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other graphics that appear in articles are expressly not to be reproduced other than for personal use. All rights reserved. CONTENTS Vol. 16, No. 2: AprilJune 1984 Nakamura Masanori - The Emperor System of the 1900s Kawamura Nozomu - Fukutake Tadashi: Rural Sociologist of Postwar Japan Roger W. Bowen - Political Protest in Prewar Japan: The Case of Fukushima Prefecture John W. Dower - Art, Children, and the Bomb Brett de Bary - After the War: Translations from Miyamoto Yuriko Jayne Werner - Socialist Development: The Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in Vietnam Laura E. Hein - The Dark Valley Illuminated: Recent Trends in Studies of the Postwar Japanese Economy A. D. Haun - Three Works by Nakano Shigeharu: The House in the Village, Five Cups of Sake, The Crest-Painter of Hagi, translated by Brett de Bary / A Review Sandra Buckley - Flowers in Salt: The Beginnings of Feminist Consciousness in Japan, by Sharon L. Sievers; and The Hidden Sun: Women of Modern Japan, by Dorothy Robins-Mowry / A Review Audrey Kobayashi - Rebellion and Democracy in Meiji Japan: A Study of Commoners in the Popular Rights Movement by Roger W. Bowen / A Review Kenyalang - The Sarawak Chinese by John M. Chin / A Review Brad Geisert - Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse, 193745 by Hsi-sheng Chi / A Review BCAS/Critical AsianStudies www.bcasnet.org CCAS Statement of Purpose Critical Asian Studies continues to be inspired by the statement of purpose formulated in 1969 by its parent organization, the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS). CCAS ceased to exist as an organization in 1979, but the BCAS board decided in 1993 that the CCAS Statement of Purpose should be published in our journal at least once a year. We first came together in opposition to the brutal aggression of the United States in Vietnam and to the complicity or silence of our profession with regard to that policy. Those in the field of Asian studies bear responsibility for the consequences of their research and the political posture of their profession. We are concerned about the present unwillingness of specialists to speak out against the implications of an Asian policy committed to en- suring American domination of much of Asia. We reject the le- gitimacy of this aim, and attempt to change this policy. We recognize that the present structure of the profession has often perverted scholarship and alienated many people in the field. The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars seeks to develop a humane and knowledgeable understanding of Asian societies and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity and to confront such problems as poverty, oppression, and imperialism. We real- ize that to be students of other peoples, we must first understand our relations to them. CCAS wishes to create alternatives to the prevailing trends in scholarship on Asia, which too often spring from a parochial cultural perspective and serve selfish interests and expansion- ism. Our organization is designed to function as a catalyst, a communications network for both Asian and Western scholars, a provider of central resources for local chapters, and a commu- nity for the development of anti-imperialist research. Passed, 2830 March 1969 Boston, Massachusetts Vol. 16, No. 2/Apr.-June, 1984 Contents Nakamura Masanori 2 The Emperor System of the 1900s Kawamura Nozomu 12 Fukutake Tadashi, Rural Sociologist of Postwar Japan Roger W. Bowen 23 Political Protest in Prewar Japan: The Case of Fukushima Prefecture John W. Dower 33 Art, Children, and the Bomb Brett de Bary 40 After the War: Translations from Miyamoto Yuriko Jayne Werner 48 Socialist Development: The Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in Vietnam Laura E. Hein 56 The Dark Valley Illuminated: Recent Trends in Studies of the Postwar Japanese Economy A. D.Haun 59 Three Works by Nakano Shigeharu: The House in the Village, Five Cups ofSake, The Crest-Painter ofHagi, translated by Brett de Bary/review Sandra Buckley 63 Flowers in Salt: The Beginnings ofFeminist Consciousness in Japan, by Sharon L. Sievers, and The Hidden Sun: Women ofModern Japan, by Dorothy Robins-Mowry/review Audrey Kobayashi 66 Rebellion andDemocracy in MeijiJapan: A Study of Commoners in the Popular Rights Movement, by RogerW. Bowen/review Kenyalang 69 The Sarawak Chinese, by JohnM. Chin/review Brad Geisert 71 Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse, 1937--45, by Hsi-shengCh'i 72 List of Books to Review Contributors Roger Bowen: Department of Government, Colby College, Waterville, Maine Sandra Buckley: Asian Studies Centre, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia Brett de Bary: Department of Asian Studies, Cornell Univer sity, Ithaca, New York John W. Dower: Department of History, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin Brad Geisert: Department of History ,Northwest Missouri State University, Maryville, Missouri A. D. Haun: Stanford University, Stanford, California Laura E. Hein: Graduate student, Department of History, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin Kawamura Nozomu: Department of Sociology, Tokyo Metro politan University, Tokyo, Japan Kenyalang: A student of Sarawak affairs Audrey Kobayashi: Department of Geography, McGill Univer sity, Montreal, Quebec Nakamura Masanori: Faculty of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan Jayne Werner: Southern Asian Institute, Columbia University, New York, New York l I i I i I The Emperor System of the 1900s by Nakamura Masanori Introduction The prewar Japanese state with its emperor system had a set of characteristics not to be found at any time in any other capitalist country. The absolutist emperor system emerged progressively, but not full blown, out of the Meiji Restoration after the suppression of the Movement for Democratic Rights. With the promulgation of the 1889 Meiji Constitution in 1889 and the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890, it was consolidated. Later, following the Sino-Japanese and Russo Japanese Wars, the emperor system transformed itself into an imperialist state. Then, during the 1930s, it became, along with Germany and Italy, one of the mainstays of the international fascist movement, thereby dragging the whole nation into the first total war in Japanese history. That the very same power kept playing so many different historical roles is a rare phenomenon, perhaps without equal in the history of the world. I But what exactly did the emperor system mean for the modernization of Japan? That question remains a matter of deep concern for the Japanese people, as evidenced by the growing number of historians who are attempting to reassess the entire course of Japan's moderniza tion and have been conducting new investigations into the modem emperor system since the 1960s. For fifty years students of modem Japanese history have debated the question of whether the Meiji Restoration should be interpreted as a bourgeois revolution or as an emergence of absolutism. Although the controversy is still to be decided academically, it seems safe to say that the scholarly mainstream regards the Restoration as the emergence of absolutist rule. When it comes to the question of how to interpret the emperor system in the age of imperialism that began in the 1900s, this conventional view divides into two schools of 1. Shimoyama Saburo, "Kindai tennosei kenkyu no igi to hoho" [The Significance of the Methodology for Studying the Modem Japanese Emperor System] in Rekishigaku Kenkyu (July 1966). thought. One school maintains that as capitalism developed in Japan the absolutist emperor system changed itself accordingly by acquiring certain bourgeois appearances. Yet the absolutist nature of the system remained essentially unchanged until Japan lost the war in 1945. 2 The other school insists on stressing that the absolutist emperor system actually transformed itself into a bourgeois, imperialistic power. 3 Further controversy then arises among historians over the specific timing of that change. Unfortunately, neither view succeeds in grasping the real historical significance of the modem emperor system. The former view, which emphasizes the absolutist aspects of the emperor system, fails to recognize in its theory of the state the full significance of a crucial fact: Japan's economic structure changed over time and acquired bourgeois characteristics. In other words, Japanese capitalism completed its industrial revolution between 1890 and 1910, and attained the monopoly capitalist stage in the 1920s. The latter view on the other hand pays attention to the transformation of absolutist into bourgeois power, but slights the absolutist aspects of the political structure. Specifically, it fails to offer a convincing explanation for the fact that the emperor system continued to keep the Japanese people under its absolute, un-democratic control until its defeat in 1945. The question I should like to address here is: how can we overcome the drawbacks inherent in these two views and formulate an alternative theory of the modem emperor system? 2. Hoshino Jun. Shakai Koseitai ikljron josetsu [Introduction to the Theory of Transition of Social Formation] (Miraisha. 1969) and Kokka ikoron no tenkai [On the Development of the Theory of State Transition] (Miraisha, 1980). 3. Goto Yasushi, "Kindai tennoseiron" [On the Modem Emperor System] in Koza Nihonshi, Volume 9 (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1971) and "Kokka Kenryoku no Kozo ni kansuru shosetsu" [Concerning Theories of the Structure of State Power], in Nihon shihonshugi hattatsushi (Yiihikaku, 1979). 2 Establishment of the Basic Organization of the Emperor System, 1900-1910 Japanese historians have been long accustomed to discussing the emperor system mainly in relation to the Meiji Restoration. But when the emperor system first became the subject of scientific inquiry, during the twenties and early thirties, it was discussed in close conjunction with the debate on the strategy for the Japanese revolution then taking place within the Marxist camp. At that time the main focus of analysis was not the power of the emperor system forged during the Meiji Restoration but rather the imperial power then in the process of suppressing the people inside Japan and stepping up colonial aggression abroad. The 1927 and 1932 Theses of the Japanese Communist Party called the emperor system into question not as a power existing in the past era of the Meiji Restoration but precisely as a power existing in the present age of imperialism characterized by highly advanced monopoly capitalism. Discussing the modern emperor system primarily in relation to the Meiji Restoration abstracts it from its essential character, however, and is tantamount to defining the emperor system as the final form of a feudal, absolutist state existing at the last stage of the dissolution of feudal society. Such a definition implies also that the modern emperor system was incapable of shedding its basic nature as a feudalistic-absolutist state, irrespective of the development and the structural changes which Japanese capitalism experienced subsequently. An argument on revolutionary strategy derived from this view maintained that it would be impossible to advance a thesis of a two-stage revolution unless the emperor system was defined as a quasi-feudal, absolutist state. This formulation betrays an attempt to one-sidedly magnify and fix a historical event by going back to its genesis. Clearly, we need to view the matter from a different standpoint. Rather than focusing on the emperor system during the stage when its fundamental structure was in the process of formation, or viewing the interwar period exclusively from the perspective of the Meiji Restoration as has been done previously, we must approach the question from the reverse direction and ask: when and how was the emperor system, the object of analysis of the 1932 Theses, both "formed" and "established"? Quite unlike the ordinary, commonsense understanding of the word, "establishment" in this sense does not mean that something solid and fixed is brought to completion. Rather, inherent in the logic of establishment is the logic of dissolution, for the very manner in which something is established has inherent in it the moment of contradiction which later determines the way in which it is dissolved. That is, the manner of the emperor system's establishment determined the manner of its dissolution and, conversely, the very manner in which the old regime ended its historical life and dissolved revealed the basic nature of the emperor system at the time of its establishment. In other words, the process of establishment of the emperor system and of its dissolution are closely related to each other, each illuminating and being illuminated by the other. Adopting this standpoint should enable us to correct the distorted image of the emperor system which derived from viewing it only from the perspective of the Meiji Restoration and develop a balanced overview of the historical evolution of the emperor system all the way from its genesis in the Meiji Restoration to its collapse on August 15, Japan's military victory in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars and the colonization of Taiwan and Korea represented a significant breakthrough for the ideology of the emperor system, which thereafter began spreading and striking roots deep among the Japanese people. In a sense the emperor system took advantage of the two wars not only in solidifying the military machine-the core of the state machinery-but also in bringing to completion its dominion with regard to ideology. If we take this standpoint and look at the dissolution of the emperor system as an ancien regime, we must begin by asking the destruction of which component elements of the old order enables us to say that the system as such came to a standstill. Briefly, the characteristic features of the fall of the old order can be summarized in terms of the following six areas: the dissolution of the emperor-led military; the loss of the colonial territories; the dissolution of the zaibatsu; the land reform; the establishment of the new Constitution; and the collapse of the ideology of the emperor system. On the level of the theory of the state there were three decisively important mainstays of the old order among the above features of the emperor system: the Meiji Constitution, the military and the bureaucratic apparatuses, and the ideology of the emperor system (the ideology of domination typically manifested in the Imperial Rescript on Education). On the level of the economic substructure there were three other mainstays: the old colonial territories (Taiwan, Korea and "Manchuria"), the zaibatsu interests, and the parasitic landlord system. This logically leads us to another set of questions. When and how were these six component elements of the emperor system formed? And, given that these six elements did not exist independently of each other but in certain structural relations to one another, what were these binding relations? Finding answers to these questions will be of decisive importance in identifying the structure which the emperor system had in its formative stage. There is not enough space to make a detailed examination of this matter, but it seems clear that the above six component elements of the emperor system, each structurally joined to the other, formed and took root in the period following the Sino-Japanese War through the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, in other words, in the period from 1900 through 1910. These six component elements did not stand in parallel with each other at the same level: the military machine and soldiers carried the heaviest weight, playing the role of a link binding the other five elements. Moreover, the possession of the colonies pushed the military in the direction of becoming a force with a large degree of independence. More precisely, the colonization of Taiwan in 1895 and Korea in 1910, though having taken place within an institutional framework in which the prerogatives of supreme 1945. 3 command was supposed to be inviolable, actually served as a crucial stimulus to the military to grow larger and become a central political force in its own right. Japan's military victory in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars and the colonization of Taiwan and Korea represented a significant breakthrough for the ideology of the emperor system, which thereafter began spreading and striking roots deep among the Japanese people. In a sense the emperor system took advantage of the two wars not only in solidifying the military machine-the core of the state machinery-but also in bringing to completion its dominion with regard to ideology as well. As for the Meiji Constitution, the fundamental law of the state which legally epitomized the emperor system, the year of its promulgation, 1899, marked an epoch in Japan's modem history. From that time forward the fundamental shape of the state was determined, though the Constitution did not actually begin to function with political effectiveness until after the Sino-Japanese War. In the Diet prior to the Sino-Japanese War, the Government with its fukoku kyohei (enrich the nation, strengthen the military) policy was always fighting fiercely with the political parties which insisted upon policies of minryoku kyuyo (store up national power through alleviation of tax burdens) and keihi setsugen (curtail state expenditures). The extent of political control at the disposal of the Meiji Government was thus very unstable. What about the parasitic landlords and the zaibatsu interests which were the class and economic foundations for the emperor system? The landlord system established itself first as an integral part of the dominant system of rule, followed by the zaibatsu interests which succeeded in forming Konzerns in the period between the end of the Sino-Japanese War and the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War. In this period the zaibatsu interests and the landlords formed a bourgeois-landlord bloc. The fundamental structure of the emperor system characterized by the six component elements mentioned above can, therefore, be regarded as having been established during the course of the first decade of this century. 4 If the above analysis of the structure of the emperor system in its formative stage is correct, then the following question arises: how to define the historical and class nature of this emperor-system-dominated state. In answering this question, it is necessary first to clarify the characteristics of the Japanese bourgeoisie and landed proprietors who together constituted the class basis of the emperor-system-dominated state, and then go on to discuss the central features of the organizational structure of this state as epitomized by the Meiji Constitution. Economic and Political Composition of the Capitalist Class Japanese capitalism simultaneously established itself and completed its transformation into imperialism in the period between 1890 and 1910. Keeping abreast of this change, the capitalist class secured the position of an economically dominant class. Although the bourgeoisie became an econom ically dominant class, the specific types of capitalists varied from one industrial sector to another depending on the differences in the modes of capital accumulation. Consequently there were differences in the relations they had with the emperor-system-dominated state power. In order to clarify these differences it is necessary to classify capital into several types and identify the corresponding types of Japanese capitalists as well. Anticipating my conclusion, the kinds of capital that existed in the formative period of Japanese capitalism fell into five types: 1) state capital, 2) zaibatsu capital, 3) spinning interests (bOseki capital), 4) silk-reeling interests (seishi capital), and 5) weaving interests. s Japanese capitalism simultaneously estab lished itself and completed its transformation into imperialism in the period between 1890 and 1910. Keeping abreast of this change, the capitalist class secured the position of an economicaUy dominant class. State capitai consisted not only of "state capital in the form of industrial capital" operating in such government-con trolled enterprises as the Army and Navy Arsenals, steel works, railways and telephone and telegram, but also of special banks including the Bank of Japan and other kinds of "state capital in the form of loan capital." Throughout the period of the industrial revolution, these various types of state capital continued to gain in importance. For instance, in mining, manufacturing, and transportation, the share of government owned enterprises in the total amount of owned capital and reserve fund of both government and private enterprises combined was 29.3 percent in 1897 and 27.2 percent in 1902. In 1907 the government's share leaped to over 50 percent as a result of the extensive nationalization of railways. In banking, too, state capital loomed large. The special banks' share in the total paid-up capital and deposits of special and commercial banks combined increased from 31.4 percent in 1897 to 38.5 percent in 1907. Behind this significant weight held by state capital lay the fact that private industrialists had been able to accumulate only insignificant amounts of funds. Second, in view of the large risk involved in investment in heavy industries, zaibatsu interests chose not to go into these areas. Initially the Meiji Government, driven by the necessity to compete militarily and politically with the advanced imperialist countries and with the countries of Southeast Asia, poured 4. Nakamura Masanori, "Kindai tennosei Kokkaron" [The State Under the 5. Nakamura Masanori, "Nihon burujoajii no kosei" [The composition of the Modem Emperor System] in Nakamura Masanori, ed., Taikei Nihon Kokkashi Japanese Bourgeoisie] in Oishi Kaichiro, ed., Nihon sangyo kakumei no kenkyii [Outline of the History of the Japanese State, Modem Period I] (Tokyo [Studies in the Japanese Industrial Revolution], Vol. 2 (Tokyo Daigaku Daigaku Shuppankai, 1975). Shuppankai, 1975). 4 I enonnous amounts of government funds into government owned enterprises in complete disregard of cost-profit consid erations. Thus not only did state capital serve as an important economic base, facilitating the transfonnation of Japanese capitalism into imperialism, it also provided the essential material conditions for the bureaucrats of the emperor system to attain relative autonomy. The second variety of capital, zaibatsu capital, was represented by the three largest all-around zaibatsu-Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo. These zaibatsu capitalists operated basically as family-based and closed consolidations of several undertakings. Their pattern of accumulation was through diversified operations rather than accumulation by way of specialization in one specific industry. For instance, Mitsui had three major undertakings under its direct control: Mitsui Bussan, Mitsui Bank and Mitsui Mining, while Mitsubishi had as its mainstays Mitsubishi Mining, Mitsubishi Shipbuilding and Mitsubishi Marine Transportation. Zaibatsu capital chose this pattern of accumulation based on diversified operations because during the time of primitive accumulation state capitalism had already inaugurated the key sectors of heavy industry. This pattern of accumulation through diversification became all the more solid as the sectors of political and military significance grew larger during the period of industrial revolution. As a result, with the notable exception of mining and shipbuilding industries, the zaibatsu interests were barely able to hold a grip on the heavy industrial sectors. They had to content themselves with controlling the light industrial sectors or the sectors of circulation including banks and trading companies. In spite of this, the zaibatsu interests succeeded in making enonnous profits as they managed to coax the emperor dominated state into offering them all sorts of protection on a preferential basis. To cite some examples of the privileges they enjoyed, the business activities of Mitsui Bank in the period of industrial revolution were sustained by large sums of borrowings from the Bank of Japan. Mitsui Bussan was able to carry out business thanks to large sums of government and social funds mobilized on its behalf by Yokohama Specie Bank, Mitsui Bank, Daiichi Bank, and Shanghai Bank of Hong Kong. Mitsubishi enjoyed privileges of no less significance. Nippon Yiisen Kaisha and Mitsubishi Shipyard in Nagasaki were able to gain huge profits, thanks to preferential measures with regard to fund procurement that were prescribed under the Navigation Promotion Law and the Shipbuilding Promotion Law. In short, the zaibatsu interests were more dependent upon and much closer to the state power than other private interests. 6 I Third, the cotton spinning industry, along with the railways, was one of the industries that led Japan's industrial revolution. With exports of cotton yarn surpassing imports in 1897, the industry became competitive internationally. As early as 1903-04, on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, the six largest spinning companies had solidly established themselves, prematurely gaining monopoly control over the spinning 1 industry. The pattern of accumulation in the cotton spinning ! I industry was characterized by a heavy reliance on external funds. Capitalists in this industry met their requirements for j 6. Matsumoto Hiroshi, Mitsui zaibatsu no Kenkyu [A Study of Mitsui Zaibatsu] (Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1979). 1 ''A uniquely researched, lucidly written, powerfully compelling dramatic account . ... There Is nothing like it in the entire literature on post-J949 rural China. A major contribution to our understanding of what really happened in rural China in the era of Mao Zedong." -Edward Friedman CHEN VILLAGE The Recent History of a Peasant Community in Mao's China by Anita Chan, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger $19.95 at bookstores University of California Press Berkeley 94720 fixed capital (that is, equipment funds) by mobilizing the savings of merchants and landlords through the medium of joint stock companies. In the procurement of the liquid capital (funds for purchasing of raw cotton) they at first relied heavily on borrowings from banks, but eventually the supply of credits by trading companies in the fonn of cotton bills became much more popular. The excessively heavy reliance on external funds by the capitalists in the spinning industry meant that they had to meet heavy interest payments. But they managed to raise profits far in excess of that burden through forcing female spinning workers to do exhausting midnight labor at wages no better than those paid in colonial India. On behalf of the spinning industry, too, the state devised various sorts of politically motivated protection, even though these were not so generous as those enjoyed by the zaibatsu interests. The measures of protection included exemption from both the raw cotton import duty and the cotton yarn export duty, provision of subsidies to cargo ships running on the Bombay line under contract to carry cotton from India, and granting by the Bank of Japan and the Specie Bank of foreign exchange credits for import of raw cotton and export of cotton yarn and cotton cloth. It is therefore impossible to discuss the rapid growth of the Japanese spinning industry without referring to these measures of protection offered by the state. 7 7. Takamura Naosuke, Nihon bOsekigyoshi josetsu [Introduction to the History ofthe Japanese Cotton Spinning Industry, vols. I, 2](Hanawa Shobo, 1971). 5 J In brief, the electoral system consisted of different levels of representatives, with town and village assemblies situated at the bottom, pro ceeding up to the prefectural assemblies, the national Diet and the House of Peers. The interests of local men of influence (meibOka) was its axis and on that basis stood the power of the emperor system with the emperor at the peak of the pyramid. Fourth, the silk reeling industry solidly laid its foundation in 1894, the year in which the production of mill-reeled silk surpassed that of hand-reeled silk. Outstripping Italy in terms of export in 1905 and China in 1909, the Japanese silk industry became the world's largest silk exporter. Unlike the spinning factories which were run in the form of joint stock companies, the silk mills were either private managements or family partnerships. The mills were able to meet their equipment expenses by themselves since the amounts involved were not so large, but they relied on raw silk wholesalers in Yokohama and local banks for the supply of funds for purchasing cocoons. Such borrowings took up a dominant portion of their liquid capital requirements. Furthermore, the silk reeling industry was subject to the control of the American silk fabric industry across the Pacific Ocean. This placed it in the unfavorable situation of being frequently troubled by violent changes in silk thread price which were out of their own control. Placed in such a situation, the silk-reeling industry was virtually without any assurance of making profits on a constant basis. The capitalists in the silk reeling industry made up for this particular weakness by forcing the cocoon raising peasants to supply their cocoons at an extremely low price, and forcing the silk-reeling female workers to do long hours of hard work for little pay. 8 In contrast to the generous measures of protection the government took on behalf of the zaibatsu and the cotton spinning interests, the silk reeling industry had far more limited and indirect governmental protection. In the period from the l890s through the 1900s, the government policy toward the sericulture industry was centered on the provision of politically motivated financing (i.e., financial aid) to the raw silk wholesale merchants in Yokohama. In other words, the capitalists in the silk-reeling industry were "protected" only indirectly in the sense that the wholesalers, supported by government financing, made advance payments to them. Here we see the difference in the intensity of class unity between capitalists in the cotton spinning industry and those in the silk-reeling industry. The bourgeoisie in the cotton spinning industry reorganized their Federation of Cotton 8. Ishii Kanji, Nihon sanshigyoshi bunseki [An Analysis of the History of the Japanese Silk Industryl (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1972). Spinners' Associations in 1888, discarding its former appear ance as a government-dictated organization and making it appear a more independent and horizontally structured organization. Thereafter, the Federation served on the one hand as a vehicle for implementation of industry-wide labor policies such as countermeasures against strikes and prevention of an excessive scramble for female workers by the spinning mills, and on the other hand it functioned as a lobbying organization vis-a-vis the government, successfully coaxing it into providing the set of protective policies mentioned above. In contrast, the capitalists in the silk reeling industry, who were mostly small- and medium-sized capitalists located in the countryside, were unable to organize themselves on a nation-wide scale in this period. Rather it was the Silk Yarn Exporters' Association of Yokohama, an organization of the raw silk wholesale merchants, that represented the interests of the sericulture industry as a whole. In a way this reflects the weaker position vis-a-vis industrial capitalists of the silk reeling interests, depending as they did upon merchant capital. The fifth category of capital was the weaving industry, which we shall touch on only in passing. Except for the limited cases in which cotton spinning companies were also active in weaving and looming operations, these operations were mostly carried out on the basis of farming-out by the piece under the control of weaver-merchants. Weaver-merchants directly rented out weaving materials to loom-workers, paid them at a piece rate, and received the cloth in return. What was characteristic of the weaving industry, furthermore, was that these weaver-merchants in turn were more or less dependent upon yam dealers or local wholesale merchants. Because their membership was composed of different types of traders with varying interests, the trade associations of weavers lacked unity. Accordingly, they did not have much ability to pressure the state authority into taking important measures on their behalf. Compared with the capitalists in the cotton spinning and the silk-reeling industries, the capitalists in the weaving industry were more distant from state power and were able to acquire far less government protection. In that sense, capital operating in the weaving industry was the least privileged among the five categories of capital mentioned above. We have examined several segments of the Japanese bourgeoisie with reference to the corresponding categories of capital. Clearly, the capitalists in the various industrial sectors in Japan were far from uniform. Capitalists formed a hierarchy in accordance with differences in the pattern of accumulation in each sector and differences in the degree of governmental protection each enjoyed. The zaibatsu capitalists stood at the top, followed by the capitalists of the cotton spinning industry, next the silk reeling industry and finally the weaving industry. In other words, the interests of the bourgeoisie were divided along the borders of industrial sectorse, making it impossible for the bourgeoisie in these sectors to join hands with each other across the boundaries of industries and form an autonomous class unity of the bourgeoisie as a whole. Thus, the bureaucrats of the emperor system, in implementing policies that reflected the interests of the bourgeoisie, did not have to do anything other than organize from above the zaibatsu capitalists who stood at the top of the whole bourgeoisie and simply rely on them for full fledged cooperation. As a matter of fact, after the Sino-Japanese War, the bureaucrats began to solicit the opinion of the zaibatsu affiliated capitalists by asking them to take part in various 6 governmental consultative bodies. On their part the capitalists actively began to work upon politicians and bureaucrats through various channels, and to succeed in realizing their interests to some extent. 9 I Three such channels linked the bureaucrats and the zaibatsu interests. The first channel consisted of the various consultative bodies of the government such as the Supreme Conference of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry (1896-98) and the Currency System Investigation Committee (1893-95), both of which operated in the post-Sino-Japanese War period, and the Production Investigation Committee (1910-12) which appeared in the post-Russo-Japanese War period. Zaibatsu affiliated capitalists were asked to sit in these consultative bodies as influential members. The second channel of communication between the bourgeoisie and the bureaucrats was provided by such organizations of the bourgeoisie as the Japan Economic Society (1897), the Society of Commercial and Industrial Economy (1900-created jointly by the Japan Economic Society and the Tokyo Society for Consultation on Commerce and Industry), and especially the Yiiraku Club (1900), an organization of Tokyo-based zaibatsu capitalists. The third channel took the fonn of "private" and cozy relationships which business maintained with bureaucrats and politicians. These ties became especially important from I around the Russo-Japanese War as the zaibatsu interests began to establish, on the private level, relationships by marriage with prominent politicians-Mitsui with Inoue Kaoru, Sumitomo with Saionji Kinmochi, Furukawa with Hara Takashi, and Mitsubishi with Kato Takaaki-and, on the collective level, a reliable channel with the bureaucrats in the t fonn of the Anko-kai (Anglerfish Eating Club) during the first Katsura administration and the Unagi-kai (Eel Eating Club) during the second Katsura administration. In contrast, the cotton spinning interests, the second most important section of the bourgeoisie after the zaibatsu capitalists, rallied under the banner of the industry-wide association of their own, the Japan Federation of Cotton Spinners, submitting proposals to and petitioning the govern ment in search of various measures of governmental protection on various issues. The channel between themselves and the government was not so solid as the ones the zaibatsu interests enjoyed. The silk-reeling and the weaving interests had hardly any reliable connection with the government. In addition to those we have mentioned above, other important associations of capitalists came into existence after the Sino-Japanese War such as prefectural Chambers of Commerce composed of local merchants and industrialists and the National Federation of the local Chambers. The activities of these organizations, for instance the submission of various proposals and petitions to the government, reflected chiefly the interests of the larger bourgeoisie of major urban centers, like Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama, Kyoto, Kobe and Nagoya. Only the anti-Business Tax campaign of 1896-97 reflected the interests of the smaller I I bourgeoisie as well. I I 9. Nakamura Masanori, "Nihon shihonshugi kakuritsuki no kokka kenryoku" [State Power in the Period of the Establishment of Japanese Capitalism] in I I Rekishigaku Kenkyii, bessatsu tokushu 1970. Yamashita Naoto, "Ni-Shin Nichi-Ro senkanki ni okeru zaibatsu burujoajii no seisaku shiko" [The Zaibatsu Bourgeoisie and their Policies between the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese I Wars] in Rekishigaku kenkyii (November, 1977). Hawaii Under the Rising Sun Japan's Plans for Conquest After Pearl Harbor By John J. Stephan 240 pages, $16.95 This book reveals Japan's wartime plans to invade and occupy Hawaii following the December 7, 1941 air attack on Pearl Harbor. The seizure of the Hawaiian Islands, America's main outpost in the Pacific, was to have been the most ambitious and far-reaching Japanese opera tion of World War II. Conceived by officers on the staff of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Com bined Fleet commander, the invasion of Hawaii was regarded as the kind of blow that would pre clude an American counteroffensive, force Presi dent Roosevelt to the peace table, and guarantee Japan's future security in the Pacific Basin. While the military worked on the invasion plans, civilian planners prepared scenarios of Hawaii under Jap anese rule. Included in those scenarios were the restoration of the Hawaiian monarchy as a puppet government, the breakup of major American firms, and the re-education of Hawaii's Japanese American population. "With scrupulous care and responsibility [John Stephan] has pieced together materials from many sources to trace Japanese preparation for the con quest and occupation of Hawaii. It is sobering to realize that, despite the ambivalence that must have characterized the outlook of senior members of Hawaii's Japanese community, the war years found them left alone to contribute their work and products to the economy of the Islands. The mass evacuation of West Coast Japanese Americans thereby becomes even stranger and less just." -Marius B. Jansen, Princeton University John J. Stephan, professor of history at the University of Hawaii, is also the author of Sakhalin: A History, The Kuril Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacif ic, and The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile. , j To order: Send check, money order, or VISA or MasterCard information (account number, expi ration date, signature) for $18.00 (includes ship ping) per copy to: University of Hawaii Press 2840 Kolowalu Street Honolulu, Hawaii 96822 \.. _____________________- " ~ 7 ~ I ! 1 i j I i Strata of Land Owners Total Amount of Land Number of Land Value Value in Thousand Yen Percentage ofTotal LandOwners Percentage ofTotal More than 100,000 Yen 7,382 0.46 41 0.0006 50,000-100,000 Yen 10,063 0.63 154 0.0023 10,000-50,000 Yen 85,212 5.36 5,208 0.08 1,000-10,000 Yen 503,067 31.63 255,086 38.27 400-1,000 Yen 436,413 27.44 701,709 10.53 200-400 Yen 259,897 16.34 919,144 13.79 Less than 200 Yen 288,328 18.13 4,784,440 71.78 Total: 1,590,362 100.00 6,665,782 100.00 Source: Prefectural Affairs Department, Home Ministry, "Table of Private Landed Property in Each Metropolitan Area and Prefecture," Home Ministry, 1886. Various sections of the bourgeoisie had their own interests reflected in. the will of the state in different ways and these differences formed a multiple-layered hierarchical structure, corresponding to the hierarchical relations among these sections themselve. The character of the Japanese bourgeoisie thus in tum provided a basis for the relative autonomy of the bureaucrats in the service of the emperor system. There was another economically dominant class with no less significance than the bourgeoisie, the landlords. In the last decade of the nineteenth century the landlord class established its dominant position in Japanese rural society. 10 Like the bourgeoisie, the landlord class was internally stratified. According to the 1886 "Survey on Landowners by Class Strata," made by the Prefectural Affairs' Department of the Home Ministry (see table), forty-one landlords, possessing land valued at over 100,000 yen, occupied the top of the pyramid. Its base consisted of about 4,780,000 petty land owners with land valued at less than 200 yen. Thus, the farming class had a pyramidal structure. This hierarchy of land ownership similarly shaped the political order of the village. The various electoral systems from the state level down to the village level show this quite clearly. Prior to the opening of the Imperial Diet in April 1889, the Town and Village Ordinance was enacted together with electoral systems for the selection of town and village assemblymen and assemblymen for prefectural and metropoli tan district assemblies. This system of local self government accorded rights of participation in local government only to "citizens" (kOmin). To qualify as a kOmin one had to meet three 10. Nakamura Masanori, Kindai Nihon jinushiseishi kenkyu [A Study on Landlord System in Modem Japan] (University of Tokyo Press, 1979). 8 conditions: 1) be a male house head over twenty-five years of age; 2) live in the same town or village for over two years; and 3) in order to qualify for the rights of suffrage and participation in town and village assemblies, pay a land tax or direct national taxes of over two yen. In short, the decisive qualification for becoming a kOmin was possession of a significant amount of property. Moreover, the election of town and village assemblymen rested on a system of ranking and dividing electors into two different classes, an arrangement highly advantageous to owners of large amounts of landed property. The list of electors was drawn up corresponding to the amount of money that each paid in taxes. The top group, who paid over one half of the total amount of vifllage taxes, were designated as first-class electors. The remainder were made second class electors. Each group elected one-half of the total number of village assemblymen. Naturally, only first class landowners could become village chiefs or village assemblymen. Often they simply sent to the village assembly people directly under their influence, thereby further strengthening their own voice in village affairs. The qualifications for prefectural assemblymen and national Diet members were extremely favorable to the upper strata of land owners. Suffrage rights for prefectural assembly men and metropolitan district assemblymen were given only to those who paid over 5 yen in direct national taxes, chiefly the land tax. Eligibility rights were given to those who paid over 10 yen in direct national taxes. Both the suffrage and eligibility requirements for the Diet were limited to payers of over 15 yen in taxes. In 1890, payers of a land tax of 15 yen were either landed farmers or small landowners owning fields of about two hectares, so the overwhelming majority of men sent to the first Imperial Diets were landlords, people whose occupation was agriculture. This particular mechanism of electoral representation lay behind the criticism that the early Diets were "landlord Diets." Although we speak of landlord Diets, the House of Represen tatives actually centered mainly on middle- and small-scale landlords. The stage for the activities of large-scale land owners was the House of Peers, which was composed of members of the imperial family, the court nobility, imperial appointees and those who paid large amounts of taxes. The Peers was the stronghold of the emperor system. Large landlords entered the House of Peers on the basis of the "Large Taxpayers Membership System," thereby securing their voice in the control of national affairs. This system elected one Peer from each prefecture and metropolitan district. They were elected by mutual vote from among the top fifteen payers of direct national taxes (both land and income taxes). In brief, the electoral system consisted of different levels of representatives, with town and village assemblies situated at the bottom, proceeding up to the prefectural assemblies, the national Diet and the House of Peers. The interests of local men of influence (meibOka) was its axis and on that basis stood the power of the emperor system with the emperor at the peak of the pyramid. The power structure established by the Imperial Constitution of 1889 and the Local Self Government Law was further stabilized after Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. In particular, the establishment of the Seiyu Party in 1900 allowed the landlord forces to acquire their own political party and draw close to the bourgeoisie, becoming one wing of the bourgeois-landlord bloc. Kiyoura Keigo, member of the House of Peers and prime minister in 1924, once remarked that "Although we made a good constitution, the fulfillment of its content is the main thing. Only after the establishment of the system of local self government did constitutional politics for the first time come fully into operation."" The landlord class, just like the bourgeoisie, was ranked politically by the size of its land holdings. Mediated by the system of local self-government, they supported from below the rule of the emperor system state over the localities. Characteristic Features of the Form of the State under the Emperor System A distinction between type of state and form of state must be made. Generally speaking, the state is above all a political organization of those in possession of the fundamental means of production, and as such, in any socio-economic formation, is "ordinarily a state of the most powerful and economically dominant class. This class, using the state as its own means, becomes also a politically dominant class, thereby obtaining new means for oppression and exploitation of the oppressed classes." (Marx-Engels Werke, 21. Bd., SS 166-67) The ancient state was basically characterized as a slave state which was nothing but a means of exploitation and oppression of the slaves by the slave holders, the feudal state as one based on serfdom, and the modem bourgeois state as a capitalist state (or as one based on wage labor). That is to say, the historical II. Koshaku Yamagata Aritomo Den [Biography of the Duke Yamagata Aritomo, Vol. 2, p. 1042.] (Hara Shobo, 1969). 9 and class nature of a state is decided by what particular class interests it serves. The concept "type of state" points to the class nature of the state in the sense above, but this is insufficient for clarifying the historically specific characteristics of an individual state. For instance, a bourgeois state might take any of a variety of forms from republican constitutional monarchy, or Bonapartist, to fascist. Just calling a certain state bourgeois without making any distinction between these various forms makes very little sense. In making a historical analysis of a state, therefore, it is imperative to pay special attention to the characteristics of the specific form it takes. What, then, is a "form of state"? The form of state is a concept encompassing the mechanism by which the will of the state is decided and enforced on the population, and includes the manner as well as the mechanism by which the population is controlled ideologically. In other words, the essential task of the theory of the form of state is in clarifying which class is in possession of state power, and what is the specific form by which it organizes the various organs of the state so as to control the dominated classes. Studies of the emperor system undertaken in Japan have so far failed to realize the importance of this point and have given rise to unnecessary confusion. Below I will present in summary form my interpretation of the historical characteristics of the emperor system. Japanese capitalism, as explained earlier, established itself in the period between 1900 and 1910 and at the same time transformed itself into imperialism. In keeping up with this change. the capitalist class climbed to the position of the economically dominant class, and state policies began to be devised and implemented faithfully reflecting the interests of the zaibatsu capitalists who stood at the peak ofthe bourgeoisie. The absence of such a situation prior to the Sino-Japanese War suggests that the class nature of the state under the emperor system turned into a bourgeois one. But what makes the discussion of the state under the emperor system difficult is that even though a change can be seen in the class nature of the state during the 1900s, a corresponding change cannot be seen in the form of the state that was consolidated with the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution in 1899. On the contrary, during the same decade of the 1900s the absolutist framework of the state with the emperor at its top became all the more solid. Constitutional scholars and historians in this country have long noted that the political position of the emperor under the Meiji Constitution was immensely strong. To be transmitted along an unbroken line of succession, the Imperial Throne was supposed to be sacred and inviolable. Under the prescriptions of Articles 6 through 16 ofthe Meiji Constitution, the following powers and functions of the state-which encompass virtually all the essential ones-resided in the emperor in a concentrated manner: sanctioning, promulgation and enforcement of laws (prescribed for by Art. 6); the right to convene, open, close, suspend and dissolve the Diet (Art. 7); the right to issue extraordinary Imperial ordinance (Art. 8); the right to mandate injunctions (Art. 9); the right to establish a government I organization and to appoint and dismiss civil and military i officials (Art. 10); the right of supreme command and organization of the Army and the Navy (Arts. II and 12); the right to declare wars and to conclude peace and treaties (Art. t 13); the right to proclaim martial law (Art. 14); and the right to confer honors and orders and to grant Imperial amnesty (Arts. 15 and 16). Moreover, the emperor exercised these Imperial powers as absolute and inviolable ones. One thing needs. to be clarified here, the sense in which we mean that absolutism or an absolute monarchy is absolute. The answer in a word is that an absolute monarch is absolute in relation to the laws of the state, free from any form of legal restraint. There is neither any state machinery that is not based on his own will nor any that can oppose him. Seen from such a viewpoint, the emperor as defined by the Meiji Constitution was certainly an absolute being. As explained above, the sovereignty resided in him, and the final power of decision on the will of the state belonged to him, as far as the prescriptions of the Constitution were concerned. Of course this did not mean that the emperor made all the decisions himself and acted on his own. In the actual administration of the affairs of the state, especially in the decision of the will of the state made under the name of the emperor, both the elder statesmen-who were something like political advisors to the emperor-and the Privy Council-a consultative body to the emperor-played an important role. The elder statesmen, in spite of the fact that their existence was not prescribed for by the Constitution, had tremendous influence on important governmental policies. They took part in Imperial conferences, held their own meetings, personally expressed their opinions to the emperor, and, from time to time, even attended cabinet meetings. In the Meiji and Taisho eras, the elder statesmen had the de facto power to make decisions on important matters such as declaration of wars, conclusion of peace, and important affairs of personnel administration including appointment and removal of prime ministers. In this way, under the Meiji Constitutional system, the state policies with the highest priority were made by the emperor and his close attendants such as the elder statesmen and the cabinet, with the Diet having only very limited power. Especially active among other state organs in the enforcement of the will of the state upon the ordinary people were the physical means of coercion such as the military forces, the police, the court, the prison and jails. All these state organs too were under the control of the emperor and were called the "emperor's military," the "emperor's police," the "emperor's court," etc. This being the case, it was only to be expected that the state machinery as a whole, that is to say the composite whole of these state organs arranged in a systematic and well coordinated manner, was strongly absolutist. Moreover, this absolutist state machinery grew even more powerful following the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese Wars. For example, the so-called three laws pertaining to civil officials established in 1899-the Amended Civil Service Appointment Ordinance, the Ordinance Pertaining to the Status of Civil Officials, and the Ordinance Pertaining to the Discipline of Civil Officials gave birth to powerful legal and institutional barriers against intervention into the bureaucratic machinery by the Diet and the political parties. It was also during this period that the military bureaucrats gained further reinforcement of their relative autonomy. Important indices of this included: the establishment of the Naval General Staff Office in 1893, the institution of the practice of appointing Army and Navy Ministers from among officers in active service in 1900, the promulgation of the Military Command No.1 in 1907, and the revision of the Ordinance Pertaining to the General Staff Office in 1908. All of these were meant to institutionally assure the military bureaucrats of their political supremacy over the cabinet and the Diet. These measures of adjustment and reinforcement of the machinery of the military bureaucrats were extended abroad for application in colonized Taiwan and colonized Korea as well. The emperor system countered the growing class awareness of the workers and the expansion of political parties inside Japan, and the evolution of the national resistance movements in the colonies by means of further reinforcing its absolutist state machinery. This leads to the conclusion that although the state under the emperor system in the 1900s acquired a bourgeois nature, keeping pace with the transformation of Japanese capitalism into imperialism, the absolutist form of state remained intact. A bourgeois state (or a state under the control of the bourgeoisie and landlords) with an absolutist form-that was the historical substance of the emperor system at the formative period of Japanese imperialism. A counterargument might be anticipated, one which maintains that, according to conventional understanding of the Marxian theory of state, the form of state is always determined subject to the concept superior to it, the type of state. If the Japanese state under the emperor system is regarded as a bourgeois state, its form should also be defined as that of a bourgeois state, or that of bourgeois constitutional monarchy. This is what the conventional theory of state and political sciences would have us believe. However, in the structure of the state under the emperor system as it was consolidated in the 1900s, the form of state and the type of state did not coincide. On the contrary, and quite characteristically, there was a divergence between them. This was the undeniable historical reality of the emperor system. We are thus obliged to re-examine from a new theoretical perspective the relation ship between the form of state and the type of state. In the historical case of the Japanese state under the emperor system, the essential choice does not lie between the two alternatives, absolutism and imperialism. Rather, the problem is to clarify the structure of the paradoxical link between these two, the link in which the factors of absolutism became more and more conspicuous as Japanese capitalism entered the stage of imperialism. * ASIA! INTRODUCTORY OFFER! One year for $15 Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars Articles and reviews on topics that matter-social and economic change, imperialism and revolu tion from China to Indonesia, from India to Japan. Subscriptions: $20 Free index of back issues. BCAS, Box R, Berthoud, CO 80513 10 A Selection of Savitri: Portrait of a Bombay Working Class Woman. Past Contents. 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Cheque or international money order payable to: Centre for Developing-Area Studies I Subscriptions should be addressed to: Publications, Centre for Developing-Area Studies, McGill University, 815 Sherbrooke West, Montreal, Quebec, CANADA H3A 2K6 I It 1 J Fukutake Tadashi, Rural Sociologist of Postwar Japan by Kawamura Nozomu Introduction Fukutake Tadashi, born in 1917, is one of Japan's leading sociologists. After graduating from the University of Tokyo in 1940, he conducted a wartime survey of a Chinese village community, resulting in his first major book, Chugoku nosonshakai no kozo (The social structure of a Chinese village community). It was published in 1946 immediately after the war.! In 1948 Fukutake became as sistant professor at the University of Tokyo and in 1960 he was promoted to full professor. Thereafter he published many books including some English editions, of which Man and Society in Japan (1962), Japanese Rural Society (1967), and Japanese Society Today (1974) are especially important. 2 Because Fukutake has become the representative fig ure of postwar Japanese sociology, a close examination of his work is instructive. Significantly, the end of a war of aggression was the starting point of his sociological studies and his main concern has been the democratization of Japanese society. As a rural sociologist, he has been con cerned primarily with the liberation of tenant farmers who had long suffered under the domination of their landlords. Although he criticized the semi-feudal systems and sup ported the modernization of the family and the country side, he did not believe that social problems in Japan would be solved by capitalist modernization. In analyzing Japanese society, one must first acknowl edge that since at least the tum of the century the Japanese social formation has been capitalist. Japan is still the only 1. Fukutake Tadashi, Chugoku nOsonshakni no kozo (Tokyo: Daigado, 1946); reprinted in Fukutake Tadashi chosakushu (The complete writings of Fukutake Tadashi) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku shuppankai, 1975-76), Vol. 9. 2. Fukutake Tadashi, Man and Society in Japan (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1962); Japanese Rural Society (translated by R.P. Dore, London: Oxford University Press, 1967); Japanese Society Today (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1974). 12 non-Western society to have a highly developed capitalist system, though other countries have achieved some success in following the same road. Yet studies emphasizing the unique aspects of Japanese society, like Nakane Chie's, tend to treat the traits of Japanese society, culture and personality as if they were ahistorical phenomena, existing outside the influence of historical periods, geography and social classes. 3 In contrast, Fukutake's standpoint is histor ical and focuses on the study of the modem capitalist stage of Japanese society. Unlike advanced capitalism in the West, Japanese capitalism still retains many traditional or pre-modem ele ments. In Fukutake's scheme of explanation, the "distor tion of modernization in Japan" arose from its timing: Japan's capitalistic modernization commenced at a time when capitalism in other parts of the world was about to enter the stage of imperialism."4 According to Fukutake, the people and society of Japan can be measured against an ideal yardstick, deviating from the standard. In Japan, there has been neither a tradition of free citizens nor an economic ethic of capitalism supported by religion, as in the West. He notes that in Japan, modernization cannot proceed in the same manner as in the West, toward what might be regarded as a typical civil society. He writes: "from the first, Meiji government policies promoted in dustrialization and greater production, national wealth, and military strength. . . . That this growth was protected and fostered from the very beginning by the national gov ernment meant that no truly liberal tradition developed with it. "5 3. See Nakane Chie, Tateshakni no ningenknnkei (Human relations in vertically structured society) (Tokyo: KOdansha, 1968); and Japanese Society (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970). 4. Man and Society in Japan, p. 6. 5. Japanese Society Today, p. 3. Fukutake is correct in emphasizing the survival of semi-feudal elements in modern Japan. What characteri zed Japanese capitalism in its infancy was that industrializa tion came "from above," through the centralized power of national government. Village communities were still alive and landlords dominated the peasants, utilizing their tradi tional privileges in the village communities. At the time of the Meiji Restoration, conditions had not yet matured to a stage where the dissolution of feudalism and the develop ment of capitalism could proceed spontaneously. Fukutake agrees that Japan embarked on a process of forced-draft capital accumulation, which as a result ad vanced at great speed. The leaders ofthe Meiji government introduced the modern factory system from the West and established governmental enterprises. These were later transferred to the' control of privileged merchants who formed zaibatsu, giant family-controlled enterprises. The first burst of industrialization after the Restoration resulted in industrial goods for military use. This sector utilized modern equipment from abroad. The second stage brought the development of the consumer-goods industries, mainly textiles. The third stage came with the expansion of heavy industry in general, during the time of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. As Jon Halliday points out, "the extent to which the development of heavy industry was govern ment-led and arms-oriented cannot be exaggerated."6 Fukutake focuses on the backward and distorted na ture of capitalism in Japan. In a purely economic sense, as a mode of production, it could not form the basis of society. He considers prewar Japan to have been a pre-modern society resting on its "old-fashioned" rural foundation. He points out that Japanese agriculture was still essentially no different from that of the feudal period and "it is hardly surprising that the farmers who made agriculture their livelihood, and the rural society which those farmers cre ated, should have been of an old-fashioned character."7 The astonishing development of Japanese capitalism, which was supported by the mechanism of cheap rice and cheap wages, also did not confer any fringe benefits but kept Japanese agriculture and "Japanese villages firmly entrenched in their old-fashioned mould." Fukutake's view of the development of capitalism in Japan has a num ber of shortcomings, however, as will become clear from the brief survey of the inter-war years presented below. As capitalism developed, many changes did occur, even in rural society. With the spread of a higher stage of commodity-based economy, the contradictions between capitalist production and the landlord system grew more visible. First, from about the time of World War I, the relationship between landlord and tenant began to change. Beginning in 1915 and building into the 1920s, tenant dis putes spread throughout Japan. In 1916 and 1917, when they were particularly numerous, the government re sponded with repression; later it combined repression with attempts to adjust rents and establish schemes whereby 6. Jon Halliday, A Political History of Japanese Capitalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), p. 58. 7. Japanese Rural Society, p. 8. tenants could purchase the land they worked. The Taisho era (1912-1926) saw the rise of a movement for reform involving laborers, farmers, students and women, called the "Taisho Democracy Movement." The extension of the suffrage in 1925 was one of its most significant products. Suffrage, however, was limited to males over the age of twenty, and the reform was accompanied by restraining legislation, namely the Peace Preservation Law, which Fukutake oversimplified the situation by assert ing that all Japanese had a feudal outlook, and that Japanese society was more or less held to gether by its traditional culture. aimed at repressing the socialist movement as well as the farmers' and laborers' movements. Nevertheless, the wider suffrage, by undermining the basis of the landlords' domi nation of the village, changed the traditional power struc ture in rural areas. Previously, voting rights had been con fined to males over the age of twenty-five who had resided in an area for two years or more and who had paid a land tax or some other direct national tax of more than two yen per annum. Voters had further been classified into three classes for the municipal suffrage and two for the towns and vil lages. For example, in the latter category, first-class voters were those who paid high taxes to towns or villages and contributed half of the total amount of tax received by the government. All the rest were in the second class. Each class elected half of the total assembly members. This meant that a member of the first class could become an assembly member with a very small number of votes. In 1921, prior to the establishment of manhood suf frage, qualifications for full citizenship status were reduced to the simple payment of city, town or village taxes. There by the electorate was enlarged and the system of electoral classes abolished. Manhood suffrage was implemented starting with the local elections of 1926 and the general election of 1928, when all tax-based qualifications for suf frage were finally removed. These changes clearly reflected a decline in the power of the landlords in the villages. By the mid-twenties (late Taisho-early Showa) the position of landlord declined within the ruling bloc and monopoly capital became the dominant component. Thereafter the landlord was steadily relegated to the back ground. The ruling bloc after the Meiji Restoration had consisted roughly of government leaders descended from the lower echelons of the former warrior class, privileged merchants (who later formed zaibatsu), large landowners, the new peerage, and the court supported by the Emperor system. Then in the Taisho period, the zaibatsu increased in power, and party politicians and bureaucrats appeared as new elements in the ruling bloc. As Japanese capitalism approached the monopoly stage, the political power of landlords began to decline. 13 In Japan, party politics and party cabinets were not products of mass movements from below. Rather, they resulted from the initiative of big business, although par liamentary politics received its main impetus from the in troduction of universal male suffrage in 1925. Also, the abolition of county offices in 1926 symbolized the rationali zation of administration in the hands of liberal elements in the zaibatsu and party politicians. In the rural areas, farm ers of the upper stratum (not parasitic landlords) played a major role in remolding the social order in the village. In the 1920s the reformist elements in big business and the government attempted to resolve, from above, contradic tions in the semi-feudal landlord system. When conditions changed greatly in the 1930s, the reformists had little success. The great depression of 1929 in the United States created a serious agrarian panic in Japan, plunging Japanese capitalism into a severe crisis. Right-wing radicals and young military officers pushed for a "Showa Restoration" in order to implement the idea of "Japanism" as the solution to the crisis. After the Manchu rian Incident of 1931, they embraced fascist ideas and took an anti-zaibatsu, anti-industry, and anti-urban stand. In Japan the fascists saw no internal means of reforming the domestic political-economic system. To solve domestic contradictions they turned outwards, towards aggression and the invasion of other Asian countries. The fascists' ideology, though it took on the appearance of traditional agrarian fundamentalism, family-ism, was no mere revival of traditional values. Unlike the fascist movements of Germany and Italy, which were supported by the majority of the urban middle classes, the Japanese movement was supported by mem bers of the rural middle class who directly cultivated their own land and were active in the producers' co-operatives. Right-wing groups and young military officers claimed to speak for the farmers and attacked the liberal elements in the zaibatsu and bureaucracy. Therefore, during the early 1930s, some contradictions seemed to emerge between the fascists and the traditional bases of power. But these con tradictions and oppositions were purely superficial, or at most only temporary. Since the beginning of the century, the leaders of big business and the political establishment had been concerned about the labor problem and other expressions of unrest, fearing a connection with the spread of socialism and communism. Since there were no means of resolving the crisis other than through oppressing both the farmers' movement and the labor movement, and diverting frustration outwards toward the war of aggression, the conflicts between the zaibatsu and the fascists were, as a result, minimized. In this respect, they shared common interests. "Japanism" and the myth ofthe Emperor system cap tured not only the attention of the military officers and right-wing groups, but also of monopoly capital. Tradi tional and revered symbols were manipulated to mobilize the people for Japan's great war. Those who would not fight abroad on behalf of monopoly capital were encour aged to do so for the Emperor. Monopoly capital also took the initiative in building up the myth of the Divine Em peror, using it for its own profit. A major shortcoming in the work of Fukutake is now clear: he failed to perceive and explain the decisive role of 14 monopoly capital before the war. He also overlooked the manner in which the "old-fashioned" system functioned to enhance the political power of monopoly capital. Fukutake oversimplified the situation by asserting that all Japanese had a feudal outlook, and that Japanese society was more or less held together by its traditional culture. It seems incredibly naive to suggest that Japan rushed headlong into the war only because of the lack of individualism, civilian control or a civic social order. If this were so, how can we explain the similarly aggressive wars of other modernized countries where individualism was held to be a virtue? Fukutake believed that the major obstacle to the democratization of rural Japan was the minute size of family holdings. The postwar land reform merely transferred the ownership of land without any effect on the size of the holdings. The reform left untouched the problem of atomized holdings, the cancer of Japanese agriculture. The Question ofFeudallnftuence on Rural Social Structure Japanese imperialism was defeated in 1945 and great changes took place under the American occupation after the war. The main reforms were the introduction of a new Constitution, a purge of undesirable personnel from public office, zaibatsu dissolution (the rebuilding ofJapanese capi talism), and land reform. The promulgation of a new Con stitution demythologized the Emperor, categorically deny ing him any supernatural attributes and relegating him to serve as a "symbol of the state and of the unity of the people." Land reform undercut the foundation on which the semi-feudal relationship between landlord and tenant had rested and tended to undermine the family system which had been regarded as a uniquely Japanese institution. Under these conditions the major focus oftheoretical attention was on the democratization of Japanese society. Along with other social scientists, Fukutake engaged in fieldwork in rural Japan. In 1949 he published his first book on rural Japan which emphasized the importance of democratization for the rural family and community. "Un less Japanese village society can move toward being truly democratic," he wrote, "Japanese society will never be come a stable democracy. "8 Later, during the rapid growth of the Japanese economy in the 1960s, he also pointed out that "unless Japanese villages can somehow in the course of 8. Nihon noson no shakaiteki seikaku (The social characteristics of rural Japan) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku shuppankai, 1949), p. 1. their transition, move towards a solution of these contra dictions, Japanese village society will never become a truly democratic society." It was a matter of considerable con cern that "at present one cannot hold out bright prospects for Japanese agriculture and Japanese villages."9 Although in both instances he used the same term, "a truly demo cratic society," his implication changed over the course of time,as we shall see later. Fukutake believed that the major obstacle to the democratization of rural Japan was the minute size of fam ily holdings. The postwar land reform merely transferred the ownership of land without any effect on the size of the holdings. The reform left untouched the problem of atom ized holdings, the cancer of Japanese agriculture. At that time, however, Fukutake believed that Japanese capital ism had already approached the monopoly stage; a move ment away from small holdings could be realized, there fore, by socialist cooperation. 10 Immediately after the war Kawashima Takeyoshi pub lished an essay entitled Nihonshakai no kazokuteki kosei (The familial structure of Japanese society) (1946), in which he argued that the democratization of Japan would fail unless the Japanese family system was revolutionized. 11 Otsuka Hisao also wrote an article in 1946 entitled "Kindaiteki ningen ruikei no sOshutsu" (The necessity of creating the modern civic type of person). 12 He too was afraid that the institution of democracy would be like a skeleton without any flesh and blood unless the people changed their values and gave the reforms spontaneous and voluntary support. He believed that the democratic type of person would emerge only when the tenants were liberated from the oppression of the landlords and a full-scale domestic labor market was created. 13 Within ten years, these two prerequisites for democ racy were realized, but matters did not move in the direc tion Otsuka had predicted. He claimed later that he did not visualize the early-modern European societies as a model for contemporary Japan. His earlier writings, he argued, were meant as suggestions on how the Japanese people could assimilate new ideas and have them reflected in their own behavior.14 Nevertheless, the misunderstandings re sulted from Otsuka's failure to address the problem ofclass contradictions in modern Japanese society. He did not come to grips with the presence of big business interests and the ability of monopoly capital to subordinate state agencies while at the same time continuing to use the prewar vocabulary, much of which was defined in terms of the Japanese and their uniqueness. 9. Japanese Rural Society, p. 27. 10. Nihon nOson rw shakaite1ci seikaku, p. 235. 11. Kawashima Takeyoshi. Nihon shakai no kazokuteki msei (Tokyo: Ni hon hyoronsha. 1950). pp. 24-25. 12. Otsuka Hisao. "Kindaiteki ningen ruikei no sO sOshutsu." reprinted in Otsuka Hisao. Kindaika no ningente1ci kiso (A personal basis for moderni zation) (Tokyo: Chikuma shooo, 1948). 13. Ibid . p. 16. 14. Otsuka Hisao. "Gendai Nihon-shakai ni okeru ningenteki jokyo" [Social conditions of people in present-day Japanese society]. Sekai, Au gust 1963. p. 108. Fukutake's failure too lies in his overemphasis on the feudal elements in modern Japanese society. He argues that "individuals can no longer be prevented from having desires of their own, but nevertheless the 'ie' and the 'hamlet' which required the suppression of such individual ity are still living concepts. "IS Reiterating the same view point, he writes: The hamlet is still the hamlet. Just as that other important social unit, the ie, has not disappeared, so the hamlet too, though headedfor disintegration, has still not arrived at that point. We have not reached that happy state in which free individual farmers can cheerfully co-operate with each other, spontaneously and voluntarily, not as a result of the pressure ofthe "village community." 16 In this context the ie refers to the household commu nity (hiiusgemeinschaft in German), the hamlet (mura in Japanese) to the village community (Dorf-gemeinschaft in German). The continued existence of the ie and the hamlet does not result from any semi-feudal social relationships. The ie and the hamlet of today are not the same ones that existed under the landlord system in the prewar period. After the war all farmers came to own their land and to sell their agricultural products. They became commodity pro ducers, even if only on a small scale. As Fukutake notes, agriculture in Japan is carried out by family labor, since capitalist farm management by means of hired agricultural laborers has never developed. Under such conditions the ie and the hamlet will continue to survive, until capitalist agriculture reaches an advanced stage ofdevelopment. The communal characteristics of the ie and of the hamlet will last so long as the small family holding exists. The goal is thus not to encourage further development of capitalism in agriculture, that is large-scale capitalist farming which would create only a few large-scale farms at the expense of most poor farmers. Rather, the goal is the free c0 operation of farmers fighting against the oppressive power of monopoly capital. In his 1949 book on the social characteristics of rural Japan, Fukutake draws a distinction between the dOzoku type of village and the ko and kumi type village, contrasting the dozoku principle of organization with the ko-kumi princi ple of organization. The former is based on lineage rela tionships and the latter (purposeful association) is based on neighborhood relationships.17 The dOzoku is the lineage group of male descent and comprises families branching off the main parent family. It takes on a pyramidal structure, typically with the original family at the top, then its branch families and finally their branch families (from the original family's point of view grandchild-branch-families). Rank ing within the dozoku depends upon the antiquity of the family's branching and on the directness of its descendents' relationships with the original family. The problem of how the dOzoku can be related to the social structure of the village community will be examined 15. Japanese Rural Society, p. 212. 16. Ibid., p. 87. 17. Nihon noson no shakaiteki seikaku, pp. 34 ff. 15 later. Here it must be noted that in the prewar period the study of the dozoku was the main theme of rural sociology. At that time, studies of the ie and the hamlet were related to the ideology of "Japanism." For example, Yanagida Kunio, skeptical as to whether imported theories such as Marxism could explain the dynamics of Japanese society, believed that Japanese folklore provided a rich source of inspiration for the development of indigenous theories. His studies of local customs in various parts of Japan led him to evaluate highly the ability of the ie to perpetuate itself. Already, earlier, he had identified individualism as a de viant form of behavior which served only to undermine the value placed on lineage. IS Moreover, the main principle of the ie was none other than the main principle of the Emperor system. He argued that the nation was more than the sum of its individual members, and that the uniqueness of the Japanese ie was rooted in the fact that the Japanese people had lived and served the Emperor as the original family for over a thousand years. 19 Yanagida also explored the oyalmta-kolmta relation ship in traditional rural society. He distinguished between concepts such as oyalmta (one who takes the role of the fictive parent) and umi no oya (biological parents). Accord ingly, kokata (child) is not necessarily someone linked to an oyakata through blood as is the case with natural parents and children. Yanagida emphasized that the terms were originally used to indicate the leader-follower relationship within the social unit in which work was organized in the extended family (dozoku). He noted that these fictive kin ship ties played an important role in social relationships among households. Exploring in more detail the structure and functions of the dozoku, Aruga Kizaemon developed many themes which Yanagida had initially identified. In particular, he distinguished between the internal and external relations of the family. He described the distinction as follows: The system ofthe extendedfamily is characterized by both an internal structure ofrelationships in which each family mem ber is connected subordinately to a patriarch and an external structure according to which each extended family is con nected subordinately to the head ofthe lineage group. 20 According to Aruga, the major structural feature of Japanese society was its familial principle of organization. This principle applied not only to the family, but even to the community and to "the state. " The overriding principle of "concentric hierarchies" meant that each group had its own subunits of organization, while also being part of some larger organization. The Japanese state or nation was seen as being the ultimate unit of organization, the Emperor serving as the patriarchal head of the national family. Just as the relationships between members of the family were 18. Yanagida Kunio, Noseigaku (Agricultural administration), 1902 1905, in Yanagida Kunio Shu (The writings of Yanagida Kunio), Vol. 28 (Tokyo: Chikuma shobO, 1962), p. 195. 19. Yanagida Kunio, lidai to nOsei (The Age and Agriculture), in Yanagida KunioShu. Vol. 16 (Tokyo: ChikumashobO, 1961), p. 39. 20. Aruga Kizaemon, Nihon kazokuseido to kosakuseido (Japanese Family System and Tenant System), (Tokyo; Kawade shobO, 1943), p. 722. hierarchical, so too were relations between main and branch families or between the Emperor and "his people. "21 Aruga's belief in the importance of a peculiarly Japan ese national character can be seen in the following passage: Though I do not deny the existence ofsocial classes in Japan, I believe that the Japanese have a consciousness somewhat different from thatfound in the West. Western social organi zation is based on the individual and has developed along horizontal lines. For example, the political system revolves around the interaction among representatives from each social class. Japanese social organization, however, is based upon the vertical or hierarchical links between oyakata and kokata or between main and branch families within the dOzoku. 22 Thus Aruga attacked the Marxist theory of class strug gle and lauded the Japanese national character during the Pacific War, a time when the state was brutally suppressing class struggle and Marxist theory. On one point Aruga's offensive against left-wing scholars is well-founded. He criticized the Marxist theorists who defined a nago (a kind of kokata) as a serf, and saw the labor performed for myoshu (a kind of oyakata) as being equivalent to labor rent. The Marxists believed that in Japan too, the forms of the feudal rent developed sequentially as labor, product, and finally monetary rent. Aruga pointed out that the labor of nago was not the corvee of feudal Japan. The labor of the nago was not a feudal labor rent but a form of the kolmta's household labor for the oyalmta within the extended family system. 23 Of course, he argued that these social relation ships between the oyakata and kolmta were merely manifes tations of the Japanese national character. In statements based on historical data, Aruga was more carefully qual ified, noting that the independence of subordinate nago or kokata was the major characteristic of feudal Tokugawa Japan (1603-1867). Aruga mustered a considerable amount of empirical evidence to demonstrate that the oyalmta-kolmta relation ship within the large extended family was carry-over from earlier times and existed as such before the small landhold ing families gained their independence. Yet he exaggerated the nature of oyakata-kolmta relationships before the feudal Tokugawa era and gave ideological support to such rela tionships by claiming that they were the essence of Japan's unchanging national character. In this regard, then, he aligned himself with ultra-nationalism as defined by the peculiar intellectual milieu of the 1930s and early 194Os. Fukutake, on the other hand, assumed a coincidence between ranking based on descent and ranking based on economic standing, and argued that the dozoku type of village developed into the ko-kumi type. The dozoku had significance only when the ranking of its descent relation ships was supported by real economic power, and paral leled by landlord-tenant relationships. Only in this case 21. Ibid., p. 726. 22. Ibid., p. 323. 23. Ibid., p. 612. 16 could the original family exercise strong control over all the other members of the group. But even in the feudal era, that was very rarely the case. More often the original family would fall into decline and its branches would become more powerful. Fukutake later modified his typology, noting that "the dozoku group centered on a cultivating landlord could hardly be said to be typical of the modem period when Japanese agriculture was characterized by the parasitic landlord system. "24 But, he continued to argue, "the dozoku group is, however, undeniably important as a basic pattern for the social structure of Japanese villages."25 He admitted that the dozoku groups had been developed along with the cultivating landlord system at the end of the feudal era, and not with the parasitic landlord system in modem Japan. As noted earlier, the typical dozoku groups were not found in the feudal era when the oyakata's extended family had dissolved and most kokata-peasants became indepen dent. The dOzoku groups under the cultivating landlord were not a prototype but were only seen in the late de veloped areas where a cultivating landlord happened to ensure his agricultural labor force through oyakata-kokata relationships. So Fukutake admitted that "even where they were typically found it was, in fact, fairly rare for there to be an orderly pyramid of an original stem family, stem families and branch families left intact. "26 Therefore, in the more advanced areas, the absence of such oyakata kokata relationships was typical by the Meiji era. Concerning this typological dichotomy, Isoda Susumu tried to draw a distinction between the family-status type and the non-family-status type villages. 27 He established these two types in a contemporaneous rather than histor ical way. Under the landlord system in modem Japan, the determinant of family status was not descent, but land ownership. Therefore the non-family-status type village was usually found in the mountain and fishing villages where the differentiation of arable land ownership was undeveloped and big landlords were absent. Unless the village community invariably has a hierarchical structure, the direction of development from dozoku to ko-kumi is very doubtful. The dozoku type and ko-kumi type of villages could exist side by side in the same historical period. On this point Fukutake was theoretically confused. 28 Fukutake on Japan's Postwar Democratization As mentioned previously, immediately after the war Fukutake argued that the democratization of rural Japan would be possible only through socialist co-operation be tween farmers. Awaiting socialist democratization, he was skeptical of capitalist modernization. In his later books, 24. Nihon noson no shakaiteki seikaku. p. 40. 25. Japanese Rural Society. p. 66. 26. Ibid., p. 65. 27. See, Isoda Susumu, (ed.), SonrakukOzo no kenkyu (A study of village structure), (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku shuppankai, 1955), chap. 1. 28. See, Kawamura Nozomu and Hasumi Otohiko, "Kindai Nihon ni okeru sonrakukozO no tenkai katei" (The development process of the village structure in modem Japan), Shiso. May-June, 1958. however, he altered his position and supported the policies of the government designed to promote "modernization" and "rationalization" of agriculture by the removal of part time farmers. The overall defect of Fukutake's sociological theories is his underestimation of the oppressive power of monopoly capital. The basis of the anti democratic elements in Japan is none other than big business. For the democratization ofJapanese society, it is more important to fight capitalist economic and social development in the interests of the profits of big business than it is to eradicate the survival of pre-modern elements in families and villages. Under rapid economic growth, agriculture ceased to be the main stream of economic development. Farmers who could not maintain their livelihood by agriculture alone became part-time farmers, and the agricultural labor force came to consist increasingly of women and old men. In order to rescue agriculture, Fukutake demanded struc tural reform: "if a decline in the agricultural population means a decrease in the number of farms and an expansion in the average size of holdings, this is something very much to be desired from the point of view of agricultural de velopment. "29 The problem, according to him, was that a decrease in the agricultural population did not necessarily imply a decrease in the number of farming households. In this sense he supported the Basic Agriculture Law of 1961, the preamble of which states: It is a duty springingfrom our concernfor the public welfare, and a necessary complement to the mission of agriculture and agriculturalists in our society, to ensure that those disadvantages resulting from the natural, economic and so cial limitations ofagriculture are corrected, to promote the modernization and rationalization of agriculture while re specting the free will and initiative ofthose engaged in it, and to ensure that the nation's farmers can enjoy a healthy and cultured livelihood not inferior to that of other members of the population. 30 In line with the Basic Agriculture Law, the govern ment has since implemented the Structural Improvement 29. Japanese Rural Society. p. 23. 30. "Nogyo Kihonho" (Basic Agriculture Law), 1961, in The Commis sion of Inquiry into the Basic Problem of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, (ed.), Nogyo no kihonmondai to kihontaisaku (Basic problems and basic policies of agriculture), (Tokyo: Norintiikei kyiikai, 1961). 17 Table 1. Numbers of Fann Households by Full-time and Part-time Status Year Full-Time Part-Time Total Numbers of 1st class 2nd class Households (%) (%) (%) (%) (1,000) 1950 50.0 28.4 21.6 100.0 6,176 1955 34.8 37.7 27.5 100.0 6,043 1960 34.3 33.6 32.1 100.0 6,057 1965 21.5 36.7 41.7 100.0 5,665 1970 15.6 33.6 50.8 100.0 5,402 1975 12.4 25.4 62.1 100.0 4,953 1980 13.4 21.5 65.1 100.0 4,661 Source: Agricultural Census of each year, cited from Norintokei (Agriculture and Forestry Statistics) (Tokyo: Norintokei kyokai, 1982), p. 123. Program. Poor farmers and part-time farmers have pro tested, believing this program to be a program for pushing out the poor farmer. Fukutake did not see it that way. "These moves cannot simply be dismissed," he said, "as they frequently are by some critics, as 'the policy of wiping out the poor farmer.' "31 According to Fukutake, even if part-time farmers with tiny holdings had farmed co operatively, little progress would have been achieved. The Structural Improvement Program was open to criticism because it contained no provisions for aiding the migration of poor farmers. "What is necessary," he stressed, "is that the poor part-time farmers should be, not wiped out, but made able to transfer to some other occupation without hardship or insecurity. "32 Fukutake failed to consider whether in fact the capital ist system is able to transfer these poor farmers to other occupations without creating hardship. Did he really ex pect conservative politicians closely aligned with big busi ness to do anything of the kind? The ideal of a smooth transition contrasts sharply with the reality of the dekasegi (seasonal workers from poor agricultural households). Clearly, the nature of the co-operation he expects has changed from a socialist orientation to a capitalist one. Co-operation among poor farmers is rejected, and c0 operation among the upper stratum of farmers after the poor part-time farmers are "transferred"-not "wiped out"-to other industries is considered the only means to solve the present stagnation in agriculture. 31. Japanese Rural Society. p. 198. 32. Ibid. However, the real changes did occur in a way different from Fukutake's expectations. For example, the total num ber of farm households decreased from 6,176,000 in 1950 to 4,661,000 in 1980. In addition, between 1950 and 1980 the ratio of persons engaged in agriculture (including forestry and fishing workers) to the total work force decreased from 44.6 percent to 9.8 percent. But such changes did not create favorable conditions for agriculture. Statistics show that the number of part-time farm households increased from 50.0 percent of the total in 1950 to 86.6 percent in 1980. Especially those who had mainly engaged in other occupa tions (the second class part-timers) increased from 21.6 percent in 1950 to 65.1 percent in 1980 (see Table 1). Thus most farmers who cannot maintain their liveli hood solely by agriculture do not abandon their farming, but become part-time farmers. Of course, some small farmers do resign from agriculture. As shown in Table 2, the actual numbers of farmers who cultivate land of less than one hectare decreased from 4,420,000 in 1950 to 3,157,000 in 1980, and the total numbers of farmers de creased from 5,931,000 to 4,496,000 in the same period (from these figures the Hokkaido district is excluded be cause of its specific agricultural conditions). The numbers of relatively large farmers who cultivate more than three hectares increased slowly from 27,000 in 1950 to 105,000 in 1980. Nevertheless, one cannot conclude from such data that a real tendency towards capitalist agriculture exists in Japan. During the 1950s, farmers who cultivated less than one hectare of land decreased while cultivators of between 1.0 and 1.5 hectares increased. But in the 1960s and 1970s the latter began to decrease, and in the 1970s only farmers who cultivated more than 2.5 hectares increased. On the other hand, the ratio of farmers who cultivated less than 18 ! I I ! one hectare decreased only from 74.5 percent in 1950 to farmers of the upper stratum might occur regardless of 70.2 percent in 1980. That is, in 1980, only 4 percent of all their co-operation. But, since it is impossible to transfer farm households, or only 187,000 out of a total 4,4%,000, them and since they should not be "wiped out," they have I have favorable conditions for the development of fanning. to be protected and guaranteed as stable small farming Nonetheless, they have little opportunity to expand their enterprises. Through the stabilization of their production, farming by purchasing or borrowing land from small they could co-operate spontaneously and move toward I farmers. non-capitalist large-scale farming. Fukutake thinks that the problems of Japanese agri From such a standpoint, Fukutake has attacked the culture derive from the small size of family farming. There left-wing parties for their "formalistic" policies, saying that fore he supports policies which promote the migration of "the left-wing parties have succeeded in making only a very I j small farmers from rural areas. He considers that further weak impact on the farmer and their policies are highly capitalist development of agriculture could solve the pres formalistic and lacking in appeal." According to him, when ent crisis of agriculture in Japan. But, as we have seen the socialist and communist parties attack the govern
above, under the control of big business which supports the ment's policy of improvement of the agrarian structure as i .1 liberalization policies of agricultural products, agriculture "wiping out the poor farmers," or when they talk of co I itself faces great difficulties. The crisis of agriculture in operative management as the solution to the problems of Japan is the crisis of the small farming enterprise. If, as the disintegrating intermediate stratum, they can hardly ! Fukutake mentions, the smooth transfer of small farmers expect to win the confidence of fanners who vote for the to other occupations was possible, then the development of Liberal Democratic Party. He claims that, by the standards I l
J 1 Table 2. Fann Households by Scale of Cultivated Land 1950 1955 1%0 1965 1970 1975 1980 (Hectares) (1,000) (1,000) (1,000) (1,000) (1,000) (1,000) (1,000) Under 0.5 2,468 2,285 2,275 2,0% 1,999 1,984 1,848 0.5-1.0 1,952 1,955 1,907 1,762 1,604 1,436 1,309 1.0-1.5 945 981 1,002 945 868 727 660 1.5-2.0 363 376 404 407 404 349 327 2.0-2.5 132 147 156 170 162 163 176 2.5-3.0 48 54 59 71 74 82 3.0-5.0 26 28 34 36 55 67 90 5.0- 1 1 2 2 5 9 15 Total 5,931 5,806 5,823 5,465 5,174 4,818 4,4% (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) Under 0.5 41.6 39.3 39.1 38.4 38.6 41.2 41.1 0.5-1.0 32.9 33.7 32.7 32.2 31.0 29.8 29.1 1.0.:...1.5 15.9 16.9 17.2 17.3 16.8 15.1 14.7 1.5-2.0 6.1 6.5 6.9 7.4 7.8 7.2 7.3 2.0-2.5 2.3 2.5 2.8 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.0 2.5-3.0 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.8 3.0-5.0 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.1 1.4 2.0 5.0- L 0.1 0.2 0.3 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 , " Source: Agricultural Census for each year, cited from Norinlou; (Agriculture and (Tokyo: Norintokei kyokai, 1982), p. 125. 19 Table 3. The Class Structure ofJapan (in percent) 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 Capitalists 1.9 2.0 2.7 3.6 3.9 4.2 4.7 Persons in security services 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.4 Self-employed proprietors 58.9 53.2 45.7 38.3 34.8 29.4 27.3 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 44.6 37.7 30.6 23.0 18.1 12.7 9.8 Mining, manufacturing, transportation and communication 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 7.3 6.8 6.7 Sales 6.2 7.0 6.2 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.7 Services 0.9 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.3 2.6 2.7 Professionals and specialized technicians 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.4 Working class 38.2 43.6 50.5 56.9 60.1 65.0 66.6 Salaried employees 11.9 12.5 14.2 17.0 18.7 21.9 23.3 Productive workers 20.0 22.4 27.8 29.2 29.6 28.7 28.5 Nonproductive workers 4.3 6.8 7.8 9.3 10.5 12.2 12.4 Unemployed 2.0 1.9 0.7 1.4 1.3 2.3 2.5 Source: Cited from Fukutake, Japanese Society Today, p. 26. Data of 1975 and 1980 are added from the Census of each year. ofthe advanced countries, the "poor-farmers" ofJapan are by far the worst off; and that even the "upper stratum" of farmers must co-operate if they are to have any future. 33 He places priority, however, on the co-operation of upper stratum farmers over that of "poor farmers." Fukutake advises the left-wing parties that "when it becomes clear that the hopes of progress by individual management are illusory and if, at this time, the radical parties can offer concrete plans to substitute for that illusion, then and only then can one expect any new developments in the farmers' political attitudes. "34 Fukutake's conclusion is that the right to co-operate is reserved for farmers of the upper stratum. In Japanese Society Today (1974), he also argues that agriculture cannot be saved unless some measures are taken to enable large numbers of people to leave the farms and to develop a system which promotes some form of co-operation among those families that remain in agri cuIture. 35 Once again he reveals the illusion that the policy of transferring farmers to other occupations without risk of unemployment can indeed be successfully implemented. For example, he criticizes the Socialist Party for its weak response to the needs of farmers, and for its protests against the conservatives' policy of discarding poor farmers, but he fails to offer any practical alternative. He merely writes that "the socialists should have foreseen changes in the structure of rural society, and should have assured farmers that unlike the government party it would find ways to create employment opportunities for them so that even if they left the farms they could get jobs without having to worry. "36 According to Fukutake, the reformists' "conservatism" is far worse than the conservatives' "reforms. " Yet, Fukutake acknowledges that governmental ag ricultural policies are fundamentally adapted to the inter ests of big business. He points out that although the Liberal Democratic Party has been at great pains to speak of the need for modernizing agriculture and to stress its determi nation not to sacrifice the farmers' interests, "national policies are in essence always attuned to the interests of big business and when they speak of consideration for agricul ture and for farmers there is always the proviso: in so far as this does not clash with business interests or hinder their development. "37 Acutally Fukutake himself emphasizes the need for modernizing agriculture and calls on the na 33. Ibid., p. 221. 34. Ibid. 36. Ibid., p. 143. 35. Japanese Society Today, p. 50. 37. Japanese Rural Society. p. 195. 20 tional government to "wipe out" the poor farmers from rural areas, not in the interests of big business, but for the sake of the farmers themselves. Fukutake describes the class structure of Japan today as comprising a handful of capitalists, an old middle class of independent proprietors (mainly farmers and shop own ers), the new middle class (consisting of a small number of service workers and specialized technicians), and finally the working class which includes salaried workers (see Table 3). Table 3 also clearly reveals a steady decline in self employed proprietors. By 1980 the proportion of farmers had fallen to less than 10 percent. However, the working class had come to occupy two-thirds of the total. From the point of view of class rule, the capitalist's domination of the working class is equally clear. In Japan as well as other industrial societies, the capitalists and top managers of large corporations, who ally themselves with politicians and high-ranking bureaucrats, have become the ruling class. Thus Fukutake writes, The roughly 100 Japanese corporations capitalized at one billion yen or more constitute no more than 0.1% of all enterprises, but own half the total capital. Moreover, the greater part ofindustry is virtually controlled by a few giant enterprises. The large number of small enterprises and the high degree ofmonopoly control are two striking features of Japanese industry. It is those who control the giant enter prises that run Japan. 38 As Fukutake admits, the national government is con trolled by the power of monopoly capital, and the dictates of capital are given priority over social welfare. The "miracle" of rapid economic growth since 1960 has de pended among other things on immense environmental destruction. Such serious problems as pollution, traffic congestion, population imbalance, income inequality, de struction of agriculture and small enterprises, and social tension are all the direct results of a deliberate policy which the government adopted for capital accumulation, and not the unavoidable "by-products" of technological develop ment. In fact, economic policies catering to big business have increasingly destroyed the livelihood of many people, and the national and local "development" plans have threatened the survival of communities and exploited their inhabitants' land, labor and lives. If this is true, how can Fukutake look so favorably on the conservatives' "reforms"? In the period immediately after the war, "moderniza tion" was seen as equivalent to democratization, although the conservative government and big business were always opposed to "modernization" that aimed to expand the civil liberties and rights of the people. Since the early 1960s, the term "modernization" has been appropriated entirely by conservative ideologues in order to sell their own policies for economic development. In Fukutake's case, "demo cratization" initially meant the movement toward "social ism" or "socialization," but later it came to mean the process of "capitalization" and, in this sense, "moderniza tion" in its more recent usage. This corresponded to the national policy of dedication to building up an extraord inarily high rate ofeconomic growth. As the original goal of "democratization" was buried in oblivion, Fukutake's own definition of it also changed. Fukutake altered his position after the tension gen erated by the AMP039 demonstrations of 1960 had receded. At that time a growing concern with "moderniza tion" was evident. While serving as the American Ambas sador to Japan, Edwin Reischauer was active in propagat ing "modernization theory" as a counter-model to offset the influence of Marxism and socialism. "Modernization theory" was born out of an ideological competition in which two parties claimed that they were the true interpret ers of the Japanese experience. Within this framework, it is not surprising that Reischauer's activities have been re ferred to as the "Reischauer offensive" by Japanese in tellectuals on the left. The design of this "modernization" approach was succinctly stated by Princeton historian, Marius Jansen: ... the important thing is that people read, not what they read, that they participate in the generalized function of a mass society, not whether they do so asfree individuals, that machines operate, not for whose benefit, and that things are produced, not what is produced. It is quite as "modem" to make guns as automobiles, and to organize concentration camps as to organize schools which teach freedom. 40 In this statement three basic characteristics of the "modernization" approach stand out: the belief in prog ress, the belief in rationality, and the normative judgment that mechanization or industrialization is good. The schol ars adopting the "modernization" approach tried to sum up Japan's experience in terms of a model characterized by gradual and non-revolutionary development along capital ist and even "democratic" lines. In Japan, this approach was quickly adopted by sociologists of the functionalist school. For example, in 1964 Tominaga Ken'ichi wrote Shakai hendo no riron (Theories of social change), in which he used the vocabulary of Parsonian "system theory" to criticize Marxist theories of social change. The various social problems and contradictions resulting from Japan's rapid development he dismissed as minor and temporary aberrations which simply represented the "time lag" by which "social development" followed economic develop ment. He optimistically claimed that this temporary dis location would disappear as soon as "social development" caught up with economic development. 41 Fukutake's viewpoint is, ofcourse, different from such 39. AMPO refers to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. In 1960 there were many demonstrations against the revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and the ensuing mass demonstrations brought down Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke's government. 40. M.B. Jansen, "On Studying the Modernization of Japan," Asian Cultural Studies, no. 3 (October, 1962), International Christian Univer sity, Tokyo, p. 10. 41. See, Tominaga Ken'ichi, Shakai hendO no riron (Theories of social 38. Japanese Society Today, p. 27. change) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1964). 21 "modernization" theorists. But his stance is ambivalent. On the one hand, he stands against the rule of monopoly capital and government which speaks in favor of its in terests. On the other hand, as in the case of the Structural Improvement Program of Agriculture, he actually supports the modernization and rationalization policy at the cost of poor, part-time farmers' interests. Fukutake dreams of the construction of a new type of community combining agri culture and industry into one entity. For rural society to move toward the development of new communities, the majority of the poor, part-time farmers must make a com plete break with farming. In Japanese Society Today, Fukutake stresses the im portance of social welfare and writes that "the level of social welfare must rise even at the sacrifice ofgrowth in the economy." He concludes that "Japan must become a soci ety which truly guarantees to everyone, whether he can work to his fullest capacity or is unable to work, 'a healthy and cultured life.' "42 The goal is admirable, but how can we attain it without controlling the great power of big business? The overall defect of Fukutake's sociological theories is his underestimation of the oppressive power of monopoly capital. The basis of the anti-democratic ele ments in Japan is none other than big business. For the democratization of Japanese society, it is more important to fight capitalist economic and social development in the interests of the profits of big business than it is to eradicate the survival of pre-modern elements in families and villages. Conclusion Japanese society today is capitalist society. As capital ist countries, the United States, West Germany and Japan are similar, but of course every modem capitalist society has its own character, historical traditions, political proc ess, and indigenous elements which are neglected when we talk about capitalist society in general. Modem society in Japan has different cultural traditions from modem West ern societies. As a historical fact, capitalist society first appeared in Western countries, and since these countries shared common Mediterranean cultural traditions the ini tial formulation of the theory of modernization tended to ignore the experiences of non-Western societies. One re sult is that people have tended to confuse modernization and Westernization. In Japan, indigenous elements have often been regarded as deviations or distortions-aberra tions not in keeping with the main course of modernization. On the other hand, Japan as a late-developed capital ist country has retained many pre-modem and communal relationships in families and communities. Traditional values which emphasize communal interests are preserved in the everyday life of the common Japanese. This cultural tradition originates from actual realities of centuries of communal life in the small household enterprises. Thus one could claim that further capitalist development should be encouraged. Also one could idealize the model of Western advanced industrial societies and encourage Japan to strive toward this ideal. But further "modernization" or "ration 42. Japanese Society Today, p. 153. alization" in Japan would not resolve contradictions and problems in Japanese society today. Japan, as well as many other Western countries, has faced many difficulties which the capitalist system itself has initiated. The dominance of monopoly capital has brought disastrous situations for the Japanese people. "Modernization" policies aim not to dis solve feudal or semi-feudal relationships but to reorganize them and facilitate the rule of monopoly capital. The main obstacle to democratization in Japan is not the existence of small household enterprises but big mo nopoly capital. In order to realize a new egalitarian human society in which each individual can freely develop his or her potential and attain self-realization, the power of monopoly capital must be abolished. Exactly this is what Fukutake fails to posit in his theoretical frame of reference. * .. Latin American Perspectives has in its short lifetimeacquiredaneminent reputation among Latin Americanists both in the United States and in Latin America. It fills an intricate gap in our knowledge of this area which is not currently covered by other journals. I have long subscribed to this Journal and also urged my students to do so. I have also used several of the special issues in my classes." Helen I. 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In this process, I rely on Latin American Perspectives ... to stimulate my ideas and provide valuable informatKm oiIen unavailable elsewhere. -Stephen Kinzer, The New York TImes Frequency: Quarterly in February, May, August, and November Rates: One Year Twe Years Three Years Single Issues Individuals: $18.00 $36.00 $ 54.00 $ 6.00 Institutions: $46.00 $91.00 $136.00 $12.00 On subscriptions outside the U.S., please add $4 per year lor foreign postage. ($) SAGE PUBLICATIONS The Publishers of Professional Social Science ~ 275 South Beverly Drive, Beverly Hills, California 90212 22 Political Protest in Prewar Japan: The Case of Fukushima Prefecture by Roger W. Bowen Just over one hundred years ago "modern" Japan experienced its first non-samurai-Ied political protest which challenged the legitimacy of the Meiji State. The event is known as the Fukushima Incident, taking its name from the prefecture in which it occurred. In Fukushima in 1882, thousands of farmers, teachers, priests, businessmen, local government officials, and craftsmen, affiliated with or belong ing to the new Liberal Party (Jiyuto), organized tax boycotts, anti-labor conscription movements, anti-government rallies, court litigations, petition campaigns, and finally massive protest demonstrations before eventually being brutally sup pressed by the government. The basic issue which they so fervently contested was the central government's presumed right to determine local taxation, roadbuilding and administra tive policies. Acutely aware that Tokyo's powers if left unchecked could do serious harm to the interests of the landed and commercial elites of the prefecture, these same elites assumed the leadership roles in the Incident. The couched their general demand for greater powers of self-government in the rhetoric of natural rights. Man is a creature deriving freedom from heaven. He therefore has the rights of freedom. On this depends his happiness. When he loses his rights he cannot secure the safety of his life or his property; he cannot have nor enjoy prosperity; it does not take a scholar or a genius to know this . ... To protect our [natural] rights we need [legal] rights in our country and in our society. I More than six decades passed before language remarkably similar to the above words was incorporated into Japan's postwar constitution drafted under American aegis. Today, I. Quoted in Roger Bowen, Rebellion and Democracy in Meiji Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 227. 23 nearly forty years later and over a century after the Fukushima Incident, thousands more Fukushima citizens are fighting to secure, in the words of their forebears, "the safety of ... life and ... property." The issue has changed, however. Today they are protesting the construction of several nuclear power plants in their prefecture. But the older themes of center versus periphery, and safety of person and property, are still being echoed. Said one protester: Let me teach you something good. Electric power used in Tokyo is not generated in Tokyo. The noise and radiation generated up here is not sent through the wires reaching Tokyo . ... My house is here. I live here. I do not want to become a martyr for someone else. 2 The citizens of Fukushima of both 100 years ago and of today, whose voices have been heard only because they joined political protests, have not been anti-modern provincialists inveighing against progress per se. Rather, they seem to be self-interested moderns intent upon protecting their lives and property against Tokyo's grand designs for developing the crowded Japanese archipelago. The protest strategies they have adopted, the political organizations they have created or joined for purposes of protesting, the self-justificatory ideology they have employed, and the State's response to all these, serve as excellent indices for interpreting changes and continuities in the character of Japanese state and society over the past 100 years. The purpose of the paper is to offer some very tentative observations about the changes in state and society in Japan during the past century that have been suggested by the limited case studies of political protest in Fukushima prefecture. 2. Quoted in Kenmochi Kazami, Genshi hanto [Nuclear Archipelago] (Tokyo: Matsuzawa, 1982), pp. 355-56. Characteristics of Fukushima Fukushima's representativeness makes it possible to draw conclusions about the experience of political protest for all Japan from the experience of this one prefecture. Befitting its rank as Japan's second largest prefecture (after Hokkaido) and first in population of all six Tohoku prefectures, Fukushima's human and economic geography exhibits the same sort of variation as does Japan as a whole. There are three natural regions in the prefecture-the coastal east, the central plains, and the mountainous west-which developed over the past century along distinctive paths according to the natural and human resources of each. On the coast, the southeastern town of Taira served as the hub of industrial and commercial activities that built up around farming, fishing, and mining interests. By the time of the First World War coal-mining, cement factories, mining-machinery factories, and fishing industries dominated the economy. The central part of the prefecture, stretching on both sides of the north-south railroads which cut the prefecture in unequal halves, developed around the prefectural capital of Fukushima City. Because it served as a railroad terminal, it became the central market for goods manufactured and grown in other parts of the prefecture. By the 1920s it was famous for sake production, silk-reeling, cotton-spinning, printing, stock breeding, export companies and, of course, government. It shared with the western part of the prefecture the task of generating hydro-electric power. Of the three regions, the west developed least quickly. The market centers were Wakamatsu and Kitakata where lacquerware, silk, cotton, tobacco, carrots, and rice were traded and sold. Cottage industry was far more important to the local economy than was factory industry. Here also economic power was concentrated in the hands of relatively few large landowners who controlled all phases of production and sale of rice, silk, and lacquerware. Largely because of the pervasive influence of a few large landowners over the economy of the region, the Nippon Times could characterize the west as late as 24 February 1949 as "an area pervaded by feudalism."3 While no one of the three areas experienced appreciably more political protest than the others, political protest in each area can be attributed largely to the differing effects that economic change had on the population of each area. Fukushima Incident, 1882 In 1882 the fifteen-year-old Meiji government began implementing a policy of building roads that would connect outlying markets and administrative centers with the central government in Tokyo. Its purpose was the two-fold one of consolidating central rule and developing an infrastructure for commercial activities in what was still a largely agrarian-based economy. Still bothered by a multitude of problems of governing, ranging from samurai disaffection to foreign economic and political pressure, the ruling oligarchy did not 3. Quoted in Chalmen; Johnson, Conspiracy at Matsukawa (Berkeley: Univen;ity of California Press, 1972), p. 96; for a lengthier statement on Fukushima's demography, see ShOji Kichinosuke, Kindai chihO minshii undo shi [A History of Modern Regional Democratic Movements], Vol. II (Tokyo: Kokura shoten, 1 9 7 ~ k p p . 124-26. hesitate to use repression to quell dissent generated by its policies of consolidation. In principle those living in the areas most affected by the policies of consolidation, such as Fukushima, did not object to the development of a commercial infrastructure so long as the attendant increase in taxes was equally shared by the central and local governments and so long as those affected were granted rights to help determine the course the new roads would take. The latter was deemed critical by the thousands of rising commercial farmers who wished to minimize the expenses of transporting their products to the market. The course a road would take could mean the life or death of a traditional market town, especially since in the 1880s the roads in question would link Fukushima with the Yokohama export markets. For the sericulturalists in the west and central part of the prefecture, the only real silk market was the export market. These two "so long as" conditions, set by Fukushima farmers, defined the parameters of the Fukushima Incident of 1882. Early that year a bureaucrat was sent from Tokyo to assume the governorship of Fukushima. He arrived with a plan for building a road whose intended course bore little relationship to the commercial centers which local power figures depended upon and wished to see developed; and he carried a plan for taxation which relied more heavily on rising local tax revenue than on national. The new governor's plan met with immediate resistance. Those who initiated the protest against he road scheme were, not surprisingly, the wealthier commercial farmers who had the most to lose and who also happened to be locally elected Jiyl1to officials, some of whom held seats in the prefectural assembly. Virtually all of those 24 who began the protest claimed that the road "was arbitrarily decided" and did not follow a route "in accord with the interests of the people in the area."4 Subsequent resolutions in the JiyiitO-controlled prefectural assembly censuring the governor and his road plan were initiated by the Jiyiito landowners most affected by the plan. The government's undisputed success in suppressing both the local party leaders and the grassroots movement which formed around them [in the Fukushima Incident of 1882] sent unmistakable signals to the national leadership of the party: protest parties based on principles fundamentally in conftict with the principles of central oligarchical rule would not be permitted in new Japan. The Jiyiit6-Liberal (or Liberty or Freedom) Party-was founded in late 1881 by dissident ex-samurai and wealthy commoners who had been excluded from positions of power in the ruling oligarchy. While the national leadership and in some instances the local Jiyiito leadership subscribed to elitist principles of leadership, they nonetheless embraced the doctrine of natural rights because its democratic inclusiveness helped in attracting a large popular following. By openly touting the doctrine and by carrying its message of equality in the countryside, the Jiyiito quite naturally set itself up as a party of protest. Against a government rigidly based on rule by oligarchical decree in the name of the emperor, the Jiyiito called for constitutional rule, representative assemblies and local self-government. In the Fukushima Incident it was the local Jiyiito which led the tax boycotts and the demonstrations, and eventually its leadership wrote a secret pact to overthrow the "oppressive government which is the public enemy of freedom" in the name of inherent natural rights to life, liberty and property. 5 The issue of the roads, entirely rooted in elightened self-interest, served merely as the precipitant for raising the larger issues of local self-rule and constitutional representative government that would protect the natural rights of property owners. The government's undisputed success in suppressing both the local party leaders and the grassroots movement which formed around them sent unmistakable signals to the national leadership of the party: protest parties based on principles fundamentally in conflict with the principles of central oligarchical rule would not be permitted in new Japan. What would be permitted, and this was the message of the 1889 constitution, were political parties represented in the Diet (parliament) whose membership was restricted to the larger 4. See Appendix A in Bowen, Rebellion. 5. Ibid., p. 237. 2S tax-paying property owners, the very sort that led the Jiyiito protest in Fukushima. In this way the Meiji state effectively co-opted the liberal leadership by adopting a limited liberal conception of law-making. Its effect in Fukushima was to put an end for the next forty years to the protest role of political parties as representatives of a larger population. The Meiji system of rule was thereafter based on the state's accommoda tion of landowner parties and with that change, one-time enemies of authoritarian rule became permanent allies. Rice Riots, 1918 For the three years following the Fukushima Incident there occurred numerous Jiyiito-related protests and armed rebellions which also called for democratic representative government and greater powers of local self-rule. In this respect the 1882 episode in Fukushima was very much a part of a larger nationwide protest movement known as the freedom and popular rights movement (jiyu minken undo). If the movement had a real end, it was with the dissolution of the Jiyiito in late 1884. Party politics as the politics of protest against authoritarian rule experienced a very real eclipse until the 1920s. The Rice Riots (kome sOdo) of 1918 were no exception, though they were a nationwide event and reached an important level of intensity in Fukushima. The Rice Riots began in Toyama prefecture on the Japan Sea in late July 1918, toward the close of the First World War. The causes of the riots are well known: a war-produced inflationary spiral at a time when wages were decreasing pushed the cost of the staple food of the Japanese beyond the purchasing power of the average citizen; the problem was accentuated by hoarding and market speculation and rumors that rice was being exported to client states and the military overseas just when an unusually poor harvest was creating shortages at home; and within Japan shifts in population from country to town were creating a new urban market where demand and ability to pay outstripped that in the very rural areas where rice was grown. The anomaly of rice producers, usually tenants, forced to forego consumption while urban workers enjoyed filled bowls was an outrage to rural folk" Anywhere from 600,000 to a million people in thirty-seven of Japan's forty-five prefectures took part in the riots, prompting the government to mobilize the army, local police, and army reservists in over sixty cities, towns, and villages throughout Japan. For forty-five days the rioters, largely consisting of members of the lumpen proletariat and lower middle class, attacked and seized control of rice stores, police stations, pawn shops, and factories before being stopped. 7 Some 6,650 people were arrested and convicted of crimes ranging from riotous action to arson and robbery. The rioters were not the only victims. Occurring only shortly before Japan was forced into an unpopular peace treaty ending the First World War, the riots served as additional evidence of the bankruptcy of the so-called transcendental governments and 6. See George Totten, "Labor and Agrarian Disputes in Japan Following World Warl," Economic Development andCultural Change. 9 (October 1960): 193; and Shinobu Seisaburo, TaishO seiji shi [A Political History of the Taishii Period], Vol. II (Tokyo: Kawabe shobO, 1953), pp. 542,560,572. 7. Ibid., p. 657; and Shoji Kichinosuke, Kome sOtJij no kenkyu [A Study of the Rice Riots] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1957), pp. 3 ~ . helped to usher in what is know as the first genuine party government and the beginning of "Taisho democracy. 8 The riots of Fukushima closely paralleled the disturbances that occurred elsewhere, showing very clearly that the "riots" consisted of something more than the spontaneous action of mere mobs seeking to gratify hunger pains. The rice riots in Fukushima reveal highly organized protest activity that reflected the economic and social changes which had gone on since the 1882 Incident but had yet to find concrete political representations. Following the arrest of as many as two thousand participants and the imprisonment of scores of Jiyiito leaders in the wake of the Fukushima Incident, the political parties in the prefecture ceased operation for several years before re-forming as elitist organizations. It could hardly have been otherwise. The voting laws which accompanied Japan's new emperor-centered constitution of 1889 restricted the franchise for national Diet elections to males, twenty-five years or older, who paid more than fifteen yen in direct property taxes. In the case of the first election in 1890, only 13,923 or 1.45 percent of Fukushima's residents qualified to vote. 9 Likewise, the number of eligible voters in the prefectural assembly elec tions-where tax requirements were not as onerous-varied from county (gun) to county, ranging from .86 percent of the population in the poverty-stricken county of Minami-Aizu to 10.35 percent in agriculturally rich Tamura county, with a mean voter eligibility of 4.07 percent by county prefecture wide.'o And as tax qualifications for candidates to stand for election were even more severe at both the prefectural and national assembly levels, the electoral system became one where the wealthier property owners elected the wealthiest of their kind to office, which at this time meant landlords in this still overwhelmingly agricultural economy. Such remained essentially the case-landlord control of the Diet and prefectural assemblies-until at least 1925 when electoral laws were changed, though the trend for landownership to be concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, and hence for tenancy to rise, was not reversed until after the Second World War." Even after 1925, the conservatism of the major parties was so firmly entrenched and so deeply tied to state rule that the influx of non-landowners into the electoral process made little difference. Party politics in Fukushima mirrored the national trend of convervative landlord domination. Because of electoral laws the reconstituted parties in the 1890s and later had no compelling reasons to build wide popular bases of support or to represent the interests of the non-landed against statist policies, except in instances where state policy ran counter to the interests of the landed elite themselves. 12 8. General Terauchi's government fell; Hara Kei of the Seiyiikai became the first party premier. The Japan Times Mail, an English-language newspaper of the time, reported as early as 17 August that "Government May Have to Resign" because of its "utter failure to foresee and to deal promptly with the present situation [the riots]." 9. Fukushima ken shi, 16[A History of Fukushima Prefecture] (Tokyo: Yiigen Kaisha, 1969): Seiji, 2: 56-57 [Heareafter abbreviated FKS]. 10. Ibid., pp. 100--101. II. Shoji, Kindai, Tables 9, 10, II (pp.17-18). 12. FKS, 16-46. It was precisely people from such political "out-groups" who participated in Fukushima's Rice Riots [in 1918]. Industrial workers, day laborers, jinrikisha pullers, printers, fisher people, small company employees, construction workers, miners, drygoods salespeople, res taurateurs, silk weavers, and a kaleidoscopic array of other urban and rural workers joined in forty days of demonstrations, meetings, petition drives soliciting the assistance of the wealthy, and robbery and looting throughout Fukushima. Evidence for this proposition is seen clearly in the political careers of one-time popular rights activists and Fukushima Incident participants who had been imprisoned between 1882 and 1889. In the 1890, 1892, and 1894 and, in several cases, later elections, Kono Hironaka, Aizawa Yasukata, Hirajima Matsuo, Shirai Enbei and several other Incident leaders who had been convicted of conspiring to overthrow the state, were elected and reelected to the national and prefectural assemblies. Besides campaigning on the popular national issue of ridding Japan of the unequal treaties imposed by the West a quarter of a century before, they ran on the issue of reducing the land tax on the propertied. Except for Kono, \\ho once suggested a broadening of the franchise, the position these onetime activists took was conservative and statist. 13 Kono, so moved by patriotic zeal following Japan's victory over China in 1895, even announced in 1897 that he was quitting the reconstituted Jiyiito because he felt it had outlived its partisan purposes. 14 Dozens of other onetime popular rights activists followed his lead and joined the "establishment party" (kisei seit6) , the Kenseito. The impact of Kono's defection was felt in prefectural political circles as well, because the vast majority of Jiyiito prefectural assemblymen also quit the party to join the Kenseito. 's Many of those who felt Kono had betrayed the party had by late 1900 joined the other of the two established parties, the Seiyiikai of oligarch Ito Hirobumi. 16 The Rice Riots in Fukushima serve as a reminder that the electoral system, dominated by landed interests, failed to keep up with the dramatic changes in society and economy that took place between 1890 and the First World War. By 1918, agriCUlture in Fukushima accounted for only half of the value of all goods produced in the prefecture (down from two-thirds as late as 1912) and employed only 56 percent of the workin s 13. Ibid., pp. 45-54. The one instance when Kono is known to have supported a universal franchise law occurred in February 1902; See FKS, p. 133. 14. Ibid., pp. 61-63. 15. Ibid., p. 102. 16. Ibid., pp. 104-5. 26 population (down from about 67 percent in 1910).'7 Because of the industrial boom and expansion of the economy produced by World War I, the manufacturing, mining, service (retail) and livestock sectors of the economy were outpacing agriculture.'"By 1918 the industrial sector, though employing only 4.16 percent of the work force, was accounting for well over 25 percent of the gross prefectural product. By 1918 nearly 16 percent of the working population was employed in the service sector and another almost 5 percent in banking and government service. Miners, not even accounting for .2 percent of the working population, nevertheless produced more than 10 percent of the prefecture's total wealth that year.' In other words, there existed highly productive, numerically growing blue and white collar workers whose contributions to the economy were in no way compensated by a right to participate in the electoral process and be represented by a party. They remained politically insignificant because they paid no land tax, the prerequisite for engaging in legal politics. It was precisely people from such political "out-groups" who participated in Fukushima's Rice Riots. Industrial workers, day laborers, jinrikisha pullers, printers, fisherpeople, small company employees, construction workers, miners, drygoods salespeople, restauranteurs, silk weavers, and a kaleidoscopic array of other urban and rural workers joined in forty days of demonstrations, meetings, petition drives soliciting the assistance of the wealthy, and robbery and looting throughout Fukushima. 20 The riots began in Fukushima City, the prefectural capital, on 13 August and then moved on to the regional towns of Wakamatsu in the west and Koriyama in the east on the 16th and 17th. In these urban centers the riots began with peaceful demonstrations involving several thousand people at each site, demanding that rice merchants offer "bargain sales" (rembai). Graffiti and insulting posters were written or tacked onto the shops of the presumed hoarders. But besides the rice sellers, who often were simply merchants for the large landlords, the demonstrators also targeted landlords, loan dealers, banks, manufacturing companies and construction firms, insisting on, as the case may be, low interest loans, rent reductions, higher wages, and the like. Refusal of demands usually meant looting. Instances of demonstrations before government offices, in which demands included the granting of greater powers of local self-nile (which translates at this time into lower taxes) or government intervention to control prices were also reported. 2' With minor variations, such was the nature ofthe activities of the "rioters" in 6 cities, 16 towns, 3 farming villages, 3 fishing villages, and,2 mining towns across the prefecture. The scale and size of the "riots" were heaviest in the cities where anywhere from five to ten thousand people participated. Generally speaking, the greater the number of participants, the greater the level of violence that followed the refusal or denial of their demands. In the towns, 300 to 500 participants was the average turnout, several hundred in the mining towns, and ! I I 17. ShOji, Kindai, p. 9; and Shoji, Kame sjjtJ6, p. 114. 18. Ibid., p. !OJ. only a score or so in the villages. Violence was highly specific for the most part, directed mainly at those rice dealers and merchant-landlords widely suspected of artificially inducing shortages and high prices. 22 The riots are as important for what did not happen and what happened in their aftermath as for what actually took place at the time. What did not happen was a collectively organized appeal for assistance or mediation to party politicians or prefectural government figures. The only two parties represented in the prefectural assembly, the majority Kenseikai (successor to Kono's Kenseito) and the minority Seiyukai, were indifferent to the rioters' concerns. As the prefectural history characterized the parties' position, In the prefectural assembly that year [I918} there occurred absolutely no debate concerning policy toward the riots. The members ofthe two parties, the Kenseikai and Seiyukai, as always the centrists, were too tightly glued to the great landlords and wealthy entrepreneurs and would not serve as spokesmen for the poor farmers and urban working class people. 23 Rather, the parties supported the government in its policy of armed suppression of the rioters by the military. The urban and rural poor, the industrial working class, and the shopkeepers who joined the riots knew enough not to expect party or government intervention in their behalf; hence, they made no entreaties. Because the rioters had no access to official channels for voicing their demands, their demonstra tions, meetings, leafletting, and other organized protest activity were labelled "riot" (sodo) by the authorities. In this sense, "riot" becomes the official term used to describe protest by the politically unrepresented rural and urban lower classes. The kame soda was the last significant collective protest that enjoyed no genuine political representation in Fukushima. Thereafter a plethora of political groups emerged, each representing different segments of the lower classes and giving meaning to the term Taisho democracy. The connection between the riots and the emergence of the new political groups can be understood by looking at the aftermath of the Rice Riots in Fukushima. Taisho Democracy, 1920s and 1930s Shortly after the First World War ended, depression began. As with the rest of the country, in Fukushima the effects of a sudden end to the war-related boom and inflationary spiral began to be felt by late 1919. 24 Taking 1901 as the base year for indexing the value of production (l 00) , the value of agricultural production in Fukushima reached 553 in 1919 before precipitously dropping to 302 in 1920. Industrial production and mining likewise hit highs in 1919 at 581 and 1,110 respectively before falling to 383 and 897 in 1920. 2s Rates of tenancy and unemployment rose accordingly. 22. Ibid., pp. 110--11,115; Shoji, Kome sjjtJ6, passim. 23. FKS, p. 118; The Seiyiikai seized control of the prefectural assembly that year for the first time, indicating that the rice riots may have discredited the I 1 19. Shoji, Kindai, p. 9; and Shoki, Kame sodo. pp. 114-15. Kenseikai administration. 20. Shoji, Kindai, pp. 98-100, passim. 24. FKS, p. 18. 21. Ibid., pp. 116, 127, 129. 25. Shoji, Kome sod6, p. !OJ. 27 In recognition of the economically troubled times as well as the recent spurt in industrialization, the attendant growth of the labor force, urban growth, an increase in rural tenancy, and an internationalization of the Japanese market and society, various organizations came into being that sought to represent politically all these new unleashed social forces. The Yllaikai, Japan's first labor union (founded in 1912), which had established two branches in Fukushima as early as 1914, reorganized as the Nihon R6d6 S6d6mei in 1919. 26 In 1922 Japan's first Farmers Union (Nihon N6min Kumiai) and Japan's first communist party were also organized. Industrial strikes and landlord-tenant disputes led by local groups in Fukushima affiliated with the larger national organizations began in earnest for the first time. Eight labor strikes in 1919 and scores of landlord-tenant disputes following the organization of the union served notice to the prefectural authorities that the times had changed. 27 In reaction to these instances of political activity in Fukushima and elsewhere around the nation, the government issued a series of repressive laws in 1922 and 1923 intended to counter what they regarded as radical, subversive movements in town and country. 28 Urban and rural workers were not alone in organizing and protesting in Fukushima following the Rice Riots. In early January 1919, school teachers and newspaper journalists from all over the prefecture gathered in Shinobu to discuss how they might contribute to promote "a trend of thought called democracy (minshushugi)."29 In the same spirit, in May 1919, some 2000 railroad workers, salaried middle class workers and city employees demonstrated in Fukushima City in opposition to a proposed increase in city and prefectural taxes. They launched a "Movement to Reform City Government" (shisei sasshin undo), in the process urging the public "to stop obeying blindly and begin pushing for the just rights of all citizens. We ourselves should force reform of city government."3O They won part of their fight as city officials retracted the plan to increase property taxes. This sort of temporary alliance between workers and middle-class salaried employees was consistently reforged in the next five years during the struggle for universal franchise. Beginning in late 1919, throughout Fukushima dozens of new suffrage groups, such as the Association for Establishing Universal Suffrage, Youth for Reform League, Constitutional Youth Party, and Society of World Workers, organized themselves quite separately from the two establishment parties and proceeded to demonstrate for the vote. First the newspapers and then ultimately the establishment politicians began echoing the views of the disenfranchised, leading in 1925 to the passage of the Universal (male) Suffrage Law by the 50th Diet. But the victory of the suffrage groups was bittersweet. Ten days before the establishment parties passedtbe voting law, they passed the draconian Peace Preservation Act. This law made it a crime to advocate a change 26. FKS, p. 135. 27. Ibid., pp. 139-40; and Nomin sogo undo shi [A History of the Fanners Union Movement] (Nagoya: Nichikei Nogyo Shimbunsha, 1960), Appendices, p.30. 28. FKS, p. 139. 29. Ibid., p. 141. 30. Ibid. in the emperor system or in the system of private property. Naturally it was invoked against socialist groups, especially those active in the labor and tenant organizations, and was used most notoriously on 15 March 1928, Japan's Night of the Long Knives, as police mobilized in thirty-one prefectures, including Fukushima, to round up 1,568 left-wing organiz ers. 3l But the important point to be made is that with these two acts of parliament, the vote and the Peace Preservation Act, the negative effects of the latter going far to nullify the positive effects of the former, the establishment parties proved themselves once again to be the ever-obedient servants of the state. The rising popular parties (minto) of the late Taisho and early Showa periods (1922-1940) were effectively tethered by legalized suppression intended to negate the growth of democratic forces after the passage of manhood suffrage. In Fukushima, at least, Taish6 democracy struggled to remain alive despite the Taish6 state's attempts to stifle democratic dissent. Following passage of the suffrage law a variety of renewed and new political groups emerged in Fukushima to protest unsatisfactory social conditions. Though these groups often worked together, their membership overlap ped, and they shared the same objectives, the six most important political movements and organizations in the prefecture will be dealt with separately below. They are: the proletarian parties, the consumer union movement, the right-wing organizations, the citizens movement, the tenant unions, and the labor unions. Proletarian parties (musan seito) began organizing in Fukushima in 1927 with the establishment of a Social Masses (Shakai Minsh1it6) branch in Fukushima city, then three years later another branch in the Iwashiro district and three years after that another in Koriyama. In important respects the Social Masses Party served as the political arm of the S6d6mei labor federation. Its introduction into the prefecture was followed in 1929 by the establishment of two branches of the Labor-Farmer party (Zenkoku R6n6t6). The illegal Japan communist party (JCP) under the guise of the Political Research Society (Seiji Kenkyl1kai) began organizing in industrial areas as early as 1925 before going underground in 1927 and encouraging individual members to join branches of the other proletarian parties and labor unions and also to create various youth leagues. By 1929 the JCP in Fukushima was publishing its 31. Shoji, Kindai, p. 150; and Nihon minshU rekishi, Vol. 8 (Tokyo: Sansh6do, 1975), pp. 169-170. 28 own newspaper but, like the party, it never fared very well as the authorities were relentless in hounding it. The membership figures of the different proletarian parties, though probably a poor indication of their popularity and the extent of their influence, are unimpressive. The Social Masses Party's branch in the mining area of Joban boasted 420 members by 1928 and the Koriyama Ronoto branch had 518 members by 1931, but as few as six members made up Fukushima City's Social Masses Party branch in 1927. 32 Membership in the consumers union movement (shOhi kumiai undO) cut across the membership of the proletarian parties, the labor unions, and the tenant unions. The origins of the movement date back to the 1890s in Fukushima when the first union was started by railroad workers, but the movement only took off after the Great Depression. Though, once again, membership figures are an inadequate measure of influence, by February 1931 there were thirteen unions with a membership of 516 people, concentrated mainly in Soma county. Two years later, deeper into the depression, at least eight more unions were formed around the prefecture, adding several hundred more members. Soup, sake, rice, knitted goods, stationery, and other sometimes scarce items were among the goods that the unions sold at discounted prices to their members. As the unions became better organized they became more political and issued position papers and drafted charters that reflected the social class of their membership. The obvious political aspects of the unions show they were anti-war , anti-imperialism, anti-company unions, anti-big capitalist, pro-union (labor and tenant), and for the rights of free speech and assembly. A very concrete action they took was to provide financial aid to striking tenants and workers. 33 Much the same sort of socioeconomic and political change that spawned the proletarian parties and the consumer unions-the impact of the depression and the failure of the establishment parties to represent the interests of the lower classes-gave rise to right-wing organizations in Fukushima. The rightist organizations drew not only from the same constituency-the lower and lower middle classes-but also, quite naturally, sprang up in many of the same areas of the prefecture. 34 Between 1927 and 1934, forty-eight groups with a combined membership of about 3,000, taking such names as Citizens' Association for a New Japan (Shin Nihon Kokumin DOmei) and Greater Japan Producers' (Dainihon Seisanto), sprang up allover the prefecture, professing loyalty to nation and national socialism. ~ A majority of the rightist organizations were located in the cities and towns of the coastal region, in Date county, and in Fukushima City, that is, in the industrial and mining areas. They were led by army reservists, hospital administrators, journalists, village heads, priests, and shop keepers. 36 Their declared enemies were "individualism, liberalism and capitalism" and the "left-wing of the socialists and communist movements."37 32. ShOji, Kindai. pp. ISO, 161, 167. 33. Ibid., pp. 167-74. 34. FKS, pp. 339-44; Shoji, Kindai, pp. 174-77. 35. Ibid., p. 176. 36. FKS, p. 343. 37. Ibid., p. 327. Citizen movements (shimin undo), so called because being urban-based they drew on city-dwellers of all classes, also developed into a political force in Fukushima in the late 1920s and 1930s. As much as anything, they grew out of a widespread reaction to the ill-effects of unplanned capitalist growth in the cities. 38 One of the more dramatic of the citizens' movements occurred in the cities of Fukushima, Taira, Koriyama, and Wakamatsu in 1927. The precipitating issue was the Tobu Electric Company's decision to increase the electric rates of all consumers even though high demand for electricity by new factories had prompted the decision. The decision threatened especially the very poor people and many of the small- and medium-sized factories in the towns. Initially after the Electric Company announced the hike, the Koriyama branch of the Nihon ROdo labor union led in protesting the rate hike, but as the protest movement developed during the year, other industrial workers, farmers, merchants, miners, shopkeepers, small manufacturers, and restaurateurs joined. 39 When negoti ations between leaders of the movement and the electric company failed, violence broke out in Koriyama City once the police ordered the crowd of four or five thousand gathered outside the negotiation site to disperse. A combination of repression and government support for the power company ensured defeat of the movement. Participants in the consumers, citizens and rightist movements may have simultaneously been members of any one of the new political parties of the Taisho period, but the organizations of rural tenants and urban workers were either creations or affiliates of the proletarian parties in the prefecture. This was both a blessing and a liability; the connection was a blessing for the organizational experience of the parties that tenants and workers could draw upon when first setting up their unions, but certainly a liability during periods when the parties were rent by factionalism, personal and ideological, and when they were targets of government repression. This happened most of the time. Consequently, workers and tenants primarily depended on the more stable and accessible unions of which they were a part and on which they depended for protection of their interests. In the case of poor farmers and tenants, one such organization, the All Japan Farmers Union (Zen Nihon Nomin Kumiai DOmei) which prospered in Fukushima, offered its members a "Farmers Song" (1926) that captured in succinct terms the farmers' dilemma and the means necessary to escape from it. As our lives are threatened the nation's foundations tremble while capitalism prospers with the law on its side. Organization! Forming groups offarmers united in Justice. This will strengthen the foundations of a new Japan.40 38. ShOji, Kindai. pp. 178-79. 39. Ibid., pp. 189-90. 40. Quoted in the "Forward" to Nomi" sogo undO shi. 29 Such sentiments, equally serviceable to the right or the left, found their most organized expression in Fukushima in the actions and pronouncements of the left, but only after 1927 to any significant degree. Previously, tenant organization had been negligible and tenant protest activity sporadic. Between 1917 and 1928, only fifty-nine tenant-landlord disputes occurred in the prefecture, forty-six of which in 1926-28. Few had the backing or force of a large (trans-village) organization. 41 Only in 1928 was there a sudden increase, reaching a pinnacle in 1936 when 455 tenant disputes and strikes occurred, second in the nation only to Yamanashi prefecture. Moreover, there was a close correlation btween the rising number of disputes and the growing number of unions and union membership.42 In 1925 there were only 23 local tenant unions in Fukushima with a membership of 1,426; in 1931 there were 53 unions with over 3,000 members and by 1935 nearly 7,000 members were organized into 130 unions. 43 Organization efforts by tenant unions, especially those affiliated with the Nihon Nomin Kumiai, became particularly intense in the sericultural regions of Shinobu, Date and Adachi when silk prices plummeted because of the depression. 44 The other major union in the prefecture, the Zen-No Zenkoku Kaigi Fukushima-ken Hyogikai, especially prominent in Onuma county, had branches in five other counties as well. Of the two, the latter was the most radical politically, having a close affiliation with the communist Labor-Farmer Party. The Farmers Union was closely associated with the center and center-left factions of the Social Masses Party.4S Nonetheless, both tenant union organizations in Fukushima were highly vulnerable to government repression; especially after 1932, arrests of tenant union leaders in Fukushima became com monplace. 46 The main purpose of the tenant unions was to help secure rent reduction and secondarily to counter the growing landlord unions (jinushi kumiai) and government-sponsored "concialia tion unions" (kyochO kumiai). But in addition to these goals, the unions also engaged in more overt political activities. In 1935, for instance, the unions in Fukushima ran their own candidates for seats in the prefectural assembly. In 1936 they organized a petition campaign to force the central government to pass legislation protecting the tenants' right to cultivate, that is, the right not to be evicted. And in 1937 in Fukushima City, the more moderate of the two large unions celebrated the anniversary of the founding of the movement by featuring speeches by leaders of the Social Masses Party who exhorted tenants to fight for a tenant protection law, special loans to tenants, lower rents, greater powers of self-government, and against fascism. 47 Later in 1937, after Japan invaded China, tenant unions in Fukushima, as elsewhere in the nation, followed the pragmatic path chosen by their union federations and party 41. Ibid., pp. 4--6 (Appendices); FKS, p. 698. 42. Nomin sogo undo shi, p. 31 (Appendices). 43. Ibid., p. 20. 44. Ibid., p. 699; ShOji, Kindai, p. 158. 45. Ibid., pp. 156-57; Nomin sogo, p. 699; FKS, pp. 626-28. 46. ShOji, Kindai, pp. 157-58. 47. FKS, p. 646. leaders and joined patriotic farmer organizations in support of national unity. The impact of the war on the tenant movement will be taken up below. The labor movement in Fukushima followed a pattern of activism quite similar to the tenant movement. In its origins in the Meiji period the labor movement was an outgrowth of the mechanization of the silk industry, mining industry, and the railroads. But up until the First World War labor activity in each of these industries was limited for special reasons: the silk industry was largely cottage-based and staffed primarily by women workers who were culturally oppressed and therefore politically quiescent; mining was so localized in the east as easily to permit containment of miner agitation to that area; and the railroad workers, so vital to the centralization process, formed a sort of labor elite whose high wages made them largely indifferent to political activism. The strikes in these industries that did occur before the war were usually of very limited duration and of low intensity, and they were carried out independently of any outside organizations. Only after the war when the labor force expanded and as new machineries were installed in a process of "rationalization" (gorika) did the movement take off. 48 Politically significant organization began only in 1927 with the formation of the Joban Regional Coal Miners Union which was affiliated with the socialist labor federation of Nihon ROdo Kumiai Domei. In the year of its founding the Miners Union was the largest in the prefecture with over 3,000 members organized in eight different locals. 49 The other principal labor federation active in organizing workers in the prefecture was the Nihon Rodo Kumiai Hyogikai, which like the tenant hyogikai was one of the most radical and therefore under constant seige from the authorities. This union organization enjoyed its greatest successes among workers in the printing industry in Fukushima. so The left wing of the Social Masses Party supported this federation, while the centrist factions of the Party supported the Domei. S1 Between 1927 and May 1934, ninety-seven labor disputes and strikes occurred in the prefecture over the issues of wages, working hours, safety conditions, and so on. Though it is not clear how many of these were supported by the unions, seven of twenty-five disputes occurring between 1925 and 1927 did involve union support. S2 It seems safe to conjecture that a much higher percentage had union support between 1928 and 1935 when union activity was peaking. Mter 1935 protest activity by Fukushima labor groups followed the national pattern and sharply declined. The salutary effects of Japan's "second industrial revolution" coming in the wake of the colonization of Manchuria were being enjoyed by Fukushima workers. Unions became correspondingly less militant, especially after the July 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident. By late 1937, in an open expression of support for the China War, organized labor renounced the right to strike (a "right" they never legally enjoyed), and organized labor's 48. Ibid., pp. 348-78. 49. Ibid., p. 404. 50. ShOji, Kindai, p. 152. 51. Ibid., p. 153 52. FKS, pp. 408-9; Shoji, Kindai, p. 155. 30 principal political supporter, the Social Masses Party, patriot declared its support for the war. Then in 1938 the same party supported in parliament the National Mobilization Law, clearing the way for total worker allegiance to the New Order (shintaisei). By 1940 all parties, including the establishment parties, dissolved themselves in favor of national unity under a one-party imperial state. 53 It would be a great mistake to leave the impression that the labor movement in Fukushima collapsed or failed because federation and/or party support succumbed to the excesses of patriotism. As much as anything, union activism disappeared because the economy was not yet ready for it. It is well to remember that nationally not even 8 percent of all factory were ever organized into unions in the prewar period, 10 large part because of the industrial dualism that characterized the period. As late as 1934, 56.5 percent of all workers were employed by small enterprises with 5 to 9 workers, and another 39.7 percent were employed by medium-sized concerns having 10 to 99 workers. 54 In such situations paternalism, not unions, served as the grease to prevent friction between labor and management. In Fukushima the situation was similar. In 1932 about one-half of all factories employed fewer than 10 workers; about 40 percent of all factories employed from 10 to 30 workers; only 33 factories in the prefecture employed more than 100 workers. 55 Moreover, women made up more than half the industrial and mining labor force of 33,439 in 1934, 15,500 of whom worked for menial wages in the large clothing and weaving industry. 56 Very few unions penetrated any of these enterprises. Where the unions were successful in organizing workers---in railroad yards, electrical companies, cement factories, steel factories, mining equipment manufacturers, and in the mines--they were also successful in the immediate postwar period when a rebuilt Communist Party oversaw their efforts. 57 In such industries political protests and strikes resumed almost as if the war had never intervened, indeed, almost as if the war had given labor organizing a boost in credibility and legitimacy that it never enjoyed in the prewar period. 58 Because of increased industrialization and production during the war years, a greater number of laboreres, many of them Koreans "imported" from the colony during the war and forced to work under slave-like conditions, were fully prepared after the war to strike against the deplorable working conditions they had so long been forced to endure. The New Order, it would seem, gave rise to something much newer than its architects had ever envisaged. It might be suggested that the war had much the same effect on the tenant unions. By the last year of the war the New Order was encouraging greater agricultural production by rewarding tenants in Fukushima, who tilled almost 35 percent 53. FKS, p. 204,481-82; and Stephen Large's excellent newhook, Organized Workers and Socialist Politics in Interwar Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), esp. pp. 167-68. 54. Quoted in Ibid., Ch. 4, quoting Lockwood, Economic Development (Princeton), Table IS, p. 202. 55. FKS, p. 457. 56. Shoji, Kindai, p. 154. 57. Ibid., Part HI, passim. 58. FKS, pp. 483-90; cf. Johnson, Conspiracy, pp. of all land, a four-times greater cash bonus than the landlords received. 59 Producers, rather than owners, were being rewarded for the fruits of their production, which is precisely what the tenant unions had sought since the 1920s. Indeed, the rapid resurrection of almost 100 tenant unions in Fukushima within two months of the end of the war served notice to the defeated government and to the Allied Occupation that democratic land reform was going to have to implemented quickly.60 Conclusion Political protest in "modem" prewar Japan, to the extent the Fukushima case is representative of the national experience, was democratic in intent. In the early 1880s farmers, the mamstay of the economy, sought to make the central government more accountable to the wishes of property owners. Most dramatically demonstrated by the tax boycott, the theme of no taxation without representation was clearly stated. The "Rice Riots," the most apparently anomie of the various incidents studied, can be interpreted as the outcry of the poor and hungry in behalf of instinctive notions of fairness and equity at a time when they were shut out from a political system. The establishment parties could not conceive of a P?litical solution to t.he problems of the economically dIsadvantaged. The VarIOUS movements of the twenties and thirties explicitly sought political solutions to the economic problems the lower classes faced. They sought representation 10 those areas of the public domain where their interests were most at stake. As they could not gain entry into the established the period, they created their own organizations tned to forge out of a mass of politically impotent mdlVlduals a collective power that the state would have to respect. The "development" of political protest in Fukushima, if such a term has meaning, reveals a political system of remarkable continuity operating within the circle of state overlordship. The political system, by which I mean electoral and administrative politics, consistently served rather than (let alone resisted) the state's primary activities of the. strengthening the military, protecting the lmpenal mstltutlOn, colonizing overseas territories and suppressing democratic, therefore dissident, groups at home. The sole possible representatives of popular will, the parties, were early on, as the Fukushima Incident helps illustrate, made designed to facilitate the linkage of the SOCIally mfiuentlal strata with the state. The kisei seito or parties" were exactly as their name suggests. The nsmg popular parties (minto) of the late Taisho and early ShOwa periods (1922-1940) were effectively tethered by legalized suppression intended to negate the growth of forces the. passage of manhood suffrage. Asslstmg, perhaps mfiuencmg, the state's containment of democratic forces was the "double dual economy," double because the dual economy applied in both the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy. Farmers were badly divided along lines of ownership between non-owners (tenants) and 59. ShOji, .Kindai, p. 17; Ann Waswo, Japanese Landlords: The Decline of a Rural ELlie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 136. 60. FKS, pp. 736-39. 31 ----------------------- owners (self-cultivating and landlords); workers were no less divided between the very few large industrial concerns where SIMULTANEOUS CLOTH AND PAPER union federations could operate and the many small factories and cottage industries where an objectively oppressive paternal rule prevented horizontal relationships from emerging. Between tenant and landlord, between laborer and factory owner, stood only a few tenant and labor unions. Had there been no war and had the economy continued its gradual levelling process, allowing more wealth to "trickle down" to workers, perhaps stronger unions and even stronger popular parties would have become better representatives of the economically disenfranch ised. Yet in a time of militarization of the world economy, of steady imperialistic advances by Japan and other major powers, so-called barely democratic nations like Japan (and Italy) required greater internal order to be able successfully to take advantage of external disorder. Wars of territorial and economic aggrandizement, in Japan's case at least, required the total mobilization of the nation's resources. That this occurred just at the time when democratic forces at home were organizing at an unparalleled rate is a factor of timing too important to overlook. The timing is crucial and the comparison with Europe unmistakable. Peter Merkl points out the "crucial timing of fascist revolution at the precise point where democratic mass participation is in the offiing for a society in cataclysmic transition. After all, European fascism is a perversion of incipient democracy. "61 "Cataclysmic" is not a word that would be used by many, save extreme rightists of the period, to describe the period of the twenties and thirties, though few would deny that "democratic mass participation was in the offing." But that was nipped in the bud by the 1937 China War and the fascistic organization of society in mobilizing for the Pacific War and in this sense helped Japan out of the political impasse posed by rising democratic forces. And it would seem that the cathartic effect of the war paved the way for a resurgence of these same democratic forces in the postwar period. * 61. Peter Merkl, "Democratic Development, Breakdowns, and Fascism," World Politics 34, I (Oct. 1981): 118-19. This publication is available in microform. University Microfilms International 300 North Zeeb Road 3032 Mortimer Street Dept. P.R. Dept. P.R. Ann Arbor, Mi. 48106 London WIN 7RA USA England AMIRAMIN THE FUTURE OFMAOISMl translated by Norman Finkelstein In this extended essay, Samir Amin continues his analysis of the role and future of MaOism In China, and the implications of its success or failure for the entire third world. In the first part, Amin outlines three models of accumUlation-socialist, capitalist, and statist-and projects the longterm implications of each for an underdeveloped country. The second part is then devoted to an examina tion of China's economic performance during successive phases of devel opment under Mao. A third and final part compares the Maoist to the revisionist approach to development, particularly regarding revolutionary class alliances, linking the future of Maoism to the nature of worldwide revotution. $12.00/7.05 CL8224 (cloth) 18.50/3.85 P88232 (peper) Please add $1.SO lor the first book, 25 lor each additional book, when OIdering by mail. Monthly RevI_ P..... (@ 155 West 23rd Street, New York, NY 10011 Now at 20% off 6 issues just $12.00! send check or money order to: p Science For The People 897 Main St. Cambridge, MA 02139 Name Addl'ess Zip _____ 32 Art, Children, and the Bomb by John W. Dower Among the various arguments which were advanced by Americans in the summer of 1945 in support of using the atomic bombs against Japan, there is one that has been generally neglected. We might call it the concept of idealistic genocide. This line of reasoning, endorsed by a spectrum of eminent men associated with the Manhattan Project, held that the world at large would never be able to imagine the awesome destructiveness of the new weapon unless it was actually demonstrated in combat for all to see. To convey the urgency of arms control in the future, it was necessary to first create an unforgettable atomic wasteland in the present. This chilling line of thought has proven to be both naive and prescient. The arms race occurred despite the immediate shock of the bombs, but the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remains absolutely central to peace movements throughout the world. No slogan is more graphic than "No More Hiroshimas." No voices are more eloquent than the cries for peace of the hibakusha atomic bomb victims). At least two strong forces work against the perpetuation of these memories of August 1945, however. One is the technocratic jargon of the managers of the arms race, whose language is often deliberately meant to confuse the public and place the human and moral aspects of nuclear confrontation beyond the pale of "realistic" discourse. The other counterforce is the simple passage of time itself. Memories fade and die if Copyrieht C 1980 by Toshi Maruld special efforts are not made to preserve them for succeeding generations. Not surprisingly, it is the Japanese who have done the most to preserve the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Their anniversary observances serve this purpose, and the memories have been recreated over and over again in prose, poetry, and the graphic arts. It is noteworthy, moreover, that Japanese children share in these expressions, and much of the work on the bomb is specifically directed to them. By contrast to the Japanese, youngsters elsewhere in the world generally have been shielded from exposure to intimate and graphic depictions of the atomic-bomb experience. In the United States, this was readily apparent prior to the television showing of "The Day After" late in 1983, when self-styled experts of every stripe debated how old one should be before being allowed to watch this film about the nuclear destruction of a Midwestern city. In 1982, a team of American educators repsonsible for preparing a teaching unit on nuclear issues for middle-school students actually adopted a policy of using no graphics whatsoever, on the grounds that young people could not cope with their traumatic impact. These are serious, legitimate concerns, and in Japan too, more cautious and conservative voices have argued that graphic depictions of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are "too blunt" or "too cruel" for children. These were, in fact, the very phrases used 33 Copyright 1978 by Keiji Nakazawa CONTROl- YOURSEtr! WE ARE ALL S1RWIN6 FOP- -ntE. VlOOR'f Of JAPAt-l ... 'fOUR c.oNDLtt IS" OISfPACE. To IHE. EMPIREI! SHlTf UP!( I 6E CAU..ED A TAArtbR JUST eErAuse I FARn:.D when (in the first instance) the serialization of Japan's most famous cartoon-style depiction of Hiroshima, Barefoot Gen, was terminated by its original publisher in 1974. And the phrase used was "too cruel" in a case of textbook censorship in 1982, when the Ministry of Education refused to recertify a text that included among its illustrations a detail from one of the famous "Atomic Bomb Panels" (Genbaku no Zu) painted by the husband-and-wife team Iri and Toshi Maruki. In Japan, however, the political significance of the debate over exposing children to depictions of nuclear destruction is clearer than in other countries, for it is transparently tied up with the issue of accelerating remilitarization and more active Japanese support of American global anti-communist policies. Japanese educators, politicians, and parents alike are acutely sensitive to the importance of historical consciousness in shaping the political inclinations of the young; and the treatment of World War Two in the schools and mass media now plays a central role in the struggle to control this critical aspect of education and socialization. For the large number of Japanese who are too young to remember the war, the atomic bomb is the single most unforgettable symbol of a dark recent past. In Japan, for adults and children alike, recollection of the atomic-bomb experience thus leads inexorably to a host of intertangled non-nuclear issues. The bomb is placed in a context of militarism and imperialism, for example, and eventually racism and prejudice enter the picture and even the identity of "victim" and "victimizer" begins to blur. Thus, we soon learn that tens of thousands of Koreans were in Hiroshima when the bomb fell, and the Japanese hibakusha continued to discrimi nate against their Korean fellow sufferers in medical treatment 34 and even disposal of the dead. Afterwards, the Japanese hibakusha themselves were forced to endure discrimination at the hands of other Japanese. Both the Marukis and Nakazawa Keiji, the author of Barefoot Gen, have introduced such themes in their atomic bomb art, and have gone on to address other non-nuclear aspects of the war and postwar period as well. After completing their fourteenth major panel on the Hiroshima motif in 1972, the Marukis turned their extraordinary talents to depictions of the Rape of Nanking, Auschwitz, and the victims of the Minamata mercury poisoning. Nakazawa's cartoon books, which have been assembled in a 19-volume "peace comics" collection in Japanese, include such subjects as the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. He and the Marukis have also used their art to record the exploitation of the people of Okinawa under both Japanese and U.S. rule. The Japanese art of the atomic-bomb experience also leads, at least potentially, in another direction: to skepticism toward authority. It is not anti-American per se, but rather a stark reminder of what was done by both the Japanese and American sides four decades ago in the name of patriotism and high ideals. This is not conducive to seeing current global conflicts in black-and-white terms. And in contemporary Japan, where the ruling groups are deeply concerned with reinstiIIing "love of country" and consolidating a highly paternalistic democracy, any such encouragement of skepticism toward authority is extremely discomforting to the elites. It is, in fact, all the more unsettling because, by all available evidence, young people as a whole respond positively and maturely to these materials. Barefoot Gen, which has now been expanded into a 7-voIume paperback edition in Japanese (each volume is over 250 pages), continues to enjoy immense popularity ten wAR JUST MAKES us UNHAPPY. JAPAN HAS TO WALK THE WAYOr. PEACE-NOT WAR.. I BELIEVE 1l11S. Copyright 1978 by Keiji Nakazawa YOU TRAITOROUS SUBVtR$IVE YOVR THOUGHTS ARE YOU'RE NOT GOING TO BE LET ' E?y WITH THIS I I'LL STRAIGHTEN OUT YOOR SPIRIT FCR 35 years after the original serialization was terminated. The museum in Saitama (the Maruki Bijitsukan) in which the Marukis' "Atomic-Bomb Panels" are displayed is visited by thousands of school-children annually (I myself have watched them become absorbed in these masterworks of high art). And in 1980, Toshi Maruki, herself one of Japan's best-known illustrators of children's books, published a picture book for very young readers titled Hiroshima no Pika which quickly became well known. 36 Copyright 1980 by Toshi Maruki Western artists and illustrators have not ventured to engage the atomic-bomb experience at these levels of sustained intimacy, but several of the Japanese works, including the best ones for children, are available in translation. Toshi Maruki's Hiroshima no Pika, published under the same title in English, won several prestigious American prizes in 1982. The first volume of the lengthy Barefoot Gen series, based on Nakazawa's own experiences as a boy of six living in Hiroshima when the bomb fell, can be obtained in an excellent 37 Copyright 1978 by Keiji Nakazawa I j j I I I 1 black-and-white English version; for young readers, it is hard to imagine a more vivid and engrossing introduction to life in wartime Japan, the bomb experience itself, and the ordeals of the survivors. This famous Gen series was inspired by a short version of his experiences done by Nakazawa in 1972, and in 1982 this was made available in a standard colored comic-book format in English under the title I Was There. Gen can be read as meaning "root" or "source" in Japanese, and in the introduction to the first English volume of his famous series, Nakazawa explains how he came to call his semi-autobiographical protagonist Barefoot Gen: I named my main character Gen in the hope that he would become a root or source of strength for a generation of mankind that can tread the charred soil of Hiroshima barefoot and feel the earth beneath their feet, that will have the strength to say "no" to war and nuclear weapons . ... I myself would like to live with Gen's strength-that is my ideal, and I will continue pursuing it through my work. Out of the terrible destruction has thus emerged a heightened commitment to creativity. Adults may ponder this. Children seem to appreciate it intuitively. For them, art may be the most constructive medium through which they can begin to come to grips with the nuclear world they have inherited. * AND... "Tl\IS IS... 11<0 .. LOOK GEN/ LOOK AT ALL lliE l<XlJSTS/ Copyright 1978 by Keiji Nakazawa Keiji Nakazawa's A1Ltobi*Af'hi(Al books About HiTOshi",a aft AV'Aita."l( f..-01Il
box QOlLl6 S&n frAn"S'o calif. write for a free catalog 39 After the War: Translations from Miyamoto Yuriko by Brett de Bary Introduction Within a year of the end of the Pacific War on August 15, 1945, Miyamoto Yuriko had written two companion novels, The BanshU Plain (Banshii Heiya) and The Weathervane Plant (Fiichiso), both descriptive of her experiences in the weeks and months immediately following the surrender. The fact that this pair of novels, written by an author who had been under constant police surveillance and whose works had been banned during much of the wartime period, received the Mainichi Cultural Prize for 1947, is as indicative of the dramatic transformation of the Japanese literary scene in the wake of defeat as it is of the timeliness of Miyamoto's subject matter. The Banshu PLain remains one of the most soberly detailed literary evocations of Japan in August and September 1945, while The Weathervane PLant provides an account of Yuriko's reunion with her husband, Communist Party leader Miyamoto Kenji, after his release from twelve years of wartime imprisonment. In The BanshU PLain, Miyamoto's viewpoint is panoramic, her attention outward-turned; The Weathervane PLant focuses on the inner workings of Yuriko's marriage and often reads as a probing, even sadly resigned, attempt to take stock of the "fit" between her feminism and her personal life . Translated below are excerpted chapters from the two novels. The first is the opening chapter of The Banshu Plain, containing a depiction of the day of Japan's surrender which is one of those written most closely in time to the actual event. The setting of the chapter is a town in Tohoku, rural northern Japan, where Yuriko, represented by the character Hiroko, was living as an evacuee at the war's end. The chapter captures well the sense of numbness and moral confusion with which many Japanese responded to the news of surrender-Hiroko's evasive brother, a Tokyo professional, cannot explain what is happening to his children, while the local farmers take to drink. For Miyamoto, this is symptomatic of a Japanese lack of inner resources with which to deal with defeat, a "moral bankruptcy" which becomes the major theme of the novel and which she 40 sees as the most tragic legacy of the war. The Peace Preservation Act, which Miyamoto refers to in both novels, was originally passed in 1925 and prescribed heavy penalties for participation in a broad range of political and cultural activities defined as subversive of the Japanese government. The provisions of the act were made more stringent as the war progressed. It was on the basis of this law that Yuriko's husband, Miyamoto Kenji, was imprisoned for 12 years and that Yuriko herself was arrested, detained for brief periods, and kept under surveillance during the war. Although Hiroko expresses concern about the fate of her imprisoned husband Jiikichi (Miyamoto Kenji) throughout The BanshU PLain, it is only in The Weathervane PLant that the subject of their reunion is taken up. The heady renascence of political and cultural activity among Japan's left-wing intel ligentsia that resulted from the dismantling of the wartime Peace Preservation Laws forms the background for this intimate portrait of a marriage. While the novel is infused with a sense of the tranquil joy that Yuriko, then age forty-seven, must have experienced at being reunited with her husband after twelve long years, the couple's adjustment to living together again is shown as often painful. Despite many years of activism in the socialist women's movement, Hiroko is cut to the quick when Jiikichi intimates she has become "too tough," too independent, living alone during the war; throughout the novel she is unable to reconcile her self-assertiveness with her need for her husband's approval. The disparity Hiroko senses between her inner strength, tempered during the war, and the accommoda tions she makes to her husband, is depicted in a particularly subtle and moving way in Chapter Four, translated here. The measured rhythm and self-contained lyricism of Miyamoto's prose in these excerpts is reminiscent of the style of "I-novelist" Shiga Naoya, whose works Miyamoto studied as a young woman. The BanshU Plain, Chapter 1 It was the evening of August 15, 1945. In the dining room, where an ancient clock hung on the wall, Yukio's wife Sae was setting the table for the family's dinner. "What do you think, Papa ..." she called to her husband. "It's all right to turn the lights on tonight, isn't it?" From the verandah off the dining room, the Adatara mountain range was visible in the distance, to the south of them. Yukio had spent the entire afternoon in silence, smoking and staring at the mountains. "I don't know ..." He turned to his wife, in the utterly unhurried manner that was characteristic of him, and looked into her face intently for a few moments. "Maybe it would be safer to leave them turned off a bit longer." "All right." The compliant Sae continued setting the plates out on the table. Hiroko sat at one end of the table, helping her four-year-old nephew Kenkichi finish his meal before the others started. The subdued tone of the dialogue between her younger brother and his wife, who had still not fully recovered from their sense of shock, resonated with her own mood. For the past few days this region of Tohoku had sweltered under a heat wave. Deep cracks had appeared in the parched clayey earth in the yard outside the house. And at about five o'clock every morning, with roars that seemed to tumble straight down out of the glittering azure sky, a large formation of bombers would attack. Last night, just as on the night before and on the night before that, the air raid siren had sounded about 11 p.m. and, until 4 or so the next morning, hundreds of B-29 bombers, in wave after wave, had filled up the windless summer night sky. A barely audible radio broadcast had given Akita Prefecture as the destination of the planes, but no one in the village placed much faith in the report. Earlier, when the railroad depot and the military installation in this village (where the Tomii family were living as evacuees) had been severely bombed, the air raid siren had only sounded several minutes after the first attack. Yukio and Hiroko had kept watch all night on the 14th. The moon had come out late that evening, revealing in its dim light the gently swaying fields that lay just beyond the verandah, the one closest to the air raid shelter, where Hiroko and her brother-in-law had been sitting in silence with the rain shutters thrown wide open behind them. In the intervals between the passing of the American planes, the village civil defense team would relay their messages. One of the voices was a woman's. "En-e-my!" Hiroko felt saddened as she listened to the slender throat strain to prolong each syllable. The sound floated intermittently across the sweet potato patch, which was covered with mist, from somewhere near the large pond. Was it a sense of the importance of her duty that made the middle-aged woman's voice seem to tremble? The voice brought to Hiroko's mind a desolate shack on the outskirts ofthe town. She pictured the sweaty, entangled bodies of several children sleeping under a worn mosquito netting, the sleeping face of a grandmother. Surely there was no man in that house. Hiroko approached the mosquito netting where Sae had retired to sleep with her three children as quietly as possible, but no sooner had she peeked inside than Sae asked, in a polite, concerned voice, "How are you? You must be exhausted. Is Papa still up, too? What a noise they made last night!" A small, carefully enclosed oil lamp had been set beside Sae's pillow, just large enough to light the way if she had to escape with the children. The blue sheen of the mosquito netting and the intricate shadows cast by the lamp made Sae' s beautiful nose look sharp and severe against the white pillow case. With a roar that seemed to shave the earth right off the fields, the last formation of bombers passed. Afterwards, no matter how intently they listened, the sky was empty. Hiroko suddenly felt the strength rush out of her body. "It must be over." Sae had inched out from under the mosquito netting. She unfastened the strings of her air raid hood, shaking her head as if it had been a real nuisance to wear it. Yukio had stood, shoes and all, on the step outside and lit a cigarette. On the first puff he had taken a deep, deep breath that indented both his cheeks. On the day of the 15th, before they had finished a late breakfast, the air raid siren sounded again. "It's the midget planes!" Twelve-year-old Shinichi's eyes were wide with excitement. As he dashed out of the house, he stopped to put on little Kenkichi's air-raid hood and to lead him into the shelter. Just three days ago, when the nearby military installation and airstrip had been bombed for an entire day, it had been done by a formation of midget planes. 41 "Mother! Hurry! Hurry!" Sae, bearing her sickly oldest daughter in her arms, came in and sat in the innermost part of the shelter. Above the hand-dug trench into which the family had crowded, summer grass grew thickly. When it looked as if Kenkichi was about to cry from boredom, Hiroko plucked some wild flowers and had him hold them in his fist as she made up a little story. But just over three hours later, at 11:30, it was suddenly quiet. "That's funny. The planes are all gone. Really." Shinichi shouted down in a disbelieving voice, as he surveyed the sky with his telescope from the roof of the shelter. Up until yesterday, when the midget planes had appeared they would attack repeatedly until the sun set. "Strange things do happen . . ." "Maybe they took a break: for lunch. They'll be back." Despite these skeptical comments, they poured out of the air-raid shelter with slightly lightened hearts. Everyone returned to the dining room. Sae asked if they should eat right away, or listen to the radio broadcast. Earlier there had been an anouncement that there would be an important broadcast at noon today. "Let's wait. We had a late breakfast," said Yukio. "Sister, is that all right with you?" Hiroko agreed. Shinichi had put himself in charge of the radio and was watching the clock. In a few minutes, a tape recording of the Emperor's voice came on. But the voltage in the radio was very low and the feeble voice, uttering strangely formal phrases, was exceedingly difficult to understand. Shinichi, amazed that it was the Emperor's voice he was listening to, kept adjusting the sound. When the volume was clearest, the speech was just barely intelligible. Even Kenkichi was listening quietly in Sae's lap. As the tape continued, they caught the phrase, "We have no choice but to accept the Potsdam Declaration." Hiroko, who had been standing near the verandah, edged,in spite of herself, toward a spot just beside the radio. She pressed her ear against it. This circuitous, nearly incomprehensible speech was a declaration of unconditional surrender. When the voice stopped, she looked at her brother and his wife. "Did you understand what he was saying? It's an unconditional surrender." The tape was followed by an announcement from the Cabinet. Then that, too, was over. No one spoke until Yukio uttered, as if in complete disgust, "Incredible!" Given what had just happened, Hiroko was astonished at how quiet everything around them was. The air burned in the blistering August afternoon; hills and mountains were en veloped in boundless heat. But in their town there was not a sound. No voice broke the silence. Hiroko felt as if her entire body reverberated with it. At some point between noon and one o'clock on August 15, while all of Japan was mute and at a loss for words, history had turned this great page in silence. This stillness that had immobilized this small town in Tohoku along with the heat-what could it be if not a moment of convulsion in that terrible history in which, up until this very day, Hiroko's life itself had been painfully caught up? Hiroko shuddered. Sae, with Kenkichi in her arms, stepped out onto the verandah and quietly wiped away tears. From the back her matronly figure, clad in the work pants she had worn even when she went to bed at night, conveyed a mixture of relief and let-down she could hardly articulate. Shinichi's sunburnt cheeks seemed to have turned to gooseflesh in patches and his eyes shifted from his parents to Hiroko. "Auntie, is the war over?" "It is." "Japan lost?" "Yes. Japan lost." "Really? It's an unconditional surrender?" Hiroko was both moved and vaguely frightened by the expression on the youth's clean-cut countenance--a sense of humiliation that cut him, personally, to the quick. Of course, she realized, Shinichi had believed in all sincerity that Japan would win the war. "Shin-chan," she addressed him slowly, "right up until today all they told you, at school and every place else, was just that Japan would win. There were lots of times when Auntie wanted to tell you something different, but I was afraid that if you heard one thing here and something else at school, you wouldn't know what to believe. That's why I never talked to you about it." For the fourteen-year duration of the war, Yukio's family had quietly skirted the edges of the catastrophe, sustaining only the most minor shock waves. Yukio had been exempted from military service for a slight physical defect that did not incapacitate him in any way. That had been the primary reason for their good fortune. The so-called "peaceful" construction work that Yukio had been involved in as an engineer had felt the impact of the economic blockade. This had caused a short-term crisis in liquidity. But they had skillfully managed to stay afloat on the tide of the wartime inflation. Just a year and a half ago, Yukio and his family had evacuated to this 42 country house where his grandfather had spent his declining years. Hiroko had often harbored doubts about what was reported in the newspapers and the bulletins from the Imperial Agency during the war. Usually, the reports seemed either barbaric or unbearably tragic. For a person like Hiroko, it was natural to discuss these reactions. Sometimes Yukio would express vague agreement with her, puffing on a cigarette, but often he would chide her for taking things too seriously. "There's nothing people like you and me can do, after all. Whatever they say, we should just keep our mouths shut." A dark, severe look would come into his eyes. This aspect of Yukio became more pronounced as the war progressed. Sensing that his anxiety extended to the matter of what his son was told, Hiroko had kept most of her observations to herself. The paralyzed silence of the village had continued uninterrupted from noon through evening and into the night of the 15th. The next morning, Hiroko, in a bright peaceful atmosphere that she felt strangely unaccustomed to after all this time, changed out of her workpants and started a letter to her husband Jiikichi, who was in prison in the Abashiri Penitentiary. * She sat at the desk her grandfather had prized and upon which, during her childhood, her grandmother had always carefully set out a bronze water container, Chinese porcelain inkstone, and other writing utensils. Today the desk, reflecting the turbulent and unstable life of the family who lived in the house, was littered with clumsily written exercises Shinichi had been assigned to do while school was in recess due to the air raids, and with partially nibbled pieces of com left by Kenkichi. After writing a few lines, Hiroko stopped to muse. Surely Jiikichi, behind his high, small cell window at Abashiri, had heard that the war had ended. Jiikichi, who had lived out the last twelve years in prison. Jiikichi, who had smiled through the glass panel of a prison visiting room in June, just before she had moved from Tokyo to Tohoku, and said, "You'll be there half a year, ten months at the most ..." With what emotions would someone like Jiikichi learn of the end of the war? A silent cry of victory welled up in Hiroko's breast. Over the years, she had written more than one thousand letters to him, and all had been inspected by prison censors. As she and Jiikichi had developed an understanding between themselves, and as their methods of expression had become more and more deft, they had been able to infuse even descriptions of the natural scenery with their delicate communication as husband and wife. But today, as she began this letter, Hiroko sensed only irritation at the pathetic skill she had mastered. There was something she wanted to ask directly, something which was the main point of her letter. It could be written in a single line. But even now, she was unable to write it. When will you come home? That was all that Hiroko wanted to write. When, indeed, would Jiikichi come home? For over fourteen years, the provisions of the Peace Preservation Law had been so stringent there was barely room to breathe. The government had gone so far as to import a Nazi-style system of detention centers. According to the recently announced resolutions of the Potsdam Conference, * The Abashiri Penetentiary was in Hokkaido. this law, which bore down like a heavy weight on their small country, was to be dismantled and abolished immediately. But Japan's rulers had divulged information about this set-back in round-about phrases that those working in the fields and the factories could not readily comprehend. Hiroko glimpsed in this the wiliness of a group straining to hold on to the last vestiges of its power. What were they trying to do with the Peace Preservation Law? In what manner, in what areas, might they be able to maintain it? A wariness on this point, a painful insecurity which would be difficult for someone who had not experienced it to understand, made Hiroko stop writing. The simple phrase "I'm happy," so direct in expression, was something she couldn't feel safe putting in a letter to Jiikichi. Too open an outpouring of her emotion might provoke instant retaliation from some unforeseen direction, in the form of nasty behavior toward Jiikichi, who was tenaciously struggling to maintain the minimal conditions for physical survival. With each line she penned, Hiroko's pulsating spirit twisted and turned as if in agony. She thought of Jiikichi, who with his shaven head and dull red prison uniform still had eyes bright with expectation for the future. When the heat generated by her contortions struck his palm, how would he look back over the years the two of them had spent united, but separated by space and time? Hiroko's sense that today she had unexpectedly come to the bnnk of a steep incline was surely vividly shared by Jiikichi. She felt this strongly. Beyond the sliding doors that Hiroko's desk faced was a verandah. Until just yesterday the family, thrown into a panic by the air raids, had left it open all night long. Their rucksacks and several bundles tied with cloth were there, along with oil cans they had packed with edible provisions. Everything they had hastily set out was still standing there. This morning, two rain shutters were still pulled across the verandah, and from one of the knotholes a hot ray of sun penetrated the gloom inside the house. It fell across Hiroko's wicker travelling trunk that had been tightly bound with cords. Hiroko wanted to go and live in Abashiri, where Jiikichi was in prison. As a writer who had some flexibility in choosing where she would live and work, Hiroko had made this decision toward the end of July. One day, a letter she had addressed in all good faith to Jiikichi in Tokyo's Sugamo Prison was returned to her bearing an official label explaining that the addressee had been transferred to Abashiri. Discovering the word "Abashiri" in blurry characters on the cheap paper of the label, Hiroko felt as if her center of gravity had been wrested away to some distant place. Until that moment, Abashiri had been only a name to her. Yet, confined as Japan was, countless mountains and rivers now lay between Hiroko and the place where Jiikichi had been sent. As the air raids increased in severity and it was even rumored that American troops might land on Japanese soil, there were times when Hiroko feared those mountains and rivers might cut them off from one another for years. Hiroko had been living in her younger brother's vacated home in Tokyo when she learned of Jiikichi's transfer. As quickly as possible, she had arranged for someone to look after the house and had moved to this town in Tohoku. She had gone to the train station and travel office several miles from the house to ask about buying a ticket across the Tsugaru straits. While waiting for the ticket to become available, she had started her preparations for her journey. 43 As far south as Tohoku, where Hiroko was, the mountains would change color in August. In Abashiri, the autumn mist had probably already appeared. Hiroko hoped she could at least make the passage cross the straits to Hokkaido before snow squalls from the Sea of Okhotsk made the roads impassable. Selecting items which would be suitable for living in a cold climate, Hiroko had packed her trunk in the sunlight of a summer afternoon. She hadn't the vaguest idea what kind of life she would lead in Abashiri, where she didn't know a single soul. Wherever Hiroko had moved during the war, the probation officer consistently forbade her to socialize with other people. Recently, it had become difficult for her to travel by sea, even alone and empty-handed. She couldn't carry any of her belongings with her. Nevertheless, Hiroko kept Abashiri, the place where liikichi lived, uppermost in her mind, and she reacted with alarm each time there was another air raid over Aomori. The city of Aomori had been bombed, and over half the ferry boats that took people to Hokkaido had already been destroyed. Hiroko took out a stamp and put her letter, in which she had written that if she could get a ticket she would be in Abashiri tomorrow, in an envelope. Yet she wondered if her wicker trunk would ever really cross the sea. A thoughtful acquaintance in Tokyo, concerned about the fact that Hiroko had decided to travel to Abashiri, where she knew no one, had written to friends in a nearby city to ask them to help her. After what seemed an interminable wait, Hiroko had heard from the man. In characters hastily scrawled on a postcard, he had informed her that their area, too, had recently been subjected to air raids, that the people he knew had either been evacuated or killed, and that therefore it would be difficult for him to assist her-perhaps she should discuss the matter with her husband and postpone her journey. "You might wish to discuss the matter with your hus band . . ." the man had written, as if Hiroko were planning a trip to some place he knew nothing about! The message on the card palpably conveyed the distracted state of the kindly gentleman who had written it, his eyes darting about his surroundings as the vortex of war closed in upon him. To be sure, Hiroko mused, he had also taken into account the fact that she was a woman under surveillance. Although Hiroko had come to this town in Tohoku simply to live for a time with her younger brother, the local Special Police Officer had investigated her relationship even to people who came to the house on ordinary buiness. Sae had been told that, because the local officials were quite considerate, if she submitted the name and age of any visitors to their home she would immediately be granted a supplementary rice ration. Sae had been happy to comply. When the police officer later questioned Hiroko about people who had come to the house on such trifling business she wondered how he ever knew about it, it turned out these were all names which had been submitted to him in relation to the rice ration. When Hiroko mentioned this to Sae, Sae raised her eyebrows and seemed taken aback. "Is that what they were doing?" In the face of all this, Hiroko was still trying to travel to Abashiri. When she went to get some paste to seal her envelope, she heard an unfamiliar male voice in the dining room. The man was speaking loudly, already rather drunk. "I tell you, sir, if it weren't for a time like this, absolutely out of the ordinary, I wouldn't be so bold as to come calling on you ..." Yukio made a polite response. "Anyway, now it's all over, what's a man to do but have a drink or two? It don't make sense, none of it, so who cares? How about it, sir? Our sake isn't altogether low class. We put it through a cloth of pure cotton, y'know. Come on, sir. We're acquainted with each other, after all . . ." Hiroko put on her geta and went around to the back door of the kitchen, which was shaded by an apricot tree. Sae was squatting on the earthen floor with a pile of firewood to one side of her, peeling potatoes and listening to the exchange in the dining room. "A visitor?" Hiroko asked. Sae nodded her head, looking somewhat put out. "Who is it?" "It's Mr. Oto from Yota's place." The man worked at the control association in the town. Hiroko went out to mail her letter at the post office on the comer, with little Kenkichi at her side. The place had the typical look of a town which had grown up on the site of a Meiji frontier settlement; until yesterday military trucks and motorcycles had sped back and forth along the broad highway. Today, there was not a single one to be seen. The still, deserted road was whitened with dust and Hiroko could glimpse Mt. Miharu off in the distance beyond the patches of cucumber and pumpkin that had been planted in the open spaces between the low, squat houses along the road. When Hiroko returned down the dirt road she saw, emerging from the gate near the cedar grove, Yukio, in his white shirt, with Mr. Oto's arm flung over his shoulder. After the fifteenth, all radio entertainment shows were halted, throughout the nation. Instead, day and night, the radio carried demobilization instructions for the army and navy and 44 directives for those in the local reserve forces and pilot training schools. Interspersed with these were explanations of the severity of the atomic bombing catastrophe to which the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had fallen victim, and of the fearful power of the atomic bomb. To forestall a run on the banks, there were broadcasts proclaiming the nation's economic stability. The Minister of Agriculture announced that there was no need for anxiety about the food situation. The Minister of Education declared that Japan would be reconstructed as a nation of culture and peace. One after another, announcements filled the air of the country town, as if the silence of an interruption in radio broadcasting would be unendurable. In every house, radios were simply left running, and people listened attentively. Yet their faces, as they listened, registered a profound aimlessness and confusion they seemed helpless to express in words. Up until today, they had been like players in a tug of war, determined to win, pulling with might and main on their cable. That cable had suddenly snapped. Now, before they had even had a moment to tumble backward on the rebound, a different cable was being thrust at them and they were asked to grab on. How must they feel? That night, for the first time in six months, the lights in the Tomoi household shone brightly, illuminating every nook and cranny on the heavy, old-fashioned beams and floorboards which had been blackened by years of smoke. At some point, unbeknownst to anyone, a large round weight stone used for making pickles had tumbled down out of the high shelf in the kitchen. When it suddenly became visible tonight, they all burst out laughing. Hiroko, wearing a tennis shirt for a blouse, had the feeling that even the outlines of her own body emerged more distinctly in the unfamiliar brightness. Outside, the electric lamp beside the well was turned on, and through the windows behind the raindoors that, for the first time in many days, had been thrown open at the end of the corridor, Hiroko could clearly see the dark yard and its overgrown flower garden. Bathed in light at last, every comer of the ancient house seemed to take on a fresh, new life. Yet how sharply that same light, in hundreds of thousands of other homes throughout Japan, must illuminate the place by the hearth of one who would never return! When Hiroko thought of this, the joy she felt as light surged through the house was accompanied by a pang of sorrow. That night, in the brightly lit atmosphere that exposed even more glaringly than usual the feeble, inept quality of the government broadcasts, they listened to the news that the Suzuki cabinet had resigned. The Higashikuni cabinet had taken its place. 45 The Weathervane Plant, Chapter 4 Jiikichi worked at the table that was large enough to sit down at, writing. Beside the table they had set a Japanese style desk, where Hiroko was making a clean copy of Jiikichi's draft. "That's funny. My feet are cold." 1iikichi gazed into the sunlight off the southern verandah, as if in disbelief that he could feel a chill when its rays were so warm. It was a tranquil afternoon in early November. 'The chrysanthemums are usually beautiful at this time of year," said Hiroko, throwing a blanket over his legs. "But none of the flower shops in this area survived the bombing." With their neighborhood surrounded on all sides by rubble, the quiet brightness of late autumn seemed unusually expansive this year. At night, the whistle of the steam engine in Tabata sounded as if it was just around the comer. "I wish, just for once, 1 could get a good pile of charcoal burning for you in the hibachi. But I guess there's not much chance of it," said Hiroko. "That's all right. Now that I'm home I can put on as many layers of clothing as I want to when it gets cold." 1iikichi spoke without putting his pen down, and went back to his writing. After spending so many years without the basic human comfort of warm food, 1iikichi was now fond of heating practically everything he ate. Hiroko might bring a plate of freshly cooked tempura-style vegetables to the table and 1iikichi would still say, "I bet these would taste even better if we grilled them," and warm each piece over the electric burner before eating it. "Let's warm this up!"-whether it was tea, soup, or whatever, Jiikichi heated things up as if all life's pleasures were best warm. Hiroko experienced these little pleasures of Jiikichi's vividly. A few minutes ago, when she had put a kettle of water on the burner, Jiikichi had commented, "I seem to be drinking a lot of green tea these days." He seemed surprised. "I never liked it that much before." "It's the same for everyone. There's nothing else to drink. Did you hear what they used to do with the left-over tea leaves? When the war first started they fed them to the horses. Then they told us to eat them." "I ate them, too. In prison. I was constantly hungry." They went back to work for a while, until Hiroko came to several lines she couldn't make out. "Where does this part go?" She handed the draft, which was full of erasures, up to Jiikichi. "Right after the line that says, 'In view of the Potsdam Declaration. ", He traced the lines with his eyes. "Right here." He showed Hiroko the place he had marked with his pen. '''In the future, we should adhere rigorously ... '" "All the way to there? You're jumping allover the place, aren't you?" They became silent again. But gradually Hiroko's copying began to outpace Jiikichi's writing. She filled the idle spaces by making tea or going downstairs to do some preparation for dinner, while Jiikichi, totally oblivious to her comings and goings, continued to work with a will, in a manner which was both relaxed' and concentrated. Sitting with her chin in her hands, Hiroko drank in the atmosphere. When had she ever worked so happily and with such a sense of fulfillment, as if she were shaking sleek, ripe ears of grain from their stalks? The sliding doors of the three-mat room behind them were open. Hiroko's eyes wandered to the room and she stared at it. The afternoon sun lit up the shOji. A folding bed was stored against the wall. Hiroko could see the intricate pattern made by the metal bars of the bed when it was folded in three, and the patches of rust on the nickel-plated springs. When she had left this house to go to Abashiri, when 1iikichi had been in the penitentiary there, she had folded up this bed and put it in the comer. There it had stayed, collecting a light film of dust, until this very day. When Jiikichi had returned home and discovered it, he had remarked, "That's handy. We can use it to rest on during the daytime." But Hiroko had had no inclination to open up the bed. There was one scene that always came to mind when Hiroko looked at that single-mattress bed. It was the scene of a spare, six-mat, second-story room, with a small lattice window on the east and a bare balustrade along the southwest wall. This bed stood alongside the lattice window, covered with a light-blue-striped towel on which had been set a flimsy pillow. To the right, at the entrance to the room, was a large writing desk. Between the desk and the bed there was just two mats of open floor space. From afternoon to evening the western sun, only partially screened out by a bamboo blind, beat down on the worn brown mats, the bed, and the desk, making the room broil. One could smell invisible particles of dust burning. The air was relentlessly dry. The afternoon sun was truly blinding. This was the second-story room that Hiroko had lived in for four years. She would write there with a towel clenched in one hand, feeling as if she were gasping in the dry air. The room had a narrow balcony for drying clothes. On the balcony stood a large pot with a weathervane plant in it. It was mid-summer, 1941. Since Hiroko had been banned from publishing her work from January of that year, she was barely managing to eke out an existence. Jiikichi, who was in Sugamo Prison at the time, had not supported the idea that she should 46 struggle against all odds to go on living alone. He proposed that she live with the family of her younger brother Yukio. Without wishing to oppose 1iikichi, Hiroko had not taken readily to the idea. She had lived apart from the family house for twenty long years, and to those who were in the old house now, it would appear that Hiroko was moving back because the difficult life she had embraced, not out of necessity but out of her own desire, could no longer sustain her economically. Jllkichi told her it was out of a base concern for saving face that she declined Yukio' s invitations. He wrote this in a letter. Three years previous to this, Hiroko had also been banned from publishing for a year and several months. But at that time she had not been alone. Several close friends were in the same situation. In those days, the capacity to be outraged by such treatment was still alive in most writers, and Hiroko did not feel isolated in her distress. There were always people she could talk to. Three years later the situation was utterly changed. The Peace Preservation Laws, like a barbed wire fence, had created an impassable no-man's land between writers who were "banned" and those who weren't. Moreover, while both the morale and the economic situation of writers who were active on the front line in China and Manchuria were flourishing, Hiroko's position was like that of a lone wall on a river bank, holding out against the pressure of the swollen waters which came flooding over it. It was not merely that Hiroko was in a precarious situation economically, she was suffocating spiritu ally. Should she confide in 1iikichi her sense that she was beginning to choke for lack of air? During the few minutes that she was able to visit face to face with Jllkichi-just that brief interval-Hiroko would feel relieved and would be able to smile. It pleased Jllkichi to see her chatter brightly. But as soon as she would leave the prison and stop to visit Yukio's family (her friends' homes were too far away), whose every word and gesture seemed utterly divorced from her inner life, she would hurry home, thankful that at least she had some place where she could live alone. But how hot and dry that second-floor room was! How clumsy, how dull the sheen, of that huge desk where all her writing was locked away! One evening Hiroko, with nowhere else to go, wandered out into the marketplace in front of the station. Outside a plant shop where the blinds had already been drawn, a line of potted weathervane plants stood on the sidewalk. The plants had just been watered, and Hiroko took an extraordinary delight in looking at the profusion of narrow leaves, still beaded with water and glowing green beneath the electric light. She had to have one. In an elated mood, she bought a pot, had someone deliver it to her later that night after the shops were closed, and set it out on the balcony. For a few days Hiroko, whose life no longer had room for such quiet, routine activities as spreading dripping laundry out to dry, watered the plant on her bare balcony faithfully. But her situation was worsening, and as her composure gradually disintegrated, the dry, tortuous summer took its toll, even on the poor weathervane plant. At some point, a few withered leaves appeared. Hiroko glared at them. But she stopped watering the plant. When she tried to recall it now, Hiroko couldn't even of wind and for a few seconds the clover which bloomed along the embankment would be a confused, trembling mass. Hiroko, with her frayed nerves, one day sensed with a start that her soul was shaking as violently as the clover. It was as if all her pent-up feeling had been made visible there. Night and morning, Hiroko had slept and risen in the bed that was stored against the wall. At the very sight of it the memories of that parched summer, when she had nowhere to tum, rose up in her mind. She had bought the bed in early summer, 1935. Early one morning Hiroko had awakened to find a man in a fedora peering at her from behind the screens in the rented room where she slept in that bed alone. He was a special police officer who had come to arrest her, and who had broken into the room by jimmying open the bathroom door. After Hiroko had moved out of her room and had turned it over to a friend, the plant on the balcony had dried up and been thrown away. But there was another weathervane plant that was sharply etched in her memory. It was the trim little pot that stood in front of the window of Cell No. to, Women's Ward, Sugamo Detention Center. Although Hiroko had pressed the plant as close to the window as possible, not even the tips of its slender leaves stirred. No matter how often she looked at it or how patiently she waited, she had never seen the leaves moved even once by a breeze, even in the middle of the night. The building she was detained in, which had a slanted glass roof like a greenhouse, broiled and steamed in the heat of the hottest summer in sixty-eight years. Hiroko felt choked by these memories. Could she ever tell all, all of it to 1iikichi? It was only after he had returned home that she had been able to relax, liberated from the tensions that had threatened to destroy her; it was only then that she could perceive clearly what she had been struggling against all those years and how unnaturally stiff she had appeared to those looking at her from the outside. A friend of Hiroko's, who had herself been involved in a very complex situation when Hiroko knew her, had written a short story about two sisters with very different personalities. At one point, the younger sister, who sees herself as a woman of feeling, says to her chaste and dutiful older sister, "But come now, your reputation is the pride of the whole family!" Although to an outsider these words would appear to have nothing to do with Hiroko, she could still hear her writer friend's distinctive voice addressing them to her. When she had read the book, she had stopped and stared at the line. A feeling that was difficult to put in words had flared up inside her . . . was it something she would ever be able to talk about? She went over and put her hand on the shoulder of J ukichi, who was still writing. "What is it?" "Please let me write." She took his empty hand in hers. "Please. I want to be active politically, but be sure I have time to write." Jukichi smiled warmly into Hiroko's flushed face, and with a touch of amusement. "Now, now. Calm down." With the same fingers that held his pen he traced a pattern, like a magic charm, on Hiroko's brow. "Let's not misunderstand each other. Hasn't it been I who has been urging you to write?" They were involved in the formation of a new literary association around that time. Critics, poets, and novelists remember what she had eaten to keep herself alive. She could whom Hiroko had not worked with for more than ten years remember the stalks of blooming clover near the Sugamo were coming together again to raise a cry from the heart of a * station. When the electric train sped past there would be a blast nation whose lips were no longer sealed. 47 Socialist Development: The Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in Vietnam by Jayne Werner Introduction Since reunification in 1976, Vietnam's faltering economy has produced a crisis of grave proportions, the causes of which are not yet fully understood. The drawn-out consequences of 45 years of war and international isolation are obviously important elements affecting the Vietnamese economy, but the crisis has continued-if not worsened since the end of the war.! Grain production-16.2 million tons in 1983-has not kept pace with consumption needs. Official figures indicate that during 1983 per capita food production was 296 kg., up from a 1978 low of 243 kg., but still well below war-time levels. 2 Central to the debate about Vietnam's economy is an assessment of agricultural cooperativization. Agricultural cooperatives, in place in northern Vietnam since the late 1950s, were designed to increase agricultural productivity, a promise which has yet to materialize. It is clear that agricultural collectives must be evaluated politically as well as economi cally, and there is a strong argument to be made for the fact that their political successes have been greater than often 1. Vietnam's small industrial capacity was crippled by the war, urban centers in the south became dependent on foreign military and economic aid, and programs of "forced urbanization" created severe rural/urban imbalances. U.S. diplomatic and economic isolation has played a role in Vietnam's economic difficulties and Vietnam's cold war with China has been costly, but the break with China and the military occupation of Kampuchea exacerbated existing economic problems-they did not create them. By the time Vietnamese troops went into Kampuchea, the 1976-1980 Five Year Plan was already being scrapped. The economic crisis in Vietnam is thus not directly linked to the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. 2. Calculations made by Alec Gordon, "Vietnam's Food Crisis," paper presented to the conference "A Critical Examination of Vietnam's Economy," Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, June 1982. Figures for 1981 and 1983 are from the Weekly Bulletin, published by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Permanent Mission to the U.N., October 4, 1983, p. 5. Average caloric intake in Vietnam is well below world standards-I 800 calories in 1979 compared to the world average of 2590 calories. See the Bulletin d'lnfonnation et de Documentation, published by the Association d' Amitie Franco-Vietnamienne, Nos. 52-53, SeptembrelDecembre, 1983, p. 4. acknowledged. The economic issues are a good deal more troubling. 3 During the war years, agricultural collectivization pro vided a crucial political bond between village and state, which sustained nation-wide mobilization against the Americans. Until 1975, however, villagers in the north had a good measure of economic autonomy. Higher-level producers' cooperatives (hop tae xa) tended to coincide with the traditional village (lang or xa). Production at the local level aimed at self-reliance. Although national unity (and party control) were unassailable during the war, economic links between state and locality were tenuous; economic administration was fragmented and infra structural development was weak. 4 3. Le Duan and Pham Van Dong, Towards Large Scale Socialist Agricultural Production. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1975. 4. See Nguyen Tu Chi, "The Traditional Viet Village in Bac Bo: Its Organizational Structure and Problems," Vietnamese Studies, No. 61 (Hanoi: FLPH, n.d.). Traditionally, village and state were integrated through the Council of Notables and its administrative agents, the ly dich, who ran the everyday affairs of the village and "defined the options and measures aimed at conducting the affairs of the village and the nation" (lang/nuoc). By the 19th century the ly dich had become, for all practical purposes, the executors of state directives (trat). Ly dich conferred access to communal land to male peasants, by which they gained entrance to the adult community. Ly dich also compiled the tax and land registers which gave public citizenship to males, and with it an obligation to pay taxes, do corvee labor and be available for military duty. The allocation of communal land to male villagers on behalf of the village and the nation (lang/nuoc) required villagers to defer to the exactions of the nation (nuoc). The second mechanism of state legislation was the statutes of the village (huong-uoc), a codified set of laws which included prohibitions, rewards and punishments for certain types of behavior, and compensations for meritorious deeds. Huong-uoc were, according to Nguyen Tu Chi, "a masterly combination of village traditions and state power." The third mechanism was the tutelary spirit of the commune, which defined its personality and provided a focus for village/state identification. The cult of the tutelary spirit or the thanh hoang (the "spirit of the ramparts and the moats"), around which the spiritual life of the village revolved, was 48 With the end of the war, the peasantry's willingness to produce for the state weakened. Since the supply of consumer goods was very sparse and access to agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, equipment and seeds was limited, peasants simply curtailed their transfers to the state in like manner. The state was as a result obliged to devise stronger incentives to motivate peasants to raise productivity and release their surplus to state collection agencies. In addition, drastic cuts in aid from the Soviet Union and China, poor weather and profound political disputes within the Vietnamese COll)lIlunist Party itself combined to produce an agricultural crisis of immense proportions, which peaked in 1977-78. The Party responded to the crisis with a series of economic reforms, designed to spur agricultural productivity, and initially known as the "Sixth Plenum Reforms," following the sixth plenum of the fourth party congress in the summer of 1979. Decentralization of Production: Subcontracting and the "Family Economy" A central aspect of the new reforms is the system of dual contracts between the state and peasant producers. These contracts oblige peasants to deliver a negotiated amount of grain to the state in exchange for the state's obligation to supply fertilizer, seeds, and certain kinds of equipment at a reasonable price to the peasants. In 1981, the key policy of subcontracting agricultural tasks to families was introduced, known as the khoan san pham ("contracted products") or subcontracting. Subcontracting has proved to be very successful. After a year's time, production in some cooperatives was said to be up by 30 percent. 5 The contract system provides incentives to increased output by setting a quota of production at averaged levels which is to be sold to the state at state prices. The producers can keep the surplus and dispose of it as they desire. For agricultural products, free market prices are considerably higher than state prices,6 so that with the new system peasants have the opportunity to increase their income and their purchase of consumer goods, which provides incentives for the production of these goods. The widespread adoption of subcontracting, in addition to the system of private plots in existence since the beginning of collectivization, has reduced the role of collective structures in agricultural production to the point where non-collective practiced at the village dinh or communal hall. State power conferred identity and legitimacy on local spirits which were the focal point of village festivals, ceremonies, and competitions, all contributing to a strong sense of communal life. Communist party rule restored the nation to the village. by achieving national independence. The local party leadership, transformed in its class basis, found itself in the same position vis-a-vis the state and village as the ly dich. The local party as the agent of the state was obliged to collect taxes, procure grain and mobilize military manpower for the state. The party rules of the village cell were derived from national party statutes. Land was allocated through the party appartus. I am not suggesting that "national integration" was or is weak in Vietnam, because I see cultural and political dimensions to integration that have been highly cohesive. However, labor productivity and agricultural production have been two weak points in'the system. 5. Interview with Huu Tho, agricultural editor of Noon Dan, 8/26/82, Hanoi. 6. For instance, peasants sell rice to the state for 2.6 dong per kilo, 3 dong in the south. On the free market, peasants can sell rice for 10-12 dong a kilo and upwards (1982 prices). forms of production now equal collective structures in importance. Since productivity has been found lacking, agricultural reform necessarily has involved questions of unit productivity, be it the cooperative, the team, or the family. This in tum has entailed questions of centralization vs. decentralization and local autonomy vs. state control. Both subcontracting and private plots rely on the family or household as the unit of production. As family forms of production, they involve different types of relations with collective structures. Private plots in Vietnam are farmed on "5% land," or land which is owned by the family and which constitutes about 5 percent of the total collective land. Farming on 5% land bears no formal relationship with the agricultural cooperative. Subcontracting, another form offamily production, consists of the family signing a contract with the collective unit (the cooperative or the team) for farming on state-owned land, that is, on land owned by the cooperative. Responsibility for fulfilling the contract lies with the family, which allocates work based on relations within the household. It can be argued that decentralized forms of production increase productivity, but they do so by strengthening local autonomy at the expense of the state. In Vietnam, decentrali zation in agriculture has shifted responsibility for production down from the level of the cooperative to the production team, and from the team to the family. Half of the six agricultural tasks formerly performed by the agricultural cooperative are now performed by the family as a result of the adoption of subcontracting. 7 The three new tasks taken over by the family are transplanting, weeding, and some harvesting. Plowing, water control, and pest control, with the remaining harvesting, are still performed by the cooperative using collective labor. It is mainly women's work, rather than men's work, that has been de-collectivized and reverted back to the family, with a concomitant loss in the role in production of the collective-unit leaders at the level of the cooperative management committee or the team, many of whom were women. As collective units of production lose their role in production, the state finds its leverage vis-a-vis the localities reduced. Non-state mechanisms such as the family and the market have picked up the slack. Thus economic reforms in the form of moves toward decentralization seem to call into question the original socialist vision put forward by the party. Especially troubling are the increase in women's work and domestic labor as a solution to the economic crisis and the decline in participation of women in social production and public life. The pros and cons of subcontracting are debated openly in Vietnam. Party cadres appear to dislike the contract system for ideological reasons, but since the results have been good, the party leadership has been reluctant to abandon it. Many officials argue that subcontracting is a temporary measure, and that following this period of crisis, it will prove to be unnecessary and can be scrapped. Others argue that individual and family forms of farming are "appropriate" to an underdeveloped economy which relies primarily on manual labor, has limited mechanization, and virtually no small-scale industry.8 Despite intense debate, subcontracting has proved 7. Interview with Huu Tho, 8126/82, Hanoi. 8. Interview with Nguyen Huy, Deputy Director of the Economics Institute, 8/23/82, Hanoi. 49 its usefulness and probably will not be abandoned in the foreseeable future. Its benefits were recently affirmed at the 4th party plenum (5th party congress) in mid-1983. 9 Agricultural cooperatives in the north which the writer has visited since the adoption of subcontracting have generally reported substantial gains in production. As a rule, cooperatives with production problems have stood to benefit more from subcontracting than those with no problems in meeting their quota. But even successful co-ops or state-aided co-ops ("model" co-ops), most of which adopted the contract system later than the weaker co-ops, have reported progress. Adoption is voluntary but presumably the party line is a very effective means of persuasion. At Yen So co-op near Hanoi (Thanh Tri district), which I visited in 1980 and 1982, families exceeded their quotas by an average of 200 kg. in paddy in 1982, which they were able to keep as surplus. 'O This co-op achieved self-sufficiency in rice in 1982 without state aid, I was told, which suggests it is a strong co-op. Half of the agricultural work here is carried out by individual or family labor under contract to the cooperative, and the remaining half is organized by the management committee of the cooperative. Family and individual contracts are made for transplanting, weeding, and harvesting, whereas the cooperative manages plowing, irriga tion, and pest control. The contract system is also used for pig production. After raising a fixed quota, extra pigs can be sold on the free market at the family's profit." At Dong Hoa co-op in Thai Binh province, the contract system was adopted rather late because the peasants were not enthusiastic about implementing a new policy. Nevertheless, it did spur production; 50 percent of the families exceeded their quota.'2 Pigs and fish are also raised under the contract system. It was explained that peasants now enjoy the system because they can use additional labor to advantage. That is, leisure hours spent working for the cooperative are remunerated-once the quota is met, the surplus belongs to the producer. Family labor in this context becomes particularly valuable. The standard of living at Dong Hoa is still low, and self-sufficiency in rice has been achieved only with great effort. Average per-capita paddy production used to be 95 kg., but with assistance from the state in the form of irrigation and new seeds per-capita production went up to 240 kg. With grain self-sufficiency state aid ceased. At Nguyen Xa village in Thai Binh province, famous for its traditional water puppets, the agricultural co-op registered a 7 percent increase in family income after a year's adoption 9. Hoang Tung, "Some Views on Thoroughly Understanding the Resolution of the 4th Party Central Committee Plenum," Noon Dan, 30 August 1983, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Asia andPacijic, 14 September 1983. 10. Talks with the Manager and Deputy Manager of the Agricultural cooperative. Visits were made to the northern and the southern parts of Vietnam in the spring of 1980 and in August 1982. During both month-long trips I visited the following provinces: province of Hanoi city, Ha Nam Ninh, Thai Binh, Hai Hung (in the north); Ho Chi Minh province, Tay Ninh, An Giang, Hau Giang, Cuu Long, Dong Nai, Tien Giang (in the south). II. In 1982, a pig raised in Yen So sold on the free market for twice as much as the state price. 12. Talks with the Chairperson of the Commune People's Committee and the Manager of the cooperative. Mine was the first foreign visit this co-op had received. of the contract system." Nguyen Xa is a successful co-op in a fertile valley and has invariably met its production quota despite vagaries in agricultural policies. After the contract system was adopted, it was explained, work was more intensive and of better quality. The contract system is also used for handicrafts, which provide over 40 percent of the income at Nguyen Xa. The handicrafts co-op, in which women make up 90 percent of the labor force, manufactures carpets and mats. Each loom is operated by a worker in a large, one-story farm-type stucco building. Half of the building is devoted to carpets, the other half to multicolored mats. The quota for carpet production is 12 sq. meters a month, for which workers get 25 dong a meter. If they produce over that, as most do, they getthe same amount. For the mats, the quota is 160 sq. meters a month (pay: 2 dong a meter). The average monthly production for carpets is 14 meters (2 meters above quota), for mats, 180 meters (20 meters above quota). Handicraft workers thus average around 350-360 dong a month. The cooperative sells the mats, exported to the Soviet Union, for 45 dong a meter, making a handsome profit even after administrative and building expenses are met. The contract system has stimulated production, but its extensive adoption has put most of agricultural labor under the control of the family, In addition to the reversion to the family of half of what the cooperative previously managed, the family also reaps the fruits of its labor from the private plot. Income from the private plot is known as the "family economy" (kinh te qia dinh). The family economy alone comprises 40-60 percent of total peasant income.'4 Therefore, if this can be quantified, roughly 75 percent of agricultural labor, according to source of income, is now being carried out by the family, and the rest is collective. The family economy is quite distinct from the contract system. Peasants practice highly-productive intensive farming on 5% land and, in some cases, obtain four crops a year on this land. Vegetables, fruit, pigs and poultry-all fetching good prices on the free market-are preferred, although rice is also sometimes grown. In suitable areas, mulberry trees and silkworms are raised on 5% land rather than collectively since their cultivation requires intensive effort. (This is the case, for instance, in Dong Hoa commune.) The family economy supplies 90 percent of the pork and chicken produced in Vietnam and more than 90 percent of the fruit. 15 Although the family economy is highly productive, officially it is considered to be a "subsidiary" economy. It is also sometimes termed a "supplementary economy" because workers and civil servants can have a "family economy" too. Teachers can tutor on the side in addition to their regular employment; doctors working for a state enterprise can treat a few private patients. The deputy-director of the Economics Institute in Hanoi illustrated this point by saying that his wife and children make clothes that are sold to the state. (He says he cannot take part-he already works 14 hours a day for the state). So the family economy, according to the official view, 13. Talks with the Chairperson of the People's Committee and Manager of the Agricultural Co-op. 14. This is my own estimate, based on a reading of the Hanoi press and extrapolating from averages of the eight co-ops I have visited to date. 15. Noon Dan, 8/23/82. 50 is the economy of work done in the family, at home, or on the side. The bounty of the family economy reflects the economic difficulties of Vietnam. In other socialist countries, it is reported in the Hanoi press, the family economy contributes about 30 percent of the over-all GDP. Nhan Dan frequently carries articles on this subject concerning the situation in the USSR and Eastern Europe. In Vietnam, the state economic sector fails to provide enough work to sustain full-time labor force participation. Workers in industry and agriculture may work only Y2 or 2/3 of the year. Factory workers are sometimes turned away at the door (they receive 70 percent of their salary if laid oft),'6 if repairs on equipment are slow or shipments of raw materials have been delayed. Even village carpet-making in rural cooperatives can be held up by lack of raw materials, as the wool is provided by the state and in some cases the state cannot meet the demand. Agricultural co-op workers may only work 150-180 days a year, although the obligation for both men and women is to work 200 days a year in collective production. The "subsidiary" economy can also boost incomes considerably, sometimes more than state employment. The contract system, although it applies to work for the cooperative or the state, operates according to some of the same principles. It seeks to utilize labor more rationally and productively and increase the number of worker-hours in production. It also seeks to motivate workers, especially agricultural workers, to invest more time and effort in their work and increase their respect for the common property in agricultural equipment, livestock, and the land. Low labor productivity is not always the cause of production difficulties, however. Peasants may not meet their quotas due to corrupt or inefficient management which assigns the best land, tools, and even livestock, to cadres' families. It is difficult to say how prevalent this is, but it comes up in one's conversations with top economic specialists. The true figures for production, in fact, might well be higher because peasants underreport their yields and purposely lag behind in meeting their quotas. Since the state does not always fulfill its part of the bargain-prompt deliveries of fuel, fertilizer, adequate power and electricity-the incentives to tum over the fruits of one's labor to the state are not always there. There appears to be little debate about the permanent inclusion of the family economy in the socialist system in Vietnam. It is likely to remain in effect for the indefinite future, but subcontracting may be shorter lived. In the short run, subcontracting is in the individual interest of the producer. At the same time, it undermines collective spirit, cooperation, and the cooperative structures. While subcontracting rewards individual initiative, it encourages peasants to underreport their yields. It is difficult for the state to police production reports, especially if the cooperative management has its own figures to hide. Furthermore, subcontracting has de-collectivized entire operations that were formerly run by the cooperative, which will arguably be more difficult to transfer back to collective management. For instance, in 1980 when I visited Yen So 16. According to Nguyen Huy, Vice-Director of the Economics Institute, Hanoi, 8123/82. cooperative outside Hanoi, pigs were being raised in a newly built, impressive series of roofed pig-stalls and the co-op produced 150 tons of pork that year. It seemed to be an efficient operation. Two years later when I returned to the co-op, I noticed the pig stalls were empty. Pig production had been de-collectivized and transferred back to the family. Less pork was being produced, which is ironic considering the goal of increased productivity with contracting. Some of the stalls were being converted into buildings for the expansion of handicraft production (embroidered silk and carpets). This mayor may not have been a "rational" move on the part of the co-op, but certainly handicraft production is highly lucrative since it is geared to the export market. The embroideries being manufac tured were beautifully done, but the efforts and the obvious pride of the co-op leadership in 1980 in having built up a rather large-scale piggery went for nought. It should be noted pigs are raised not only for meat but also for manure, a vital local "raw material" in light of chemical fertilizer shortages. Comments have also been made in Nhan Dan, the party paper, about the spirit of collective endeavor being adversely affected by the contract system. 17 Obviously good party leadership at the local level is important to manage a balanced application of the policy and provide guidance for the wise investment of surplus income. It has been found that as incomes rise, peasants prefer putting their money into brick houses and expensive furniture to investing it in fertilizer or tools to make their agricultural work more productive. '8 Furthermore, the contract system actually penalizes those families who make the most sacrifices for the country, since families from which males have been mobilized for military service lack the labor power to profit from the contract system. Invariably those families with more pairs of hands have more "extra" time to subcontract to the cooperative than those whose labor power is limited. In the co-ops I visited the deleterious effects of the contract system in this regard were invariably pointed out. It was explained that families whose male members were in the army were far less enthusiastic than those who were not and that the co-op had in effect to assume the responsibility to aid those families with men in the army. It is difficult to see how long this situation can continue. In Nguyen Xa, 90 percent of the families have men in the army, which does not seem to have affected production or party loyalty, but Nguyen Xa is clearly an atypical commune. Its revolutionary roots go back to the first liberation war, and one of its leaders is a former provincial party cadre. 19 At Dong Hoa commune, 50 percent of the families have men at the front and these families experience greater difficulties in their living conditions than non-combatant families. At Yen So, I was informed 80 percent of the families have sons and fathers at the front. 17. There was an important debate in Nhlin Dan on the contract system in January-March 1982. 18. Huu Tho referred to this problem in our discussion, and it is noticeable in many villages, where one sees fancy altar tables and china cabinets adorning even the simplest houses. 19. A revolutionary martyr, Nguyen Chat Xe, came from Nguyen Xa, and party loyalty has always been very strong. During the French War, the French suffered a big defeat near there. One thousand men from Nguyen Xa joined the army during the U.S. war, some families contributing three to five sons to military service. 51 Also, families with war dead and war invalids suffer and need compensation or special benefits from either the commune or the state. In some co-ops, these families are allocated the best land for subcontracting and their quotas are reduced. The state sells them paddy at reduced prices and will give them advances on their workpoints before the harvest. Furthermore, the mass organizations like the Fatherland Front and the Women's Union have developed special programs to help war families. Yet subcontracting may lead to extreme inequalities in income and undermine collective unity as well as the spirit of collective sacrifice which has been one of the strongest bonds between peasant and state in Vietnam. Women and "Family" Production In the long run, the shift of economic policies toward family forms of production conflicts with the goals of raising the status of women and promoting sexual equality. The new policies will have deleterious effects on women unless conceived as short-term measures to solve the crisis in food production. Indeed, the condition of women and the women's movement has declined since the mid-1960s when North Vietnam was battling the air war against the U. S. 20 This is in part due to the increase in family forms of production, but also to the deteriorating economic situation. Under the contract system, the tasks that have been subcontracted to the family are mostly women's work-trans planting, weeding, some harvesting. In fact, one estimate is that women are performing 90 percent of these subcontracted tasks.21 Women also perform most of the labor in the "subsidiary economy of the family" and indeed participate in family production far more than in collective production. Now that the family pays more attention to the work being performed in subcontracted tasks women have to work harder and longer hours. At Dong Hoa co-op in Thai Binh province, I was informed women are even doing the plowing because they cannot wait for the men to do it. Therefore their work load has considerably increased with the contract system. The contract system has helped to increase family income but it has also decreased the time women need for rest, to supervise their children, and to attend to their own health needs. There appear to be no statistics on the effects of the contract 20. See Werner, "Women, Socialism, and the Economy of Wartime North Vietnam, 1960-1975," Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. XIV, Nos. 2 & 3 (Summer/Autumn \981), pp. 165-190. In this article I argue that women's status and position in society rose considerably during the war because of the initial effects of cooperativization, war-time mobilization of males, and party policies to promote the training and promotion of women cadres and local leaders. In a conversation with Nguyen Khac Vien in Hanoi in August 1982, I discussed my assessment, with which he agreed, that the women's movement had declined since the war. This conclusion is also reinforced by a frank and self-critical examination of the Women's Union by Mme. Nguyen Thi Dinh, President of the Women's Union, in a speech given to the 5th Congress of the Women's Union, held in Hanoi in March 1982. In this speech, Mme. Dinh describes the great difficulties facing women in Vietnam today, which the Women's Union has been slow to respond to. She says the number of women cadres has declined, and implies conditions for women have worsened. See Mme. Nguyen Thi Dinh, "Report of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Women's Union to the 5th Congress of Vietnamese Women," Hanoi, 1982. 21. According to Huu Tho, interview, Hanoi, 8122/82. 52 system or the family economy on women's health, miscar riages, and infant care, and these investigations are a pressing need. Also, the scientific institutes are neither seriously studying problems of women's work nor focusing specifically on the participation of women in the labor force, Indeed there appear to be no policies regarding women's labor as such. Those agencies responsible for women's welfare must be of two minds about the contract system, as perhaps the women producers and local Women's Union officials are themselves. The role of the Women's Union is to help women with family problems and encourage them in specific areas. For instance, in Dong Hoa commune, where silk-worm raising is important, the Women's Union decided that all of its members would plant ten mulberry trees and encourage non-members to plant two or three in their courtyards, The work of the Women's Union is therefore closely tied to production and is oriented to helping those families with production difficulties. It is the most important communal mass association in terms of assistance to war families, along with its affiliate organization, the Association of Combatants' Mothers. Membership in these women's organizations can be quite high: in Nguyen Xa, membership in the Women's Union was 450, in the Association of Combatants' Mothers 170. In Dong Hoa, the Women's Union had 450 members. Each of these villages has a population of about 600 people. Of all the mass associations, the Women's Union is by far the most important because it deals directly with production via the majority of producers (women). The Women's Union plays a multifaceted and vital role in the implementation of economic policy, its economic responsibility outweighing even its social obligations. The Women's Union has developed programs to practice intensive cultivation, to increase acreage devoted to cultivation, including subsidiary crops, to adopt new seeds, to prepare manure, to encourage soil improvement, water conservation, and improve livestock raising. Local branches of the Women's Union, in cooperation with the local party cell, design and publicize slogans such as "three hens per family member," "two-three pigs per family." These slogans are directed towards women, who in family production raise the chickens and the pigs. The Women's Union also sponsors emulation drives for transplanting rice, silkworm raising and livestock breeding. These drives encourage competition for higher output and provide awards for model producers. The Women's Union has been actively involved in helping families to achieve self-sufficiency in grain production and to meet their quotas and in campaigns to encourage sales of surplus rice to the state. There has also recently been a strong emphasis in Women's Union activities in the local areas on encouraging peasant women to practice thrift. Whenever I talked with Women's Union officials at the provincial or the communal level, this aspect of the work of the Women's Union was usually mentioned. Local branches of the union also operate as a sort of social welfare agency. They try to help women with medical problems or family difficulties, to make their lives easier. They even help with field labor if need be, and give advice on selection of seeds and fertilizers, as well as plan meetings to exchange farming experiences and talks about improving women's condition. In some cases they supervise the distribution of food aid from the co-op or state to needy women and children. They also encourage women to sell their surplus farm products to the state. In its social programs, the Women's Union promotes the current party line regarding women-"New women build and defend the homeland" -and encourages women to practice family planning, to raise their children well, and develop "new type" socialist families, which means encouraging children to have socially responsible attitudes. Political activities include political sessions to make women aware of their rights and duties and explain party and state policies. There are a number of contradictions between family forms of production, especially the contract system, and other policies like population policy. Current population policy is to limit births to two children per family, yet Vietnam has one of the highest birthrates in Asia. There are no reliable statistics, but it may be as high as 2.8-2.9 percent per annum. 22 The contract system promotes a greater birth rate; the more hands for extra work, the greater the income. Families which have five or six children are doing well under the contract system. Indeed population policy and even family policy seem loosely implemented, especially in comparison to economic policy. Population campaigns are evident in roadside and ferry-side "billboards" (signs painted on near-by farm buildings) such as pictures of a happy couple with two children, with the slogan "Two Children per Family." But an official (a woman) at one commune remarked that "family planning is encouraged here -our goal is three children per family."23 Population policy appears to be poorly coordinated and unfocused indeed. While the government encourages family planning, there is no nationally coordinated program to support it. Local branches of the Women's Union are also more concerned about economic policy at the moment than family planning. Monetary supplements are still being given to families with more than two children. The Ministry of Health gives families 5 dong a month for the third child up to the tenth child. Housing policy is contradictory. If there are two children a family is allocated an extra six square meters in the ctiy, with nine square meters for a three child family, and so on.24 These interrelated policies remain uncoordinated. The contract system may also conflict with educational policy. The pressures to mobilize women's labor have undoubtedly led to adolescent girls dropping out of school earlier than their brothers. One other important aspect of women's labor needs to be mentioned. This is handicrafts production, which in recent years has seen a tremendous expansion. Family forms of handicraft production exist, but handicraft co-ops in almost every commune are being expanded or newly developed for all kinds of products. These include carpets, mats, em broideries, knitted and other apparel, wicker-work, lacquer work, ceramics and glassware, furniture and silver-ware. Craft co-ops also produce spare parts, work-tools, motors, bicycles, bricks and small machines for the home market, and 22. Different agencies give different statistics. The Sociology Institute claims the birth rate is 2.5 percent per annum, and the Women's Union gives the figure as 2.3 percent. A demographic survey for Vietnam has yet to be done. The Sociology Institute has completed a survey for Hanoi, with findings that the population rate is 2.24 percent per year. 23. Yen So Commune, interviews, 8/25/82. 24. According to Do Thai Dong, the Vice-Director of the Sociology Institute, interview, Hanoi, 8/23/82. transportation equipment like carts and sampans. Every commune appears to be searching for ways to expand handicraft production for the export market. In fact craft production is seen as somewhat of a panacea for agricultural difficulties. Workers in craft co-ops have the potential of making higher incomes than those in agricultural co-ops, and those communes with 50 percent or more of their income from crafts are much richer than non-diversified communes. Crafts are also being promoted by the state because of their adaptability to local, low-scale conditions, their flexibility alongside family production, their absorption of surplus rural labor, their production of much needed consumer goods, and their ability to contribute, eventually, to regional industry.25 Craft production requires more initial investment on the part of the commune (for buildings and raw materials) but once production is under way it produces more income because craft prices are market-determined and higher per worker-hour than rice prices, which are deliberately kept low by the state. Handicraft work not only pays more to the workers in wages in comparison to rice production, the workload is also lighter. In some communes, women workers provide virtually all the labor in the handicraft co-ops. The handicraft co-ops I have visited employed women workers almost exclusively (in carpets, mats, embroideries, textiles). According to the Women's Union, women make up 85 percent of the workers in handicrafts,26 but at the communal level the percentage is probably higher. Women's labor in the countryside is thus of double value, although it is not yet recognized as such, contributing to both agricultural production and to the new forms of industrial production. Women's labor in family production is not as visibly paid as it is in collective work where women individually collect wages in cash or kind. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the increase in family labor for women in recent years is connected to the decline in their public position. This does not mean that the many profound changes and improvements in women's lot since the August Revolution are now being reversed. It is now an accepted pattern of village life for women to play a role and voice an opinion in the "affairs of the nation and the village." Their educational and medical opportunities have vastly improved, as have those of their children. They playa greater role in the affairs of the family and attitudes have demonstratively changed, especially among younger women. As far as family relations with the state are concerned, it should be noted that the nuclear family has been the predominant kinship unit in Vietnam since pre-colonial days. Consumption, production, residence, and ancestor worship were organized mainly by the single family (a couple and their unmarried children). Extended family forms of residence were rare, unlike in China, with more positive implications for women's position. Furthermore, although women's political and social participation were restricted, they virtually monopolized the local trade and marketing networks, which periodically kept women away from home. Income from trade, in addition to agriCUltural work, was often a substantial 25. A recent issue of Vietnamese Studies is devoted to handicrafts (No. 62). 26. Women's Union of Vietnam, Women o/Vietnam, Statistical Data. Hanoi: Vietnam Women's Union, 1981. 53 contribution to the family purse, and its sole source was women. women. In addition, although women were not given access to communal land (their names did not appear on the communal tax and land registers), they did have the right to own private land, with the titles in their own names. Thus as private land encroached upon public land in the 18th and 19th centuries, women probably benefitted from this trend as well. In an investigation of the private land registers in Tu Liem district near Hanoi, it was found that women constituted one-fourth of the private landowners. Generally speaking, they owned less land than men, amounting to 3 mau (10,000 sq. meters) on the average. 27 Neighborhoods of small families constituted the basis of peasant society, where residential relations took precedence over the patrilineage (ho) and extended family allegiance. Lineage relations were also weakened by stratified relations within the village which had already produced many inequalities. Women thus occupied a somewhat ambiguous position toward the state when the Communist party came to power. Land reform and cooperativization eliminated the class basis of society and weakened the power of the lineage. The small family cell, however, was strengthened by social change, as well as women's position in it. Cooperativization, even during more radical phases of land policy than the current one, always rested on family production and women as "family producers." This mutually reinforcing relationship in fact served the system well during the liberation war. But on the other hand the state promoted women's equality (nam-nu binh dang), granted equal rights to women in the land reform, established the legal basis of women's equality, and established pressure points and lobby groups within the state and party structure to improve women's livelihood. Of these, the Women's Union was the state organization par excellence devoted to improving women's position. Conclusion: Agricultural Productivity and Socialist Transition It has been argued that private plots and by extension other forms of family farming like subcontracting provide a way for socialist economies at a low level of development to use "surplus labor," that labor which cannot be entirely utilized by the collective, to their greatest advantage. In this sense, moves toward decentralization and contracting to the family unit are methods to "control surplus labor." As such they are "realistic" accommodations to conditions and constitute a positive contribution to production. 28 Implicit in this argument is that such socialist economies are at a very low level of development, in effect, are non-industrialized. The poorly developed industrial sector is what makes the collective economy weak. Under these conditions, family forms of production stimulate labor 27. Nguyen Duc Nghinh, "Land Distribution in Tu Liem District According to the Land Registers," Vietnamese Studies. No. 61. In the villages of this district, according to the land registers of the Nguyen dynasty, family land took up 6.27 percent of the total land acreage. 28. Nguyen Huu Dong, "Agriculture collective, agriCUlture familiaie, economie socialiste: quelques op. cit. productivity since peasants are more highly motivated when their immediate self-interest is taken into account. This view is challenged by the argument that "surplus labor" in cases such as Vietnam's is often performed at the expense of collective labor. Peasants have a choice-and they choose to reduce their contribution to collective labor and devote themselves to their private plots. The incentives for their behavior in Vietnam come from the fact that prices on the free market for food produced on the private plot are much higher owing to their scarcity in the collective sector. The fault therefore lies with the planning apparatus and the system of distribution which is unable to supply sufficient amounts of meat, fruit, vegetables, and other products needed by the consumer. The fault does not lie with the individual producer who may lack sufficient "socialist consciousness"; she or he is merely responding to economic realities. 29 More basically, there is good reason to question whether "surplus labor" actually exists. If 75 percent of agricultural work is being performed by de-collectivized labor, and if most of this labor is being performed by women, it is difficult to see how women's labor can be termed "surplus labor." Family forms of labor add to the work women already have, rather than take up the slack in their collective labor or their leisure time. The labor they performed in their collective work that is now subcontracted is the same work. Women's collective labor has been reduced because the contract system has been adopted, and the same may also be the case for private-plot labor. Family labor increases women's work-hours, rather than taking up idle hours. Women now perform three types of labor: domestic labor (for which they are unpaid); family labor, private-plot and contract labor (for which they are paid by the task or the product); and collective labor (for which they receive wages). Following the end of the war (1975), women's labor for the most part has fallen outside of collective labor. As has been shown, the value of women's labor is linked to the prominence of the family economy and is in large part responsible for the increase in food production associated with the contract system. While on the one hand, women's labor is thus contributing to increased productivity, on the other, the form in which it is being done reduces women's autonomy and places them under greater family control. This situation threatens to undermine the advances that have been made by women during the war and the principles of women's liberation that the revolution has been based upon. It can be seen from the above that the labor process in Vietnam has not been fundamentally transformed by the cooperativization of agriculture. Even the reorganization of agricultural production with collectivization did not represent a new labor process, as such. Rather, cooperatives were and have been collective organizations to manage agriculture, at a rudimentary level; distribute social security; organize collective care for children, the old, and the sick; and run public schools and health facilities, which they fund themselves. Cooperatives should be seen less as "units of production" than as "structures of distribution."30 The real transformation of labor in Vietnam 29. U Thanh Hoi, op. cit. 30. See A.D. Magaiine, "Cooperative et transformations du du travail dans I'agriculture vietnamienne," Critique Socia/iste. No. 46, 2"-3" trimestre, 1983. 54 will occur when agricultural tasks become mechanized, at which time the labor process will be reorganized. This will necessitate intervention from the state. As the above discussion has indicated, intervention from the state may be difficult. The state's wartime political successes were achieved on the basis of considerable economic autonomy for Vietnam's peasantry. Peasant loyalty to the "nation" is sometimes juxtaposed to peasant suspicions of the "state."* The wartime experiences of the party have cautioned party leaders against squeezing the rural populace too hard. It appears unlikely, therefore, that "development" in Vietnam will occur as a result of the exploitation of the peasantry. The new economic reforms, especially subcontracting, are noteworthy for their attention to strengthening the incomes of rural inhabitants. It is an observable fact in Vietnam that peasants live better than city dwellers. Taxation policies and even price policies which could control peasant income for the sake of state capital accumulation have not been fully implemented. It may well be that agrarian collectivization will not provide the basis for development as such. Given the nature of the peasant-state relationship in Vietnam, economic development may require massive external assistance to finance capital-inten sive projects in key sectors such as hydro-electric power, transportation, petroleum, steel and cement, fertilizer and other areas. This would at least provide the infrastructural capability to meet rural demands on a consistent basis for agricultural inputs and some industrially produced goods. I In the absence of a clear foreign threat, the Vietnamese leadership will need to reassess and revitalize its ties with local society.31 As it has begun to do so, it has encountered a major contradiction between its political and economic goals. As a socialist government, Hanoi would like to incorporate its peasantry into a centralized political system, abolishing the traditional and highly individualized peasant producer once and for all. The need to increase economic productivity, however, 1 has necessitated decentralization, which has in tum reinforced the nuclear family as the basic unit of production. This not J only runs the risk of weakening the bonds between peasant and t state, it also threatens to undermine the gains made by Vietnamese women since the beginning of the war of resistance. As Vietnam grapples with these dilemmas, it should be taken into account that development contains an element of desire and capacity of a populace to achieve national goals. This voluntaristic aspect of the process depends in large part on the cohesion and will of a people, and it is too soon to tell how the ability to muster these resources mayor may not affect the final equation. * * Ho Chi Minh was the symbol par excellence of the nation; the extractive functions of the national government are taken to be the "state." 31. My thinking on state-peasant relations has been considerably aided by a thoughtful conversation with Pham Huy Thong. 12/6/83, New York. JOIN URPE: Union For Radical Political Economics Founded in 1968, URPE is an association of people devoted to the study, development, and application of radical political economics. In our work we cooperate with other organizations and publish a journal - THE REVIEW OF RADICAL POLITICAL ECONOMICS, a NEWS LETTER, and other educational materials. We hold forums for debate and discussion through our national and regional conferences. We also have active working groups for study and discussion, as well as an active women's caucus. 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URPE is a nonprofit. tax eJiempt OIJanization.. Your donations are tax. deductible. N ~ __________________________________________ Ad"'''' ____________________________________ City State Zip _______ Send to URPE, Room 901.41 Union Square West. New YOlk, New York I(XI03 Make checks payable to: Reproductive Rights National Network 17 Murray Street New York, New York 10007 0$8 Regular 0$12 Supporting o $______ Sustaining Name ____________________________ Address __________________ City _____ State_____ Zip___ 55 The Dark Valley Illuminated: Recent Trends in Studies of the Postwar Japanese Economy by Laura E. Hein Historians are continually fascinated by the way a new idea, seemingly independently and simultaneously, emerges from many minds at once. Such ideas step assuredly into the mental environment that has been prepared for them by material conditions, but they seem to belong so naturally that it is easy to forget to question how they arrived. In the case of historians this often involves a re-examination of a historical period. The most recent years to emerge, reorganized in a novel interpretation, are those of World War Two. In several recent publications the war has been described as the crucible for Japan's postwar growth. This presents the embryo of a new theory of the origins of Japanese economic growth, competing with the earlier explanations of culture, miracles, and rational and evolutionary modernization. This new emphasis on the war suggests some fresh directions for research on such topics as postwar labor relations and industrial policy. It also raises questions about the relationship between war and the Japanese economy that are relevant today to the current debate on rearmament. This resonance with contemporary events is hardly surprising. Following E.H. Carr's dictum that the historian's topic, above all, reveals the age of the historian, the echoing refrain to the question "what is new?" is always "why now?" Chalmers Johnson's historical study of the Ministry of Trade and Industry is a striking example of the increased emphasis on the war years and the effect of the war experience itself on postwar Japan (MITI and the Japanese Miracle, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982). Johnson argues that Mm's powers were foreshadowed by wartime economic centralization and by mobilization of the economy in bureaucratic hands as part of the war effort. He backs his argument up with specifics: for example, the Ministry of Munitions established a presence in electric power development and airplane manufacture which its successor, MITI, retained after the war. Furthermore, Johnson argues, industrial policy itself was a child of the war effort which only matured in later years. Emblematic of the new prestige of industrial policy, the Ministry of Munitions finally achieved coveted office space in Kasumigaseki shortly after it was established in November 1943 (Johnson, p. 169). Johnson's insights into the impact of wartime mobilization on bureaucratic centralization are corroborated by a recently translated book by Nakamura Takafusa (The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981, originally published in Japanese in 1980). Although Nakamura's first chapter is entitled "Prepara tion through Destruction: The Wartime Economy," he argues for a much more positive legacy. At the very outset he writes: To a real extent the system which was created during the war was inherited as the postwar economic system. The industries which were expanded during the war became the major postwar export industries; and the postwar national lifestyle. too. originated in changes that began during the period of conflict (p. 3). Farther into his book, Nakamura details his argument at length, stressing the fact that the effect of reorienting the economy to meet wartime demands was of greater long-term significance than was the war destruction itself. This extended to the structure of the economy. The chemical and heavy industries had far more plant and equipment capacity during the war than prior to it. The conspicuous reductions in light industry capacity. particu larly textiles. were due more to wartime conversion to military production and scrapping ofequipment than to war damages. This shift in emphasis formed the basis for the heavy and chemical industrializationfollowing the war (pp. 14-15). Industrial organization was similarly reoriented during thf! war, according to Nakamura. The famed subcontracting system, while first appearing before the war, emerged on a large scale in the munitions-related plants. Nakamura explains that large firms in the military industries had at first made it a rule to produce everything in-house. including parts. But they developed a system of sub-contracting parts and other work out to small and medium-sized firms as an emergency measure to facilitate production increases . ... Here lie the origins ofthe long-term postwar relationships between small enterprises and their patron or "parent" companies (pp. 15-16). Similarly, in-firm production techniques, product standardiza 56 - tion, and technical training all developed under the stimulus of war. Nakamura places the origins of yet another important aspect of interfirm relations squarely in the war years. This is the bank-centered grouping known as the keiretsu, and is certainly one of the most distinctive features of the present-day Japanese economy. He argues that this arrangement dates from the spring 1944 "System of Financial Institutions Authorized to Finance Munitions Companies." In 1944 the leading economic sector was, of course, the set of firms supplying the government-coordinated military effort. The government, in turn, designated "authorized financial institutions" for the munitions companies and arranged for these institutions to provide an unimpeded supply of needed funds to the companies. The arrangement was so contrived that other financial institutions, as well as the Bank ofJapan and the government, were to back the authorized institutions so that they would not lack for funds (pp. 16-17). These relationships reappeared in the late occupation years as the keiretsu. While Nakamura concurs with Johnson in arguing that MITI's power was first amassed during the war, he extends the argument to other economic ministries. In particular, he believes that the Bank of Japan's "window guidance" techniques were developed through experience with wartime controls (p. 18). Labor-management relations similarly owe their form in large part to a wartime institution, the Patriotic Industrial Association (Sangyo Hokoku Kai). Chapters ofthis association were established by government decree in each firm as an explicit replacement for labor unions. They were organized along military lines with the company officials occupying the leadership spots. The primary functions of the organization were to maintain production and ensure industrial discipline, not to protect workers. Nakamura's contention that the form associated with this coercive institution was carried over into the contemporary period as the "enterprise union" is supported by a recent book on the 1945-47 labor movement by Joe Moore (Japanese Workers and the Struggle for Power, 1945-1947, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983). Moore details the ultimately unsuccessful efforts of labor organizers immediately after the war to build democratic industry-wide labor organizations and block government and industry efforts to retain the authoritarian core of pre-surrender labor in stitutions. In other recent developments, a panel at the March 1983 meeting of the Association for Asian Studies focused on the "trans war" continuities of aspects of the Japanese political economy. One of the participants, Richard Samuels, argues like Nakamura and Johnson that the postwar pattern of business-government relations in the energy industries is based on relations established in the 1934-1945 period. (Within that framework, however, Samuels differs sharply from Johnson on the question of the relative power of government and business within the economy.) Another panelist, Sheldon Garon, detailed the continuity of bureaucratic personnel who made labor policy from 1939 through the 1950's, as well as of their policies. Andrew Gordon disagreed with Nakamura and Moore's thesis that enterprise unions owed much to the wartime Patriotic Associations, arguing that that body was largely ineffective, but he stressed the wartime origins of the seniority wage system. Jointly these authors cover many of the most conspicuous aspects of the postwar Japanese economy: industrial policy and the role of the state in the economy, industrial structl)re including keiretsu and sub-contracting, enterprise unions, and the postwar sectoral shift toward heavy industry. These features are attributed not to Japanese culture, not to a miracle, not to the slow, rational modernization of the economy, but to military mobilization and the reorganization of the Japanese econorny for the purpose of conquering much of Asia. The implications of this analysis have yet to be fully explored, and I can only begin to do so here. How does the new focus on the wartime economic mobilization as precursor to the postwar economy contribute to existing debates about Japan? One implication of this approach is to minimize the importance of the Occupation-era reforms. When the central focus is on the direct continuity between wartime and contemporary economic institutions, the Occupation reforms become either ineffective or a minor (As is described below, this notion of an interrupted historical trend is not new but has been moved slightly forward chronolog ically.) The emphasis on the war also steers Western scholars away from dating the period of modern Japan from August 1945; rather, Westerners are drifting toward the Japanese emperor-centered dating system which begins a new era with the current reign in 1926. This Showa dating structure itself acts to minimize the Occupation years and!\tresses the continuous flow of events from 1926 to the present. No longer is the war set apart; the roads out of the "dark valley" are suddenly being illuminated and the territory 100kl' surprisingly familiar. A second major implication derives from the fact that these observations paralleled studies done of tQe. American postwar economy. Very much like Japan, the of mobilizing for and fighting a "total war" acted, to centralize economic organizations, legitimize bureaucratic planning of the economy, standardize production enhance technical training procedures. (For example" see C.harles Maier, "The Politics of Productivity: Foundati0'.ls.of American International Economic Policy after World War n" in Bt;twe,fln Power and Plenty, Peter Katzenstein, ed., MaQison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978.) . : These parallels suggest directiqRs fot the, continuing debate over the uniqueness of Japanese.eCQoomk i,nstitutions: while the specific forms of the the enterprise union may be unmatched in other nations, the,impact of .total war mobilization on Japan closely resembles,the effect on other industrialized, capitalist countries. The Qf an experience like the Second World War, whether or on vanquished, seems to transcend . These studies of the war econOlllY d,\(fer from, earlier research in yet another way. Previou& $1Udies pfwelWStwar Japanese economy have revolved around. t)te was there a secret to Japan's believers have generally ignored the experience although some have .argued,that .. prewar vue structures play a central role in postwar These scholars stress the utter collapse in 1945 to highlight the contrast (Probably the best-known proponent Qf thisargumen,tis the late Herman Kahn in The Emerging Japanese Sw'et;state: Challenge and Response, Englewood Inc., 1970.) This argument has become a bit in 57 scholarly circles but much of the best research in the field has been dedicated, in part, to refuting it by unearthing the rational, historical roots of the postwar boom. Significantly, until recently most Western scholars have skipped over the war years in their analysis of the relationship between the prewar and postwar economies. For example, Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, in their influential monograph, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1973), argue that Japanese economic growth occurs in "long swings" which connect the economy of the 1930s directly to that of the 1950s. Since the decade in between is by definition abnormal (although distortions caused by the First World War, the colonization of Formosa, Korea, and of Manchuria are not), Ohkawa and Rosovsky simply left those years out of their statistical calculations. Similarly, W. W. Lockwood echoes this assumption of economic abnormality and, therefore, irrelevance. ''The bitter experience of World War II, followed by the reforms of the Occupation, permitted the nation once more to resume the trend interrupted in 1931" ("Japan's New Capitalism" in Lockwood, ed., The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965). This thesis of an interrupted historical trend is echoed in many analyses of the political system, which stress the link between "Taisho democracy" and postwar party politics and skip over the "dark valley" in between. The basic assumption underlying the thesis of the interrupted trend is that the war was an aberration in Japan's otherwise smooth path to modernization and development. This approach, which John Dower, after Yoshida Shigeru, calls the "historic stumble" theory, has often resulted in an a priori assumption that the vast economic and social changes of wartime Japan were of minor relevance to the present (Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979). In this view, it was as if the nation had gotten lost in a dark cavern for a few years; once it had returned to the right path, the experience was over. This analysis tended to see only the war-related factors that hampered the process of "normali zation" (such as the destruction offactories) and not those that changed the Japanese economy in new ways. By stressing continuity between the war and the present, the new arguments outlined earlier implicitly reject the notion of an "historic stumble." They also strike at the assumption that Japan has been evolving into a more modern and democratic society since the Meiji Restoration, for this assumption has been closely tied to the practice of ignoring the war as an aberration, or assuming that Japan has inherited the democratic traditions of Taisho without being tarnished by the authoritarianism of early ShOwa. The direction of postwar change, however, is not at all clear. There are two logical directions one could go after recognizing the contribution of the war to the contemporary Japanese economy. The first is to reexamine postwar economic institutions with a fresh eye to the repression and instability inherent in their formation. This is of necessity a critical eye, but it does not imply a wholesale condemnation of Japan's postwar economic structure. Rather it clarifies the role that state power and military force has played in organizing that structure. For example, the argument that the postwar enterprise union grew out of the wartime Patriotic Associations raises interesting questions. The mandatory organization was not set up for the benefit of workers or even the enterprise itself. Rather, it was a state-sponsored means of securing productivity and obedience. The fact that this structure was retained after the war suggests that it was probably useful to the enterprise and/or labor later, but this is a more complex development than previously argued. It is certainly not simply a manifestation of a culturally derived paternalistic corporate family. The coercive roots of the institution suggest that there was some conflict over its adoption. The role of harmonious values remains important at the level of justification of the institution's existence but perhaps not at the level of causation. The other possible response is to admit the role of the war without accepting the reality of the wartime oppression of the Japanese and other Asian peoples. This solution is essentially to justify and recast the war as the precondition for economic growth. This is curiously reminiscent of the argument that the Americans did the Japanese a favor by bombing all their obsolete plants. There is precedent for this type of scholarly recasting of Japanese history. In Japan the dominant Marxist analysis of modern Japanese history has been that "feudal legacies" such as class oppression and bureaucratic disdain of ordinary people lived on into the twentieth century. In response to this argument, Western scholars, led by John Hall, have thoroughly redefined feudal Japan as a nearly modern, nearly democratic era. In the Hall analysis, the Tokugawa legacies to modern Japan are indeed strong, but they are positive bequests. Tokugawa centralized feudalism has been completely recast as legalistic, fair, and as "a rather good sort" of political system. The undoubted economic vibrancy of the period has been reinterpreted as an integral part of samurai rule rather than as an unwelcome development that proceeded in spite of the Shogunate's best efforts to quash it. My fear is that, in a parallel way, the World War II period will be mined only for positive legacies; scholars will excavate from the wartime archives only those historical facts which support the conclusion that global conflict contributed to Japan's economic growth. The context for this fear is the current rearmament debate in Japan. Crudely put, the Japanese government, backed by the American government, wants to rearm on a large scale. The majority of Japanese people are against the plan partly because of memories of the last war. A major element of the government's response to this anti-military attitude has been to try to blur those memories. The Ministry of Education, which has betrayed a shrewd understanding of the uses of history in its censorship of school textbooks, is trying to prevent transmission of the bitter memories to Japanese children. The meaning of World War II is a major political issue today. This, then, is the problem which scholars as participants in their own society must face. As researchers carry their lamps and mattocks into the unexplored recesses of World War II research, it is important to remember that whatever is brought to light will have an impact on the rearmament debate. * 58 Review by A.D. Haun The life and works of Nakano Shigeharu, (1902-) are of interest to Western readers for several reasons: his in volvement in radical politics, his experimentation with new literary forms, and his contributions to the left-wing liter ary movement. As an author he moved from early commit ment to the thirty-one syllable tanka poetic form to free verse, journalistic polemics, and proletarian writings. His literary radicalism paralleled his attachment to Marxist politics. Nakano entered the German Literature Department of Tokyo Imperial University in 1924. The next year, he joined the New Man Society, a group described in de Bary's introduction as "Japan's first Marxist student organization and a center of intellectual ferment on the Tokyo U ni versity campus" (p. 1). Over the next two years, Nakano's main contribution to student debates on the issues of the day consisted of critical articles on the arts and politics. The translator sees this period as a time when the writer was tom between his leanings toward traditional rural society and filial obligations to his father-who wanted him to take over the family farm-and his commit ment to the new, urban way of life, with the excitement of radical politics and cultural activity. From 1928 to 1932 Nakano was active in the left-wing literary movement as an editor and contributor of articles to radical journals. De Bary summarizes his work as an effort to find a balance between "revolutionary consciousness in literature" (p. 3) on the one hand, and aesthetic demands and "the experien tial reality of Japanese life" (p. 3) on the other. Authors active in the left-wing movement soon came under police surveillance. Radical writing was banned, political organizations were repressed, and writers were censored or arrested. Nakano was arrested three times between 1928 and 1932 for his literary and political activity, including membership in the Communist Party which had gone underground after being prohibited by the Peace Preservation Law. He was released after admitting his participation in an illegal organization and promising not to resume such activity. This "ideological conversion" was important in the lives of several Japanese intellectuals like THREE WORKS BY NAKANO SIDGEHARU: THE HOUSE IN THE VILLAGE, FIVE CUPS OF SAKE, THE CREST-PAINTER OF HAGI. Translated by Brett de Bary. Cornell East Asia Papers no. #21. Ithaca: Cornell University, 1979. 159pp. Nakano. It involved the physical rigors of arrest and impris onment, as well as the psychological wounds that arose afterward. De Bary points out that this turning point in Nakano's career is related to his "emergence as a mature novelist" (p. 4). One work from this period is the autobiographical story, "A House in the Village" ("Mura no ie") which deals with his return to his rural home after leaving prison. A later article by Nakano on the officers' rebellion of February 26, 1936, was banned. He was under surveillance from 1936 to 1945 and was banned from publishing be tween 1937 and 1938. Nakano registered protest by main taining silence instead of expressing patriotic support of the war. After the war, Nakano resumed the life of a Com munist Party member and radical writer. The long story "Five Cups of Sake" ("Goshaku no sake") and the short story "The Crest-painterofHagi" ("Hagi no monkamiya") came from the early postwar body of writing. He published longer works as well, such as Pear Blossoms (Nashi no Hana), based on the experiences of his rural childhood. It won the Yomiuri Prize in 1960. His political activity was not satisfying, however. Following a clash with the leaders of the Communist Party, he was purged in 1964. De Bary notes that his relationship with the Party, "though often tense and beset with adversities, was a major source of creative energy in his literary career" (p. 6). Nakano's works, including the three translated here, are similar to much of modem Japanese literature in that they incorporate a great deal of autobiographical material. "The House in the Village" centers on the conversion experience, as do literary works by several authors of Nakano's generation. Historical incidents are also alluded to in the other works. "Five Cups of Sake" discusses the promulgation of the new constitution during the Occupa tion, while "The Crest-painter of Hagi" contains oblique references to the Pacific War and its aftermath. The interplay of incident, characterization, and atmosphere is more effective in "The House of the Village" than in the other two stories. The autobiographical story 59 line depicts the arrest, imprisonment, conversion, and re lease ofthe young hero, Benji, partly through narrative, and partly through flashbacks in the main character's mind. The text is mostly concerned with the hero's thought processes, his motives for behaving as he does, and the conflict be tween him and his family, especially his father Magozo. Magozo is the only other fully drawn character, and he appears more vivid and convincing than his son. Benji seems weak-willed and inconsistent-not a very admirable or interesting personality. Other characters are either men tioned in conversation or in flashbacks. They are sketched briefly, and serve as foils to illustrate the conflicting per sonalities and viewpoints of the father and son. One conflict is caused by their divergent ways of life. Magozo represents the rural setting of old Japan and the continuity of traditional values, especially the importance of family obligations and patriarchal authority. Benji's father is not entirely old-fashioned, though. As a successful farmer, land-holder, and part-time businessman, he is a respected and important figure in the small community where old ways of life and thought still prevail. In contrast, Ben ji prefers the new, foreign ways, rep resented by the city, the university, and left-wing politics. He resists his father's influence by refusing to shoulder the responsibility of taking over the family farm. But his resis tance proves to be self-centered and conditional. When arrested, imprisoned, and physically and psychologically pressured to renounce Communism and to demonstrate his loyalty to the government, he gives in. It is true that he only complies with the minimum requirements and is still under police surveillance when he is released and sent to his father's home. Nevertheless, both father and son feel that Benji has been more weak-willed than others in the same position. His "conversion" provokes a sense of shame and guilt. Magozo feels contempt for his son's turning away from his former views and his comrades who remained loyal to the Communist movement. The father feels that his son's spinelessness renders worthless all his left-wing writing and that Benji should now begin a self-respecting and responsi ble life as a farmer. In the end there is a standoff. Benji stubbornly maintains that he wants to continue writing, in spite of his father's ridicule and his own sense of shame. Most of the story's first part is taken up with Benji's flashbacks to his pre-prison activity, his life in the city, and his mental arguments with himself as he tries to rationalize his decision to recant in prison. The first half of the story reads like a conventional first-person novel (shishosetsu), the personal narrative style of fiction popular in modern Japanese literature. This type of writing tends to become tedious and repe titious, because after a time it appears that the narrator is mostly interested in talking endlessly of his own affairs. The verbose review of one's personal life seems done not so much for the purpose of examining motives, or clarifying the proper course of action to take next, as simply for laying out everything in the open. The narrator seems to be self absorbed rather than interested in life in the larger world outside his own mind. The most prominent feature of the second half of the story is Magozo lecturing to his son on the difficulties that he, as the father, had in keeping the household together, and in particular, his frustration at trying to deal with his son. In the course of Magozo's argument, the man's strength, confidence, and determination become evident, in contrast to his son, who is flabby, self-centered, and irresolute. The father carries out his responsibilities, while expecting others to do the same. Benji lacks a strong sense of obligation toward members of his family, his comrades in the Party, and even himself. Magozo sets standards for himself and tries to live up to them, whereas his son has little clear idea at this point of where he belongs. It seems incongruous to call Benji the "hero" as he is not a heroic individual. The contrast between the two men extends even to their physical features: the father, though nearly seventy years old, is more vigorous and powerful than his much younger son, who is physically frail and subject to illness. The story is more successful as an evocation of mood and character types than as a portrayal of Benji's psycho logical conflicts. Perhaps the work is too short to allow for an adequte development of the theme. A longer novel might show the evolving personality of the hero, describe the conflicts within the family in greater detail, and explore the psychological processes that led the imprisoned Com munists to convert or to stay loyal to their comrades. Then the themes of ideological conversion and intergenera tional, urban-rural conflict would be more persuasive. As it is, the reader is not completely convinced of the historical and social importance of the issues because they are not adequately explaineed in "The House in the Village." There is not enough analysis of the protagonist's personal ity to make his decisions seem significant and convincing. Thus, the story succeeds neither as psychological fiction nor as a realistic development of plot. It does not seem to be a completed work. In these respects, it shares the prob lems of the first person narrative genre. The next story, "Five Cups of Sake," emulates an old Japanese literary form, "following the brush" (zuihitsuj) , the rambling, impressionistic essay which allows the writer to muse on whatever comes to mind. It is frustrating to read such works, because they tend to lack the coherence of the essays as the genre developed in Western literature. In "Five Cups of Sake" the writer indulges in a protracted narration of what is on his mind, talking to himself, and not committing himself to persuade the reader of a particular point of view. The work is structured around a fictional convention that supposedly holds the work together, namely that a school principal spends an entire night writing a letter to a student, with a supply of sake to fortify himself. If we accept the convention of late-night activity under the influ ence of alcohol, then that might account for the incoherent, disconnected quality of the composition. The writer discus ses the reform of the Emperor system, the farcical nature of some of the new democratic institutions of Occupation-era Japan, and the clash with the persistent tradition of au thoritarianism. These issues may be significant enough to warrant an actual essay, editorial, or article, but couched in the loose, sprawling style of this work, the result is dis appointing. Too long and repetitious to hold the reader's atten tion, it is the most difficult and inaccessible of the three pieces because of the random, casual style, which falls somewhere between the bounds of personal narrative and 60 impressionistic essay. Although Nakano fictionalizes in "Five Cups of Sake" to the extent that he presents the essay as a letter is written from one person to another, de Bary identifies in the story a mixture of-not necessarily in tegrated or balanced - "personal reminiscence, prose poetry, and political commentary" (p. 12). If the author had concentrated on one theme and adhered to one form, the piece would be more enjoyable to read and the author's line of thought easier to follow. There is sufficient material in Nakano's own experience concern ing, for example, the importance of the mass media in society, their obligation to serve the public well, and Com munist Party activity in the educational system to justify his writing a straightforward political essay concerning the Communist movement and their publications. In fact, he wrote an article on cultural affairs for Red Flag (Akahata) shortly before this piece appeared. The point of the authyor's arguments is diluted further as he wanders into another area of interest, the Emperor and the postwar role of the monarchy. These musings are even more personalized, idiosyncratic, and discursive than the discussion of the Communist Party's problems, which at least has the conviction and clarity of a debate on practi cal matters reflecting Nakano's personal knowledge and experience. Some of his ideas are well-reasoned-such as the need for a change in the Emperor's status and in the attitudes of the public toward the throne-but they are hard to pick out from the abundance of more personal comments. Finally, "Five Cups of Sake" contains the personal narrative of the high school teacher who is supposedly writing the essay/letter. This alone would provide in triguing material for an independent story on the impact of the war on teachers and students. The moral dilemma of the teacher, who tries to protect his students from the intrusion of the outer world, especially the militarism prevalent then, makes for provocative reading by itself. But the effect is vitiated by the rambling style of so much of the rest of the story. This work can be enjoyed more for its individual parts than for its overall effect, since the concerns of the teacher/ writer are so varied. The variety of topics and opinions is so great that it is hard to know what to think of the whole, however much a reader may admire the components. "The Crest-painter of Hagi" is much shorter than the other two stories, yet it is similar to them in its tone, technique, and general impression. The piece has little by way of a plot or directly stated resolution. Because Nakano resorts frequently to flashbacks to minor events in the narrator's life and concentrates more on mood, atmos phere, and description than on narrative, action, or charac ter development, it would be more accurate to call this story a sketch. The story concerns the narrator's trip to the town of Hagi, where he is supposed to settle a dispute between Party members. Given the rather isolated setting and minor mission, the narrator has occasion to wander aim lessly around the town. The stroll provides the pretext for describing the physical surroundings and recalling events in the past which are tenuously connected with the present. The sights of the town and the reminiscences which are evoked serve no specific purpose, nor do they necessarily lead to a significant action or to important decisions by the narrator. The descriptions and reminiscences, like the mus ings in "Five Cups of Sake" and similar "follow-the-brush" writings, appear to be more for the gratification of the writer than the reader. Since it is not completely clear what the point is, it is difficult for the reader to become emotionally or intellectu ally involved. Perhaps it is unreasonable to expect to find a clearly defined purpose from the immediate act of writing in this style. Such pieces are moderately entertaining, but it is a mistake to burden them with too great expectations. The feelings that are evoked by such a story or sketch are likely to be a slight nostalgia or melancholy of the kind often encountered in Japanese literature, rather than strong emotion of any kind. A large section of this third piece is taken up by a description of how the narrator comes across a particular kind of candied fruit in a shop and of memories of some years ago evoked by the sight of the fruit. For example, he wonders whether he should take some home as a souvenir for his daughter, muses at length over his usual neglect of such souvenir-buying, and debates with himself whether to mail the package or carry it. Following this rambling sequ ence, he comes to another minor episode, when he sees the crest-painter and reads a broader significance into this. In telling about the woman who paints crests, Nakano's narrator describes in detail how she appears as she bends over her work. He takes such a long time to come to the point and labors so much over the description that the reader supposes that it must symbolize something, that the scene of the woman and the emotions aroused by it should lead up to something. But in the end, the emotional build-up dissipates and we are left feeling rather deflated, as though we expected too much. De Bary states that the story deals with the realization that the Pacific War is over and that people must come to terms with it. The outward connection to the war, other than the reminiscences called up by seeing the candied fruit, is the narrator's realization that the crest-painter is a war widow. The narrator expresses sympathy for the losses of wartime which are symbolized by this individual tragedy, but draws no conclusions. It seems that the author has drawn attention to this phenomenon as something remark able in itself, without connection to anything else. On the one hand, we can appreciate the skill with which the author uses images and associations to portray incidents, sketch striking visual impressions, and evoke an atmosphere. All ofthis, as de Bary notes, connects Nakano with the Japanese lyric tradition of word play and associa tive imagery which are so important in tanka and haiku. On the other hand, it is somewhat disappointing and frustrat ing to see little of substance beyond this. It is a problem that exists in a good deal of Japanese writing, especially in essays and personal narratives, wherein writers draw atten tion to details and minor features of their works, so as to inspire moods and create atmosphere. The elements, feel ings, and incidents can be appealing on a small scale and are impressive close to the eye. But much of this writing lacks a strong, substantial basis underneath the intricate surface detail. Similarly, the elements of these three pieces by Nakano are attractive in themselves, but seem loosely as 61 sembled when it comes to viewing each work as a whole. It is as though in concentrating on the fine details, the author has forgotten to relate them to one another within an overall scheme. The individual components seem to be associated by accident as much as by design and could be rearranged without changing the overall effect. Each ele ment may relate to the segments immediately adjacent to it, but the effect of the whole would not be seriously altered if any particular element were omitted. It is discouraging to see the gifts of someone like Nakano widely dispersed in such works instead of being concentrated on achieving a more singular objective. Works such as the three here may be too esoteric-too bound up with events and the atmosphere integral to the Japanese experience-to be readily enjoyable to an out sider. Explanatory notes might make them more accessible as social documents but cannot make them universally appealing as works of art. Nakano deserves credit for at tempting to tackle in fictional form such significant social themes as the war period and the new constitution, but the effort is not altogether successful. De Bary has shown skill and dedication in presenting such a challenging and im portant author to a wider public and in providing important background notes which help us to understand Nakano's work. We may hope that more of his writings will become available to the general audience, so that we can have a more balanced appreciation of his achievements. * 'DAY OF INFAMY' - FDR .... OR 'YEARS OF INFAMY' - Michi Weglyn HARl30R Some Historical Consequences of the Pacific Crisis 1941 TRENCHANT REVISIONIST CRITIQUE UNDERMINES by James]. Martin James J. Martin is a historian and editor specializing in American intellectual history, contemporary diplomatic thought and practice, and analysis of the fonnation of public opinion. He is a graduate of the University of Michigan (M.A., Ph. D.) and, following a quarter of a century in the edu cational world. is now engaged in independent writing and editorial work.
snorlly after Gen. Mars"all early Saturday ""on. Dec. &. the Memorandum 902 from TOk,yO l:Iegan to corne Hl. and tne JaPdnes.. Embassy In WUhington wa. taking II down, unknown 10 tMm,the Amertcan ,ntell'gence ,ntems were dOin,. the same, 'lid ""ollerlong ,\ 'nto Engl"h ,omewha! IHter, And tr", nad catastrophiC con$<lquences Th" comboned Army .nd Navy team of code were nOI only mOre succeS!lul l!'lan tn.. EmM,w people ,n (".om)(\9 up w,tn an EngliSh I,nguage .... of this memoranOum. 3,,0 well ahUO of Ihe latter Tne d,fflcult,es of Ih. E"mbany decooers leO to a hl (u,n"hing thelf d'Plomal, with a lIerslon in time to make tne scheduleo preseMat'on al Ihe SIMe O.. partm.. nl. compounOlng the" problem with of PlanneO dece,t to Caller Ihe alf al laCK on Hawaii u a con .... Sut thli le9,nO does nol fil w,ln Ihe facts. Even Ihe Japanese educalor-hlstoroan Sa!:>u.o lenag Ihough !:>ilterly hostH. to the JaPanele '8g,m.. whiCh lOOK Japan ,nto war with the U.S.A., exonerates them of Ih. unille.\.ally-heid notion In me u.s',A. that tney had "planned ill perfidiOUS attaCk wllhaul any p,lor warning." Tn" ., ",ncorrect," lenaga flatly declared. It was tile Japanese gove,nm..nl', clea, ,no tention to nohfy the Siale Depa.tment "immediately oefore the attaCK'" at Pearl Ha'bor that dlplOmat.c .elalio'" were conslde.ed broKen, but th .. lormal nollee wa, delayed because "Ihey had difficulty with the lasl long me...."'e frnm TOkyO." (lenag', ThtJ Pacific w",.. 1931'1946, N.w York: Pantheon 600'<'. 1978. p_ IJb,) "Pearl Harbor. Anler;;edenls. BackgrOUnd and Consequences" and "The hamingor Tokyo Rose." 0/ permission of Ralph Myln, Publisher, Inc., P.O. Box IS33, Colorado Springs, Colorado 1l0901. The renew of YRIJ'
by permiwon or lIben"i.n Review Inc., San Francisco, ('a1irornia 94111 Previously unpublished material mcorporatt:d In t:dilioD copy '----____---' right by James J, Martin, May 1981 71P lHlfltry I-I I)LOWSHARE PRESS RRI. LITTLE CURRENT. ONT. POP IKO CANADA 62 The Beginnings of a Feminist Consciousness: A Review Essay by Sandra Buckley There have been many English-language histories of the Meiji-Taisho period, but for the most part the writers of these histories have ignored the existence of women as effectively as the Japanese governments of the time would have liked to do themselves. However, as Sharon Sievers makes clear, the government was no more able to ignore the voice of Japanese women during the Meiji and Taisho periods than it is today. I The extremes to which the Japanese state was willing to go to obstruct and discourage the activities of Japan's earliest women activists is the best testimony to the potential political force they represented. Article 5 of the Meiji constitution-the I exclusion of women from all political activity-was the most blatant expression of the government's concern over the threat posed to its nationalistic policies by women's protests. As Sievers points out, it is no longer satisfactory to simply go on lumping the women's movement together with the popular rights movement. The introduction of Article 5 and other discriminatory policies, and the government's determination over the next fifty years to retain the most restrictive elements of its anti-women legislation, are proof of the seriousness with which the government treated the political activity of women. Why then have western scholars of Japan not treated Japanese women with the same seriousness? The first sign of any serious attempt to redress the balance in western scholarship came from Joyce Lebra et al. in their volume of essays Women in Changing Japan (1976). Those familiar with the Lebra book will be aware of the uneven quality of the essays, but despite this the overall impact of the work was still significant. Essays such as those on factory women and women's suicide rates exposed the holistic theories of a homogeneous, happy Japanese family/nation for the fallacies they are. The cracks these essays left in the image of Japan so enthusiastically peddled by Japanologists in the seventies (and still today) allowed many readers-non-specialists, students and, one suspects, even some Japanologists-their first view of Japan as experienced by the majority of Japanese women. Susan Pharr (Political Women in Japan. 1981) and Joy Hendry (Marriage in Changing Japan. 1981) followed Lebra several years later. Both works stop short of making any significant Flowers in Salt: The Beginnings of Feminist Consciousness in Japan, by Sharon L. Sievers. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1983. 240 pp., $22.50. The Hidden Sun: Women of Modern Japan, by Dorothy Robins-Mowry. Colorado, Westview Press, 1983. political interpretations of the mass of data they collected between them. The language of both Pharr and Hendry is the language of the establishment upon which they have depended for so much of their data. Both works were written entirely within the context and limitations of the paradigm which so many Japanese women (feminist and non-feminist) are fighting to dismantle. The next work to appear in the tradition of Lebra et al. was Alice Cook and Hayashi Hiroko's Working Women in Japan: Discrimination. Resistance and Reform (1980). The willingness of the authors to confront the exploitation of women head on, which is implicit in the title, runs through the fabric of the entire work. Hane Mikiso in his Peasants. Rebels and Outcastes: The Underside of Modern Japan discloses a few more flaws in the portrait of the happy Japanese family/nation. Prostitution, for example, is brought out of the "family" cupboard to be aired publicly. Sievers' Flowers in Salt is a history of the emergence of the Japanese women's movement during the Meiji and Taish6 periods. As she traces the activity of textile workers, Christian Reformists, Socialists and the New Women of the Seitosha (Bluestockings), Sievers creates a history of dissent. Flowers in Salt is also a history of the State's concerted and ongoing efforts to obstruct and restrict the activities of anti-establishment women. The forms of government interference included discriminatory legislation, the support of pro-establishment women's groups, harassment and imprisonment. Sievers' portraits of Fukuda Hideko, Hiratsuka Raicho and Kishida Toshiko are welcome tributes to these pioneers of a radical tradition. The choice of these women over more conservative women such as Shimizu Toyoko, Tsuda Umeko or Hatoyama Haruko, serves the dual function of undermining both the myth of the homogeneous, non-radical Japanese and the popular image of the passive Japanese woman. Sievers' respect for the work of these women is implicit in the care and detail of her research into their lives. This same respect is evident in her willingness to stand back and allow her subjects to speak for themselves. The intelligence, eloquence and confidence of these voices is a strength of Flowers in Salt. Japan's earliest 63 feminists speak out and demand the attention of the modem reader. Sievers deserves praise for her skillful use of quotations and her thoughtful and lively translations. In her treatment of radical women Sievers is inevitably drawn into the area of debate between patriarchal-capitalist and Marxist feminists (Michele Barrett's Women's Oppression Today offers a good summary and bibliography). The following quote from Fukuda is as relevant to the current debate as it was to the socialist women of Meiji-TaishO Japan. Unless the (communist) system is carried out, the achievement of voting rights, of opportunities for women in universities, courts and the government bureaucracy, will benefit a few elite women. ... As there is class struggle among men, so there will be class struggle among women. (Fukuda, 1913, quoted in Sievers, p. 178). As early as 1884, Kishida showed an inclination to encompass the exploitation of women under a broader umbrella of economic exploitation. Accepting the right of those with superior force to dominate those who are weaker, whether man over woman, or Western nation over Asian nation, was an argument for savagery, not civilization. (Paraphrase of Kishida, 1884, in Sievers, p. 39). There has been a shift in Sievers' own position since her article in Signs, "Feminist Criticism in Japanese Politics in the 1880s: The Experience of Kishida Toshiko." Sievers has moved away from the traditional view of Kishida as a mere drawing card for the Liberal Party (a passive voice), to a more serious treatment of Kishida's political career. Although she occasionally refers to the gap between the urban, educated women who form the focus of her study and rural or working women, Sievers does not locate herself in relation to either side of the class-gender debate-then or now. Sievers is drawn into the debate through the political position of the women she gives voice to, but stands on the sideline without engaging herself in it. Sievers seems confused when she asserts on one page that "what Japanese women needed was something to make them realize how similar their experiences were ..." (p. 129) only to state on the next page that "class and political divisions were apparently too great to permit a unified front." The institutionalization of the capitalist class structures which divide Japanese women to this day date from the period of Sievers' study. While Sievers refers to the emergence of these class structures in discussions early on of textile workers and the "Victorian lady" of the Rokumeikan period, the distinction between elite and working women-a distinction which was much clearer then than in these days of the ideology of the middle-class-bulge-becomes less clear as the work progresses. Flowers in Salt is a political history rather than an economic history. It is also worth noting the political risks of treating these two as discrete areas of analysis. This is perhaps never truer than for the history of women. Can the extent of the Japanese state's resistance to calls for political equality for women be understood without reference to the interests of industry? At a time when up to 60 percent of the workforce was female, is it surprising that even some non-socialist women considered class struggle a prerequisite for women's equality? Sievers' concentration on political reform groups tends to exclude the less organized resistance of rural and factory women. The predominance of urban, educated women apparently accounts for the absence of any reference to the rice riots of 1918 in which rural women played a significant role. 64 The rural workers of poor fishing and farming villages carried much of the burden of the early industrial and urban development. However, any discussion of the relationship of the women who constituted the membership of the Reform Society, the Blue Stocking and the socialist movements to their poor rural sisters would have required Sievers to engage in the class-gender debate. Flowers in Salt falls short of being a feminist account of Meiji-TaishO women, that is, an account based on feminist theory. It is a history of feminism, not a feminist history. These comments should not detract from the important contribution of Sievers' research, for this work has broken the ground for a new school of Japanese studies informed by the developments of feminist theory. Flowers in Salt marks the beginnings of a feminist consciousness in Japanese studies. Another book to appear in 1983 on the subject of women's history was Dorothy Robins-Mowry's Hidden Sun. This book is the product of the author's experience and research over a ten-year period in Japan as an officer of the United States Information Service attached to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. There is no space here even to begin to address all the problems of Robins-Mowry's treatment of pre-Meiji women's history. Let it suffice to say that in attempting to cover the first 1,600 years of recorded history, an area with which the writer is clearly unfamiliar, in fewer than thirty pages, all that is achieved is a confusion of historical and mythical "fact"-in cluding various of the myths which constitute the archetype ''The Japanese Woman." Chapter Two is called "The Way of Modernization." Here the stark contrast between Robins-Mowry's book and Flowers in Salt is clear. Compare their disparate readings of the same moments in history. Sievers' treatment of the "textile workers" leaves no doubt as to the dreadful conditions these women worked under. Robins-Mowry on the other hand, while describing to some extent the harshness of factory conditions, comes across as patronizing. In one place she focuses on the "pitiful little songs" sung by these "spinning girls." The almost fairy tale quality of "spinning girls" is reinforced by the reproduction of the painting of Empress Haruko's visit to the Tomioka Mill. The illustration is a total romanticization of the working conditions of the women who are not, anyhow, even the focus of the painting. The humid, steamy conditions which ate away at the health of the young workers are transformed here into a romantic mist, framing the imperial presence. Naruse Jinz6 is, to Robins-Mowry, a progressive and influential educator; in Sievers his institution is described as "little more than a finishing school for upper-class women." To Robins-Mowry, Kishida Toshiko was "brilliant and beautiful" and "enchanted her audiences." This is a far cry from the woman whose attacks on the Japanese family system led to the disruption of her meetings by authorities and her eventual arrest. Sievers devotes a whole chapter to the socialist and would-be assassin Kanno Suga, while Robins-Mowry does not even mention that the leader of the "plot to assassinate the Emperor" which led to a massive crack-down on all anti-government activity was a woman. The failure to identify the leader of this plot as a woman is one of the earliest examples of Robins-Mowry's determination throughout The Hidden Sun to deny, or at best ignore, the strong historical links between the left and the women's movement in Japan. Although she at one point acknowledges that "on the local level women more often find help from leftist or progressive anti-establishment groups," the activities of socialist and communist women are only occasionally referred to. When they do appear it is usually only to be derided in a frighteningly McCarthy-like tone. Socialist or communist attention to women's issues is scorned as election "tactics" while the LOP's failure to do the same is described as "heeding too little the changing needs and expressions of the people." The activity of Communists in the Occupation period is described as fanning out to "penetrate labour unions, schools, organizations." The quotation, "a tiny group of people can lead a large number of foolish people," is an insult to the communist workers, unionists, educators and politicians of the day. The source of this quote is only identified in a later footnote as Hashiguchi Toshiko, an LOP stalwart. The Fujin Minshu Kurabu (Women's Democratic Club) was established in 1946 with the "blessing and advice of SCAP." The group announced that a "time has finally come in which we can think, choose, and act of our own accord for our happiness." Less than two years later the group had fallen victim to "red guard tactics" and lost SCAP support. We are told elsewhere that at the same time (1948) the Occupation "cracked down" on Japanese Communism. So much for "freedom to act of our own accord." The account of the "Communist infiltration" of the International Congress of Mothers is not only neurotically anti-communist but elitist. Communist influence is explained as the exploitation of women, while "ordinary women" are described as naive pawns. The message is clear-no intelligent woman would become a Communist and all communist activity is suspect and reprehensible. Anti-V.S. activity is treated in much the same way. The 1960 AMPO crisis is described as "nasty violence." We are told of the concern of "sensible Japanese people" that the crisis would damage democracy, while the massive non-partisan opposition to this newest of Japan's unequal treaties disappears under the McCarthyite rug. Robins-Mowry repeatedly attributes the success of indi vidual women and organizations to their exposure to American and Christian influences. Much credit is also given to the Occupation and the 1946 Constitution. Robins-Mowry defends the "separate approach" of Occupation women's policies, but her simplistic arguments will not pacify the women who are fighting the current constitutional battle against the discrimina tory legislation which encodes the "separate" -ness of women a legal heritage for which they have the Occupation to "thank." The repeated emphasis on the "V. S. -connection," though presented as proof of ongoing cooperation, can only infuriate Japanese feminists by its implicit denial of the initiatives of Japanese women activists and the independent status of the movement in Japan. A corollary of the ChristianJV. S. emphasis is the frequent assumption that what Japanese women mean by equality is achieving the life-style of a middle-class American woman. Progress towards equality is confused with increased consumer capacity and leisure time. The term "women" is often used to describe the specific category of urban, educated, middle-class women. The book is dominated by the history of the success of women of this one group. The women who work within the existing political framework-"establishment women"-are the focus. This is not surprising given Robins-Mowry's own affiliations. In her position as Women's Activities Officer attached to the V.S.LS. the writer was able to collect a considerable bibliography of materials as well as establish contacts within certain areas of the women's movement. Robins-Mowry's bibiliography and the mass of statistical and other detailed information contained within this book will be of value to the student of women's history. The accounts of women's participation in citizen's consumer movements and the "clean elections" campaign are the more informative sections of this book. Readers familiar with the life of Ichikawa Fusae will be sympathetic to Robins-Mowry's extensive tribute to Ichikawa. There can be no doubt, however, that The Hidden Sun is written in the poijtical tradition of the Mandarins. It is therefore only appropriate that the foreword should be written by Edwin Reischauer. He describes Japanese women as combining "meekness and ironlike strength, docility and domestic dominance, gentle beauty and daring action." Robins-Mowry even anger, a feminist reader, but she can only gain by comparison with this attempt of Reischauer's to address women's history-an area he has successfully ignored or misrepresented for some forty years now. Although we might share Reischauer's hope that much more will be written about women in Japanese society, let us hope that future research in the area will follow in the alternative tradition begun by Lebra, Cook and Sievers. * The Berkeley Journal of Sociology A Critical Review Volume XXIX 1984 Terry Strathman on Child-Rearing and Utopia Martin Gilens on The Gender Gap Denise Segura on Labor Market Strati8cation and Chicanas Jennifer Pierce on Functionalism and Chicano Family Research Jeff Holman on Underdevelopment Aid James Jasper on Art and Politics Individuals: $5.00 Institutions: $12.00 Discounts on Back Issues and Multi-Volume Orders THE BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY Univ. of CA 458A Barrows Han Berkeley, CA 94720 I f 65 I I Review by Audrey Kobayashi The contention of this book is that it is necessary to study political activity at the level of the common individual. This position is in clear contrast to the common assumption that individuals are ineffectual in asserting their political rights, unaware of political issues and unimportant in the course of national history. Bowen has aimed his study deliberately at the actions and associations of the commoners involved in the Meiji popular rights movement. He focuses upon three gekka jiken ("incidents of intensified violence"}-the Fukushima Incident of 1882 and the Kabasan and Chichibu incidents of 1884---seeking "to learn why they happened; what they tell about general social, economic, and political conditions; and what consequences they had for society and politics as a whole" (p.6). This work challenges the "failure thesis," advanced in a number of Western interpretations, that there is no historical precedent in Japan for the extension of democracy and civil rights and that Japan's past provided neither a basis for the success of ''TaishO Democracy" nor for a popular challenge to the authoritarianism, ultra-nationalism and militarism that dominated the 1930s. Bowen's approach takes the effectiveness and representativeness ofinstitutional-level politics for granted. It assumes that the failure of democracy at the institutional level precluded the possibility of resisting political and economic oppression by those without institutional power, much less changing things for the better. The first chapter provides a descriptive account of the three incidents and introduces some of the major figures involved. In the Fukushima incident, local residents reacted against demands for taxes and corvee labor to complete a road scheme for the self-serving purposes of a corrupt governor. The Kabasan incident involved a small group of radical opponents to political repression following the Fukushima incident, and was initiated in a spirit of revenge against the same governor. The Chichibu incident occurred on a larger scale, as an attempt to organize commoners to achieve debt deferment, tax reductions and an end to usury. The three events were dissimilar in terms of duration, number of participants, degree of violence involved, as well as in their "precipitating causes," the specific circumstances towards which the rebel- REBELLION AND DEMOCRACY IN MEW JAPAN: A STUDY OF COMMONERS IN THE POPULAR RIGHTS MOVEMENT, by Roger W. Bowen. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: Univer sity of California Press, 1980, 367 pp., maps and figures. lions were directed. Nonetheless, Bowen claims that they were fundamentally linked in that their "underlying causes" all stemmed from the social, economic and political constraints under which the Meiji commoner lived. All occurred as opposition to a recognized governmental authority. All began with organized, lawful attempts to initiate reform, but later gave way to radical factions that saw violence as the most effective means of struggle. All involved an alliance between the Jiyfito (Liberal Party) and local farmers. The analysis of the underlying causes in the bulk of the book is in terms of two broad areas: the circumstances within which rebellion occurred and the role ofcommon ideology in bringing it about. Chapter IT analyzes concrete historical circumstances. It presents the paradoxical situation faced by the Meiji farmer who confronted a range of new "rights" defined within a free market economy: rights of contract, property ownership, and access to the market and to the accumulation of capital. At the same time the right to subsistence, guaranteed under Tokugawa moral economy, was threatened by the exigencies that accompanied the new rights, in particular, the obligations of taxation and the intensifying effects of monopoly and usury. Rights guaranteed in theory could not be translated into practice, and rebellion occurred in order to overcome obstacles to economic rights. Bowen rejects "the commonly held belief which says that 'unique Japan' could not have experienced anything akin to Western liberalism," in favor of the Marxist position that the Japanese popular rights movement occurred within a context in many respects similar to that of Western bourgeois liberalism, characterizing a particular stage in the development of capitalism: heavy and arbitrary taxation following on the heels of a period of prosperity; the commercialization of agriculture to a significant extent; a sharp drop in demand for commercial products, accompanied by indebtedness, bank ruptcy, loss of landownership, and the corresponding fall into tenancy; the consciousness of agricultural producers that they lack the political rights necessary to defend their economic rights as producers; the rise of an opposition movement whose platform promises producers the political 66 rights they lack; and the social fact that the leaders of the necessitated changes in the form and rationale of revolt, and opposition are generally educated, relatively wealthy, and, that in the Japanese popular rights movement the rationale was for the moment at least, believe that their interests coincide provided through the incorporation of Western notions of with those of the uneducated and relatively poor but "natural rights" as expounded in the theories of Locke, nonetheless small capital producers. (p. 176) Rousseau, Jefferson, Mill and, especially, Spencer. They all The parallel with Western revolutionary history is drawn, however, only "insofar as it has been shown that certain regions ... exhibited economic, social and political features which could have engendered a liberal revolution" (p. 75). This does not in any sense imply a reduction of Japanese conditions to those of the West; nor joes it mean the above-cited factors should be called determinants. Rather than providing a simplistic shopping list of possible causes, Bowen attempts to show that the conditions of developing capitalism occurred throughout Japan in. various local economies. The rebellions occurred in areas where, particularly in the sericulture industry, the money economy was well established. These were areas ofcomparative wealth which were nonetheless highly susceptible to the vagaries of market conditions. Against this economic background, Bowen claims that the sufficient causes for rebellion in these particular areas depended upon the of recognition among the participants that they must acqurre a greater measure of political power. It is suggested, paradoxically, that it was the awareness of the freedoms theoretically guaranteed within a market economy that led to rebellion against the constraints imposed in practice by the market economy's more insidious results. The issue becomes: "did this development of a liberal economy affect the farmers' consciousness of their political rights and how was this consciousness expressed?" (p. 128). The discussion of political consciousness tries to establish a relationship among three elements: the individuals involved in the rebellions, the ideas which justified the rebellions, and the means by which they were organized. Chapter III provides of in each of the incidents: over ninety mdividuals are dIscussed in terms of residence, age, status, occupation and property relations. Although the data available are limited and do not fully represent the thousands involved in the incidents, they do provide grounds for a number of general observations. Most of the participants were young, of heimin (commoner) status, and farmers, though a variety of rural occupations and economic status groups were represented. Yet most were not poverty-stricken and a few were even wealthy. The leaders especially tended to come from only a few geographical regions. Bowen's intent is to show the social make-up of the groups and to assess how this make-up related to the possibility of revolution. Not all of the factors chosen for analysis, especially age, provide much indication of the causes of the incidents. The most significant conclusion that Bowen is able to draw is that those participants for whom information is available came predominantly from the class of small landholders, the sector of society in which the economic conditions for a liberal revolution might well be found. I Despite the limited value of the discussion of individuals to understanding the overall causes of the incidents, the importance of certain individuals who were instrumental in the organization of the incidents is clearly demonstrated in Chapter N, in which is developed the major theme of the book: the j relationship between ideology and social organization. The central thesis is that the shift from the older moral order of subsistence farming to a new moral order of capitalism indeed 67 1 supported the principle of equality within a society of property owners based on a capitalist economy. No claim is made that there was a direct embracing or understanding of liberal ideas by all commoners, but only that the influence of those intellectuals who did embrace them was sufficient to establish the beginnings of "rice-roots democracy." At this point the argument is on rather uncertain ground. While it. is easy to show that western theories of natural rights were bemg read and advocted by Japanese intellectuals, it is very difficult to assess the influence that those intellectuals exerted on the ordinary farmer. Upon Bowen's evidence, which includes the fairly high degree of literacy in the countryside and the existence of popular songs espousing a natural rights doctrine, rests only a tentative claim that commoners could have been exposed to, and influenced by, such ideas. Even fairly conclusive evidence of interaction between the common ers and those who held certain doctrines tells us rather little of the actual expression of the ideas, or of the form of understanding achieved by the commoner who might have been exposed to them. Subsequent discussion of the "force" of ideas in guiding the development of history is both mystifying and empirically unsubstantiated. The book is saved from a headlong plunge into idealism by its culminating emphasis on the more pragmatic issue of !he organization of the rebellions. This emphasis shows that how.ever they are conceived, are expressed only in .and must be understood in the light of therr practical mtegratlOn at every social level. Thus a second edge to the book's thesis claims that the organizational forms used to propel of the incidents led to differences among them. Three major factors are identified: the degree of awareness of oppression, the type of recruitment within different traditional forms of socialization, and the methods of continuation. Bowen argues that the direct influence of natural rights doctrine was much stronger in the Fukushima and Kabasan incidents than it was in the Chichibu incident which involved a larger number of commoners and a much more spontaneous form of organization. Concern there was for the amelioration of immediate conditions, rather than for funda of social order. The most significant aspect of thIS discusslOn IS the type of relationship which existed the In each case it derived from traditionally that defined such things as class, patronage or mantal affiliations. Bowen reminds us that "events" such as the. gekka jiken are historical conceptions only if it is .that they are by individuals acting with other mdividuais and withm an established structure of social relations, that structure being continued and transformed in the process. Bowen's work with the expanding field of Mel]I hlstonography. The first lies in recognition of !he degree of regional variation in Meiji Japan and of the Importance of this variation in influencing the course of local history. Differences existed both at the prefectural level in terms of concentrations of certain economic conditions and social forms, as well as at the local level, where elements of cooperative enterprise, communal ties, strength of leadership I i 4 and specific traditions of landholding and familial relations dictated that each social group stood as an expression of its own history. For example, the book discusses the specific consequences of a new road project for the participants of the Fukushima incident and the effects of Meiji economic policies on the sericulture industry in all three areas, showing that although the parameters of the market economy may have been set consistently throughout the country, the particular situations that developed within those parameters varied. Such discrepan cies further justify the importance of understanding any situation in terms of concrete, historical praxes. A second point concerns the degree of continuity between the Tokugawa and Meiji regimes. In Bowen's estimation, there occurred among the commoners a major shift in ideological perspective from the "benevolent lords and honorable peas ants" conception of social order within which Tokugawa uprisings occurred, to the liberal democratic ideology that fuelled the Meiji incidents. Despite the fact that there was widespread de facto participation in a market economy well before 1868, this shift occurred, Bowen claims, because the de jure status of the Meiji capitalism made a profound difference to the development of heiminshugi (consumerism). A similar argument could be made with respect to other aspects of Meiji liberalism, such as the right to private ownership of property, the growing independence of the family, and the expansion of individual occupations. This discussion of the significance of explicitly legal reforms casts new light upon the moral economy debate, and underscores the need for more detailed studies of Meiji conditions. Conspicuously absent from Bowen's discussion are references to class structure, either as it changed in the course of ideological shifts in the Meiji period or as it may have played a part in the development of the popular rights movement. Implicit in Bowen's argument is that the class system in Meiji Japan derived not from categories imposed by a system of capitalist production (although this may indeed have become the case subsequently), but from the hereditary classifications established during the Tokugawa period. This situation is directly linked to the way in which the development of political activism received traditional justification and occurred in different forms through local indoctrination. For Bowen, these facts provided strength to the organization of the gekka jiken; class divisions were transcended in a common ideological pursuit. Opposed to this interpretation is what seems to be the more popular one which claims that the failure of the gekka jiken was in part a result of the class contradictions inherent in the alliance of small farmers and landlords. 2 Resolution of the issue surely lies in ascertaining what exactly determined the outcome of the uprisings. Was it the ability of both small farmer and landlord to draw upon traditional bonds of social relationship in order to organize common activity? Or did the market economy create sufficient social divisions to curtail the successful achievement of democratic reforms by splintering 1. Irwin Scheiner, "Benevolent lords and honorable peasants: rebellion and peasant consciousness in Tokugawa Japan," Tetsuo Najita and Irwin Scheiner, eds., Japanese Thought in the Tokugawa Period, 1600-1868 (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 39-62. 2. See Mikiso Hane, Peasants, Rebels, and Outcastes: The Underside of Modern Japan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), pp. 22-27. the effects of common activity against a bulwark of political oppression and economic deprivation? Bowen offers some intriguing suggestions as to the relationship between the two, but because he fails to address the issue directly by specifying either conflict or change in status as the dominant factor, his final position is equivocal. The issue of whether class is indeed an issue remains unresolved. It is partly this weakness that requires the reader in the end to make an overwhelming leap from a claim concerning the development of liberal reform principles during the 1880s to a diagnosis that the strength of liberal ideology was both broadly based and increasing. The first claim is well supported by Bowen's empirical evidence, but I find less convincing the suggestion that the effects of this movement were not in their immediate results (which were firmly squashed by the power of governmental authority), but in that they germinated during the 1880s, took root during the "TaishO Democracy" of the 1920s, and finally were allowed to burgeon in the post-World War IT reform movement. Contrary to the expressed intentions of the author, this is a lapse back into the practice of pulling "ideas" out of their specific material contexts. One can share Bowen's faith in the ability of the commoners to organize their activities toward a common goal of overcoming political or economic oppression, redefining their circumstances as they become aware of their own power as a group. One can also recognize that this has happened in Japan throughout the past century, in circumstances perhaps less dramatic than those of the gekka jiken in question. We await, however, a more comprehensive empirical study that will provide evidence of development and continuity in the rural democratic movement, and that will provide due analysis of the changing structure of class relations over that period of time. Important questions for further study arise from the book, such as the nature of rebellion and of commoner political organization, and the paradoxes of Meiji society, with its combination of marlcet freedom and political and economic restriction. The book represents a challenge, not only to rethink some of the complacent assumptions upon which events of the Meiji period have been interpreted, but also to continue empirical studies of historical conditions in specific localities, eventually to provide a strong basis for comparative understand ing. Above all, it stands as a reminder that the common individual can never be ignored. * COUNTERSPY P. O. Bo= 647~ Ben FrankLin Sta. ' Washington D.C. 20044 - U.S.A. Since World War II, the U.S. government has made more than 20 nuclear war threats, many aimed against Third World coun tries and liberation struggles. READ: U.S. Nucleal" Threats: A DOCMTlentar-y Histor-y. $2.60. Wl"ite for discounts. 68 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ THE SARA W AK CIllNESE, by John M. Chin. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1981. Review ix, 158 pp., iIlus., maps, bibl., index. (Oxford in Asia paperback series.) by Kenyalang Chin's The Sarawak Chinese is a welcome addition to the only other serious work on the Chinese in Sarawak, T'ien Ju Kang's The Chinese of Sarawak: A Study of Social Structure. t In this slim volume, the former Principal Wel fare Officer of the Ministry of Welfare Services, Sarawak, Malaysia, traces the history ofthe Chinese in Sarawak from the self-governing kongsis in the West Borneo goldfields in the eighteenth century to their uneasy position in the 1970s. The Sarawak Chinese, the author claims in the preface, is written primarily for the general reader but it also aims to serve as a basic introduction to more detailed studies onthe subject by other researchers. It is in the light of the latter that this review must be read. Of the nine chapters that make up the book, the eight that examine the relationships among the social, economic and dialect groups within the community, and the treat ment by the "authorities" in the pre-Malaysia period of this minority, "whose contribution . .. has been largely re sponsible for the State's growth and development" (Pre face), make interesting reading. The last and ninth chapter is a straight-forward account of Chinese participation in 1 party politics in the Malaysian period with little analysis. i i The Chinese presence predated the creation of Sara wak, on the island of Borneo, by the Englishman, James Brooke, in 1841. This was a part of the periodic migration from the "Middle Kingdom" that was to scatter Chinese to the four comers of the world in search of fortune which the 1 I 1 1 I 1. T'jen, Ju Kang. The Chinese of Sarawak: A Study of Social Structure. i London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 1953. individual' Chinese hoped to bring back for his retirement in his birth-place. The Chinese-finding themselves in the anarchic environment ofWest Borneo-transplantedtheir traditional village organization of the South Chinese social structure to form kongsis, mining-and-agriculture coopera tives, for their governance and self-protection, and to se cure their livelihood. Marshalling anthropological and his torical evidence, Chin builds up a convincing case for the legitimate position of the kongsis in the evolution of the autonomous Chinese Hakka communities in Sambas, Montrado, Bau and other Borneo goldfields, as opposed to the conventional view of their origin in the secret Triad Society. All this is set against the background of Dutch imperial expansion inland from the Borneo coast. By 1854 the Dutch had vanquished the strongest of these kongsis, and the scene in the book shifts to the Bau Kongsi just beyond what became the Dutch sphere of influence in the East Indies. The first half of The Sarawak Chinese, culminating in the turning-point of the "Chinese Rebellion" of 1857, is the more significant part of the book. The conventional view of this "rebellion" puts the onus on the "treacherous" Chinese of the upriver Bau Kongsi for having attempted a coup d'etat against the legitimate government of Rajah James Brooke at downriver Kuching. Chin's account, based on oral history and European sources, argues con vincingly that the Chinese were not entirely blameworthy. In particular, he points to the "curious" episode where the Chinese "rebels," having overran Kuching on the fateful day in 1857, did not rape the women or raze the town, but instead retreated, leaving most of the town people un molested. They also left a message for Rajah James Brooke I
69 I to the effect that the line has been unbroken, and Chin remarks "river water does not trespass on well water," that they would not interfere with him so long as he did not interfere with them and confined himselJto the districts he governed. 2 Chin adds interesting details to the "thesis" of the American scholar, Craig A. Lockard, 3 first advanced in an article in 1978, in which the "rebellion," set in the wider Borneo context, is seen as part of a well-established West Borneo pattern of rivalry between a self-governing upriver mining settlement and a downriver trading port-in this case, one ruled by an Englishman who was beginning to extend his fief-for the resources of the same river basin. For some odd reason, neither Lockard's article nor James Jackson's path-breaking monograph4 on the goldfields of West Borneo is mentioned in Chin's footnotes or bibiliog raphy. The "Chinese Rebellion, 1857" is indeed a mis nomer for Chapter Four of The Sarawak Chinese, but the immediate result of the conflict was the near-massacre of the Chinese at Bau. The long-term effect was equally disas trous: a lasting stigma, if not odium, to plague generations of Chinese in Sarawak. Henceforth, although immigration was encouraged under the second Rajah, Charles Brooke, the community was kept under watchful eyes, and Chinese industry and business acumen were harnessed to the econ omic development of the State. Rajah Charles Brooke asked the Chinese he brought in to grow rice but such was the influence of the external world economy that the set tlers invariably turned to cash crops like pepper, gambier and rubber. The rest of the book is uneven. In a sense, the second half comes as a disappointment after the promise held out by the refreshing first half of the book. More than a century of history-roughly between 1863 and 1979-is covered in eighty-five pages, but the ground scanned is mostly descrip tion, and tantalizingly brief at that, of surface events that adds little to what one reads in the standard history text books on Sarawak/Malaysia. Few names of the notable families in the mercantile elite that continued to dominate the import-export business in the decades after the 1930s are mentioned. Their inter-family and patron-client rela tionships are not delved into, and the linkages with their counterparts and the agency houses in Singapore are not explored despite a chapter on "Pre-war Social and Eco nomic Organization." Even less is said about the post-war evolution ofthe mercantile elite. The personae of the Chinese notables come alive in the vignettes sketched by Chin. Representing the Chinese Hokkien mercantile group in Kuching who had supported Rajah James Brooke against their "fellow countrymen" from upriver Bau in 1857, these notables succeeded more in amassing personal fortunes because of their official con nections than in fighting for the rights of their less privileged fellows as citizens of the new state. Since 1857, 2. John M. Chin The SarawakChinese (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 36. 3. Lockard, Craig A. "The 1857 Chinese Rebellion in Sarawak: A Reap praisal," The Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. IX (1) (March 1978): 85-98. 4. Jackson, James C. The Chinese in the West Borneo Goldfields: A Study in Cultural Geography. Hull: University of Hull, 1970. the social and economic power wielded by a select group of wealthy merchants and others as recognized leaders con tinued to ensure that the Chinese Chamber of Commerce remained the primary political link between the government and the Chinese people. 5 There was much to be desired about the leadership, which, in spite of the compromises made with the "enemy" during the Japanese Occupation during World War II, continued to be accorded official recognition by successive govern ments. The community tended like water to try to find its own level and did not always follow. Chin's characterization, In the past, lack ofproper understanding ofthe Chinese way of life, their cultural differences and social background led successive administrations in Sarawak to think of them as aliens and to regard their intentions and motives with mis trust' has a familiar ring about it beyond the shores of Sarawak. Written from "the Chinese perspective," The Sarawak Chinese offers insights that counterbalance the hagiographic ten dencies of most histories written from the "top" looking down. It is, therefore, regrettable that, in the conclusion, the author allows his sanguine feelings as a citizen of Mal aysia-of which Sarawak is now a part-to get the better of his judgment as a historian. For instance, the admonition to the Sarawak Chinese leaders to give up ambitions of personal aggrandizement to serve the needs of their people, and the assertion that the days of political op portunism are over are contradicted by the behavior of the mercantile elite which Chin described earlier in his book. It is perhaps difficult for the author, having spent a life time in government service, to shake off the bureaucratic mind-set with its infinite capacity for rationalizations that fly in the face of facts. In the same concluding paragraph, he applauds Malaysia's "assiduous practice of parliamen tary democracy" (p. 132). This is laudable only if one were to compare Malaysia's record with the worse of her neigh bor's and ignore inconvenient facts like: the suspension of the Sal'awak State Constitution by the Federal Govern ment in 1966 to remove unconstitutionally the recalcitrant Chief Minister, Stephen K. Ningkan; the suspension of the General Elections in peaceful Sarawak in May 1%9; the suspension of the Constitution of Malaysia at the same time; and the subsequent blackmail of the opposition parties into cooperating with the Federal Government prior to the restoration of "parliamentary democracy." Chin's undemanding style, clear maps and ample black-and-white photographs make The Sarawak Chinese an easy-to-read history book. The author will have achieved his purpose in the long run of encouraging more detailed studies on the subject by other researchers if readers, whose appetites are whetted by the first half of this intro duction to the subject, are provoked into questioning much of the "conventional wisdom" in the second half of the ~ ~ . * 5. Ibid., p. 110. 6. Ibid., p. 132. 70 Review by Brad Geisert Chi's main thesis is that the Guomindang regime's preoccupation with military power, dating from at least 1927, prevented it from dealing effectively with China's social, economic, and Political problems. An additional thesis is that, like a straw breaking an already emaciated camel's back, "the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-45 repre sented a. stress beyond the KMT's coping abilities and eventually forced it to collapse" (p.3). However, the book is more disparate than these theses would indicate, as Ch'i traces Guomindang military strategy, party factionalism, regionalism, personnel management, taxation policy, and a host of other concerns. Not surprisingly, considering the wide field of vision of the work, the treatment of many of these areas is shallow. Ch'i is undoubtedly correct that the Guomindang re gime had a predilection for military solutions to problems, though it was seldom as candid about this as the 1936 government publication which stated: "it is an undeniable fact that [our control of] the localities depends on suppres sion (chen-ya) by the armed forces."1 However, Ch'i's ex planation of the origin of the Guomindang's "politics of militarization" is less satisfactory. He points the finger of accusation at: 1) the Guomindang's decision during the Northern Expedition to strike easy deals with Northern Warlords-and the concomitant necessity to redress the preponderance of military power those regionalists re tained; and 2) Jiang Jieshi's peculiar attraction to bushido and other militaristic streams of thOUght. Unfortunately, Ch'i passes over some of the most salient causes of militari zation, a phenomenon hardly found exclusively in the Guomindang regime. The sad fact was that from the early 1800s on, China had been undergoing a creeping militarization of every level of her society and politics. Village and local politics were increasingly dominated by local military power. At NATIONALIST CIHNA AT WAR: MILITARY DEFEATS AND POLmCAL COLLAPSE, 1937-45, by Hsi-sheng Ch'i. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1982. 309 pp., index, $20.00. the root of this process of militarization was the lack of legitimacy of any set of elites, indeed the lack of any set of values held by all or most Chinese that could legitimize anyone in power. Thus, all power was illegitimate, and being so could only be generated by controlling and apply ing the means of violence (or by assembling a set of legitimizing values and in some way rallying the Chinese people to those beliefs). 2 To be sure, Ch'i understands this legitimacy problem, as indicated by his criticism of Jiang and the Guomindang for failing to mount an "ideological and organizational offensive" (p. 10), though he fails to pursue this as a cause of militarization. Still, it could be argued that the Guomindang's re liance on military approaches was less thoroughgoing than Ch'i would have us believe. As Ch'i observes, many of the regime's difficulties stemmed from the continuing exist ence of regional military forces. In this very important realm Jiang foreswore aggressive military solutions, choos ing instead to construct ad hoc political coalitions of re gional militarists through negotiation, rather than preemp tively moving to wipe them out militarily. What Ch'i calls a Guomindang strategy of pursuing "easy military victory" (p. 233) was actually a policy of seeking an easy political solution. Likewise, if Jiang sawall problems from a military vantage point and sought military solutions to all difficul ties, it is curious that he moved as slowly as Ch'i says he did in modernizing and expanding the armies he himself con trolled (p. 37). Ch'i does not succeed, to my satisfaction, in demon strating that it was truly the bias toward military solutions and analysis that doomed the Guomindang. Many of the failings of the regime seem in no way to have been dictated by emphasis on military affairs. Corruption, lax admin istration, inefficient taxing systems, and regional insubor 2. Guy s. Alito, "Rural Elites in Transition: China's Cultural Crisis and 1. Jiangsu sheng zhengfu mishu chu, San nian lai Jiangsu sheng zheng the Problem of Legitimacy," Select Papers from the Center for Far Eastern shuyao (Zhenjiang, 1936), baoan section, introduction, p. 1. Studies, 1978-79, No.3, pp. 218-275. 71 dination are hardly things willingly embraced or tolerated by militaristic dictators, no matter how narrow their intel lect or horizons. Additionally, it could be argued that leaders at all levels of the regime tended to rely on ad ministrative tinkering, reorganization, and reshuffling of offices at least as often as identifiably military approaches to problems. The major importance of the book lies less in its some what strained thesis than in its engagingly new interpreta tions in other areas. For example, Ch'i provides plausible rationales for the Guomindang army's all-out defense of Shanghai-which decimated China's best-trained and -equipped armies. He holds that Jiang bet most of his forces in a Shanghai stand: 1) in order to pursuade regional mili tary leaders to fight Japan by demonstrating that he was not holding his own troops in reserve; 2) because Shanghai was the hub of Jiang's power base and the heart of China's economic resources, and he could not afford to lose it (it was also, Ch'i says, the most heavily fortified area in China and presumably the easiest to hold); 3) because the Chinese success in holding the Japanese around Shanghai in 1932 had resulted in the conclusion by Chinese military leaders that fighting in urban areas somehow canceled out "Japanese superiority in firepower, mobility, and logistics" (p. 46). Thus Ch'i rejects the common view that the disas trous Shanghai strategy of attempting to hold Shanghai at all costs was a ploy by Jiang to grab world attention, sym pathy, and aid. It was, he says, the opening curtain in a Chinese strategy of fighting a war of attrition. Many who have written on wartime China have felt that the Guomindang's policies and war strategy were de signed more to prepare for eventual war with the CCP than to defeat Japan. Ch'i's analysis of politics within the Guomindang regime creates the impression that Jiang and his advisers were more concerned about regional military leaders than about competition with the CCP. One bloody flag often hoisted by both CCP and Guo mindang polemicists has been that the opposition party bore less of the brunt of Japanese attacks and either fought in a lackluster fashion or sat back avoiding any significant engagements with the Japanese in order to save its forces for the coming civil war. Neither side will find complete vindication in Ch'i's book. He argues that even after the battle of Shanghai the Guomindang launched a military offensive-the disastrous winter offensive of 1939-thus proving that it had not yet adopted a strategy of holding its forces in reserve. Later, after the miserable failure of the offensive, and especially after the Japanese Ichigo offen sive, the Guomindang armies were simply too weak to do other than bide their time. In other words, planning for civil war had little to do with the Guomindang sitzkrieg. His line on Ichigo is that the Guomindang troops (and particu larly the crack units aligned with Jiang) bore the fury of Japanese armored thrusts, so much so that Ichigo very nearly sealed the fate of Jiang. In Ch'i's view Ichigo, like the failed winter offensive and the Shanghair defeat, dra matically shifted the military balance in China, strengthen ing the hand of regional militarists vis a vis Jiang. Thus Jiang's power was slipping away during the war. Increas ingly, rather than effectively imposing his will on the Chinese army, Jiang had to negotiate with its various re gional leaders. Seen from this perspective, Jiang's re luctance to relinquish complete control over the army to U.S. General Stilwell stemmed from the fact that Jiang himself never had such powers to give away. Historians of CCP military strategy will undoubtedly debate Ch'i's analysis of the evolution of CCP military tactics. Most notably, he outlines a significant shift in the early- and mid-1940s from reliance on guerilla soldiers and tactics toward emphasis on regular army forces and large engagements (pp. 122-128). Ch'i's presentation is marred by a few minor inac curacies (for example, Sun Yat-sen's death is wrongly dated 1924) and the prose is occasionally poorly edited (e.g. the author identifies Jiang Jieshi as an "it"-p. 29). Yet Ch'i is a pioneer stepping into an academic wilderness. His book and Lloyd Eastman's soon-to-be-released work are virtually the sole scholarly studies of the Guomindang in the Sino-Japanese War. Ch'i'smonograph is a useful and essential work for all who would understand the fate of the Nationalist regime. * Pacific Affairs COURTSHIP, LOVE, AND MARRIAGE IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA INTRODUCTION Marilyn B. Young MARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND THE STATE IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA Margery Wolf MAKING A FRIEND: CHANGING PATTERNS OF COURTSHIP IN URBAN CHINA Gail Henbaner PRIVATE ISSUES, PUBUC DISCOURSE: THE UFE AND TIMES OF YU LUOJIN Emily Honig APPENDIX: THE MARRIAGE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBUC OF CHINA (1980) THE CAROUNIANS OF SAIPAN AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS William H. Alkire PAKISTAN'S SEARCH FOR A FOREIGN POUCY AFTER THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN W. Howard Wriggins NUCLEAR PROUFERATION: SOUTH ASIMf PERSPECTIVES Review Article A.bok Kapur BOOK REVIEWS Vol. 57, No. 1: Summer 19&t \n Intt1rnational H('rie" (If .\sia and tilt' Parilit" Published Quarterly PACIF1C AFFAIRS University of British Columbia Vancouver, Be, Canada V6T lW5 72
Xin Yan Et Al - External Qi of Yan Xin Qigong Differentially Regulates The Akt and Extracellular Signal-Regulated Kinase Pathways and Is Cytotoxic To Cancer Cells But Not To Normal Cells