necessity and good, and also to acknowledge the bond that connects them. According to her, grace gives a person the possibility to behold, in its total irreducibility, the distance that exists between the two poles. Thanks to that, a person is able to recognize that the good and necessity are totally other,7 and that, at the same time, they are mysteriously united by an invisible bond. For Weil, the awareness of the total otherness of good and necessity, the discovery of their transcendental unity, and the religious contemplation of that mystery are the rst fruits of grace. The second approximation to the nature of grace has to do with the eventual incorporation of humankind into the contemplation of the mystery. For Weil, the mere awareness of the existence of the transcendental unity between the good and necessity is not enough in order to be transformed. One must also take a step further and contemplate that unity with love and desire.8 When love and desire are added to the equation, Weil points out, something of [that] transcendental unity is communicated to those who, without understanding it, without being able to make any use either of their intelligence or of their will in regard to it, contemplate it.9 Grace, in that sense, is that mysterious power that enables human beings to participate in the transcendental unity of good and necessity by contemplating, with love and desire, the divine tension between the two poles. The third approximation toward the meaning of grace has to do with how grace draws human beings toward the good. For Weil, human will is incapable of moving directly toward the good. The good, as it is absolutely supernatural, cannot be reached by natural means or by the sole determination of the will. It is necessary that the spirit persuade (in the sense of the platonic peitho) the human will to turn toward the good and start a slow ascension towards it. In fact, for Weil, the spiritunderstood as an innitesimal fraction of the supernatural good that dwells in the most intimate part of the human soulis the only agent capable of compelling a person toward the divine good. However, the way the spirit does it is not by drawing the human will strongly, but on the contrary, smoothly and effortlessly. Weil depicts the effortless persuasion of the spirit as an innitely small force that works quietly and secretly in this world drawing humankind toward good. She compares the effectiveness of that innitely small force to the function that catalysts, bacteria and fermenting agents, have in nature; to the keystone that supports a whole building from above; to the point of leverage that Archimedes was looking for to lift the world; to the decisive function that the pomegranate seed has in the myth of Persephone; and to the symbolism that the pearl and the grain of mustard have in the Gospels.10 Grace, in this context, means the innitesimal force
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Simone Weils Concept of Grace 243 that, regardless of its size, is capable of enticing humankind toward the good, and therefore toward God. Finally, the fourth approximation toward the denition of grace has to do with the direction that the soul has to follow in order to reach the good. Weil, following Platos philosophy, places the two poles of reality in a vertical plane. For her, the good is situated at the upper level of it, towering over all creation from above. Necessity, on the other hand, is placed at the lowest level, ruling over all creatures. The spiritual journey that the soul has to start upwards in order to reach the good is, in Platos terminology, a dialectic process. That process involves a movement of the soul which, at each stage, in order to rise to the sphere above, leans for support on the irreducible contradictions of the sphere wherein it nds itself. At the end of this ascent, it is in contact with the absolute good.11 For Weil, that ascending movement of the soul is assisted by the supernatural operation of grace,12 and it is described as a passive movement by which the soul is drawn upward.13 In that sense, grace can be described as a dialectic movement that, assuming the contradictions, and using them as steps in its ascending journey, entices the soul from the lowest levels of existence to supernatural contemplation, and nal participation in the divine good. II Along with the rst model, Weil depicts another that places human existence between two opposing realms: the reality outside the world (ralit hors du monde) and the reality of here below (ralit dici-bas). Weil describes the rst realm as a reality outside space and time, outside mans mental universe, outside any sphere whatsoever that is accessible to human faculties, and also as the unique source of all the good that can exist in this world: that is to say, all beauty, all truth, all justice, all legitimacy, all order, and all human behavior that is mindful of obligations.14 On the contrary, Weil depicts the reality of here below as a realm ontologically separated from the rst one, incapable of producing any good, and intrinsically constituted by necessity.15 According to Weil, human beings know about the existence of that transcendent reality because of two indirect experiences: by their longing for an absolute good, which is never appeased by any object of this world, and by the presence in this world of absurd and insoluble contradictions, which are always the terminus of human thought when it moves exclusively in this world.16 Even though between both realities there exists a gap that cannot be bridged, human beings have the possibility to connect them through the capacity of attention and love. In fact, for Weil, those minds whose attention and love are turned toward that reality are the sole intermediary through which good can descend from there and come among men.17 The only necessary condition for this to happen is the factual consent of a human beingexpressed or not, conscious or not18to redirect his/her attention to the transcendent good.
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244 Bartomeu Estelrich It is worthwhile to emphasize that between this model and the rst one there do not exist great differences but striking similarities. Both coincide in sharing the existence of two different realms, separated by an unbridgeable gap, which can be depicted as the realm of transcendent good and the realm of immanent necessity. In addition, in both models, human beings are situated in the midst of the two realms, and through their exercise of attention, love and/or desire are able to build a link between them. Finally, in both models, striving for the divine good and the use of contradictions are the two basic tools that human beings might utilize to reconnect both realms. However, the main difference between them lies in the fact that the rst model depicts the separation between necessity and the good as a noetic distance, and concurrently describes the operation of grace as an uplifting movement that uses dialectics to ascend to the divine good; the second one depicts the distance between the reality outside the world and the reality here below as a cosmological gap, and concurrently describes the operation of grace as a descending movement from the divine good to the lower levels of existence. In that sense, it is noteworthy to point out the resemblance of these two models with the two moments of the illuminating process described by Plato in his allegory of the cave: a rst moment that describes the ascending path of the inhabitant of the cave toward the outside world where the sun/good is present; and the second one that describes the descending path to the cave once he has been illuminated by the sun/good. For Weil, it is precisely in this second movementthat is, in the return of the inhabitant to the cavewhere it is possible to nd not only the profound insight of platonic philosophy, but also a decisive clue that permits discovery of the ultimate motive for universal respect toward all human beings. For Weil, the resolution of the inhabitant to descend once again into the cave after being illuminated by the divine good marks a qualitative difference in the way he perceives reality and understands necessity. For, after his transformation by the idea of good, the cave dweller is able to perceive reality as intrinsically constituted by necessity, and to understand necessity as the immaterial force that subdues all creation to its dictates.19 However, when Weil wonders why all his fellows remain in the cave and do not start the ascending process toward the good, she discovers that it is not because of any transcendental hindrance, but because they are subjected to the misery of need.20 Need (besoin), in that sense, means any basic human aspect or privation that a person has to overcomeboth regarding the soul and the bodyin order to maintain his/her existence alive and keep going toward the good. Thus, according to Weil, the basic needs of the body that must be satised are, food, warmth, sleep, health, rest, exercise, [and] fresh air.21 And the basic needs of the soul that must be fullled are: order; equality and hierarchy; obedience and liberty; responsibility and equality; truth and freedom of expression; solitude, privacy, and social life; private
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Simone Weils Concept of Grace 245 and collective property; punishment and honor; disciplined participation in a common task of public value and personal initiative within this participation; security and risk; and, nally, the need to be rooted in several natural environments and to make contact with the universe through them.22 For Weil, this set of needs, and the obligation to fulll them, constitute the minimum that persons are asked to do for their fellow human beings, and, in that sense, they constitute the fundamental set of universal aspects that anybody is asked to respect. Grace, in this model, must be dened, primarily, as the supernatural power that impels human nature to exert its consent to redirect its attention and love beyond the world, toward the reality that exists outside the reach of all human faculties. In addition, it must be regarded as a descending movement that goes from the contemplation of the transcendent good to the active care for the most basic human needs. Grace must also be characterized as the faculty of expressing affection for human beings, and of recognizing them as subjects of universal respect. Finally, grace must be typied as the power that permits human beings to transform their natural tendency to increase their ego and to look for personal rights, into a supernatural tendency to decrease their ego, to be more focused on their obligations towards their fellow human beings, and to take care of their basic needs. III The last model in which Simone Weil describes her concept of grace takes place in another cosmological setting, although this time she adds some crucial theological nuances. In this new model the two poles of tension are God and creation, though, as we will see immediately, the real tension does not take place in the relationship that God maintains with the material universe, but between Him and any human being who has been beaten by afiction. To better understand this tension, we must start by depicting two theological assumptions in Weils philosophy: her understanding of the Trinitarian life before the act of creating, and the concept of creation itself. Thus, Weil denes Gods internal life before creation as a blissful state in which He is a happy God, known and loved Himself by Himself, a God that has in Himself the blessed life of the Trinity.23 In such a perfect state, God does not need to create anything different to him. He is self-sufcient, and he is, as it were, everything. He is the origin, the center and the ultimate object of his innite love.24 On the other hand, Weil denes Gods intentional act of creating as a deliberate decision to break that idyllic state which has as its primary cause Gods abiding love and absolute freedom. In fact, according to Weil, God does not need to create something different from Himself in order to be who He really is, or to reach His plenitude. On the contrary, any hypothetical increase of Gods essence must be regarded as a diminution of
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246 Bartomeu Estelrich his being, and any expansion in his being as only possible by an effective withdrawal in his essence.25 For in creating God renounces being all, He abandons a bit of his being to what is other than Himself.26 In that sense, creation, considered as the action of creating, must be regarded as an act through which God restrains and renounces Himself of being all;27 and, considered as the nal result of that action, creation must be regarded as the resultant space/time in which God has voluntarily excluded his presence, and in which He is completely absent. For Weil, creation is not a unique act that was done once and for all at the beginning of time, but a process that was only perfectly culminated with the Incarnation and the Passion of Christ.28 By including the Passion of Christ in the concept of creation, Weil not only is able to redene her concept of Gods intra-Trinitarian lifeby saying that the innite nearness and identity between the divine persons includes also the notion of an innite afiction and distance in the bosom of the holy Trinitybut also to redene her concept of creation as an innite distance between God and humankind. Weil reaches that conclusion, because according to her, the afiction of Christ on the Cross not only introduces afiction and separation in the very core of the Holy Trinity, but also represents the greatest possible distance that a human being has ever been from God. Thus, by connecting Christs extreme afiction on the Cross to the afiction that any person is bearing in his/her life, Weil is able to draw a line between them, and point out that both are at the greatest possible distance in creation from God, and also that both perceive that distance as an innite and painful sentiment of separation.29 When this level of awareness is reached, and that person realizes that this universe where [he/she is] living, and of which [he/she] form[s] a tiny particle, is the distance put by Love between God and God. [That he/she is] a point in this distance. [That] space, time and the mechanism that governs matter are the distance. [And that] everything that [he/she] call[s] evil is only this mechanism,30 then, that person perceives in the deepest levels of his/her spirit the vastness and emptiness of creation, the vital need to reconnect his/her existence with God, and the desire to start moving toward Him. But, how is that person to seek Him? How is that person to go toward Him? For Weil, no human being is allowed to start an active search for God or to go directly toward Him, but only to proceed indirectly and passively. Weil uses the Greek term hupomone to describe this process, which, essentially, means the supernatural attitude of waiting. According to her, only by an attentive and faithful attitude of waiting can a human being transform the impersonal subjection to necessity into a faithful obedience to God,31 and the disruptive distance between them into a mediating separation.32 For, if a person wants to cross that distance on his/her own, or by the sole force of his/her will, instead of nding God at the end of that pursuit, he/she will reach only his/her own ego. But if, on the contrary, that person remains still, motionless,
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Simone Weils Concept of Grace 247 waiting for the good and keeping evil away,33 someday he/she will receive a visit from God, and God will possess him/her.34 Then the insurmountable barrier that keeps him/her away from God will be breached by the supernatural help of grace. The way Weil denes the resolution of God to break into somebodys life and possess him/her marks a decisive difference from the way she denes grace. In fact, in this model, grace acquires some specic connotations that mark a difference from the way it was previously described.35 First of all, grace does not have as its ultimate purpose to redirect human attention towards a noetic concept of good, but on the contrary, towards a personal encounter with God. Second, grace does not use contradictions to climb to the highest levels of goodness or to descend to the lowest levels of human nature; instead, grace uses afiction to bridge the distance between God and humankind. Third, the ultimate goal that grace attempts in this model has nothing to do with the goal that it attempts in Weils other characterizations, since in the rst two models grace is intended to transform the perception of a person through the contemplation of good, and in this one grace is intended to decreate the self of a person through afiction. Fourth, the former models place the struggle of humankind to reach the good in an imaginary setting where the two poles of attraction are located in a vertical plane. In that sense, verbs like to ascend and to descend, and adverbs such us up and down, above and below, are constantly used. However, in this model Weil changes the orientation of the setting, and places it in a horizontal plane. This change of orientation can be perceived by the use of verbs like to cross and pass through, and by the pervasive utilization of the adverb across. Finally, in this model, grace is presented as the culmination of the former two types of grace, which, as we already know, has been described as a spiritual persuasion (peitho) that quietly and secretly entices humankind toward the good through the activity of a divine seed placed in the soul; and as a supernatural power that impels human nature to exert its consent to redirect its attention and love beyond the world, toward the reality that exists outside the reach of all human faculties. In this model, grace, even though it presupposes those characterizations, surpasses them. Thus, grace not only is the plausible consent to receive or to refuse Godas in the second modelbut the assertive nuptial yes that gives permission to God to cross the universe and come to us.36 Grace, in this sense, is more than a simple authorization allowing God to come down and invade the soul. It is an actual resolution to be possessed by Him, to be transformed by His love, and to disappear during that process. On the other hand, grace is no longer described as a divine seed that God has planted in the soul in some past momentas in the rst modelbut as the most beautiful of all trees where the birds of the air come and perch.37 Thus, in this model the minute seed of grace has grown, has developed roots in the soul, and has become a substantial part of
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248 Bartomeu Estelrich human existence. Grace, consequently, is regarded not only as an impersonal force that draws the soul toward God, but also as a conscious acceptance to be possessed, devoured, and digested by the presence of God.38

IV Thanks to the analysis of these three philosophical models, it is now possible to underline the main differences and similarities that the concept of grace has in Weilian philosophy. However, once this preliminary description is nished, one must take a new step, and contemplate those three models synthetically, that is, as parts of a single, unied process. This new endeavor is possible if we take into account the absolute complementarity of the three models, and remember that the nal purpose of the Weilian philosophy is to offer a holistic comprehension of reality. At the same time, the existence in those models of two different kinds of attitudes toward the apprehension of the ultimate goalan active attitude and a passive one make possible two ways of grouping the models and, concurrently, of discovering two new perspectives on the meaning of the concept of grace. Thus, if we connect the three models, and consider them as successive stages of a lineal process in which the soul has an active attitude in its search for God, then we have a phenomenological conception of grace that has as its main characteristic the attitude of searching. However, if we consider the three models not as stages of a linear progression but as parts that converge in an hypothetical center, and if we describe the actuation of the soul in its search for God as passive, then we have a mystical conception of grace that has as main characteristic the attitude of waiting (hupomone). In addition, we can also connect these two new perspectives with two Weilian afrmations that are inspired by the Pythagorean tradition. These afrmations state, rst of all, that the purpose of human life is to construct an architecture in the soul39 in which the nal goal would be the apprehension of the divine order veiled behind reality,40 and, secondly, that that architecture must be regarded as a divine geometry,41 hidden from the eyes of the distracted, but absolutely necessary in order to transcend the materiality of this world. It is thereby possible to connect the rst perspective the one that considers the three models as successive stages of a linear processwith the geometric gure of a triangle, and the second perspectivethe one that considers the three models as opposing movements that converge in an hypothetical centercan be connected by means of the geometric gure of the cross. Triangle and cross, consequently, become the two basic geometric gures that sustain the human apprehension of reality, and the ones that can be used to discover an ultimate meaning of grace.
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Simone Weils Concept of Grace 249

First model
First model Second model

Third model
Third model

Second model

First Geometric Figure

Second Geometric Figure

By juxtaposing the rst geometric gure (triangle) with the phenomenological concept of grace, grace can be seen as a divine force that pushes a person to go up, down and across the three sides of the imaginary triangle; grace is thus the dynamism that fuels the soul to cover the noetic, cosmological and theological distance that separates it from the good, the reality outside the world, and God; on this view grace is the divine persuasion (peitho) that enables the soul to differentiate good from necessity, to be aware of basic human needs, and to willingly accept Gods invasion; and, nally, on this account grace is the factual consent to be altered, changed, and transformed by the presence of God. On the other hand, by juxtaposing the second geometric gure (cross) with the mystical conception of grace, grace comes to be regarded as the passive attitude that pushes the soul to remain at the very center of the cross. On this view grace is the painful, though salvic, knowledge of the absolute absence of God in creation. Here grace is the patient waiting that neither forces nor urges Gods arrival, and here grace is the nuptial yes that consents to be effectively and totally possessed by Him. Considering together the two geometric gures as dimensions of the same reality allows us to see that grace is, rst of all, a noetic process that permits the synthesis of the two main rational contraries that the mind nds in its pursuit for the truth: necessity and the good, God and creation. Second, it encourages us to see that grace is an active-passive attitude that permits humankind to shorten the cosmological distance that exists between the reality outside the world and the reality of here below. And third, grace comes to be appreciated as a theological dynamism that enables a human being to bear the absence of God in creation, and wait for a mystical encounter with Him. Nevertheless, to further narrow this analysis, it is now possible to point out that the common denominator of these three aspects, and the essence of the concept of grace in Simone Weils philosophy, is the notion of movement. In that sense, grace can be regarded (a) as the divine movement that impels the soul in two opposite directions: a centrifugal movement that expands the soul towards any given direction of reality, making knownas Weil wrote, quoting Saint Paul in The Love of God and Afiction42the
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250 Bartomeu Estelrich breadth, and the length, and depth, and height (Ephesians 3:1719) of all creation; and a centripetal movement that concentrates the soul at the very center of the universe, in a point beyond space and time,43 where there is only waiting, attention, silence, immobility, constant through suffering and joy.44 In addition, grace can be regarded (b) as the divine movement that, even though it pushes the soul up and across the imaginary Weilian geometry, its main characteristic is to drag the soul down,45 and to force it to begin a kenotic process, whereby the soul is emptied of its egocentric tendency to increase the self, and enabled instead to be entirely receptive to Gods will. Finally, grace can be regarded (c) as the divine movement that, in its incessant spiral motion from the outer limits to the center of creation,46 enables the soul to behold all the disconnected aspects of reality, to discover the element that holds them together, to nd the transcendental unity of the contraries, and to live a life in a total and perfect harmony with God and the entire creation.47

NOTES 1 This paper was written with the support of the Jesuit Institute at Boston College and presented at the Twenty-eighth Annual Colloquy of the American Weil Society on the topic The Nature of Grace and Grace in Nature, held at St. Michaels College, University of Toronto, in April 2008. See Simone Weil, Oppression and Liberty, trans. by Arthur Will and John Petrie (Amherst, MA: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1973), pp. 172173. Plato, The Republic 493 a-d. I am using Simone Weils translation of The Republic as it appears in Simone Weil, Intimations of Christianity among the Ancient Greeks, trans. E. C. Geissbuhler (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), pp. 8586. Plato, The Republic, 493 b. Ibid., 493 c. Weil, Oppression and Liberty, p. 173. Ibid., p. 174. Ibid., p. 176. Ibid., p. 176. See Ibid., p. 175. Ibid., p. 190. Ibid., p. 190. Ibid., p. 191. Simone Weil, Selected Essays 193443, trans. by Richard Rees, (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 219. See Ibid., p. 221. Ibid., p. 219. Ibid., p. 219. Ibid., p. 218. See Ibid., p. 221. Ibid., p. 221. Ibid., p. 224. See Ibid., pp. 224227; Also, Simone Weil, The Need for Roots, trans. Arthur Wills, (New York: G. P. Putnams Sons, 1952), pp. 344. See Weil, Intimations of Christianity among the Ancient Greeks, p. 93. See Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, trans. Arthur Wills, (New York: Octagon Books, 1979), pp. 78 and 111. See Simone Weil, First and Last Notebooks, trans. Richard Rees, (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 81. See also Simone Weil, Waiting for God, trans. Emma Craufurd, (New York:

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HarperCollins, Perennial Classics, 2001), p. 89 from where this paragraph has been taken: On Gods part creation is not an act of self-expansion but of restraint and renunciation. God and all his creatures are less than God alone. God accepted this diminution. He emptied a part of his being from himself. Weil, Intimations of Christianity among the Ancient Greeks, p. 183. See Weil, Waiting for God, p. 89. See Ibid., p. 74 and Weil, Intimations of Christianity among the Ancient Greeks, pp. 182183. See Ibid., p. 73. Ibid., p. 75. See Ibid., p. 76. See Ibid., p. 75. See Ibid., p. 128. See Ibid., p. 79. For all the following description in this paragraph see Ibid., pp. 7981. Ibid., p. 79. Ibid., p. 80. See Ibid., p. 103. Weil, First and Last Notebooks, p. 208. All goods in this world, all beauties, all truths, are diverse and partial aspects of one unique good. Therefore they are goods which need to be ranged in order. Puzzle games are an image of this operation. Taken all together, viewed from the right point and rightly related, they make an architecture. Through this architecture the unique good, which cannot be grasped, becomes apprehensible; Weil, First and Last Notebooks, p. 98. See Ibid., p. 98. Weil, Waiting for God, p. 81. Ibid., p. 81. Ibid., p. 126. Creation is composed of the descending movement of gravity, the ascending movement of grace, and the descendent movement of the second degree of grace; Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 48. See Weil, Intimations of Christianity among the Ancient Greeks, p. 98. See Ibid., p. 95.

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