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INTRODUCTION

awareness of the flow of inner time as well as the unity of that flow of inner time. H e provides an account that at once accounts for the temporality of experience and for our pre-reflective awareness of that temporally ordered and unified experience, that is, for our pre-reflective self-awareness a fact that reveals how unfortunate is his use of the expression temporal objects when referring to the noetic o r imm anent d imension of the intentional correlation. The account of the consciousness of inner time and of absolute consciousness is one of the most difficult in Husserl; indeed, he himself said that for absolute consciousness we, properly speaking, have no names. 20 While the revisions in the theory of intentionality and the methodological discussions centered around the phenomenological reduction find their way into Ideas I, the reflections on the nature of inner time-consciousness and absolute consciousness, which reached a mature form by 1911, do not. Given the nature of the reflections on time-consciousness, this means that by the time Husserl wrote Ideas I his actual phenomenological analyses had already outstripped some of the methodological limitations we find in that work. In particular, the implications of the reflections on time-consciousness point to ward a less static and more genetic account of the origin of se nse or meaning, an account in which the formation over time of experiences with their intended objectivities comes to the fore. Although this development, clearly foreshadowed in the years from 1907 to 1911, is not to be found in Ideas I itself, it becomes a central aspect of Husserls work in the 1920s and 1930s. The Years at Freiburg (19161938) In 1916 Husserl was appointed the successor to Heinrich Rickert and Professor Ordinarius at the Albert-Ludwigs Universitt in Freiburg. Despite or perhaps because of the tumult of World War I, H usserl continued to develop his analyses of reason. The 1920s are marked first by a series of courses on transcendental logic in which Husserl analyzes the emergence of sense in our experience of objects. These analyses take the form of extensions of the theo ry o f time-co nsciousness, and in them H usserl describes the intentionalities at work in the primary passive syntheses of near and distant association and in the secondary passive syntheses of history, tradition, and c o m m unity. 2 1 T hese analyses develop an ap proach known a s g e ne tic phenomenology, the analysis of the genesis of sense in time and passive syntheses. The point of these analyses is to disclose the underlying material for the kinds of articulated judgments that occur in active syntheses. The point, in other words, is to work out the underlying basis for the possibility of a transcendental logic, a philosophy of logic that reveals the manner in which