Sie sind auf Seite 1von 13

Is the Participation Argument Self-Defeating?

Author(s): Thomas Christiano Reviewed work(s): Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 82, No. 1 (Apr., 1996), pp. 1-12 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4320661 . Accessed: 30/11/2012 16:09
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.217 on Fri, 30 Nov 2012 16:09:59 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THOMASCHRISTIANO

ARGUMENTSELF-DEFEATING? IS THE PARTICIPATION

(Received 25 July 1994)

for democracyemphasizesthe educativeeffects Oneprominent argument on citizens of participatingin democratic decision making. The participation argumentinvokes the idea that democraticdeliberationand traitsin the participants which are decision makingproducescharacter highly desirableor even essential to some intrinsicallygood featureof persons.' Rousseau states that the passage into a democratic society producesa remarkable changein man, "insteadof a stupidandunimaginative animal, [it] made him an intelligent being and a man."2Many have arguedthat this educative effect of democracyis an independent and main argumentin favor of choosing democratic institutionsover non-democraticinstitutions which are not thought to produce these desirablecharactertraits.This argumenthas come under severe criticism recently.3 The objectionis thatthe participation argument requires a self-defeating attitudeon the part of citizens so it cannot be a free standing argumentfor democracy.They argue that only if democracy is more efficaciousthan otherpolitical systems in producinggood legislation will citizens have the motives for participatingin democratic government.Only if democracyis efficacious by some standardother thanits educativeeffects will it have them at all. Therefore,they argue, the educationargumentcan, at best, be only a secondaryargumentfor for democracyit is self-defeating. democracy.As a main argument I shall show that this objection fails and that we ought to look more closely at the participationargument.In what follows, I shall outline an idealized version of the participationargumentand I will describe the self-defeatingnessargument.Finally I will show that the self-defeatingnessargument fails in a varietyof important ways to undermine the participationist defense of democracy.
Philosophical Studies 82: 1-12, 1996. ? 1996 KluwerAcademicPublishers.Printed in the Netherlands.

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.217 on Fri, 30 Nov 2012 16:09:59 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THOMASCHRISTIANO THE PARTICIPATION ARGUMENT

The participationistsclaim that democratic participationis likely to enhance the autonomy,rationalityand morality of citizens as well as increasetheirknowledge of theirown and others' interests.Since these featuresof personsare independentlyvaluable,they argue,the fact that democraticparticipation producesthem is a free standingargument for democracyas a methodof collective decision making. Democraticparticipation involves engagingin discussionwith other members of the community about how best to promote the common good as well as whetherlaws and policies are just or not. In this kind of context, citizens must explain and justify their views to others as well as listen with an open mind to the argumentsof others if they are to make any headway within the democraticprocess. Democratic participationalso includes citizens' organizingthemselves and others to articulateand defend their interestsin the society. It invites them to understand and to be sensitive to the complexitiesof theirown interests as well as the commonalitiesof interestsamongcitizens. And it requires them to take an active stance in articulatingand defending their own convictions and interestswhile encouragingthem to be tolerantof the opposing interestsand opinions of others. These activities of rational and moral justification, openminded listening, tolerationas well as the pursuit of self-knowledge and the active role a citizen mustplay in political life are essentialto doing well in a democratic society. The supportingcharactertraits are therefore highly functionalfor a person in a democraticenvironment.Participation demandsthatcitizens be able to actively reflecton, andstandup for, their interestsas well as what they believe to be just. Only those who have these capacities will achieve their aims in a democraticsociety. It is highly functionalbecause in a democraticsociety what gets done dependson the actions of all the citizens. Moreover,the more one participates, the more one is likely to have an influence on the outcomes and the higher quality of one's participation is likely to give one more of an influence.Hence in a democracy,citizens have reasonto develop these abilities.

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.217 on Fri, 30 Nov 2012 16:09:59 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ARGUMENTSELF-DEFEATING? IS THE PARTICIPATION

their exercise strengthenscitizens' abilities to justify Furthermore themselves to others,to be open to a multiplicityof points of view, and to take otherpersons' points of view seriously enough to accommodate them. These are charactertraits that individuals acquire from being active citizens and which they acquirebecause they work well in the democraticenvironment.4Also, the more one is successful in one's participation,the more one is likely to have a sense of efficacy with regardto politicaldecisions andthe more one is likely to be encouraged in the developmentof ones abilities.5 In addition, as others participate and develop these capacities, citizens' activities mutuallysupporteach others' concerns,enhancethe self-esteem and sense of efficacy of each and so providefurthercondiIn Tocqueville'swords: tions underwhich these traitsare encouraged.6 "Feelingsandideas arerenewed,the heartenlargedand the understanding developed only by the reciprocalactionof men one upon another."7 Hence, democraticparticipation producestraitsof rationality,thoughtan active dispositionto standup for fulness, morality,openmindedness, oneself and what one believes as well as a betterknowledge of oneself and one's interests.In short, it appearsto make citizens autonomous, rationaland moral. These kinds of psychological state are not as likely to occur in authoritarian or completelyanarchic societies becausethe traitsinvolved are not as highly functionalin those contexts. I am not as likely to take an active interestin otherpersons'well being or in debateanddiscussion with othersif no one careswhat I thinkanyway andespecially if I could well be punished if I begin to think and express subversive thoughts. The same might well be true for the dispositions to understandmy own interests and how I share them with others. These traits are not functionalin an environmentwhere a person or distinct group rule in theirown interestsand accordingto theirown judgments.Nor are they particularlyfunctional in a society where collective action is rarely undertaken successfully.Hence, in these other societies, people areless likely to develop them. These traits are highly desirable.They contributeto the happiness of individualsin the society since they enable individualsto learnwhat their interestsare and they contributeto the moralityof their actions.

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.217 on Fri, 30 Nov 2012 16:09:59 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THOMASCHRISTIANO

Some even claim thatthese traitsare intrinsicallygood. They advocate ideals of autonomy,rationalityand morality in persons for their own sakes. The fact that these are good traits of charactersuggests that those conditions which uniquely contributeto the formationof these traits of characterare themselves at least instrumentallygood in this respect. Some have gone so far as to say that the principalvirtue of democracyis that it producesthese traitsof character. They argue that even if democracy does not produce other good consequences aside from these, these consequences are sufficientto argue that democracy is a superiorform of government.Indeed, they could argue that even if democracywere worse in certainrespects (it tended to produceless prosperous societies or even less just societies), the good character traitsthat it producedin citizens might outweigh the negative effects. In any case, the idea is thatthe participation argument is a free standing argumentin the sense thatit providesindependent groundsfor thinking thatdemocracyis desirable. This argumentought to be distinguishedfrom an importantinstrumentalistargument. areprimarily concernedwith Manyparticipationists institutionswould not have the deleterious showing that participatory effect on collective decision making that theoristssuch as Schumpeter claimed they would have.8They arguethatthe more individualsparticipate in decision making, the more adeptthey will become at doing so and that the net effect on collective decision makingwould actuallybe an improvementin the outcomes of decision makingover a less participatorydecision making process. That argumentwould indeed require the independenttruthof the thesis that democracy is a good form of government.The argumentI have been discussing above suggests that the beneficial effects on characterthat such institutionspromote are reasonsfor thinkingthatdemocracyis desirable. independent

THE SELF-DEFEATINGNESS OBJECTION

Jon Elster claims that such "argumentsfor political institutions and constitutionsare self-defeating since they justify the arrangements in question by effects that are essentially by-products."9 A by-product

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.217 on Fri, 30 Nov 2012 16:09:59 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

IS THE PARTICIPATION ARGUMENTSELF-DEFEATING?

for Elster is a result of an activity which one cannot intentionallyor intelligently bring about by that activity. The paradigmexamples are sleep, belief and pleasure.We cannot intentionallyand directly aim at falling asleep without underminingour plan to fall asleep. What we do when we try to fall asleep is aim at something else like counting backwardsfrom one hundredin order to fall asleep. We might not be able to fall asleep if we intentionallyaim at sleeping. But we can fall asleep sometimes if we do not aim at it. In this sense falling asleep is essentially a by-productof action and not an aim of action since we cannotproducethe stateby aiming at it. To aim directlyat falling asleep would thereforebe self-defeating. Similararguments have been proposedagainstthe thesis of psychological hedonism. Psychological hedonism states that all actions are aimed at achieving happiness for the agent. Many philosophershave noted however that such a thesis is deeply paradoxical.Joel Feinberg arguespersuasivelythat"thesingle-mindedpursuitof happinessis necessarily self-defeating,for the way to get happinessis to forget it ... To derivesatisfaction,one mustordinarilyfirstdesire somethingotherthan satisfaction,andthen findthe meansto get whatone desires."10 The best way to achieve happinessis to get involved in the pursuitsof friendship andartand so on; happinesswill resultfrom these pursuitsbut it cannot generallybe attainedby pursuingit directly.In Elster'sterms,happiness is essentially a by-product. Similarly,Elster states thatthe main benefitor purposeof a political system cannot be found in the educative effects it has on the citizens. He claims thatif democracyis not superiorto other systems of decision making in terms of the justice or efficiency of its decisions, then it cannot be publicly advocated for its educative effect. This is because the educative effect of democracy is a by-product. One cannot aim directly at becoming educated.One must aim at other goals which one believes are likely to be achieved in a democracyand which one thinks are valuable in order to become educated in the process. Hence, one must alreadythink that democracyhas an independentvalue in order for the educative effect to be produced.Therefore,Elster argues, the educative effect cannot be the main basis for advocating democratic institutionsif we are to avoid self-defeat.

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.217 on Fri, 30 Nov 2012 16:09:59 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THOMASCHRISTIANO OBJECTION THE REFUTATION OF THE SELF-DEFEATINGNESS

But there is an importantambiguity in Elster's argument.One way to understandhis point is thatjust as happinesscannot be attainedby traitscannot aimingat it in one's actionsso the developmentof character be attainedby aiming at it in one's actions. And this claim seems quite plausible.After all, when I engage in discussion with a personI am not aiming at developing my mentalcapacities,I am then aiming at developing the points I am making. Indeed, I may hampermy participation in discussion if I am directlyaiming at developing my capacities.And in a discussionwith the sole aim of developingmy thusmy participating mental capacities may be self-defeating.This much seems right about Elster's claim. Here he is attackingwhat we might call the individualby saying that it is argument psychological version of the participation self-defeating.A second way of statinghis pointis thata politicalsystem cannotbe advocatedby its membersexclusively on the groundsthat it has an educativeeffect on its members.Hence he says thatif "thedemocraticmethodwere introducedsolely because of its side effects ... and I no one believed in it on anyothergrounds,it wouldnot producethem."1' WhatElsteris suggestingis thatif the membersof a democraticsociety know that the only reason for preferingdemocracyto other methodsis then they would not the educativeeffect on them of theirparticipation, be able to participatein a way thatmakes the educativeeffect possible. They would not participateor discuss or organize.They would not do these things or at least they would not do them well because they knew that these were advocatedsolely on the basis of the educative effects these activitieshave. Instead,he thinks,the only basis on which citizens will participate is if they alreadybelieve thatthe democraticsystem will produceresults superiorto those of other political systems. This is the possible. Thus only kindof aim thatwill make the educativeby-product the system cannot be advocatedon the basis of its educative effects, it mustbe advocatedon the basis of the superiorresultsthatsuch a system of decision makinghas, resultswhich the citizens can aim at. HereElster argument. is attackingthe social-normativeversion of the participation Elster is concernedwith the social-normativeargumentand clearly the participation argumentI outlinedabove is a social-normativeargu-

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.217 on Fri, 30 Nov 2012 16:09:59 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ARGUMENT IS THEPARTICIPATION SELF-DEFEATING?

ment. His objection depends on there being a close parallel to the individual-psychologicalone. It is clearly a self-defeating argument. So, if the parallel is a strong one then Elster's argumentagainst the participationist position will succeed. The parallel is quite weak. There are two importantdifferences versions andthe individual-psychological betweenthe social-normative First,the argument. which underminethe objectionto the participation social-normativeversion of the participationargumentfor democracy relatesto advocacyandvaluationof, or reasonsfor democracygrounded in its educative effects. It states something about what is good about democracy.The individual-psychologicalversion relates to aiming at one's own developmentor pleasureor sleep throughone's actions;it is of action.It is a psychological not aboutadvocacyat all but the structure fact aboutme thatI cannotsuccessfullyaim directlyat my happinessand achieve it. This says nothing about whether the reason for my engaging in variouspursuitsis thatmy happinessresultsfrom those pursuits. Psychologicalhedonismis not a normativethesis or even a thesis about what norms people have. It is a thesis about what people aim at. Both the truthand falsity of psychological hedonism are consistentwith the thoughtthatthe ultimatevalue in my life is my own happiness. The second difference is that the social-normativeversion of the participationargumentthat Elster objects to does not claim that we act so as to produce educative effects for ourselves as the individualpsychological version does; it states that we ought to have certain political institutions because within the context of those institutions we have reasonto act or are even forced to act in such a way that produces certain charactertraits. The supposed parallel in psychological hedonismconcernsmy own action and the aim thatI now have for this action.It does not say anythingaboutthe context of my actionnor does it say anythingabout the effects of that context on my motivation.A more genuine parallelto the participationargumentwould be that the justificationfor my strikingup a friendshipwith someone is the happiness I would get out of it. I mightreasonalong the following lines. When I strike up a friendshipwith anotherperson, I am naturallyinclined to do things, desire things, learn things and share things with my friend that ultimately make me happy; I also become happy because of the

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.217 on Fri, 30 Nov 2012 16:09:59 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THOMASCHRISTIANO

things my friend does for me. Hence, I may choose the relationshipof friendshipbecause it will make me happy.When I am in that context, I will not be directly aiming at my happiness since so aiming would probablydestroythe friendshipand thus destroymy happiness.Mostly I will act for my friend's well-being, but the overall effect of being in that relationshipwill be my happinessand that may be my reason for having the friendship.12 Both of these distinctionsvitiate Elster'sargument. The firstdistinction shows that Elsterconfuses the structure of valuing things with the structure of action.To show this I need merely repeatthe point that the falsity of psychological hedonism does not entail the falsity of ethical hedonism. The fact that I must desire and pursue friendshipand art in orderto be happy does not imply thatmy happinesscannotbe my ultimate and only reason for pursuingthese things. Even thoughhappiness is a by-product,it does not follow that it is not the chief justification for everything I do. To make such an inference would be merely to confuse the aim of action with a justificationof action. Indeed what I aim at may be of little or no importanceto me. Considerthe example of playing tennis. Why do I play tennis?I may aim at winning while I am playing tennis and having that aim may be essential to my playing well, but the reasonsfor my playing tennis are to get exercise, improve my health,relieve stress or merely to-enjoylively activity,all of which are essentiallyby-products. These thingsare more important to me than winning which is my aim while I am playing. ThoughI cannotdirectly aim at improvingmy health,it is certainlymy reasonfor playingandit is much more important to me thanwinning a game of tennis.WhatI aim at in my action need not have much to do with the reason for engaging in that action. Obviously the aims of political action are important, but it need not be the case that the method by which we realize these aims is justified by referenceto whetherthose concernsthemselves are best satisfied. Ourreason for the methodmay be the educative side effects of the methodeven though the aim of participating in the methodmay be to satisfy the concerns. The second distinction also undernines Elster's argument.Elster states that we cannot advocate democracymerely on the groundsthat it has an educative effect on the participants. Why not? There are two

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.217 on Fri, 30 Nov 2012 16:09:59 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ARGUMENT SELF-DEFEATING? IS THEPARTICIPATION

possibilitieshere. First,those actionswhich constitutethe advocacy and establishmentof democracycannotby themselves aim directly only at of those who participatein them for the developmentof the characters cannotbe developedif one merelyaims obviousreasons.One'scharacter of attempting to at developingit. At most it is developedas a by-product establisha democraticsystem. But surelyno participationist is arguing is arguingthat the reason for setting up otherwise.The participationist democraticinstitutions is that when they are established, individuals will have to act in ways that will have the side effect of developing The developmentof character is the aim of the establishment character. not in the sense thatthe act of establishingwill develop of the institutions but only in the sense thatonce the institutionsare established character individualswill be constrainedto act in such a way thattheircharacters will develop. We, as framers,can now see thatwe, when we participate within the proposedframework,will have to act in such a way that will develop our characters.Ouractions now aim at setting up a context in which our actions later will tend to improve our characters.The byproductwe want will come later.And there is no problemwith aiming at the by-productin this sense. Would it make sense to establish a democraticconstitutionfor this reason even if one thought that democracywas not superiorin other ways to non-democratic contexts?Surely it might.Participationists can agree with Brian Barry that, "politics is a serious business" and that the actual substanceof political decision making is important.People must be fed, groups must be organized, liberty must be secured and for all these purposes laws must be made and complied with. The participationisttheses are concerned with how one should go about making those decisions. It is perfectly coherentto claim that political decisions are of fundamentalsignificance for people while asserting thatwhatmakesdemocracypreferableto othermethodsof makingsuch decisions is its educativeeffect.This rationale need in no way undermine the seriousnessof citizens when they confrontthe hardissues of politics in a democraticcontext. Indeed, we might think of democraticinstitutionsas regulatingthe process of decision making and, to use Elster's term, a kind of indirect technology for the productionof desirablecharactertraits in citizens.

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.217 on Fri, 30 Nov 2012 16:09:59 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

10

THOMAS CHRISTIANO

Democracy might do this by requiringcitizens to participatein order to get the outcomes they desire. As I observed above, it makes what and favors those who happensdepend on all the citizens' participation are The of serious so each will see a more. issues participate politics lot at stake in participating. Thus individualshave some incentive for participatinginasmuchas more participationwill help them get more of what they want or think desirable.From this we can see that David Estlund'sobjection fails to underminethe participationargument.He arguesthat:
Self-educativeparticipation does seem to dependon what might be called system based hope, the hope thatone's highest aim might be well served by the system in which one participates.If a person has no basis for hope that his or her aims will be well served by the political system, then one is not likely to have a basis for hope thatone's agency as a participantin that system will serve those aim well either. As a result, important character effects will be missed.13

This argumentseems to be based on a fallacy of division. Estlund misses the fact thatan individualcan have good reasonfor participating in a political system because,given that the systemis in place his or her will improveoutcomes over what they might have been if participation he or she had not participated. Thus the hopes an individualhas for the success of his or her own participation need not dependon the relative success of the system. Thus it is not clear why any charactereffects will be missed. Democracy gives individuals incentives and motives for participating even if they are less likely to get what they want in a democracythan in some other regime. As long as the democracyis in place, they mustparticipate in orderto makea differencefor themselves. Most individuals are more likely to achieve outcomes they prefer if they pursue them within a democracy than if they try to overthrow the democracyand bring about some other political arrangement. The difficultiesand costs involved in attemptingto bring about large scale institutionalchange are too great. Thus even if an individualbelieves thathe could get more of what he wantedwere anotherpolitical system in place, he still has an incentive to do what he can to get what he wants in the democracyhe actually lives in. Inasmuchas participation produces good charactertraits, the democratic arrangementscan be trusted to produce these beneficial effects on charactereven if they

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.217 on Fri, 30 Nov 2012 16:09:59 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ARGUMENT SELF-DEFEATING? IS THEPARTICIPATION

11

producelegislativeoutcomesthatare worsethanthose produced by othersystems. thetwocrucial differences showthatwhiletheindividualTherefore, is self-defeating, thesocial-normative psychological argument argument is not. And it is the latterthatthe partipationist is offering. Evenif a in producing is less efficient desirable outcomes forparticidemocracy in individuals itcanstillproduce desirable character traits because pants, theseindividuals still have reasonto pursuetheirends in the society. aresufficiently Andif thesecharacter traits valuable theymaybe worth the loss in othergoods thatmightresult.Thusthe self-defeatingness fails to undermine the thoughtthatdemocracy is valuable argument because of theeducative effectsit has.
CONCLUSION

The incoherence argument does not workagainstthe participationist of It defense democracy. remains to be seenwhether theparticipationist is successful. In order to assessthisargument argument we mustdetermine the worthof the traitsof character that are assumedto result fromparticipation in democratic institutions andhowtheirworthcomparesto thatof otherimportant aspectsof politicalsystems.Also, the
factual claims assertedby the participationists must be assessed. It is these issues that must be addressedby advocatesand opponentsof the

participation argument.
NOTES
1 See HannahArendt On Revolution(Harrnondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973); Aristotle, Politics, Book I, 1253al-40; Carol Gould, RethinkingDemocracy (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1988) JohnStuartMill, Considerationson Representative Government (Buffalo, NY: PrometheusBooks, 1991), p. 40 for some among many versions of this kind of argument. The argument I outline in what follows is an idealization and collection of some of these differentarguments. 2 Jean JacquesRousseau The Social Contractand Discourses (trans,G. H. D. Cole) (London:J. M. Dent, 1973), pp. 195-196. 3 Jon Elster Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality (Cambridge:

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.217 on Fri, 30 Nov 2012 16:09:59 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

12

THOMASCHRISTIANO

CambridgeUniversity Press, 1983); see also, David Estlund "MakingTruthSafe for Democracy,"in The Idea of Democracy, ed. David Coop, Jean Hampton and John CambridgeUniversityPress, 1993), pp. 71-100 see esp. pp. 83Roemer (Cambridge: 84. The argumenthas been very briefly criticised by me in my "Freedom,Consensus and Equalityin Collective Decision Making,"Ethics, October 1990, pp. 151-181, esp. p. 155. 4 CarolGould, Rethinking Democracy, pp. 79, 291. Cambridge S See CarolePateman,Participationand Democratic Theory(Cambridge: for these conclusions. Therehas UniversityPress, 1970) for some empiricalarguments been an enormousamountof controversyon the empiricalsupportfor these claims but against I shall discuss themhere since my focus is on one more narrowset of arguments participationism. 6 CarolGould,Rethinking Democracy, p. 73. 7 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (GardenCity, NY: Anchor Books, 1969) trans. George Lawrence; ed. J. P. Mayer, p. 515. See also John Stuart Mill, Government (London:J. M. Dent, 1958). Considerationson Representative 8 Joseph Schumpeter,Capitalism,Socialism and Democracy (New York:Harperand see Carole Pateman,Participation and DemoRow, 1956). For the counterarguments cratic Theoryas well as Peter BacharachThe Theoryof Democratic Elitism (Boston: Little Brown, 1967). 9 Jon Elster,Sour Grapes, p. 92. 10 "Psychological Egoism," in Reason and Responsibility sixth edition, ed. Joel PublishingCo., 1985), pp. 480-490, esp. p. 484. Feinberg(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 1l Jon Elster,Sour Grapes, p. 96. 12 See JuliaAnnas TheMoralityofHappiness (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1993), pp. 249-262, for an account along these lines of Aristotle's conceptionof the relation of friendshipto self-love. 13 pp. 83-84. David Estlund,"Makingtruthsafe for democracy,"

Universityof Arizona Tucson,AZ 85721 USA

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.217 on Fri, 30 Nov 2012 16:09:59 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions