Unclassified with SECRET Attachments

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES

Draft Monograph Outlines as of 7/29/03

Team 1A (Commission Sensitive)

Team 2 (SECRET)
Team 3 (Commission Sensitive)
Team 4 (LES)
Team 5 (Commission Sensitive)
Team 6 (Commission Sensitive)
Team 7 (Commission Sensitive)
Team 8 (Commission Sensitive)

Unclassified with SECRET Attachments

 Commission Sensitive

TEAM 1A MONOGRAPH OUTLINE

The September 11 Conspiracy

I. Overview of Conspiracy

II. Formation of the Conspiracy

A. Antecedents of Plan to Conduct Attacks Using Civil Aircraft

1. Air France Hijacking by GLA Terrorists - Dec. 1994
2. Manila Air (Bojinka) - 1994-95
3. Murad debriefing by Philippine National Police - 1995
4. Other

B. Hatching of 9/11 Plot

1. Conception of Operation
2. Kuala Lumpur meeting - Jan. 2000
3. Detailing of Nawaf Al-Hazmi (NAH) and Khalid Al-Mihdhar (KAM) to US
4. Recruiting of Hamburg Cell in Germany, Pakistan, Afghanistan - 1999-2000

III. Preliminary Phase of Operation

A. San Diego
1. Arrival of NAH and KAM in LA - 1/15/00
2. Activities in LA [to be investigated]
3. Meet Al-Bayoumi and Move to SD - 2/00
4. Activities in SD
a. Move into Parkwood Apartments
b. Open BOA account
c. Buy car
d. Move to Muppet's House
e. KAM departs
f. NAH's life in SD - 6/00-12/00 [to be investigated]

B. Hamburg Cell Pilots' Preparation

1. Researching Flight Schools - early 2000
2. Preparing for Travel to US - spring 2000
3. Al-Shehhi, Atta, Jarrah Arrive in US - May-June 2000
4. Financial Support from Operatives in UAE
5. Flight Training - June-Dec. 2000

C. Substitution of Hanjour for NAH as 4th Pilot - Dec. 2000

1. Hanjour arrives in SD
2. Hanjour and NAH travel to Arizona

Commission Sensitive
 Commission Sensitive

IV. Consolidation Phase

A. Bin Al-Shibh Trip to Obtain Further Instructions for Atta - Jan. - June 2001
1. Meetings with UBL, KSM, Abu Hafs Al-Masri in Afghanistan
2. Meeting with KSM in Karachi

B. Travel of Non-Pilot Hijackers to US

1. Selection of Operatives in Afghanistan
2. Arrangements to Travel to US
3. Arrival of Operatives in US
4. Infusion of Additional Financing

C. Transcontinental Test Flights by the Four Pilots - May - Aug. 2001

1. Information pilots were able to obtain
2. Las Vegas Rendezvous

D. Bin Al-Shibh's Coordination Role

1. Spain meeting and in phone contacts with Atta - summer 2001
2. Contact with and money transfer to Moussaoui - July - Aug. 2001
3. Receipt of 9/11 date from Atta and communication thereof to KSM

E. Acquisition of Tickets for 9/11 Flights

IV. Execution

A. Assembling of Flight Teams

1. AA #11: Atta, Al-Suqami, Waleed & Wail Al-Shehri, Al-Umari
2. UA #175: Al-Shehhi, Banihammad, Ahmed & Hamza Al-Ghamdi, Mohand Al-Shehri
3. AA #77: Hanjour, NAS, KAM, Majed Moqed, Salim Al-Hazmi
4. UA #93: Jarrah, Saeed Al-Ghamdi, Al-Haznawi, Al-Nami

B. Return of Excess Funds to Operatives in UAE

C. September 11 Hijackings and Crashes

IV. Sidebars to Address Loose Ends, Alternative Theories and Popular Misconceptions

A. DSM
B. "Holy Tuesday"
C. Second Wave of Attacks
D. Other

VI. Glossary of Who's Who in Conspiracy

Commission Sensitive
 WITH DRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148
Box: 00004 Folder: 0009 Document: 6
Series: Stephanie Kaplan Files

Copies: 1 Pages: 3

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: Team Monograph Outlines

Document Date:
Document Type:-tettef- D^--H»-e
Special Media:
From:
To:

Subject: Team 2: U.S. Intelligence Management, Collection,

and Analysis

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.

NND: 301
Withdrawn: 06-20-2008 by:

RETRIEVAL #: 301 00004 0009 6

System DocID: 2868
 Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

TEAM 3 MONOGRAPH OUTLINE

Counterterrorism Policy

X How did the United States try to fight terrorism before 9-11?

-, Narrative: What did senior decision makers see as the U.S. "strategy " infighting
terrorism? Infighting al-Qa 'ida?

1 . How did they articulate this strategy?

2. Was it shared at all senior levels?

3. Was it shared with the field (commands, CIA stations, diplomatic posts, etc)?
How was it understood by those in the field?

4. Did policymakers recognize the unusual nature of the al-Qa'ida challenge?

5. How did the strategy evolve over time and adapt to developments?

6. Key decision points linked to events

a) Which specific policy responses were considered after each key event
(i.e. African Embassy and U.S.S. Cole bombings)?

b) What were the "windows for the use of force" for each considered
response and did the U.S.G. miss these "windows"?

7. Policy statements, documents, bureaucratic changes, and other manifestations

Description of each Department or Agency participation

1 . Did the CIA contribute with robust covert action efforts?

a) What instruments did the CIA use and why?

b) What contributions did these instruments make?

(1) To counterterrorism

(2) To efforts against al-Qa 'ida

c) What were the limits of each instrument? Were instruments used in a

timely fashion?

Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

 Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

d) What instruments were not used?

(1) Why were they ruled out?

(2) What contribution might they have made?

e) What obstacles impaired the CIA's ability to target Bin Ladin?

2. Did the DoD and the military consider the full range of its capabilities?

a) What instruments did the military use and why?

b) What contributions did these instruments make?

(1) To counterterrorism

(2) To efforts against al-Qa 'ida

b) What were the limits of each instrument? Were instruments used in a

timely fashion?

c) What instruments were not used?

(1) Why were they ruled out?

(2) What contribution might they have made?

d) What obstacles impacted the military's ability to use force against al-
Qa'ida? Was it limited to "TLAM therapy"?

e) What was the extent of the DoD's cooperation with the CIA? To what
extent did it support the CIA's covert action mission?

f) What steps, between 1 998-200 1 , did the DoD prepare for a 9- 1 1

attack?

g) To what extent did the DoD participate in homeland defense?

Jf. Did the DoJ ensure a robust legal strategy and response?

a) What instruments did the DoJ use?

Unclassified — Commission Sensitive

 Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

b) What contributions did these instruments make?

(1) To counterterrorism

(2) To efforts against al-Qa 'ida

c) What were the limits of each instrument? Were instruments used in a

timely fashion?

d) What instruments were not used?

(1) Why were they ruled out?

(2) What contribution might they have made?

e) How legalistic were the lawyers? What was their relationship with
those operating in the field?

f) Were there times when a legal response was not appropriate?

g) Was the legal strategy coordinated and consistent with the overall U.S.
strategy?

>? 4; To what extent did the State Department properly emphasize counterterrorism
•^ in overall diplomacy? What were State's priorities from 1998-2001?

a) What instruments were used and what contributions did they make?

(1) To counterterrorism

(2) To efforts against al-Qa 'ida

b) What were the limits of each instrument? Were instruments used in a

timely fashion?

c) What instruments were not used?

(1) Why were they ruled out?

(2) What contribution might they have made?

Coordination

a) Did agencies coordinate with each other? How did they do so?

Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

 Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

b) Did the White House ensure proper coordination and leadership on

counterterrorism issues?

6. Did counterterrorism support and attention go beyond senior (political) levels

of the agencies to include the civil service (and vice-versa)?

7. Did support and attention extend to the USG field offices, which would be
coordinating efforts in the field?

C. Were there gaps in U.S. strategy?

1. What gaps existed, if any, given the threat that was emerging?

2. Did policymakers recognize the gaps? If not, why not?

3. Did policymakers try to fill them?

4. Why were certain instruments not used?

5. Why did policymakers select cruise missiles strikes after the 1998 Embassy
bombings. Why were other responses not employed?

6. Why was there no response to the attack on U.S.S. Cole?

7. Given the gaps in our strategy, was sufficient attention given to homeland
defense?

II. Did we miss opportunities to stop al-Qa'ida before 9-11?

A. Could we have stopped al-Qa 'ida in Sudan?

1. Was Bin Ladin recognized as a problem during his time in Sudan? Was al-
Qa'ida? To what extent did we discuss the Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida issues with
Sudan? What about the presence of terrorists in general?

2. What other goals did the United States have in Sudan?

3. What leverage did the United States have with Sudan? With its neighbors?

4. What instruments were considered for pressing Sudan? Which ones were
used and why?

5. Why was Bin Ladin expelled?

B. Could we have stopped al-Qa 'ida in Afghanistan?

Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

 Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

1. When was Bin Ladin, and al-Qa'ida, recognized as a problem by senior

policymakers?

2. What other goals did the United States have in Afghanistan? With its
neighbors? To what extent did regional relations shape our Afghan policy?

3. What leverage did the United States have over the Taliban? Were there
indirect forms of leverage (e.g. through Pakistan)?

4. What instruments were considered? Which ones were used and why?

5. How successful were the various instruments?

C. Was stopping al-Qa 'ida apriority in the many permissive environments in which it
operated?

1. Identify range of al-Qa'ida operating environments and select several

(Pakistan, Germany, and Saudi Arabia) for particular scrutiny.

a) Describe the al-Qa'ida problem

b) Type of activity conducted in the country

c) Government response, or lack thereof

d) Degree of government cooperation with al-Qa'ida (or penetration), if

any

2. Explaining U.S. policy

a) Was al-Qa'ida recognized as a problem by senior policymakers in the

United States with regard to the various countries?

b) What other goals did the United States have in these countries? How
much did these conflict with our counterterrorism agenda?

c) What leverage did the United States have?

d) What instruments were considered? Which ones were used and why?

e) Why did the various instruments fail or succeed?

III. To what extent did the following bear on our efforts to fight terrorism and al-Qa'ida?

Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

 Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

A. Conflicting priorities/focus

B. Resources

C. Recognition of the enormity of the threat

D. Levels of popular support for dramatic change

1. How strong was the opposition?

2. Was there an attempt to shape/lead public opinion?

E. Levels of foreign government support

1. Regimes that supported al-Qa'ida

2. Regimes sympathetic to al-Qa'ida's ideology

3. Regimes fearful of a confrontation with Islamists

4. Regimes that did not enjoy close relations with the United States

5. Lack of regime capacity for cracking down on al-Qa'ida (i.e. resources, civil
liberty issues, etc)

F. Poor bureaucratic coordination and communication in the U.S.

G. Possible disconnects between Washington and the field

H. "Somalia syndrome "/casualty aversion

I. President Clinton's political troubles

J. Bureaucratic resistance (discuss for various bureaucracies, as appropriate, including

the U.S. military)

1. Did not see al-Qa'ida as their institution's mission

2. Did not see al-Qa'ida as a sufficient threat

3. Institution unable to contribute due to lack of capabilities

K. Attitudes towards using covert action

L. Many to add here

Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

 Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

IV. Have these issues been addressed?

A. Sufficient money?

B. Sufficient focus?

C. Degree ofinstitutionalization?

D. New problems that have emerged?

V. Are we doing the right thing now? (And is the lack of attacks tied to this?)

A. WMD, loose nukes

B. Iraq

C. MEPP

D. Draining the swamp

E. Anti-Americanism

F. Are we encouraging other countries (i.e. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) to cooperate
and address terrorism? What is the quality and sincerity of their efforts?

Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

 A

^fl^
0 O

S? O.Oi p

"*?'
C/
^
X1

Vn
£ ~^
«? ^
0
I ^
-f if P
>
o
^A»^
^,
\

•^^ I
1 \\

^ \

Sf-
)
 OL

9- t/
J
 Initial Monograph Outline
Terrorist Entry Into the US
Team 5, Immigration, Nonimmigrant Visas and Border Control
Revised August 12, 2003

What happened? *May begin here if information permits

I. Entry of the 19 hijackers.
A. Visa issuance to the 19 hijackers
B. Entry of the 19 hij ackers at ports of entry
C. Failed attempts at entry by Sept. 11 plot participants
II. Entry by September 11 associates: comparison and contrast with the 19 hijackers
III. Previous entries by Al Qaeda and Islamic terrorists, WTC I - September 11.
IV. Failed entries by Al Qaeda and Islamic terrorists, 1995 - September 11 plot.
V. *A1 Qaeda advance travel planning — probes and critical factors
e.g., identity, country of birth, passport, visa, travel route
VI. Evolution and variations in terrorist entry, 1990 - Sept 11 attack
VII. Border security: Immediate response to the attacks [TBD]
A. Leadership actions
B. Border controls
C. Internal immigration enforcement policy

Why did it happen: Did our border control system afford a missed opportunity to
prevent the entry of the 19 hijackers or to remove them from the US? ([] indicates
tentative inclusion depending on facts to be developed.)
I. The role of watchlists and clearances
A. TIPOFF: Terrorist Watchlist developed and used for visa processing
B. Watchlisting by the CIA
1. Facts relating to the 19 (al Hazmi, al Mihdhar)
2.Other possibilities: institutional role of terrorist watchlisting
C. Watchlisting by the NSA
1. Facts relating to the 19
2. Other possibilities: institutional role of terrorist watchlisting
D. Watchlisting by the FBI
1. Facts relating to the 19 (Hanjour, Jarrah, flight schools)
2. Other possibilities: institutional role of terrorist watchlisting
E. Lookouts by INS and Customs?
[- untapped legacy-INS and Customs databases?]
F. Assessment and accountability
II. [The role of terrorist mobility intelligence in decisions of consular officers abroad
and border-related federal inspection services]-^T^ H if\teC |fl ioC^US^/^Cu/'/lJ
III. The impact of border security policy on visa and entry decisionmaking 7
A. Counter-terrorism and security policy (FDD's, State S/CT, INR, DS, etc.)
B. Country and regional policy (e.g. State/NEA, SA, Egypt, UAE, Lebanon)
C. Migration, immigration, and international crime policy (State/CA, PRM, INL)
D. Other border control policy (DOJ, INS, FBI)
E. Assessment and accountability

M/UTV t>UA^ cuw O/AxU "n*4rt^ c/iiT/v

/ J 0
 IV. The impact of visa administration procedures and practices on visa decisions
A. Legal standards
B. Clearances and advisory opinions
C. Visa Express and other programs
D. Forms, interviews, and technology tools
E. Department of State Consular Affairs budget and personnel
F. State Department evaluation criteria for consular posts
F. Assessment and accountability
V. The role of federal inspection at the ports of entry on September 11, 2001
A. Legal standards
B. Primary inspection
C. Further checking at secondary inspection
D. Watchlist/lookout information
E. Immigrant compliance history information
F. [Technology factors]
G. Interview criteria
H. Assessment and accountability
VI. Potential opportunities for US immigration authorities to detect the 19 hijackers
after entry
A. 1996 mandated student tracking system
B. 1996 mandated exit-entry system
C. 1996 mandated biometrics requirement
D. Internal immigration enforcement policy and practice
E. Technology factors
F. Assessment and accountability
VII. Border security opportunities: Overall assessment and accountability
A. White House
B. Intelligence agencies
C. Department of State
D. Department of Justice, INS, FBI
E. Congress

hat border security measures can be undertaken to prevent terrorist access to the
US?
I. Borders and terrorists (strategic context)
yft*' A. Al Qaeda's and other terrorists' targeting within the US
-^JC B. Internal and external demand for foreigners' access to the US
W\. [Demand for access to US citizens and entities abroad]
U. "?D.. Common interests with other countries in border security arrangements
, j^j-(t1'E. Border security in balance with the advancement of peace and prosperity
icfW- VO VO Vulnerabilities
V of our border security system (tactical context)
* ' Review of vulnerabilities exploited by the 19 terrorists
Review of vulnerabilities exploited by other similar terrorists
C. Terrorist mobility patterns and tradecraft
D. Relationship of terrorist entry to other transborder crimes:
Alien smuggling; illegal financial flows; narcotics trafficking; arms trafficking
III. Future scenarios
IV. Key new anti-terrorism features of the border security system
A. Watchlist, security advisory opinions/clearances, and lookout intelligence
changes
B. Domestic immigration law enforcement
C. Immigration compliance systems
D. Visa and federal immigration inspection policies
1. reorganization (DHS)
2. additional security reviews
3. visa applications and process changes
4. new compliance systems - student tracking, exit/entry
E. Hardening of the northern and southern borders

V. Recommendations. Team 5 has identified seven groupings of border security

policy issues from which a few key recommendations will emerge, taking into
consideration the current threat, existing systems, and feasibility. The areas are:

Intelligence and watchlisting. USG needs to identify terrorist groups and their individual
members in manner that facilitates an institutionalized information exchange among
border security officials in order to prevent entry of known terrorists or apprehend them if
they are already in the US. Related issues are: (1) collection and analysis of border
security information and intelligence; (2) institutionalization and organization of such
intelligence; (3) ensuring the preservation of individual rights; and (4) the role of the
private sector (airlines and other transportation entities).

Border Enforcement. Terrorists exploit the US visa process, entry without inspection,
asylum claims, amnesty, legal permanent residency, and perhaps refugee programs,
immigration law benefits, alien smuggling, and corruption of border officials. Issues
involved in shutting down border security loopholes and abuse include: (1) the role of
our domestic and international border enforcement policies; (2) the role of technology
(cameras, sensors, unmanned aircraft, fences, smart cards, stand alone and interconnected
databases, new and renovated entry ports); and (3) the role of the military (national guard,
unmanned aircraft).

Screening abroad (visas) and inspection at border points. This is a broad area ranging
from whether legal standards for assessing potential terrorists' eligibility to enter need to
be changed to whether changes in visa and POE screening may be required. Issues
include: (1) consideration of possible changes to the visa waiver program, transit without
visa and international-to-international transit, entry-exit enforcement; and pre-
clearance/pre-inspection; and (2) the value added of super name checks and other
programs instituted since 9-11 to US border security and other national interests.

Identity security. USG needs to address terrorists' use of fraudulent and counterfeit
supporting documents to attain US-issued travel documents. Such "breeder/feeder"
documents include: birth certificates, drivers' licenses, social security cards and other
"national" ID cards. Issues include: (1) USG efforts to improve technology (databases,
biometrics and machine readable documents) to discourage use of fraud; (2) national
regulation of breeder/feeder document issuance; and (3) USG prioritization of anti-fraud
efforts, including training of border security officials.

Immigration law as a counterterrorism tool. USG has instituted use of strengthened

immigration laws in response to the 9/11 attacks, including: (1) post 9/11 detention and
removal of aliens with outstanding immigration violations; (2) special registration
requirements for certain classes of aliens; and (3) student tracking. Issues include: (1) a
determination of the usefulness of the policies and practices instituted to implement these
laws; (2) their implications for US constitutional rights and foreign policy.

International Undertakings. USG has undertaken bilateral, regional and multilateral

cooperative efforts on border security, as well as international watchlisting and data
sharing. Issues include the value of these efforts, and the instruments used to achieve
USG goals in anti-corruption and anti-fraud efforts, visa policy, and secure travel
documentation.

Iw^^°
TV) -LiZ^.
C"/V) C(jy(]
/q
 Commission Sensitive

TEAM 7 MONOGRAPH OUTLINE

Status of Civil Aviation Security on September 11, 2001

I. Creation and Evolution of Civil Aviation Security to September 10, 2001

a. Threats to Commercial Aviation prior to Pan Am 103 (SB)

1. Domestic threats
2. International threats
3. Commercial Aviation as terrorism target
4. Hijackings

b. Creation and evolution of the system prior to Pan Am 103

1. Legal authorities and statutory requirements (BJ)
• Federal Aviation Act of 1958
• Air Transportation Security Act of 1974
2. International Conventions (SB)
3. Role of federal government, airlines and airports (BJ)

c. Destruction of Pan Am 103 (1988) and response (JR)

1. Change in perceived threat
2. President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism
(1990)
• Recommendations
• Implementation, statutory and regulatory (including
Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990)
• Evolving roles of federal government, airlines and airports

d. Destruction of TWA 800 (1996) and response (BJ)

1. Change in perceived threat
2. White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (1997)
• Recommendations
• Implementation (including Federal Aviation
Reauthorization Act of 1996 and Airport Security
Improvement Act of 2000)
• Evolving roles of Federal government, airlines and airports

II. Civil Aviation Security System on September 10, 2001

a. Congress (JR)
1. Legislation
2. Funding
3. Oversight (including GAO)

Commission Sensitive
 Commission Sensitive

b. Federal Aviation Administration (BJ)

1. Culture
2. Authorities
3. Organization

c. Air Carriers (BJ)

1. FAR 108 and Air Carrier Standard Security Program
2. Screening
• Individual screening
• Carry on items
• Checked baggage screening
3. Access control
4. Other responsibilities

d. Airports (SB)
1. FAR 107 and Airport Security Program
2. Facility Security (including workforce)
3. Access control
4. Law enforcement

III. Civil Aviation Security Elements on September 10, 2001 (JR)

a. Intelligence gathering and threat assessment
b. Ticketing and profiling
c. Access to secure air operations areas (including workforce security)
d. Passenger screening and carry-on baggage screening
e. Checked baggage screening
f. Cockpit security
g. Pilot and crew response protocols
h. Federal Air Marshal program

IV. Aviation and terrorism 1995- September 10, 2001 (SB)

a. Incidents 1995-2001
b. Terrorist knowledge of U.S. aviation security system

V. Conclusion: The World of September 10, 2001

a. Changing threat (SB)
b. Intelligence analysis and dissemination (JR)
c. Development, implementation and enforcement of security standards (BJ)
d. Economics, political will and public opinion (BJ)

Commission Sensitive
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

TEAM 8 MONOGRAPH OUTLINE

Immediate Response

The newly constituted Immediate Response Team plans to tell the story of the
events on 9/11 in a three-part monograph. Part One will narrate the events of that day in
an integrated fashion, juxtaposing the real-time responses of the various individuals and
agencies with the developments on the hijacked flights in an effort simply to tell the story
of the immediate response to the attacks. It will be a straightforward factual account of
9/11, as Team 8 is able to reconstruct the day. It will be accompanied with a graphic
presentation of the comprehensive 9/11 timeline. Part Two will evaluate the performance
of individual agencies, entities and leaders in responding to the attacks and in interacting
with each other. Part Three will mine from the hard experience of 9/11 specific policy
recommendations that, if adopted, will enable the United States to respond more
effectively in the event of a future attack.

Because many of the critical decisions and developments of the day (e.g., the
decision to order a shoot down; the decision to close the financial markets) remain
uncorrelated to precise time frames, the outline set forth below is necessarily preliminary,
and subject to organizational and substantive refinement based on the results of Team 8's
investigation.

I. Integrated narrative/Timeline -

A. AA 11 — First hijacking

1. FAA loses contact with the flight; FAA response,

communications with other flights (including UA 175), agencies

2. Cell phone communications

3. Response upon impact

a. NY

1. Within the buildings; PA and tenants

2. First responders: FDNY; NYPD: OEM, EMS

b. Federal response/critical decision making

1. President/Vice President/White House personnel

2. FAA/DOT

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

3. NORAD/DOD

4. Others if relevant, e.g., WHMO, Secret Service

B. UA 175 ~ Second hijacking

1. FAA communications with the plane; loss of contact; response

2. Cell phone communications

3. Response upon impact

a. NY

1. Within the buildings; PA and tenants

2. First responders: FDNY, NYPD, OEM, EMS

b. Federal response/critical decision making

1. President/Vice President/WH personnel

2. FAA/DOT

3. NORAD/DOD

4 Other

C. The Twin Towers Collapse: Response

a. Building tenants

b. PA

c. FDNY

d. NYPD

e. Federal first responders: FEMA; FBI

f. OEM

g. Mayor's office

D. AA77: The Third Hijacking

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

1. FAA loses contact with AA 77; response

2. Cell phone communications

3. Response upon impact

a. The Pentagon

1. Within the building

2. First responders: Arlington County Police, Fire

3. Federal first responders: FBI, ATF

b. Federal response/ critical decision making

1. President/Vice President/WH personnel

2. FAA

3. NORAD/DOD

4. Other

E. UA93: The Fourth Hijacking

1. FAA loss of contact

2. Cell phone communications

3. Response upon impact

a. In PA: Local first response

b. Federal response/critical decision making

1. President/VP/WH personnel

2. FAA/DOT

3. NORAD/DOD

4. Other

F. The Remains of the Day: Emergency Response on 9/11 After the

Attacks

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

1. Critical national decision making

a. President/VP/WH personnel

b. FAA/DOT

c. NORAD/DOD

d. Other

2. The New York response

a. FDNY

b. NYPD

c. OEM/Mayor's office

d. Federal first responders: FBI, ATF, FEMA

3. The Pentagon

a. Arlington County FD, PD

b. Federal first responders: FBI, ATF

G. Recovery and Initial Lessons Learned: From 9/11 to 9/20

1. The progress of recovery in NY

2. The progress of recovery at the Pentagon

3. Federal Lessons Learned: Homeland Security Czar, Patriot

Act

H. Continuity of Government/Operations/Business Issues

II. Agency/Entity Emergency Response Performance: A Critical Reappraisal

A. Federal

1. President/VP/WH personnel

2. FAA/DOT

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

3. NORAD/DOD

4. Secret Service

B. New York

1. FDNY

2. NYPD

3. OEM

4. Mayor's office

5. Federal first responders: FBI, ATF, FEMA

C. The Pentagon

1. Arlington County FD

2. Arlington County PD

3. Federal first responders: FBI, ATF

III. Lessons Learned and Best Practices

A. Best Practices for Emergency Response

1. Unified command structure

2. Interoperable communications

3. Evacuation procedures: state of the art

B. The persistence of bureaucracy

1. Turf wars: FAA/DOD; NYPD/FDNY; FBI/ATF

2. Potential solutions

COMMISSION SENSITIVE