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CONTENTS
Vol. 13, No. 2: AprilJune 1981
Peter Moller Christensen and Jorgen Delman - A Theory of
Transitional Society: Mao Zedong and the Shanghai School
Mitch Meisner and Marc Blecher - Rural Development, Agrarian
Structure and the County in China
Victor Nee - Post-Mao Changes in a South China Production
Brigade
Edward Friedman - Learning About China After the Revolution ...
for the First Time!
Phyllis Andors - The Four Modernizations and Chinese Policy on
Women
Bobby Siu - Sociology and Socialism in Contemporary China by
Wong Siu-lun / A Review Essay
Gene Cooper - Hong Kong: Liberation without Liberation
Carl Trocki - Power and Paradigms / A Review Essay
Richard Franke - East Timor Report by M. Chamberlain / A Review
Jayne Werner - Vietnam by Gareth Porter (ed) / A Review
Saundra Sturdevant - Manila by Lino Brocka / Cinema Review
BCAS/Critical AsianStudies
www.bcasnet.org
CCAS Statement of Purpose
Critical Asian Studies continues to be inspired by the statement of purpose
formulated in 1969 by its parent organization, the Committee of Concerned
Asian Scholars (CCAS). CCAS ceased to exist as an organization in 1979,
but the BCAS board decided in 1993 that the CCAS Statement of Purpose
should be published in our journal at least once a year.
We first came together in opposition to the brutal aggression of
the United States in Vietnam and to the complicity or silence of
our profession with regard to that policy. Those in the field of
Asian studies bear responsibility for the consequences of their
research and the political posture of their profession. We are
concerned about the present unwillingness of specialists to speak
out against the implications of an Asian policy committed to en-
suring American domination of much of Asia. We reject the le-
gitimacy of this aim, and attempt to change this policy. We
recognize that the present structure of the profession has often
perverted scholarship and alienated many people in the field.
The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars seeks to develop a
humane and knowledgeable understanding of Asian societies
and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity and to confront
such problems as poverty, oppression, and imperialism. We real-
ize that to be students of other peoples, we must first understand
our relations to them.
CCAS wishes to create alternatives to the prevailing trends in
scholarship on Asia, which too often spring from a parochial
cultural perspective and serve selfish interests and expansion-
ism. Our organization is designed to function as a catalyst, a
communications network for both Asian and Western scholars, a
provider of central resources for local chapters, and a commu-
nity for the development of anti-imperialist research.
Passed, 2830 March 1969
Boston, Massachusetts
Vol. 13, no. 2/Apr.-June, 1981
Peter Moller Christensen and Jorgen Delman
Mitch Meisner and Marc Blecher
Victor Nee
Edward Friedman
Phyllis Andors
BobbySiu
GeneCooper
Carl Trocki
Richard Franke
Jayne Werner
Saundra Sturdevant
Contents
2 A Theory of Transitional Society
Mao Zedong and the Shanghai School
16 Rural Development, Agrarian Structure
and the County in China
32 Post-Mao Changes in a South China Production Brigade
40 List ofBooks to Review
41 Learning About China after the Revolution ...
. . . for the first time!
44 "The Four Modernizations" and Chinese Policy on Women
57 Sociology and Socialism in Contemporary China
by Siu-lun Wong/review essay
61 Hong Kong: Liberation Without Liberation
64 Six books on Thailand/review essay
74 East Timor Report by M. Chamberlain/review
75 Vietnam by Gareth Porter (ed.)/review
76 Correspondence
77 "Manila" by Lino Brocka/cinema review
79 Map orChina
Contents of Vol. 13. No.3
Contributors
Phyllis Andors is in the Political Science Dept. of Wagner
College, Staten Island. N.Y.
Marc Blecher teaches in the History and Government Dept..
Oberlin College. Ohio.
Peer Moller Christensen is with the Institute of East Asian
Studies. Univ. of Aarhus. Denmark.
Eugene Cooper is teaching in the Anthropology Dept.. Univ. of
Southern California. Los Angeles.
Jorgen Delman is associated with the Institute of East Asian
Studies. Aarhus. Denmark.
Richard Franke is with the Anthropology Dept.. Montclair
State College. New Jersey.
Edward Friedman is currently Assoc. Staff Director of the
Subcommittee on Asia. Committee on Foreign Affairs. U.S.
House of Representatives.
Mitch Meisner is with Madison College, Michigan State Univ ..
East Lansing. Michigan.
Victor Nee teaches for the Anthropology Dept .. of the Univ. of
California at Santa Barbara.
Bobby Siu is a graduate student at Carleton Univ. in Ottawa.
Canada.
Saundra Sturdevant will be working in China during the coming
year.
Carl Trocki is with the History Dept. of Thomas More College,
Ft. Mitchell. Kentucky.
Jayne Werner is at the Center for Asian Studies, Arizona State
Univ. in Tempe.
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A Theory of Transitional Society
Mao Zedong and the Shanghai School
by Peer Moller Christensen and Jorgen Delman
Introduction
The coup d'etat in China in October 1976 struck most of
the Western world with astonishment. Within a couple of
months political power relations in China seemed to be re
versed, as was its most recent history. Taken aback by the
Chinese explanations and disoriented by the suddenness and
finality of events, public opinion in the West tended to accept
the reasons for the coup d'etat offered by the victorious
conspirators.
It is, however, highly problematic to accept immediately
new explanations-as well as old-just because they are of
fered by people in power. Beneath current accusations against
Mao Zedong and the "Gang of Four" for "sabotaging," "un
dermining, " etc. the socialist economy and the socialist system,
one finds substantial evidence that doing away with the Cultural
Revolution is not just a question of legal justice. Real political
and theoretical contradictions between factions within the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership certainly existed
and formed the basis for recurrent power struggles. Therefore
we still find it worthwhile to study the decade of the Cultural
Revolution-not to "acquit" Mao Zedong or the "Gang of
Four" of whatever mistakes or crimes they may have commit
ted, but to gain a more sober and realistic understanding of that
tumultuous decade.
In this respect it is necessary to consider the theory or
theories lying behind the Cultural Revolution as a basis for
analyzing actual policy-making. In this article we intend to
present an outline of the theory oftransitional society developed
during the period 1949-1976 by the radical wing within the
CCP, notably Mao Zedong and the Shanghai School, econo
mists and politicians in Shanghai who cooperated with radical
politicians within the CCP leadership (such as Zhang Chunqiao
and Yao Wenyuan).
This theory was presented as a "political economy of
socialism" based on, but critical of, Soviet Marxism. In
its final version it came close to contemporary Marxist theory
propagated by members of the New Left in Europe such as
Charles Bettelheim and Rossanna Rossanda. One of the in
teresting features of this Chinese theory was its ability to gradu
ally free itself from Stalinist dogmatism and the straightjacket of
Soviet Marxism and to reach new insights concerning the nature
and structure of China as a socialist society.
Our article is divided into five parts: First, we present a
theory we call the "system theory" which was developed under
Stalin's auspices in the Soviet Union in the forties and early
fifties and later exported to China. Part two is a brief digression
introducing the development of a theory of market-socialism in
China in the late fifties and early sixties. Part three traces Mao
Zedong's development of a "generative class theory," and in
part four we analyze the theory of what we call the Shanghai
School which was developed in the early and mid-seventies. It is
presented here for the first time outside China. In our final
remarks we shall offer some comments on the applicability of
this theory as well as on its self-contradictions and obvious
limitations.
The "System Theory"
The political economy of socialism was not introduced in
China on a wider scale until the early fifties, and then in the form
of the Soviet' 'system theory"l which found its way to China as
part of the superstructure of Soviet economic and political
assistance after Liberation in 1949. The "system theory" was
presented as the Marxist theory on the political economy of
socialism and was expounded by Soviet manuals on political
economy, primarily in Political Economy; A Textbook pub
lished in 1954.
2
Before this book came to China, Chinese economists al
ready had a notion of the nature and ideas of the "system
theory" from Stalin's small pamphlet: "Economic Problems of
Socialism in the USSR" (1952), which was meant as a guide
line for the authors of the "Textbook," themselves distin
guished Soviet economists. 3 Stalin's participation in writing the
"Textbook" and final approval of it made it the most authorita
tive work of the "system theory." It later appeared in second
and third editions, but the theoretical substance remained
identical.
I. This is our own designation for this specific theory. It is meant to describe a
theory regarding socialism as a social system governed by a set of objective
laws. The "system theory" is regarded as a scientific system in itself.
2. Danish ed .. Copenhagen 1955.
2
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We do not know to what extent the' Textbook" was used
*****************
in China before 1959, when an official translation of the third
edition appeared.
4
But we do know that Mao Zedong followed
the translation of the third edition with intense interest and that
Notice
he criticized it in his "Reading Notes"
s
immediately after its
publication.
Most of the ideas and concepts of the "system theory"
came from the classical writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin,
from Stalin, and from various Soviet economists. They were
well-known beforehand, but this was the first attempt to present
socialist political economy as a coherent entity and a scientific
system. The "Textbook" was divided into chapters covering all
known modes of production from tribal communism to as-yet
unrealized communism. The aim was to elaborate on Stalin's
rather sketchy theses and concepts, to present a scientific under
standing of the evolution of society, and to bring order to the
chaos of history.
One basic concept in the "Textbook" is that social de
velopment is determined by two qualitatively different cate
gories of objective laws. One category of laws consists of
general laws operating through all known modes of production,
as for example the law determining that production relations
(which Stalin defined as comprising the ownership system,
mutual relations within production and the distribution system)
will invariably, and almost automatically adapt to new eco
nomic imperatives and will follow developments in social pro
ductive forces. The other category of laws are specific to one or
some, but not all modes of production , as for example the law of
value, which is the basic law of commodity production, as in
capitalism.
The "Textbook" defines socialism as an independent and
relatively stable social formation with its own set of objective
laws. At the core is a ''jundamentallaw ofsocialism" determin
ing that socialist production produces not for profit, as in capi
talist production, but to satisfy the ever-increasing material and
cultural needs of the working people in the process of building
socialism.
3. Another source has been: Mi Fei Sibilidunnuofu (M.F. Spiridonovl.
Zheng:/li jin!{jixue jiangyi. /-1/ (Lectures on Political Economy). Beijing: Gao
deng Jiaoyu Chubanshe. 1954. We found this manual in a second-hand book
store in Shanghai in 1979. As it was published neibu (internally) in a limited
number of copies it has-to our knowledge-never been listed in an official
bibliography. Consequently. we did not know of its existence until accidentally
buying it. Basically. its theoretical substance corresponds to that of the "Text
book." and we shall still consider this the most authoritative and influential
work in the Chinese context as it was written under Stalin's auspices and later
criticized by Mao personally.
4. Zhengzhi jin!{jixue. Jiaokeshu (disan ::engding ben) /-1/ (Political Economy:
Textbook [Third Enlarged and Revised Ed. n. Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe.
1960. This is yet a revised edition of the third revised edition published in
January 1959 (Reviewed by Li Yun in Hongqi (Red Flag) no. 15. 1959). An East
German edition of the "Textbook" is available: Politische Okonomie in der
USSR. in Martin (see note 5). pp. 124- 129.
5. The Reading Notes on the Soviet Text 'Political Economy' is available in Mao
Tsetung. A Critique o/Soviet Economics. annotated by Richard Levy and with
an introduction by James Peck (N.Y.: Monthly Review Press. 1977). German
ed.: Helmut Martin (ed.). Mao Tse-tung. Das Machen wir anders als Moskau.
(Hamburg: Rowohlt. 1975). The Chinese original is available in two slightly
different versions (both published in Taiwan): Mao Zedong sixiang wansu;
(Long Live Mao Zedong Thought). 1967. pp. 167-247. and Mao Zedong
sixiang wansui. 1969. pp. 319-99. Hereafter: Wansui-67 and Wansui-69
respectively.
3
Here, in a two-part special, the Editors present essays that
focus on China since the death of Mao Zedong. As with
our continuing series of articles on Southeast Asia since
1975, the contributions here and in the accompanying
issue (Vol. 13, No.3) are not definitive or final. We invite
other readers to join this dialogue by submitting essays or
research reports (in triplicate, please) that will, both in a
progressive and critical manner, further our understand
ing of contemporary China.
The Editors
*****************
Around the "fundamental law" there are a series ofmutu
ally interrelated non-.fundamental laws." They are all subor
dinated to the "fundamental law" and serve to fulfill its de
mands. The most important "non-fundamental laws" are: (I)
The law of planned and proportinate development guaranteeing
correct relations among the various sectors of the economy and
of production; (2) the law determining that there will be a
constant heightening of labor productivity guaranteeing a con
stant and swift development of material production; (3) the law
of distribution according to work guaranteeing everybody who
works an income in correspondence to his/her productive ef
forts; (4) the law of value (itself the "fundamental law of
capitalism") guaranteeing that products are exchanged at equal
value.
These laws are defined as objective and incontestable.
They are independent of man's will. They gradually extend their
sphere of influence after the establishment of socialist produc
tion relations, and at the same time they replace the specific laws
of the previous mode of production.
The "Textbook" follows Stalin in asserting that the law of
value still exerts its influence under socialism because commod
ity production and commodity circulation still exist. But it is
emphatically stressed that it operates in a "purified form,"
controlled by public ownership and socialist planning and con
sequently having only a regulatory function. Even though so
cialism is considered to be an independent social formation,
there still exist categories such as money, commodities, value
etc. known to be vital to capitalist economies. Theoretically
they are identified as concrete expressions and manifestations of
the objective laws governing socialist society, but it is asserted
that they too exist in a "purified form," free of capitalist
content.
According to the "Textbook," as long as these laws are
understood and applied correctly, socialist production will be
able to develop smoothly and at a rapid pace. Consequently.
socialist society will experience a corresponding fulfillment of
the ever-increasing material and cultural needs of the people.
Political economists, therefore, have it as their task to identify
and study the objective laws in order to provide a basis for
rational economic policies.
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Even though the "system theory" presents itself as a
logically coherent and scientific theory of socialism, it contains
a series of more or less obvious self-contradictions and unsolved
theoretical problems which tend to neutralize its analytical po
tential altogether. To mention but a few:
The "system theory" defines objective laws as part of
the object of political economy. However, when reading the
"Textbook" it becomes apparent that these laws have all been
defined beforehand. not detected by analyzing real social prob
lems, relations and contradictions in the USSR. Thus the meth
od tends to become tautological, and the conception of social
ism mechanistic.
Secondly, the entire theoretical complex has been put
together from bits and pieces taken from the writings of Marx,
Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and various Russian economists without
taking into consideration the original textual and historical con
text. The intention of Stalin and the authors obviously was to
substantiate a preconceived theory of socialism and to construe
a system of thought, a "genuine" and "scientific" Marxist
theory, only in order to explain economic policies and beautify
harsh social realities.
Thirdly, the "system theory" is a closed system of
thought which precludes the possibility of identifying new laws.
This tends to neglect the allegedly dialectical method of analysis
of the "Textbook."
From 1970 to 1976-especially after the fall of Lin
Biao in 1971-an intense etTort was made to develop a
comprehensive, independent Chinese theory on social
ism. The result was the manual "Political Economy of
Socialism" (PES), which was based on the cultural
revolutionary experiences and Mao's interpretation of
the nature and structure of Chinese society.
Fourthly, the critical dimension so prevalent in Marx's
criticism of bourgeois political economy entirely disappeared in
the"system theory. " The "Textbook" reduced political econ
omy to a science of legitimization more geared to the needs of
economic policy-making than to the needs of obtaining knowl
edge about the nature and structure of socialist society.
Finally, the "system theory" purported to be a science
for and of the working people. It maintained that anything done
by the leaders and the Communist Party was done "in the
interests of the working people. " This idea based itself on the
assumption that, due to the nationalization of the means of
production, the working class had become masters in socialist
society. Furthermore, class-struggle would die out because
there was no more private ownership to form a basis for con
tinued exploitation of the working people. The obvious inten
tion was to ideologize a non-existent social harmony within
production relations. It is a well-known fact that production
relations in the USSR were imbued with contradictions. The
violent suppression of opposition under Stalin bears testimony
to this. By ideologizing production relations, the "system
theory" precluded itself from becoming the critical theory and
instrument of class-struggle which Marx's original theory had
been.
The political economy of the "system theory" was the
subject of several articles in the Chinese economic magazine
lingji Yanjiu (Economic Studies) from its inception in 1955.
6
But most articles concentrated on specific topics, primarily the
question of objective laws under socialism. The "system
theory" was not presented officially in its entirety until the
appearance in 1959 of the translation of the third edition of the
"Textbook." The Chinese version of the "system theory" was
basically identical to the Soviet original, 7 but it had to be applied
in an entirely different social and historical context. Therefore,
it quickly met with opposition, notably from market socialists'
like Chen Yun and Xue Muqiao, and from Mao Zedong, who
was at that time starting to develop a theoretical platform of his
own.
The Theory of Market Socialism
We shall not dwell long on the topic of market socialism
here, R but only briefly give an introduction to the theoretical
platform of its foremost protagonists, Chen Yun and Xue
Muq iao. For them the key problem left unsolved by the' 'system
theory" was the question of how to interpret the function of the
law of value* under socialism. They claimed that the law of value
should be allowed to play an independent and active role in
developing and controlling the market in a socialist economy,
thus contending the idea of the "system theory" that the law of
value only had a regulatory function and was controlled by
economic planning.
Chen and Xue maintained that large sectors of a planned
economy could be substituted by a market economy controlled
by the law of value, i.e. primarily the supply-demand mecha
nism. They acknowledged the qualitative difference between
the laws governing a planned economy and market economy,
and consequently the contradiction between the two. But, none
theless, they believed that a market economy could still cure
some of the maladies of a planned economy, such as over
centralization of economic decision-making, bureaucratization
6. For the indices and subjects ofJillgji Yalljiu see: James Nickum. A Research
Guide to Jillgji Yalliiu (Ecollomic Studies) (Berkeley: University of California.
Center for Chinese Studies. 1971).
7. A good introduction is given in an article by Yu Ding: XI/exi
jillgjixlle xuyao :huyi de jige wellti (Some Problems to Pay Attention to When
Studying Political Economy), Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), July '27. 1959.
R The issue of market socialism in China is still virgin soil. Here we can only
give a few tentative references: G.W. Lee. Current Debates Oil Profits and
Value ill Maill/alld Chilla. Australian Economic Papers. June-Dec" 1965. pp.
n-78: Charles Bettelheim, Die Preispolitik Ulld die Rolle des Profits. in Bet
telheim et al.. Der Au{bau der ill Chilla. Munchen. pp.
10:1-74: JiangI/O yilai shehuizhuyi shallgpill shengchall he gui/u lun
l\eIl.W{/Il. /,1/ (Selected essays on the theory of socialist commodity
and the law of value since the founding of the PRC). Shanghai: Renmin
Chubanshe. 1979. Unfortunately, this collection of essays excludes material
from the Cultural Revolution including that of the Shanghai School.
*The law of value was identified by Karl Marx as the law governing commodity
production. Roughly speaking, the law of value determines that all exchange in
a commodity economy is carried out at equal values. measured in terms of
socially necessary labor spent in producing a specific economy. In capitalist
society the law of value has a wide range of economic. social and political
implications and consequences manifesting themselves in a very competitive
and anarchic production leading to waste of raw materials and labor force.
4
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of the planning apparatus, ineffectiveness in creating overall
balance, and extensive waste of raw materials and labor. These
were all problems which had arisen in the course of the first
five-year plan based on Soviet planning principles and the ideas
of the "system theory."
The inspiration for working out a Chinese theory of market
socialism came from various sources, primarily the Yugoslav
experiment, but also from debates on economic reforms then
current in East European countries.
Mao Zedong's "Generative Class Theory"
Mao Zedong was a most radical critic of the "system
theory." During the fifties and early and mid-sixties he de
veloped a stand of his own on several aspects of political
economy, in opposition both to the "system theory" and to the
theory of market socialism. Mao's formulation of a "generative
class theory"9 (a theory on the growth of new classes within
socialist society with a socialist economy as the material foun
dation) was undoubtedly his most significant contribution to
socialist theory. 10
The "generative class theory" saw the light of day in the
mid-sixties as the result of a long and rather complex develop
ment running through at least three phases: (a) before 1958;
(b) 1958-61; (c) after 1961. Here we shall briefly summarize
the main points in this development, in order to provide the
Chinese theoretical and conceptual background to the theory of
the Shanghai School.
Before 1958 Mao's most important theoretical contribu
tions were his assertions that class struggle continues in socialist
society even after the transformation of the ownership system, II
and that revolutionizing production relations is a necessary
precondition to promoting an extensive development of social
producti ve forces, I 2 i. e., economic growth. Furthermore, Mao
revived the concept of revisionism which was excluded from the
"system theory," identifying revisionism as a bourgeois ten
dency within the communist party having its roots in socialist
society itself. The protagonists of revisionism "dream of a
restoration of the capitalist system, " stated Mao. 13
In the second phase Mao criticized Soviet theory directly.
In two criticisms (1958 and 1959)14 of the above-mentioned
pamphlet by Stalin and in his "Reading Notes" of 1960, Mao
presented a series of new ideas. All three articles were criticisms
of Soviet texts, and therefore do not present themselves as
consistent theoretical works. They were sketchy commentaries
and critical notes by means of which Mao reached new insights
concerning the nature of socialist society.
In these works Mao broke away from the idea that social
ism was an independent mode of production. He found social
ism to be a transitional social form, a society on its way between
capitalism and communism. It is not-as claimed by the "sys
tem theory" -characterized by harmonious and peaceful de
velopment (provided objective laws are correctly interpreted
and applied). On the contrary, Mao found that socialism is
dominated by contradictions between economic base and super
structure, between productive forces and production relations,
and-most importantly-within production relations them
selves. Thus he still considered social contradictions and class
contradictions to be the motivating force in social and eco
nomic development.
Mao acknowledged the existence of objective laws, but
stressed that they are, after all, only man-made and that one
cannot allow oneself to become a slave of them as did the
protagonists of the "system theory." Mao favored a much more
voluntarist approach in his recurrent stress on the primacy of
production relations over productive forces. It was stated sev
eral times by Mao that major developments in productive forces
always come after changes in production relations. The process
of constantly revolutionizing production relations is a process of
simultaneously changing aU three aspects of these relations:
the ownership system, mutual relations within production, and
the system of distribution of the social product. The direction of
the process is from private to collective to state ownership and
finally to ownership by the whole people; from one person
management to party committee control and other forms of
democratic management; and from individual consumption to
collective, from pay according to work to recompensation ac
cording to need.
By stressing the need for simultaneous revolutionization of
all three aspects of production relations, Mao discarded the
evolutionary and mechanistic beliefs inherent in the "system
theory" and stressed the revolutionary potential of socialism
instead. This approach manifested itself in many respeCts.
First of all, Mao saw the Great Leap Forward in 1958 as a
conscious attempt to evade the inherent logic and implicit social
consequences of the law of value as identified by Marx in
Capital. The Leap did not justify its costs economically speak-
By stressing the need for simultaneous revolutioniza
tion of all three aspects of production relations, Mao
discarded the evolutionary and mechanistic beliefs in
herent in the "system theory" and stressed the revo
lutionary potential of socialism instead.
9. A designation introduced by Bill Brugger in Brugger (ed.), China. The
Impact ofthe Cultural Revolution. Croom Helm, 1978.
10. In "On the 'Restoration of Capitalism' -Mao and Marxist Theory,"
(Modern China. vol. 5, no. I, pp. 41-78), Joseph W. Esherick traces the
roots of the analytical concept "Restoration ofCapitalism " in Marxist literature
and in Mao's writings. He sees Mao's contribution to socialist theory as being
the development of the analytical concept "capitalist restoration." But it be
comes apparent from Esherick' s article that Mao's contribution in this respect
cannot be identified by explicit reference to his own works, but only by
induction. Therefore, we find it more fruitful to trace Mao's "generative class
theory," which can be substantiated by references, and which is, actually, a
blueprint for the theory of the Shanghai School, which expounded the concept of
.. capitalist restoration" by taking Mao's"generative class theory" as one of its
starting points.
II. "Guanyu zhengque chuli renmin neibu maodun de wenti" (1957) (On the
Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People), Mao Zedong xuanji
(Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung), vol. V, Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1977,
pp. 363-402,p. 389.
12. "Guanyu nongye he::uohua wenti" (1955) (On the Co-operative Transfor
mation of Agriculture), Mao Zedong Xuanji, vol. V, pp. 168-91, where Mao
argues that cooperativization precedes industrialization on a big scale and
consequently mechanization of agriculture.
13. "Guanyu zhengque . .. ," p. 392.
14. "Guanvu 'Sulian shehuizhuyi jingji wenti' yi shu de jianghua" (1958)
(Speech Concerning "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR," in: Mao
Tse-tung, A Critique . .. pp. 129-134), Wansui-69, pp. 247-251; "DuiSidnlin
'Sulian shehuizhuyi jingji wenti' de piyu" (1959) (Critique of Stalin's "Eco
nomic Problems of Socialism in the USSR," in: ibid., pp. 135-137), Wansui
67,pp.156-166.
5
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According to the Shanghai School's theory, socialism
is a transitional society consisting of both communist
and capitalist factors and elements, existing simul
taneously within socialist relations of production. The
capitalist factors are not simply surviving elements of
capitalist structure but are factors reproduced
through the social and economic processes in socialist
society.
ing, but it was necessary in political terms in order to satisfy new
demands of production. Secondly, the always incomplete proc
ess ofcontinually revolutionizing production relations will exert
its influence on the economy, which will move forward in leaps
and bounds and will constantly suffer from imbalances. Mao
disagreed with the "system theory" that regarded balanced and
proportionate development as an objective law. He argued that
it can only be regarded as a political imperative. Consequently,
development is wave-like, leaps are followed by stagnation,
maybe even retrogression, until followed by new leaps. Finally,
Mao argued that planning can by no means be meta-historic,
always securing proportionate development and correct coordi
nation between supply and demand. The role of planning is to
maintain a certain eqUilibrium, but this can only be done tempo
rarily. Planning is a process of learning and planning can only be
perfected by studying leaps and bounds, disproportions and
imbalances, whenever they occur. Therefore, plans do not be
long to the economic base-as claimed in the "system
theory' , - but to the superstructure, as a form ofconsciousness.
On the question of the existence of the law of value and ofa
commodity economy in socialist society, Mao basically agreed
with Stalin's viewpoints. But he did dispute Stalin's assertion
that the means of production are not commodities simply be
cause they are produced by state-owned enterprises and trans
ferred within the state-owned sector. Mao argued that as long as
there are two ownership systems, collective and state, means of
production will still be exchanged as commodities. Therefore,
the only way to finally do away with commodity production
is-given the necessary stage of development of productive
forces-to carry through the transition to ownership by the
whole people within all spheres of production, to go from
exchange of commodities to exchange of products and from
exchange of value to exchange of use-value. *
During the third phase Mao again focused on China's
internal problems. and especially on the nature ofclass struggle.
This led finally to his formulating the "generative class theory"
around 1964-65. This process can be traced in the development
of Mao's vocabulary during the period. but let us first sum
marize the preconditions. In the mid-fifties Mao had pointed out
* Whereas Marx saw a close connection in the contradiction between exchange
value and use value within commodities under capitalism and the existence of
class struggle in capitalist societies. Mao did not draw the same conclusions
concerning class struggle under socialism. To him the law of value was a purely
that the turbulent class struggles of the past had come to an end.
But at the same time he asserted that the bourgeoisie still
existed, and that the contradiction between 'the bourgeoisie on
the one hand and the proletariat on the other would continue to
exist for a considerable struggle was by no means
over and might even evolve into a state of violent clashes
between antagonistic classes and political groups. IS This posed
the question of whether the struggle came from the old, now
socialized. bourgeoisie or a new one generated within socialist
society. Mao was far from clear on this point. In "Reading
Notes" he did, however, argue that there are "vested interest
groups" and "conservative strata" in socialist society trying at
each new phase of social development to exert their influence to
consolidate development and prevent further changes in order to
protect their own vested interests and privileges.
Basing himself on these theoretical observations, Mao
quickly moved towards new insights when combining them
with actual developments in China during the period 1961-64/5.
In early 1962 he argued that in socialist society the working
class is confronted with "new bourgeois elements" generated
within the given social framework and that these are also to be
found within the Communist Party, thus opposing socialism
from within. 1
6
In August 1962 he stated that class struggle most
importantly was aimed at new non-socialist forces, i.e., new
bourgeois elements and "people walking the capitalist road. "
Here Mao for the first time used the concept of "capitalist
roader. " He furthermore stated that China might change color
and become revisionist or even fascist if these people were
allowed to make policy. 17
Later in 1962 Mao advocated the policy of continued class
struggle in the essay, "The Party's Basic Line For the Historical
Period of Socialism," but this was only a summary of theoreti
cal concepts presented previously.
During the period 1961-65 Mao more than once criticized
the leadership's desire for privileges and warned people in
leading positions against trying to protect their vested interests.
All these points were summarized and further elaborated upon
in "On Khruschev's Phony Communism and Its Historical
Lesson For the World" (1964), which presented an analysis of
"capitalist restoration" in the Soviet Union and attempted to
identify the material basis for a new privileged layer taking over
power in a socialist society. This analysis was primarily made
for foreign policy reasons, and Mao never applied this analytical
approach in detail to China. But he obviously thought a similar
restoration possible in China.
* According to Mao Zedollg X"allji. vol. V. p. 65. Mao. as early as 1953. had
already identified the main contradiction in socialist society as being that
between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. It has to be borne in mind. however.
that vol. V of the Xuanji was published after Mao died underthe auspices ofHua
Guofeng. It has been proved that some of the texts were revised. crucial words
were changed and paragraphs inserted or omitted. So this short quotation from
1953 may be an invention of the editors made for political reasons.
15. "Guanyu ;:hengque . ... " p. 389.
16. "Zai kuoda de ;:hongyang gong::uo huiy; shang de jianghUll" (Talk at the
Enlarged Work Conference of the Centre). Wansui-69. pp. 399-423. here pp.
406-407.
17. "Zai Beidaihe ;:hongyang gongzuo huiyishang de jianghUll" (Talk at the
Central Work Conference in Beidaihe). Wansui-69. pp. 423-429. here pp.
424-428. The manuscript for this talk is probably the most important source for
economic phenomenon. 6 identifying Mao's theoretical stand in this period.
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Even though he would not admit to the existence of new
classes of social layers in China (specifically a "new bour
geoisie")' he said that it was important to focus on "people in
power within the communist party." 18 They were identified
later in December that year as the protagonists of capitalist
policies and branded "people in power within the communist
party walking along the capitalist road. "19 Thus Mao had form
ulated the basic analytical concept of his "generative class
theory. "
In May 1967 he commented further on the issue of "capi
talist roaders." He stated that they were old revolutionaries who
had stopped with the democratic revolution. They did not want
to make socialist revolution, and consequently propagated capi
talist policies.
20
By identifying the Communist Party as the
nodal point in the overall social process whereby the new
bourgeoisie is generated, and by pointing out the need for
continued class struggle, Mao not only presented a new concep
tion of socialist society; he also provided a guideline for future
political struggles in China. As Mao was not willing directly to
admit to the existence of a new bourgeoisie as a class, but only
as a "stratum," "elements," etc., it may be argued that his
"generative class theory" was at most a sociological theory.
Apparently he never succeeded in combining his insights in the
political economy of socialism with his new theory of classes
and class struggle. But with the publication in 1976 of his
"Instructions" (which we shall deal with later on), he may have
reached new understandings, especially during his last ten years
while cooperating with the new cultural revolutionary theoreti
cians such as Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan.
The Shanghai School and
"Political Economy of Socialism"
After the many tumultuous events of the Cultural Revolu
tion and its many programmatic and organizational reforms a
theoretical summary had to be made-a summary which
draw theoretical conclusions from the practical experiences and
put them into a theoretical framework. After the de facto sus
pension of the most radical cultural revolutionary reforms from
1967 and onwards, the "cultural revolutionary" wing within
CCP had to try to maintain at least the theoretical perspec
tives of the Cultural Revolution.
From 1970 to 1976-especially after the fall of Lin Biao
19: I-an intense was made to develop a comprehen
Sive, Independent Chinese theory on socialism. The result was
the manual "Political Economy of Socialism" (PES), which
was based on the cultural revolutionary experiences and Mao's
of t.he nature and structure of Chinese society.
ThiS work was mainly carried out by a group ofeconomists from
Shanghai, many of them connected with the Institute of Political
Economy at Fudan University. (We shall call this group the
"Shanghai School. ") The purpose of writing the manual was to
summarize and develop the theoretical basis of the actual policy
propagated by the "cultural revolutionary" wing within the
CCP.
18. "Zhongyang gongzuo ::uotanhui jiyao" (Summary of the Central Work
Conference), Wansui-69, pp. 578-97. here p. 582.
19. "Zai zhongyang gongzuo huiyishang de jianghua" (Talk at the Central
Work Conference). Wansui-69, pp. 598-602. here p. 599.
20, "Dui Arbaniya junshi daibiaotuan de jianghua" (1967) (Talk to the Al
banian Military Delegation), Wansui-69, pp. 673-679. here p. 677-678.
When one uses money and prices, the price of a com
modity may be higher than its value. Production of
this kind of commodity will earn a bigger profit than
the average item, and therefore it may become attrac
tive for certain enterprises to maximize their profit by
producing that kind of commodity rather than less
profitable (but socially useful) ones.
We do not know the exact nature of the relationship bet
ween the "Shanghai School" and the "cultural revolutionary"
wing, but without doubt Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan
took active part in the work and Zhang Chunqiao played an
especially important role. After their arrest in October 1976, the
"Gang of Four" and the Shanghai School were accused of
having planned to canonize' Zhang Chunqiao Thought. "21
The final edition of "Political Economy of Socialism"
never appeared. The printing press was stopped by the coup
d'etat on October 6, 1976. The book was confiscated and a year
later it was condemned as a work intended to create "the
theoretical basis for the counterrevolutionary program of the
. Gang of Four.' "22 Later we shall present a rough outline ofthe
theoretical content of the final edition of' 'Political Economy of
Socialism." As the process of writing this book, however, ran
through many stages and phases and took the form of a constant
and thorough-going revision and development of the theory, we
have chosen also to describe the different manuscripts which
were written during the process.
It is a general rule that discussions and decisions concern
ing important political matters in China occur behind closed
doors. Solutions and documents are not presented to the public
until an agreement has been reached. Apart from the more
chaotic periods of the Cultural Revolution this has been the main
pattern of political life in China ever since 1949. But this
procedure was not followed during the process of writing
"PES," even though it was of considerable importance to the
policymakers of the "cultural revolutionary" wing within the
CCP. All the manuscripts were published in limited numbers in
order to give people an opportunity to make comments on the
manuscripts and thus contribute to the constant improvement of
theory. In .this w.ay there are rich opportunities for compara
tively open diSCUSSions on the theory. It is remarkable to see
thorough were the changes made during the relatively short
penod from 1971 to 1976. Original self-contradictions were
gradually solved and the final edition of "PES" presented a
and consistent theory. This theory analyzes the
SOCial baSIS of class contradictions in Chinese society. In con
trast the above-mentioned Soviet "system theory," this
theory could not be used to legitimate the Chinese social struc
ture: it was a "critical" theory. *
21. Renmin Ribao (The People's Daily). November 24. 1977.
22. Ibid.
Peer Moller Christensen had access to the 1972 and 1975 manuscripts when he
was a foreign exchange student at Fudan University in Shanghai in 1979. As for
the unpublished 1976 manuscript, we have only had access to selected quota
tions from it published by the Chinese press after the coup in 1976. The rest of
7
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The Starting Point
When writing a manual on the political economy of social
ism during the '70s, Chinese economists could base themselves
upon Mao's conception of socialism as well as on the Soviet
"Textbook" and a manual written in Shanghai in 1961.23 But at
the same time it would be necessary to further develop Mao's
theory of socialism by incorporating criticisms of what was
considered to be the "capitalist restoration" in the Soviet Union
as well as the experiences from the actual class struggles during
the Cultural Revolution. Therefore a manual on political econ
omy of socialism would have to provide answers to the follow
ing questions:
How could the Soviet Union have turned capitalist?
Can China tum capitalist as well? If so, how could this
happen and what could be done to prevent it?
Can a bourgeoisie be generated in China that might eventu
ally usurp political and economic power? If the answer is
positive. what will this bourgeoisie be like, and will it be able
to initiate and promote a capitalist development?
The following description ofthe development of the theory
elaborated by the Shanghai School will emphasize those ele
ments in the different manuscripts representing phases in the
criticism of the Stalinist' 'system theory. " In this connection we
particularly want to examine how the books answer the above
mentioned questions. In our opinion the answers provided to
these questions gradually burst the dogmas and formulas of the
"system theory." Therefore, we do not intend to give a total
and complete picture of the books and manuscripts. but only
intend to describe the main theoretical development.
The First Manuscript
From 1971 to 1976 five versions of "Political Economy of
Socialism" were written. The actual work started in June 1971
when Zhang Chunqiao approved the plans for writing such a
book. The first manuscript was presented in September 1972.
24
According to that manuscript. the main feature of socialism is
the abolition of private ownership of the means of production.
Socialism is a coherent social system basically different from
capitalism. The socialist system determines the character of the
various elements within the system, which. therefore, a priori
are different from their capitalist counterparts.
In describing socialism the manuscript used China as an
example-as a concrete manifestation of the conception of
socialism. Apart from the fact that this brought the theory close
to becoming a theory of legitimation. it also implied that certain
phenomena in Chinese society a priori are defined as socialist
and therefore fundamentally different from similar phenomena
inside capitalist societies. Economic categories such as com
modity, money, wage, capital, profit, etc. found to be objec
tively existing within Chinese society are not equivalent to their
capitalist counterparts. On the contrary. only the form is the
the manuscripts have been unavailable to us. but fortunately the Shanghai
School customarily printed popular versions of the PES. thereby making it
possible for us to analyze the main trends of thought in the unavailable manus
cripts. The popular versions were published in greater numbers and were more
widely distributed than the originals.
. jingjixlIe jillo('lli" (Shehui:huvi hufen) (Teaching Material on
Political Economy. (Socialism-part)). Shanghai. 1961
jil1gjixue" (Zhengqiu viiillll gao) (Political Econ
omy of Socialism>. (Manuscript to be commented) Shanghai (Hereafter
"PES." Shanghai 1972).
same. In socialist society these phenomena are socialist. This
way of conceiving economic categories was a legacy from
Stalin. and for a long time it was an obstacle to making a realistic
and concrete analysis of actual problems in Chinese society.
According to this manuscript. the abolition of private own
ership to the means of production has made comprehensive
economic planning possible. Introduction of conscious plan
ning has in itself caused a change in the nature of socialist
production that is basically different from private production.
Socialist production is. fundamentally speaking, directly social
production. and labor in socialist production is therefore no
longer private labor but directly social labor producing directly
social products. As exchange within socialism, however. takes
the form of commodity exchange, the products of socialist
production also contain "value." Therefore socialist produc
tion is a unity of a directly social-working process and a value
creating process.
This conception originates in the Soviet textbooks on the
political economy of socialism. In our opinion it is a theoretical
misconception, an ideologization of reality. According to
Marx. directly social labor is work which does not have to use
the value form to realize its social content. All commodities are
a unity of use-value as well as exchange value. and this unity is
actually what the manuscript describes. When distribution of
products in China has to take the form of commodity exchange.
it really shows that Chinese economic planning is insufficient to
make production directly social and work directly social labor.
In the 1961 manual from Shanghai all production under
socialism had been described as commodity production, but still
as a form of commodity production which is basically different
from commodity production under capitalism. According to the
1972 manuscript of "PES." all commodity production under
socialism is not only basically different from its capitalist coun
terpart. but a part of production under socialism is simply no
longer regarded as commodity production. Exchange within the
state-owned sector of the economy is not called "commodity
exchange" but "product exchange." Product exchange is not
realized through a market but through state allocation based
upon economic plans.
In this way the 1972 manuscript adheres to. ideas propa
gated in "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR."
where Stalin wrote that the reason for the objective existence of
commodity relations within socialist society is the existence of
two forms of ownership. collective and state-ownership. Ac
cording to Stalin. exchange within the state-owned sector of the
economy (primarily exchange of means of production) can no
longer be called commodity exchange.
25
Similarly the 1972
manuscript asserts that socialist product exchange as well as
commodity exchange are basically different from all other
forms of commodity exchange known down through history.
With these new forms of exchange. elements of a direct distribu
tion of means of production and goods for consumption emerge.
elements pointing forward towards communism.
25. Stalin: "Economic Prohlems o(Sociali.\m ill the USSR." Beijing.
FLP. 1972. p. 53 ff.
8
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All in all, the conception of socialism presented by this
manuscript is a mere duplication of Stalin's basic ideas and
concepts. It contains the implicit conclusion that, due to the
abolition of private ownership of the means of production, the
bourgeoisie has lost the social basis for exerting its power. and
consequently the bourgeoisie will never reemerge. Therefore
there is no longer any risk of a "capitalist restoration." The
most important aim in socialist society is, therefore, to develop
productive forces through planned production. This will lead
socialist society to a gradual transition to communism.
The most apparent self-contradiction in the 1972 manu
script is between the authors' repetition of the fundamental
concepts and ideas propagated by the "system theory" on the
one hand, and the incorporation of Mao's critical viewpoints
and his rejection of the conception of socialism of the "system
theory" on the other. A few examples should suffice to show
this:
-Even though the authors of the manuscript considered
the change in the system of ownership the constituting factor of
socialism, they also stated that the question of ownership has not
been completely solved in China; a major part of the Chinese
economy is still collectively owned and. therefore. only social
ist to a certain degree. Furthermore, there is still a problem with
the leadership in the state-owned sector of the economy. If
power slips from the hands of the working class and "true
marxists." the "bourgeoisie and its agents inside the party,
walking the capitalist road, " may transform the enterprises into
capitalist ones. In this way the bourgeoisie may usurp power and
lead the country in a capitalist direction. This. states the manu
script, was what had happened in the Soviet Union.
- The 1961 manual had also come to the conclusion that
the collective sector might change character and turn capitalist if
the leadership-power of the collectively owned units was
usurped by rich peasants and higher middle-peasants. In the
1972 manuscript the question of leadership-power was extended
to include relations within the state-owned sector. In this way
the first step was taken to reject the schematic division inherited
from Mao, of the relations of production in three elements: (a)
the ownership system; (b) mutual relations within production;
and (c) the distribution system. Mao had inherited this schem
atic tripartition from Soviet Marxism and it had been part ofthe
Stalinist legacy adhered to by the CCP. Conceiving the problem
of leadership as a constituent element of the ownership system.
however, makes this tripartition analytically inapplicable. As
long as the relations of ownership were synonymous with for
mal. legal relations, there was no problem. But when interpret
ing leadership-power-which belongs to the category of mutual
relations within production-as being a constituent element of
the ownership system, the demarcation line between the aspects
of the relations of production is blurred. Consequently, you
have to approach the relations of production as a totality. * On
the one hand. the transformation of the relations of production is
not simply a legal transformation of the ownership of the means
* Despite this new recognition. the 1972 manuscript still takes the tripartition of
production relations as the basis for the description and analysis of socialist
society. Furthermore. this apparent self-contradiction was never dealt with by
the Shanghai School in later manuscripts.
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The Second Manuscript
of production. On the other hand, transforming the relations of
production is a necessary prerequisite for developing the pro
ductive forces. In this respectthis manuscript adopts Mao's idea
from "Reading Notes" that "A change in the relations of
production always precedes a major development of the produc
tive forces. "26
- Even though it is stated that planning changes the nature
of production, the manuscript adheres to Mao's idea on the
incompleteness of planning. The authors of the manuscript state
that a plan can never guarantee a development with complete
sectoral balance:
Nothing in the whole world develops in complete equilib
rium. Equilibrium is temporary and relative, disequilibrium
constant and absolute. 27
- The manuscript attempts an analysis of a "new bour
geoisie" which might take the lead in a "capitalist restoration"
by introducing two concepts, "those inside the party taking the
capitalist road," .and the "bureaucratic monopoly bour
geoisie. " But the manuscript does not identify the material basis
for the emergence of this "new bourgeoisie" or for a possible
capitalist development. It only points out illegal, "system
external" factors in this process: the ideological influence from
the bourgeoisie, "capitalist traditions and birthmarks," and the
illegal sprouts of capitalism such as black market, corruption
and the like.
- This manuscript describes economic categories under
socialism as fundamentally different from their counterparts in
capitalist economies, thus making it impossible to explain how
the same economic categories and phenomena may become
constituents in a capitalist process of production.
-Furthermore, the 1972 manuscript describes exchange
within the state-owned sector as a form of exchange which can
no longer be called "commodity-exchange." What would then
be the precondition for transforming this "product-exchange"
back into capitalist commodity-exchange?
It can be seen that this manuscript contained a lot of
self-contradictions and inconsistencies, which had to be solved
in the following process of rewriting and revision. After its
publication in September 1972, the Shanghai daily, Wen
huibao, published a number of articles under the headline
"Study Some Political Economy." They presented the most
important ideas and concepts from the manuscript in a more
popular form and subsequently compiled and published them in
November 1972 in a small pamphlet again called "Study Some
Political Economy. 2 ~ The book carried the same introduction
as the manuscript, an essay by Fang Hai originally published in
the Magazine Hong Qi.
29
The purpose of publishing the book
seems to have been to start a broad public study campaign and
discussion on the political economy of socialism.
26. "PES." Shanghai. 1972. p. 120.
27. Ihid .. p. 164.
28. "Xltedian :heng:hijillgjixlIe." Shanghai. 19T! ..
29. Hongqi no. 7. 1972.
When the first manuscript was finished in September 1972.
Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan left Beijing for Shanghai in
order to arrange a meeting to discuss the problems which had
arisen in the writing. 30 The meeting took place in October and
Zhang Chunqiao presented some new "directives" on the basic
theory and line of argumentation presented by the book. The
directives suggested the following themes to be elaborated upon
and they were to provide the theoretical nuclei of the book:
- I. There are capitalist factors inside socialist relations of
production.
- 2. The question of ownership is a question of power.
-3. Mutual relations within the working people are class-
relations.
31
The first thorough revision of the manuscript was made after
this meeting, and the process of revision was finished and the
second manuscript written some time during 1973.32
The manuscript itself is unavailable, but in May 1974
another popular manual on political economy entitled "Funda
mentals of Political Economy"J3 was published in Shanghai.
Even though the manuscript had been revised, the theoretical
contents do not seem to have been basically altered. The three
themes mentioned by Zhang Chunqiao at the meeting in October
1972 were not elaborated upon; for example, the concept' 'capi
talist factors inside socialist relations of production" was not
mentioned at all. (In fact it was not to reappear until the final
edition in October 1976.) The self-contradictions so manifest in
the first manuscript remained, and the authors still adhered to
the fundamental ideas of the "system theory" which excluded
the possibility of a "capitalist restoration."
Mao's 1975 Instructions
Shortly after the Fourth National People's Congress in
January 1975, the national media published a quotation of
Mao's which started a mass discussion campaign, "The Cam
paign for Studying the Theory of Proletarian Dictatorship."
Mao did not take part in the NPC session, and many China
watchers interpreted this as his way of showing disagreement
with the decisions taken by the Congress. If this is true, the
publication of the quotation and the following campaign might
be an answer to the Congress made by him and his political
allies.
In the quotation which was called "Mao's Latest Instruc
tion on the Question of Theory, " Mao states:
In a word, China is a socialist country. Before liberation she
was much the same as capitalism. Even now she practices an
eight-grade wage-system, distribution to each according to
his work and exchange by means of money, which are
scarcely different from those in the old society. What
is different is that the system of ownership has changed.
~ O . Guangming Ribao. January 16. 1978.
31. Ihid.
~ 2 . "Shehlti:hl/vi :heng:hi jillgjixue" (Modillggao), "PES" (Final draft).
Shanghai. 1973.
:n. Zhellg:hi jillgjixue jichll :hishi. Shanghai. 1974. It has been translated into
English and published by M.E. Sharpe: "Fundamentals ofPolitical Economv.
ed. by George Wang (New York. 1977). .
10
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---- Our country at present practices a commodity
system, and the wage-system is unequal too, there being the
eight-grade wage-system, etc." these can only be restricted
under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus it would be
quite easy for people like Lin Biao to push the capitalist
system, if they came to power. 34
This quotation fits perfectly into the theoretical development of
the Shanghai School. It solved one fundamental theoretical
problem of the first two manuscripts, the contradiction between
the Stalinist conception of socialism on the one hand, and the
claim that a "capitalist restoration" could take place on the
other. According to Mao, socialist economic categories such as
commodity, money and wage are not basically different from
their capitalist counterparts. On the contrary there is no qualita
tive difference, and they could, therefore, quite easily become
functional in a capitalist production process.
In the same year, Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao
published articles, in March and April respectively. 35 They
elaborated further upon the ideas presented in Mao's "Instruc
tion" and on the framework and issues raised by the manu
scripts of the" PES. " The close connection between the start of
the "Campaign for Studying the Theory of Proletarian Dictator
ship" and the theoretical work done by the Shanghai School is
made clear by the factthat Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao' s
articles as well as Mao's "Instruction" initiated the campaign.
Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao, who were both in the
"Cultural Revolutionary" wing of the CCP, were directly in
volved in the theoretical work with the "PES" in Shanghai.
Nevertheless, it has to be underlined that the campaign was not
only a part of the theoretical development of the Shanghai
School; it was also the starting point of a new and very intense
political struggle in China.
In their articles Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao used
the designation "the Lin Biao clique" as a synonym for "the
new bourgeoisie. " Apparently, the articles were not directed at
Lin Biao and his political allies. They were attempts at analyz
ing the material and social basis for the appearance of a "new
bourgeoisie" and the possibility of a "capitalist restoration."
No doubt, the object of the analysis was a much broader social
group than the group around Lin Biao. According to the articles
the problem with the "new bourgeoisie" had not been solved by
purging Lin and his group. The "new bourgeoisie" was still to
be found in powerful positions in China. *
Taken as a whole, Mao's "Instruction" and Yao Wen
yuan's and Zhang Chunqiao' s articles presented a solution to the
most conspicuous weaknesses and self-contradictions of the
second manuscript of the "PES": the first being the absence of
an analysis of the material basis for the emergence of a "new
bourgeoisie"; and the second the contradiction between the
34. Peking Rel'iell'. February 28. 1975.
35. Yao Wenyuan: On the social basis o{the Lin Piao-anti-party-clique. Peking
Review. March 7. 1975. Chang Chun-chiao: On exercising all-round dictator
ship over the bourgeoisie. Peking Review. April 4. 1975.
* Seen from a theoretical point of view. it is difficult to understand why the Lin
Biao group was used as a target. but it has to be borne in mind that Lin Biao was
the most recent victim of inner-party struggle in China. and following the rules
and traditions of political strife in China. theoretical criticisms and analysis
frequently are made as criticisms of the most recently degraded political op
ponent. regardless of actual political viewpoints.
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interpretation of economic categories and mechanisms under
socialism as fundamentally different from those under capital
ism, and the supposition that a "capitalist restoration" is a
possibility under socialism.
In their articles Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao
pointed at "bourgeois right" as the material basis for the emer
gence of capitalism and a "new bourgeoisie. " They rejected the
views presented by the first two manuscripts of "PES," where
"bourgeois right" was regarded as a phenomenon closely con
nected with the "three major differences" (i.e., the differences
between city and countryside, between worker and peasant, and
between intellectual work and manual work) and as a principle
primarily functioning within the sphere of distribution. Yao and
Zhang regarded "bourgeois right" as a more general concept,
as exchange at equal values with its roots in commodity-produc
tion, and playing a role within all aspects ofrelations ofproduc
tion. In accordance with Mao's "Instruction," they stressed
that it is possible for a "new bourgeoisie" to promote a capital
ist development because socialist economic categories and
mechanisms are not basically different from their capitalist
counterparts.
11
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The Third Manuscript
After the publication of Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chun
qiao's articles, the second major revision of the manuscript of
the "PES" was started. The revision resulted in the third man
uscript. 36 This manuscript incorporated the theoretical view
points contained in Mao's "Instruction" and in Yao and
Zhang's articles. But at the same time, the concept "product
exchange" was still used to describe exchange within the state
owned sector of the economy. The idea that socialist com
modities are not basically different from their capitalist counter
parts did not include products produced and exchanged within
the state-owned sector. Even though Mao's "Instruction" and
Yao and Zhang's articles were an enormous inspiration to the
Shanghai School's theoretical clarifications, the "PES" still
contained ambiguities and self-contradictions in 1975.
The Fourth Manuscript
The fourth manuscript of the "PES" was written during
the period from June 1975 to December 1975. when Zhang
Chunqiao corrected the draft himself. Unfortunately, we have
not had access to this manuscript, but in December 1975 a
revised edition of "Fundamentals of Political Economy" was
published. 37 As it can be presumed that this manual was written
on the basis of the fourth manuscript. it is possible to attain a
fairly clear picture of the theoretical contents of the fourth
manuscript.
The "Fundamentals" goes even further than the earlier
manuscripts in two respects: in the analysis of the role of state
under socialism; and in the analysis of commodity production
under socialism.
-1. The analysis of the state. The manual states that the
socialist state is-in Lenin's words-a "bourgeois
state" because it has to protect "bourgeois right." Con
sequently the transformation of private ownership of the
means of production into state-ownership is not tanta
mount to a transformation of the system ofownership into
a "non-bourgeois" form. Thus "Fundamentals" rejects
the identification of socialism with state-ownership of the
means of production, an idea which was still present in
Zhang Chunqiao's article
38
and in the third manuscript.
In this way the road had been paved for a more reasonable
and logically consistent explanation of Soviet "state
monopoly capitalism. "
-2. The analysis of commodity production. The manual re
jects the concept "product-exchange" used in earlier
manuscripts. According to the "Fundamentals," all ex
change under socialism is commodity exchange, and this
goes for exchange within the state-owned sector as well.
This is a complete rejection of Stalin's idea concerning
production within the state-owned sector. Actually, this
had already been the case in the 1961 manual from Shang
hai
39
which had stated that all exchange under socialism
"Shehuizhuyi zhengzhi jingjixue" (Modinggao dierbanl. "PES" (Second
edition of the final draft). Shanghai. 1975.
jingjixue jichu ;hishi (Fundamentals of Political Economy).
Shanghai. 1975.
See Bettelheim: The Great Leap Backwards.
39. See note 13.
is commodity exchange. But whereas the 1961 manual
considered commodity exchange and commodity produc
tion under socialism to be fundamentally different from
commodity exchange and commodity production under
capitalism, "Fundamentals" stated that commodity ex
change under socialism is not very different from its
capitalist counterpart.
In these respects the 1975 edition of the "PES" repre
sented a step forward both in rejecting Stalin's analysis of
socialist commodity production and his general concept of social
ism, and in the theoretical clarification of the Shanghai School.
But it still contained a fundamental self-contradiction inherited
from earlier manuscripts, i. e., the idea that production under
socialism is a unity of direct social production and value creat
ing production. This self-contradiction was not solved until the
writing of the fifth and final manuscript of the "PES." which
was to have been published in Shanghai in October 1976.
The Fifth Manuscript
When the fourth manuscript of the "PES" was ready in
December 1975 Zhang Chunqiao wrote a new "directive,"
which started the last major revision of the manuscript. In this
"directive" he wrote:
We must criticize revisionism. Criticize Liu, Lin and DenR. 4()
Criticize Trotsky, Bukharin and the like. Political economy
can not be written properly, if revisionism is not criticized ..
We must understand that the influence from Stalin's mistakes
is still very strong. 41
The result of the revision was the fifth manuscript of the
"PES. "42 The authors had planned to publish the book in
October 1976, but, as noted, when the book was still in the
press, the coup d' etat of October 6 occurred and the manuscript
was confiscated. After the coup the Chinese media heavily
criticized the unpublished book and a similar one written in
Tianjin in close cooperation with the Shanghai School. 43
The critical media articles contain quite a few quotations
from the two "PES" books, which were considered to be the
result of the theoretical work of the "Gang of Four" and their
supporters. (For a list of critical articles. see the Appendix.)
Even though we have not had access to the two "PES" manu
scripts, it has been possible-by means of the many quotations
in newspapers and magazines-to get a fairly comprehensive
Liu Shaoqi. Lin Biao. Deng Xiaoping.
I. Rellmill Ribao. November 1977
jiflgjixue (Political Economy of Socialisml. Shang
hai. 1976.
According to the Gllangmillg Ribao. April 17. 1975. contact was es
tablished between the Shanghai School and a group from [he Nankai University
in Tianjin. also working on a manual on the political economy of socialism, in
July 1975. The cooperation between the two groups was continued until 1976.
The book written by the Tianjin group was published as late as November 1976
("Political Economv" (Socialism part) (Rel'ised Edition) (Tianjin. November
1976) and later it was criticized alongside the book written in Shjanghai. We
consider the Tianjin group as belonging to the Shanghai School. In reconstruct
ing the theoretical contents of the final manuscript of the "PES" we have.
therefore. also used quotations from this book. as they both are criticized for
being "Gang of Four"-theory.
12
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Appendix
Chronological list of articles in Chinese magazines and
newspapers criticizing the Shanghai School.
Nov. 24. 1977. People's Daily (PD): "A book which
creates the theoretical basis for the counterrevolutionary
program of 'the gang of four,' " by Dong Fureng and
Tang Zongkan.
Dec. 5. 1977. Guangmin Ribao (GR): "On socialist
wages and their concrete forms." by Wu Jinglian. Zhou
Shulian and Wang Haibo. (Continued in GR Dec. 12.
1977).
Jan. 16. 1978. GR: "A completely counterrevolutionary
'Political Economy.' "by Hu Naishi and Wang Yongzhi.
Jan. 20, 1978. lingji Yanjiu (lY) no. I. 1978: Leading
article: "Lead the struggle to expose 'the gang of four' in
the fields of economics to the end. "
Feb. 20. 1978, lY no. 2, 1978: "Refute the theory in
vented by 'the gang of four' on 'the double character of
socialist relations or production,' " by Hu Ruiling. And:
"Will money inside the socialist economy necessarily
create a bourgeoisie?" by Zhang Wenxiao.
March 20. 1978.lYno. 3.1978: "A reactionary theoreti
cal system." by Dong Fureng. And: "An example of how
'the gang of four' distorted the character of socialist
commodity production." by Yang Dongqing.
AprilS. 1978. PD: "Condemn a 'Political Economy,' "
by Zhang Chaozun and Hu Naishi. And: "Refute the
theory of the soc ailed 'two factors' of socialist relations of
production." by Xing Hua.
April 17, 1978, GR: "Examples of phenomena pretend
ing to be left but actually right, inside the political econ
omy," by Ma Piao. And: "A bad book propagating the
reactionary viewpoints of 'the gang of four: " by He
Wei.
April 20. 1978. lY no. 4. 1978: "Criticize the idealistic
economic theory of 'the gang of four. ' "by Hu Ruilong.
Zhao Renwei and Duan Ruofei. And: "Refute the theory
of the socalled 'two factors' inside the socialist relations
of production, "by Wei Xinghua. And: "Is the contradic
tion and struggle between the proletariat and the bour
geoisie the concentrated expression of the fundamental
contradiction of socialism?" by Wang Qingbao.
April 24. 1978. PD: "Criticize the counterrevolutionary
'gang-book.' 'Political Economy of Socialism.' "
May 20, 1978, lYno. 5. 1978: "Are the socialist relations
of production, relations between the proletariat and the
bourgeoisie?" by Zhou Shyulian.
May 29. 1978. GR: "Socialist commodity exchange can
not engender capitalism," by Li Guangzi.
June 20, 1978, lY no. 6, 1978: "A black example of
historical idealism," by Wang Ruisun. And: "We will
not allow the distortion of the present socialist common
ownership system in our country, ,. by Wang Changchun.
And: "Are mutual relations between people in the social
ist production process class-antagonistic relations?" by
Wang Haibo. And: "Will the socialist commodity system
necessarily produce capitalism and new bourgeois ele
ments?" by Liu Gangdi.
July 20. 1978. lY no. 7, 1978: "On profit in the socialist
economy," by Kuang Rian and Zhang Zhouyuan. And:
"Criticize the false doctrines fabricated by 'the gang of
four' concerning the law of value," by Wang Yongzhi.
And: "The question of the relationship between the fun
damental and the most important contradiction in socialist
society, " by Jiang Zhong.
Aug. 20, 1978, lY no. 8, 1978: "Why must this book be
criticized?" by Tang Zongkan. And: "A bad book propa
gating the reactionary ideological system of 'the gang of
four,' " by the critique-group of the Institute of Eco
nomic Research, Nankai University, Tianjin. And: "Re
ject the slogan 'Repudiate the slogan: All for the moderni
zation.' "by Yang Shengming and Guan Bai.
Sept. 20. 1978, lY no. 9, 1978: "The category, profit,
and the management of socialist enterprises," by Wu
Jinglian, Zhou Shulian and Wang Haibo. And: "The
fundamental difference between the circulation of funds
and the circulation of capital," by Cheng Mujiu.
Sept. 20, 1979. lY no. 9, 1979: "The theory that 'classes
exist from the beginning to the end' has brought confusion
into the formulation of the political economy of social
ism." by Dong Fureng.
Nov. 20. 1978.lYno. II, 1978: "We will not allow the
distortion of the character of socialist reproduction," by
WuShuqing.
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picture of the theoretical contents of the manuscripts. In the
following we shall present the manuscripts as one theory of
political economy of socialism elaborated by the Shanghai
School immediately before their political defeat.
According to the Shanghai School's theory. socialism is a
transitional society consisting of both communist and capitalist
factors and elements. existing simultaneously within socialist
relations of production. The capitalist factors are not simply
surviving elements of capitalist structure but are factors repro
duced through the social and economic processes in socialist
society. They are found within all spheres of socialist economy.
The existence of capitalist factors and elements within socialist
relations of production implies that capitalism and a bourgeoisie
are constantly produced and reproduced in socialist society.
"The new bourgeoisie" emerges within the ranks of the work
ing people and especially inside the Communist Party. The
material basis for the emergence of a new bourgeoisie is to be
found in the incompletely transformed structures of socialist
society-i.e.. in the above-mentioned capitalist factors and
elements such as commodity, money, wage-relations. the ex
change of equal values as a regulating principle in the economy
and. finally. the continued existence of a division of labor
inherited from the old society.
Division of labor leads to the development of an "in
tellectual aristocracy." which deprives the workers of the real
right of leadership to the means of production. In this way the
system of ownership will gradually change its nature. Within
the enterprises there will emerge a system of intellectual work
ers ruling over manual workers. According to the final stand of
the Shanghai School. such a system has to a certain degree
already developed in China. Therefore the proletariat is already
being ruled over and exploited by the "new bourgeoisie."
Consequently the "new bourgeoisie" will be the most impor
tant adversary of the proletariat in the class struggles during the
entire socialist period, and the "new bourgeoisie" must be
regarded as the most important object of the revolution under the
dictatorship of the proletariat.
The contradiction between the proletariat and the bour
geoisie is therefore the most important contradiction in socialist
society; and class struggles, which are outcomes of this contra
diction. will first of all be struggles for the extension or limita
tion of "bourgeois right." i.e . the capitalist factors and ele
ments within the socialist relations of production.
The collectively-owned economy is an incompletely trans
formed structure within the ownership system. The means of
production as well as the results of production are private
property owned by individual collective units: production is. in
that sense. private production. Furthermore. the question of the
leadership of collective units as well as within the state-owned
sector plays a very important role. with the decisive question
being which class really controls the means of production. If the
power structure of the leadership ofan enterprise is changed. the
"ownership" of the means of production may change accord
ingly. Socialist enterprises may change their nature and become
the property of a bureaucratic monopoly-bourgeoisie if the
workers are deprived of the leadership-power. i.e .. the right to
manage the enterprise or the collective unit. When the "new
bourgeoisie" has the means of production in its hands it may be
able further to promote a capitalist production process. because
capitalist factors and elements already exist in all spheres of
socialist production.
Socialist production. moreover. is the production of com
modities. The existence of commodities and commodity pro
duction is not just due to the coexistence of the two forms of
ownership. ownership by the state and collective ownership.
Within the state-owned sector alone. an eq'ually important rea
son is the relative independence of individual accounting en
terprises such that the mutual relations between the enterprises
will in fact be relations between individual "owners." and pro
duction even within the state-owned sector will again be private
production.
The circulation ofcommodities under socialism can also be
transformed into circulation of capital. If this transformation is
carried through. labor power may again become a commodity
and money can be transformed into capital. This transformation
may come about if the necessary realization of value becomes
the aim of commodity exchange instead of the realization of
use-value. This is important because the law of value is the law
of commodity production and here it is identified as playing an
important role in the socialist economy. In other words, accord
ing to the 1976 "PES" manuscript, the law of value under
socialism is not basically different from the law of value under
capitalism. By letting the law of value regulate production the
bourgeoisie can subordinate the production of use-values to the
production of values. When one uses money and prices, the
price of a commodity may be higher than its value. Production
of this kind of commodity will earn a bigger profit than the
average item, and therefore it may become attractive for certain
enterprises to maximize their profit by producing that kind of
commodity rather than less profitable (but socially useful) ones.
Production aimed at realizing surplus-value may thus, under
given circumstances, distort overall production and the alloca
tion of occasionally scarce resources in a socialist society.
As mentioned above. a capitalist restoration may take
place first and foremost because of the existence of this com
modity circulation carried out by means of money. Further
more. the "funds" of the various enterprises are only incomp
letely transformed forms of capital, thus being still very similar
to capital in the old society. Therefore, it would not be necessary
to change fundamentally the form or contents of such funds to
have them performing the function of capital. The same goes for
wages. The socialist principle, "To each according to one's
work" is not basically different from wage labor. No fundamen
tal transformation of the form and content of wages would be
necessary to make labor power a commodity once again.
According to the 1976 manuscript, the ideological form of
a "capitalist restoration" in China might well be like the
"theory of productive forces" and "the four modernizations,"
both of which express the ideology of the "dying out of class
struggle under socialism." To make sure that socialist society
advances towards communism, then, it is said to be necessary to
stage many "cultural revolutions." the aim of which will be
gradually to limit and eliminate capitalist elements and those
factors defined as "bourgeois right" within the relations of
production. including the division of labor inherited from the
old society. In this way the material basis for the emergence ofa
"new bourgeoisie" and capitalism can be eliminated.
The old division of labor has to be eliminated by the
workers taking active part in and exerting control over the
management of the enterprises and by forcing intellectual work
ers to take part regularly in manual work. The contradiction
between intellectual and manual labor should be eliminated
through these means and through a restructuring of the educa
tional system, which gradually must eliminate the boundaries
14
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between production and education. The material privileges of the
"new bourgeoisie" must gradually be eliminated through a
reform of the wage system. The reform must aim, first, at
discarding the use of "material incentives" as the most im
portant means of raising the enthusiasm of the workers, and
second, at establishing a more even distribution of wages.
Bonuses and piece-rate wages would be abolished and society as
a whole would gradually leave the principle "to each according
to one's work." Finally, production must be planned, in ac
cordance with use-value criteria and, conversely, the influence
of value categories must be limited.
Comments on the Final Theory
The 1976 manuscript of the' 'Political Economy of Social
ism" was the final result of a long process of theoretical de
velopment, which was suddenly and involuntarily cut off. It
presents, if not a complete, then at any rate a consistent answer
to the questions left unanswered by Mao, specifically how can a
capitalist restoration take place in China or in any other social
ist country, and which social forces will promote such a
development?
Even though this final theoretical position solved most of
the self-contradictions inherent in the earlier manuscripts of the
"PES," it still contained a number of unclarified points and
weaknesses. As mentioned above, the basic issue in the theoreti
cal development of the Shanghai School seems to have been
how capitalism can develop in a socialist society. But Mao and
the Shanghai School never formulated a clear and consistent
definition of capitalism. They described China before 1949 as
"semi-feudal and semi-colonial" as well as "much the same as
capitalism." Because of this ambiguity it is difficult to see why
the difference between the Soviet Union and China is so great
that China deserves to be called "socialist" while the Soviet
Union is described as "capitalist." They did not say which
structures within China's "socialist economy" have to be
changed before it might be called one producing surplus value as
in capitalist production.
Another weak point is the class analysis. The "new bour
geoisie" is defined as "the bureaucratic monopoly bour
geoisie" and "those performing intellectual work in produc
tion." How does this fit with the idea propagated by the manu
scripts that the Communist Party is the main "hotbed" for this
"new bourgeoisie"? This problem was left unsolved, because
the Shanghai School lacked a critical analysis of the functions of
the Communist Party in China.
Describing the specific measures which must be underta
ken to prevent a "capitalist" restoration, the Shanghai school
failed to make clear who the agents of these measures might be.
They implicitly assign the Communist Party a central role in this
process. This seems problematic after defining the party as the
most important' 'hotbed" for the new bourgeoisie and capitalist
tendencies. It seems that the members of the Shanghai School
were able to criticize and abandon Stalin's economic ideas and
theories, but when it came to practical political measures and
their implementation they could get no further than clinging to
Lenin's ideas and the theory of a vanguard party. This seems
paradoxical when one recalls that the Shanghai School had its
roots in the cultural revolutionary wing of the CCP which
advocated replacing this very same party with other political
structures.
Mao Zedong's theory and that of the Shanghai School
emerged amidst factional struggles within a Communist Party
which had inherited much Stalinist dogmatism and which was
without political democracy. Within the political and theoretical
traditions of either the CPSU or the CCP, it has been common
practice to barrage opponents with abuse rather than conduct
serious political debates. The eventual aim was always to purge
opponents, not to come to terms with them. In this connection,
the term "bourgeois," for example, has been one of many
useful words in the treasury of abusive vocabulary. It might be
argued that it should be unnecessary to pay any serious attention
to one faction calling a competing faction "bourgeois" in its
quest for power, because this is what the political culture
demands.
In our opinion, however, this would be too hasty a conclu
sion. Even though Mao and the Shanghai School were in
fluenced by rigid Stalinist dogmatism, it would be erroneous to
write off the analytical potential of their theory. When looking
at the entire theoretical process developed by Mao and the
Shanghai School we find sufficient proof that their angle and
analytical method were new. They showed an astounding desire
to do away with the somewhat metaphysical conception of
socialism prevalent in the "system theory" and to adapt a more
realistic attitude towards some of the problems of Chinese
society. They eventually worked out a platform for analyzing
the incompletely transformed social and economic structures in
so-called socialist societies. It is, after all, remarkable that a
critical theory such as this could be conceived by leading politi
cal figures within the party and state of an allegedly socialist
country.
But does the theory of the Shanghai School have real
theoretical validity? What are the implications for understand
ing modern China? Does this theoretical platform in any way
contribute to the still evolving theories on transitional society?
These are extremely important questions that remain open, and
we hope that further research may provide answers to them. *
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Rural Development, Agrarian Structure
and the County in China
by Mitch Meisner and Marc Blecher
Introduction*
In 1975, elements in the Chinese leadership attempted to
establish a comprehensive policy line for rural development.
Issued as a set of guidelines for setting up "Dazhai-type coun
ties." the program, publicized most notably in Hua Guofeng's
speech at the First National Conference on Learning from Da
zhai in Agriculture, reinterpreted and extended on a general level
a set of policies and" experiences" that had been in evidence in
Dazhai and Xiyang since the Cultural Revolution, and had
grown out ofearlier experiments with collective economic fonns
since the fonnation of the people's communes. A close look at
these documents, especially at Hua's six-point program for
building Dazhai-type counties, shows a general policy that
incorporated many on-going tensions of the turbulent Cultural
Revolution decade and may be considered an attempted com
promise among existing positions, though, in light of present
perspectives, with a radical "lean."
The years since Mao's death have seen the rapid dismantle
ment of this program. Undercurrents of indirect criticism which
began to appear in 1977 built gradually into open, direct attacks
by late 1978, which in tum grew in severity through early 1981,
by which time the Dazhai-Xiyang model had been almost fully
repudiated. Criticism touched all of the substantive features
associated with the Dazhai-Xiyang program: brigade-level ac
counting, its methods of allocating work-points and grain, col
lective cultivation of private plots, and collective provision of
housing and various social services. Aspects of Xiyang's eco
nomic record were also called into question: it was accused of
inefficient and wasteful planning and management of large scale
infrastructure projects and industrial enterprises, and its falsifi
cation of grain production statistics from 1973 to 1977 was
* An earlier version of this article was presented in November 1979 at the
Conference on China's New Development Strategy. sponsored by the Institute
of Development Studies of the University of Sussex. England. We thank
Gordon White and Jack Gray.the conference organizers. for inviting us to
present our work there and together with the numerous conference participants.
for providing three of the most stimulating days we can remember. A different
version of this article will be published in the volume from that conference:
Gordon White and Jack Gray. eds .. China's New Development Strategy (Lon
don: Academic Press). Our thanks to Academic Press for permission to publish
the article here.
revealed. Chen Yonggui, the famous Dazhai brigade secretary
who, in connection with the ascendance of Dazhai and Xiyang,
catapulted to a Vice-Premiership, was accused of abuses like
nepotism. favoritism and subjectivism, and was dismissed from
all his posts. I
Dazhai's and Xiyang's own experiences in rural develop
ment since 1967. and the attempts to generalize them into a
national program, involved a structural emphasis on the role of
the county in the administration of and political leadership over
rural development. In this article we wili examine the reasons
for this emphasis on the county, the various substantive aspects
of rural development policy with which it was associated in the
Dazhai/Xiyang model, the implications of its role for social
(including class) relations and contlict in rural China, and its
fate in the post-Mao years as the Dazhai/Xiyang model has
come under attack. We will argue that the county continues to
today to playa key role in rural development administration.
But the scope for political leadership over rural development
emanating from the county, especially from the county party
committee, has been sharply circumscribed. The county is now
to be strictly limited in its capacity to intervene in the economic
affairs of the collective units at the commune level and below,
especially in carrying out redistributive policies among them.
This change resonates to the declining importance in post-Mao
China of political considerations and power in almost all spheres
of social cultural and economic activity, including socialist
productive relations such as ownership, organization, planning,
regulation, distribution, and redistribution. 2
I. The decline of the Dazhai-Xiyang model and the attacks u(Jlm Dazhai and
Xiyang themselves are discussed at length in: Tang Tsou. Marc Blecher and
Mitch Meisner. "Policy Change at the National Summit and Institutional
Transformation at the Local Level: The Case "fTachai and Hsiyuang County in
the Post-Mao Era." Proceedings or the Cellfer/iJr For ElIStern Studies. Uni
versity of Chicago Center for Far Eastern Studies (Chicago: 19811. pp.
2-+1-.'91.
2 For a full discussion of the theme of the decline of (Jlllitical factors in
eClmomic. cultural and social life in post-Mao China. see Tang Tsou. "Back
From the Brink of Revolutionary-'Feudal' Totalitarianism: Some Preliminary
Retlections." paper presented at the Luce Seminar. University ofChicago. May
.10. 1980.
16
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It is still an open question whether or not decreased leeway
for politically-motivated decision-making by the county Party
Committee and collective-sector allies (especially brigade party
branch committees) implies a reversal in rural "class relations"
in development, as might be suggested by analogies with earlier
periods. In fact, to some persons in political power now, the
relatively explicit attempt by the 1975 program of establishing
Dazhai-type counties that would link a fairly strong class line to
other redistributive elements was one of the problematical ele
ments in that policy formulation, tying it fatally to the past.
Few Western scholars have examined closely the relation
ship since 1949 between modes of production in the local, rural
economy and class relations. Managing a developing economy
which is rooted in the daily and seasonal work of agrarian
settlements, and is rapidly responding to industrialization and
other modernizing forces-all within a conflictual socialist
framework-is a difficult task. There are no historic formulae,
no simple solutions straddling the consideration of economic
efficiency, social equality and popular power. The work of
Mark Selden (1971) on the "mass line" in the administration of
border region government and economy in the Yan'an period
has been helpful, as has the pathbreaking political analysis by
Franz Schurmann (1968) of the social implications of inner
party conflict in the 1950s and 60s. 3 In particular, Schurmann's
work on alternative forms of decentralization of political and
economic administration may shed light on the social implica
tions of current shifts. We will consider major outlines of
Schurmann's analysis, ascribing class implications to the de
centralization debates of 1957, in more detail later. However,
the earlier lines of class analysis may not be so useful for
changes originating in today's political economy. We shall
argue that the 1975 Xiyang-Dazhai program, at least in its ideal
design, pushed certain class issues, particularly those involving
inequality of collective units and the loci of political power,
quite far. In the China of the 1970s and 1980s such policies may
not have been practicable and rested perhaps on unworkable or
outdated conceptions of class relations and class conflict.
The Structural Significance of the County
Several major questions arose when the Chinese revolution
achieved state power: problems of social relations and economic
development posed questions for the form oforganization of the
nascent Communist governmental and administrative system.
The nature of the state and its involvement in social-economic
management and development issues of urban-rural and indus
trial-agricultural institutions, including the degree and speed
with which collective forms would take precedence over private
ownership, were intertwined with and had obvious implications
for changing social relations. Issues of relations among old and
new rural strata (and also among the latter themselves) emerged
from land reform, from ensuing rural-urban stratification, and
eventually. from divisions among richer and poorer collective
communities.
In the summer of 1955. Mao Zedong successfully pushed
through a policy of full-scale agricultural collectivization. But
given the rapid pace of that change. tensions having to do with
size and management of the collective unit, productive relations
within the collective economy, and the relation of the collec
tives to surviving private endeavors remained. These funda
mental tensions in development policy and socio-economic
structure continued to pose problems for evolving units of state
administration such as the county. 17
Because the county leadership is expected by higher
level policy-makers to show results in program imple
mentation that depend on its direct leadership within
the area, the county has the burden of establishing an
effective connection between itself and the collective,
local institutions.
Historical Background
The county has been an important unit of basic territorial
government since Imperial times. and throughout the Nation
alist and Communist periods. In the past. longevity may have
been the county's greatest attribute, but in the 1970s as a focal
point of development efforts, the county acquired new functions
and renewed significance.
4
County government is a structured meeting between state
and society. In the Imperial period, the county was the lowest
level of direct governance and the primary point of contact with
rural society. The county magistrate supervised the collection of
taxes, adjudicated local civil and criminal cases, and maintained
public order and welfare. Effectiveness of county administra
tion, however, did not rest simply on its own operations. The
powers of the magistrate, a civil official assigned from outside.
were reinforced by a system of local social and economic power
in which local land-holding gentry sought to secure their in
terests.
The orbit of the gentry reached to the county capital, but
tended in the main to connect through a series of social pathways
that ran to the basic "standard marketing towns" (later urban
centers of the enlarged townships or da xiang in the 1950s). The
local market towns were common crossroads for members of all
rural strata and special meeting places for the gentry. 5 The
gentry helped to arrange large-scale water control projects,
public (and private) defense and relief; and local elites generally
held the reins (with regional variations) of clan-based social
networks that cut vertically through class divisions. By these
civic and social webs of affiliation and control, the labor and
loyalty of ordinary peasant-producers were harnessed by rural
elites.
3. Mark Selden. The Yenan Way in Rel'Olutiol1arY China (Cambridge. MA:
Harvard Univ. Press. 1971), Franz Schurmann. ldeolog\' and Organi:"rion in
COllllllunistChinl/ (Berkeley. CA: Univ. of California Press. 1968).
4. There were about ~ . 2 0 0 counties in China in 1971. Whitaker and Rinn-Sup
Shinn. Area Handbook for rhe People's Repuhlic ofChina. (Washington D.C.:
Department of the Army. U.S. GPO. 1971) p. 25. In 1967. Barnett estimated
the average county population to be 300.000 and number of counties per
pmvince between 60-100. although both saw wide variations. Today the
average cI)unty popUlation is undoubtedly at least 400.000.
5. In this section we are indebted to the comparative study of Theda Skocpol
who examines the relationship between social structure and political power.
"France. Russia. and China: A Structural Analysis Ilf Social Revolutions" in
Comparath'eStudies in Societ\'(lnd Histon' , 18 (April 1976): pp. 175-210. esp.
198-20 I. Skocpol believes that the extent and complexity of social wotml
wielded in local areas by the landlord-gentry made autonomous. effective
political activity by small peasants very difficult and posed the key problem for
Communist revolutionaries operating in the countryside. Also see Ben Stavis.
People's Commulles alld Rural Development in China (Ithaca. NY: Cornell
Univ .. Center forInternational Studies. 1974).
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Peasant village communities were not autonomous, nor
were poor peasants easily unified. There were no significant
common village landholdings or other public goods, for exam
ple, and as private small-holders or tenants, peasants could not
easily affiliate on a class basis. To be successful, then, peasant
movements needed the adherence of portions of the local gentry
and other mobile or lumpen classes, the suspension of local
authority structures, or the protection of an outside armed force.
It was the structural position of the peasantry in rural society
which Mao (1927) was trying to describe when, on the basis of
his investigations in Hunan province in 1926-27, he wrote:
A man in China is usually subjected to the domination of
three systems of authority: (I) the state system (political
authority). ranging from the national. provincial and county
government down to that ofthe township; (2) the clan system
(clan authority). ranging from the central ancestral temple
and its branch temples down to the head of the household;
and (3) the supernatural system (religious authority). rang
ing from the King ofHell down to the town and village gods
belonging to the nether world. and from the Emperor of
Heaven down to all the various gods and spirits belonging to
the celestial world. As for women. in addition to being
dominated by these three systems ofauthority, they are also
dominated by the men (the authority of the husband). These
four authorities-political. clan. religious and masculine
are the embodiment of the whole feudal-patriarchal system
and ideology. and are the four thick ropes binding the Chi
nese people. particularly the peasants.
Attacking these hegemonic networks during the protracted
rural revolutionary struggle, the Communist Party managed to
replace customary rural authorities at the county level and below
with its own offices and armed power. This provided the basis
for fundamental restructuring of rural society and economy
through the destruction of the landed gentry and a more egalita
rian division of landed property and other agricultural assets.
After land reform, a series of collectivization measures led
within a decade to the formation of a large, integrating unit
of rural collective economy and government, the people's
commune.
The County After Collectivization
During the Chinese Revolution, both before and after
1949, the county continued to be a major unit of political and
administrative control in Chinese rural society. The Communist
Party supervised land reform from the county and its subunits.
County government became thoroughly bound up in rapid suc
cessions of economic development strategies linked to 'societal
transformation. The relation of specific institutional arrange
ments and development programs has been a subject of great
interest. 6
After much experimentation with the composition of units
of rural government and collective ownership, the people's
commune settled down by 1961 to about the size of the former
enlarged township, and the county remaining entirely a unit of
the state. 7 The commune, which incorporated the former town
ship government. remains partly a unit of state administration.
Its highest ranking (i.e., commune-level) officials are civil
servants appointed, ranked, and paid by the state. But the
commune-level administration is at the same time the highest of
a three-tiered system of collective rural ownership. Thus,
though commune-level administration carries out many normal
governmental functions such as financial administrations. local
marketing, management of schools and medical facilities. and
local militia defense, its economic base is juridically and practi
cally rooted in local society. The brigades and teams which
comprise the commune as a whole are hamlet- or village-level
collectives, and even industrial and sideline enterprises operated
by the commune-level are treated as collective rather than state
run units of management and finance (although, for reasons
which remain mysterious to us, for statistical purposes they are
grouped with state-sector enterprises of all types at the county
level and above). In the socialist vocabulary, the persistence of
the commune system signifies the continued existence ofcollec
tive ownership rather than, as in the case of industry, a higher
stage in the march toward communist society of "owership by
the whole people." Thus, the great bulk of the rural economy is
organized within tiered units of collective ownership, whose
workers-the Chinese peasants-are, significantly, called
"members" (sheyuan) and are, more like coequal shareholders
than employees, especially atthe team level. The "wage" (i.e.
the work-day value) of the members of a rural collective, unlike
that of workers in state enterprises owned by the "whole peo
pie, " varies much more directly with the rise or fall of collective
profits.
Ifthe commune, despite its partial state character and many
governmental functions is in economic terms essentially an
aggregation of local village collectives, the county, though
small enough to have regular, immediate communications with
basic levels, has always been entirely a unit of the state. The
county contains both government and Party offices, but for
practical purposes these have been combined under the principle
of "unified leadership by the Communist Party" (though this
may become subject to change). This means that the Party
organization has been dominant in all decision-making at
county level.
Because the county leadership is expected by higher level
policy-makers to show results in program implementation that
depend on its direct leadership within the area, the county has
the burden of establishing an effective connection between itself
and the collective, local institutions. Higher-level bodies like
the province and the prefecture do not have to make such a
connection. Thus, as with the county of Imperial China, the
contemporary problem for the county's role in development
administration is set by its location at the most sharply defined
structural meeting point between institutions of state and
society.
8
6. For a recent example of such analysis. see Tsou. Blecher and Meisner
( 1979). The subject of study is the sub-commune unit. the production brigade.
7. Jack Gray has reminded us of nne outlandish idea. current around 1958 in
some parts of China. for a "county-wide commune." Personal communication.
See also G. William Skinner's articles in the Journal ofAsian Studies, Vol. 24
( 1964-65).
8. We are aware that there is always some ambiguity to this formulation
because "fthe mixed character of the people's commune as well as the signific
ant institution l,f Communist Party (hence. "state") power at the brigade level.
This paper does not explore the commune as such. but evidence suggests that,
though the commune may at times play the role of purely implementing state
sponsored programs to lower levels of local society. its collective economic
character imparts a strong societal component as well and subjects it to strong
intluences fmm basic-level interest.
An interesting example of the "mixed" character of the commune level in
18
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Edited by Leo A. Orleans, with Caroline David
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Kim Woodard. The first detailed, comprehensive
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Revolution and Tradition in
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Kenneth G. Lieberthal. China's second-largest
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Mao Tse-tung, Ch'en Po-ta, and the
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Elizabeth]. Perry. In an effort to determine why
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19
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The county is the major political center at the basic levels
of rural society. As the heart of the Communist Party organiza
tion in the countryside, the county has been responsible for
leading reforms, for medium-scale planning and project man
agement, and for supervising routine agricultural activities car
ried out by the collectives. The county Party committee is in
charge of overseeing the careers, education and activities of
Party members and cadres at the grassroots who, though local
farmers, villagers and neighbors, must observe central party
discipline and view the revolution as a whole. The pre-eminence
of the Party in all spheres of rural governance and of the county
within the rural local Party organization has distinguished the
county as the locus of political power in the countryside. This
has dismayed some analysts (including many in China) who
regard a super-ordinate political orientation as an irrational
displacement of more useful administrative or technical matters
and market forces. 9
The county as a unit of state government has a series of
administrative/technical bureaus Vii) and sub-bureaus (Ke, or
"sections") for dealing with subject matter ranging from agra
rian science and technology to finance and trade, and important
technical staff offices within the county executive itself. The
counties are in charge of making available to lower-level units
resources allocated from the greater economy. 10
In this case the county followed a production decision from
above. at the same time serving its own need for materials that
could not be acquired from outside.
The activities of the county in local development reflect the
degree to which county leaders act as administrators of central
policies to the broad society. In his very useful treatment of
pre-Cultural Revolution politics. B. Y. Ahn discusses Chinese
criticism of the county for functioning mainly as a "conveying
center" of tasks set at higher levels. In tum, the county leaders
spent much time reporting to provincial/prefectural supervisors
on the implementation of their orders. According to one report.
leading cadres of YingKou County in Liaoning Province spent
two-thirds of their time conferring at the provincial or pre
fecturallevels.
14
One particularly explicit self-criticism published in the
People's Daily in 1965 states:
The [county Jcommittee also discussed the problems ofwhat
were called 'hard' and 'soft' tasks. A 'hard' task refers to a
task which is required to attain certain targets as set by the
leading orxan at a higher level, while a 'soft' task refers to
the task originating from the demand of the peasant masses
.... Formerly, two different attitudes were adopted toward
these two tasks. The 'hard' task wasprmlyfulfilled. while the
'soft' task might befulfilled or left unfulfilled. 15
The leadership now warns against overemphasizing
grain production as a key to capital accumulation in
collectives. In some instances, perhaps even in terms
of broad regional specialization, cash-crop production
(e.g., fruits and nuts, timber, animal husbandry) and
sideline industry may legitimately serve as the princi
pal sources ofcollective income. Simply put, teams alld
individual households are encouraged to get rich.
Students of Chinese development administration have
wondered about the degree to which the county enjoys auton
omy within its sphere of operations. Ofcourse county cadres are
subject to supervision from higher authorities both in policy
matters and in career terms. Top county officials apparently are
ranked in the State civil service according to the size and
economic strength of the county. II Falkenheim argues that
province-level authorities make decisions and county leaders
carry them out: the county cannot on the whole be understood as
a unit expressing local interest. The degree of autonomy of the
county may depend on the issue. Major campaigns based on
central policy decisions or special economic efforts such as
agricultural mechanization depend considerably on orders and
inputs from above. 12 For example, according to one former
county official,
In 1971 [our] county set up electrical industries, producinx
motors and transformers, as well as radio components. The
county didn't really push this, but the province had called on
eveT\' county to get into production ofelectrical items, so we
did a little. So no, it wasn't the county's idea to go into
production of electrical items; but given that the province
called on them to do so, it was their idea to produce the
transformers. of which we couldn't get enough through uni
fied distribution. 13
relalilln tll State plllicies Cllmes from an interview with a former clIunty (techni
cal cadre in Guangdong province. Cllmmenting ,m the role of county agencies in
carrying out policies tll cut ,)IT "Iabllr outflow" from the agricultural economy
tll (\ther areas (\1' empillyment. hc states that:
.. the commUlles also took a {,art ill cOlltrollillg this. YOlllleed pllpers (rom
the COl1ll1lUlleto get olltside work. a lid these hm'e (0 be rellewed el'en' mOll1h
hr rhe commlllle at the rime I"hell YOII remit {,art ,,(\'Our sailln to WJllr tellll/.
At these times o( ('oll1ml of labor 0lltf7ml'. the commlllles lI'ollld refuse to
reissue {'opers to these people. But afier l/ short time. rhe ('ommlllles
particlllorl." the poorerolles "'ith excess labor pOl1'eralld {,oplliatioll. lI'here
the olltflml' {'mblem lI'lIS l1lost seriolls-II'm"d {'ermit them to go agaill.
,illc(' the ollt17ml' has (/d\'(/IIfllges fil/, rhe commlllles. It'hich receil'e their
sidelille fl'e.
When individual peasants contracted to wnrk ,mtside the collective. they
were required 1<) rcmit a set amount of money ffllm their earnings tll Ihe
pmduclion team thcy belonged to. The learn in tum sent a percentage (10-15
percent cach) III the brigade and Ihe commune as a so-called "management
fee." (Marc Blecher: Interviews cllnducted at the Universities' Service Centre.
Kllng. 197R1.
9. A. Doak Barnett. Cadres. Bllreallera('\' olld Politiml POlI'er ill Chhw (New
Y,)rk: Cnlumbia Univ. Press. 1967).
In. In his analysis of the county as a strategic unit f,)r adminislcring agricultural
1llotlernizatinn. Butler sees nne llfthe tWll key functi,ms 'lfthe cllunty as being a
distrihuti,m pnint fnr Sl)phisticated inpuls pmduced elsewhere. S. Butler, "Ag
rinIitural Mechanizatilln in China." East Asian Institute. C)lumhia University.
197X. p ... (\
II Blecher.
12. Victnr Falkenheim. in Chilla Qllarter!.". 59 (1974>' pp. 51R-543 Our
major inforn1ant nn rccent cllunty governance inf,)rms us that "Of cnurse. ,mc
fach)r mntivating the expansion of agricultural mechanizalilln was the needs ,)f
the cnunty itself. But more impol1ant was the demands nf the higher levels. But
the higher levels als,) suppol1ed this cnunty-Icvel undel1aking. with hank loans
and materials distrihuted." Also, "If nther kinds nf machinery pnxlucti,m Inst
1llnney, they Ithc county I gllt criticized: but not agricultural machinery factories.
Yes. I think this has to d,) with the movement tn learn fmm Dazhai '" Blel'her.
197R.
U Blechcr. 197R.
14. B.Y Ahn, Chillese Politics 1I11d the Cultllral Rel'llilltion (Sealtle. WA:
Univ. 'If Washin!!l<>n Press. 1976),
''i "' Fllrum lln Bui Iding a Socialist New Countryside Thmugh Revllluli,mi/
ing the Leadership of CCP Hsien C,)mmittces." People's DlIil." (hcginning
Octoher 12. 1905>. inCllrrl'lItBlIckgwlInd. no. 779 (January 17. 1%6). r 2X.

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In contrast. the strongest case made for county autonomy. County for the economic failure and continuing "coverup" of
rooted in what she sees as a growing material base or near the problems at its hand tractor factory may in part be related to
autarky. was made by Audrey Donnithorne. describing the political attacks against the post-Cultural Revolution leadership
possibility of a "cellular economy" at county level. 16 of the model county and Jinzhong prefecture. But we found
There is no question but that the complexity of county examples of similar critiques and moves toward specialization.
government. the size of the rural economy partly under its rationalization. and centralization in farm machinery manufac
purview (by virtue of the dramatic growth of rural industry). and ture in both Hebei and Jiangsu provinces.
18
In some cases,
the possible opportunities for intervention into the collective commune and brigade enterprises were being integrated into
sector available to it. all give the county a significant position in county machinery enterprises as parts subcontractors; in others,
Chinese rural development today. Yet, even this statement must independent manufacturing efforts (of tractors, for example)
be qualified in light of current adjustments. For example. one were being closed down, closely supervised for specifications,
may point to the overall growth of both state-owned industry or integrated as specialized subsidiaries to enterprises
located in or directly managed by the county. as well as com which design and supply farm machinery to a wider region.
mune and brigade-run industry within the collective sector. and Moreover. in terms of budgetary and other financial rela
under the supervision of a branch of the county government as tions with the province and the center. the county is scarcely
evidence of the growing weight of a diversified county-level autonomous. The county government collects revenues accord
economic establishment. 17 But recent changes in state policy ing to quotas set by the higher levels of the state and makes
also suggest that from the county's point of view some of the expenditures only in categories and amounts fixed and allocated
more autonomous industrial developments at and below the by those same higher levels. It undercollects or overspends only
county level may be disappearing. For example, in Shulu at the peril of incurring financial penalties.
19
As mentioned
County. various forms of collective or "county-run collective above. untied sources of funds seem to be disappearing under
enterprises" (not speaking of those strictly within the people's current policies. In addition, though the industrial base at the
commune sector) had at least until 1979 contributed some of county level has grown considerably, the profits on the whole
their profits to the use of vertically organized bureaus (such as have flowed upward into higher level state coffers. The third
the Second Light Industry Bureau) or to an "extra-budgetary session of the Fifth National People' s Congress has announced
fund" outside the purview of the higher-level state fiscal and
planning authorities. Such income had been invested by county
government authorities in industry or agricultural support proj
ects. A major water-control project affecting the land of ten
What we may see, then, in the t1ight from "politics" to
communes was thus undertaken in 1977-78 using several mil
"pragmatism" is the continuing inability to find a
lion yuan from an "extra-budgetary fund." Such unattached
socioeconomic or class analysis that is appropriate to
monies had been important because many prosperous counties
the present Chinese situation while at the same time
(and apparently at least the better-off ones) tend to contribute to
adequate for economic development programs and
the provincial (or higher) levels a larger sum in industrial and
socialist political leadership.
other income from taxes and profits than they get back for
expenditures. But in interviews in 1979. Shijiazhuang prefec
ture officials outlined new reforms which would have the effect
of bringing these untied monies under prefectural control. There
is a tendency to leave more profits in the hands of local level its intention. unclear in precise form as yet. to reform this
enterprises, a decentralizing move that may also take away from system by requiring state-run enterprises to remit only taxes, but
the power of county officials. This shift was started experimen not profits. to the higher levels of the state. On the other hand.
tally in Sichuan under the current Prime Minister, Zhao Ziyang. the very recent (March 1981) and still sketchily described at
and is now being generalized. But in this change. though en tempt by the state to get central control over excess funds
terprise autonomy in the locality may benefit considerably. the through a bond issue and a requirement that state-sector (and
powers granted to factories are essentially opposed to those that perhaps even rural collective-sector) units purchase a certain
might otherwise be enjoyed by local state authorities at the
quota of them suggests that at least some influential state leaders
county level. In other words, the shift of control may be up to and economic planners are unwilling to give up central control
higher levels or down to the enterprise, the latter a structural over locally- (in many cases, county-) generated surpluses.
move resembling what Schurmann called Decentralization I. The quality of county administration may be important in
Also. current attempts within the industrial sectorto ration helping along an ever more important county and commune
alize and standardize the production of machinery-including, industrial base. but such responsibility does not necessarily
importantly. agricultural machinery-also suggest that produc constitute a case for growing autonomy; as we have suggested,
tion initiatives undertaken at county level in a blaze of publicity the apparent direction at present seems to be toward enveloping
in the 1970s are being centralized. The recent attack on Xiyang the county in an increasingly interdependent set of relationships
rooted in a more complex, widely integrated structure of indus
~ trial planning and production.
10. Audrey Donnithome in China QI/arterly No.5:! (197:!) pp. 005-019.
f

17 The Second Light Industry Bureau in Hebei's Shulu County which we have
~
,tudied in depth. Interviews. Shu lu County. 1979.
IR. Interviews. Shulu County and Changzhou City. 1979.
19. Interviews. ShuluCounty. 1979.
21
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The County as Focal Point of Development
All issues surrounding the relation of county to society and
to upper levels of the State appeared weightier in the fall of 1975
when a month-long conference. convened first in Xiyang
County. Shanxi Province and then in Beijing. attempted to
focus future Chinese agricultural development around a specific
county model. The major thrust of this conference was to focus
the endeavors of lower-level collective units in an increasingly
county-centered development effort and to link that effort with a
comprehensive national drive to increase rural mechanization.
The movement to build so-called "Dazhai-type counties."
based on the phenomenal growth of Xiyang county. the home of
the national model Dazhai brigade and the first county dubbed
"Dazhai-type." dated on a national level from the North China
Agricultural Conference of 1970. But never before had the
specific criteria of the model been grouped together and made so
explicit.
It should be noted that Chairman Hua Guofeng' s speech at
the 1975 conference placeda concurrent emphasis on the" great
task of mechanizing agriculture"-to be accomplished in the
main by national (and provincial) authorities. But agricultural
mechanization was to be related both to the further stimulation
of local industrialization and to the growth of brigade and
commune-run enterprises. while also being furthered by in
creased investments from within the collectives of labor and
other resources in farmland capital construction and infrastruc
tural development. 20
In his address. Hua projected that by 1980, at least one
third of all counties in China should be "Dazhai-type." What
was a Dazhai-type county? Hua listed six criteria:
I. A county Party committee leadership core that firmly
grasps the Party's line and policy and is united in struggle.
2. Established the dominant class power of the poor and
lower-middle peasants. able to struggle resolutely against bour
geois activities and to exercise effective supervision and reform
measures over class enemies.
3. Cadres at the three levels of county. commune. and
brigade who like Xiyang cadres persevere in participating in
collective production labor.
4. Rapid development and sizeable results in basic farm
field construction. agricultural mechanization. and scientific
cultivation.
5. Collective economies expanding uninterruptedly,
with production and income of poor communes and brigades
attaining or surpassing. those of middle-level communes and
brigades in the locality.
6. An all-around development of agriculture, forestry.
animal husbandry. sideline industries. and fisheries. a great
increase in productive output insuring a big contribution to the
State and for commune members. a step-by-step improvement
in standard of living.
Xiyang County. in Shanxi Province's mountainous Tai
hang region. suffered from a short growing season. water con
servancy problems and a shortage of arable land. From the fall
of 1970. the Xiyang success story was promoted in China as an
inspiration to rural development in all areas of the country. rich
or poor. The message appeared in another wave of media
publicity in the spring of 1973. and there is reason to believe that
the elements identified with the Dazhai-Xiyang experience.
especially since 1967. were given very high priority in develop
ment policy throughout these years. in central pronouncements
at least. and in varying degrees in various localities. 21.
Of Hua's six criteria. two concern the role of leadership,
perhaps as a way of emulating Dazhai Brigade's own experience
of a long-tenured, vigorous leadership "core" (i.e., Party
branch committee) dedicated to unity and continuity. In a late
1973 report to a meeting held jointly by the Ministry of Ag
riculture and Forestry and the CCP Beijing Municipal Commit
tee. Chen Yonggui stressed the importance of local leadership
most strongly. arguing that there is a link between active leader
ship and maintaining the' 'relative stability ofthe work force"
the latter a key substantive goal of the 1975 program. 22
20. Hua Gunfeng in the People's Daily. n I October. 1975l.
21a. Fnr a short description of this period. based (In accnunts in the Chinese
and related dncuments. see Mitch Meisner. "In Agriculture Learn from
Dazhai: Theory and Practice in Chinese Rural Development" dissertation.
University of Chicago. 1977. pp. 384-412. Pp. 35.'-373 discuss the pattern nf
change in Xiyang cnunty itself after the Cultural Revolutinn shifted the county
leadership. Insitutional and political-economic aspects n[ the development in
X iyang county, especially around the theme (If the relatinnship of growth and
equality. are dealt with in cnnsiderable analytic detail by Tsou. Blecher. and
Meisner. Modem China Nn. 5 (1979). pp. 3-39. 139-11\5. Thierry Pairault, in
reCllpere: La politique economique rurale au debut des annees 1970.
takes a close. hardheaded economist's political-economic look at the implica
tions 'If the directinns fnr agriCUlture posed at the beginning nf the 1970s. He
also includes a direct analysis of a number of the important texts of this period.
and reproduces them in Chinese. including the lead article in People's Dail.\'.
"In Agriculture Learn frnm Dazhai." September 23. 1970. which really started
the major media publicity that fall. (Publications Orientalists de France. Paris:
1977). Annther important article by Pairault. on the 1975 Conference itself also
shnuld be cited here because we shall have occasion to refer to it: "Etude de
Tachai et develnppement ecnnnmique en Chine: La cnnference natinnale de
J'automne 1975." MOlldes Asiafiqlles. No.8 (Winter 1976-1977) pp. 467-498.
Alsn. Neville Maxwell. "The F,lUrth Mnbilization: New Phase of the Tachai
Mnvement." World De,elopmeIlfNo. Ii (1978) pp. 499-518.
In Guangdong province by late 1970. the province. prefectures. and
cnunties had ostensibly all set up special ()ffices and pmgrams to implement the
"Dazhai-type cnunty" program. The province and prefecture circulated period
icals specially dire.ted to assist the movement. and the Yunfu county "Learn
ff()m Dazhai Small Gmup" nf the c(lunty Party committee alsn circulated a
hulletin (m the subject twice a month. Blecher. 1971\.
Interviews and research carried out in 1979 in Wuxi County. Jiangsu.
pm\'ide eloquent testimnny It) the high level of variability in substantive cnntent
which the Dazhai-Xiyang Pmgram could have in localities very different fmm
the originals. Wuxi closely identified with the movement to emulate Dazhai and
Xiyang, starting in 1970 at the time ()f the North China Conference nn Ag
riculture: and oftlcials there stated with considerable pride that Wuxi became a
"Dazhai-type county" in 1975. Yet in looking at the substance of its program.
one sees that it identified its emulation efforts (and successes) primarily with
point a massive program of farmland capital cnnstruction
financed primarily with Incal snurces of accumulation.
lb. For a discussion of Dazhai's leadership. see Meisner. 1977.
22. "Cnmrade Ch'en Yung-kuei's [Chen Yonggui'sl Rept1l1 at the Reptlrting
Meeting held Jointly hy the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the
Chinese Cnmmunist Party Peking Municipal Cnmmittee." Union Research
Senice nos. IS (February ISand 19.197.:1): pp. 11\7-188.lnhistalk.
Chen spoke of one hrigade that had changed its leaders every month for a year.
Dazhai's neigh"'lring Wujiaping brigade. whose Party secretary Li Xishen was
a close ally of Chen's and is now Vice Secretary of the Xiyang County Party
Committee. is rcpt1l1ed to have had eight brigade leaderships and 24 production
team leaderships between 1958 and 1965. (Wilfred Burchett with Rewi Alley.
Chilla: The QualifY of'Lite. (London: Penguin Books, 1976). p. 128. In
Guangdong af()und the time of the Cultural Revolution. a lot of county sec
retaries were transferred frnm nne county tn the next to help shield them from
nlllre criti<:ism. "since in the new county their background would n(H be known
"l well" Blecher. 1978.
22
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Although in 1980 the Dazhai-Xiyang program would begin
to be linked with "ultra-left" political and economic policies,
the actual criteria enunciated by Hua and other leaders suggest a
critique or at least a modification of some such elements. For
example, emphasis on the unity of the county Party committee
leadership core (i.e., its standing committee) suggests the need
to promote strong political direction while guarding against
factionalism, a negative legacy of Cultural Revolution politics.
In addition, the growing scope of county functions, in particular
responsibility for rural industrialization, suggests a concern for
insuring effective executive power in the county.
A second leadership criterion (third on Hua's list) calling
for heavy participation in collective productive labor by county,
commune and brigade cadres seemed to strike at bureaucratic
elitism and the separation of the local cadres from the everyday
toil of the peasants. The model Xiyang leadership had in 1967
established guidelines for such participation: 100 days per year
for county cadres, 200 for commune cadres, and 300 for brigade
cadres. 24 As Hua emphasized, the experience might help county
leaders to deal with their inadequacies. Some county Party
committee leaderships suffer from "softness," "lack of con
centration," and"laziness" ("ruan," "san," and "Ian"),
said Hua. In his address Hua also stated that new blood should
be recruited into county Party leaderships from among basic
level activists distinguished in the movement to learn from
Dazhai. These would most likely be brigade cadres who head
the most dynamic unit within the commune structure. Forexam
pIe. Li Xishen, the county vice-secretary and de facto leader of
Xiyang County until his dismissal in 1980, was recruited from a
local brigade (Wujiaping); and Li Suoshou, the first secretary of
neighboring Pingding County, was formerly Party branch sec
retary of Nannao Brigade in Dazhai Commune. In general.
however, other evidence. both from interviews with emigres
and with Chinese officials in 1979. does not suggest widespread
existence of this recruitment/promotion pattern in the years that
followed. It is now regarded. in fact. as a version of the Cultural
Revolution practice of officials rising too precipitously-in the
Chinese metaphor. like helicopters. 25
Hua's second criterion argues for the "dominant class
power of the poor and lower-middle peasants, able to struggle
resolutely against bourgeois activities and to exercise effective
supervision over class enemies." This points to insuring sup
port for the growth of collective economic institutions and
adherence to them as a main source ofaccumulation and income
distribution. With an economy that still relies on manual labor.
and with major investments to be made in land improvement and
water conservancy (to provide a field for efficient introduction
of machinery and modem inputs). the most crucial of all goals
was to maintain full commitment to a stable. collectively-organ
ized agricultural work force. Hua stated:
For example, we must pull back labor power who have left
the area to engaRe in individual endeavors, organize dis
persed individual craft workers, return to the collective
wasteland or private plots cultivated in excess of amounts
stipulated by government policy, and straighten out tenden
cies to neRlect accumulation by distributinR all and consum
ing al/.
But why the strong class-oriented guideline? Here the
program veers to the left and suggests a very questionable
analysis.
The recall or control of labor outflow is obviously not a
cure-all in every type of rural environment in China. although it
is held to have been crucial in the experiences of Dazhai and
Xiyang themselves. For example. it was argued by one fonner
county-level official interviewed in Hong Kong that in parts of
Guangdong which had better conditions and/or higher labor
density. recalling labor from extra-agricultural pursuits really
did not bring much improvement in agriculture-in fact. it
could lead to serious losses in both private and collective in
come. Nonetheless. in that region. the recall of labor power
was emphasized by county leadership, apparently in an overly
rigid way. Particularly in areas where peasant culture remains
strongly wedded to private as opposed to collective sources of
income. an unbending insistence on carrying out such restrictive
measures could have a negative effect.
Hua also stressed the need for major improvement in the
productive base to provide a material basis for the social/politi
cal goals of the model. Obviously material and technical capac
ity and not just inspired leadership were needed. He specifi
cally called for diversification in agricultural production and
enterprises, and linked this with both public accumulation and
improvement in the standard of living for individual peasants
points strongly emphasized in present policies as well. It is
notable that this document does not. at least on its face, signify
the "grain-first" policy that is now so vigorously criticized.
Improvement in the agrarian base, technology, and diversity of
production should be associated with increasing economic
equality among lower-level collective units. This may appear to
be a leftist goal, but as Nicholas Lardy (1980) has recently
suggested. the present policies encouraging specialization also
embody an economic logic leading to increased equality among
units. localities or regions. Places which suffered economic
losses because of policies emphasizing grain production can
now realize greater prosperity through production of higher
priced commodities to which their natural and human conditions
are more suited.
Paimuit makes the point particularly strongly when he connects
on revlliutillnizatilln llf CI)unty tll the progmm of the linking I)f Dazhai
type agricullUml development to the establishment of an industrial base at the
cllunty level. This was an outcome. in his opinion. of a period of relative
,eparation in agricultuml and industrial development since the early 19f1Os in
which each sector tl) pursue its own "egllcentric" deveillpment. ( 197fl-77,
pr.+R9-.+91 1.
Guo Fenglian. "Jianchi da pi zibenzhuyi. jianchi da gan shehuizhuyi."
People's Daily. September GUll is the secretary of the Dazhai
brigade Party branch. She was a protege ofChen's and succeeded him. Today
we criticism of the program ofcadre participatilln in labllr ,m a
number of that they need time tll attend III theirofticial that they
ought tl) be able to undertake them free 1)1' the clmcem that if they fail to
rarticipate in manual labur their families may gl) hungry: and that such lalll)r
participatilm makes llnly a marginal cllntribution to productive Wllrk while
actually hurting administr.uilln.
Interview. Hebei Province (Shijiazhuangl. 1979 The high Hebei Province
I)fticial with whllm we were discussing this mailer the analllgy of oogoing
up by airplane" I'<'i;i sl/(/Ilglfll) as well the mllre familiar oohelicllrterOO
analogy'
Tang TSllu. M. Blecber. and M. Meisner in ModC'mChil/a Nil. 5 (1979) PI'.

Blecher. interviews. 197.+-75
Paimuit believes (and with gllod we think) that the kind Ill' leader
de,ired in the deveillpment implied by the Dazhai-county rrogmm
nlll abllvc all a technician. but rather. OOa leader Ill' men. a I!uioe read mllre
than cxpert. mllre a Schumpetcrian entrepreneurthan a manager ..
24
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Farmland capital construction and water conservancy proj
ects are immense enterprises in China. They are seen as bases
for securing stable yields and for making it possible efficiently
to apply mechanical means to agricultural production. Farmland
capital construction. costly as it is to colIective budgets and
the private endeavors or leisure-time of peasants. can have
long-term benefits at any level of colIective organization. Its
most successful development seems to come when county lead
ership. on the one hand. can mobilize the basic-level units to
contribute labor to individual projects. and on the other. or
ganize special county-sponsored teams and equipment to imple
ment major projects. Depending on how they are financed. such
county-centered capital construction projects may have a redis
tributive effect among as welI as within the local colIective
units-both because the benefits of county-sponsored projects
may go to poorer units or because the county may hire and pay
welI extra workers from poorer units. Certainly the optimal
effort in long-term capital improvement to the agrarian econ
omy is a major part of present agricultural development pro
grams. and no unit below (or above) the county level realIy has
the ability that the county has to mobilize. direct. and finance
such work.
19
The criterion that calIs for the equalization of production
and income of poor colIectives within the county points to an
enormous problem and helps to understand better the strategic
emphasis placed on the county in 1975 (as welI as some of the
great difficulties in this strategy). If colIectivization enables
China to narrow individual income gaps within colIectives.
there is no guarantee against polarization among colIective
units. The persistence or increase of inequality among colIec
tives militates against enlargement of the colIective unit and
may be a source of discontent and setbacks to socialist goals.
Why was the county chosen to solve the problem of inequality
among collective units?
First. the county is a source of funds and other inputs that
can be used tll help promote equality among units. less through
direct subsidy than by promoting a capacity for growth in
selected units. Pairault pllints to evidence of significant use of
cllunty funds to improve the productive capabilities of poorer
units in Xiyang County. JtI In Xiyang 80 percent of the county
budget was alIocated to agricultural investment in 1976. and the
county secured some 17 percent of the total cost of basic farm
land construction and water conservancy from the state. J I The
example of a large water conservancy project in Shulu County
has already been mentioned. Communes do use funds accumu
lated at the commune level for internal redistribution in the form
of projects or assistance to strengthen the economic perform
ance of poorer brigades and teams. J1 But without strong county
leadership they are not likely to contribute in any way outside
their llwn jurisdictillns.
Second. as Communist Party center. the county is best able
to translate into practice overalI policy. At the basic levels the
brigade Party branch is an equivalently strong Party organiza
tion. and it is arguable that dynamic brigade party leaders. in
conjunction with the county Party committee. are most likely to
implement equalization programs. JJ The brigade is most suited
to organize its economic and human resources to make max
imum use of new opportunities, and the county is best able to
maximize and direct new reSllUrces to where they can be best
used.
Here the commune is in a more difficult position than the
county because it is moted partly in local society. and because it
is a collective unit responsible solely for its own affairs rather
than the interests of the state. The commune is more subject to
conservative or cautious local impulses in the face of risky
programs-yet it lacks the direct economic power and oppor
tunities for long-term. face-to-face relations with the peasants
and their grassroots leaders in the production teams that brigade
leaders can have. The commune is "tainted" with the identity
of the State among those members of rural society suspicious of
statist designs. yet it lacks the concentrated political organiza
tion and awesomeness of the county not to mention its access to
valuable material and technical resources. 34
APPROXIMATELY 1'4 ACTUAL SIZE
The Franklin Mint
21). See Pairault. 11)76-77. pp. f'lr a good statement analyzing the
primacy of farm capital (or infrastructurall construction for rural development.
Chin Chi-chu. ,. All-Out Eftillt to Develop Agriculture:' Pekillg
Redell'. No. 26 (June 30. 11)7Rl. This article on Pingding county in Shanxi
prnvince has a good description of extensive prnjects. including a major water
conservancy endeavor. of the "Xiyang-type" sponsored or supervised hy the
,:ollnty
T. Pairallit. /l4O//(/es Asialiqlles. No. R (1976-77>. pp.
J I Tsou. Blecher. Meisner (1979) op. cit.
Interview. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. June 1979.
For e,ample. in Xitang Brigade. Qianzhou Commune. Wuxi County.
visited in 1979. Cllmplex measures have heen taken underhrigade supervision to
amalgamate the economies of the production teams into seveml suh-hrigade
units III provide a tr,msitional tilrm to facilitate a move underway toward
hrigade-Ievel aCCllunting. It is clear that the hrigade Party leadership played an
unusually creative and active role in devising a system to smlloth over likely
during this transition.
Neville Maxwell has the tilliowing til say ahout the attitudes. relatively
'peaking, of county and Cllmmune cadres ahout taking measures (here.a rela
tively radical one) to promote equalization:
The II"riler' .I' di,l"<'II,uiollS lI'ilh ("adres o( Ihe Chillese adlllillislralioll IU/I'e
,l'hOlI"ll a dil'ergel/{"e o,-allillld(' al ,'O//11ly /nel. I;,r exalllple. ("adres
are lII(1re likell' 10 slress Ihe raisillg o,-,he IIl1il 0'-a("("0//11110 lel"e/ as a
1I('{"es,,,,,,y ('ollse(/lIell('e o,-,h(' Tlldwi ('alllplligll: \\'hilt' dO\\'11 III ('Olllllllllle
"el"<" {"adre,l' are 1II11('1r more (,lIl1lious a//(/Ielllali"e ahollllire pm.'pe('ls Ii,,'
widespread raisillg o,-,lre Ine/o,-II('('O//11I, Seeillg Ihis 11.1' hasi('a".'" a IIIl1l1er
o'-peasalll allillldes. lire\" elllphusi:(' Ihlll decisiollS 011 lire lilllillg 0'- SIl('1r
{"Iwllg(',> 11111.1'1 ('o/lle ''-mll1llre llra.ues.' Ihey klloll" fmllllireir 011"11 experiellct'
Ilrlll ref;)/"/lls illll'osed fi-rJlllllhOl'e lire likely 10 he IIhorli"e
WorM Del"<'/Ol'lI1elll No.6 ( 197R) p.513. In Yunfu County. "In the peasants'
the Cllmmune and county represent the state, and the te'lm and hrigade
represent them" Blecher. 197R.
25
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Strategic Factors and Implicit Political Program
In summary, we would like to specify three important
factors in the prominent role of the county in Chinese rural
development programs. The first is the structural characteristics
of the county located just above the junction of state and society.
An entirely state unit, the county can be knowledgeable about
and in direct contact with daily affairs at the production levels of
society. Cadres' participation in labor and supervision of all
Party members in rural society provide avenues of contact. Low
enough to have direct contact with leading grassroots cadres of
local communities, county officials at the same time have bu
reaucratic ties and obligations to higher levels of the state, and
there the factor of direct, face-to-face contact exists as well.
Commune cadres do not have those contacts, whereas leading
county cadres frequently attend enlarged national-level Party/
glwernment meetings.
A second major factor is that counties have increasingly
become industrial entrepreneurs or managers. Industry is both
intended as a direct producer for agricultural needs and a con
sumer of agricultural raw materials. At the same time. it pro
duces county revenue and employs peasants. Aside from mak
ing the county govemment larger and more complex and bring
ing the county into closer relation with the urban/industrial
sector, the development of rural small-scale industry gives the
county increased resources with which to affect the economic
lives of rural residents-cum-members of the people's com
munes. The development of rural small-scale industry increases
the ability of the county to playa redistributive role in relation to
the production and incomes of lower-level collective units. It is
likely that more balanced demand for the products of county
industry will increase the ability to plan for more uniform
production and distribution of certain products.
Along with rural industrialization at the county level, ma
jor aspects of farmland capital construction, water conservancy,
and other infrastructural developments as well as scientific and
technological research and extension can only be carried out
with county leadership and sponsorship. The enlargement and
planned development of these programs which, with agricul
tural mechanization. will provide the effective material basis of
rural modernization, should make possible much more balanced
and efficient application of labor in the rural sector. Making best
use of labor in the rural setting, coordinating labor-saving im
provements and seasonal labor surpluses with new labor-utiliz
ing projects will be of major value in Chinese economic devel
opment. J5
The position of the county in a state-society nexus, and the
increasing resources and complexity of the county economy due
to rural industrialization and other large-scale projects are linked
to the third and final factor: the quality and political character of
leadership capacities vested at the county level. County leader
ship is placed and equipped to promote far-reaching, collec
tively-based. and redistributive economic development proj
ects. Pairault notes that the movement to learn from Dazhai (the
.. self-reliant' brigade) became in the Dazhai-type county
movement in actuality an "interventionist politics" designed to
offer active assistance to backward units. 31> The characterization
~ 5 . F"r Cllmments lln this point see: Rl/ral Smal/Scale II/til/Sin' Delegation
(Berkeley: Univ. llfCalifomia Press. 1977). p. 152: alsll Pairaull. pp.4R2-494.
is apt, but as Pairault himself suggests, it would not be a politics
of charity, but a program intended to supply aid that will be of
utmost utility precisely because it goes to those who, by receiv
ing it, are most able to help themselves. Such a process was
demonstrated in Xiyang County. Maximum efforts by its con
stituent collectives was stimulated by means of leadership, labor
and financial investment provided by the county. Whether or
not such county aid was possible partly because of large outside
in vestments of state aid in the 1970s, as is now alleged by
Xiyang's critics in China and out, remains to be investigated
further. But it does appear that county leadership was especially
valuable in carrying out massive land reconstruction and water
conservancy projects. It also intervened at times to provide
support to get communities through hard times and to bolster
collective morale. Such policies in tum made it more possible to
carry out the overall goal of stabilizing the collective agricul
tural work force at the highest possible level. 37
The promise of a county-focused development plan was to
link the potential energies and initiatives of collective units to
supplies of local orextemal resources that could boost them to a
level where collective efforts begin to payoff. On a broad and
flexible scale within a county. especially in line with a growing
county industrial system, such a strategy would be likely to pay
off in balanced and resilient patterns of growth.
What the Dazhai-type county development program of
fered, then, was the extension through the county of political
and material incentives to local cadres, especially those at the
brigade level, to assess local problems and potentials and to
formulate plans by which to achieve significant growth. In
essence, the Dazhai-type county program called for entre
preneurial linkages between the collectives (that is. the com
munes and brigades) and the primary agent of the state (county)
-linkages oriented toward both growth and redistribution of
development capabilities. In this program, both county and
collectives committed themselves to a collectivist pattern of
development that relied on activist political leadership within
given institutional forms to provide the major dynamic force for
incorporating increasingly available material inputs in a suc
cessful pattern of economic growth.
As Marianne Bastid has written:
Since the Cultural Revolution, the authority and responsi
bilities of the county level are going through a revival which
reminds one of the administrative pattern in imperial times,
though its basis is different. 38
The net effect of the approach to rural development enun
ciated in the 1975 National Conference on Learning from Da
~ 7 . Fllr example. Chen Yonggui reported in 1973 that when the past year's
dmught conditions had caused what appeared to be a likely failure of the harvest
in six communes. there was considerable unrest. and "bad elements" comp
lained that. "without grain. without money. what are we supposed to do?"
These pellple. "incited the labor powers to leave the locality. They abandoned
the water conservancy projects and disbanded the specialized work teams."
The response of the county Party c"mmittee to the precarious situation was
III announce that they would guarantee the receipt of 460 jin (506 pounds) of
grain whatever the outcome of the harvest. "Comrade Ch'en Yung-Kuei's
Report." Union Research Sen'ice No. 74. p. 185.
3R. M. Bastid in S. Schram (ed.) Authorit\". Participation lind Cultural Change
~ O . Pairault. IIp. cit.
(Cambridge. MA: Univ. Press. 1973).
26
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zhai in Agriculture was to place a very great stress on political
leadership and political considerations in economic life. This
was because ofthe redistributive character of the overall criteria
for economic success and because of the relative inclination
toward self-reliance. Given the continuous growth of a diversi
fied local rural economy. especially its industrial sector. it is
hard to imagine any Chinese rural development policy that
would not give a place of some importance to the role of
functional leadership by county agencies. But a redistributive
growth policy based on integrated planning for the county as a
whole and requiring mutual. perhaps sacrificial. contributions
by collective units is one that requires political and ideological
commitment. especially if grandiose. labor-intensive projects
are tried. That is all the more true if the starting point of the
various collectives is relatively unequal. and if the level of
outside aid available (and of farm commodity prices) is not
high. Competitiveness among collectives could intensify to the
extent that recognition as a successful unit eligible for aid comes
about as a result of political wheeling and dealing. favoritism.
factionalism. etc. Undoubtedly. the 1975 policy strengthened
political authorities and factors-the county Party committee.
its allies within the collective leaderships and supporters at the
prefecture and province. and the fighting slogans associated
with class struggle that gave such leadership its putative legiti
macy. The effect of these factors would be particularly strong
because of the structure of the Chinese state at the time. the
unified leadership exercised by the Party over government af
fairs. and the power of Party bureaucrats in relation to the
individual lives and careers of Party members at the grassroots.
We believe that it is partly this highly demanding. if not loaded.
political character of the Oazhai-type county program. as well
as possible economic insufficiencies it entailed. that contributed
to its dismantling at the end of the decade.
Recent Policy Shifts
The passage from Bastid. recalling the role of the county in
imperial administration. suggests that this is where we came in
and will exit. But Chinese politics refuses to allow research and
pronouncements to end. For some time after the changes of
leadership following the death of Mao Zedong. it appeared that
agrarian policies associated with Hua Guofeng's 1975 Oazhai
Conference address would remain effective. But by the tum of
the 1980s. a qualitative shift of major dimensions was under
way. We now perceive within the past few years two types of
directions available for rural development.
For several decades, growth in Chinese agriCUlture has
been seriously deficient, a fact (and criticism) that has prompted
a series of policy changes. Most dramatically the salience of
political leadership and political desiderata in rural economy has
been diminished. Emphasis has been placed on the role of
economic forces worked out through market relations and
strengthened by the economic institutions that make such rela
tions possible. Specifically. the current Chinese leaders have
weakened the direct decision-making powers of party and gov
ernment officials and instead granted more leeway to directors
of production units. letting them shift for themselves in a world
of profits. prices. competitive contracts. etc. In adtiition. more
straightforwardly economic. individuated incentives are used
for employees. while market and internal trade systems are
elaborated and legitimated for enterprise and even private ex
change. 39 The rehabilitation of the long-silenced "revisionist"
economist. Sun Yefang. the publication of his economic writ
ings. and the prominent role of Xue Muqiao are very important
indicators of this change.The basic tenor of present policy
critiques is to insist that the best indication of good leadership is
the extent to which leaders are able to grasp and follow "econ
omic laws"; this is the philosophical core of contemporary
Chinese pragmatism.
The Australian Journal
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,W, In this shift. undoubtedly, real power has passed into different sets of hands
in a structural sense and pmbably in relation to ideological viewpoint, The
application of class criteria tIl this shift is a difficult pmblem. one we discuss to
some extent in the body of this analysis. But we do however recognize that in a
"real" sense, the nlltion of such an economic/political separatilln is a fictitious
idea. In 1980s China, economic relations among individuals or organized
gmups invlllving questions of domination or inequality or equality
still go 1m, and legitimate interactions are organized and pnltected by agencies
established in tenns of the particular structures and ideology of Chinese state
pllwer.
27
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Severe criticism has been levelled at all practices that use
administrative methods ("handing down orders") as a substi
tute for indigenous motivation calculated according to econ
omic advantage. In institutional terms. the autonomy of the
team has been guaranteed protection as never before-this.
obviously. in contradistinction to the ambitions of brigade lead
ers to "level-up." The team is to have maximum control of its
production plan without interference from upper levels. and it is
to have the right to seek income from a variety of sources. The
leadership now warns against overemphasizing grain produc
tion as a key to capital accumulation in collectives. In some
instances. perhaps even in terms of broad regional specializa
tion. cash-crop production (e.g .. fruits and nuts. timber. animal
husbandry) and sideline industry may legitimately serve as the
principal sources of collective income. Simply put. teams and
individual households are encouraged to get rich. Editorials
characterize earlier programs as having started from the premise
that to be poor is good. A variety of privately-oriented practices
such as household sidelines. private plot production. and petty
trading on rural free markets are at minimum to be protected.
and in effect encouraged. In a revival of some institutional
forms of local productive organization that appeared in the wake
of the Great Leap Forward and were subsequently criticized
during the Cultural Revolution as signposts on the "capitalist
road . subcontracting to small work groups and even to house
holds has now reappeared with official imprimatur.
4o
Finally.
several recent articles indicating direct criticism of Xiyang
county "ultraleft practices." their leadership and institutions.
add to the urgency and political weight of the policy shifts. 41
Another change makes clearcut planning distinctions be
tween policies for different areas: some will be handled as
"commodity grain bases"; others as "industrial crop bases."
The actual administrative content of this program remains elu
sive even in discussions with Chinese planners
42
and the policy
itself may be formative. subject to change. or even fleeting in
existence. It appears. however. that these base areas will receive
special allocations of modern producer inputs. While it is gener
ally felt among Western observers that such regions will be
selected on the basis of an established record of high production
and prosperity. Nicholas Lardy reminds us that some of these
grain base regions "lack adequate water resources and conse
'+0. For a detailed discussion of the new "responsibility systems." see Ts<lU.
Blecher and Meisner. Proceedil/gs of the Center ti" Far Eastern Stl/dies.
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago. Center for Far Eastern Studies. 1981).
.+ I. See for e)(ample. "Ba Dazhai di jiiti jingyan dangzuo falii jiushi bum in
zhu." ["Treating the Concrete E)(perience <)f Dazhai as a Law is Undemo
cratic")' Nal/f{mg Riboo. March 1'+. 1979. p. :!. "Bi)(ii zhaidia<) 'fan Dazhai' di
jinguzhou:' ("'It Is Necessary to Take Off the 'Anti-Dazhai' Evil Spell").
Jiefal/g Ribao. March 7. 1979. p. 3. "Li Xishen tongzhi zai Xiyang )(ianwei
changwei kuoda huiyi he )(ianwei kuoda huiyi shang daibiao Xiyang )(ianwei
jiancha qi fanmian wenti." (" At Enlarged Meetings of the Xi yang County Party
Committee and Party Standing Committee. ComrJ.de Xishen. on behalf of the
County Party Committee. E)(amined Seven Problem-areas") Wel/hui Boo.
March R. 1979.
42. Interview. Jiangsu Province (Nanjing). 1979.
43. "Jia Juai nongye ji)(iehua de zhengque fangzhen." ("The Correct Direc
tion for Hastening AgricuiturJ.1 Mechanization"). People's Daily. February 6.
1979.
44. An interesting que_tion arises here: Will this compete <)r contlict with
measures taken to decrease urban unemployment. especially among youth"
.+5 Our thanks to Ben Stavis tl)r this point.
quently now achieve relatively low per unit grain yields." Be
that as it may. a recent editorial states explicitly that the benefits
of agricultural mechanization cannot. as was suggested in the
1975 program. be achieved for all units across the board. Cer
tain regions. localities and units will be targeted for maximum
available supplies of agricultural machinery or subsidized in
vestments for their production. while in others semi-mechani
zation or manual labor will continue to be the main basis for
agricultural production for some time to come. And these areas
may have to depend for their advancement on a much more
completely self-reliant policy in capital accumulation. 43
Related to this. it is likely that in poor areas in general there
will be less emphasis on farm capital construction and grain
production and more on the development of subsidiary side
lines. special industries. and other income producing measures.
There may even be an increasing willingness to tolerate the
outflow of labor as an income maintenance measure for poorer
households or units.44 Criticisms of past policy-that it was
contrary to the economic demands and motives of the pesantry.
overly redistributive in nature. and that it ignored "economic
laws" -suggest that market relations organized on a freer basis
will become much more important in rural economy. Obvi
ously. the Chinese leadership at present argues that. despite
some success stories of full-blown collective commitment to
"common prosperity" (rising together). by and large peasants
have been demoralized by overemphasis on collective accumu
lation and need to be released to follow their economic noses.
This will be in harmony with policies that no longer stress
self-sufficiency in grain production. that allow for local and
regional specialization. and. by implication. that call for an
expansion of exchange among areas to make up for local de
ficiencies.
45
What will happen to the county as focal point for develop
ment? All evidence points to a lowering of its sights and a
reduction of its power. especially to combine economic growth
policies with specific socio-economic and political goals. In
development. the stress on free play of economic forces as
opposed to political leadership is a key indication of this. The
current criticism of redistributive measures which is that they
dangerously blunted the "socialist enthusiasm" of the peasants
is likely to result in a weakening of the relationship in the
Xiyang strategy between county political centers and activist
commune and brigade leaderships. In all likelihood. state func
tional bureaucracies and planning agencies on the one hand and
individual households on the other will also become more prom
inent in economic decision-making. in technical innovation.
greater flexibility in cropping. and in other fiscal changes
wrought by the third session of the Fifth N.P.C. For example. in
a 1978 comment on the relation between present agricultural
development plans and the 1975 Dazhai-type county "package
of policies." Dernberger and Fasenfest argue that. while some
of the more radical political-institutional elements of the pro
gram (e.g .. brigade decision-making) were removed. rural
material investment aspects of the program were not. They
mention specifically farmland capital construction. water Clm
servancy. changes in cropping patterns. rural small-scale in
dustries. increasing application of technical innovations. and
various fl)rms of agricultural mechanization (including wider
electrification) all of which are tl) remainY' It would seem that.
given the dimensions of these projects and the already signifi
cant accumulation of industrial investment at county levels. a
major role fl)r county government will remain in any event.
28
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Of all the questions raised by the appearance in rapid
succession of two contrasting rural development strategies in
the past five years, the most provocative concerns the interests
l)f the societal groups potentially served by each. Since this
question suggests consideration of the interrelationship of soci
etal interests and state structures. we tum for inspiration to
Franz Schurmann's insightful work (1968) on the Chinese pol
icy debates of the 1956-57 period over alternative plans for
decentralization. In his analysis, Schurmann explicitly con
nected disputes about the organization of political and admini
strative leadership over economic activity with the impact of
alternative policy outcomes on differentiated societal interests.
In that debate, Schurmann argued. two identifiable sets of
advocates within the Communist Party promoted two varying
strategies for decentralization of economic leadership. Schur
mann tied "Decentralization I" to Chen Yun. a long-time
Communist Party leader active in economic policy-making and
a "conservative" who advocated less mobilization, less heavy
industry. and more reliance on market forces. material incen
tives, and smaller collectives. "Decentralization I" called for a
maximum degree of decision-making power to be vested in the
hands of producing units. Schurmann argued (p. 198) that
"putting decision-making power into the hands of producing
units also meant creating external conditions for the auton
omous exercise of such power, namely some form of market
conditions." The emphasis on markets and more direct material
incentives is. in Schurmann's view, associated with a more
liberal class policy and "the growth of free-market tendencies
[which] would have reduced the power of regional administra
tion to direct the economy in the area of their jurisdiction."
The alternative. "Decentralization II." and the form
adopted at the end of the debate, Schurmann associates (p. 196)
with Mao. Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. This called for
placing greater power in the "hands of lower-echelon admini
strative units." i.e., the provinces. prefectures. and counties.
Decentralization II is based on the principle of social mobiliza
tion. coordinative rather than vertical forms of administration
and control (emphasizing strongly the role of the Communist
Party organization at the several regional jurisdictional levels).
and. we would add. the prominence of political leadership and
class-oriented collective institutions over market arrangements.
In a brief observation of relevance to the present policy
shifts. Schurmann notes that one reason behind the preference
of the majority at that time for the second model of decentraliza
tion was
. . . the fact that the Agricultural Producers Cooperatives
in /957 were apparently again coming under the control of
what was euphemistically called 'prosperous middle peas
ants.' Tolerance toward 'prosperous' peasants in Commu
nist China has generally gone together with economic relax
ation and permissiveness toward the market. Since the
'prosperous' peasants were less amenable to Party control,
greater freedom for them inevitably meant less control by
Party-dominated regional government over the peasantry.
Social mobilization, of course, was intended to have the op
posite effect. Thus both the economic consequences of De
centrali::ation I and the social consequences ofcooperatives
dominated by 'prosperous' peasants would hm'e had sign({
icant political consequences.
Looking at the tentative outcome of major policy shifts
more than two decades later. there appears at first glance a
suggestion of parallel occurrences and parallel implications.
The present policy that looks very much like a (belated!) victory
for Decentralization I may have been achieved by the shift or
absorption of the advocacy of Deng Xiaoping and like-minded
colleagues from the decentralized compromise of the centralists
(i. e .. Decentralization II) with its heavy statist component to
what for convenience sake may be called the Chen Yun or
"economists" positionY Preliminary reports of the delibera
tions of the August-September 1980 National People's Con
gress present evidence of decentralization, especially the plac
ing of much more authority (and autonomous control of vital
funds) in the hands of the managers of economic producing
units.
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THE REINSTATEMENT OF ECONOMICS
IN CHINA TODAY Cyril Lin
THE PROVINCIAL REVOLlITIONARY COMMITTEE,
1967-1979: AN OBITUARY [)avid S. G. Goodman
CONGRESS AND THE COLD WAR:
U.S.-CHINA POLICY, 1953 PhiLip J. Brigg8
Reports froll China
LAW ON DISPLAY IN CHINA ELlen R. EZiasoph and
Susan Gruenebel'g
BIRTH CONTROL IN CHINA: LOCAL DATA
AND THEIR RELIABILITY Lucien Bianco
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NATIONAL
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Rarch Note
THE SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL DISPUTE
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46. Robert F. Dember!!er and David Fasenfest. "China's Post-Mao Economic
Future." in Chinese E;'onom,' Post-Mao. Volume I. Policy and Performance.
(Washington. D.C.: U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee. 1978). pp.
24-26. The authors argue that the efficient use in boosting productive output in
agriculture by even th'e technical-capital improvement package alone may be
limited effectively to better endowed regions with more access to water. trans
purt. urban markets. and good communications. While this may seem in
contradiction with the Xiyang county experience which took place in a back
ward. poorly endowed region. the argument may be made that the Chinese
leadership has decided that they simply cannot supply the material inputs
necessal)' for such growth in poor regions across the board. even if they can
increase the availability ofagricultural producer goods and financial subsidies to
the better off areas so that they may continue to get a reasonable return in
increased production. This may help to explain the recent policy shift to more of
a "dual strategy" in promoting mechanization of agriculture.
29
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Given this ultimate shift. what is tl) be made today of
Schunnann's suggestion that the effect of Decentralization I in
the rural areas would have amounted in 1957 to a change in
relative class positions. favoring fonner advantaged rural
classes or individual class members who survived land reform
and early collectivization? Are there implications for the class
structure of rural society in the present policy of development?
To the extent that Decentralization I depends on a freeing up of
private economic activities and market-oriented production
planning. even today it may be argued that the prestige and
relative importance of former middle peasants. prosperous
"new" middle peasants who emerged right after land refonn.
and rich peasants and their children and allies in the villages
(including some cadres) would be enhanced. Although indi
viduals from all rural strata have in the past taken part in
activities that in radical phases are labeled "spontaneous capi
talist tendencies." such persons in the early I 960s and in some
places even in the mid-1970s come from among the fonnerly
ml)re economically advanced or entrepreneurial strata of rural
society.4K The group that might lose out from this new policy
mix will be those commune members whose income potential
for one reason or another had been lower and had benefitted
from county-localized redistributive growth. Similarly. poorer
units. oreven counties or regions, are not likely to have the same
range of material and capital investment funds extended to them
under the new policy as in the past Dazhai-type county
approach. It remains an open question whether or not greater
opportunity given such units to participate in self-enriching
sideline activities and specialized agricultural production will
make up the difference.
In addition. the recent alteration of the class line in the
countryside. and in most cases the dissolution of land refonn
era categories speaks to an even stronger analogy between
Schunnann's interpretation of the class implication of Decen
tralization I and our view of the possible social significance of
the eclipse of the county-centered. class conflict oriented pro
gram of the Dazhai-type county strategy. In a momentous his
torical judgment. the Communist Party decided in early 1979 to
lift the last sanctions against former landlords and rich peasants
who since land reform have been stigmatized as class enemies.
targeted in frequent political campaigns in the countryside. and
subjected to economic discrimination as well as to limitations on
their civil and political rights. The new policy has stated that the
children of such people are to be treated from the outset as
l)rdinary peasants and not saddled with their parents' class
labels.
See Deng's interview with Oriana Fallacci. WmhillglOlI Post. August:ll.
19l10.
During a interview prnjeCl in Hnng Knng in 1974-75. Blecher
was surprised tn find repeatedly that old class distinctinns fixed at that time 25
years or more in the past still seemed to be discernibly related to the distribution
nf entrepreneurial skills and ecnnomic acumen (but not wealth or income),
Specifically. while these traih were hardly monopt,lized by former landl<,rds
and rich peasants. the fonner economic elites tended more than memhers of
<lIher cla"es to be likely to have such traits. In one village_ for example.
basic-level cadres made use of the continuing netwnrk of personal contacts <,I' a
fnrmer landlnrd in an un<lfticial electric motor factnry. In an<lIher.
former landlords and rich peasants m<lOl,pt,lized prntitable carpentry and con
struction skills. There. the son of a mason who was a f<lnner landlord was
apprenticed tIl him. In another "the edul'ated pe<'pic are mostly land
lord, and rich peasants." Blel'her. Interviews. Universities' Servil'e Centre.
H<,")! 1974-75.
However. such similarities may be more apparent than
real. or appropriate only in a partial or marginal way. In 1957.
Deng Xiaoping endorsed Decentralization II and the policies of
rapid mobilization and large collectives which were later em
bodied in the Great Leap Forward. His transparent use of a
metaphor of conflicting cats and rats to depict solutions to
economic problems-conflicts and solutions hitherto under
stood as embodying class struggles-signified a renunciation of
that earlier policy and an abandonment by some veteran revo
lutionaries of the use of 1940s class labels to analyze con
temporary economic relationships. It is true that in the present
day we do see. even in economic terms. unevenness in the
distribution of income and opportunity. But these seem related
more fundamentally to differences among localities in the level
of development of the productive and material base and of the
specific branch of the economy than they do to class status as
fixed in the land refonn.
While some descendents of former elite classes may. if
gi ven greater freedom. still be the most powerful and energetic
seekers of individual advancement. so there are manifold other
sources of differentiation emerging with the growth of a modern
Chinese economy: differences between urban and rural resi
dence. industrial and agricultural employment. official or non
official position. household size and "hand-mouth ratio." as
well as the significant material differences among collective
units. areas. and regions. Of these. the original type of class
differentiation in the old rural society may be the least important
factor. Thus, the recent decision to remove class discrimination
against the remnants of old village elites may be more a recogni
tion of reality and the need for ending an atavistic form of
discrimination than a pandering to the interests of a group ready
to seize the reins of economic ambition and leadership. It may
also be an attempt to harness the economic skills and energies of
some of the old economic elites and their children within a
basically collective economic framework.
Conclusion
We may now make several points about the analytical basis
of the Dazhai-Xiyang county emulation program for rural de
velopment. First of all. the program attempted to overcome
inequalities arising from the new collective institutions and
productive relations in socialist China. The most important and
l)riginal parts of the program were I) the desire to find ways of
resolving inequalities among communes and units within them
and. 2) by means of the political and economic leadership of
county authorities. making maximum use of local resources and
competing with other counties for additional financial aids from
higher levels of the state. At the same time. however.the politi
cal analysis and basis of legitimation of political power used to
undergird this objective was one that invoked the old language
of rural class and class conflict. "poor and lower-middle peas
ants . etc. each having organizational surrogates in the county
and collective Party committees. Although the 1975 program
was lIot a creature of what has now become known as the
ultraleft of the 1970s. its use by a variety of political leaders at
the sub-provincial and county level may well have tended to
promote radical policies on a wholesale and militantly
politicized basis. as is now charged. The complex sources
of inequality in contemporary China. especially inter-unit and
inter-regional inequality within the form of socialist collective
l)wnership. may well mean that any effort to base a com pre hen
30
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Lanzhou

Xion
sive program on a class analysis that harkens back to the old
days of the Civil War and Land Refonn will. as Mao once
warned. fail to distinguish properly between enemies and
friends.
What we may see. then. in the flight from "politics" to
"pragmatism" is the continuing inability to find a socio-eco
nomic or class analysis that is appropriate to the present Chinese
situation while at the same time adequate for economic develop
ment programs and socialist political leadership. The goal of
redistribution has not been abandoned;48 rather. with the policy
favoring local politics and the decentralization of leadership, it
has been reoriented in a very important structural way.
To illustrate this point by comparison, the kind of redis
tribution envisaged in the' 'Dazhai-type county" strategy called
for a high degree of redistributive growth within the local county
milieu. relying in the first instance on the maximum generation
of local resources, based on the mobilization of labor power and
other capacities, and supplemented by external funding to ac
tivist county leaders hips and their subordinate units. 49 Today
we see another type of redistributive policy being attempted.
one that is more macro-economic in scope and that deals with
different societal inequalities. Current criticisms, including
those of the degree of state aid given to Xiyang County itself.
suggest that self-reliance by the poor and continued growth by
the better-off -as parallel means toward growth with increased
equality-may both be illusory strategies in present-day China.
Instead, policy-makers are pursuing a program that involves
at least for the immediate years-a large-scale redistribution of
income mainly between urban and rural society and between
industry and agriculture via across-the-board, massive rises in
prices for agricultural commodities. especially for above-quota
sales. This would certainly benefit all agricultural producers,
but because of the 50 percent bonus for above-quota sales of
grain. the very biggest and most efficient producers would do
the best. The poorer and less well endowed units or areas,
therefore, would be left with the other options of the policy: viz ..
the encouragement to engage in specialized production of cash
crops or sidelines, to go on the market individually or collec
tively. and the like. This set of approaches would seem to
portend a reduced role for the county in economic redis
tribution.
I
I
I
Despite the present view that political leadership. collec
tive incentives, and redistributive policies have acted as brakes
on peasant enthusiasm, and therefore hindered the growth of
productive forces and output in rural China, it may tum out that
the rural population. and crucial members of rural society (such
as many brigade cadres) are divided on this point. It could be
that we are in for a period of conflict. compromise or combina
tion of elements from the two approaches. But it is also possible
that relative movement from one to another approach will en
gender a new round of political conflict, with a different set of
aggrieved rural actors. Whether county "leading cores" will
slip back into a more relaxed administrative posture and tend to
their tractor factories or take a more activist and "radical" (if
the word still means anything) posture may depend both on the
strength of inheritance of their "Dazhai spirit" and the relative
economic capacities of their units. Because of the scope and size
of the economic base and functions of the county in 1979 as
compared to 1956 or 1957. it may be less easy -or even less
intended-then it would have been in 1956 to dismiss the
poiitical weight of the county government. If the present pol
icies suggest that "Decentralization I" is in the works today, it
will run up at least against the accumulated economic endow
ments and iricreased functional responsibility of county gov
ernment.
One final point remains to be made. The extreme and
sustained upheavals of the Cultural Revolution, continuing fac
tional conflicts in Party and non-Party units. and uncertainties.
setbacks, or uneven successes in economic development have
led to some degree of crisis of political legitimacy ofthe Chinese
revolutionary state. Many of the steps taken by Chinese leaders
since 1976 seem designed to deal with this crisis-tightening
Party organization, placing impediments in the path of more
unregulated fonns of dissent (such as the "four big freedoms"),
and seeking ways to involve members of the public and of
various institutions of the social economy in regular, orderly
procedures of representation, participation. and conflict resolu
tion. Hence, for example, we may understand attempts to ex
plore patterns of political participation by workers and staff
members in industrial units as part of the search for an orderly
democratic element in Chinese institutional practice. Similarly,
despite the apparent downgrading of the political pre-eminence
of county Party leaders hips in overall economic decision
making, we note with interest the initiation of constitutional
changes that call for popular elections to county legislative
bodies. 50 Such activity may well have the cumulative effect of
restoring and strengthening the popular legitimacy of county
leadership institutions-therefore making it easier for the
county to resume a more extensive role in integrating rural
economic and social development policies. The structural pre
conditions are already in place. *
49. Ts<lU. Blecher and Meisner. np. cit.
50. We are grateful tn Jack Gray fnr suggesting this pnint.
31
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Post-Mao Changes in a
South China Production Brigade
by Victor Nee
With the opening of possibilities for field work in China.
we can anticipate a new stage in the systematic study of Chinese
society. Previously. sociologists and anthropologists were lim
ited in their quest for social data to refugee interviews. decipher
ing Chinese newspapers. and reports filed by visiting delega
tions and journalists. Although relatively sophisticated methods
were developed by researchers to compensate the "data prob
lem." I the field maintained a defensive stance when challenged
on the reliability of its data.
In this report I shall discuss the findings of a recent field
work project which brought me to a village that I had studied
from afar through informant interviewing. The field work was
conducted in a rural county in southwestern Fujian province.
from March 17 to April 18. 1980. A month would not have been
adequate for a serious sociological study had it not been that
prior to my visit. I had completed an interview project with
former educated youths who lived in the village from 1969
1975. The interview project. carried out at Cornell University
from December 1977 to September 1979, produced unusually
rich data. about 1.500 pages of detailed text and diagrams about
life and social structure in the village. My visit to the village
allowed me the opportunity to conduct an independent study to
check the reliability of the data I had gathered from afar, as well
as to learn about changes and developments subsequent to my
informants' departure in 1975. Methodologically. therefore. the
study can be seen as a bridge between the earlier works based
upon refugee interviews and the new studies of Chinese society
being conducted in the field by sociologists and anthropologists.
The report discusses the impact of recent changes in national
agrarian policies. the current birth control campaign. youth
discontent. and evidence of consolidation of the local elite in
light of the data gathered from interviewing former educated
youths.
I. See. for example. Andrew Walder. "Press Accounts and the Study nf
Chinese Society." Chilla QlIarterly. Vol. 79. September 1979: and the method
ological note in William Parish and Martin Whyte's Vii/age alld Family ill
Col/temf'0rary Chilla (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1(79).
:!. This study was funded by a postdoctoral research grant from the Social
Science Research Council 1980-81. The study will be published in book lim11 at
a later date. I am appreciative of the helpful comments I received from Carl
Riskin. William Parish. Edward Friedman. and Mark Selden.
Yangbei Production Brigade is a single surname settle
ment. with a population of 2.400. located in one of the three
Hakka counties bordering Guangdong and Jiangxi provinces. It
is a two day bus ride from Xiamen. along winding mountain
roads. In modem times these counties experienced major peas
ant uprisings. In 1929 Yangbei villagers, together with Peasants
from neighboring villages. organized a peasant movement and
succeeded in establishing a soviet government in the Xiangdong
market town. The area continued to support an active guerrilla
movement after the defeat of the Xiangdong soviet government
and the fall of the base area. Survivors of the peasant movement
recall seeing Mao Zedong at Gutian. a day's walk from the
village. during the Gutian Conference in December 1929. These
counties continued to be regarded as a poor hinterland area by
provincial authorities in Fuzhou. Economic development and
standard of living remained lower than the national norms. In
1979. per capita income in Xiangdong People's Commune was
68.10 yuan, whereas that for Fujian province was estimated at
80 yuan. Per capita grain consumption in the commune was
cited at 523 jin. whereas national per capita grain consumption
is about 600 jin. After the departure of the last educated youths
from Yangbei in 1977. there have been few visitors from the
coastal cities.
From Radicalism to Market Socialism.
Peasant morale. according to my original informants, was
low in the early 1970s, during the resurgence of rural radicalism
associated with the ultra-left phase of the Cultural Revolution.
They had told me that during the "learn from Dazhai" cam
paign. the village moved from team to brigade accounting. The
village adopted the Dazhai workpoint system. stressing politi
cal. rather than material incentives. Better-managed "rich"
teams were called on to assist the poor teams. This was accom
plished both through direct labor contribution. and through a
type of economic subsidy accomplished by brigade accounting.
which leveled workpoint value between rich and poor teams. As
in the abortive Great Leap Forward. peasants were mobilized to
contribute labor for local construction projects. The free market
was tightly controlled through the imposition of regulations that
restricted the sale of pork and grain and discouraged peasants
from engaging in handicrafts and other household sidelines. The
32
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Table 1
Yangbei Production Brigade: Per Capita Grain Consumption
jin
(606)
600
(454)
(405) (406)
400
(333) 300
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
size of free plots was cut back by 40 percent. Reminiscent of the
Great Leap Forward. though on a minor scale. there was a drop
in grain production. a shortage of fresh pork in the free market.
and a thriving black market in grain. Villagers grumbled to the
educated youths that they didn't have enough to eat. and that
their present standard of living was lower than before the Great
Leap.
At the time of my early interviews. the description of
declining standard of living and peasant discontent seemed to
me too much like the stereotypical refugee account. Certainly
people have been known to complain even when their condi
tions were actually improving bit by bit. Without concrete data
on consumption patterns over time. it was impossible to assess
the validity of claims that radical policies had depressed the
rural economy enough to lower the living standard in the village
below that which was achieved on a per capita basis in the
1950s.
Informal conversations with villagers early in my field
work this spring revealed that villagers felt their standard of
living had improved markedly since the mid-1970s: but older
villagers still maintained that per capita consumption was not up
to par with the level attained in the 1950s before the Great Leap
Forward. As table I reveals. the data on per capita grain con
sumption supported the villagers' statements of improved living
standard. There was a dramatic increase in per capita grain
consumption from the low of333jin* in 1977 to 606jin in 1979.
followed by a dip to 500 jin in 1979 due to a serious spring
drought that year. A poll of older peasants revealed estimates
from per capita grain consumption for 1955-57 ranging from
575 jin to 600 jin. markedly higher than the per capita grain
consumption between the years 1970-77. confirming the data
from the educated youths. I concluded. then. that the dip in
consumption in 1979 from the high in 1978 accounted for the
perception that the living standard in the mid-1950s was still
slightly higher. I emphasize grain consumption as a key indi
cator of living standard because of its importance to the peasant
household economy. With an adequate grain supply. exceeding
*All grain tigures are for unhusked rice.
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
what is needed for human consumption. the peasant can in
crease production of pigs and poultry. the main source of cash
income. The recent increases in grain supply thus was reflected
in the abundant supply of fresh pork and poultry at the free
market.
As a result of the recent improvement in living standard.
there was a noticeable optimism among villagers at the time of
my visit. The mood was reflected in the numbers of new homes
in the process of construction, in comments suggestive of in
creased enthusiasm for working in the collective sector. and in
the general belief that grain production would continue to in
crease. Villagers attributed the sharp increase in grain produc
tion to changes in the management of the team economy and the
restoration of a more pragmatic rural policy. Although the
experiment with brigade accounting was terminated in 1973. it
was not until the four modernizations campaign was launched
that reforms were carried out in the village. These reforms were
reminiscent of those associated with Chen Yun during the re
covery years after the Great Leap Forward.
The brigade party secretary's comment on the direction of
reforms reflects the liberalized climate of thinking in regards to
management and incentives. He remarked that "because of the
strong tradition of individual household production. the closer
we can approximate individual household production while still
maintaining the collective system of ownership. the higher the
productivity we can expect to achieve." This candid appraisal
reflected the change in sentiment away from the radical em
phasis on increasing the size and scale of agricultural organiza
tion to a belief that smaller units of production were more
efficient and capable of achieving higher productivity. Villagers
felt that smaller teams were easier to manage and that people
could identify more with the fruits of their labor. whereas the
redistributive aspect of brigade accounting made it less reward
ing for people in richer teams to work hard. Since 1978. there
was a rash of team fissions in the brigade; from an original II
production teams. there were twenty-one teams. with the small
est team comprising only 7 households. When asked whether
there were villagers who preferred to return entirely to indi
vidual household production. villagers said there were those
who felt this way. When asked what were the advantages of
33
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Table 2
gross income
Yangbei Production Brigade: ratio of prOduction costs
5
1971 1972 1973 1974
collectivized agriculture, team cadres replied that it was realized
in a better division of labor and in an economy of scale. Villa
gers said that only the production team could purchase chemical
fertilizer, insecticides, and power tillers, whereas individuals
could not; moreover, only the teams qualified for the low
interests credit from the state for purchases of modem inputs.
Also. while a few households strong in labor power might prefer
individual farming, households that were short on labor power
and on skilled farmers, who had sufficient breadth of experience
to feel they could handle the entire cycle of agricultural produc
tion. (such as female-headed households or households of
cadres or soldiers who worked outside), did not anticipate
advantages in individual farming. Nonetheless, it was clear that
the trend was towards smaller units of production. Before my
departure from the field, a team cadre told me that he felt there
were soon to be further team fissions. *
Accompanying the trend towards smaller production teams
was the concern of villagers to implement incentive systems that
reward individual effort within the context of collective farm
ing. There was a decisive shift away from non-material incen
ti ves to a reward system that tied workpoint allotment directly to
performance. As a result, the frequency of meetings held to
evaluate and assign workpoint value to an individual's perfor
mance increased, with some teams doing this as often as once a
month; by contrast, when the educated youths lived in' the
village, workpoint assignments were made once a year, and at
times every other year. With teams empowered to decide on the
most appropriate incentive system suited to their needs, there
has been a tendency for teams to approach incentives on a
tentative, experimental basis. emphasizing pragmatic consid
erations. Accordingly, there was a mix of incentive systems
being used by different teams in the brigade. Some teams had
*A recent letter from the village (January 1981) reponed thatthe process of team
fission had resulted in an apparent breakup of collectivized agriculture with new
teams in the natural village now as small as two households. How this came
about and the implications of this breakup will be the foclIs ofa planned revisitto
Yangbei during the summer of 1981.
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
recently adopted the' 'baogong daozu,jiafen daotien" system of
dividing tasks among the team's small groups and assigning
workpoint value to a specified plot or task. Vilagers felt the
advantage of this system was that it rewarded on the basis of a
specified task or plot of land without limitation of time, thus
those who completed their task earlier would be given the same
workpoints as others who took longer to complete a similar task.
While this system tended to reward speed, villagers who didn't
use this system pointed to its disadvantages: quality of work
tended to drop, as villagers rushed to complete their work so that
they could leave earlier and tend to their household sidelines.
The teams that employed this system asserted that the problem
of quality control could be corrected by an alert team leader and
group pressure. These teams, however, were among the affluent
teams, with a history of good management and strong collective
discipline. The more commonly used incentive system was the
system called "dingchan daozu" which assigned production
quotas to small groups based upon previous years' production.
If the small group succeeded in surpassing the quota, 50 percent
of any surplus production was divided among small group
members as bonus. The strength of this system, villagers said,
was that it rewarded the quality of performance and actual
results; however, they also pointed out that there was an element
of luck involved since grain production fluctuated from year to
year according to climatic conditions, a factor beyond their
control.
While villagers believed that the trends towards smaller
teams, more effective incentives and greater team autonomy
have contributed to higher morale, there was yet another factor
responsible for the increases in grain production of the past
years. This has been the very sizeable increase in modem inputs
utilized by the production teams. Since 1975, when most of the
educated youths left the village, the number of power tillers
owned by production teams increased from three to seventeen;
recently the brigade acquired a large, second-hand tractor which
it utilized primarily for transport purposes. The amount of
chemical fertilizer and insecticide available to the teams also
increased dramatically.
In fact, there was a close correlation between the increase
34
4
3 ~ - - - ~
2
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in application of chemical fertilizer and grain production; grain
production virtually doubled following the sharp increase in
chemical fertilizer application in 1978. However. the increasing
use of modem inputs raised the cost of production significantly.
resulting in a declining ratio between income and production
costs. Thus. while grain production increased sharply since
1977. per capita income from the collective sector increased
only slightly. reflecting the declining profit margins.
As a result of mechanization. the amount of time required
of villagers to work in the collective sector declined in recent
years by almost 30 percent. Whereas a strong laborer worked
approximately 280 days a year a few years ago. today he or she
might work only 200 days; moreover. the workday shortened by
more than two hours during the non-busy season in the collec
tive sector. The opening up of more free time and the declining
profit margins in the collective sector led villagers to focus more
of their time and effort in developing their household sideline
production. Increased per capita grain allotment stimulated hog
and poultry production, the basis of the household sideline
economy. yet it has been difficult for villagers to start new
sideline production. In the mountainous area where rural in
dustrialization proceeded very slowly, the possibilities for side
line income outside of the exploitation of natural resources such
as resin, bamboo shoots and mushrooms appear to be limited by
a shortage of capital and experience in handicraft production.
Nonetheless, it appeared that villagers were concentrating more
effort and time into raising their household sideline production.
As one villager said, "If I don't use the extra time. then there
isn't any income to make up for the fewer workpoints we make
each year." Although the value of workpoints increased, vil
lagers understood that effective use of time in increasing house
hold sideline income was the best way for them to increase their
overall family income, at least in the short run. Thus, villagers
were planning to dig ponds to raise fish. opening up new land on
the hillside, which according to the new policy could be used by
the household for its own sideline production. and trying to
think up other possible sideline productive schemes.
In balance. the increases in grain production did not lead to
a comparable increase in income from the collective sector due
to increasing production costs. But because more families over
drafted in the last two years, per capita grain consumption
increased substantially. This, in tum, brought in more cash
income from the sale of hogs and pOUltry. There was an increase
in per capita consumption, in household sideline income; but
overall, these increases appeared not to have resulted in a living
standard higher than what was achieved during the mid-1950s.
Birth Control
Underlying the apparent lack of increase in per capita
income over the past two decades was a village population that
grew from 1346 in 1954 to 2202 by 1979. an increase of 61
percent. On the basis of the informant data. I had predicted that
the birth rate in the village would continue to be high relative to
urban areas. despite the government's concerted effort to bring
about a rapid decline in population growth. According to my
data. there were strong economic and social incentives for vil
lagers to continue to have large families. Villagers preferred
families ranging from five to three children. with four children
the ideal; having two sons seemed to many villagers to provide
adequate insurance in the event that one fell ill or died of an
accident. Despite the government's policy encouraging late
marriages. marriages were performed early in the area with
women marrying between the ages of 18 and 21 and men 20 and
22. It was the custom for couples to have their first child soon
after the marriage. followed by successive children spaced
relatively closely behind each birth. Having children was for
villagers an investment for future security and even prosperity.
Male children provided family continuity and support for par
ents in old age. Among the most impoverished and pathetic
villagers were elderly couples without adult offspring. object
lessons for villagers who failed to have sons.
Female children were also seen as providing benefits for
the family. although daughters. who would marry out (in most
cases to other villages). were seen as merely temporary mem
bers. A daughter could help out with household tasks and.
during the teenage years, she contributed to the family economy
through the workpoints she earned. An unmarried teenage girl
was considered among the best workers in the team. Although
villagers felt that they were likely to experience a period of
economic difficulty when their children were young. there was
the expectation that once they came of age to work. the family
could begin to prosper. Moreover. the economic burden of
having small dependent children was minimized by the policy of
allowing families to overdraft on their income from the col
lective economy. Overdrafts were like interest-free loans which
allowed villagers to defer payments until their children were old
enough to work in the team economy. thus paying off the cost of
their upbringing. There was also the positive incentive of having
children in a time of grain shortage. such as the one which was
experienced in the early 1970s. Villagers calculated that the
grain ration alloted each child was more than adequate for the
child's minimal needs. thus leaving a small surplus for adult
consumption. In addition. each child was given a free plot
allotment by the team. Families with few children generally
were compelled to purchase high priced rice on the black market
when their rations ran short. whereas families with many child
ren often sold rice on the black market to raise additional cash
income. Villagers felt it was better to have children than to have
to purchase rice on the black market. because in the end you
have something to show for it.
In the early 1970s the county government initiated a birth
control campaign which. for a brief period. put pressure on
villagers to practice planned parenthood. Brigade cadres were
mobilized to take the lead in accepting sterilization. Prizes and
bonuses were offered to women who agreed to sterilization. The
county birth control office sent its cadres to the communes and
villages to educate local cadres and villagers to the importance
of birth control. The county sent a female gynecologist to the
commune hospital as a permanent staff member to take charge
of the local birth control program. For a brief period. there were
a number of women in the village who aborted pregnancies and
accepted sterilization. Once the campaign was over. however.
villagers realized that the government was not going to enforce
its strict sanction. which had stipulated that families that gave
birth to more than two children had to open up an extra mu of
land for cultivation. According to the educated youths. some
women who aborted their pregnancy regretted having done so.
and proceeded to get pregnant again. There was a general sense
among villagers that sterilization was bad for the health.
weakening them; men felt that it undermined their masculinity.
Villagers gossiped that ever since the party secretary was ster
ilized. he seemed less vigorous and masculine. Another cadre
attributed his wife' s leaving him for another man to his steriliza
35
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Photos by Victor Nee
tion. The educated youth reported that other means of birth
control such as the pill and LU.D. were not available. and the
sole means of birth control appeared to have been abortions and
sterilization. It seemed from the educated youth's account,
therefore. that the birth control program in the commune was
relatively ineffectual. For these reasons I anticipated a continu
ing high rate of population increase.
During my field work. I conducted a house to house survey
in four production teams to administer a birth control census
based upon one which had been implemented in Taiwan. The
census revealed that most villagers still preferred 3 to 4 children,
stating that the ideal was two sons and a daughter. Virtually all
villagers believed that it was necessary to have at least one son.
Yet despite these attitudes. there was a general agreement
among villagers that birth control was necessary. which was
retlected by the fact that 87 percent of fertile married women in
the sample were practicing birth control. The number of sterili
zations in this sample was high. at 55 percent of fertile married
couples. Couples not practicing birth control were young re
cently married villagers. My prediction of continuing high birth
rates thus was supported by the fact that the desire to have more
than two children was prevalent in the village. However. I had
not accounted for the strictness with which new birth control
regulations were being enforced by the county and commune
governments.
The objective of the new birth control regulations was to
limit young peasant families to two children. Although in urban
areas the goal was a one-child family, in mral areas. the State.
while encouraging one-child families. only hoped to achieve
within the short term the acceptance of the two-child family. It
was clear from talking with villagers that they felt the new
campaign was more serious and concerted than any previous
birth control program. Each level of local organization. from the
production team to the commune. had its birth control cadre
or representative. Birth control was made a top priority issue
for local cadres and there was no question about the commit
ment of the State to achieving a rapid decline in population
growth. But what most impressed villagers were the strict
sanctions for having more than the permitted number of chil
dren. Afterthe birth of the first child. the mother was required to
agree to the installation of an L U. D. at the commune hospital
upon registration of the baby's birth. Refusal to comply meant
the baby could not be registered, thus denying the family the
alloted grain ration. free plot assignment and other coupons for
the additional family member. After five years the couple could
apply to the commune for permission to have the LU.D. re
moved for a second pregnancy. After the second birth. the
husband or wife are required to agree to sterilization. or to a
contract with the State that if they choose to use another form of
birth control. an accidental pregnancy will have to be aborted.
Likewise, failure to comply meant the child could not be re
gistered. In the way of positive incentives. couples who agreed
to sterilization after the birth of the first child are given in lump
sum a sewing machine by the commune. 30 yuan, and 50 jin of
rice. It would appear unlikely that. if many peasants agreed to
limiting their families to one child. local government could
afford to provide such generous grants.
The combination of sanctions and incentives seems to have
had impressive results in lowering population growth in the
area. Population growth in the county dropped from 3.1 percent
In 1975 to 1.4 percent in 1979. with the 1980 objective set
slightly below I percent. This trend towards lower popUlation
growth was paralleled in Yangbei brigade which showed a
resumption of higher birth rate after the birth control campaign
of the early 1970s faded. followed by a dip in 1974-75 and a
steady decline after 1976. Commune officials said that Yangbei
had the highest birth rate in the commune in 1979, which they
attributed to the large numbers of recently married couples.
who: they pointed out. were having their first births. They were
confIdent. however. that Yangbei would in the next few years
experience a futher decline in birth rate, bringing it down to the
level of the commune as a whole. which was 1 percent in 1979.
It is interesting to note that the new sanctions effectively under
mined the past economic incentives for having more children.
Villagers said that while they strongly preferred to have more
than two children. the prospect of raising a child without the
benefits of additional rice ration and free plot was economically
too heavy a burden for them. Nonetheless. there were a few
households in the four teams surveyed that were adept at taking
advantage of the fact that LU.D. proved to be only about 80
percent effective by going ahead and having a child in the case
of an accidental pregnancy.
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Youth and the Closure of Social Mobility.
One of the striking changes from the early 1970s was the
higher attendance of both boys and girls in the village elemen
tary school and commune lower middle school. Whereas the
educated youths reported a low level of interest in schooling
among parents and young people in the early 1970s. there has
been an apparent change in sentiment. According to the princi
pal of the village school. nearly all of the school age children in
the village are attending the elementary school. and a surpris
ingly high percentage. 95 percent are now continuing on to
complete lower middle school education. with an accompany
ing increase in the numbers that go on to upper middle school. In
the early 1970s. there were very few in the village among the
youth that continued to upper middle school. and while the trend
was towards higher male attendance in the lower middle school.
there were few female students who went on to lower middle
school. Instead the tendency was for parents to withdraw their
daughters before graduation from the elementary school so that
they could contribute more directly to the household tasks and
enter the work force earlier. It was felt. however. that a boy
needed more schooling as preparation for his becoming head of
the household. to properly manage the family sideline produc
tion. By 1980. it appeared that there was a significant change in
parental attitude towards their daughters' education. reflected
by the fact that female attendance in the elementary school was
as high as male. and by the increasing numbers of village girls
continuing their education to the lower-middle school level. In
interviewing parents. moreover. a common response was to say
that a girl ought to continue her education as far as her ability
could take her. The village teachers felt that students were much
more serious and diligent in their studies. and pointed to the fact
that every school night the study room which the school kept
open was filled with students preparing their lessons.
It is difficult to account for the change in attitude towards
schooling. other than a vague belief villagers have that educa
tion provided a means to get ahead. Certainly some parents
harbored the hope that their children might be able to avoid the
hard work of fanning. Certainly among the young villagers who
spent their evenings studying in the elementary study hall were
boys and girls who dreamed of passing the entrance examination
for one of the county's universities or technical college. Yet. the
chances of their doing so seemed terribly limited. if the record of
the past few years is any indication of the prospects for a young
villager to gain admission to an institution of higher education.
The commune reported only one student in the past three years
who was able to pass the entrance examination for a technical
middle school in the district capital. Longyan. Apparently. the
new competitive entrance examinations and the superiority of
urban schools have resulted in a sharp reduction of students
from the villages in universities and technical institutes. Faculty
at the province's major universities. Xi amen and Fuzhou uni
versities. were concerned that rural applicants scored signifi
cantly lower on college entrance exams and were being admitted
in much fewer numbers.
Upon graduation from lower and also upper middle school.
virtually all young graduates can expect to return to the village
to join the production teams and work along side their parents.
The State does not assign work for rural youth in the public
sector as it does for urban youth. In fact. villagers pointed with
some bitterness to the givernment's regulation that restricted
people with village registration from employment in State
managed enterprises. The fanner brigade party secretary. an old
guerrilla activist. quoted a saying in the viIIajre that reflected
discontent and cynicism: "Urban youths don't even need tech
nical skill to get assigned to a good job, but a rural youth who
has technical skill still can't get ahead." A few lucky middle
school graduates were selected each year for recruitment in the
People's Liberation Anny, an honor that most village young
men still aspire to. But, whereas in the past returned anny men
could look forward to State Assignments in the public sector,
mainly as local cadres, in recent years such assignments have
been more difficult to get. Instead, returned anny men since the
early 1970s appeared to have taken positions as cadres in the
brigade, a non-State job.
The seeming paucity of opportunity for mobility faced by a
generation of village youth, born after 1949 and far better
educated than their parents, has inevitably created a problem of
adjustment for these youths. An upper middle school graduate
37
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Table 3
Yangbei Production Brigade: Per Capita Income from Collective Sector
150
125
1971 1972 1973 1974
discovers upon his return to the village that his education has not
helped him to be a better farmer, and that he must learn skills
which his peers who dropped out of high school earlier have
already mastered. His initial workpoint assignment, therefore,
might be lower than the other, more experienced team mem
bers. But expenses have increased for a young villager, If he
hopes to marry, he must be able to save money towards the
marriage expense, which has been increasing, and towards
eventually building his own home. Yet, all he can expect to earn
in a day's work is from .50 -.70 yuan, depending on his team
and workpoint assignment. Young villagers felt that this is a
small amount of money for the amount of labor that it requires,
just enough to cover living expenses, with little left for saving.
Young villagers said that all they think about was how to earn
more money, how to get ahead, and become established. While
they voiced dissatisfaction with their lot in being ordinary peas
ants, and hoped for jobs with a salary, "eating state grain, " they
were realistic enough to know that this was a dream not likely to
be fulfilled, and that their future almost certainly would be as
farmers. As one youth said, "there is no way out." Older
villagers acknowledged the problem, that the youth did not look
forward to a life on the farm, had higher expectations, and feIt
frustrated. They sympathized with their aspirations for work as
factory workers or state personnel, and readily admitted that the
present regulations preventing rural youths from gaining access
to these jobs were unfair. There was complaint about what they
described as the buyuan system, reinstituted in recent years,
whereby parents working in the state sector, whether as factory
workers, teachers or cadres, can upon retirement pass on ajob in
the same field or organization to a daughter or son. Villagers felt
that this system sealed off any hope for their children to get
salaried jobs, and sealed their fate from generation to generation
on the farm. They questioned whether the buyuan system was
compatible with the spirit of socialism, pointing to the inequity
of young people getting jobs not on the basis of merit, but
because their parents happened to have worked for the State. 3
Data from the educated youth hinted at the problem of
rising expectation and discontent among village youth, but at
the time there were fewer young villagers with education whose
hopes and imagination reached out beyond the confines of
village society. Perhaps the presence of urban-educated youth in
1975 1976 1977 1978
the village had the lasting effect of influencing the present
generation of peasant youth to want more in life than what their
parents wanted, and to yearn for opportunities outside the vil
lage. One county official expressed concern about the possibil
ity that mechanization and higher educational achievement, in
the absence of rapid economic growth in the province, might
produce the conditions for instability in the future. With more
free time and higher expectations, he said, there was no telling
what thoughts might go on in people's minds. The fact that the
"problem of youth" has emerged as a major concern among
China's new leadership, is suggestive that such worry has also
been on the minds of policy makers in Beijing.
Consolidation of the Local Elite
Data from the informant interviews provided evidence of a
trend towards the consolidation of a local elite, firmly en
trenched in the local bureaucracy, extending from the county
government down to the production brigades. The core of this
local elite apeared to be the old guerrilla fighters who partici
pated in the struggle to liberate the county, land reform and
collectivization activists, and returned People's Liberation
Army soldiers, with a sprinkling of graduates from upper mid
dle school who were recruited into the bureaucracy in the 1950s
and 60s.
In the early 1950s the county government was staffed
heavily by "outside" cadres from North China who came south
with the army during the Liberation War. In the period follow
ing the liberation of the county there was a shortage of qualified
local cadres due to the low literacy rate among guerilla fighters
3. Interviews in Fuzhou and Beijing confirmed the existence of the buyuan
system. Urban people seemed to feel that the system was developed to provide
further social security upon retirement. Although the stipulation was that the
child upon his or her parent's retirement was entitled to ajob in the same general
area of employment. in practice the child was able to get jobs in the same
organization. often in the same specialization. Apparently in Shanghai, ex
perienced workers were retiring early in order to allow a son or daughter to get a
job in the factory resulting in a problem ofa reduction of the skilled work force in
exchange for inexperienced young workers with lower technical qualification.
38
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and land reform activists. Those who were literate, however,
were quickly promoted from the basic levels to help staff the
growing local government bureaus. A favored source of cadres
recruitment were returned People's Liberation Army soldiers.
In the anny, a young peasant could take literacy courses, engage
in organized political study, participate in a large organization
whose ethos of disciplined service to country was expected to
broaden the peasant's outlook and range of experience, making
him less susceptible to localist values and interests. Moreover,
the anny provided excellent opportunities for a young peasant to
join the Party. Increasingly, during the late 1950s and 1960s
local cadres were recruited into the county government and the
newly established people's communes; among them were large
numbers of returned soldiers.
One institution in particular became the virtual retirement
grounds for returned soldiers, the militia. According to my
informants, during the Cultural Revolution commune militia
commanders were propelled to dominant positions in the com
munes when they were called upon by the PLA garrison in
Longyan District to take control of newly established revolu
tionary committees. As chairmen of the county and commune
revolutionary committees, these militia commanders formed a
cohesive elite group of local men. Their common years of
service in the anny provided a strong sense of camaraderie
which was cemented in years of attending meetings and frequent
communications as local commanders of the commune militia
organizations. Though accountable to the Party bureaucracy,
militia commanders nonetheless had deep roots in the villages.
There were three commune militia commanders from Yangbei,
the most powerful of whom was the militia commander of the
commune which straddled the county town. Yangbei also
boosted a number of important county cadres, one of whom was
a leading cadre in the county public security organization.
What was the fate of the militia commanders in the post
Cultural Revolution period? It seemed that they were more
vulnerable than the other local cadres to displacement because
they came to power when Lin Biao's influence was at its peak.
To my surprise, none of the Yangbei cadres had been purged
after the fall of the Cultural Revolution radical leadership in
Fujian, a stronghold of the so-called "gang of four. "The three
militia commanders were still leading cadres in their respective
commune administrations, holding joint positions either as
vice-Party secretary or vice-chairman of the commune revolu
tionary committee. Like the militia commanders, the other
cadres from Y angbei were also able to retain their positions in
the local bureaucracy. A county cadre who worked in the
important grain departtnent was transferred back to Yangbei
during a campaign to strengthen grass roots leadership, but after
a brief tenure as brigade party secretary, he was transferred to
the commune to be its vice-chairman. The core leadership group
in the brigade during the Cultural Revolution period was simi
larly transferred to the commune administration where they
occupied important middle level positions. These transfers
strengthened the control of local people in the commune ad
ministration. If Yangbei was typical of the county, the stability
of the local elite was impressive in light of the dramatic changes
in national and provincial politics in recent years.
At both the county and commune level, the leading cadre is
an "outsider" from either another county or, at the commune
level, another conunune in Wuping county. This policy con
forms to the traditional rule of avoidance of the Chinese bur
eaucracy, The bureaucrats who staff local government in China
today have a higher official status. According to local cadres
interviewed in Wuping county, the staff of the county and
commune bureaucracy exercise considerable defacto control. A
number of local cadres said that an "outside" cadre must be
very attentive to cultivating good ties with local cadres to gain
their support. When an "outside" cadre arrives on a new
assignment, he enters a complex society where, without the
support of local cadres, he is "like a blind man," who can
"accomplish little. " Local cadres on the other hand have a deep
familiarity with local society and can mobilize long established
networks of relationships to get things done. Moreover due to
the greater size of local government now as compared to imper
ial times, the staff of local people is considerably larger in the
Communist bureaucracy. Local cadres claimed that, if an' 'out
side" cadre antagonized local sentiment, they might actively
work to undermine the "outside" cadre by going behind his
back and isolating him or her. They might also bring their
complaints to cadres from the locality who work in the county
government, who in tum can bring them to the attention of the
county leadership. Ifcomplaints were persistent and serious, the
county might send a work team down to investigate the prob
lem. Thus the local cadres with their extensive links in the
community and bureaucracy would make formidable oppo
nents. Local cadres I interviewed readily admitted that personal
ties were important in getting things accomplished in the local
government. As a cadre told me, "if you have a good relation
ship with another cadre, you can go to him and personally ask
him for help." County cadres from the locality said that they
were eager to lend a helping hand to their village as long as
requests were within the bounds of propriety. With the as
cendency of local cadres in the county and commune bureauc
racy, localism has become a structural problem and can be
expected to assert itself in the years ahead.
In Yangbei (V. Nee).
39
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Discussion.
Although I was able to gather a considerable amount of
new data from my field work in Yangbei, some of the main
findings of which were highlighted in this report, the primary
value of the field work, in terms of the study as a whole, was to
enhance my confidence in the reliability of the original data
from educated youth interviews. This was accomplished
through matching up "key indicators" such as household com
position, consumption patterns, material possessions, prevalent
attitudes, events and even gossip to check for any discrepancies.
In cases where discrepancies were discovered, I sought to ac
count for them through further questioning. For example, I had
anticipated that the birth rate, on the basis of interviews with the
educated youth, would remain high in the village. Yet, my
census of four production teams revealed that in fact, birth
control had been successfully implemented, as reflected in the
overall decline of birth rate in the brigade in recent years. The
discrepancy was attributed to changes in State policy, and not to
any unreliability factor in the educated youths' account.
Books to Review
The following review copies have arrived at the office of the
Bulletin. If you are interested in reading and reviewing one or
more of them, write to Bryant Avery, BCAS, P.O. Box W,
Charlemont, MA 01339. This is not, of course, an exhaustive
list ofthe available books in print-only a !istofbooks received.
We welcome reviews ofother worthy volumes not listed here.
Jorge A. Lozoya & A. K. Bhattacharya: Asia and the New International
Economic Order (Pergamon. 1981).
John H. Barton and Ryukichi Imai: Arms Control II: A New Approach to
International Security (Cambridge. MA: OG & H. Inc .. 1981).
Council on Environmental Quality and the Dept. of State. Gerald O. Barney
study director). The Global 2000 Reportto the President ofthe U.S .. Vol. I
(Pergamon. 1980).
R. R. Sharma: A Marxist Model/or Social Change (Humanities Press. 1981).
Frank H. Tucker: The Frontier Spirit and Progress (Nelson-Hall. 1980). (On
the US. Germany. Japan and the USSR).
Nancy Peabody Newell & Richard S. Newell: The Struggle for Afghanistan
(Cornell. 198 l).
Satchi Ponnambalam: Dependellt Capitalism in Crisi.v: The Sri Lankan Econ
omy. 1948-1980 (Zed. 1981).
Ranjini Obeyesekere & Chitra Fernando (eds.): An Allthology of Modern
Writing from Sri Lanka (Assoc. for Asian Studies. 198 I).
Gerald D. Berreman: Caste and other Inequalities (Cupertino. CA: Folklore
Inst .. 198 l).
Joseph Tharamangalam: Agrarian Class Conf1ict: The Political Mobili:ation of
Agricultural Labourers in Kuttanad. South India (UBC Press. 198 l).
John W. Mellor: The New Economics ofGrowth: A Strategy for India and the
Del'eloping World (Cornell. 1980).
Gregory L. Possehl: Indus Cil'ili:ation in Saurashtra Humanities Press. 1981).
Lloyd Rudolph & Susanne Hoeber Rudolph: The Regional Imperative: US
Foreign PoliC\' Towards South Asian States (Humanities Press. 1981).
Erik Baark & Jon Sigurdson: India-China Comparative Research: Technology
& Science for Del'elopment (Scandinavian Inst. of Asian Studies. 1981).
Judith Strauch: Chinese Village Politics in the Malaysian State (Harvard. 1981).
Cheung Ka-hing: Kampuchea: Historical and Global Colltext of the Conf1ict
(Hong Kong: Plough Publications. 198 l) 51 pp.
Pardy. Parsons. Siemon & Wigglesworth: Purari: Ol'erpowering P.N.G.:'
(Papua New Guinea: International Development Action Purari Action
Group. 1978).
Michael Chamberlain (ed.): East Timor /Ilternational Conference Report (New
York. 1980).
Likewise, the discrepancy between the low morale of peas
ants of the early 1970s and the more positive attitudes expressed
during my visit was also explained by changes in State policy.
The fact that older peasants still maintained that, in terms of
food consumption, the 1950s was better than the present period
not only provided evidence supporting the educated youths'
report, but it also was consistent with the statistical data on food
consumption gathered during the 1970s. Social structural data
gathered in my brief field work in the village closely corrob
orated the information provided by the educated youths. This
was true not only for kinship pattern, household composition,
norms and custom, but also of data on local elite and politics.
Even attitudes could be validated on sensitive issues such as
youth discontent. The educated youths hinted at the problem of
closed avenues for mobility for young villagers. My research in
the field confirmed this problem and uncovered a further aggra
vation of the youth frustration as more village youth continued
their education to middle school but found jobs in the State
sector scarce. *
Jill Jolliffe: East Timor: Nationalism & Colonialism (Univ. of Queensland
Press. 1978).
Alfons van der Kraan: Lombok: Conquest. and Underdevelop
ment. 1.'170-1940 (Heinemann. 1981).
Chr. L. M. Penders (ed.): Indonesia: Selected Documents on Colonialism and
Nationalism. 1830-1942 (Univ. of Queensland Press. 1977).
Indonesian Documentation & Information Centre: Indonesian Worker and Their
Right to Organise (Leiden. the Netherlands: 1981).
John L. S. Girling: Thailand: Society and Politics (Cornell. 1981).
U. N. Asian and Pacific Development Inst.: Local Lel'el Planning and Rural
Del'elopment (New Delhi. 19.'10).
Susan J. Pharr: Political Women in Japan (California. 1981).
Roger W. Bowen: Rebellion and Democracy in Meiji Japan (California. 1980).
Robert E. Cole: Work. Mobilitv. & Participation (California. 1980).
Kazuo Sato (ed.): Indust1"\' and Business in Japan (M. E. Sharpe. 1980).
Franco Gatti: La in Giappone. 1945-1955 (Stampatori. 1980).
Bernier. Chang & Ricketts: Le Japon: Problemes economiques et sociaux de
/'apres-guerre (Centre d'etudes de l'Asie de rEst. Univ. de Montreal.
1980).
Brett de Bary (trans.): Three Works by Nakano Shigeharu (Cornell. 1979).
James Townsend & Richard Bush (eds.): The People's Republic ofChina: A
Basic Handbook. Second Edition (The Asia Society. 198 I).
Ed Hammond: The Coming (jfGrace: An Illustrated Biographv (jfZhou Enlai
(Lancaster-Miller. 1980).
Ed Hammond: To t:mbrace the Moon; An Illustrated Biograph\' orMao Zedong
(Lancaster-Miller. 1980).
Freddy Braumann: Partdpation und Betriebsorglillisation in China (Brock
meyer. 1979).
Edmund S. K. Fung: The Militar\, Dimension of the Chinese Revolution (UBC
Press. 1981).
Elizabeth J. Perry: Rebels and Rel'Olurionaries ill North China. 1.'145-1945
(Stanford. 1980).
Thomas A. Breslin: China; American Catholicism. and the Missionary (Penn.
State. 1980).
Paul S. Ropp: Dissent in Earlv Modern China (Univ. of Michigan. 1981).
Robert Taylor: China's Intellectual Dilemma. 1949-1978 (UBC Press. 1981).
Theodore Hsi-en Chen: Chinese Education Since 1949 (Pergamon. 1981).
Hyung I. Kim: Fundamental Legal Concepts orChina and the West (Kennikat.
1981).
Raphael Israeli: Muslims in China (Scandinavian Inst. of Asian Studies. 1981).
N. H. Leon: Character Indexes ofModern Chinese(Scandinavian Inst. of Asian
Studies. 1981).
Leo A. Orleans (ed.): Science in Contemporary China (Stanford. 1980).
40
BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org

Learning about China
after the Revolution. .
. . . for the first time!
by Edward Friedman
How little we knew about China! It is almost as if we are
learning about it for the first time. This knowledge gap is most
manifest in the errors in what was once taken for granted. When
B. Michael Frolic edited and published sixteen refugee inter
views gathered before the death of Mao as Mao's People,
1
he
wanted to expose as frauds the accounts of short-term travelers
to China during the Cultural Revolution decade who reported
that China was free of crime, devoid of corruption and bursting
with vigorous democratic human relations. No doubt Frolic's
expose is accurate: crime, corruption and fearsome despotism
were rife. But Frolic insists that, in the oil industry, everyone
can see that politics did not interfere with production. In oil, he
says, it is obvious that technical expertise ran the show. (pp.
58-59) But is it? Did it?
It turns out that little could be further from the truth. The
politics of not importing needed oil equipment-the politics of
the Gang of Four-was very costly to the Chinese people.
When a drilling bit broke off, what were they to do? They lacked
the technical means to manufacture economically the equipment
needed to go down and pull out the ruined steel, replace the bit
and continue on. They wouldn't import what was needed. So
they wastefully abandoned the hole and the expensive drill and
moved the derrick elsewhere. In general, the politico
ideological opposition to benefiting from the world market was
extremely costly. The oil industry was typical; it was not, as
Frolic had mistakenly believed, above politics.
Yet some scholars even now defend the so-called Gang of
Four's position on technology imports.
2
Such analysts appa
rently do not understand the burden China placed on its own
people by wasting its scarce resources. They do not understand
that to slight the internationalist imperatives of industrialization
is to place a tax on China's very poor people. It exploits and
expropriates the Chinese people.
Most recently we have also been told that China's oil czars
ran an independent empire. It was politically corrupt in the usual
manner. The police, for example, could be forced away from
investigating a chauffeur from Daqing (the oil facility) who was
accused of sex offenses. Only years later. after a hideous rape
murder, could he be apprehended.
The difference between our knowledge of a smooth-run
ning China then and a bureaucratically corrupt one now is not a
measure ofdecline in China. Rather, it is a measure of increased
willingness of ruling groups in China to acknowledge and con
front the nation's real and long-hidden problems. We suddenly
seem smarter because in fact the real China is no longer so
hidden by gaudy, phony technicolor.
All the earlier, short, well-managed tours hid more than
they revealed. There was no way tour members could report
back, as any exchange student now can, about the day when
po stings come down for college seniors. It is like receiving a life
sentence. Once one enters a guild, a unit, a region, one may never
get out. It's virtual serfdom. It's like being a turnip caught in a
crack, the students say. People are to assemble to get the news.
If the time of announcement is postponed, the students buzz
about who it is with which connections who is pulling strings to
get a better assignment.
It was impossible to learn even such simple little things
when one had to go where the tour took one and talk with people
who had been briefed on what to say. In addition, people were
afraid to talk honestly and critically. 3 Files were kept on every
one. A bad report-even a suspicion written down-could
destroy one's career, jeopardize one's home, ruin one's chil
dren, marriage, jobs, friends, hope. And once one was suspect,
one could never get clear. "Like a Jew in Nazi Germany," Ruth
Lo writes in her memoir of the Cultural Revolution, "he was
labelled for life."4
Starting in mid-1978 as China began to deal with these
cancers, short stories blossomed in magazines and books about
young people who were wounded from such experiences, peo
ple who were, say, forced to abandon their family, to rat on
friends or to become criminals. 5 One driver I met in Beijing told
me of his pleasant experiences during the Cultural Revolution.
As so many other young people, he fled the political battlefield
and enjoyed a sight-seeing tour of China. But when he returned,
his tranquil home neighborhood had disappeared. The new
reality was mistrust, anger, locked doors, vengeance and crimi
nality. He no longer believed in any political ideals. Sylvia
Chan worries that these accounts of torture, murder, theft,
cynicism, delinquency, cruelty (using cigarettes to bum the
backs of people's heads), true as they are, stop short of probing
their deepest causes. To blame the Gang of Four, she writes,
permits a defense of continuing vested interests.6 True as that
criticism may be, it passes too quickly over the fact that it was
the policies of these Left Maoists which killed and wounded so
many millions of innocent people and ravaged all of China. The
image of the wounded young man which stays with me is the one
I came across who was a child when the Cultural Revolution
began, the one who rides on a bike now in circle after circle, his
face a blank, dumb stare. He couldn't see his parents for eleven
years. People wouldn't talk to him. His mind stopped growing.
He doesn't talk. He goes in circles and stares, one of millions of
the wounded.
Ruth Lo knows such horror well. She experienced it first
hand. Her husband was an innocent victim. No one would even
call a doctor for her husband when he suffered a heart attack. He
died.
Lo and other foreigners in China could not tell us the truth
earlier. This is not because they were liars. They were scared
and they were proud. Lo's son Mingteh told her, "Don't say
things to anyone that you wouldn't say to everyone." So, when
she had American visitors in 1972, she made certain they did not
hear about the Cultural Revolution's "ignorance, dogmatism
and chauvinism, " "the excesses and outrages, " "the system
atic degradation of China's scholars," and the cruel, irrational
separation of family members. "So they heard about financial
security, the free medical care, the low rent ... ' '7 That indeed
41
BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org
is what we heard.
The reports which reached us were varnished three times
over. The power-holders insisted on rosy accounts. Friends only
passed on the good. Visitors came home and translated that
already doubly varnished recounting into relevant language to
deal with our problems. The real China virtually disappeared.
China has not suddenly changed since Mao's death from a
revolutionary society as some ignorant sectarians believe.
Rather, a once projected image which was so distorted as to be a
lie is being replaced by real knowledge and genuine progress.
The present liberating tendencies are most welcome.
This process of movement from political lies to political
truths is embodied in the writings on China of French feminist
Claudie Broyelle. She knows one reason why people earlier on
were afraid to independently approach her and tell the truth. A
Central Committee directive stated: "Any person not specif
ically charged with meeting foreigners is forbidden to enter into
any relations with them. Anyone not submitting to these regula
tions ... will be punished for having dealings with
foreigners. "8
Following a 1971 trip to China, Broyelle wrote a book
published in 1973 (La Moitie du Ciel)9 pretending to describe
the unique freedom of Chinese women. Her 1980 volume,
China: A Second Look. took it all back. In fact, she now says
that while China in the Cultural Revolution era generally suf
fered the horrors of Stalinism, it was particularly murderous for
women. Broyelle describes how patriarchal Party policies drove
women to suicide.
Why then did Broyelle in 1973 argue that China was a
feminist utopia? She explains that she then saw political life as a
struggle in which one had to choose sides. She chose to further
the cause of the liberating left. A radical intellectual's job was
not to tell mere present-day truths but to identify with and
promote the potential forces of liberation in China and the
world.
I remember more than two decades ago going to a meeting
of some Freedom Riders who had just returned from Mississippi
where they had been jailed. They wanted to recruit more people
to become Freedom Riders. They told of life in jail. Camraderie
was high. People helped each other and sang freedom songs. It
was great. It also was a lie to keep people from becoming too
scared to join up. In fact the brave Freedom Riders had suffered
the humiliations of naked body searches, isolation, beatings and
the like. But for higher political purposes, it seemed alright to
lie, to describe a prison hell as a happy, egalitarian community.
So it was for Broyelle when she in her earlier book ration
alized away murder. Now she says she should have stood with
the female victims in that hell. She should have acted as the
early Mao did in his famous, early writing analyzing Ms. Zhao's
suicide. She should have concluded, as Mao did back then,
"Suicide is entirely determined by circumstances." 10 What she
should have explained is how Chinese society works such that it
kills women. She explains that now in 1980. It is sometimes
easy to forget that she is describing the Cultural Revolution
period.
To read Orville Schell's slim, non-book, "Watch Outfor
the Foreign Guests." is to probe none of these horrors of the
Cultural Revolution. Ignorant about China and angry about
America, Schell warns the Chinese against what he calls West
ernization. Almost as a first year graduate student of Chinese
history might, Schell argues that if you get western technology,
then you get a seamless cloth of western culture. Schell has a
42
constricted monochromatic view of the West. The Chinese do
not.
The Chinese know that the West also includes legal due
process and muckraking journalists, Shakespeare and Beetho
ven, oil drilling equipment and farm irrigation systems, Tolstoi
and Picasso, the blues and Sesame Street. The Chinese are
looking into workers' self-management in Yugoslavia and the
way Hungary handles consumer goods. They are translating and
evaluating all the best literature on what has gone wrong with
socialist states elsewhere. They are looking into the Czech
program for socialism with a human face, re-emphasizing the
democratic Lenin as does Roy Medvedev, debating the con
tributions of the Frankfurt school, analyzing dissections of the
horrors of Stalinism, evaluating Carlo, Nove, Amin, Gramsci
and so many others. This too is the West.
But Schell, apparently ignorant of the currents shaping
Chinese ideas today, II only sees China surrendering to Western
technological gimmicks such as Polaroid cameras. I remember
that when I saw people even in the foothills of Jiangxi spending
money on Japanese color televisions I worried that too much
scarce foreign exchange was being wasted on foreign lUXUry
items.
But the lovely Lo-Kindernon book, In the Eye of the
Typhoon. reports that television is experienced as liberation.
The Chinese people are poor and rooted. The transportation
system is weak and fragile. Seeing on TV something as straight
forward as travelogues about the Great Wall, Tibet, Buddhist
caves, etc., is an exciting adventure permitting Chinese to
capture some significantly larger part of their Chinese heritage.
Jet-setting Schell doesn't comprehend what it means to be poor
in China.
Actually, the Chinese government did first try to sell Chi
nese-made televisions to Chinese working people. I saw an
instance of the result on a wall poster outside a factory in
Wuhan. A worker complained that the hard-earned money spent
on his Chinese TV set was wasted. The set was a lemon. It was
exploitation of the proletariat.
The Chinese government then tried importing Hungarian
televisions. The reception, visual and popular, was no better. So
the go-ahead was given on importing from Japan until a factory
purchased from Japan could go into operation. Agreements
were signed with other places for co-production and technologi
cal improvement. Until China manufactures enough of its own
sets, the government places a many hundred percent lUXUry tax
on the item so that while the popular demand is almost met, at
the same time foreign exchange can be rationed and money (the
large tax) can be siphoned off for general reinvestment
purposes. 12
Schell, mining the ideology of the Gang, is appalled by
such economic calculus. He mocks newly-expanded peasant
markets which have brought the Chinese people more food and
earned peasants more income. Schell is scandalized that this
will permit some peasants to get richer before others. He seems
concerned not at all by decades of hunger.
Ruth Lo, on the other hand, knows better than to carry the
assumptions about food from rich America to China. She knows
that her daughter in Gansu lived "on millet porridge," her son
in rural Guangdong lived "on rice and pickles contributed by
charitable villagers. "13 Hunger was always on the mind and in
the stomach.
During all my years in China I was aware that everyone.
including myself, thought about food more or less con
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sciously all the time . ... Planning how to use the meat
ration tickets to best advantage would be the main topic of
family conversationfor hours. 14
But why should Schell focus on the non-existent issue of
capitalism when the real problem of food or power, status and
corrupt wealth has to do with too much statism, bureaucratism
and the lIke? The abused system of 'perks' and connections is
not capitalism. Broyelle et al. understand this. They write that
to those who want to hold on to and hide their power "it is
crucial that it should be capitalism which has been restored and
not that a new system of exploitation has been developed as a
result Qf State monopoly, that is, as a result of the Party. "15 In
describing this feudal, bureaucratic state, Lo notes how names
and titles in post-1949 China situate one in "socialist society"
just "as in the old extended family. "16 The "person in power
gives favors and face to his inferiors in return for loyalty and
favors" 171t is a formalized feudal statism.
Lo and Frolic find that this is not seen as corruption but as
the system. But there is, as Schell notes without comment, an
on-going campaign now against "privilege among officials. In
fact, new Letters to the Editor columns . . . are filled with
accusations against high-ranking Party-members and military
officials for using their influence to secure privileges to good
schooling, the best apartments, and cars." 18 Even a fruit seller
on a cold corner will, I found, when the fruit is in scarce supply,
try to save some and use the fruit to give to someone who has
something the fruit-seller wants in return. The unfortunate Chi
nese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) may have been given
capital for a building but that won't get the building up in
bureaucratic, non-capitalist China. Ask peasants for land to buy
and they ask what you have to give in return. And they don't
want books. Jobs for their children perhaps? Try to get help
from the Beijing City administration and hear complaints about
all those nasty articles CASS people write about the City ad
ministrators' anti-people privileges and red tape. The words are
never said, but it is clear what the city administratin wants
CASS to stop doing in return for help. It is difficult not to
conclude that even impersonal bureaucratic administration
would be a great boon in the feudalist-bureaucratic-socialist
system of China. The present government seems to understand
the systematic causes of abuse perfectly clearly. 19
None of this is to suggest that politics doesn't infuse much
of the present Chinese government's re-evaluation of the past.
Andrew Watson is absolutely right that it is not true that the
Gang of Four ran and ruined the Chinese economy from 1966 to
1976. He is right that powerful people at the state center as
sociated with Zhou Enlai' s new economic policies began to
reassert themselves already in 1969-1970.
20
The claims of the
post-Mao regime have to be scrutinized for political purposes.
The new government is insecure. It overstates its case, hoping to
win supporters. Many people cringe from joining or telling the
whole truth for fear that the nightmare may again return. Terror
haunts people's dreams.
The new books by Lo and Frolic and Broyelle and the
Chinese writers of the literature of The Wounded introduce us to
this nightmare. Schell and Bruger can't fathom it. They hold on
to their discredited dream as others hold on to other feudal
socialist monarchs, to Hoxha or Pol Pot or Stalin or Kim or
Fidel, all of whose states are even more narrowly feudal-bureau
cratic than is China's. What is needed is knowledge of how the
dream becomes a nightmare. It can happen again. It is tragic to
find foreign friends favoring the nightmare.
China has made great human gains in the last few years.
But the new openness and the beginnings of democratization in
China are opposed by many peasant nativists who hate and fear,
such as the one Orville Schell found sitting on a park bench. The
corpulent PLA officers whom Schell nicely ridicules worry
about the new government's attacks on their privileges. And the
nativist peasant identifies with the privileged soldier. They both
cite Mao and they both mistrust the urban and the intellectual.
There are powerful proto-fascist forces in China. The new
dream could give way to the old nightmare.
Should the democratic buds die, travelers again may be
able to visit China and listen to lies about a pure China marching
ever closer to classless communism. No longer will we be
pained as we are today with learning about a real place, a China
acknowledging and grappling with its real problems. People
who prefer to be inspired by thrice varnished empty tales of
perfection, people who don't want to read Lo and Frolic and
Broyelle and The Wounded will again be grateful. And once
again the wounds of darkness will rip across the life of the
Chinese people. *
Notes:
,. Mao's People, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1980.
2. Greg O'Leary, "China's Foreign Relations: The Reintegration of China into
the World Economy," in China Since the Gang ofFour (Bill Bruger, ed.; New
York, St. Martin's Press, 1980), Chapter 7.
3. One person tells Orville Schell, "I wouldn't tell a soul, except maybe my
closest girlfriend. I would just hide it inside me." Watch Out For the Foreign
Guests, China Encounters the West, New York, Pantheon, 1980, p. 96.
4. Ruth Earnshaw Lo and Katherine Kinderman, In the Eye ofthe Typhoon.
New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980, p. 273. For another accounting of
the cruelty of such Nazi-like labelling, cf. Schell, "Watch Out for the Foreign
Guests," pp. 129-138.
5. Some are translated in Lu Xinhua et al., The Wounded. Hong Kong, Chung
Hua Books, 1979.
6. China Since the Gang of Four, chapter 4, "The Blooming of 'Hundred
Flowers' and the Literature of the 'Wounded Generation.' "
7. Lo, In the Eye ofthe Typhoon, p. 205.
8. C. Broyelle et al., China: A Second Look. Atlantic Heights, New Jersey,
Humanities Press, 1980, p. 211.
9. Translated into English in 1977 as Women's Liberation in China.
10. China: A Second Look, p. 31.
II. Schell's Chinese interviewers are much influenced by these new currents.
The first is shaped by the literature of the wounded. "We were like wounded
children. No one would acknowledge our wounds since it was politically
incorrect to be wounded." (p. 10 I) The last is shaped by an influential essay by
Yu Guangyuan, head of the Marxism-leninism-Mao Zedong Thought Institute.
arguing that "the object of socialism [is] to get the necessary goods for life into
the hands of the people who need them . . ." (p. 161) Schell seems ignorant of
the fact that his Chinese friend is reciting present-day Party ideology.
12. Popular though it is, I still think it costs too much foreign exchange. ARen
min ri bao commentator has stated that "over-importation of TVs has already
hurt China's machine-building and electrical industries" and therefore had to be
reduced. (Feb. II, 1981, p. I)
13. In the Eye ofthe Typhoon, p. 241.
14. In the Eye of the Typhoon, p. 283. Ignorant of this reality, the foreign
analyst all too often favors pure theory. As Charles Bettelheim argued "line,"
so Bill Bruger (Chapter 4, "Rural Policy" in China Since The Gang ofFour)
states, "I have relied on a political economy textbook ...." (p. 167)
15. China: A Second Look, p. 224.
16. In the Eye ofthe Typhoon, p. 39.
17. Ibid., p. 55. Frolic, Mao's People, has many such instances.
18. "Watch Outfor the Foreign Guests," p. /05.
19. The luxury-loving, wasteful mayor of Beijing was replaced after this was
written.
20. Chapter 3, "Industrial Development and the Four Modernisations" in
China Since the Gang ofFour.
43
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"The Four Modernizations"
and Chinese Policy on Women
by Phyllis Andors
Introduction
The quest for economic development and social change
that has characterized the Third W orId since W orId War II has
not been an unmixed blessing. 1 The adopted development stra
tegies have entailed enonnous social and human costs that have
been, most often, distributed unequally throughout society.
Women, especially those in the peasant or urban lower classes,
tend to shoulder a disproportionate share of these costs
2
as
female laborpower has figured prominently in the labor mobili
zation strategies of countries as different in their approach to
development as Malaysia
3
and China.
4
For women, participa
tion in social production outside the home had usually meant a
longer workday as their traditional responsibilities as wives and
mothers could not be set aside and social services to relieve them
of these time-consuming chores were either non-existent or too
expensive. Moreover, the kinds of employment available and
the conditions under which women work militate against their
using their employment as a basis for creating economic and
political power or even greater social independence. This failure
to meet the basic needs of women that marked much of the Third
World's development planning stood in marked contrast to the
social experiments of the Chinese in the post-Cultural Revolu
tion years.
From 1969 until the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 eco
nomic development strategy was characterized by a serious
contradiction between the need to rapidly expand the forces of
production and the need to alleviate the inequalities of past
development and more equitably distribute throughout Chinese
society the social and human costs involved in modernizing this
still poor and technologically backward nation. The very real
economic contradictions that resulted from the dual foci of
development planning were compounded by the complexity of
bitter and often divisive political issues left unresolved by the
Cultural Revolution. It was within this dynamic and politically
charged atmosphere that the traditional mechanistic approach to
women's liberation was abandoned. The demands for sexual
equality gradually achieved some legitimacy as it became clear
that traditional female roles and attitudes towards women were
extremely important to the perpetuation of both those institu
tions and that ideology that were at issue in the debates of the
Cultural Revolution. And, in the "Criticize Confucius and Lin
Piao" campaign of the early to mid-1970s the specific needs of
women received an unprecedented amount of attention in the
national media with the result that many of the experiments that
emerged in these years contained the potential for creating
material conditions and social relationships that could support
women's progress.
The thrust of Chinese policy towards women suggested an
attempt to resolve the contradictions between women's sexual
roles within the family and their participatory roles in socio
economic production and political decisionmaking. Favored by
the ideological climate of these years, policies such as the use of
"xia-xiang" [youth working in the countryside], rural indus
trialization, expansion of educational opportunities, develop
ment of rural health facilities, birth control, development of
street industry in urban areas, etc. all sought to lessen the
severity of the real structural constraints that made women's
demands appear too costly. And while many of these policies
were met with opposition and others were implemented only
partially or only in some parts of the country, throughout this
period economic growth was perceived as the means through
which political and social goals were to be achieved.
Mao Zedong' s death in September 1976 and the subse-
I. See Charles K. Wilbur. ed., The Political Economy of Development and
Underdevelopment (New York: Random House, 1973) and Giovanni Arrighi
and John S. Saul. Essays on the Political Economy of Africa (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1973).
2. See Irene Tinker and Michele Bo Bramsen, Women and World Development
(Overseas Development Council, 1976) and Ester Boserup, Woman's Role in
Economic Development (New York: SI. Martin's Press, 1970).
3. Southeast Asia Chronicle and Pacific Research, Special Joint Issue:
"Changing Role of S.E. Asian Women," SRC Issue No. 66 and PSC, Vol. 9.
No. 5-6.
4. See Elizabeth Croll, Feminism and Socialism in China (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul. 1978) and Phyllis Andors. "Social Revolution and Women's
Emancipation: China During the Great Leap Forward," Bulletin ofConcerned
Asian Scholars, Vol. 7, No. I (1975), pp. 35-42.
44
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quent arrest of the so-called "Gang of Four" abruptly changed
the configuration of political forces and policy priorities that had
characterized post-Cultural Revolution China. The Anti
Confucian campaign which had shown strong sensitivity to the
problems of women rapidly drew to a close. News of women's
achievements and growing participation in production at all
levels receded, but women figured prominently in supporting
the new leadership's vociferous denunciation of the Gang, 5 and
this continued for the remainder of 1976 and well into 1978. The
Hua Guofeng-Deng Xiaoping coalition seemed preoccupied
with consolidating control and eliminating opposition, and not
until November, 1978, did a more or less comprehensive expla
nation of and theoretical justification for the new development
approach, called the "four modernizations," appear in an offi
cial publication.
6
The publication of certain political documents and the
announcement of new policies indicate a clear departure from
previous official policies toward women, and also mark a
change in the Party's theoretical understanding of the "woman
question. " Since official policy and theoretical understanding
shape the context within which real problems are resolved, it is
to these matters that we tum first.
Political and Ideological Developments
A new approach to the "woman question" in China was
signalled by the Fourth National Women's Federation Congress
in September 1978. The National Federation had been dis
banded in the early years of the Cultural Revolution, and had
been politically moribund ever since, at least on the national
level. However, local women's organizations appear to have
been rebuilt and were quite active in the early 1970s. This was
often the result of efforts to mobilize women for production and
5. For typical examples, see "Guangxi Women's Rally Denounces Jiang
Qing." Nanning Guangxi Regional Service, November II, 1965; "Gansu
Women's Group Condemns Jiang Qing," Lanzhou, Gansu Provincial Service,
January 27, 1977; and "Anhui Women's Federation Criticizes Former
Leader," Hefei, Anhui Provincial Service. December 9, 1977.
6. The "four modernizations" are industry, agriCUlture, science and technol
ogy and the military. A visit to Chinese factories and farms in the summer of
1978 revealed that the still virulent campaign against the "Gang" meant little
attention was paid to developing and propagandizing new policies. See Xue
Muqiao's articles, "Observe Economic Laws, Speed Up the Four Moderniza
tions," Beijing Review, November 10, 17, 24. For a critical analysis of Hu's
theory, see "China: New Theories for Old," Monthly Review. May 1979, pp.
1-21. For a debate on the implications of the emerging new policy see Charles
Bettleheim and Neil Burton, China After Mao (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1979).
7. Kang Keqing, "Chairman Mao Leads Us To Take the Road of Complete
Emancipation of Women, " Renmin Ribao. September 22, 1977.
8. See Nym Wales, Red Dust (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952).
Throughout the 1950s Women ojChina devoted a section to child-care. Kang
was a frequent contributor.
9. " ... women urgently needed revolution but also that they are a decisive
force in the success or failure of the revolution."
10. The Chinese traditionally observe International Women's Day with numer
ous articles relating to women.
II. "Give the Reins to the Tremendous Role of Women in Achieving the Four
Modernizations," Hong Qi NO.3. 1978, Beijing, NCNA, March 7, 1978.
12. See, for example, "Beijing Housewives Labour, Men Do Housework,"
Beijing NCNA, April 9. 1976.
13. See Phyllis Andors, "Politics of Chinese Development: The Case of
Women, 1960-1966," Signs 2, No. I (Autumn 1976), pp. 89-119.
In the "Criticize Confucius" campaign of the earlier
1970s, women's interests were clearly identified as
class interests even while sexual oppression was ac
knowledged. Peasant and worker class unity was
stressed. The new calls for national unity stress the
generic interests of all women and neglect the question
of class.
study because local development plans had required female
labor. The convening of the re-established Women's Federa
tion reinforced a shift in Party policy that had already been
signalled by the publication of an article in People's Daily in
September 1977 by the veteran female cadre, Kang Keqing. 7
The re-emergence of Kang as spokeswoman for the wom
en's movement was in itself a harbinger of change. Although
her revolutionary credentials date back to the pre-' 49 period
when she led a detachment offemale soldiers, in post-' 49 China
she had been most closely associated with the Children's De
partment of the Women's Federation. 8 Now in her eighties, she
was part of the grand old guard of the women's movement
which included Cai Chang, Deng Yingchao, and Song Ching
ling. All of these older women were leaders in the newly
re-established national Woman's Federation.
Kang's People's Daily article was a clear statement of
re-orientation for the officially supported women's movement
in the post-Mao period. Although the rhetoric of the Cultural
Revolution was used, what was really stressed was the pre
Cultural Revolution struggles in the pre-1949 liberated areas
and in the early 1950s.
9
The analysis focused on the supportive
tasks undertaken by women in these periods and on the impor
tance of the Marriage Law as a guarantor of female rights. The
past was presented as a model for the present and future. Kang
concluded by exhorting women to do their part in the "four
modernizations." What that part was to be became clearer as
March 8, International Women's Day, approached in 1978.
10
Articles which appeared in the press on that day clarified
the extent to which women's roles were being re-evaluated in
light of the new strategy for Chinese development. The themes
were clear. Even though women held up "the other half of the
sky, " with important contributions to socialist construction,
their release from "backbreaking manual labor and tedious
housework" was to be gradual. In the meantime, a double
burden was clearly stated.
Women workers, commune members and women scientists
and technicians need to work hard and study, but they have to
spend a considerable portion o/their time tending to house
work and children. II
The clear identification of women with familial responsibilities
and the lack of discussion concerning male participation in these
matters and a redefinition of the sexual division of labor con
trasted sharply with publicity given to precisely these kinds of
innovations a scant two years ago. 12 Images of the 1960s con
tinued to appear. \3 By the time the Women's Congress opened
in September 1978 any lingering doubts about the shift in policy
toward women were dispelled.
Although twenty years encompassing the Great Leap For
ward and the Cultural Revolution had passed since the last
45
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Congress, the leadership of the re-established organization in no
way reflected the vast changes that had occurred in China. Cai
Chang presided over the opening of the Fourth National Wo
men's Federation Conference as she had over the Third. Mem
bers of the Presidium included Song Chingling, Deng Ying
chao, Kang Keqing, Dong Bian, and Lo Qiong, 14 names which
could also be found on the federation's leading organs in the
1950s. Many of these women, prominent in the 1950s, rep
resented the urban-based intelligentsia and national bour
geoisie. Female workers and peasants constituted only 20.4
percent of the delegates in attendance at the national conven
tion, in spite of the fact that they were a much larger percentage
of local federation organizations. IS
Wang Dong, representing the Central Committee of the
Party, set the tone for the Congress in his general remarks to the
plenary session. As the Party always had, Wang viewed the
Women's Federation as a transmission belt between the Party
and the female masses. He identified the major task for the
federation in this period as the mobilization of women in support
of the new development policies. In the national effort to raise
the scientific and cultural level of the Chinese people he re
marked: "We should consider women and train a certain per
centage ofthem. "16 [Emphasis added.] Following Wang Dong,
Women are responsible for implementing fertility con
trol policy as cadres of women's organizations, bare
foot doctors and clinic personnel, but they have little
input into the policy-making process. Insofar as the
new policies reinforce the role of the famOy as an
economic unit and undermine the importance of col
lective production outside the famOy, traditional fe
male roles have received new reinforcement. In this
manner, the present polley is consistent with previous
efforts.
Kang Keqing's work report, clearly the most important docu
ment of the Congress, elaborated on these and other issues.
The major thrust of Kang' s speech suggested attitudes and
policies that in recent years had been perceived as major ob
stacles to women's progress. As the key national organization in
any matter dealing with female rights and opportunities, the
Federation's analysis of women's tasks under the "four mod
ernizations" in post-Mao China is not to be ignored. Four main
themes predominated in Kang's report. 17
( I) women as rear service workers;
(2) female responsibilities to home and family;
(3) a united front policy emphasizing unity with women of
the national bourgeoisie; and
(4) the need for family planning.
In contrast to the post-Cultural Revolution attitude that
"whatever men comrades can do, women comrades can do,"
Kang now clearly envisioned a secondary and supportive role:
Women form the main force in logistics. Among them are
women childcare andeducation workers. salesclerks. cooks.
street sweepers. nurses. barefoot doctors and other service
personnel who are making extraordinary contributions in
their ordinary posts. IS
Instead of emphasizing the acquisition of new technical skills
necessary for jobs in the modern sector, the report suggested
harnessing the traditional skills of women in a developing net
work of childcare institutions, public a n t e e n s ~ sewing, laundry
and other services primarily located in the collective sector.
Reinforcing this service role were female responsibilities for
household chores and childcare in general, whether in or out of
the public or collective sector. Although men were urged to help
in these matters, and it was even argued that "men and women
should be equal in the home with housework rationally propor
tioned between husband and wife, "19 there was no doubt that
the ultimate responsibility for these matters was female.
The problems that usually concern women comrades are the
burdens ofchildren and household chores. Should we blame
them because of their burdens? When you blame them for
having children and therefore. being cumbersome. you
should listen to your conscience and ask yourselves whether
you have helped them solve their problems . ... We should
understand that manning kindergartens and nurseries well
and doing a good job in support work are by no means
unrelated to production but are beneficial to promoting pro
duction.
2o
It was difficult to see how "equality" in the home could be
reconciled with the policy that put only women there or in a
"supporting" role while the main responsibility for production
outside the home remained male. Even employing the majority
of women as service personnel in the collective sector outside
the home put women in an unequal position. Wages, fringe
benefits, and social status in this sector were not comparable to
that received in the state sector. Moreover, the policies of the
post-Cultural Revolution period were that women should be
recruited in all sectors of the economy, and indeed women
workers had made substantial gains in other than service
oriented industries. 21
When both women's productive and personal responsibil
ities centered around household management and parenting, it
was not surprising that Kang Keqing identified the interests of
women in China as the resolution of those problems relating to
marriage and family. Thus, it appears that a major focus of the
Women's Federation's efforts will be directed against indivi
duals who threaten "harmonious" and "democratic" family
development. Strikingly absent from Kang Keqing's report and
other conference documents was discussion of the need for
women to struggle against wider historical, social, and eco
nomic forces that perpetuated female inequality in Chinese
society.
From the beginning of the Cultural Revolution until the
ouster of the "Gang of Four," the themes of class struggle in a
socialist society dominated political discussion. The present
leadership has instead stressed the united front policy, empha
sizing unity for the purpose of promoting economic production.
The Women's Federation reflected the new policy in two ways.
First, female workers and peasant delegates to the national
congress made up only one fifth of the total number of dele
gates. Second, the Congress stressed the unity of women of all
classes, most especially including the national bourgeoisie.
Working women and women revolutionary intellectuals
should be relied on to unite all women patriots. including
those from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao and the women
46
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and all their family members ofOverseas Chinese . ... The
principle of "unity, education and remoulding" should be
followed among the women ofthe national bourgeoisie. 22
In the "Criticize Confucius" campaign of the earlier
1970s, women's interests were clearly identified as class in
terests even while sexual oppression was acknowledged. Peas
ant and worker class unity was stressed. The new calls for
national unity stress the generic interests of all women and
neglect the question of class.
The last major theme in Kang's report was the importance
of family planning in the new period. This theme quickly began
to dominate most of the literature about women. The gravity of
the issues and the measures adopted by the Chinese to limit
popUlation growth demand that we return to this issue later. For
now, let it suffice to say that both population control and women
in the labor force were recognized as significant variables in the
relationship between capital accumulation and investment.
Lower numbers of children meant less expenditures necessary
on schools, childcare, medical and other services. Kang's report
discussed both the pressing economic reasons for birth control
and the necessity to protect the health of women and children. 23
The documents of the Fourth National Congress bear strik
ing similarities to the previous congress held in 1957. The
continuity of leadership was seen in the membership in the new
Presidium, and both congresses stressed the united front, house
hold responsibilities, marriage and family planning. Yet China
was not the same as it was twenty years before. Complex and
rapid economic development had occurred. Collectivization
and the ideological campaigns of the Great Leap Forward and
Cultural Revolution substantially changed the economic and
political landscape. Women had been educated, trained and
recruited for jobs in the agricultural, industrial, and collective
sectors of the economy. The superficial likeness of the pre
Cultural Revolution period and the late 1970s should not be
allowed to obscure the vast changes that have occurred. The
contradiction between the new attitudes of the period and past
progress was reflected by the Eleventh Party Congress where
women's representation in the central Party organization, al
though somewhat diminished, was clearly evident.
24
More
over, the prominent female Party members in the 1970s were
still around: Wu Gueixian, Lu Yulan, Hao Jianxiu, Guo Feng
lian and others.
Birth Control Policy and Women's Roles
The demand for birth control has always been associated
with the women's movement simply because it would decrease
the centrality of the traditional housewife-mother role, thereby
creating the opportunity for work and study. In the post-Mao
period, there was in fact a tremendous national effort to support
birth control and limit population growth. The goal is to reduce
population growth to less than I % per year by the early I 980s .
State support for family planning is officially recognized in the
1978 Constitution, and has been backed by extensive press
coverage of the issue,25 and rather severe reward and punish
ment systems developed throughout China. The widespread
development of local programs and the enornlOUS publicity
given them has created the idea that birth control is a new policy
under the "four modernizations." Indeed, the Hua-Deng lead
ership has charged that the deposed "Gang of Four," and, by
implication, official policy during and after the Cultural Revo
lution opposed both birth control and late marriage, severely
impeded implementation of birth control programs, and com
promised public health efforts generally. 26 Although the in
tensity and scope of the present effort-combined with a new
system of financial and material rewards and punishments-are
a departure from previous policy, family planning was an in
tegral part of the development policies emerging from the Cul
tural Revolution; significant, though perhaps scattered progress
was being made.
A mass campaign against early marriage and unplanned
births unfolded in rural areas in the early 1970s, reinforced by a
developing network of health services using many "xia-xiang"
students in the countryside. The development of collective
sideline production and rural industry which utilized female
labor also had an impact on the birth rate.
27
It is this larger
context which provided a set of integrated policies to support
birth control that is presently being re-structured by the "four
modernizations" and in which the approach to family planning
has assumed a new prominence. Birth control policy is now a
separate and distinct policy and the previous set of rural policies
is changing dramatically.
The general expansion of health-care services, especially
in rural areas in the post-Cultural Revolution period, benefited
women in several ways. 28 Increased participation by women in
the health care delivery system in the early 1970s substantially
increased the level of health care available to women. More
14. Dong Bien was the pre-Cultural Revolution editor of Zhongguo Funu. She
was purged in the Cultural Revolution.
15. "Top Leaders Attend Opening," (Beijing) NCNA, September 8. 1978.
16. See Wang Dong's speech, (Beijing) NCNA. September 9, 1978.
17. Kang Keqing, "Four Modernizations Discussed," (Beijing) NCNA. Sep
tember 11, 1978. See other reports of Kang's speech in Beijing, NCNA.
September 9, 1978; and "Lofty Tasks of the Women's Movement in China in
the New Period," Beijing NCNA. September 18, 1978.
18. Beijing NCNA. September 18,1978.
19. Beijing NCNA. September 12, 1978.
20. "People's Daily Praises Women's Congress," Beijing NCNA. September
17. 1978.
2 I. See note 12.
22. Beijing NCNA. September 12, 1978.
23. Beijing NCNA. September 12, 1978 and September 18, 1978.
24. Women constituted 26 out of the 223 members of the Presidium. 14 of the
20 I members of the Central Committee, and 23 of the 132 alternate members of
the Central Committee. Beijing Review, No. 35, August 26, 1977, pp. 14-16.
25. See NCNA. March 7, 1978. Also "Inner Mongolia Planned Parenthood,"
Huhehot, Inner Mongolia Regional Service, July 21, 1978; "Sichuan Planned
Parenthood Meeting Opened," Chengdu Provincial Service, August 20, 1978;
"Fujian Holds Meeting on Planned Parenthood," Fuzhou, Fujian Provincial
Service, September 3. 1978; and "National Planned Parenthood Conference
Held in Beijing," Beijing, Xinhua, January 26, 1979; among others.
26. See "Shanghai Holds Planned Parenthood Meeting." Shanghai City Serv
ice. September 16, 1978; and "Hunan Opens Congress on Planned Parent
hood." Changsha, Hunan Service, November II, 1978.
27. For a discussion of the growth in the female component of the labor force in
the countryside see Marina Thorberg. "Chinese Employment Policy in 1949-78
with Special Emphasis on Women in Rural Production," Chinese Economy
Post-Mao. Vol. I, Policy and Performance. Joint Economic Committee of
Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1978).
28. See David Lampton, "Economics, Politics and the Determinants of Policy
Outcomes in China: Post-Cultural Revolution Health Policy," The Australian
and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, Vol. 12, No. I, February 1976. pp.
43-50.
47
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were practicing birth control. At a Nanjing Textile Mill prior to
the Cultural Revolution births numbered in the hundreds but in
The "xia-xiang" of educated youth to the Chinese
countryside ... was clearly one ofthe most controver
sial but innovative aspects of development strategy in
the Maoist period. Whatever the problems raised by
this policy, it was clear that the introduction of urban
educated women into the countryside challenged tra
ditional attitudes about female capabilities.
important in the long run, it fostered the increasing integration
of women into the labor force and helped raise the status of
women into the labor force and helped raise the status of women
as they occupied respected professional jobs. The number of
women in medical schools rapidly increased. 29 Many of these
graduates staffed the gynecological and obstetrics departments
of urban hospitals, and participated in the "xia-xiang" of medi
cal personnel and facilities to the Chinese countryside where
they helped rural women in medical matters including childbirth
and birth control.
As purveyors of a badly needed service, women doctors,
nurses and paramedics encountered less opposition than the
younger and less experienced "xia-xiang" female students.
Their acceptance by local rural communities helped these stu
dents as well as local women by reinforcing new public roles for
women. At the same time, these urban women participated in
the national effort to reduce the inequalities between urban and
rural areas by reorienting the national network of medical facil
ities to service those most in need. 30
In Chinese cities, the network of health care did not end
with the hospitals which organizationally were administered by
the State. Most cities are divided into neighborhoods and lanes
and the growth of health stations at these levels staffed by
neighborhood health workers or Red Guard doctors was an
increasingly common phenomenon.
31
These local health facil
ities were run by the Residents' Committees and, though sepa
rate from the local hospitals, apparently worked in close coop
eration with them. Medical policy set by municipal authorities
was implemented by these local health workers. The Red Guard
doctors became involved in a significant birth control program,
illustrating a definite attempt to reduce population growth in the
post-Cultural Revolution period.
The birth control or family planning campaign was part ofa
wider campaign against the "feudal practice" of early mar
riage.
32
Contraception, planned births, and late marriage were
all identified as contributions to building a socialist society as
well as factors in women's liberation. The Red Guard doctor,
most often a former housewife who had been given one to three
months training, was responsible for the distribution of con
traceptive devices, which had been free since 1970.
33
The success of efforts to limit births appears to have been
quite significant in the urban areas, although data is frag
mentary. The high rate of contraceptive practice resulted in a
natural annual increase rate by 1974 of 6-7 thousand in Shanghai
and 13 thousand for Beijing. 34 A municipal campaign in Suzhou
factories found comparable results in individual plants. At the
Suzhou Dongfanghong Silk Mill, the birth rate dropped 11.4
percent from 1971 to 1972 and atthe Xiadong Machine Tools and
Electric Appliance Factory, 91 percent of the women workers
1970 there were only 65 and in 1972,42. This particular factory
experienced a rather intensive birth control campaign, reaching
women workers through their study groups. The goal of a 2
percent or less popUlation growth rate per annum was con
sidered desirable and there were claims that by 1974 Beijing's
rate had dropped to I. 17 percent and Shanghai's to 0.6 percent.
The political pressures maintained by the institutionalization of
birth control work by Residents' Committees and reinforced by
the increasing opportunities for female employment were im
portant variables in the solution to limit population growth. 35
The progress made in Chinese cities was not, however,
matched in the vast countryside, where even in the 1970s
decisions to allocate scarce investment resources to health facil
ities still came into conflict with the more immediate demands
of production, especially at the team and brigade levels. As one
brigade in 1973 complained: "We are already fully occupied in
production and yet we have to grasp the work in women's
disease. " The large-scale establishment of cooperative medical
systems at the commune level after the Cultural Revolution was,
however, important. 36
29. See E. Gray Diamond. "Medical Education in China." Asia. No. 26.
Summer 1972. p. 68. He remarked. "Almost 50o/r of the students in medical
school are women."
30. See "Beijing Obstetrics Hospital: A Modem Gynecological Hospital."
Wenhlli bao. March n. 1972. in JPRS Translations on People's Republic of
China. No. 229. p. 15. for discussion of mobile medical teams sent to rural areas
and the training of barefoot doctors by urban doctors.
31. See "Family Planning in China." (Shanghai) NCNA. March 5. 1973. in
SCMP 5335. which claims that in Shanghai alone. 30.000 neighborhood health
workers have been trained since the Cultural Revolution. See also Victor Sidel.
"Serve the People: Medical Care in the People's Republic of China. " Asia. No.
26. Summer 1972. pp. 3-30. in which he describes the medical care provided at
the lane health stations. which generally serve up to 3000 residents.
32. For two good accounts of the success of fertility control in China. see
Tameyoshi Katagiri. "A Report on the Family Planning Program in the People's
Republic of China." Studies in Familv Planninf?, Vol. 4. No.8. 1974. and Pi
Chao-chen. "China's Population Program at the Grassroots Level." For an
historical perspective on the population question with especially good statistics
for the 1950s. see Leo A. Orleans. EI'erv Fifth Child: The Population (}fChina
(Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1972).
33. Victor Sidel. "Serve the People." Asia No. 26 (Summer 1972). p. 12.
"The Red Guard doctor makes a monthly visit to the house of every woman of
childbearing age within the neighborhood and discusses her menstrual period
and the method of contraception she is using. ,. See also Ruth Sidel. Families of
Fengsheng (New York: Penguin Books. 1974). Also see Pi-chao Chen.
"China's Population Program at the Grassroots Level." in Studies in Family
Planning, p. 2 19: Chen claims Premier Zhou stated' 'For the past two years. the
government has provided free planned birth services of all kinds. in order to
facilitate the practice of planned birth."
34. Reported by Pi-chao Chen. "China's Population Program atthe Grassroots
Level." p. 220. and by Victor Side!. "Serve the People." p. 14. Also Tame
yoshi Katigori. "A Report on the Family Planning Program in the Peoples'
Repuhlic of China. " in ibid.
35. Jiangsu Municipality Coordinated Planned Parenthood Work." (Beijing)
NCNA, September 10, 1973. Also see Tameyoshi Katigori, op. cit.. p. 217: and
Han Su-yin. "Family Planning in China." New York Times editorial page.
September 1974. For a general discussion of factors influencing fertility man
agement. see Janet Salaff. "Institutionalized Motivation for Fertility Limita
tion." in Marilyn Young. ed . Women in China. Michigan Papers in Chinese
Studies. No, 15 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. 1973). pp. 93-145.
36. The quotation is from "Actively Prevent and Cure Women's Diseases.
Protectthe Women Labor Force." RMRB. March 13. 1973. in SCMP 5340. pp.
173-76. Provincial radio broadcasts. 1969-72. constantly cited the establish
ment of cooperative medical systems in communes and at the county level. For
48
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The communes assumed the burden of more expensive
care while the brigade established less costly clinics and teams
concentrated on training barefoot doctors. The national effort to
develop rural health services went beyond commune hospitals
and training paramedics. 37 Capital construction budgets at the
county' level contributed to building medical schools where they
could be most responsive to the local needs. Maternity and
gynecological care was often considered an important aspect of
the new facilities. Individual provinces, communes and bri
gades differed markedly in the quality and extent of medical
care offered to the rural popUlation. The overall development of
rural medical facilities was related to the progress of economic
development generally.38 But nevertheless, in post-Cultural
Revolution China, medical care in general was a politically
important issue,39 as was the question of family planning.
The demand for family planning, long associated with the
women's movement, acquired new support and legitimacy with
the expansion of general health services in the countryside. The
idea that unbridled population growth endangered socialist con
struction was increasingly publicized. Birth control work, while
still largely the responsibility of a woman cadre (most often the
head of the local women's association), was increasingly por
trayed as something that demanded male cooperation. Com
mune Committees on Planned Birth Work usually included
male and female members who shared the responsibility for
supervising and coordinating the work on planned births.40
Here, as in other matters, the Dazhai Brigade was portrayed as a
model, because at Dazhai the campaign for planned births had
succeeded in spite ofconsiderable opposition. It can be assumed
that similar forms of opposition were operative in the myriad
other teams and brigades of rural China.
At the beginning of the family planning propaganda pro
gram, there was little positive response because ofthe mis
givings clouding the minds ofthe women. But Comrade Song
Uying, member of the Party branch and Chairman of the
Women's Congress, broke the ice by taking the contraceptive
measure first herself, saying, "this is not merely for reducing
the number of children and my family burden, but also for
enabling one to study, work and labor more successfully,
thus making great contributions to the revolution." By now,
98% of the men and women of our brigade who are able to
produce offspring have joined the family planning program.
This has enabled more and more women to participate in
collective productive labor. 41
The Dazhai approach suggested that a successful program
of family planning had to have the active support of men, had to
be reinforced by the participation of women in collective pro
duction and by active female leadership, and had to be moti
vated by the desire to contribute to a national effort at socialist
production and revolution. Here was the crux of the matter, for
by 1974 the ability to participate in family planning was not a
matter of availability of contraceptives. Even remote villages
could be supplied with anyone or a combination of the follow
ing methods of contraception: pills, IUD, male condoms, dia
phragms, and injections. Sterilization and abortions were also
widely used.
42
Thus, Dazhai's experience suggested that the educational
and motivational work done by women cadres in rural areas was
as significant in the gradual but steady acceptance of birth
control as the availability of particular contraceptive devices.
The organization of study groups, a development of the Pi Lin
It is under collectivized production, especially above
the team level, that women appear to have made sig
nificant progress in gaining wage parity, educational
opportunities, and developing political leadership.
example. Zhao-yuan County Hospital. Shandong. trained doctors from founeen
communes to perfonn "four types of family-planning operations." Cinan.
Shandong Provincial Service. June 26. 1972.
37. See "Genghao di fahui funii laodong Ii di zuoyong." Hong Qi. No.3.
1973. pp. 43-45. The 10th Brigade in Judong Xian. Jiangsu, was commended
for paying attention to women's needs by training midwives and barefoot
doctors specializing in women's illnesses. Women's needs were considered
equal to men's under the principle "Today there is no difference, men and
women are alike, whatever men can do, women can also do." See also Anhur
Galston, Daily Life in People's China (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co.,
1973) on the Marco Polo Commune. The commune runs a hospital while the
brigades run clinics. Women staff members numbered 6 of7 atthe brigade level.
And see Chu Li and Tien Chieh-yun, in chapter 13, "Medical and Health
Services," Inside a People's Commune (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press,
1973). pp. 194-208. Chiliying Commune's brigade local health care was also
dependent on barefoot doctors.
Whether or not the expansion .of rural health programs was a result of
decentralization remains an open question. See the provocative debate between
Audrey Donnithorne and Nicholas Lardy in the China Quarterly. No. 66, June
1976, pp. 328-355. While disagreeing about the impact of decentralization on
the central government's ability to control resources, both agree on the increased
availability of health, education and welfare services generally.
38. "Honan Area Works to Raise Level of Rural Medical Service," (Beijing)
NCNA. August 8, 1971. This county also had 11,000 "xia-xiang" medical
workers with 5,500 pieces of equipment. Also see: Joshua Hom, Awav With All
Pests (New York: Monthly Review Press. 1969); "Shenxi Medical School
Aids Peasants in Countryside," (Beijing) NCNA. October20, 1971; the moving
of Zhongshan Medical College to rural Guangdong. "Look To Rural Areas To
Start A Socialist Medical College," Guangming Ribao. June 22. 1971, p. 4;
Victor Sidel, "Serve the People"; and "Development of Medical Treatment,
Health Services in Guangdong," Zhongguo Xinwen (China's New Culture),
Beijing, November II. 1972, p. I, translated in JPRS Translations on Com
munist China, No. 223. Finally see Lampton, "Economics. Politics and the
Detenninants of Policy Outcome in China: Post-Cultural Revolution Health
Policy," especially Tables I and II, pp. 44 and 46.
39. See Mao Zedong, "Instructions on Public Health Work." February 1970,
JPRS Translations on Communist China, No. 49826, No. 90, p. 24; "Fight for
Women's Better Health," RMRB. March 3, 1971, in SCMP 4859, pp. 86-90;
"Medical Network Protects Health of Women and Children," (Beijing) NCNA.
March 8. 1973; and"Actively Prevent and Cure Women's Diseases, Protectthe
Women Labor Force."
40. For a report on the progress of Liaoning women, see Shenyang, Liaoning
Provincial Service, August 20, 1973. In Yunnan binh control was an imponant
issue at the women's provincial congress; see Kunming, Yunnan Provincial
Service, March 17, 1972, for Jiangxi's progress in binh control. Also see
Pi-chao Chen, op. cit . p. 223.
41. "Advance Continuously Along Chainnan Mao's Proletarian Public Health
Line." GMRB. September 29, 1971, p. 3.
42. For an anicle with some extremely interesting data on the Chinese ability to
manufacture and distribute the most sophisticated oral contraceptives, see Carl
Djerassi. "Some Observations on Current Fenility Control in China," China
Quarterly. No. 57, January-March 1974, pp. 40-63. Djerassi's findings dispute
the conclusions of such Western population analysts as Leo Orleans and Janet
Salaff.
43. See "Fogang Xian, Guengdong Province, Strengthens Leadership Over
Women's Work," RMRB. September 24, 1971. in SCMP 4991, pp. 150-151;
see article by Bien Fenjing in RMRB. October 5. 1970; Lanzhou Gansu Provin
cial Service, February 10, 1972; and see Changsha, Hunan Provincial Service,
September 8. 1969.
49
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Pi Gong (Anti-Lin Piao and Confucius Campaign), especially
among those women who did not work and were probably most
in need of contraception, was considered crucial to carrying out
the tasks of women's work.43 These groups attempted to deal
with the underlying fears of economic insecurity in old age-a
major reason why peasants traditionally had large families and
favored males over females as potential laborers. The groups
were made up of men and women. It was stressed that the
collectives' ability to guarantee minimal security in old age
meant that women no longer had to bear several male children so
that a family could avoid poverty in old age. A major cause of
female subordination could thus be eliminated, and female
infants would be equally cherished. Moreover, health advances
increased infant survival rates and thus made irrational the need
to produce many children so that one would survive. Finally, the
groups stressed the importance of allowing women the oppor
tunity to study and work and contribute to building socialism.
These face-to-face meetings with political cadres as well as the
"home delivery" of contraceptives were the main ways thatthe
policy for birth control was implemented. Linking the birth
control issue to the socialist revolution increased if not legiti
mized public discussion of what had heretofore been considered
too personal. 44
Efforts to promote family planning were reinforced by a
simultaneous campaign against early marriages and the promo
tion of free-choice marriages, neither of which had become
universal even though the Marriage Law had been in effect for
twenty years. It was argued that if young women did not marry
early, they were more likely to acquire education and skills that
allowed them to play more prominent roles in "political and
class struggle." The assumption was that once they had been
active, they would be more likely to continue to work after
marriage and childbirth, just as their urban counterparts did.
4s
All of these campaigns during this period appeared to rely
greatly on political organization and exhortation. One of the
more popular tactics of the Party was to use theatrical produc
tions like "Late Marriage is Good," to propagandize the effort
against early marriage. Also important were efforts to publicize
examples set by the young people themselves, especially the
educated youth sent to the countryside.
We propose that the vast majority of educated youth must
take the lead in changing outdated habits and customs and
insist on getting married late for the revolutionary cause: We
also hope that rural cadres actively support the educated
youth in this revolutionary practice. 46
44. See Nanjing Jiangsu Provincial Service. March 8. 197 r; "People's Daily
Short Commentary on Doing Women's Work." NCNA, March 19. 1972; and
see Shenxi Forum on Women's Work. Xian. Shenxi Provincial Service. De
cember 6. 1971.
45. "Bring the Role of Women into Full Play in Revolution and Construction ...
Hong Qi. No. 10. 197 I. in SCMM. pp. 73-78. The article emphasizes the need
to lighten the household responsibilities of women by rejecting the feudal
system in which early marriage and children dominate a woman's life in favor of
the proletarian system of late marriage. activism and husband and wife sharing
household burdens. Further. the Party expended great efforts in many areas to
train young women. referred to as "backbone elements." See. for example. the
Milo Commune; Hunan. Changsha. Hunan Provincial Service. March 8. 1972.
46. See the practical results of actress Shen Ping's efforts in "Educating Young
People to Practice Late Marriage and Family Planning." RMRB. November 20.
1972. in SCMP 5268. pp. 14-15. The quotation is in "Vigorously Encourage
Late Marriage for the Revolutionary Cause." RMRB. January 30. 1971. in
Rural women who emerged as active decision-makers in
rejecting feudal marriage customs were given great pUblicity.
Whereas in the pre-Cultural Revolution period it was the men
who were so often credited with revolutionary consciousness,
now the women came to the fore. In some places progress was
noted by the increasing numbers of women who had made
free-choice marriages.
47
Yet, the economic realities of rural China remained. The
fact was that rural economic development had not progressed,
on a macro level, to the point where enough women had been
pulled into the kinds of work or education that would have
reinforced fewer births and later marriages. Nevertheless, post
Cultural Revolution development strategy did have a positive
impact on women's economic position in rural China and eco
nomic developments did reinforce the political and organiza
tional emphasis of the period's policies.
Free choice marriage meant that women more frequently
remained in their natal areas. As the family's institutional role in
the arrangement of marriage ended, women became free to
assume productive roles in the collective economy shaped by
the commune or brigade rather than the family. It helped to
break down the fear that educating and training a daughter was
"weeding someone else's garden," i.e., investing in someone
who moved away and who, therefore, would make no contribu
tion to the family's well-being.
The growth of commune and brigade level economic activ
ity reinforced these possibilities by providing job opportunities
for women who could then become part of collective efforts to
increase services and income to the teams and families. 48 Thus,
women's real and potential contribution to the immediate col
lective becomes more important. Young women who remained
in their natal areas could now take advantage of kinship ties in
this transitional context to become leading activists,49 while
those who left to work at the commune or brigade level could
still make contributions to their original families or teams.
Either way, new roles reinforced new economic possibilities
and new economic possibilities reinforced new roles.
What emerges strikingly from analyzing the situation for
women in rural areas was that social change was dialectically
shaped by a conflict between fiercely resistant traditional cus
toms, attitudes and behavior patterns and new habits emerging
from the changes in material conditions in the countryside. The
post-Cultural Revolution policies attempted to deal with both
aspects of the "woman question." However, material condi-
SCMP 4831. pp. 122-123. These are xia-xiang youth. From the cautious tone of
the article it is clear that in some places rural cadres were rather lax in doing this
work and it is also evident that such efforts as these by the educated youth
aroused a certain amount of opposition locally.
47. See the stories of Shi Jinren. Liu XiangIan and Shi Jianmin. Changzhou.
Honan Provincial Service. December 20. 1973. and that of a Ms. Zhao in Zhao
Huaio. "Revolutionary Youths Must Take the Lead in Changing Old Habits and
Customs. in SCMP 5072, pp. 89-91. See also the New York Times article.
"Chinese Girls Oppose Presents for Weddings ... January 20. 1974; and Norma
Diamond. "Collectivization. Kinship and the Status of Women in Rural
China." in the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars Vol. 7. No. I (1975).
pp. 27-28.
48. See Marina Thorborg, "Chinese Employment Policy in 1949- 1978 with
Special Emphasis on Women in Rural Production ...
49. See Zhao Huoai. "Revol utionary Youths Must Take the Lead"; and Norma
Diamond. op. cit . pp. 89-91.
50
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tions did not always correspond to ideological principle or
political rhetoric. The tensions generated in some areas must
have been enormous as the realities of a still poor countryside
clashed with the political demands of the leadership. Yet the
successful beginnings made in curbing population growth sug
gest an inherent rationality in a policy that was based on a
recognition that there were ideological roots as well as socio
economic conditions that oppressed and exploited women in
Chinese society. In combatting these, the "xia-xiang" youth
and promotion of both collective sideline production and rural
industrialization played an important role.
Post-Mao Policy of Birth Control and Women's Roles
The post-Mao leadership has set a target of achieving a
population growth rate ofless than I percent by the early 1980s.
Building on the legacy of the pre-'76 period in which Party
committees and municipal and provincial political organs began
assuming more active roles in the implementation of family
planning programs, a new national policy on family planning
emerged fairly quickly. Throughout 1977 and 1978 provincial
conferences on planned parenthood were held, and a national
conference was called in January 1979.
50
Chen Muhua, a Vice-Premier of the State Council and
leader of the National Group on Planned Parenthood, used the
example of eleven provinces and municipalities which had
already reduced their population growth rate to less than I
percent (Beijing, Shanghai, Sichuan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Shan
dong, Shanxi, Shenxi, Zhejiang, Hubei) to stress the impor
tance of having only one child or two at the most, and spacing
them at least three years apart. Population control policies were
to be implemented with other new policies, and indeed they
reflected the radical changes that were occurring elsewhere.
Whereas previously there had been a reliance on collective
economic development combined with political persuasion and
peer group pressure, now a system of material rewards and
punishments aimed at individuals and families would be used to
ensure compliance with a policy that was considered basic to the
success of the' 'four modernizations." Although Chen did not
elaborate on the nature of the new system other than to suggest
that they would involve increasing or decreasing welfare be
nefits, the message to individual provinces, counties and cities
was clear. The national press reported on the early experiments
50. Provincial conferences were numerous throughoul 1977-1978. See, for
example, "Gueizhou Conference on Birth Control Cities Gains, Policies."
Gueiyang, Gueizhou Provincial Service, March 19, 1977; "Zhejiang Holds
Meeting on Planned Parenthood," Hangzhou, Zhejiang Provincial Service,
January 16, 1977; "A Great Event on Protecting and Liberating the Women's
Labor Force," Beijing NCNA July 5, 1977; "The Key to Doing Well in Planned
Parenthood Lies in Strengthening Party Leadership," Gueizhou Daily, De
cember to, 1978; and "Fujian Holds Meeting on Planned Parenthood." Fu
zhou, Fujian Provincial Service, September 3, 1978. On the national confer
ence, see "National Planned Parenthood Conference Held in Beijing," Beijing
NCNA. January 26. 1979.
51. See "Sichuan Adopts Family Planning Measures." Beijing. Xinhua.
March 14, 1979. Sichuan developed two systems; one for urban residents and
one for rural dwellers. Urban residents were to receive pay benefits and their one
child special consideration in admission to school and for job assignment. Rural
peasants received greater workpoints, increased grain ration and special consid
eration in the allocation of private plots. There was no discussion of punish
ments. The system was a trial measure. Other localities had instituted punish-
with the new policy. By the summer of 1979 several localities
had experimented with reward and punishment systems and
while the individual localities differed somewhat, the major
outlines of a coherent system of family planning began to
emerge. The discussion below is based on the experience of
Shulu Xian, Hebei Province, in the summer of 1979.
51
Shulu Xian, Hebei
Shulu Xian, the easternmost county in Shijiazhuang Pre
fecture, lies less than one hundred miles northwest of Beijing on
the North China Plain. The high ratio of population to arable
land
52
-about two mou per person-has led to a widespread
rural industrialization effort that is more intensive than in most
Chinese counties. As part of a liberated base area in the pre
1949 period, it has strong Party and mass organizations and a
relatively high degree of collective production. Shulu's previ
ous success in family planning is evidenced by the decline in
births from 20.2 per thousand in 1972 to 14.7 by 1978. Thus, for
Shulu Xian, family planning was already an established pro
gram. Local book shops in Shulu carry a variety of publications
discussing the methods of contraception and explaining the
importance of family planning. Most of these materials were
published prior to 1976 and had been available for several
years. 53
Song Jiure, Deputy Director of Shulu Xian's Planning
Office outlined the county's efforts to comply with the national
effort to reduce the rate of population growth. The Family
Planning Office was responsible for implementing policy
formulated by a county-level committee of twelve "responsible
persons," headed by the Chairman of the Revolutionary Com
mittee of Shulu Xian. The committee included only three
women, all of whom were involved in women's work. By
contrast, the Family Planning Office and the local Women's
Federation were responsible for actual policy implementation
on a daily basis, and were staffed entirely by women. These
women worked in cooperation with office, factory, commune,
brigade and team personnel specifically charged with the task of
implementing family planning policy in their units. Thus,
women were an integral part of the organizational network
involved in population limitation programs that rewarded com
pliance and punished violation.
The system of rewards for familial acceptance of the new
ment systems by September 1979. See "Gueizhou Officials Punished for
Ignoring Birth Control Regulation." (Beijing) Guangming Ribao September 7.
1979. One cadre was denied a promotion and another cadre and his wife had
salary reductions of 5%.
I spent two weeks in Shulu Xian as part of a five-member research team
studying county level government in the summer of 1979. All of the data on
Shulu was provided by county officials.
52. The pressure to develop birth control policies in land poor areas appears
greater. See also the experience of Shangguo Xian, Jiangxi, in "Jiangxi Stresses
Planned Parenthood Work," Nanchang, Jiangxi Provincial Service, May 18,
1979.
53. See ]ihua shengyu zhishi wenti (Information Concerning the Question of
Planned Births) (Renmin Weisheng Chuban she. Kulin sheng). This was first
published in 1972 and reissued in 1979 and ]ihua shengyu (Planned Births)
(Renmin chubanshe, Beijing), 1975. Both of these were purchased in Shulu
Xian. Hebei, in the summer of 1979. I was told they had been available for
several years.
51
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birth control effort focused on the creation of single child
families. The individual work unit could give material rewards
in the form of "honorable passes" (entitling the holder to
purchase special goods not generally available), a wage increase
of five yuan per month to factory workers (until the child
reached age fourteen) or in the case of peasant families, an
additional two or three days' workpoints per month and an adult
grain ration once the child was three. But rewards went beyond
immediate subsidies to the family or to the child. The single
child was also given special consideration in educational op
portunities, medical treatment, and the family would be eligible
for room space in new housing. All of these privileges were
revoked with the birth of a second child.
The system of punishments became operative when fam
ilies had more than two children or children born less than four
years apart. For the latter, the severity and duration of the fine
depended upon the time elapsed between births. Just as rewards
sought to increase the standard of living, penalties were cal
culated to make the costs of raising an additional child outweigh
the benefits. For factory and office workers a third child meant a
4 percent reduction in pay for four years. Commune members
lost three to five workdays per month for four years, a stiffer fine
which probably reflected the urgency of achieving control over
population growth in the land-poor countryside. Additional
children resulted in further income reductions, but were never to
allow the family to fall below the subsistence level. Non
monetary penalties included lack of maternity benefits to
women, parental assumption of educational and medical costs,
no promotion for four years, and, for peasants, buying grain for
these children at higher prices. Communes had the right to deny
families access to additional land for private plots and rights to
collective grain-the latter important in times of flood and
drought.
To meet the manpower needs of the county over the long
run and to accommodate the individual desires of families to
have children, each productive unit was responsible for de
veloping its own plan to limit population growth, and each
woman was given a year in which she could have a baby. For
those who persisted and did not practice birth control, or if a
woman became pregnant out of tum, maternity benefits were
denied and deprivation of wages or workpoints resulted. In
addition to monetary and other penalties all violators were
subject to public pressure and criticism.
Shulu Xian's quick response to the national effort to de
crease the rate of population growth was far from typical among
China's 2200 counties. For many counties, particularly where
land fertility and other forms of production ameliorated the
pressure of popUlation density, mandatory countywide pro
grams did not yet exist as of the end of 1979. Typical of these
was Wuxi County in Suzhou Prefecture, Jiangsu Province.
Wuxi, a relatively rich, fertile area, with several "one-ton rice
fields," 54 and a political history markedly different from Shulu,
preferred leaving the initiative for birth control programs in the
hands of individual communes, although even here a reward
system was mentioned. As the pressure to conform to basic
goals of the new development policy increases, many counties
will probably develop programs similar to that of Shulu.
55
Thus, assuming even minimal acceptance throughout China,
the new policy and the development strategy of which it is an
integral part has important implications for structuring the ideo
logical and material context for women in the 1980s.
Family Planning Committees generally are under the con
trol of Party Committees, Revolutionary Committees and the
leadership of various production units. Most of these organiza
tions tend to have a predominantly male leadership. This per
petuates women's lack of access to decision-making bodies that
formulate policies that shape women's roles in Chinese society.
This problem, unresolved even by the Cultural Revolution's
innovative efforts at creating institutions for mass participation
(many of which have since disappeared) remains as a formid
able barrier to women's equality. Women are responsible for
implementing fertility control policy as cadres of women's
organizations, barefoot doctors and clinic personnel, but they
have little input into the policy-making process. Insofar as the
new policies reinforce the role of the family as an economic unit
and undermine the importance of collective production outside
the family, traditional female roles have received new reinforce
ment. In this manner, the present policy is consistent with
previous efforts.
The new policy, unlike pre-1967 efforts to control popula
tion growth, apparently separates the birth control issue from
the larger one of expanding health services in general. In the
post-Cultural Revolution period birth control was emphasized
within the context of developing gynecological and obstetrical
services for rural women. Reports concerning efforts to solve
the special problems of individual pregnant women, or women
whose reproductive function was threatened by disease, ap
peared frequently in the press. "Xia-xiang" youth were ac
tively involved in the effort to bring gynecological and obstetric
care to rural areas as part of the decentralization and dismantling
of urban medical facilities. 56 Since 1978, however, reports
emphasize the development of preventive medicine in rural
areas and the adoption of modem Western medical technology
in urban-based hospitals. The use of educated youth to provide
minimal medical services in rural areas has also been sharply
reduced as the numbers of educated urban youth being assigned
to the countryside recedes and the policy is criticized. 57 Rural
areas, in short, are being asked to assume the burden of local
health-care efforts by themselves. 58
54. Infonnation on Wuxi was obtained from county officials during a field
research trip in the summer of 1979. One-ton fields are specially constructed
fields in some Wuxi County communes that can yield one ton of grain (rice).
They were built by the local population with the help of the county. They
represent the best technology in the area.
55.See. e.g .. the policies adopted in Sichuan Province. note 51. Xu Dixin. pro
fessor at Beita and Vice-President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sci
ences in a visit to Columbia University in 1979. stated that national policy
favored single child families and indicated that a good deal of pressure is being
exerted on local areas to tighten up their population control programs.
56. See "Beijing Maternity Hospital Makes Good Progress." (Beijing)NCNA.
March 7. 1972. Pregnant women suffering from malignancies and heart disease
were successfully delivered by the hospital staff. Also see "Beijing Obstetrics
Hospital: A Modem Gynecological Hospital." Wenhui baa. March 22. 1972. in
JPRS Translations on Peoples' Republic of China. No. 229. p. 15. for dis
cussion of urban personnel serving rural areas and training rural counterparts.
57. See the remarks by Vice-Minister of Health. Jian Xinzhong on the question
of the modernization of the medical field in China. NCNA. December 30. 1978.
The emphasis on Western sophisticated methods and technology makes it
questionable that these services will be available in rural areas. Also see Thomas
Bernstein. The T r a n ~ f e r of Urban Youth to the Countryside: A Case ofRevolu
tionary Change in China (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1978).
58. This impression was reinforced by visits to the PRC in 1979 where the level
of medical services in Shulu was clearly limited by local resources. In Wuxi. the
communes outside the city of Wuxi appeared to rely on its hospitals for
extensive medical care.
52
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Previous success in the effort against early marriage and
for family planning was due, in large part, to the larger context
of economic and political change within which the "woman
question" was viewed and evolved. Policies supportive of the
gradual acceptance of birth control included use of "xia-xiang"
youth, especially young women, in the development ofproduc
tive and welfare services in rural areas, the emphasis on rural
industrialization under the decentralized policies of the post
Cultural Revolution and the increase in educational opportun
ities. The policies associated with the "four modernizations"
may substantially change what was beginning to appear as a
supportive context for the decline of the traditional familial roles
of women and the development of alternative ones.
The "xia-xiang" of educated youth to the Chinese coun
tryside where their skills and education could help to eliminate
the inequalities between urban and rural life was clearly one of
the most controversial but innovative aspects of development
strategy in the Maoist period. Whatever the problems raised by
this policy, it was clear that the introduction of urban-educated
women into the countryside challenged traditional attitudes
about female capabilities and showed that women's productive
and social contributions could be made outside the nexus of
familial relationships still so prevalent in rural areas. Whether or
not this policy will be totally eliminated remains, as yet, un
clear. Conflicting reports in the press suggest that no final
decision has been made but several areas, especially those like
Shanghai, where Cultural Revolution criticism of the policy was
strongest, favor its end. Other areas, mindful of the needs of
economic construction and the lack of urban employment, favor
its continuity on a reduced scale. 59
Whatever the economic benefits or costs of ending this
policy. there is no doubt that the education and social welfare
services. not to mention the social ferment that had. in some
measure. been provided by the xia-xiang youth will now dissi
pate if not disappear altogether. Slower development of these
services will hinder women's ability to develop non-familial
productive and social roles; the traditional forces have elimi
nated an important source of challenge. Insofar as the policy
will continue, those sent will largely be disappointed candidates
for university or college entrance or the urban unemployed. &0
If the elimination or severe cutback of the "xia-xiang"
policy raises potential problems for rural women, the effect of
this change in policy on urban women will be more immediate.
Middle-school graduates who do not attend college need jobs.
59. See "Shanghai Holds Meeting on Educated Youth Guidelines:' Shanghai
City Service. January 4. 1979. "They [Shanghai's youth I will no longer be sent
to settle in the countryside." See also "Zhejiang Stresses Shift of Emphasis in
Educated Work." Hangzhou. Zhejiang. January I. 1979: and "Shanxi Holds
Conference on Educated Youth." Taiyuan. Shanxi Provincial Service. January
8. 1979. In Shanxi. "The provincial party committee will try to see that. three or
four years from now. no such settlement of educated youth in the countryside is
done." Finally see "Further Reportage on Leaders' Meeting With Educated
Youth." (Beijing) Xinhua. August 29. 1979: "Anhui Holds Conference on
Educated Youth." Hefei. Anhui. March 26. 1979.
60. NCNA. Beijing. December 14. 1978.
61. Xu Dixin. Vice-President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. has
stated that more than twenty million people were waiting for job assignments in
China's major urban centers.
62. "Zhejiang Stresses Shift of Emphasis in Educated Youth Work." And see.
"Zhejiang Labor Bureau Director Discusses Jobs for Youth." Hangzhou.
Zhejiang Provincial Service. March 3. 1979.
53
but a relatively slow expansion of employment opportunities
continues to characterize the modem industrial sector in most
Chinese cities.
61
To avoid sending these unemployed youth to
the countryside, the present leadership intends to promote col
lective services and light manufactures to provide jobs for the
increasing numbers of young men and women graduates. With
the collective sector absorbing as much as 80% of the people
assigned jobs, 62 the original composition of this labor force
predominantly "former housewives" -is bound to change
dramatically.
In arranging jobs for educated youth. the various depart
ments concerned in Shanghai have put into full play the
effective role ofneighborhood processing groups and service
groups. Since this year service groups in Shanghai Munici
pality have recruited some 45.000 persons. &J
Photo by Paul Ropp.
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An accelerated expansion of production and services by
street industry will depend upon the willingness of national and
local authorities to invest in this heretofore neglected sector of
the economy. While the press had said little about the nature of
investment and growth planned in this sector, it is clear that
many of its products are slated for export in the Chinese attempt
to create a competitive position in world markets. The need to
earn foreign exchange to pay for the greatly increased imports of
foreign technology64 necessitated by the "four moderniza
tions" strategy may place increased pressures on the collective
sector to develop in ways that will limit "former housewives' "
participation but provide employment for young men and
women. Indeed, since standardization and specialization of
production to insure sales abroad require skills and a fulltime
labor force, it may be likely that women, once married, will
return to the home to be replaced by eager young people seeking
urban jobs. Once out of the labor force these women may find
re-entry difficult. Thus, urban women might easily become an
important, though temporary, part of the urban labor force.
65
Further, some women - for clearly many of the educated youth
will be females-may find their opportunities to participate in
social production limited to a secondary temporary role. For
other women, employment opportunities may increase because
of the central role played by textiles and light industry in the
export market. 66 Although pressures on the female patterns of
employment created by post-Cultural Revolution policies is
evident, it is not entirely clear what impact the "four moderni
zations" policies will have on female employment.
As the collective sector develops and more youth are re
cruited to work in it, pressures to adjust wages and benefits may
increase. Already it is evident that some youth are less than
happy with assignments to work in collective undertakings
where the pay, benefits and status are not commensurate with
that of the state sectorY The continuity of women's labor
within this sector, problematic though it may be, reflects a
major transformation in China: the growing acceptance of wo
men's labor outside the home, at least in Chinese cities. For
rural women the new development policies pose different
questions.
Central to the agricultural development policies of the
pre- 1976 period was the emphasis on increasing the levels of
63. See "Shanghai Arranges Jobs for Returned Educated Youth." Shanghai
City Service. February 19. 1979.
64. See the RMRB editorial. "There Should Be a Big Growth of Foreign
Trade." RMRB, Decernber4. 1978.
65. That there was a potential if not actual substitution of youth for married
women in the urban labor market seemed to be acknowledged by Xu Dixin who
noted that many of the "former housewives" were ready to retire anyway!
66. See GonRrt'n Ribao, March 13. 1979. for a discussion of the textile
industry's role in earning foreign exchange. A 1978 visitto Foshan. an industrial
city outside of Guangzhou. whose role in textile exports is very important.
reinforced this idea. Most of the Foshan workers were female youth working in
the collective sector. See also "Light Industry Minister Discusses Accomplish
ing Modernization." Beijing City Service. February 3. 1979.
67. 'Zhejiang Labor Bureau Director Discusses Jobs for Youth .
68. See "NCNA Commentary Calls for Advanced Sideline Production."
CINAN. NCNA. October 13.1977.
69. Discussions at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences with Xuan Xiang.
its President. and others confirmed the policy that the production team was
considered the basic unit of accounting and also the new effort to develop rural
free markets and have private plots managed by individual families.
collective production as embodied in the Dazhai model, includ
ing the move from team to brigade level accounting. The em
phasis on collective production was maintained'in the early
post-Mao period where family sideline production remained
subordinate to the collective's role: the policy was summed up
in the slogan, "In developing rural sideline production, first it is
essential to develop the collective sideline production. "68 As
the post-Mao leaders solidified control and the "four moderni
zations" unfolded, the stress on rural collective production gave
way to efforts aimed at expanding the rural free markets, private
plots, and family centers of subsidiary production aimed at
increasing family income.
69
Women, traditionally responsible
for sideline production, may come under increasing pressure to
spend larger portions of their labor time in support of family
production, thereby restricting their ability to participate in
collective production. And, as we have seen, it is under col
lectivized production, especially above the team level, that
women appear to have made significant progress in gaining
wage parity, educational opportunities, and developing political
leadership.70 Collective production at the team and brigade
level, and especially rural industrialization all freed women
from the conservative power of the family and the natal village
by mobilizing increasing numbers of women to work in new and
less constricting jobs.
Rural industrialization, initiated under the Great Leap For
ward and continued unevenly during the early and mid-J960s,
was a major aspect of rural development policy in the post
Cultural Revolution years. 71 Under the decentralization policies
of the early 1970s the county became a major initiator, or
ganizer, planner and coordinator of rural industries whose func
tion was to spur development of the local economy, especially
in the quest to mechanize agricultural production. 72
The diversification and expansion of the agricultural sector
in the early 1970s aided by the favorable ideological climate for
women led to the increased mobilization of female labor and the
beginnings of a small but significant female labor force in
brigade and commune industry. 73 Although more women were
recruited for field work and related subsidiary production, edu
cated young women were increasingly absorbed in the rural
industrialization projects that mushroomed across the Chinese
countryside. Female employment in industry was significant in
70. See P. Andors. Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars. Vol. 7. No. I
( 1975).
71. See Stephen Andors. China's Industrial Revolution (New York: Pantheon.
1977). Chapters 6 and 7; see also Benedict Stavis. "China's Green Revolu
tion." Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars. Vol. 7. NO.3 (July-September
1975). pp. 22-39.
7'2. See Jon "Rural Industrialization in China." in China: A
Reassessment ofthe Economy. Joint Ecorlomic Committee. Congress of the
United States (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1975).
73. See Marina Thorberg. "Chinese Employment Policy in 1949-1978 With
Special Emphasis on Women in Rural Production." Women's role in rural
industry is very important in both Shulu and Wuxi Counties as I observed during
my trip in the summer of 1979.
74. See the stories of Wang Yunying and Liu Xiumin. both of Honan in
"Women in Central China Mountains Make Progress in Revolutionary Strug
gles." (Chengzhou) NCNA. March 27. 197'2. inSCMP 5110. p. 71. and that of
Yuan Mairong of Fujian in "Educated Young Woman Makes Progress in the
Countryside." (Fuzhou) NCNA. January 5. 197'2). in SCMP 5055. pp. 14-16.
See also paper delivered by William Hinton at 1980 Association for Asian
Studies Conference in which he talks of Longbow (Shenxi) women's participa
tion in rural industry.
54
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several ways.
Wages in brigade and commune industry were paid in
workpoints, a large portion of which reverted back to the collec
tive unit (team) from which the worker came. A small cash
stipend for living expenses was given to the worker. This meant
that women workers now could make a direct and larger con
tribution to collective income. and hence that the status of
women would rise in the community. Women tended to get the
same workpoints as men when there was a shift from physical to
technical expertise based on the use of machinery. In many
cases women gained access to the most skilled jobs such as late
operation while men often did the heavier. dirtier and less
skilled jobs.
74
Female acquisition of skills was an important
basis for rural wage equality, a phenomenon that has wide
repercussions as more peasants become aware of the ability of
women to add significantly to family or collective income. For
the large industrial projects in towns or county seats some
services, on a small scale, such as housing and child-care, were
available.
75
But, the necessity to run local industry on the
principles of self-reliance, diligence, and thrift necessarily re
stricted the availability of such welfare services and accounted
for the predominance of young, most often, unmarried girls as
workers. It also explained the larger number of "xia-xiang"
female students among the workers, since their educational
backgrounds made them ideally suited. 76
In addition to the impact on female employment, rural
industry was significant in other ways. The generation of addi
tional income from rural industry also increased collective
wealth at a level above individual production teams where
women's demands for increased facilities generated so much
opposition during the Great Leap. The establishment of some
basic industries, such as cement, chemical fertilizer, machine
repair stations, grain milling, and the development of agro
technical institutes and educational facilities created conditions
for further growth of the agricultural sector by increasing irriga
tion and mechanization and the cultivation of larger areas with
increased yields.
77
The increased use of machinery tends to
lessen the male advantage of physical strength in the fields as it
did in the factory. And even women who have had no education
could benefit. Here again, the Dazhai model was operative.
Women in Xiyang County (where Dazhai Brigade is located),
for example, operated one-third of all the agricultural machin
ery in the county. 78
The establishment of industries which alleviated house
hold burdens and provided special opportunities for female
employment was also significant. Flour mills appeared to be a
consistent feature of most industrialization programs, and they
freed women from one of the most onerous and time-consuming
chores. Food-processing industries, cotton textile manufactur
ing, the use of sewing machines, all tended to reduce the
household burdens of rural women thus freeing them for other
work. The organization of cotton or textile factories in areas
growing the raw material was important because females were
the main source of labor even in those mills established at the
county level. 79 Insofar as rural industry facilitated the establish
ment of social welfare services like health, and child-care, the
Henan, whose 65 enterprises contained up to 40 percent female
workers, largely because of the experience of this county in the
Great Leap Forward. The future of women in rural China is,
therefore, closely tied to the role of rural industry in the de
velopment strategy. Recent changes regarding centralized plan
ning and specialization may have a significant impact on the role
of brigade and commune industry. on the extent of the support
that local industry ~ i l l get from the center. and on the ability of
localities to carry out or initiate their own industrial projects. 80
Insofar as the new policies stress a "go it alone" strategy for
brigade and commune industry, economic support for new rural
industrial projects will. apparently, have to be generated by
brigade and commune income. This means richer communes
will advance more rapidly. and hence that women on these
communes may leap ahead of their less fortunate sisters in the
poor areas.
Local industry is still considered important in raising the
standard of living and income in rural areas. It will increasingly
provide exports for the growing volume of foreign trade. and
other local plants will become part of specialized production
networks making machinery. The development of handicrafts,
processed foods and machine parts factories therefore seem to
be the main avenue of development for local industry under the
new development strategy. Whether women will be assimilated
into all sectors of what rural industry does develop, or whether
their increased importance in family-based sideline occupations
will keep them tied to the home remains an open question.
Accompanying the new post-Mao policies is a greater
emphasis on formal education and experts.
81
The inability of
75. In Shulu County some of the larger factories in the city provided dormitory
facilities for workers.
76. See "Educated Young Women From Beijing in Yunan." (Sian) NCNA,
March 8. 1983. in SCMP 5337, p. 63; "Pay Attention to the Selection ofCadres
from Among Young Female Workers." RMRB. March 4. 1973. in SCMP 5334.
pp. 128-130: "YCl Girls in Heilongjiang Build Highway Bridge." (Beijing)
NCNA. February 22. 1971, and "Women Geological Workers in Innder Mon
golia Praised," (Beijing) NCNA. February 25. 1971; and story of women's
bridge-building team in RMRB. February 27. 1971. p. 4. Often included within
the "xia-xiang" groups are local students who have left the county for training
and have returned. Many appear to have been trained as agricultural technicians.
77. See" A Xian in Honan Province-Self-Reliantly Set Up Small But Com
plete System of local Industry." RMRB, Decembe IS. 1969. in SCMP 4564.
pp. 1-3.
78. Taiyuan, Shanxi Provincial Radio. March 6. 1972.
79. In 1959 Chiliying had two small factories. a flour mill and a ball-bearing
shop. See Chu Li and Toien Chieh-yun.lnside A People's Commune, p. 80. At
liu ling the brigade built the grinding mill. See Jan Myrdal. China: The
Rel'OllItion Continued (New York: Vintage Books. 1972). p. II. And see
Chapter Three on the Great Leap Forward which discusses early rural industry
projects. For a discussion of rural women's daily chores. see Delia' Davan.
"Women in the Countryside of China. " in Roxanne Witke and Margery Wolf.
eds .. Women in Chinese Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1975).
pp. 243-273. In Foshan. outside of Guangzhou. the textile industry was almost
entirely staffed by female workers. This observation was made in the summer of
1978.
effect was to lessen the individual reliance on the family.
Although the labor force in rural industry is still predomi
nantly male, the proportion of females is growing. By 1975,
women appeared to average 20-30 percent of the workers in
rural industry. There were exceptions, such as Lin County,
80. See Hu Qiaomu. "Act in Accordance with Economic Laws. Step Up the
Four Modernizations." Beijing NCNA, October 5. 1978.
81. See "College Graduates to be Assigned to Key Projects." Beijing NCNA,
August 16, 1978. and" Accelerate the Training of Middle Grade Technicians. "
GMRB, August I ~ . 1978. See also the series of articles on education appearing
throughout 1977 and 1978 in the Chinese press.
55
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rural areas to provide even elementary education for all chil
dren, combined with the cutbacks in aid from urban areas, the
decline of the "xia-xiang" movement, and the decreasing op
portunities for rural youth to receive college educations in light
of the reinstitution of the examination system -all will make it
more difficult for women to gain those skills that will be increas
ingly needed for industrial work. 82 This will be true, at least in
the short-run, until rural development can support increased
educational facilities.
Conclusion
It is still too early to evaluate the impact on Chinese women
of the "four modernizations" policy. Yet certain observations
regarding the implications of the departure from policies as
sociated with the pre- '76 period can be made. It is clear that the
present Hua-Deng leadership perceives socialist development
more as technologically solvable issues of economic growth
than its predecessor which viewed the social revolution as an
integral part of the process of economic modernization. In this,
the present approach to development is more closely identified
with that of the period of the First Five Year Plan and the early
1960s. And the conservative analysis of the roles most women
play in China under this development strategy' are analogous to
those identified under the FFYP and the early I960s. Thus, in
political-ideological terms, the resolution of the "woman ques
tion" in China is to be dependent upon the future success of
economic modernization. The attempt to defuse the politics of
women's liberation, however, may prove difficult as the need
for population control mandates the development of the small
nuclear family, thus undercutting the importance of familial
roles for women. And, the acknowledgment of the legitimacy of
female labor force participation, especially as the quest for
foreign exchange is met by exports of light industry, a sector in
which female labor is both traditional and a present target for
mobilization and recruitment under the' 'four modernizations"
strategy, further suggests increasing contradictions regarding
the proper roles of women in Chinese society. The ambiguities
regarding women reflect both the ideological and the material
constraints of the new policies. In an economy unable to gen
erate sufficient numbers of jobs for all those able to work, the
political decision to curtail and/or channel female labor force
participation reflects the influence of traditional attitudes re
garding women. Moreover, the tensions between ideology and
reality are great.
As we have seen throughout discussion ofpost-'49 China,
the increasing levels of female labor force participation and
socio-political involvement, especially in the GLF and the post
CR, have created powerful pressures within Chinese society to
support the demands of women's liberation. The present at
tempts to identify women with home and family and certain
kinds of jobs, in what must be considered a retreat from the
goals of female emancipation, are likely to create new tensions
within Chinese society. *
82. See "Guangdong Schools to Use New Teaching Materials."
Guangdong Provincial Service. September I. 1978: "Guangzhou
Rural Branches of Urban Middle Schools." Guangzhou. Guangdong ProVinCial
Service. July 29. 1978. and a GMRB editorial. "One Cannot Be Indifferent to
Not Making Use of What One Has Learned." GMRB. July 13. 1978. and see
note 81 above.
BULLETIN
OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS
Other Essays On
China
Stephen Andors, "The Political and Organizational Implica
tions of China's New Economic Policies, 1976-1979" (Vol.
d12, No.2. 1980: $3.50).
James E. Nickum. "Surplus Transfer and Economic Develop
ment in Taiwan and Shanghai" (Vol. 12, No.2. 1980).
Paul S. Ropp. "The May Fourth Movement"/a review essay
(Vol. 12. No.2. 1980).
Ulrich Vogel. "K. A. Wittfogel's Marxist Studies on China
(1926-1939)" (Vol. II, No.4. 1979: $3.25).
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Review Essay
SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIALISM IN CONTEMPO
RARY CHINA, by Siu-Iun Wong. London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1979, 147 pp. + xii.
by 80bbySiu
This book is an ambitious attempt to trace the historical
development of sociology in China in the twentieth century. He
compares sociology before and after Liberation, and notes that
in the late nineteenth century, China began to adopt European
and American sociological thinking instead of creating its own.
In the first three decades of this century, China was strongly
influenced by what Wong called "missionary sociology" im
ported from the United States. It was characterized by an orien
tation toward "social problems" and surveys. It was also in this
period that Marxian sociology began to emerge and compete
with the "missionary sociology." In the 1930s and '40s, efforts
had been made on the part of Chinese sociologists to "sinify"
sociology; and Wong argues that before 1949, sociology in
China was functionalist in its analysis and closely resembled its
American counterpart.
Under socialist China, sociology, as an academic disci
pline, has had its ups and downs. First of all, Marxism became
the guiding light in scientific inquiry. In the early 1950s, sociol
ogy was abolished; sociology professors were transferred to
positions other than teaching, and no new sociologists were
trained. During the Hundred Flowers movement, sociology
re-asserted itself for a very brief time in 1957. Later in 1957,
sociology was again dismissed as bourgeois, and until 1973,
when Wong finished his research on this area, sociology, using
his tenninology, has been" in oblivion." I
Wong examines three fonns of social inquiry "which are
quite similar to sociology": sociological investigation and re
search, studies on minority nationalities, and the "four his
tories" project. (viii) In all of these cases, he notes the differ
ences between Chinese and Western styles of inquiry and social
organization of infonnation. For example, he argues that in
China and the West there are differences in the values and
assumptions governing social analysis, the organizational ac
tivities of sociologists, the research problems under investiga
tion, the research techniques, and the presentation of findings.
To illustrate his arguments, Wong uses the ethnological studies
of minority nationalities in China. He also points out that al
though sociology was "banished from the academic arena,
research and teaching in anthropology persisted." (78) This
special concern in minority groups is grounded on two motives:
political (to gain the support of minority groups) and academic
(to"rescue" the data which may be lost during a period of rapid
social change). The "four histories" project (which I will
describe below) was described as the largest survey in China to
map out the political consciousness of the people. Although
Wong sees little scientific value in this survey, he maintains that
it has a sociological-historical significance in the same way that
oral history helps us understand social change.
In his final chapter, Wong outlines a theoretical debate on
the issues of ideology, religion", and sociology. He insists that
although sociology went through a different route of develop
ment in China than it did in the West, it will maintain its
identity. He expresses his hope that as Chinese society becomes
more stable, academic sociology in the Western sense will
re-emerge.
Wong's Conception ofSociology
Although Wong provides a historical account of the de
velopment of sociology in China, his book does not have a
central thesis. Basically, he asks two questions at the beginning
of his research: "Is sociology inherently tied to a bourgeois
social order? As an intellectual product of western industrial
civilization, how far is sociological inquiry culture-bound and
thus not applicable to the understanding of Asian societies?"
(vii) Proceeding from these questions, he attempts to evaluate
and redefine the meaning of sociology in the context of China.
However, neither objective is attained by the end of the book,
and his evaluation and redefinition of sociology in the Chinese
context remains problematic.
I. Wong's book grew from his M.A. thesis at the Chinese University of Hong
Kong in 1973. Since that time, there have been changes in China. After the
Cultural Revolution, the universities were re-opened in 1970, and by 1973 some
of the basic courses were re-introduced. After the death of Mao and the purge of
the "Gang of Four," the development of sociology took a new tum. There are
signs which indicate that China is now welcoming the exchange of sociological
knowledge between Chinese and Western scholars. Sociology as an academic
discipline began to re-establish itself. For example:
(a) The Ministry of Education ofChina signed an agreement with the Council of
Ministers of Education of Canada on June 1979 expressing the. Chinese
willingness to allow Canadian scholars to do research in China;
(b) Western professors were (and are) invited to lecture in China;
(c) The Chinese Academy of Social Science was formed in 1977. It is separate
from the Academy of Science, and this suggests that social sciences are on
the rise;
(d) The Chinese Sociology Society was formed and its president-Fei
Xiaotong-visited Canada in October-November 1979, and exchanged
ideas with Canadian sociologists and anthropologists;
(el The Chinese Association of Sociology Research was formed in Beijing in
May 1979; and
(0 By 1979, one or two departments of sociology have been established in
Beijing and Shanghai.
57
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First of all, his conception of sociology is narrow and, at
times, ambiguous. Following Alex Inkeles' definition of "so
ciology, "2 he limits his boundary of inquiry to " 'the study of
social action and of their interrelations with a set of rules and
norms accepted by the participants in this activity to govern the
validation of observations and the making of inferences." (ix)
This definition is basically structural-functionalist and follows
the Parsonian tradition. It deals mainly with the "actions" of
actors, the relationship between their behavior and the value
system(s), and uses the "consensus" model of analysis.
This narrow definition of sociology prevents Wong from
seeing that sociological inquiries can be more encompassing
and extensive. Besides, Parsonian sociology is not the only
sociology in the world; there are other types of sociology, such
as C. Wright Mills' school which focuses on the relationship
between structural change and individual biographies, or the
Marxian school which pays attention to the study of develop
ment of societal change in historical context. All these varieties
escape the concern of Wong. In the text, he neither specifies
why he selected the functionalist definition, nor spells out its
implication, both theoretically and methodologically, for his
study of "sociological activities" in China. If he had used other
definitions or a much wider definition of sociology, his survey
and analysis might have taken another course(s), and his book
might be fundamentally different in its description, categoriza
tion of historical events, explanations, and predictions.
Although he gives a clear definition at the outset, Wong is
inconsistent in its usage. In tracing the historical development of
sociology in pre-1949 China, he notes that Marxian sociology
was in competition with American sociology. But the boundary
of inquiry and analysis of Marxian sociology is very different
from those of (academic) "sociology" which he described
earlier. Marxian sociology is not based on an assumption of
"consensus" and does not fixate on the actors' "actions" and
value system. According to Wong's definition, Marxian sociol
ogy should not be labelled as "sociology" at all.
In the following chapters, the boundaries of concern
further deviate from Wong's original definition. In post-1949
China, Wong argues that there was a period in which sociology
was abolished; but what he actually means, based on the mate
rials he presents, is that sociology departments were abolished,
sociology abandoned as an academic discipline, and the training
of new sociologists neglected. (42-48) In the strictest sense,
such changes do not denote the abolition of sociology per se. In
fact, as his data show, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (cre
ated in 1955) had a social science division which, in all1ikeli
hood, incorporated Marxian sociology. Since Wong included
Marxian sociology as one branch of sociology in his analysis of
pre-Liberation China, surely, to be consistent, he should have
included Marxian sociology as one kind of sociology after
1949. As he maintains, "Marxist social theory ... became
THE guiding thought of the country. " (35) Later, in Chapter 2,
Wong argues that, between 1957 and 1973 (the year he com
pleted his research), "sociology [was] in oblivion," but he
means the death of non-Marxian sociology as he notes that most
of the articles in magazine were polemical debates against
Russian "revisionism" (which he doubts has any "sociologi
cal" qualities).
The confusion over what sociology is becomes much more
severe when Wong finally deals with two of his selected areas of
investigation: "Ethnology and the minority nationalities" and
"the four histories." He now includes "ethnology" in the
category of "sociology." The study of non-Han people and
emigrant communities became important after 1949. Ethnologi
cal studies in China include: identification of nationalities,
accumulation of historical data on minority nationalities, social
morphology, and the ways of life and cultures of ethnic minor
ities (which include the means, knowledge and techniques of
production; class variations in customs and habits, art and
literature). One must note that these studies, strictly speaking,
cannot be legitimately included in Wong's definition of sociol
ogy. They more closely resemble the ethnological studies of
urban poor communities and immigrant communities of the
early "Symbolic Interactionists" in the U.S. Again, this shows
the inconsistency of Wong's boundary of concern.
The compilation of the "four histories," although con
sidered to be "the world's biggest social investigation effort,"
nonetheless lies outside Wong's definition of what sociology is.
(The word "four" in "four histories" refers to the four basic
institutions-the family, the village, the commune, and the
factory or the mine.) The main thrust of the studies is to locate
the changes in these institutions. Wong notes "the transforma
tions in ecology, class structure, economic culture, customs and
ways of life, etc." (95) As we may be aware, the Parsonian
"sociology" seldom deals with social change, and is at odds
with the Chinese "four histories." The latter focus on the
historical transformation of institutions which Parsonian sociol
ogy does not deal with. But what makes the readers more
confused is the fact that Wong maintains that "the distinction
between the two disciplines [sociology and history] is mostly a
matter of convention." (98) He insists that the Chinese "four
histories" is sociological because they study the immediate past
(and not the remote past) of institutions, they use longitudinal
methods, and they are concerned with class conflict and internal
contradictions. (98-100) However, these three characteristics
are alien to a Parsonian style of sociological inquiry. The latter
is notorious for its ahistorical analysis and its fixation on "con
sensus" (versus conflicts and contradictions).
Wong's Methodology
The inconsistency, limitation, and ambiguity of Wong's
conception of "sociology" lead us to question the boundary of
his survey. He uses only two periodicals-Xuexi and Xin
lianshe-to provide evidence "on the state of sociology in
contemporary China." (ix) He also relied on "books produced
in China" and secondary interpretations of Chinese sociol
ogy. (x)
Wong has ignored a large reservoir of materials which may
be properly called "sociology," for example: Lishi Yanjiu.
Xuexi Yu Pipan. Renmin Wenxue. liao YuShiJian. and Zhong
guo Funii. All these periodicals do not follow Western sociol
ogy in their analysis, presentation, and degree of advocacy
(policy making), etc. They, nevertheless, constitute an essential
part of a "sociological literature" which attempts to explain
historical changes, institutions, social movements, education or
economic process, etc.
The Chinese decision to abandon sociology departments,
banish sociologists, and to not establish a sociological journal or
2. Alex Inkeles. What is Sociology? An Introduction to the Discipline and
Profession (New Delhi: Prentice Hall oflndia [Private] Ltd., 1965).
58
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sociological associations may well have been political as Wong
indicates-that is, part of the political attempt to abolish bour
geois elements including sociology. 3 But there is another reason
which Wong did not state explicitly: American sociology may
have been seen as too restricting in its approach. China main
tained that "social sciences" should replace narrowly defined
disciplines. The interdisciplinary approach implied in the idea
of "social sciences" was seen as more encompassing,and
therefore more accurate and valid for social inquiries. Wong did
not include studies based on this generalist approach in his
survey of "sociological" publications or activities. However
when "social sciences" pubblications are included, the amount
of sociological literature may be much higher than Wong has
estimated.
Is Sociology Inherently Bourgeois
and Culture-Bound?
In answering his two initial questions, namely whether or
not $ociology is inherently bourgeois and culture-bound, Wong
maintains that sociology in China is a product of the Chinese
conditions and political ideology and therefore Western sociol
ogy may not be applied mechanically to China. The modifica
tions by the Chinese are characteristics of "Chinese sociol
ogy." Since Western sociology can be modified to fit into a
socialist society such as China, Wong reasons, sociology there
fore is not inherently tied to a bourgeois social order.
Wong's position is problematic. First of all, the criterion
he uses in evaluating sociology in China remains Western and
bourgeois. Not only is his definition of sociology borrowed
from the American sociologist, the methodologies used in social
inquiry are also measured by the approximation to contempo
rary Western bourgeois standards. The comparison between the
survey methods of the "four histories" and contemporary so
ciology (discussed before) is enlightening. Why cannot the
ahistorical and "consensus" model of Western sociology be
evaluated on the basis of Marxian sociology? One could in fact
argue that Western sociology is not quite sociological since it is
ahistorical and neglects conflicts and contradictions in its
analysis.
The second problem is also related to Wong's ambiguous
meaning of sociology. Sociology in different countries has its
own features; for example, British sociology tends to be more
structural and historical in orientation, and American sociology,
3. One of the educational goals of the Cultural Revolution was to introduce
proletru;an education, and this meant at least two things: (a) to re-evaluate the
existing academic disciplines, to eliminate the bourgeois content and structure
of the disciplines, and to establish knowledge more in line with socialist
reconstruction; and (b) to reduce academic workload so as to accommodate the
half-work, half-study programs. and to attempt to link theory and practice
together. Based on this line of thought, the bourgeois elements were gradually
psychological and ahistorical. In this sense, sociology is cultur
ally bound. But, it is difficult to say that the styles that the
Chinese follow in their social inquiries are typically "Chi
nese," for many of the so-called "Chinese" features (such as
the breakdown of specialization, the attempt to combine "red"
and "expert," the inclusion of historical analysis, etc.) are
Marxian (which is European based). Implicit in Wong's book is
the assumption that Marxian sociology is not sociology at all,
and therefore it is not surprising that he defines social inquiries
in China as "Chinese" as if they are different from Marxian
sociology.
Having falsely established that "Chinese sociology" is a
modified fonn of Western sociology, Wong then jumps to the
conclusion (not made explicit) that sociology is not inherently
bourgeois because China is socialist. Although the title of
Wong's book is Sociology and Socialism in Contemporary
China, nowhere does he elaborate or even define what he means
by "socialism." Further, since he does not articulate the rela
tionship between sociology and socialism in China, a reader
simply does not know the exact linkage between the fonns that
sociological inquiries take in China and the socialist transfonna
tion of the country. Although Wong illustrates how the First
Five Year Plan, the Hundred Flower Movement, the Cultural
Revolution, etc. affected the fate of Western (academic) sociol
ogy, sociologists, sociology departments, etc., he does not
show us the connection between the' 'Chinese" mode of social
ist construction (a stress on agriculture rather than heavy in
dustry) in the 1960s and early '70s or the transitional economy
in the 1950s and "the values and assumptions governing social
analysis" in China. (66) In other words, how are the monolithic
theoretical framework of Marx, the partisan principle (as op
posed to "liberalism"), the "democratic" function of social
inquiry, the advocacy role of social inquiry, and the combina
tion of "red" and "expert," which Wong argues to be specific
features ofChinese social inquiries, related to the Chinese style
of socialism. Nowhere does he relate what was happening in
China in structural tenns to the special mode of inquiry; he
merely talks of these "specificities" in theoretical tenns.
In all fairness, Wong did link the Chinese style of "mass
sociology" or "the layman's social research" (70) to the policy
of popularizing knowledge for peasants and workers (70), the
choice of problematic areas for research and the policy of
social/economic planning (72-73), the "emergent" policy of
research methods and the concern with mass-based analysis.
(74-75) Further, Wong argues that the very focus on minority
nationalities and the' 'four histories" of institutions as research
topics were related to political and economic changes in China.
removed, at least partially and temporarily, from sociology.
After the death of Mao and the arrest of the "Gang of Four," the more
"pragmatic" faction within the Party undid some of the former programs of the
Cultural Revolution, and stressed the technical side ofeducation. In the words of
the architect of this new tide of reforms-Deng Xiaoping- "It doesn't mailer
whether a cat is black or white so long as it catches mice." In this context. the
previous actions to eliminate specialization and bourgeois elements in sociology
are defined as too extremist and harmful to China's progress. In order to redress
the problems of the "blackout" in intellectual development before 1976. the
new regime has introduced Western sociologists. welcomed Western sociologi
MldIIIl Slwln
cal literature .. and re-established sociological associations and departments.
59
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Future of Sociology in China
Since Wong completed his research in 1973, the develop
ment of sociology has taken on a new course. This is due to the
fact that, in 1976, with the death of Mao and the arrest of the
"Gang of Four," the new leaders stressed the significance and
necessity of modernization. The efforts made in the Cultural
Revolution and its aftermath were defined as harmful to China's
competition in world progress and the Chinese people. One way
to redress the negative effects of the "Gang of Four" is to
introduce Western expertise-knowledge and technologies
into China.
The "blackout" of Western ideas before 1976, according
to Fei Xiaotong, has had its impact on the development of
Chinese sociology. In a speech entitled' 'The Social Sciences in
China Today" (delivered at the Ontario Anthropology and
Sociology Association Meeting, 1979), Fei noted two problems
in contemporary Chinese sociology: (a) lack of qualified teach
ers; and (b) lack of access to Western literature in sociology. In
this context, various efforts have been made to re-introduce the
Western versions of sociology, and this means, in concrete
terms, the formation of the Chinese Academy of Social Science,
the Chinese Sociology Society, the Chinese Association of
Sociology Research, and sociology departments in universities.
Western sociologists were (and are) introduced to Chinese
scholars to exchange ideas, and plans have been made to set up
communicative networks between Western and Chinese sociol
ogists, and to purchase sociological literature from the West.
At present, this is the situation of sociology as an academic
discipline in China. But let us look at what Wong has to say on
the future of Chinese sociology. In his last chapter, he discusses
the similarity of ideology, religion, and sociology. He argues
that sociology is different from the former two because sociol
ogy aims at "myth-breaking," as opposed to creating myths.
As such, sociology threatens the perpetuation of the political
ideology of the Party in China; this is especially the case when
"the ideology is newly established and has yet to consolidate its
position." (115) In projecting the future of sociology in China,
Wong hypothesizes that "as the [political] ideology is getting
more secure in its hold on the population, it is conceivable that a
greater part of the less controversial areas of social life may be
open to selective attention," (117) in addition to the limited
concerns of minority nationalities or "four histories. " Follow
ing the pattern of the Soviet Union, it is expected that China will
be more relaxed in its control of sociological development.
Wong foresees that in the future, "sociology will grow in
importance," (119) but it is unclear what forms it will take.
Again, he suggests that China will follow the example of the
Soviet Union, and that "as the regime is stabilized, and as
reform and gradual change supercede revolution and sudden
transformation, technical and 'objective' sociology becomes
more attractive. Some amount of autonomy free from ideologi
cal interference is granted." (118)
In light of the recent changes in the sociological enterprise
in China, it may be too quick to jump to the conclusion that
Wong is correct in his prediction. This is because of the follow
ing reasons:
First, sociology in China is not having a "U-turn." It still
maintains that the Marxian approach is the legitimate one.
According to the impression of Graham Johnson of the Uni
versity of British Columbia, who visited the Chinese Academy
of Social Science in July 1979. Chinese sociology may develop
along the line of historical materialism.
Second, the changes that we are witnessing in sociology
are not occurring in the context of political stability. At the time
of writing this article, the "Gang of Four' , is still on trial and, as
some top-level officials are aware, there are still followers of the
"Gang of Four" in the Chinese population.
But it is the premises of Wong that are problematic.
Wong's basic assumptions are that Western sociology is more
objective, autonomous, and value-free than contemporary Chi
nese sociology and that Western surveyor statistical techniques
and quantification are more advanced than Chinese rudimentary
methods. It has been argued that sociology is a biased intel
lectual exercise because it justifies corporate capitalism and
imperialism and because its practitioners usually act in the
service of corporations and government. Wong appears to be
idealistic and not aware of the intellectual (and sometimes
political) debates in the 1960s on the issue of value-neutrality.
To see sociology in China, on the one hand, as dominated by
political ideology and the Party, and Western sociology, on the
other, as free and autonomous is to say that the Chinese have a
long way to go in catching up with the West. Again, Wong
implies that Western sociology is more advanced.
It is also doubtful that sociology which fixates on quantita
tive techniques is necessarily a more advanced form of social
investigation. Conversely, the techniques that the Chinese have
been using-participatory observations, biographic study, his
torical research, oral history, etc. are not necessarily less in
sightful. But Wong's book surely gives the readers this impres
sion. One may argue that the so-called "soft" techniques such
as historical studies may yield far more accurate and pertinent
results than the "hard" techniques.
Wong judges that the abolition of professional sociology in
China was" a regrettable event." that it ruined' 'many promis
ing careers" and was "an unnecessary wastage of talents."
(viii) But if academic sociology is indeed bourgeois and biased,
one wonders if such "sacrifices" of academic careers and
talents may be necessary for the development of socialism.
Whether one likes it or not, intellectual exercises are part of the
evolving socio-historical process, and they are part of the super
structure which give meaning and guidance to the people. In
capitalism, such superstructure justifies the status quo and
guides the ruling class; in socialism, it justifies the status quo
and is at the service of the masses. Although Wong maintains.
in both his preface and conclusion. that it is stillunclear whether
Chinese sociology will take the American forms of methodol
ogy and theoretical framework. the fact that he favors Western
sociology is obvious. *
60
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Hong Kong:
Liberation Without Liberation
by Gene Cooper
Hong Kong has always been a city of paradoxes, and this is
no less so of the post-Mao period than before.
Since 1967 and the leftwing riots of that year, it became
almost a cliche that "the Hong Kong problem" was one "left
over from history" to be solved at a time deemed appropriate by
the parties concerned-Britain and China. In the meantime,
industrial peace and political stability were the common desire
of both parties. Hong Kong did not have the status ofa principal
contradiction for the Maoist foreign policy planners of the
People's Republic, and was relegated to a secondary position
while the PRC pursued its claim to be the sole legitimate
representative of the Chinese people at the United Nations.
The expiry in 1997 of the lease on the New Territories
(originally signed in 1898 for 99 years), or some time just
shortly before then, was assumed to be the "appropriate time"
for Britain and China to decide the future status of Hong Kong.
It has always been recognized that Hong Kong island and the
Kowloon peninsula (ceded to the British in perpetuity in 1842)
could not continue to exist independent of the New Territories.
If the Chinese were to "take back" the New Territories, the
colony of Hong Kong would effectively cease to exist. l
Recent years. however. have seen the People's Republic
t ~ i n g a somewhat different tack. In the first place, when the
Beijing government succeeded in displacing the Taiwan govern
ment at the United Nations in 1971, the influence that Beijing
was able to exercise in the political balance of Hong Kong
expanded enormously. Organs of Beijing power gained an enor
mous legitimacy in the new aura of respectability that came to
surround the Chinese government. Allegiance to the People's
Republic, long an obstacle to effective political organizing
among Hong Kong's largely political refugee population, be
came somewhat more of an asset. Links with Chinese bureau
cratic organs (the most obvious of which being China Travel
Service) came to be seen as conferring important advantages.
By late 1972. one could argue that the relegation of the Hong
Kong problem to the status of a secondary contradiction made a
great deal of sense as the political balance tipped noticeably in
favor of the Beijing government, as it pursued the resolution ofa
higher order contradiction. and gained a seat at the U. N.
This position of increasing influence encouraged the Peo
ple's Republic publicly to clarify its position with respect to the
lease on the New Territories. At present. that position is some
thing like this:
Since the treaty ceding Hong Kong to the British, and the
protocol leasing the New Territories to the British for 99 years
were both illegally imposed on China as a result of imperialist
aggression, their terms are not binding. China could presumably
demand the return of the Crown Colony of Hong Kong at any
time, at a moment's notice, and is in no way bound to wait till
1997 to reclaim the New Territories. Paradoxically, this non
recognition of Hong Kong's colonial status has come to serve as
a pretext for Hong Kong's authorities to plan for the future in the
post-Mao period, assuming the extension ofthe present political
status quo well beyond the 1997 expiry date of the lease on the
New Territories.
In 1978. it was fairly certain that the PRC, with its influ
ence in colony affairs continuing to expand in any case, was
prepared to tolerate the .existence of the colony into the in
definite future. Indeed, when His Excellency the Governor of
Hong Kong, Sir Murray MacLehose, travelled to the People's
Republic on an unprecedented official goodwill visit in April
1979, he brought back assurances from Vice Premier Deng
Xiaoping that investors in Hong Kong could' 'put their minds at
ease" over Hong Kong's future. The business community has
thus been temporarily assured of the security of its privately
invested capital beyond a now meaningless 1997 deadline. One
could thus argue that the Deng-Hua regime has acquiesced in
putting off the' 'liberation" of Hong Kong more or less indefi
nitely. However, that is only part of the story.
Since the death of Mao, an unprecedented expansion in
transportation and communication links between Hong Kong
and the People's Republic has occurred. Governor MacLehose
travelled to Canton by hydrofoil, a service begun in 1978 by the
Hong Kong Yaumatei Ferry Co. which cuts Ph hours off the
travelling time to Canton by train. On his return to Hong Kong,
the governor inaugurated a through service on the Kowloon
Canton railway for the first time since 1949. This will mean that
passengers will no longer have to disembark at Lowu to walk
across the bridge into China to reembark at Shumchun for the
remainder of the ride through to Canton, and will cut two hours
off the previous travel time. Through freight service is presently
being discussed. The railway itself will soon be double tracked
throughout the Hong Kong section for the first time ever, further
reducing travel time. In addition, electrification of the line atthe
staggering cost of over H.K.$600 million has now been ap
proved.
Direct air service from Hong Kong to China was also begun
in 1978. Flights from Hong Kong to Canton are now an every
day occurrence, and a direct flight from Hong Kong to Hang
zhou is in the offing.
As if all this were not enough. as of November I, 1978.
Hong Kong-registered lorries (trucks) have been able to pick up
goods from warehouses in Guangdong. goods which previously
could only be picked up at the border town of Mankamto after
transfer across by tractor from the Guangdong side. The savings
in freight handling costs will be enormous and make for greater
61
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efficiency in the marketing of Chinese products in Hong Kong.
Permits will ofcourse have to be obtained from both Hong Kong
and Guangdong authorities, and it is virtually certain that move
ment in Guangdong province will not be unrestricted. However,
one Hong Kong-based transportation company has already ob
tained permits for a fleet of 50 trucks to run a shuttle service into
and out of Guangdong.
It is clear from these developments that both Hong Kong
and Chinese authorities anticipate enormous expansion in trans
portation and communication requirements between Hong
Kong and Guangdong, and are gearing up to provide more
facilities to move people and merchandise across an increas
ingly porous border.
Meanwhile China is purchasing large quantities of land in
Hong Kong. Unperturbed by the paradox that this is land
which it already claims title, the People's Republic has acquired
land in Shatin, New Territories, and has begun to build a huge
cold storage facility for its own exports to Hong Kong, sure to
increase significantly as transportation improves. A China
based investment company is at present collaborating with
lardines and the Hong Kong Land Corporation in providing
capital for the construction ofa railway terminal in the new town
of Tsuen Wan for Hong Kong's soon-to-be-opened Mass Tran
sit Railway.
When China's trade minister, Li Qiang, visited Hong
Kong in the fall of 1978, he stressed the increasing importance
of Hong Kong in China's future foreign trade and modernization
plans. Recent reports show China interested in taking advantage
of Hong Kong's container port facilities and cargo handling
services in expanding its import-export trade. China is also
about to finance the building of a shipyard on Tsing Yi island in
the Hong Kong harbor, the land for which has already been
acquired.
However, the most spectacular of financial arrangements
of the post-Mao era to date, has been the conclusion of a
three-cornered deal involving Great Britain, Hong Kong and
China. Under its terms, the British will sell mining equipment to
the People's Republic to mine coal, which it will then sell to Sir
Lawrence Kadoorie's China Light and Powet Company to
power the new facility that he is building at a cost of H.K.$1.8
billion to generate electricity, a surplus of which will be sold
across the border to power-starved Canton. A preliminary
agreement. under which electricity will be sold across the border
to Shumchun is already in effect. That China Light and Power
should consider linking up with a power grid in Guangdong
when it has never been able to reach agreement with the inde
pendent Hong Kong Electric Company, which serves Hong
Kong island on a common grid for the entire colony, is another
of the pardoxes in which Hong Kong abounds.
In any event, the future of Hong Kong in the post-Mao era
will be inextricably linked to that of Guangdong province.
There are already signs that further steps are being taken to
eliminate the differences between Hong Kong and the rest of
South China. The border town of Shumchun has been upgraded
administratively to municipality level, and plans are afoot to
develop agriculture, industry and tourism there. Foreign invest
ment is being welcomed, and the Ford Motor Company has
already begun construction of an assembly plant which should
be on stream turning out trucks and tractors within the next year
ortwo.
There are also plans for the area around Shumchun to
dairy produce, fruit and vegetables, pigs and fish for the Hong
Kong market. In essence, this amounts to an expansion of Hong
Kong's New Territories hinterland, and will eliminate the need
for long hauls on China's railways to bring food to Hong Kong.
Hua qiao (overseas Chinese) investment is once again
being welcomed in China. The PRC has expressed interest in
having Hong Kong enterpreneurs participate in the financing,
construction and management of hotels in China, and many
Hong Kong businessmen are waiting eagerly for details of
regulations governing joint ventures to be promulgated specify
ing conditions under which their financing and managing of
plants in China can take shape. The protection of hua qiao
interests has now reemerged as an important policy in South
China, and overseas Chinese have been encouraged to build
houses in South China again. Recently a choice site in the heart
of Canton was allocated to build apartments for sale to overseas
Chinese. Each structure is to be six stories high, containing sixty
units of about 1,000 square feet each. The initial selling price is
to be on the order ofH.K.$417/square foot, substantially below
the asking price for residential properties in Hong Kong, and
therefore conceivably an attractive investment.
Talk about China creating recreation areas and beaches in
and around Mirs Bay that would be open to Hong Kong resi
dents has recently surfaced, and a tourist sector just across the
border from Macau is contemplated. For a sum of money, one
will presumably be able to walk through a turnstile, have one's
passport stamped, and enter China for a single day. The mind
boggles at the Chinese "Disneyland" that would await one on
the other side of the turnstile, but such are the prospects which
the future has in store.
This recent flurry of activity in the relations between China
and Hong Kong, the expansion oftransportation and communi
cation links, the increasingly large quantities of privately in
vested capital being welcomed into China itself, the increas
ingly large investments by the People's Republic in Hong Kong,
the governor's recent trip to China, etc., all suggest that in the
post-Mao period, the "Hong Kong problem" may very well
have been promoted in terms of the position it occupies in the
hierarchy of contradictions of PRC foreign policy planners.
With U.S. diplomatic relations out of the way, and Taiwan
increasingly isolated internationally, movement on the Hong
Kong front seems to have become a higher priority.
In the post-Mao period, the process by means of which the
"Hong Kong problem" will be resolved will not look anything
like what might have been imagined five years ago. The scen
ario will be a long drawn-out affair, accomplished not by force
of arms, but rather by the gradual elimination of differences
between Hong Kong and Guangdong, involving changes of
equivalent magnitude on both side of an increasingly porous
border. It seems likely that the British will continue on in
political command indefinitely, although Chinese influence in
the affairs of the colony will continue to increase dramatically.
The governor's 1979 trip to China assures British-Chinese col
laboration in planning the future of Hong Kong.
lust as the future of Hong Kong will increasingly involve
the participation and influence of the People's Republic of
China, so the future of South China generally will increasingly
involve the participation and influence of a Hong Kong more
closely linked and integrated, indeed absorbed into the life of
Guangdong province.
The "liberation" of Hong Kong has indeed been put off
* become an agricultural bread basket for Hong Kong providing indefinitely, but it has also in effect already begun.
62
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1
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63
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Review Essay: Thailand
Power and Paradigms
by Carl A. Trocki
Ben Anderson's characterization of modem Thai studies is
particularly relevant to the works discussed here:
... there is. to my knowledge. no self-conscious or self
critical literature about the larger problem of approach.
methods. not to say paradigm. in western (or American)
writing about modern Thai history and politics. 1
Although some of these books fall loosely into the category of
anthropology, all are essentially political and historical in con
text and implication. Anderson's critique offers an opportunity
to test these recent efforts. Do they continue to exhibit that
failing which Anderson has pointed out? That is, do they lack
conscious self-criticism of methodological problems? Before
answering these questions, it is helpful to note first some ofthe
paradigms and approaches which have dominated the relatively
isolated little universe of Thai studies since the 1950s.
Two of the major paradigms of Thai society are the loose
structure model and the benevolent-autocracy model. The first,
proposed by John Embree in 1948,2 sets Thailand apart from the
societies of East Asia, such as China and Japan. According to
this theory, Thai society is atomized and neither clustered,
stratified, nor as hierarchical as those of East Asia. Thais,
according to Embree, are individualistic and are not restricted
by over-riding loyalties to kinship groups or to social classes.
The nuclear family, rather than the extended one, is said to be
the preferred social norm. Theravada Buddhism, with its stress
on individual enlightenment, is seen to support this view of Thai
society.
The benevolent-autocracy model originates with the Thai
elite class and in fact can probably be traced back to the old ideas
of divine kingship which buttressed the traditional monarchy.
The benevolent Buddhist chakrapat (wheel-turning monarch)
I. Benedict Anderson. "Studies of the Thai State." in Eliezer B. Ayal (ed.),
The Study o.fThailand: Analyses of Knowledge. Approaches and Prospects il/
Anthropology. Art History. Ecot/omics. History and Political Science (Athens.
Ohio: 1978). p. 194.
2. John F. Embree. "Thailand. a Loosely Structured Social System." Ameri
can Anthropologist. 52: 1950. p. 194.
3. Lucien M. Hanks. Jr.. Rice and Man (Chicago: Aldine. 1972). p. 84. Hanks
sees this as Slimmed up in the Thai proverb: "The earth is good because the grass
protects it. The grass grows because the earth is good."
BANG CHAN: SOCIAL HISTORY OF A RURAL
COMMUNITY IN THAILAND, by Lauriston Sharp
and Lucien M. Hanks. Ithaca, New York and London:
Cornell University Press, 1978. pp. 314. Appendices,
Notes, Bibliography, Index, Illustrations, Maps.
THAI PEASANT SOCIAL STRUCTURE, by Jack
M. Potter. Chicago and London: University of Chi
cago Press, 1976. pp. 249. Notes, Bibliography, In
dex, Illustrations.
THE GOLDEN PENINSULA: CULTURE AND
ADAPTATION IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST
ASIA, by Charles F. Keyes. New York: Macmillan
Publishing Co. 1977., pp. 370. Appendices, Notes,
Index, Illustrations, Maps.
WORLD CONQUEROR AND WORLD RE
NOUNCER: A STUDY OF BUDDHISM AND POL
ITY IN THAILAND AGAINST A HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND, by S. J. Tambiah. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1976. pp. 577. Notes,
Bibliography, Index.
UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY POL
ICY AND AID TO THE THAILAND POLICE, by
Thomas Lobe. Monograph Series in World Affairs
Volume 14, University of Denver, 1977. pp. 181. Ap
pendices, Notes, Illustrations, Maps.
THAILAND, THE POLITICS OF DESPOTIC PA
TERNALISM, by Thak Chaloemtiarana, Bangkok,
Thailand: Social Science Association of Thailand,
Thai, Khade Institute. Thammasat University, 1979.
Pp. 357, Appendix, Notes, Maps.
puts the universe in order and thereby provides sustenance for
all. He gives support, advancement, opportunities and assis
tance to his followers in return for their loyalty and services. The
relationship is seen to be symbiotic rather than exploitative or
parasitic in nature. The weak yield to the strong and the strong
rain benefits upon the weak. Western anthropologists have
found it expressed, however, in what they perceive as Thai
cultural values. Lucien Hanks, for instance, notes that there is
no universal "you" in the Thai language. All fornls of personal
address reflect unequal status relationships. It is concluded then
that all meaningful social relationships are between superiors
and inferiors and there is no fundamental concept of equality. 3
Proponents of both models find support in the Thai pro
pensity for forming patron/client groups. For loose-structure
supporters these groups are substitutes for the fragile family
structure. Given the lack of kin solidarity, individuals seek out
powerful patrons and attach themselves to this or that clique led
by a phu-yai (big man). They become his followers or luk-nong
64
BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org
(lit. child/younger sibling). Some of these followers function as
strong men or nak-Iaeng. Since the hierarchy in these groups is
vertical, Thai society is said to lack firm horizontal strata, or
social classes. Even the elites, it is said, do not form a solid class
because of their relationship with their constituencies.
The proponents of benevolent authority see the hierarchi
cal relationships of patron/client groups as a model for the entire
political system. The benevolent king, or ruler, is the greatest
phu-yai of all. His clients, in tum, have their own dependents,
who likewise have theirs and so on down to the lowliest tenant
farmer or pedicab driver. Power is mobilized through the in
terlocking relationships of these mutually dependent cliques.
This, at least, is the theory.
In a sense, loose structure complements benevolent autoc
racy; lacking a tightly organized society, the Thai "need"
authority. They love their king. They do not understand real
democracy and need to be guided by a paternalistic bureauc
racy. As a result popular demands and mass mobilization phe
nomena are treated as being "un-Thai," and therefore are
probably the result of "outside agitators" or foreign com
munists,4 the famous "third hands" which Thai generals and
bureaucrats are fond of blaming for popular unrest. However,
the two models may also appear to be contradictory. The idea of
loose structure suggests that Thai society is inherently "demo
cratic" because society is "fluid" and competitive. Social
mobility. too, is possible. There is the suggestion that the
country is. in fact, run by a meritocracy, in which even a peasant
can rise to great status. Benevolent autocracy, however, runs
directly against that idea. The people who are on top are there
not just because of their proven merit or talent, but because of
their spiritual merit or bun. They have a sort of divine right. In
fact, the ideology of Buddhist kingship, the chakrapat, is far
more entrenched in Thailand than the idea of divine right of
kings ever was in the West. The right to rebel is unheard of,
officially speaking. Thai society is, as Norman Jacobs has
pointed out, patrimonial. All accept the inherent inequality of
existence and, within this framework, the concept of social
mobility is alien. In fact, the only way that social mobility works
is if those who are rising are willing to accept the standard of the
system and become a part of it.
Despite this apparent contradiction, the scholars have sug
gested that the system "works." They point to the "moderniz
ing" achievements of certain Thai kings. They also note the
"peace and stability" of Thai society despite frequent changes
in government during the years since 1932. The country has thus
avoided colonization and revolution and retained its' 'uniquely
Thai" traditions and culture. "This is the best of all possible
worlds and any change should take place within the parameters
already established by the country's wise and benevolent rulers.
In no case is the "alien" concept of popular sovereignty ack
nowledged as a legitimate basis for state authority.
Not many serious scholars would attempt to defend these
models as I have characterized them. Nevertheless, such ideas
have a way of percolating down from the academic level and
losing much of their complexity in the process. Thus, the
concepts have been most influential on a general level in the
minds of many American policy makers and policy-oriented
academics who have used Thailand as a stepping-stone in their
careers in the State Department, USIS, AID, Peace Corps, the
Office of Public Security (OPS) and, of course, the CIA. These
models have rung a strongly sympathetic chord in the dogma of
the American establishment, whose stated goal has been the
development of Thailand as a non-communist country. Natur
ally, since such concepts lean so heavily on the raison d' etre of
the ruling Thai establishment, objections from that quarter have
been relatively mild. Pieces by Stephen Young and Herbert
Rubin are representative of this type of policy-oriented social
science. For Young, Thai villagers are apolitical:
The villager, and possibly the average Thai, would rather
leave government andpolitics alone. This seems to be a fairly
fundamental postulate, and ... it is rooted in the culture,
ingrained deeply during childhood, buttressed by religion
and most congenialfor the style oflife in a Village. S
According to Rubin, superiors and government officials can
move villagers to action by giving them "will" (kamlangcaJ) or
by intimidating them and playing upon their sense of inferiority
or kreng. 6 In both cases the overall thrust of the advice supports
authoritarian styles of rule and discourages popular initiative.
One major cause of this lack of depth has been the very
fragmentary and biased nature of our knowledge of the Thai
past. Analytical historical studies are pitifully few in number
and those that exist are either quite new or have only recently
been made available. Works like Jit Phumisak's Choma Sak
dina Thai (The Face of Thai Feudalism), which was written in
the mid-1960s, was suppressed until after the student uprising in
1973. Historical and political. works such as those by Chamwit
Kasetsiri and Thak Chaloemtiarana are still too recent and too
little-known to have made much of an impact. 7
It should be understood that the "accepted view" of Thai
history is strictly an elite version. Before the 1960s all Thai
history written by Thais was generally the product of royal
princes and others within the elite tradition. The overwhelming
bulk of such accounts fall into the category of what O. W.
Wolters would call "works of piety" and not critical history at
all. 8 Lacking good historiography, students ofThai society have
created models and paradigms largely on the basis ofcontempo
rary situations and perceptions. As a result, ephemera is some
times confused with deep-seated cultural characteristics and
many long-term trends have been overlooked.
Bang Chan, is an example of the generalities that becloud
researchers:
Our answer must be drawn from generalities concerning the
4. "Third hand" (muah ti-sam) roughly translates as "fifth columnist" in Thai
political parlance.
5. Stephen Young, "The Nonheastem Thai Village. A Non-Panicipatory
Democracy." Clark D. Neher. Modern Thai Politics; from Village to Nation
(Cambridge, Mass.: Sherkman Pub. Co .. 1976), p. 287. Reprinted from Asian
Survey. 8: II (November, 1968), pp. 873-886.
6. Herben J. Rubin. "Will and Awe: Illustrations ofThai Villager Dependency
Upon Officials," in Neher, ibid .. pp. 290-317. Reprinted fromlournal ofAsian
Studies. 32:3 (May 1973), pp. 424-445.
7. Of primary significance in this respect are the writings of the Thai Marxist
historian, Jit Phumisak, whose Choma Sakdina Thai (The Face ofThai Feudal
ism), was suppressed until 1974. However, during the years 1974-76, it went
through three editions. Also of significance for the early history of Siam is
Chamwit Kasetsri's The Rise ofAyudhya: A History o/Siam in the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Centuries. East Asia Historical Monographs, (Kuala Lumpur:
Oxford, 1976). ForadiscussionofThak, see below.
8. O. W. Wolters. in lectures and personal conversation with the writer has used
this term to describe works such as traditional chronicles and other writings of a
purely laudatory nature.
65
BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org
organization ofThai society and the kinship system as well as
the economic scene . . .
Here are no ethnological mysteries. The system has the
familiar shape ofAdam Smith's free enterprise: each person
bargains in the open market for the best arrangement he can
make, and ifthis is not satisfactory, he may move elsewhere.
(p.46)
The book bristles with the culture bound generalizations found
also in Hanks' earlier article, "Merit and Power in the Thai
Social Order."9 That piece talks about the "unfeudal plurality"
and the "freedom of contract" that obtains in all patron-client
dealings. He asserts further (incorrectly) that there has been an
absence of peasant revolts in Thai history. '0 Bang Chan is
actually the long-overdue "final report" of the Cornell project
that studied the small village of Bang Chan just outside Bangkok
in the early 1950s. That research stimulated a couple of influen
tial books by Lucien Hanks and Herbert Phillips, but the report
of the study itself by the project leader, Lauriston Sharp, has
been slow in coming. As it is, the Sharp/Hanks. study stands as
an epitaph, not only for the village-which has been swallowed
by Bangkok-but also for the school of thought which it rep
resents."
Sharp and Hanks have subtitled the book, A Social History
ofa Rural Community in Thailand and, as such, it is not really a
bad book. The data are interesting and the story of the founding,
rise and demise of the community is told in an engaging and
easily read style. If the book were not so free with the tendency
to make generalizations about the whole of Thai society on the
basis of this one village, it would be difficult to fault. As it is,
however, it is deeply flawed. Even the most casual reader of
Bang Chan will soon be forced to ask whether or not the village
was really representative ofThai society. Bang Chan was hardly
what one would call a "traditional" village. Rather, it was
founded by a variegated and odd collection of people, including
ex-city dwellers of Chinese descent, Laotian ex-slaves, and
Malayo/Muslim deportees from the south of Thailand. These
settlers who came in the 1850s were not even appreciably
Siamese. The settlement was only about a century old when the
Cornell group arrived to make its study. There was hardly time
for these different ethnic groups to develop close inter-relation
ships, to sink deep roots and to become "truly Siamese." It may
have been that kinship ties were easily broken and that people
were "individualistic" and that cooperation was the exception
rather than the rule. Perhaps Bang Chan really was loosely
structured. Even as a social entity the village itself hardly seems
to have had a clear identity. Rather, it was always a vague
collection of hamlets, not even treated by the government as a
single administrative unit. All of these factors are spelled out in
the book, but for some reason the authors fail to give them due
consideration in their generalizations. They do not overtly pre
sent Bang Chan as an archetype, but neither do they present it as
a type. There remains the implicit and often explicit assumption
that it represents all of Thai society. If one can ignore the
theoretical speculations and the rather naive attempts at histori
ography in the final chapter, there is much of value in the book.
At least the facts are presented regardless of the way in which
they contradict the paradigm.
David Potter's Thai Peasant Social Structure is a wide
ranging and devastating attack on the loose-structure paradigm
and on the assumptions of the Bang Chan school. Much of
Potter's ammunition comes from the very data offered by Sharp
and Hanks. In addition, Potter provides his own, solidly-re
searched village study by way of contrast. The subject is
Chiangmai Village in northern Thailand. It is the very antitheses
of Bang Chan. The fragile myth of a loose structured peasant
society loses credibility by comparison with the densely inter
twined social networks of this northern village:
In contrast to the descriptions that have been written about
Bang Chan, the Thai peasants of Chiangmai Village navi
gate a well-charted social life . They operate in the context of
a corporate village community which is divided into social
strata, factions, kin groups, cooperative labor-exchange
groups which rotate the responsibility for sending rice and
food to the village monastery. In addition, there are clubs
and associations and other cooperative activities in the vil
lage, including the all-important irrigation associations.
(p.34)
In short, it is almost everything that Bang Chan was not and
contains almost every possible contradiction to the loose-struc
ture archetype. Potter usefully synthesizes a number of other
Thai village studies (e.g., Moerman, Turton, Tambiah and
Keyes), 12 to show that there is, in fact, a wide variety of villages
in Thailand. He offers eight alternative types of Thai rural
village systems ranging from a nucleated, clearly defined entity
to the scattered grouping of hamlets such as Bang Chan. Potter
thoroughly demolishes the supposed universality of the loose
structure paradigm and fits Bang Chan into a more diverse
selection of structures. While his alternative scheme is in
triguing, it still needs testing. It would be interesting to know
Potter's views on the political implications of these different
structures. Can his model explain the social and political dy
namics of Thai society in general? A further problem lies with
the environmental constraints and options influencing the dif
9. Lucien M. Hanks. Jr.. "Merit and Power in the Thai Social Order." Neher.
Modern Thai Politics. pp. 112-113. Replinted from American Anthropologist.
64:6(1962).pp.1247-1261.
10. Keyes. The Golden Peninsula. pp. 100. 112 & 298. mentions peasant
rebellions in nineteenth century Siam. Granted our knowledge of these was quite
limited at the time Hanks wrote. This shows how little knowledge we have of the
Thai past.
II. In addition to the Embree and Hanks works cited above. other significant
studies include: Herbert P. Phillips. Thai Peasant Personality: The Patterning
of Interpersonal Behavior in the Village of Bang Chan (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press. 1965); Lauriston Sharp. "Thai
(Siamese) Social Structure." Proceedings of the Ninth Pacific Science Con
gress 011 Anthropology and Social Sciences. Bangkok. Nov. 1957,3: 1963; pp.
120-30; Robert B. Textor. From Peasant to Pedicab Driver (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1967); Sharp. et aI., Siamese Rice ViI/age: A Preliminary
Study ofBang Chan. 1948-1949. (Bangkok. 1953).
12. These include. among others: Charles F. Keyes. "Baan Noong Tyyn: A
Central Isan Village." 1967, Mimeographed. To appear in Clark Cunningham
(ed.). Thai Vii/ages; Michael Moerman. "Ban Ping's Temple: The Centerofa
'Loosely Structured' Society." M a n n i n ~ Nash (ed.), Anthropological Studies
in Theravada Buddhism (New Haven: Yale University Press, Southeast Asia
Studies, Cultural Report Series 13); Steven Piker, "An Examination ofCharac
ter and Socialization in a Thai Peasant Community," Ph.D. Dissertation.
University of Washington , 1964; S.J. Tambiah. "The Ideology of Merit and the
Social Correlates of Buddhism in a Thai Village" in E.R. Leach (ed.). Dialectic
in Practical Religion (Cambridge, England. Cambridge University Press.
1968); Andrew Turton. "Matrilineal Descent Groups and Spirit Cults of the
Thai-Yuan in Northern Thailand." Journal of the Siam Society. 26: 1972.
pp.217-56.
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ferent village structures. It is worth noting that Chiangmai
Village is located in an area of dense population and little arable
land where there is a need for hydraulic irrigation. On the other
hand, Bang Chan (at least originally) was located in an area
where there was plenty of land, where population density was
low and where rainfall was sufficient for crops. In additin, Bang
Chan was oriented to the transportation network of the khlongs
or canals and thus had a linear structure. Other problems raised
by Potter's models relate to the historical age of the various
communities and their relationships to nearby urban centers.
While it seems clear that loose structure is simply too loose
a concept to be an analytical tool, perhaps there is something
there. However, we should greatly increase our knowledge
before final conclusions are drawn. I suspect that it may be a
phenomenon that occurs in traditional rural societies when they
react to urban expansion or to metropolitan pressures in a
colonial situation. It may be that Potter is correct in placing
Bang Chan and Chiangmai Village at opposite ends of a scale. It
might be interesting.to place his different village structures at
varying distances from a city to see if the various structural types
are not simply stages in the historical development of a center/
periphery relationship.
The historical relationship between the center and the
periphery is one of the dominant concerns of the books by
Tambiah and Keyes. Both attempt much broader studies than
either Sharp and Hanks or Potter. Their aim is to encompass the
w hole of Thai society. Here too the paradigms raise their heads.
Tambian in particular appears preoccupied with the benevolent
autocracy model.
World Conqueror and World Renouncer is a difficult book
to review. It is a densely crafted and closely reasoned work and
surely represents a major effort on the part of the author. The
discussion is highly philosophical and complex and the evi
dence of solid research is impressive. In esoteric anthropolog
ical circles it is no doubt considered a "state of the art" exer
cise, yet the book seems overloaded with jargon and, in the final
analysis, is pretentious.
Tambiah's work is largely a discussion of Buddhism arid
power in Thailand and old Siam, a topic which has received a
great deal of attention in recent years. 13 Since his prime concern
is the question of the relationship between the political and
religious orders, he begins with an historical treatment of the
development of Hindu-Buddhist and Siamese political culture
from the time of Asoke to the mid-1970s. He provides an
excellent survey of the scholarly literature relating to political
Hindu-Buddhism in Southeast Asia and presents a coherent
synthesis of these views, together with his own. The first part
of the book deals with the manner in which Buddhist cosmology
provided a model for the state and a framework for the rationali
zation of statecraft. There is much discussion of cosmic state
13. Studies on power and religion in Theravada Buddhist societies include:
Melford Spiro. Buddhism and Society: A Great Tradition and Its Burmese
Vicissitudes (New York: Harper & Row. 1972); E.M. Mendelson. Sangha and
State in Burma. John P. Ferguson (ed.) (Ithaca. N. Y.: Cornell University Press.
1975); and for a comprehensive listing of works on Theravada Buddhism. see
The Golden Peninsula. pp. 109-10.
14. Benedict Anderson. "Withdrawal Symptoms: Social and Cultural Aspects
of the October 6 Coup" in the Bulletin o/Concerned Asian Scholars. Vol. 9.
No.3 (July-Sept .. 1977). pp. 13-31.
models based on palace designs, mandalas and symbols of
kingship. Most intriguing are his diagrams of the traditional
Siamese political universe in Ayutthian times. He suggests that
the political structure of the Ayutthian state was in the form of a
"galactic polity." Perhaps one could read it as a "loose-struc
tured" state, made up of more-or-less autonomous principal
ities grouped around Ayutthya.
It was this political universe that the Chakkri kings of the
Thonburi/Bangkok dynasty inherited. At the end of the nine
teenth century, it was transformed into what Tambiah calls a
"radial polity" by Chulalongkorn. By so rationalizing this
"feudal" empire, Chulalongkorn created the "modem" Thai
state. Whether one agrees that this act modernized the Thai
polity or whether one thinks Chulalongkorn only created a
centralized bureaucracy (a distinction which escapes Tambiah),
he did lay the foundation for the contemporary Thai power
structure.
Anderson, in another article,I4 suggests that no real mod
ernization took place; rather the state was simply centralized
while traditional conceptions of power, as derived from Buddh
ist (or whatever) models, continued to be the foundation for
assumptions about the relationship between ruler and ruled, or
between state and subject. The ethos of the chakrapat has
persisted within the radial polity. Tambiah contends that the
polity was "modernizing," but he does not dispute the persis
tence of traditional ethos of kingship and rule in general; rather
he celebrates it!
. . . conservation and strengthening of"religion" is a plank
in the country's preservation of identity while seeking
change. In this respect Thailand possesses by virtue of a
continuity in the place of Buddhism in the polity a more
self-assured and therefore less self-conscious outlook than
previously colonized countries like Sri Lanka and Burma. (p.
526)
This development, according to Tambiah' has been beneficial
for Thai society and for Buddhism in general. As a result, there
has been no split between the religious and secular orders of the
polity. In addition to deploring the fragmentation of the polities
in Burma and Sri Lanka over questions relating t ~ t h e religious
and political orders, Tambiah points to a similar tendency to
ward conflict in Islamic states. But Thailand is unique, " ... a
crystalization, an amalgam and a totalization of a distinctive
67
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character among the so-called developing states of Southeast
Asia." (Absolute gibberish!) Elsewhere he notes that" ...
Thai nationalism can wrap around itself a cloak of Buddhistic
aura without fear of finding religious obstacles to the social
objectives it may wish to promote." (p. 431) In other words,
and although he does not say it in so many words, might is right.
Tambiah is oblivious to the possibility that this may not be
a very" good" thing. It is perhaps unfortunate that Tambiah had
not waited about two years before publishing this book. One
wonders if the events of October 1976 have given him cause to
question his sanguinity about the close relationship between
nation, religion and king. He never mentions the Thai phrase
coined by the "first" Thai nationalist, King Vajiravudh, chat
sasana-mahakrasat (nation, religion, king), much less analyze
it as an ideological construct. Certainly, had he been in Thailand
during 1975 and 1976, when that slogan became the rallying cry
for hundreds of assassinations leading to the bloody massacre
and reactionary coup of October 6, 1976, he might not have
been so positive about the trends he depicts. One somehow
wishes he had read Barrington Moore a little better; the maxim
that "modernization" (or whatever) without social revolution
leads to fascism seems to apply in Thailand. 15 Actually, there is
far less unity of purpose in "social will" in Thailand than
Tambiah suspects. Furthermore, there is a lot of bloody repres
sion that he is ignoring.
His blind spot is symptomatic of his basic failure-the
unquestioning acceptance of an elitist perspective. World Con
queror stands as the classic statement of the benevolent
autocracy model. Patrimonialism is a value which is inherent in
Thai culture. Therefore authoritarianism, in that context, is
right, proper and "natural." Tambiah does not show us state
authority as it is usually experienced by Thai villagers-in its
coercive and violent manifestations.
Certainly he is right that the "traditional" Thai political
system was authoritarian, but it was also violent. The Thai king
Narasuen (who, incidentally, was responsible for the transition
from Tambiah's Galactic Polity # I to Galactic Polity #2)
reputedly executed 80,000 people, excluding war casualties, in
the latter half of the sixteenth century. According to Jeremias
Van Vliet, Narasuen was never without a weapon.
When he saw someone who did the least thing which did not
please him, he shot an arrow at the offender and asked that
person to bring the arrow to him. He often had pieces o.fflesh
sliced offfrom those (even among the mandarins) who com
mitted the smallest mistakes and had them eat their flesh
before his very eyes. He made others eat their ownfeces. He
always said, "This is the way you Siamese must be ruled
because you are obstinate people o.f an abominable nature
and in a rotten state. But! shall do these thinRs to you until!
make you a respected nation. You are as the grass on the
fertile field: the shorter you are mowed the more beautifully
you grow." 16
Tambiah's failure to deal with the sort of evidence given by Van
Vliet is indicative of his overall lack of historical perspective.
Certainly the tatooing of the entire population of Siamese com
moners, which took place under the first Chakkri monarchs, is
an event which has few parallels in even the most tyrannical
political systems in human history. One should think of these
things when reading Tambiah.
While Tambiah has attempted to justify and explain au
thoritarianism as a "native" value of Thai culture, the next
author appears to accept culture as a given. In The Golden
Peninsula Charles F. Keyes examines culture as a system of
meaning that provides ". . . both a basis for understanding
experiences and a source of values that orient people in de
termining courses of action." (p. 9) Cultural values and situa
tions, as perceived by members of the culture, provide the basis
for social action. In this context he attempts to explain the
historical development of the various cultures of mainland
Southeast Asia and the nature of the process of adaptation and
interaction.
The Golden Peninsula offers another approach to the dis
cussion of Buddhism and power in Thai society. After all,
assumptions about power are an essential part of the paradigms
we have been examining. Keyes' work is a survey of the
cultures of all of mainland Southeast Asia. In addition to cover
ing the Theravada Buddhist cultures of Thailand, Burma, Laos
and Cambodia, it also looks at the Vietnamese and at the
peripheral and minority cultures which coexist with the majority
cultures. Keyes' approach is essentially ethnological, historical
and descriptive. He offers a very different perspective than does
Tambiah. Whereas Tambiah looks out at the Siamese state from
the court and palace, Keyes looks in from the periphery and the
villages. In addition, he has attempted a comparative synthesis
of the cultural complexes of the entire mainland region with a
stress on historical interaction and adaptation. Thus, he gives
specific treatment to questions relating to the colonial impact
and the effects of modernization, revolution and political cen
tralization.
In addition to being based on a considerable amount of
firsthand research in mainland Southeast Asia, The Golden
Peninsula also provides a valuable review and synthesis ofother
published studies and theoretical discussions. Keyes' attempt at
an overall synthesis is innovative and displays a sensitivity for
the unities of the multi-ethnic social landscape of the region. It
should be noted, however, that this is essentially a Thai-oriented
work. Although Burma, Cambodia and Laos are not slighted,
Thailand is presented as the "typical" Theravada Buddhist
society and his discussion of that country forms the core of the
book. The single, large chapter on Vietnam provides an interest
ing discussion of the success of revolutionary forces in the
post-Confucian, post-colonial society of Vietnam.
Like Potter, Keyes also finds fault with the loose-structure
paradigm and offers his own critical analysis of it. For Keyes the
problem concerns "individualism" -the alleged propensity
for Thai to act without reference to ascriptive cultural criteria
and to be nonchalant about kin demands and social pressures.
While crediting this view with a certain validity, he notes that
there are flaws in the Embree/Phillips constructs. The inclina
tion of both to generalize their findings to the whole of Thai
society is debunked. However, he accepts Phillips' contention
that this individualistic behavior may be rooted in the Theravada
Buddhist concept of karma and the idea that the religion's
principal tenet is " ... the complete psychological freedom,
isolation and responsibility of every person." (p. 164) Thus,
15. Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship. Lord
and Peasant ill the Making ofthe Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).
16. Jeremias Van Vliet, The Short History of the Kings of Siam, Leonard Y.
Andaya (trans.) (Bangkok: The Siam Society, 1975), p. 83.
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Keyes accepts at least a part of the loose structure paradigm,
with certain qualifications.
Paradoxically, both Keyes and Potter have criticized the
loose structure concept yet both accept certain elements of it.
Potter is willing to admit that at least some villages appear to be
rather poorly integrated, structurally speaking. Keyes, by con
trast, suggests that "individualism" and a tolerance for idio
syncracy appear to be established cultural values of the Thai,
and presumably of other Theravada Buddhist cultures in the
region. The two phenomena are quite independent of one an
other. Keyes also accepts the phenomenon of fragmented vil
lage structures, but attributes this, perhaps correctly, to the
Western intrusion, the spread of the market economy and the
migration of Indians and Chinese. "Forces unleashed in the
colonial period shattered the organic unity of the traditional
world ... " (p. 320)
Keyes' linking of Thai "individualism" to Theravada
Buddhism offers a comparison with Tambiah's discussion of
merit and power. Tambiah deals with Buddhism on the state
level while Keyes examines the perspective of the villager and
treats questions relating to merit-making, karma and the relief of
suffering. For Keyes, one of the major fUnctions of these be
liefs, and the ceremonies and rituals associated with them, is the
gaining of maturity. The major techniques for gaining merit are
also rites of passage and give both spiritual benefit as well as
rank within society. In addition, they are also the necessary
prerequisites for gaining occult powers. Unfortunately, he treats
these beliefs almost in passing and as if they were "supersti
tions. " I believe that he overlooks an important aspect of the
relationships between merit and power.
Tambiah notes that merit (bun) is inextricably and (for
him) ambiguously linked to the various conceptions of power,
such as amnat and itthi. Keyes' statement that "maturity" is a
necessary step in the achievement of magical powers suggests
that, for Thai peasants, the path to salvation is also the path to
power, which (although he does not say so) can bring worldly
wealth, success with the opposite sex and control over people.
But for Keyes these concepts form the basis for "individual
ism," while for Tambiah they provide the rationale for the
"benevolent autocracy." For Keyes, "All people in the region
believe that they have some significant degree of freedom of
action whereby they generate the Karma whose consequences
will determine their position in the hierarchy of suffering . . .
[and] . . . whose consequences are apparent in the present state
of the social world ..." (p. 166)
It is unfortunate that Keyes did not elaborate these princi
ples in the sphere of political action. Tambiah's discussion of
merit and power demonstrates that the cojoining of the two
concepts forms the rationale for the authoritarian state. Else
where, Keyes notes that the bases of legitimacy in Thailand
have indeed been challenged and further suggests that even
greater changes lie in the future. Does this not mean that cultural
values will also change? Here I suggest is the real crux of the
problem. Does culture define power or does power define the
culture? Certainly there is a concept of power which is defined
by the culture, but to what extent has that concept been shaped
by the powers that be?
Each of these authors gives us a different answer. For
Tambiah, the Thai polity and culture of power have been shaped
by the elite. Despite his contention that they have been modern
ized it seems clear that the only change resulting from Chula
longkorn's "modernization" has been the addition of "ra
tional" administrative techniques and improved technology.
Traditional forms of power have simply been concentrated more
densely. The continued primacy of the city of Bangkok, despite
countless proposals for decentralization, testifies to the force of
traditional concepts. The continued failure of attempts at demo
cratization and the increasing trend toward dictatorship likewise
reflect their persistence. Keyes, more sensibly, does not auto
matically assume that such policies create unity. On the con
trary, he concludes his study with the observation that:
... the predominant political, cultural, and economic roles
of the city in mainland Southeast Asia were fragmented,
being defined in part with reference to a European
dominated context, in part with reference to the interest
situation of migrants from non-Southeast Asian countries,
and only residually with regard to the social demand of the
natives ofthe country. (p. 320)
In the modem environment, the social cement of kin and
community is eroded. As this happens, relationships become
more fragile and violence increases, and, as Keyes points out,
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the Southeast Asian city has become both the locus and the
object of revolutionary change. He suggests that this change
entails a challenge to traditional religions but also maintains that
"In Thailand, in Burma, and perhaps also in Cambodia and
Laos, the emergent traditions are ones that interweave Western
thought with Buddhist thought." (p. 323) If the current situation
is any indication of the future, the prospect is certainly a de
pressing one, as the next two works under discussion here will
amply demonstrate. Despite Keyes' failure to confront fully the
problems of Buddhism and power in Thailand, The Golden
Peninsula will probably prove the most useful for students of
Southeast Asia. The format, language and scope, together with
the wealth of detail, make it the best all-around introduction to
mainland Southeast Asia presently available.
It is necessary to move beyond these questions of loose
structure and benevolent autocracy. While noting the structure
of the state, the culture and the religion, one should be able to
share in the vision of Lu Xun's madman and read between the
lines of the law books, scriptures and scholarly studies the
words upon which all despotic systems are founded- "Eat
men." The simple fact is that without some form of popular
check, any state is repressive and exploitative. At this juncture it
is useful to tum to the fifth work under consideration here,
United States National Security Policy and Aid to the Thailand
Police by Thomas Lobe. It provides an antidote to the theoreti
cal discussions of power and the cultural trivia which charac
terize some of the works already discussed. For years Western
scholars have ignored the phenomenon of regularly executed
violence against villagers by the Thai state. Rather, they have
tended to depict a benevolent autocracy earnestly trying to
uplift, to civilize and to modernize a passive and loose struc
tured peasantry. Lobe offers some good reasons why the peas
antry might appear passive while showing us a much more
malevolent side of state power.
His study is a well-documented exposure of the United
States' strenuous and consistent efforts to create a potent
counter-insurgency force in Thailand since the 1950s. The heart
of this book is the material from over 100 interviews, most with
American participants in this effort. Included are military per
sonnel, State Department officers, employees ofOPS (Office of
Public Security), CIA, USOM, JUSMAG, AID, etc. While his
is primarily a study in international relations (and he accord
ingly spends much time on the processes of American policy
formation) he also pays substantial attention to the impact of that
policy on Thai institutions.
He begins with the story of CIA aid to Police General Phao
Sriyanon and the subsequent rise and fall of the Thai police
organization in the mid-1950s prior to the Sarit coup, after
which police aid was stopped for the remainder of the Eisen
hower administration. In the early 1960s, however, police and
paramilitary aid was reborn under Kennedy's counter
insurgency advisor, the infamous General Edward G. Lansdale.
The program ofCIA/OPS-sponsored police training was subse
quently escalated along with the Indochina war. The process
spawned new organizations and programs designed to increase
the government's capacity for enforcing social and political
controls in the countryside: the Border Patrol Police, the Village
Defense Corps, the Village Secunty Officers, People's Assis
tance Teams, the Village Self-Defense Forces and others. Di
recting these were the Communist Suppression Operations
Command (COSOC) and its successor, the Internal Security
Operations Command (ISOC). OPS spent over $82 million
during 1961-197 I, a total second only to its aid budget for
South Vietnam for the same period, and exceeding the cumula
ti ve total of OPS aid to all other countries in the world for those
years, excluding Vietnam.
While Lobe's work is valuable, it lacks an analysis of the
impact of these "security programs" on village life, or on Thai
cultural values. A discussion of the paradigms does not really
fall within the rather narrow limits of this study. The data which
he presents, however, does little to support the idea of a benev
olent autocracy and reinforces the suggestion that much of what
passes for loose structure is simply the result of official
brutalization.
Another blank spot is the question of military aid to Thai
llind by the U . S. While this was not the object of Lobe's inquiry,
police aid, particularly during the years following the Sarit
coup, was only one aspect of American counter-insurgency
policies in Thailand. While a full exploration of those policies
would easily fill a dozen studies the size of Lobe's, some
discussion of that overall context would have been useful. As it
stands, a full study of the impact of American policies remains
to be written.
Despite these shortcomings, Lobe's postscript, written af
ter the massacres of Thai students on October 6, 1976, em
phasizes the significance of his presentation. The Americans
purportedly trained the Thai police to preserve order, promote
national security and to "win the people." To that end, the
police were organized into hunter-killer assassination squads.
Armed with recoilless rifles, helicopter gunships, APCs, heavy
and light automatic weapons, etc., they were turned loose on the
countryside. His conclusion is a ringing indictment of American
complicity in the right-wing coup of 1976.
... the United States, through the careful and consistent
application ofcertain kinds offoreign assistance over years,
has created the preconditions, the infrastructure. the readi
ness for a more coercive. repressive, and vehemently anti
communist set ofpolitical-military leaders. As this study has
shown. the United States government has labored cease
lessly to accomplish the end brought forth in blood on Oc
tober 6th. The future can hold only more division and more
blood: a civil war. resulting in either an even more repres
sive and fanatic right-wing government or the victory ofthe
insurgent left. United States policy has. once again. sub
verted all middle ground. (p. 123)
While there is indeed truth in what he says, one might also
legitimately ask whether there ever was a middle ground. Lobe
does not question the willingness, indeed the eagerness of the
Thai ruling establishment to adopt this vehement anti
communist strategy. We must look elsewhere for that answer.
The final study under consideration here, Thailand:' The
Politics of Despotic Paternalism, speaks most directly to the
questions raised by Anderson. Thak Chaloemtiarana (one of
Anderson's students) has both a good grasp of Western social
science theory as well as an intimate understanding of Thai
political theory and practice. His study of the rise and fall of
Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat critiques Western views on Thai
land and examines Thai political culture. It also is possible to
draw from Thak an explanation of the directions taken by
Western social scientists in Thailand. Sarit, perhaps more than
any other figure, was most immediately responsible for the
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cultural and political milieu which Americans found when they
arri ved in the 1950s and 60s.
Benevolent autocracy and a strictly hierarchical division of
the polity were at the core of Sarit's political philosophy. Sarit
himself was perhaps an outstanding example of some of the
precepts that have been subsumed into the grab bag of loose
structure. His career was a classic example of social mobility.
Coming from a plebeian background, he rose through the ranks
of the army. In the leadership crisis of the late 1940s, he was
able to manipulate the cliques and factions that divided the Thai
military. At a time when nascent democratic institutions were
tainted by the corruption and ineptness of the second Phibun
administration, Sarit seized power. The question of whether the
crisis conditions of 1957 and Sarit's resolution of them were in
any way typical or indicative of deep-seated tendencies in Thai
political life is perhaps the fundamental issue.
Even today, after the corruption scandal that came to light
before Sarit's ashes had even cooled, and after the disembowel
ing of the system which he built, Sarit remains the classic
example of the man on the white horse. Thak portrays Sarit as
the architect of " ... Thailand's neo-classical authoritarian
period, a time for despotic paternalism" (p. xxv). While he
notes that it is easy to be critical of Sarit for the harshness and
corruption of his regime, Thak suggests that there is something
to be learned from the study ofSarit and his impact on Thailand.
It is easy for us to attribute compliance to fear ofdictatorial
powers alone. There appears to be that' 'elusive quality" in
the Sarit leadership, enough to raise the issue of whether
Sarit was an anachronism. for it is still common even today to
hear remarks that political uncertainty in Thailand could be
stabilized by a leader like Sarit. He remains a controversial
prototype upon which political leaders are measured. (xxvii
xxviii)
Sarit's political ideology and the system of despotic pa
ternalism which he built revolved around the notions ofpattiwat
(revolution) and phatthana (development/modernization).
Thak points out that pattiwat was, for Sarit, a reactionary
phenomenon. Sarit saw society as a "three-tiered segmented
socio-political system" made up of the state, the bureaucracy and
the people. Sarit's aim was to create stability through the main
tenance of the hierarchical boundaries. Development, or
phatthana was intended to enhance this "revolutionary" stabil
ity. There was, of course, a contradiction here:
The incongruity of economic development and political
traditionalism built up growing tensions in Thai society.
especially after Sarit's death. For either the political system
would have to adjust itself to socio-economic change or the
regime would have to employ coercive measures to suppress
such change. The dramatic events of the 1970s in Thailand
are indicative ofthe tensions between the two systems. (xxvi
xxvii)
The flaws in Sarit's program betray a kind of innocence
characteristic of the man himself. Sarit was not born to power or
position. He lacked an aristocratic background, the polish of a
foreign education or any type of serious intellectual training.
One thing that stands out in Thak's portrayal of Sarit is the
man's unabashed mediocrity and banality. He was a parody of
his contemporary in the U.S., Dwight Eisenhower.
For Sarit, a prime indicator of development for the Thai
people was a display of riap-roy. a concept which subsumes the
ideas of cleanliness, respectability and completeness. In certain
contexts, the term suggests a kind of all-absorbing fussiness
with trivial detail. Sarit was concerned, for instance, that vil
lages should be neat and clean. Appearances were more im
portant than substance. People should not spit. They should not
chew betel nut. Needless to say, artistic and socially creative
people were not riap-roy. Thai culture was impoverished by the
censorship and repression of the regime. Not only was Sarit a
dictator, but he was a petty-minded dictator. The parody of Thai
culture he produced was what so many Western academics took
as the real thing.
Of course, most Thai took Sarit seriously too. He was
capable of having profiteering rice dealers dragged into the
street and summarily shot. In addition to his violence. Sarit was
also insecure. His insecurity, perhaps more than his stated
policies, did much to set the direction of his regime. Sarit was
involved in a continuous search for legitimacy. He needed the
army's power, and he also needed the administrative network
controlled by the bureaucrats to counter his unwillingness to
seek popular approval. Sarit considered democracy an alien
idea. To this end, he resuscitated the monarchy and refurbished
the "nation-religion-king" ideology of King Vajiravudh. The
Dammayut sect was strengthened, as Tambiah has shown, and
Sarit styled himself the phokhun. or father-figure of the nation.
Sarit, however, needed an exterior legitimizing force. This need
was filled by the American alliance. American economic aid
helped to build a lot of "neat and clean" roads that illogically
appeared to go nowhere. American military aid provided hand
outs to keep his soldiers satisfied and weaponry to keep the
people in line. Like many national armies in developing coun
tries, the Sarit army was designed to deal with a domestic enemy
rather than a foreign one.
The absence of a viable enemy was another of Sarit's
legitimacy problems. Here the communists were important. The
problem of the actual extent of insurgency in Thailand in the
1950s is still a matter of doubt. The Americans, however, were
ready to believe anyone was a communist. The "communist
ghost." as Thai intellectuals later came to call this threat,
brought American support and at die same time provided an
excuse for keeping half the country under martial law .
There were, however, unforeseen problems. The anti
communist alliance with America brought Thailand into the
Indochina war. By the late 1960s Sea-Land Inc.'s 18-wheelers
were hauling loads of napalm and Coca-Cola from Sattahip to
Takhli, Korat and other air bases over those roads that once
seemed to go nowhere. Fifty-thousand G.l.s were stationed in
71
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the country and thousands more came from 'Nam each week
on "Rest and Recreation" leaves to patronize the whorehouses,
massage parlors, bars and short-time hotels that had sprung up.
Granted, these things happened after Sarit's death, but he had
sown the seeds which bore fruit under his successors.
Sarie s flaws went deeper than his personal and political
insecurity. He did not deliver on his promises of development.
Very often his successes generated resentment rather than ap
plause, and peasants were further impoverished. Rice lands
were confiscated without compensation to build roads and then
taxes on the peasants were increased to pay for them. To Sarit's
credit, he did provide substantial encouragement for the expan
sion of education, particularly at the primary level. He also
provided for the expansion of the university system. It is per
haps ironic that the universities, more than any other institution,
were responsible for the first serious challenge to the Sarit
system in 1973.
Beyond that, Sarit remains a dominant figure in the minds
of many Thai. For especially the older generation of Bangkok
ians, the Sarit years were the "good old days." The remnants of
his military/bureaucratic system still cling insecurely to power
as they face the hornet's nest that the Americans stirred up in
Indochina. The elite which he created has run out of ideas and
begun to fragment. Nevertheless, the system has held together
for over two decades and has weathered a 3-year interlude of
parliamentary democracy. Despite his flaws, Sarit had a basic
understanding of power. He used it well, ifnot wisely.
Thak's lucid explanations of Thai political practice,
phrased in the political vocabulary of Thailand, make The
Politics of Despotic Paternalism necessary reading for all who
would understand the current political situation of Thailand.
This book, published in Thailand, will probably not receive
adequate dissemination unless it is republished in Europe or the
U.S. and preferably with an index and a bibliography.
In conclusion, how do these studies fare against Ander
son's critique? Perhaps they may be seen as falling into three
categories. The Sharp/Hanks and Tambiah are in the first. They
accept the standard paradigms without question. Bang Chan is
caught in the mire of loose-structure and in the concerns of the
1950s. It is a fossil. Tambiah, on the other hand, champions the
benevolent autocracy paradigm. For all its brilliance and scope,
World Conqueror is too naive in its acceptance of an elitist
perspective. It lacks a feeling for the Thai people. One would
think that Tambiah never smelled buffalo shit. He does tell us a
lot, however, about how the Thai ruling class views the world,
and for that, if nothing else, it is valuable.
Potter and Keyes occupy the second category or phase in
the continuum of self-awareness. Both are critical of the para
digms, but both continue to seek the' 'answer" to the process of
change in Thailand within the realm of a cultural paradigm.
Both would have us, it seems, simply find more and better
paradigms. I am not sure this is a particularly useful effort if it is
not coupled with an attempt to understand dynamic processes.
We cannot be satisfied with Keyes' dictum that cultural condi
tions change unless we also understand the objective situation
within which change has occurred and unless we can demon
strate how adaptations were made in given situations.
Keyes is by no means blind to the limitations of cultural
paradigms. His discussion of the changes being wrought on
traditional cultural values as a result of urbanization and central
ization is indicative of that. Nevertheless, he has taken us about
as far as cultural explanations can go. His suggestion that the
success of the revolutionary movement in Vietnam, and the
failure of similar movements in the Theravada Buddhist coun
tries can be explained in cultural terms is less than convincing.
Already, certain portions of the book-particularly references
to recent events in Cambodia-are badly dated. This is the fate
of all studies founded on cultural explanations.
A cultural, or any theoretical, explanation must be shown
in a historical context. Our general ignorance of the essential
facts of Thai history makes these theoretical discussions prema
ture. It is this awareness of the complexity of the Thai historical
situation that places the studies of Lobe and Thak in our final
category. In both, the main concern is with discrete historical
situations. Likewise there is an awareness of the problems
presented by historical change. This is shown not only in the
narrative structure of the works, but also in their sensitivity to
recent historical changes.
As a result, both of them come much closer to satisfying
the demands of Anderson's critique. Lobe, while not concerned
with paradigms, offers a great deal more information on a
heretofore neglected topic. Thak, likewise, adds to our store of
new data while at the same time demonstrating the permutations
of cultural values in a historical setting.
One of the reasons these two works are able to challenge
the paradigms is the fact that they have been written since 1973.
More than anything else, the events that have shaken Thailand
since October 14, 1973, have knocked the scales from our eyes.
As scholars, we must begin that "agonizing reappraisal" that is
necessary when we see all of our fond shibboleths blown away
like the morning coolness in the hot tropical sun. Within the
space of two weeks in October 1973, a mass movement fired by
"apolitical" students electrified the country. The entrenched
bureaucratic polity shuddered and the "Terrible Trio" (Thanom
Kittikachorn, Prapas Charusatien and Narong Kittikachorn)
fled with their tails between their legs. All over the country
laborers, farmers, middle class urbanites and students began to
strike, demonstrate and demand popular sovereignty. Suddenly
the mythology of a loosely structured and docile populace
evaporated. The passive peasants began organizing demonstra
tions calling for the expulsion of this or that official who had
cheated or oppressed the people. In factories everywhere the
abolition of anti-union, anti-strike laws brought on a veritable
wave of strikes. The patron-client cliques fell apart as class
consciousness began to come out of the closet. The abolition of
censorship resulted in a massive expansion of artistic, particu
larly literary, endeavors. I believe that more books, poems,
articles and periodicals were published in the next three years
than had appeared in the preceding three decades.
Both Thak and Lobe show clearly that they have begun to
reappraise the situation in Thailand as a result of those changes.
One hallmark of their very different approaches is their attention
to the American role in Thailand. More than any other single
factor. the American impact has been the decisive engine of
change in Thailand since 1945. As Anderson has pointed out in
another of his ground-breaking essays. "Withdrawal Symp
toms, .. 17 the eruptions of 1973 and since were closely related to
American influences. This was both positive and negative in
nature. If American intervention enhanced the efficiency of the
dictatorship, it also helped to educate and to radicalize those
who led the resistance to dictatorship.
It is clear, however, that serious study of the American
impact on Thailand is just beginning. A great deal more work
72
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needs to be done. Works such as that by Lobe are needed in
much greater numbers. Unfortunately, most of the records re
garding CIA and military policies and operations remain class
ified. In the economic, social and cultural areas, data is more
widely available, but needs to be gathered and presented as well
as analyzed.
Another area that should draw students in the future is that
suggested by Keyes. He has stressed the fragmenting force of
the primate city in Southeast Asia. Yet he has also pointed out
that no serious studies have been made of the dominant urban
culture. As a self-conscious product of that culture, Thak has
presented a unique insight into its value system. Perhaps West
ern anthropologists should begin to take a closer look at the
culture of the city before they attempt to interpret that of the
village. Certainly those who study the villages should under
stand the impact of the city.
There is also a need for Marxist analyses of Thailand.
Questions regarding class conflict, not only in recent years, but
over the course ofThai history, need much more detailed study.
The same is true for the problem of the colonial and neo-colonial
impact. With the possible exceptions of Andrew Turton and
Thaddeus Flood. no Western Marxist that has written about
Thailand has had substantial first-hand experience of the coun
try, its history or culture. It would be helpful if Westerners had a
little more exposure to the work of Thai Marxists before they
begin developing analyses ofthe country. Works such as those
by Suttee and Chatthip on the economic history of nineteenth
century Thailand are essential if Westerners are to understand
the nature of economic change in Thailand!S Likewise, the
forthcoming translation of Jit Phumisak by Craig Reynolds will
be a most welcome addition to our familiarity with the class
system and the nature of domination in the country.
Finally, it is necessary to see change in Thailand in relation
to the international environment. As events in Cambodia have
demonstrated, the machinations of superpower struggle and
intervention can be decisive. Despite the cultural stagnation of
the ruling Thai elite, they have been remarkably fortunate in the
recent reshuffling of the geopolitical alliances. On the one hand
the growth of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) has given the military rulers the support of all the
other right-wing regimes in the region. With the economic
backing of Japan and the military support of the United States,
the ASEAN alliance is a formidable obstacle to progressive
change.
Perhaps the major problem with Western writings on Thai
land is simply that they are Western, and as such they lack the
depth and intimate knowledge of the culture that is the sole
preserve of the native. All too often, Western scholars have
come to Thailand already armed with an extraneous agenda and
have ended up by creating issues that had no relevance to the
Thai themselves. Had there been available in 1950 a substantial
body of prior scholarship done by Thais, I suspect that such
questions as loose structure would never have arisen.
Obviously, the disciplines of Western social science pro
vide an indispensable conceptual framework for scholarship,
but theory demands a prior knowledge of the facts. It is this
combination of discipline and knowledge that makes the Thak
study such an outstanding contribution. Clearly, the most press
ing need at present is the continued production of work by Thai
scholars and a willingness on the part of Western students to
* learn from their efforts.
The Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars is distributed to
bookstores in the U.S.A. by Carrier Pigeon, a national
distributor of radical and feminist books and magazines.
If you know of stores that should sell the Bulletin, ask
them to write to Carrier Pigeon, 7S Kneeland St., Room
309, Boston, Mass. 02111 U.S.A.
Entrance to Chieng Mai Temple. Thailand (Photo by S. Sturdevant).
17. Benedict Anderson. "Withdrawal Symptoms." pp. 14-15.22.
18. Major works by western Marxists include: Malcolm Caldwell. Thailand:
Roots of Conflict (London: Spokesman Press. 1978) and David Elliott. Thai
land: Origins ofMilitary Rule (Belfast. Me.: Porter. 1979). Both of these were
unfortunately written without the benefit of the documentary collection on
nineteenth century Thailand: Chatthip Nartsupha and Suthy Prasartset. Socio
Economic Institutions and Cultural Change in Siam. 1851-1910: A Docu
mentary Sur.ey (Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies. 1977).
73
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East Timor Short Reviews
EAST TIMOR INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
REPORT, by Michael Chamberlain (ed.). New York:
Clergy and Laity Concerned, 1981. 47 pp., tables,
photographs. $2.50 (includes postage). Order from:
East Timor Human Rights Committee, Box 363, Clin
ton Station, Syracuse, N.Y. 13201.
by Richard Franke
On October 19th and 20th in New York City there was an
International Conference on East Timor. The conference was
notable partly because it attracted several representatives from
the United Nations Community as well as members of demo
cratic opposition groups from Thailand, South Korea, and
South Africa along with several academic, journalistic, and
religious personnel. The conference coincided with discussions
that resulted in the sixth consecutive U.N. resolution (printed in
the Conference Report along with the member nations' voting
record) condemning Indonesia's 1975 invasion of the former
Portuguese colony and calling for a genuine act of self-determi
nation for East Timor's still suffering and embattled people.
Of greatest interest for those not able to attend the confer
ence and who search for the occasional but infrequent press
account of developments on East Timor is the publication of the
conference proceedings by The East Timor Project of Clergy
and Laity Concerned. The New York conference brought to
gether one of the largest groups yet of East Timor experts, and
their published presentations make this report a valuable re
source for scholars, teachers, journalists, human rights activ
ists, and ordinary citizens who want to understand this little
known but major confrontation between 750,00 to one million
East Timorese and the military regime of Indonesia, a nation
numbering some 130 million.
Contents of the Report include a firsthand account from
Lisbon by journalist Jill Jolliffe who also spent 3 months in 1975
in East Timor and has followed the story intensively ever since,
and an overview by James Dunn of the problems of relief aid.
Dunn served as Australian Consul in Timor in the 1960s and has
probably the largest number of reliable sources-some of them
confidential-on developments in East Timor. Admiral Gene
laRocque (Ret.) of the Washington-based Center for Defense
Information gives remarks on the strategic importance-or lack
thereof-of East Timor for the United States. Professor Ben
Anderson of Cornell summarizes many of the problems that the
East Timor war has created both for the Indonesian people
(including approximately 2,000 soldiers killed without national
honors as the war is not admitted to the public) and for the
regime in Jakarta (e.g., flagrant violation of its own stated
anticolonial philosophy, hence also a certain diplomatic isola
tion among Third World nations). There is growing awareness
in some Indonesian circles of the similarity between their oppo
sition to the antidemocratic policies of the Suharto regime and
the East Timorese struggle for independence and self-determi
nation against that same regime.
Anthropologist Shepard Forman, who conducted field re
search in East Timor from 1973-75 offers a vivid eyewitness
portrait of the desire of the Makassae ethnic and cultural group
for political independence and participation, while Professor
Noam Chomsky describes some of the political intrigues and
press distortions to the American people that have accompanied
the portrayal of the East Timor invasion.
Finally Pretilin UN Representative Jose Ramos-Horta
summarizes his country's views on the diplomatic aspects and
reviews some of the most recent evidence of continuing and
significant resistance within East Timor.
In addition to these well-known authorities, the Confer
ence Report contains articles by Arnold Kohen and Michael
Chamberlain on congressional and grass-roots work with the
U.S. public, a chronology of the war, an extensive bibliography
of books, articles, newspaper sources, U.S. congressional hear
ings, and UN documents, as well as responses to some common
misconceptions about East Timor, a list of major U.S. arms
transfers to Indonesia, and suggestions for actions people can
take. Several well-chosen photographs and graphics help a k ~
the Report highly attractive.
The 1980 East Timor Conference Report is a document
deserving a wide audience. Its combination offacts and analysis
by reliable and well-informed scholars, journalists, and diplo
mats and its well-written style make it easy to read and absorb
the often difficult and shocking events and processes reported. It
can be of use to teachers, for college classes, for church groups,
human rights workers, diplomats, members of congress and
their aides, journalists and other media workers, and anyone
who wants to know about, understand and respond to this brutal
war. *
74
BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org
Vietnam
by Jayne Werner
This collection of documents on the Vietnam war roughly
spans the periods of French and American involvement (Vol. I:
1945-1955; Vol. II: 1955-1975) and purports to include the
major documents reflecting the key decisions of the two con
flicts. In this effort it is largely successful, and indeed the two
volumes represent the longest and most comprehensive com
pilation of documents on the war to date. The collection concen
trates on previously unpublished materials (including the "sec
ret record" of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon eras), choos
ing not to include some documents that already are in the public
record. An example of the excluded material is the Paris Peace
Agreement, concluded between the U.S. and Vietnam in Janu
ary 1973.
The documents assembled here are an indispensible reference
work for a history of the war, U.S. policy toward Vietnam from
1945-1975, and debates concerning the origins of the war. They
most strongly reflect the U.S. side of the Vietnam war, but
insofar as possible this picture is balanced with documents from
the Vietnamese side, a prime weakness in previous collections.
However, the collection is not as comprehensive as the title
professes. For the first Indochina war, there are few official
French documents; the French "side" has to be gleaned through
U.S. documents. Also, there is little documentation from the
Saigon governments, post-1955, presumably because the editor
downplays their importance in the evolution of the conflict.
However, the Viet Minh side in the first resistance war against
the French is nicely represented. For the second resistance war
against the U. S., the record is poorer, and the editor essentially
is obliged to rely on captured "Viet Cong" internal memo
randums and policy statements. There is a scattering of docu
ments relating to Laos, Cambodia and to China-Vietnam and
Soviet-Vietnam relations.
Original documents included here for the first time come
from five sources. The National Archives ih Washington, D.C.,
have yielded a few memorandums and letters concerning U.S.
Vietnamese relations in the 1945-46 period, which enhance our
understanding of the efforts undertaken by Ho Chi Minh to
establish a relationship with the U.S. Also from the Archives
comes a collection of papers regarding Vietnamese-French rela
tions which were given to the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok in 1946
by Vietnam. These documents reinforce the argument made by
Philippe Devillers and others that the French purposively
adopted a tough negotiating stance vis-a-vis the newly-formed
Viet Minh government immediately following World War II,
and were responsible for provoking the Viet Minh into military
action in 1946. The Vietnamese action was then used as a
pretext for further French intervention and reconquest. These
documents do not include the original Vietnamese papers, how
ever; they are translations by the Department of State.
The second new source includes the papers and bylaws of
the Vietnam-America Friendship Associatin set up in 1945 by
O.S.S. Major Archimedes Patti. These papers come from the
Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris, and the originals are in Viet
namese (translated into English by the editor for this volume).
VIETNAM: THE DEFINITIVE DOCUMENTA
TION OF HUMAN DECISIONS, by Gareth Porter
(ed.). Stanfordville, N.Y.: Earl M. Coleman Enter
prises, 1979, 2 Volumes, $60.00.
The third source of documents is the captured Viet Cong docu
ments, known as the Race Collection and the Pike Collection,
which are in microfilm and are located in the Cornell University
Libraries. The fourth source is official U.S. documents obtained
under the Freedom of Information Act. Finally, there are a
number of new documents from the Lyndon B. Johnson Library
in Austin, Texas.
Both the first and the second volumes contain important
material. No new areas of debate are opened up by virtue of this
assemblage, but the volumes provide additional evidence for
many of the arguments made by opponents of both wars. For
example, it can now be documented that there was wide discre
pancy between the official statements and secret policy of both
the French and U.S. governments. The documents also reveal a
consistent pattern on the part of both the French and the Ameri
cans to favor the use of military force and provocation in dealing
with the Communists, often when the Viet Minh/North Vietnam
were willing to resolve the situation by political means or by
negotiations. That the Communists would have benefitted from
this tactic is beside the point: French and American policy in
Vietnam was in large part characterized by the application of
military force to achieve a political purpose (the viability of a
non-communist government in Vietnam), a goal which was
clearly impossible to sustain by political means. Internal docu
ments reveal that Western policy makers realized this to be the
case and were aware that the "independence" of the various
Saigon governments was a fiction. Thus the history ofduplicity
and deliberate provocations to step up military action that we
have come to associate with the Johnson and Nixon administra
tions is shown in these materials to have been a pattern in the
French war as well.
There is also a pattern revealed in these documents for both
Western imperialist nations to refuse to negotiate in good faith,
when they do negotiate with the Communist Vietnamese, de
spite public professions to the contrary. The secret record fur
thermore demonstrates the covert and deliberate interference on
the part of top French and American officials in the internal
affairs of the "sovereign state" of the Saigon governments, to
an extent previously suspected but undocumented.
On the Vietnamese Communist side, the most important
materials concern North Vietnamese priorities and policy from
1956 to 1961. They illustrate conclusively that the North Viet
namese wished to avoid war with the United States at almost any
cost. The sequence of shifts in Hanoi's policy from 1956 on is
now clearer, until the decision to favor military means to topple
the Saigon government is taken in 1961. Although terrorist and
guerrilla tactics were being used by southern revolutionaries
before 1961, the party in the north opposed these tactics, except
for defensive purposes.
Some documentary highlights:
A telegram from Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew
to Ambassador Caffery in France, Mayf6, 1945, indicating that
the policy of the U.S. towards Vietnam had shifted in favor of
France, immediately following the death of President Roosevelt
75
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(Vol. I, p. 46);
The letters of Ho Chi Minh to the U.S. Department of
State, 1945-1946, which were ignored by the U.S. govern
ment, are included (Vol. I, pp. 85,95);
A Viet Minh document describing how the revolutio
qary government was able to avoid a dire threat of famine during
the difficult days of early 1946 (Vol. I, p. 114);
U. S. official correspondence which indicates that Ho
Chi Minh hinted to aU. S. official in Hanoi in 1946 possible
cooperation with the U.S. to develop the naval facilities at Cam
Ranh Bay (Vol. I, p. 129).
A number of the top-level National Security Council
memos and statements regarding U.S. policy can be found here,
including some of the most important ones. NSC 48/4 of May
17, 1951 (Vol. I, p. 349) defines the change in U.S. policy in
Asia. An earlier memo, NSC 51 of July I, 1949 (Vol. I, p.
206), previously unpublished, is the first prediction of U.S.
involvement in Vietnam. This document was declassified in
1973. Another memo, dated early 1952 and declassified in
1976, rejects a negotiated settlement by the French with the
Communists and opposes withdrawal of French forces in In
dochina (Vol. I, p. 389). The I 90th meeting of the NSC, March
25, 1954, discusses the possibility of U.S. unilateral action in
Vietnam (Vol. I, p. 515). This document was declassified on
September 30, 1977.
Volume II, which treats the American war and goes be
yond the Pentagon Papers, throws some new light on the Ken
nedy and Johnson administrations. Less is revealed about the
Nixon administration. In NSC 5612/1 (declassified September
9, 1977), a statement of policy on Vietnam declares that the
northern is to be treated as illegitimate and subject
to overthrow by military intervention (Vol. II, p. 22). However,
we still cannot "what Kennedy would have done" if he
had not been assassinated. The Tonkin Gulf affair is substan
tially elucidated by papers from the Johnson Library in Texas
(Vol. II, pp. 297-315). There are several memos by William
Bundy which demonstrate that the Johnson administration
searched for some time for a pretext to escalate the war. In one
memo, Bundy discusses the threat and the actual use of nuclear
weapons over China and Vietnam in order to exert pressure on
the North Vietnamese government (Vol. II, p. 137). In another,
William Sullivan suggests that the U.S. take over the Saigon
administration (he calls it "integration"), denying that this is
colonialism (Vol. II, p. 270).
The Nixon administration receives sparse attention be
cause of the lack of available material. Kissinger enters the story
only on p. 522, and the reader scarcely gets a glimpse of his role
in the prolongation of the war. However, the secret annex to the
Paris Peace Agreements promising post-war aid to North Viet
nam is reproduced in this volume (Vol. II, p. 599).
Nowhere in these two volumes is there mention of Alexan
der Haig, who was important in the formation of U.S. policy
toward Vietnam and Cambodia in the last days of the Nixon
administration, and about whom the secret record undoubtedly
will have much to reveal. The documentation of the Nixon
administration will have to wait for another day.
A paperback edition of these two volumes, condensed into
one volume, is being published by New American Library, and
is scheduled for release sometime in 198 I. According to the
editor, the paperback edition will include the most significant
documents from the hardback edition. *
Moving?
Moving is costly. For you. And occasionally for
us. If you change your address but do not tell us,
the Post Office throws away your copy of the
Bulletin. . . and then charges us!
Give us a break. Tell us before you move.
Old Address
(street)
(city, state/province) (ZIP)
New Address
(street)
(city, state/province) (ZIP)
BCAS, P.O. Box W, Charlemont, MA 01339 USA
Correspondence
London, England
May21,1981
To the Editors:
It has been brought to my attention that one formulation in
my article "The Korean War: Some Notes on Evidence and
Solidarity" (Vol. I I, No.3, 1979, p. 18, note 64), viz., that
"criticism of the Korean revolutionary movement must be sci
entific, not underhanded" might be misinterpreted. It was not my
intention to suggest that' Frank Baldwin had been "under
handed" and I unreservedly apologize if this inference has been
drawn.
Jon Halliday
Orono, Maine
Feb. 17, 1981
To the Editors:
Please correct an oversight by printing the following ack
nowledgement. Research for my article, "T. A. Bisson and the
Limits of Reform in Occupied Japan" (Vo\' 12, No.4, 1980,
pp. 26-37) was aided by grants from the American Philosophi
cal Society and the Faculty Research Fund, University of
Maine, Orono.
Howard Schonberger
76
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Cinema Review
The Philippines
by Saundra Sturdevant
This film's story begins when Ms. Cruz arrives in a fishing
village on the island of Marinduque. She is a short, dumpy,
middle-aged woman dressed in black. She has come from
Manila, which is about 200 miles away, to recruit young women
for factory work. Ligaya, played by Hilda Koronel, is reluctant
to go. She was born in the village and has a young male friend,
Julio, played by Bembol Rocco, Jr., whom she's known since
childhood. They are lovers. But she agrees to go. Her family is
poor and by working she'll be able to help out her mother who is
still nursing one of Ligaya's many siblings. Besides, she wants
to see Manila.
The reality of Manila is of course something else. Arriving
at a house after the trip, Ligaya is given orange juice laced with a
drug. She wakes up in the bed of the Chinese merchant, Ah Tek.
Ms. Cruz is one of those who comb the poverty-stricken rural
areas outside Manila to procure women's bodies for the sailors,
military men, businessmen and immigrant laborers who work in
that city. It is a common situation in Third World countries. We
have no idea how much Ms. Cruz paid Ligaya's mother but,
according to a UN report, $2.00 buys an Indian woman from the
rural areas of Paraguay. [K. Barry, Female Sexual Slavery,
1980, p. 57] As yet, we have no documentation on the going rate
in the Philippines.
Ligaya's position is better than other women in the house.
Although she's locked in her room, she only has to fuck with Ah
Tek twice a week. And she's not made drug dependent by forced
injections of morphine. She can hear the screams of other
women in the house as they promise to do anything for a fix. To
implant the reality of her fortunate position in her mind, Ah Tek
sees that she's taken on a tour of the place.
The film is not about this young woman's experiences.
That film has yet to be made. The film is about the ramifications
of her experiences on the life of her male friend, Julio. Or, to put
it another way, the film is about the last year in the life of Julio.
The film opens with morning street shots of Manila. Julio
is standing on Misarecordia Street in the Chinatown section.
The streets are narrow, crowded and unswept. Garbage, spit,
bottle caps, beer bottles, paper and plastic trash are everywhere.
Shops have expandable metal gates which are pulled across
glass fronts and locked at night. Neon signs-Sanyo, Pepsi
Cola, NEC- in their bright colors will light up the night sky.
Noise is everywhere: the din of repairing metal cars and
machines ... automobile, truck, cycle engines ... people
talk, cough, argue, bargain and spit ... the clang of dishes
from cafes ... the noise of juke boxes. Buildings are old and
inside plumbing is poor or broken. Inside too, a nail pounded
into a wall with peeling paint holds a change of clothes. The air
is heavy with dust. Bodies have layers of dirt and sweat. This is
MANILA: IN mE CLAWS OF DARKNESS, di
rected by Lino Brocka. Republic of the Philippines,
1975.
Manila but it could be Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, Cairo,
Bombay, Bangkok, Jakarta. These are the great cities of the
Third World, their populations expanded many times over by
immigration from the impoverished countryside. Brocka does
an excellent job in capturing the sights, the sounds, the feel.
Julio is one of these immigrants. He comes to the city
looking for Ligaya. Work is scarce but he is fortunate and gets a
job as an unskilled laborer in the construction of a multi-storied
modem building. Work is dangerous for safety rules are non
existent; accidents are frequent. There are, of course, no unions
or government regulations. Although the minimum wage is 6
pesos per day, Julio receives 3.5 pesos [25 US], and that's
before the construction boss and paymaster take their cuts. We
hear the worker's frustrations in private and we see their anger
as they queue up each pay day. But no one demands improved
conditions or a just wage. Each is an expendable commodity and
each knows it.
The young single male workers live together in a company
provided room. Conditions are squalid but they can cook their
own food. Brocka shows them as being tolerant or kind to one
another. They, for example, share their resources with Julio
when he arrives on the job weak from hunger and dead broke.
They discuss the fact their work is dangerous and exploitative,
yet many also articulate that it is better than the traditional, dead
end work and life style ofthe rural areas. Of course, no one hints
at the role of imperialism, neo-imperialism ... or the Philip
pine collaborationist class . . . in the impoverishment of the
rural areas.
Despair and fatalism are the dominant sentiments. Some
articulate the desperation of the situation by dreams of escape.
One fantasizes about becoming a famous pop singer. He prac
tices constantly. He's alive and beautiful to watch. He's killed
on the job when a board from above hurls down on him and
sends him crashing 40 feet or more down onto what will be the
central plaze of the new building. His song book flies after him.
Another worker dreams ofescape through going to night school.
He's persistent and at age 33 gets a job as an ad man. He then
carries a light brown brief case, uses a zippo lighter, and wears
canary yellow polyester pants and shirt replete with bright
yellow and orange tie. Otherwise, he is rather lifeless. His
energy has gone into bettering his economic situation and he
looks with some amount of contempt on others who do not do
the same. As an ad man he will make 250 pesos.
Brocka shows us the life of a worker with family responsi
bilities through Julio's relationship with a fellow worker who
lives with his sister, Perla, and their father in a shanty on the edge
of a garbage dump. The father is paralyzed. Having the temerity
to defy a court order to move from a section of Quezon city
77
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during a land grab by developers, the father met bulldozers with
his knife. The family had lived on the land for generations.
Enforcers working for the developer shot him. Perla crochets for
income, cleans house, cooks, feeds and tends her father. During
the course of the film the police beat the brother to death and a
fire sweeps through the shanties and kills the father. Perla then
works as a prostitute. Queson City is now a center of govern
ment offices and shopping centers to serve the upper middle
class residents of that area. It also houses two of the top uni
versities in the Philippines.
Julio too works as a prostitute. The basic work at the
construction site which employs unskilled workers is finished,
and the company lays off the last hired and the less productive
older workers. Kicked out of the company's sleeping room,
Julio is picked up by a male prostitute who introduces him to
another, much more lucrative way of making money. Brocka
shows us another side of Manila life where the sons of the
wealthy buy the services of poor young males. He does a good
job capturing the commodity nature of the transactions. Julio
doesn't last long in this world: he lacks experience, imagination
and interest.
The film's climax comes when Julio sees Ligaya on the
street. He follows her and they eventually end up in a hotel
room. We see them in bed. They've made love and Ligaya tells
Julio about her life since leaving the village. Julio pressures her
to leave Ah Tek. Ligaya is almost paralyzed at the thought. She
has a 4-month-old child whom Ah Tek uses to further ensure her
obedience to his demands. Moreover, Ah Tek severely beat her
after a previous escape attempt. If there is a next time, Ah Tek
swears he will kill her. Ligaya believes him. Julio knows noth
ing of her world and doesn't listen when Ligaya tells him of her
terror. All he knows is that he wants Ligaya to leave and come
with him. He is even willing to accept the child. Ligaya is
indecisive. She's caught between the demands of two men who
see her as their property. Finally, she agrees to try to leave that
night. Julio waits for her at a rendezvous spot. She doesn't
show. We fear she's dead.
Julio finds out about Ligaya's death when his friend, Pol,
shows him a newspaper article. She purportedly fell down a
flight of stairs. Julio takes direct personal revenge on Ah Tek by
stabbing him to death with an ice pick. Individual male youths
whose economic position mirrors Julio's give chase as he runs
down city streets trying to escape. The individual blood lust
which Julio vented on Ah Tek is in tum vented on Julio as the
youths beat him to death. But the alienation that's reflected in
the horror of this urban violence is lost as Brocka uses flash
backs of Ligaya in the village to romanticize the scene.
Manila was shown at the San Francisco Film Festival in
1980. Critical response was positive. There was no little amaze
ment, too, that Brocka could have made such a film ... in
Manila ... and that it was shown in the Philippines.
Well, Brocka did make the film ... in Manila ... and it is
important to understand why it was a popular film in the mid
late 1970s.
The movie is realistically done. It is superior to Brocka's
other films in terms of the technical aspects of film making. The
lighting is good; camera work quite acceptable. Flashbacks are a
problem: they're too abrupt and fail as a vehicle for imparting
some softness and romance into an otherwise hard film. But the
actors and actresses give good to fair performances and the
script is reasonably tight.
Although Brocka is considered an avant-garde film maker,
Manila fits into the mainstream of Philippine films. Philippine
films are primarily love stories and Manila is a love story which
falls into the category of the tragically fated couple. We know
from the opening scene that the resolution will not be a positive
one. Julio standing under the sign reading Misarecordia Street
(Street at the Heart of Misery) is but one not so subtle sign.
But what do we know of this couple in love? We see only
quick flashbacks reflecting Julio's view. We see a romantic
Ligaya who stares off into the distance. The wind blows her hair
and dress. We see a soft, holdable, lovable Ligaya. She was the
"prettiest girl in the village," Julio tells us. And further,
"Ligaya was my girl," he tells his buddy, Pol. We do not see a
flesh-and-blood Ligaya. But, as I pointed out before, this is not
a film about Ligaya.
It is Julio's view of Ligaya as something which belongs to
him that precipitates the film's resolution. Julio is not at all
sensitive to the dangers Ligaya must face in order to leave Ah
Tek. The question is not will she or won't she leave, as posed by
Julio; but how and when she will leave. Ligaya tries to raise
these questions but succumbs to Julio's pressures and agrees to
make a try that evening. The results are predictable. We wait for
the news that she's dead. And we wait for Julio's response. The
questions of how and when Julio wrecks his revenge are
predictable.
No, of course Julio's not going to join the leftist "demo"
which passes in front of him as he goes to slay Ah Tek. He waits
till it passes and then proceeds. And it's no happenstance that
Ah Tek is Chinese. The film shows divisions in Philippine
society based on real differences in historical economic roles.
Brocka shows us the stereotypical Chinese merchant who eco
nomically and sexually exploits indigenous people. The Chi
nese Ah Tek is hated all the more-or especially?-because
he's now taken Julio's beautiful Ligaya. Julio stabs him
violently.
Violence and death are integral parts of the lives of the
working class in this film. There's violence in Ligaya's being
sold into sexual slavery. There's violence at the work place,
violence in the streets, violence in the brutal death of Julio's
friend, violence in the father's being shot and paralyzed and
violence in his death. There's violence in the forced prostitution
of Perla and the woman who is brought into the work place for
fucking. And finally, there's violence in Ligaya's death and in
Julio's death and in Ah Tek's. Brocka tells it in a matter-of-fact
way.
No, no problem in making the film in Manila or in showing
it there. Brocka's characters are not outraged at their situation.
That's the way life is. They are shown as accepting violence,
exploitation, poverty, prostitution, death, racism as normal. By
showing no alternatives whatsoever, even in minor characters,
Brocka's Manila reflects the lives of the vast majority of
Manila's approximately 2.5 million squatter-slum dwellers.
Reflecting reality is just a starting point. *
In any press-run, there are always a few copies of the Bulletin
that are defective: pages upside down or missing, staples broken
off, even an occasional blank. page. Ifyou receive a messy copy,
let us know in Charlemont. We'll send a replacement.
78
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People's Republic of China: New Pinyin Romanization
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Anhwei Anhui ahn way Kweichow
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Guizhou g_way joe
Chekiang .tt Zhejiang juh je8JIng Liaoning 11'i' Liaoning l"-9w' ning
Fukien Fujian too jelLen Ningaia 'i'. Ningxia ning sheJih
Heilungkiang ajttt Heilongjiang hay - loong - jee_ong Peking
:t*
Beijing bay - jing
Honan III. Henan huh - non Shanghai 1:.. Shanghai shong - hi
Hopeh 1II;t Hebei huh bay Shanai 11111 Shan Iii shahn she
Hunan Hunan hoo nan Shanlung
111*
Shandong ahahn doong
Hupeh .:t Hubei hoo bay Shenai .11 Shaanxi shun ahe
Inner Mongolia ",.a- Nei Monggol nay - mung goo Sinkiang Xinjiang shin jee_ong
Kanau 11'. Gansu gahn - aoo Szechwan IIIIJ1I Sichuan ssu ch_wan
Kiangsi ttll Jiangxi jee,png ahe Tibel II.. Xizang ahe dzong
Kiangau Jiangau je8Jlng - au Tienlain Tianjin 18_8n jin
Kirin Jilin jee lynn Tainghai Qinghai ching - hi
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Guangxi g.Yl'0ng ahe Yunnan de Yunnan YU.9on nan
Kwangtung ,..* Guangdong g_wong doong
79
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CHNA
Coming in Part Two of the China Special
Volume 13, No.3
Peter Nolan and Gordon White: "Rural Distribution and
State Socialist Development"
Victor Lippit: "The People's Communes and China's New
Development Strategy"
Carl Riskin: "Market, Maoism and Economic Reform in
China"
Edward Friedman: "The Original Chinese Revolution Re
mains in Power"
Vera Schwarcz: "How Lu Xun Became a Marxist; Conversa
tions with Yuan Liangjun"
Ralph Croizier: "The Thorny Flower of 1979; Political Car
toons and Liberalization"
CLASSROOM OR STUDY SESSION ORDERS
OF THIS TWO-PART SPECIAL
ON CHINA
Bookstore orders of 10 or more copies:
$8.00/pair
Buy the Bulletin in bulk!
BULLETIN OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS
BOX W, CHARLEMONT, MA 01339
IMPORTANT NOTICE
The original documents, letters, question
naires and publications of the Committee of Con
cerned Asian Scholars (which spawned the Bul
letin in 1968) are being collected and catalogued in
Madison, Wisconsin.
The C.C.A.S. archives will become part of
the Social Action Collection ofthe State Historical
Society of Wisconsin at 816 State Street, Madi
son, WI 53706 USA [phone # (608) 262-7304].
If, among our readers, there are any persons
who still possess any materials relative to the
founding or the functioning of the Committee,
you are strongly urged to contact Sarah Cooper at
the State Historical Society. Or you may simply
send all such documents directly to her for the
Social Action Collection.
Also, any persons interested in studying the
various organizations from the 1960s and 70s
antiwar movement would be weD advised to in
vestigate the substantial holdings of the Social
Action Collection. The State Historical Society
received a grant from the National Endowment
for the Humanities to build a collection ofantiwar
and civil rights movement archives.
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BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org