Contemporary Construction

When the meaning of a statue is doubtful, a practical construction put upon it at the time of its passage, or soon afterwards, and universally accepted in for a long period of time, as shown by a general usage, will be entitled to great weight and will be accepted as the true construction, unless there are cogent reasons to the contrary (Black, 2008). Contemporary construction or practical constructions are the constructions placed upon statutes at the time of, or after, their enactment by the executive, legislature, or judicial authorities as well as by those who, because of their involvement in the process of legislation, are knowledgeable of the intent and purpose of the law, such as draftsmen and bill sponsors. This is a construction of a law shortly after its enactment while it is still fresh from the minds of its proponents in aid in the construction, by the courts when there is an ambiguous or doubtful provision of law. In (Cooley on Taxation [Vol. 1] 3d. Ed., p. 450.) The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature should be sought in the words employed to express it, and that when found it should be made to govern, . . . . If the words of the law seem to be of doubtful import, it may then perhaps become necessary to look beyond them in order to ascertain what was in the legislative mind at the time the law was enacted; what the circumstances were, under which the action was taken; what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed; . . . . And where the law has contemporaneously been put into operation, and in doing so a construction has necessarily been put upon it, this construction, especially if followed for some considerable period, is entitled to great respect, as being very probably a true expression of the legislative purpose, and is not lightly to be overruled, although it is not conclusive. Contemporaneous construction after the enactment of the statute, and without change of the construction by legislation or judicial decision, is declared to be generally the best construction. It gives the sense of the community as to the terms made use of by the legislature (Black, 2008). If there is ambiguity or doubt in the language and my result to the interpretation of the statute, the application of the statute when it was first drafted or created authorized by its authors will be the strongest evidence to explain and interpret the intent of the statute. The construction then becomes an established law in lieu of the doubtful statute, but if the statute is too plain and simple to be interpreted in the correct and rightful intent, then the construction cannot overrule the preceded statute. In the case of Kelly vs. Multnomah County (18 Ore., 356, 359; 22 Pac., 1110), the Supreme Court of Oregon said: In all cases where those persons whose duty it is to executed a law have uniformly given it a particularly construction, and that construction has been acquiesced in and acted upon

for a long time, it is a contemporary exposition of the statute, which always commands the attention of the courts, and will be followed unless it clearly and manifestly appears to be wrong. Contemporanca expositio est optima et fortissimo in lege the contemporary construction is strongest in the law. This is the manifestation of the circumstances where when there is ambiguity or doubt in the statute, the contemporary construction is the rightful essence and intent of the statute. The same principle is laid down in Molina vs. Rafferty (38 Phil., 167), on page 169 in which this court makes the following quotation from Cooley on Taxation, volume 1, 3d ed., p. 450: The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature should be sought in the words employed to express it, and that when found it should be made to govern, . . . if the words of the law seem to be doubtful import, it may then perhaps become necessary to look beyond them in order to ascertain what was in the legislative mind at the time the law was enacted; what the circumstances were, under which the action was taken; what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed; . . . And where the law has contemporaneously been put into operation, and in doing so a construction has necessarily been put upon it, this construction, especially if followed for some considerable period, is entitled to great respect, as being very probably a true expression of the legislative purpose, and is not lightly to be overruled, although it is not conclusive. When the statute is said to be ambiguous or in doubt, the contemporaneous construction is given a great weight and great consideration by the judges to the course of action. The use of contemporary construction must always prevail over the mere interpretation of doubtful words. This is also to aid the public and the judges when uncertainty regarding the use of words in a statute is present. The case In re Allen (2 phil., 630) it is held that: Courts will give weight to the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is so enforce it, and, unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous, will ordinarily be controlled thereby.

Executive Construction, Executive Construction is the construction placed upon the statute by an executive or administrative officer called upon to execute or administer such stature. The duty of enforcing the law, which devolves upon the executive branch of the government, necessarily calls or the interpretation of its ambiguous provisions. The executive or administrative officers are generally

the very first officials to interpret the law, preparatory to its enforcement. These interpretations are in the form of rules and regulations, circulars, directives, opinions and rulings. The rule on the executive construction ion PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor Relations G.R. No. L43760 August 21, 1976 The court still and should respect the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty is to enforce it, and unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby.

There are 3 types of executive interpretation of the law, First is the construction by an executive or administrative officer directly called to implement the law. This may be in the form of an expressed or implied interpretation. An interpretation embodied in a circular, directive or regulation is an expressed interpretation. A practice or mode of enforcement of not applying the stature to certain situations or of applying it in a particular manner is an implied interpretation; it is interpretation by usage or practice. The expressed interpretation in the construction by an executive or administrative officer directly called to implement the law may be related to of how officials act or enforce the statute or law in terms of directives, regulations, and circulars. This is a written order to execute such acts of the statute for the betterment of its subjects. The second type is the construction by the secretary of justice in his capacity as the chief legal adviser of the government. It is in the form of opinions issued upon request of administrative or executive officials who enforce the law. In the absence of judicial ruling on the matter and unless reprobated by the president, the opinions of the secretary of justice are generally controlling among administrative and executive officials of the government. This can be cited on the Sec. 83, of the Revised Administrative Code where; The Secretary of Justice shall have executive supervision over the Government Corporate Counsel and supervision and control over Provincial Fiscals. The capacity of the Secretary of Justice to execute opinions on the administrative or executive officials who enforce the law, is not limited to merely opinions only, but also when there is an absence of judicial ruling on matters, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice becomes generally controlling among administrative and executive officials. However, the President or the Executive Secretary, by the authority of the president, has the power to modify, alter or reverse the construction of a statute given by a department secretary. The Secretary of Justice only having powers of opinion, there should be a line where it divides the meaning of Rulings and Opinions,

In the case Victorias Milling v. SSC (GR L-16704, 17 March 1962) it is stated that; When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it makes; a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets pre-existing law.

The third kind of Contemporaneous

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