Transatlantic Security Task Force Series

June 2013

Policy Brief
admittedly sensitive and complicated question of the relationship between this new U.S. policy on one hand, and the rising power of China on the other. U.S. policymakers have offered a host of justifications for the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, with varying degrees of specificity and credibility. One has been that the United States is itself a Pacific power. This argument emphasizes the continuity of the United States presence and involvement in this part of the world, with the implication that the rebalance is really nothing new. As then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta put it in his speech at the 2012 Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore: Since the United States grew westward in the 19th century, we have been a Pacific nation. I was born and raised in a coastal town in California called Monterey, and have spent a lifetime looking out across the Pacific Ocean Despite the geographic distance that separates us, Ive always understood that Americas fate is inexorably linked with this region. This reality has guided more than six decades of U.S. military presence and partnership in this region a defense posture, which, along with our trading relations, along with

Summary: The Obama administration has failed to articulate a clear and compelling strategic rationale for why it is pursuing its rebalance toward Asia policy. This failure has exacerbated uncertainties, insecurities, and suspicions among governments and publics about U.S. intentions and staying power in the region. U.S. policymakers have offered a host of justifications for the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, with varying degrees of specificity and credibility, including that the United States is itself a Pacific power,a desire to tap into the enormous economic potential of the Asia-Pacific, and possible strategic justifications.

Pivot with a Purpose

by Vance Serchuk
Since 2011, the Obama administration has actively promoted an intensified commitment to and engagement with the Asia-Pacific region as one of its major foreign policy priorities. Initially described as a pivot in a Foreign Policy essay1 by thenSecretary of State Hillary Clinton and subsequently rechristened as a rebalance to Asia,2 senior officials from President Obama downward have, over the past two years, identified and initiated a lengthy list of military, diplomatic, economic, scientific, and cultural programs aggregated under this conceptual framework. What the Obama administration has failed to do, however, is articulate a clear and compelling strategic rationale for why it is pursuing its rebalance policy. This failure has exacerbated uncertainties, insecurities, and suspicions among governments and publics, both in the Asia-Pacific and beyond, about U.S. intentions and staying power in the region. It has also complicated prospects for enlisting U.S. allies in the effort, especially those from outside the AsiaPacific. The most significant lacuna has been Washingtons failure to offer a persuasive and direct answer to the
1 Hillary Clinton, Americas Pacific Century, Foreign Policy, November 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century 2 Richard Weitz, Pivot Out, Rebalance In, The Diplomat, May 3, 2012, http://thediplomat. com/2012/05/03/pivot-out-rebalance-in/

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Policy Brief
our diplomatic ties, along with our foreign assistance, helped usher in an unprecedented era of security and prosperity in the latter half of the 20th century.3 Although historically accurate, an obvious insufficiency with this formulation is that it fails to put forward an answer for why the United States is now seeking to deepen or expand its engagement in the Asia-Pacific, rather than simply maintain the status quo. What, in short, has changed that motivates the increased attention? One possibility offered by U.S. policymakers is a desire to tap into the enormous economic potential of the AsiaPacific. President Obama pressed this point in his speech before the Australian parliament in November 2011. Here we see the future, the president stated. As the worlds fasting growing region and home to more than half the global economy the Asia Pacific is critical to achieving my highest priority, and thats creating jobs and opportunities for the American people.4 But this argument, too, does not ring entirely true, especially given the Obama administrations initial emphasis on the military aspects of the rebalance. Although there may be many virtues associated with a rotational presence of U.S. Marines and Air Force assets in northern Australia, or the deployment of Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore, they do not lower trade barriers and attract foreign direct investment. Finally, then, we come to the possible strategic justifications for the rebalance the most succinct and direct of which was offered by President Obamas national security advisor, Tom Donilon, in a speech to the Asia Society earlier this year. The overarching objective of the United States in the region, Donilon stated, is to sustain a stable security environment and a regional order rooted in economic openness, peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for universal rights and freedoms. Donilon also used the speech to say what the rebalance is not suggesting an awareness on the part of the White House that their policy has been interpreted in ways not to their liking: Heres what the rebalance does not mean. It doesnt mean diminishing ties to important partners in any
3 Remarks by Secretary Panetta at Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore, June 2, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5049 4 Remarks by the President to the Australian Parliament, The White House, November 17, 2011, transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament

Although there may be many virtues associated with a rotational presence of U.S. Marines and Air Force assets in northern Australia...they do not lower trade barriers and attract foreign direct investment.
other region. It doesnt mean containing China or seeking to dictate terms to Asia. And it isnt just a matter of our military presence. It is an effort that harnesses all elements of U.S. power military, political, trade and investment, development, and our values.5 The problem here is that, while Donilon offers a vision for what the United States seeks to accomplish in Asia, he does not explain how and why it connects with what the country is actually doing. Moreover, the vision in question is hardly new; every U.S. president since at least Harry Truman would have said something largely similar about the kind of Asia-Pacific that Washington seeks. What, then, is the reason for the intensified presence and commitment of the United States in the region now? When pressed on this point, Obama administration officials have tended to fall back into generalities about the dynamic environment in Asia and rising powers.6 The implication is that something is changing in the region and the United States needs to keep up but there seems to be a hesitation, even fear, to admit openly what precisely the changed variable is. The obvious answer the two-ton elephant in the room, so to speak is of course China.

5 Remarks by Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to the President: The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013, The White House, March 11, 2013, transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/11/remarks-tomdonilon-national-security-advisory-president-united-states-a 6 See, for example, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities, January 12, 2010, available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135090.htm

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As documented at greater length elsewhere, the explosive growth of Beijings economic power over the past three decades is without parallel in world history. Within the space of a generation, China has catapulted from a backwater, largely cut off from the rest of the planet, to the worlds second largest economy a center of global manufacturing, inextricably enmeshed in massive trade flows with other economic power centers, including the United States and its Asian neighbors. Alongside Chinas economic rise, furthermore, has been an equally dramatic expansion of military spending, much of it particularly since the mid-1990s directed at developing capabilities that appear tailored to challenge the United States ability to project power in the skies and waters of the western Pacific.7 What makes Chinas considerable and growing investments in so-called anti-access area denial military capabilities even more worrisome is a growing body of evidence that suggests at least some in Beijing harbor a territorial revisionist agenda for their near abroad. In particular, since the global economic crisis in 2008, China has displayed new assertiveness against numerous neighboring states in land and maritime disputes including in the East China Sea with Japan; the South China Sea with Vietnam, the Philippines, and ASEAN more broadly; and Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh with India. The combination of Chinas economic heft, military spending, and potential territorial revisionism represents the most serious threat to the hegemonic stability that has largely characterized the international order in Asia since the end of World War II, as well as the U.S. military predominance in the region that has upheld it. This is the geopolitical context in which the Obama administrations rebalance to Asia is taking place, and it is only by reference to it that it is possible to make sense of Washingtons behavior. The most persuasive rationale for the rebalance is that the Obama administration like the Bush administration before it has come to appreciate the potential danger should China pursue a particular path. The administration also recognizes that, given Beijings integration into the global economy, in contrast to the autarchic Soviet bloc during the Cold War, containment is not a viable strategy. Rather, the best available option is to strengthen other centers of power in Asia to balance
7 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2013, Office of the Secretary of Defense, available at http:// www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_China_Report_FINAL.pdf

What makes Chinas considerable and growing investments in socalled anti-access area denial military capabilities even more worrisome is a growing body of evidence that suggests at least some in Beijing harbor a territorial revisionist agenda for their near abroad.
against the risks of malign Chinese behavior and the potential destabilization of the region. As Ashley Tellis has put it: If the consequential states abutting China for example, Japan, India, Vietnam, and Indonesia could be aided by American power to realize their strategic potential and to increase their mutual cooperation, the net effect would be the creation of objective constraints that limit the misuse of Chinese power in Asia. These checks would not materialize because the Asian partners necessarily bandwagon with the United States or even champion all its policies vis-vis Beijing. Rather, the restraints would be produced by the growing capabilities of these key nations aided by the United States and their increased incentives for collaboration both mutually and with Washington. These forces, driven by the regional actors own concerns about increasing Chinese power, would posture them in ways that were fundamentally congruent with American interests, restraining the potential for Chinese aggressiveness, while at the same time providing the necessary cushion that prevents tightened commercial interdependence [with China] from disrupting the delicate balance between economic gains and geopolitical risks.8
8 Ashley J. Tellis, Opportunities Unbound: Sustaining the Transformation in U.S.-Indian Relations, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/opportunities_unbound.pdf

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Policy Brief
In his speech before the Asia Society, Donilon hinted at this possibility noting the strong demand signal from countries across the Asia-Pacific for greater U.S. presence and engagement in the region.9 Left unsaid by the presidents national security advisor, however, was that the primary reason for this elevated demand has been the desire by these states to use the United States to balance against what they perceived as an increasingly threatening China. Nonetheless, the Obama administration has not explicitly explained the rebalance in this way which in turn raises the question as to why. One possibility is that the question itself is unresolved and is a subject of disagreement within the U.S. government. It is also possible that at least some in the administration while they may agree with a formulation that puts China at or near the center of the rebalance worry that articulating it directly and openly would be unnecessarily provocative and liable to misinterpretation, either by the Chinese or others in the region. Others may hope that, by putting off an open and honest conversation about Asian geopolitics, the United States can maximize the prospects of securing Chinese cooperation on other, more pressing problems, such as the Iranian or North Korean nuclear programs. Such fears in the case of China may be misplaced, however. In the absence of U.S. willingness to discuss Asian geopolitics directly, many in Beijing appear to be drawing the worst possible conclusions about Washingtons intentions namely, that the United States seeks the containment of Chinese power for its own sake. As Stephanie KleineAhlbrandt, the Beijing-based China director of the International Crisis Group, has observed, In China, it is widely believed that the pivot is a containment strategy of China. Almost everyone sees it as that. When the economic, political, and cultural elements were tacked onto the pivot, the Chinese said, Oh, so now were being encircled economically, politically, and culturally, too.10 The case for caution is arguably stronger with respect to some of the countries along Chinas periphery. While most governments in Asia-Pacific have been strongly welcoming
9 Remarks by Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to the President: The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013, The White House, March 11, 2013, transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/11/remarks-tomdonilon-national-security-advisory-president-united-states-a 10 Quoted in Paul Eckert, Analysis: In Bitter Irony for China, North Korea Furthers U.S. Strategic Goals, Reuters, April 10, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/ article/2013/04/10/us-korea-usa-china-idUSBRE93903U20130410

to the intensified U.S. commitment and presence, many are simultaneously deeply sensitive to any perception of being coopted as pawns in a U.S.-China bilateral competition. Indeed, they welcome the rebalance precisely because they see it as helpful to strengthening their sovereignty on their own terms.

While most governments in Asia-Pacific have been strongly welcoming to the intensified U.S. commitment and presence, many are simultaneously deeply sensitive to any perception of being coopted as pawns in a U.S.China bilateral competition.
Conversely, however, uncertainty about U.S. intentions is also unsettling to these governments. In interactions with senior Asian officials throughout the region over the past several months, many have expressed uncertainty about the purpose of the rebalance.11 This in turn raises the danger of misinterpretation in both directions the worst of both worlds. While some may conclude, like many in China, that the rebalance is ultimately about containment of China discouraging their participation others are liable to view the policy as insufficiently reassuring against the threat from Beijing. There is also an irony in the Obama administrations apparent reluctance to be forthright with and about the Chinese. One of the consistent criticisms leveled by the United States against China, over successive U.S. presidencies, has been a lack of transparency about Beijings military capabilities and intentions. In truth, however, it is difficult to shake off the sense that the Obama administration has itself at least in public been less than fully transparent about its own intentions towards this rising power.
11 Author interviews.

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What, then, might an alternative policy look like? At the far end of the spectrum, the United States could publicly declare that, while they welcome the return of a strong and prosperous China that contributes to the international system of which Beijing has been a primary beneficiary over the past 30 years, recent Chinese behavior both with respect to its interactions with its neighbors and its pursuit of certain military capabilities is deepening concerns about Chinas strategic intentions, and that the United States is intensifying its presence and engagement in the region to ensure the preservation of the international order Donilon described in his Asia Society speech. Alternatively, this same message could be conveyed privately through diplomatic channels to Asia-Pacific governments, including China, as well as those of key U.S. allies in other regions, such as Europe and the Middle East. This approach would have the benefit of being less overtly aggressive or challenging to Beijing, but nonetheless would deliver the same essential clarification of the rebalance, and inevitably would trickle into open source reporting as well. What seems ill-advised is the current approach, in which the Obama administration continues to refrain from providing a credible rationale for one of its signature foreign policy initiatives. In order to succeed in the long run, U.S. strategy must be clearly understood by both partners and adversaries, as well as throughout the U.S. government itself. Uncertainties about the intentions driving the rebalance consequently are likely to undermine its effectiveness and increase the danger of misinterpretation and misunderstanding, and with it, the potential for instability and even conflict.
About the Author
Vance Serchuk is a Council on Foreign Relations-Hitachi International Affairs Fellow, based in Japan at the Canon Institute for Global Studies. He previously served as the foreign policy advisor to Senator Joseph Lieberman.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-profit organization through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, Warsaw, and Tunis. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

Contact
Dr. Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer Director, Paris Office German Marshall Fund of the United States Tel: +33 1 47 23 47 18 Email: adehoopscheffer@gmfus.org