BHUNDOO VS PUBBON AND OTHERS 1983 MR 161 Ahnee, J.

The applicant who is the mother of the four respondents, was married under the system of legal community to the late Bijmohun Pubbon who passed away in June 1982, leaving as sole heirs entitled to apprehend his estate and succession his ten children (including the 4 respondents) and the applicant herself. Some nine months before the death of Pubbon the applicant left or was made to leave the conjugal house situate at Baillache, Long Mountain, where she was living with her husband and the respondents who are now the sole persons occupying the said house. The applicant is now moving for a writ habere facias possessionem against the respondents who, she says, are occupying without any right, title or capacity the house which was the "logement principal du mnage" contrary to the provisions of the new article 768 Code Napolon which confers upon the surviving spouse a right of usufruct "sur l'immeuble, sur les meubles meublants et sur les droits immobiliers qui appartenaient au dfunt et qui au jour du dcs, servaient au logement principal du mnage . . . ." The respondents contest that the house in lite belonged to the legal community having existed between their late father and the respondent and aver that only two rooms of the said building belonged to the community, the other rooms having been built by themselves with the express consent of their father after the departure of their mother, the applicant. I am not, at this stage, called upon to pronounce myself on the factual aspects of the case. Counsel on both sides have agreed that I should first decide whether a surviving spouse who was not living with the de cujus at the time of his death, can rely on the provisions of article 768 Code Napolon, which gives to the surviving spouse "un droit d'usufruit sur l'immeuble, sur les meubles meublants et sur les droits immobiliers qui appartenaient au dfunt et qui au jour du dcs, servaient au logement principal du mnage . . ." Our section 768 has no equivalent in the French Code Civil. Articles 765 to 767 of the French Code gives to the 'conjoint survivant non divorc et contre lequel n'existe pas de jugement de sparation de corps pass en force de chose juge" certain rights to succeed to the de cujus. Our sections 767 to 770 of the Code Napolon, on the other hand, speak in favour of the "conjoint survivant" which includes even the spouse "contre lequel existe un jugement de sparation de corps pass en force de chose juge". This is the opinion expressed by Professor Garron in an article published in the Third Volume of the Mauritius Law Review at page 47 where he writes Pour la sparation de corps, puisque la sparation des poux est, en ce cas, officialise par le jugement, on aurait pu prvoir que le conjoint survivant n'aurait aucun droit. Mais cela paralt aussi excessif et le 1gislateur (the Mauritian one) a prfr laisser au prdcd 1'entire libert de tester plutt que d'adopter une mesure gnrale et trop rigide. The right of the surviving spouse under article 768 Code Napolon, as opposed to those under articles 767, cannot however be reduced or suppressed "ni

par les dispositions testamentaires du dfunt ni par 1'effet des libralits consenties par celui-ci." Does this mean that once married the surviving spouse has an inalienable right to the usufruct so created by article 768? I do not think so. It is to be noted that the law speaks of the "immeuble servant d'habitation principale au mnage au jour du dcs". The key word, to my mind, appears to be the word "mnage" which exists only where there is "vie commune" between a man and a woman. This is again the opinion expressed by Professor Garron at pages 54 and 55 in the Third Volume of the Mauritius Law Review where he writesPar "logement principal du mnage", le 1gislateur n'a pas voulu viser le domicile. Le domicile, en effet, se dfinit comme le lieu du principal tablissement et non pas le logement principal. La notion du domicile est essentiellernent juridique et quelquefois elle est mme fictive et ne rend pas compte dela ralit. Un individu ne vit pas toujours son domicile qui peut tre professionel, commerical on simplement lu. 11 est donc dvident que l'article 768 ne vise pas le domicile mais la rsidence habituelle du mnage, qui correspond 1'endroit o ce mnage vivait effectivement, au jour du dcs. Car le but de la loi consiste prcisment, nous lavons vu, permettre au conjoint survivant de conserver le logement dans lequel ii vit effectivement et non pas de conserver un domicile qui nest quelquefois qu'une fiction juridique. En ce qui concerne cette rsidence, l'article 768 prcise qu'il doit s'agir du "logement principal" c'est dire la rsidence dans laquelle le mnage vivait habituellement par opposition la rsidence secondaire et que les juristes qualifient parfois "d'habitation". Le fait que l'usufruit ne s'exerce que sur le "logement principal du mnage" par opposition toute autre rsidence, a videmment pour consquence directe d'exclure du bnfice de cet usufruit, le conjoint survivant qui tait spar de corps lors du dcs de l'autre conjoint, car, dans cette hypothese, le mnage" n'avait pas de "logement principal" mais plusieurs residences spares. I fully agree with the views expressed by the learned Professor and hold that as the applicant was separated from her husband at the time of his death, she is not entitled to the usufruct provided by article 768 Code Napolon. Applicant : Attorneys H. M. Osman Sir Ramesh Jeewoolall Respondent: Attorney C. Seeballuck R. Rey, of counsel