Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
I. Overview of Conspiracy
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A. Involvement of Bin Al-Shibh as Liaison between Al-Qaeda Leadership and Atta - Jan.-
June 2001
1. Meeting with Atta, Berlin, Jan. 2001
2. Meetings with UBL, KSM, Abu Hafs Al-Masri in Afghanistan
3. Meeting with KSM in Karachi - June 2001
V. Execution Phase
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VI. Sidebars to Address Loose Ends, Alternative Theories and Popular Misconceptions
A. DSM
B. "Holy Tuesday"
C. Second Wave of Attacks
D. Other
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WITH DRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 148
Box: 00004 Folder: 0009 Document: 7
Series: Stephanie Kaplan Files
Copies: 1 Pages: 4
ACCESS RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:
In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.
NND: 301
Withdrawn: 06-20-2008 by:
|/U3tXA CVvja-'i'
WITH DRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 148
Box: 00004 Folder: 0009 Document: 8
Series: Stephanie Kaplan Files
Copies: 1 Pages: 9
ACCESS RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:
In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.
NND: 301
Withdrawn: 06-20-2008 by:
I. How did Al-Qaeda as an institution (as opposed to the hijackers) raise and
move funds to support itself? What were Al-Qaeda's expenditures?
C. What methods were used to move money destined for terrorist groups or
terrorist acts?
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II. Prior to 9/11, what did the U.S. do to identify and stop the raising and
movement of money in support of terrorist groups?
A. What did the USG do to gather and analyze intelligence on the raising and
movement of money in support of terrorist groups?
b. Treasury
i. FinCEN's efforts to analyze intelligence
(a) Office for Intelligence
(i) Why/how set up
(ii) Description of how it operates (including chain of
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c. Description of the roles and efforts of other agencies (e.g., State, NSA)
involved in the gathering or analysis of intelligence regarding terrorist
financing
a. CIA
i. Description and assessment of the CIA structure involved in
terrorism generally and terrorist financing specifically
(a) CTC efforts
(i) Creation of UBL station
(ii) Intelligence gathering re:
a. Al-Qaeda financing, efforts, success
b. Countries supporting terrorism
c. Abilities of foreign entities to identify, track and disrupt TF
(iii) Sources of information
(iv) Level of interest in financial activities vs. other activities
(b) Non-CTC efforts
(i) Regional/country desks
(ii) Use of foreign intelligence services
ii. Institutionally, did the CIA see a need for a separate effort focused
on the money trails
iii. Description and assessment of the amount of collection and level
of understanding about terrorist financing prior to 9/11
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B. What did the USG do to disrupt the raising and movement of money in
support of terrorist groups?
1. What were US efforts to garner international support for efforts to block and
freeze assets
a. Description of the general international attitude regarding counter-terrorist
financing
i. Support of multilateral institutions for blocking and freezing
(a) UN actions against Taliban UNSCR 1267 Oct. 99
(b) Other examples of support
(c) USG response to independent foreign efforts
(i) Did they overlap USG efforts
(ii) Were they seen as effective
(iii) Interaction with private sectors
ii. Foreign entities' views of the terrorism problem and the utility of
blocking and freezing
(a) Definitions of terrorism
(b) Charities
(c) "Legitimate struggles"
(d) Emphasis on sources of terrorism
(e) Human rights issues
(f) Link between terrorism and other issues (drugs/guns/etc.)
(g) Interface between UNSC CTC and Sanctions Committee
(h) State terrorism
b. Level of foreign cooperation
i. Assets claimed frozen vs. actually frozen
ii. Closing/sanctioning financial institutions (formal/informal)
iii. Did multilateral organizations put pressure on members
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III. Based on what we know about the 9/11 conspiracy, were there any key
opportunities to detect them as a result of their financial transactions? What
other lessons can be drawn from these financial transactions?
4. Was the existing system simply not designed to detect the type of transactions
engaged in by the 9/11 terrorists, or was there some specific individual,
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1. Discuss and assess the government's technical ability to engage in real time
monitoring and tracking
2. Two 9/11 hijackers with known extensive UBL links were not located for over
two weeks after the realization that they were in the U.S., despite holding U.S.
bank accounts in their own names
a. Why was no effort made to track them through financial transactions?
b. Had efforts been made, could the two known hijackers have been timely
found (i.e., were their specific bank accounts and/or other transactions
discoverable)
c. Address JI findings
3. Moussaoui financial transactions
a. In the pre 9/11 world, would a timely analysis of Moussaoui's financial
transactions been able to allow the intelligence or law enforcement
communities to expose the conspiracy?
IV. What has al-Qaeda done since 9/11 to continue to support terrorist
operations and move money?
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E. To what extent are these changes in reaction to USG policies discussed in Section
V below
V. What are we currently doing, and have these efforts eliminated the
deficiencies present before 9/11?
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i. Diplomatic pressure
ii. Sticks
iii. Carrots
iv. Use of multilaterals
3. Assessment
a. Does the fact that no single entity/person has authority over counter-
terrorist financing as issue impair its effectiveness
4. Does the ad-hoc nature of the PCC (why the GC of Treasury?) ultimately have
an impact on the ability of the USG to focus long-term on the problem
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I. Principles and Goals of the US Border Security System Prior to Sept. 11, 2001
A. What were the principal broad purposes of the US immigration system before the
Sept. 11 attack? What border security issues were recognized over time and how
did the system address them? How did immigration laws and policies address
Islamic and other terrorism?
B. What agencies directed our border security system, and what were their mandates
and activities? How well did the agencies involved in the system work to fulfill
their mission as they understood it? To what extent was counterterrorism a real
element of border security policy and programs?
1. Department of State
2. Department of Justice
3. Immigration and Naturalization Service
4. FBI
5. CIA and other intelligence agencies
6. Department of Defense and military
7. Congress
8. State and local authorities
9. Coast Guard
II. The Encounter Between the Al Qaeda Plotters and the US Border Security
System
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a. Statutory authority
b. Policy direction
c. Budget, personnel, training
d. Consular access to terrorist intelligence
e. Applications, other forms, interviews, and technology tools
f. Adjudication clearances and advisory opinions
g. Internal controls and evaluations of posts
a. Saudi Arabia
i. Visa Express and interview policy
ii. the 15 Saudi hijackers
iii. Saudi runner-up hijackers
b. United Arab Emirates
i. AlShehhi
ii. Banihammad
c. Germany - Berlin
i. interview policy
ii. Atta
iii. Jarrah
d. Yemen
i. Binalshibh
ii. Essabar
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a. Statutory authority
b. Policy direction
c. Watchlist/lookout information
d. Primary inspection
i. inspections of the 19 hijackers
ii. inspections of other plotters
e. Secondary inspection
i. inspections of certain hijackers
ii. inspections of plotters and associates
1. Statutory authority
2. Policy direction
3. Enforcement agencies, missions, and resources
4. 1996 mandated student tracking system
5. 1996 mandated exit-entry system
6. Biometrics
7. Identification document standards
8. Technology
9. Assessment and accountability
A. How did border security authorities respond on Sept. 11 and in the immediate
aftermath? (duration of "immediate aftermath " tbd)
1. Consulates
2. Airports
3. Land borders
4. Sea borders
5. Foreigners in the US
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B. How do we now assess the terrorist threat? Since Sept. 11, 2001, how have
those involved in our immigration and border security system redefined its goals
to address Islamic and other terrorism?
C. Key participants and their contributions to the redefined mission. How has the
US immigration and border security system changed to address Islamic and
other terrorism?
3. Department of State
a. Immediate response and its impact
b. Current role
c. Opportunities and vulnerabilities
d. Recommendations
4. Department of Justice
a. Immediate response and its impact
b. Current role
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IV. Conclusion
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2. The actual roles assumed by the various agencies acting within the United
States
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C. The Other Participants in the Domestic Counterterrorism Efforts - Who They Were
and What They Were Doing
II. The Extent to Which the Structure and Operations of the Domestic Intelligence Community
Was a Factor in the Failure of the Domestic Intelligence Community to Protect the
Homeland on September 11
A. The lack of a search for Hazmi and Mihdhar when they entered the United States and
established residence in early 2000.
B. New attention on Hazmi and Mihdhar but ultimately a failed search over Summer
2001.
A. The Changing Roles Within the Community and the Altered Legal Framework
2. The FBI's new structure, and priorities and their impact on counterterrorism
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strategy
4. How Far the FBI Has Come and Whether It Has Come Far Enough
a. Intentions versus reality - how far has the FBI come along its intended
trajectory
b. How much further the FBI must go to meet the needs of our primary
domestic counterterrorism agency
C. The Department of Homeland Security and its intended role in the Intelligence
Community
D. The Other Participants in the Domestic Counterterrorism Efforts - Who They Are
Now and What They Are Doing
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D. The best way to close the remaining gaps between the existing domestic intelligence
function and the ideal
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I. Creation and Evolution of the Aviation Security System prior to Pan Am 103
a. Threats to Commercial Aviation prior to Pan Am 103
1. Domestic threats
2. International threats
3. Commercial aviation as terrorism target
4. Hijackings
b. FAA's "Dual Mandate" and reactive nature
c. International Conventions
d. Role of federal government, airlines and airports
IV. The Institutions of Civil Aviation Security on September 11, 2001: Priorities
and Approaches
a. Congress
1. Authorizing legislation
2. Appropriations and funding
3. Oversight (including GAO)
b. Federal Aviation Administration
1. Culture
2. Authorities
3. Organization
c. Air Carriers
1. FAR 108 and Air Carrier Standard Security Program
2. Screening
3. Other security responsibilities
d. Airports
1. FAR 107 and Airport Security Program
2. Facility security (including workforce)
3. Access control
4. Law enforcement
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V. Elements of the Aviation Security System on September 11, 2001: What the
Hijackers Had to Defeat
a. Intelligence collection, threat assessment and response
b. Passenger pre-screening
c. Secure area designation and enforcement
d. Checkpoint screening for weapons
e. Checked baggage screening for explosives
f. Cargo and mail screening
g. Aircraft security
VI. The Status and Quality of the Aviation Security System on September 11,
2001
X. Consequences
a. Economic
b. Psychological
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XIII. Recommendations
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PART ONE: The Attacks: Breaching the Air Traffic Control and Continental Air
Defense Systems
I. The Air Traffic Control and Continental Air Defense Systems on 9/11
A) How the FAA watched airspace pre 9/11
1. Crowded skies - graphic freeze frame
2. Safety first vs. security
3. Hijacking protocols
B) NORAD's mission and capabilities
1. Rules of Engagement
C) The relationship and ineraction between FAA and NORAD
II. 9/11 Part One: The New York Attacks: Indicators and Warnings (8:15 - 9:10)
A) AA 11
B) United 175 (introduce confusion)
C) Sounding the alarm (9:10 am)
D) The struggle to gain situational awareness
III. 9/11 Part Two: The Washington Attacks: A Failure of Situational Awareness
(9:10-10:15 am)
A) Chasing the phantom A 11
B) Missing AA 77
C) Changing the Rules of Engagement (the shoot-down decision)
D) United 93
V. Lessons
A) Indications and Warnings
B) Command and Control
C) Homeland Defense
D) Bureaucratic Rivalry/Interaction
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II. Pentagon
A) What happened (damage, fire, casualties)
B) Critical choices
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