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obj e ct s o f works of art. t.e .

prop e rl y ap~Jre<:tated and/or criticized, iueludinJ?; at> tht"tic quulitit· . 1

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want to rnamtmn that, although the te•m ""·H· tl

~f th est• t:xpress1~1n~, the tvw sense~ ha\ · littlP or nothing in ('Ormnun.

kind of peJct·ptuul qualit)

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dist inetion is i~not

Ac::,thetie

ubjc~ctof a \\ork of art i J ,,hat

might

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pr?~>e.rties of a \\ urk of art which ma) prop"'rl~ be app1eciated and/or

~ntletzed: and, con::,~quentl). ib eullccted elemPnt ma) in a gi' en

mstance uwlude \ arwus aesthetic qualitie , nnnat· thetic qualitie , per onal qualities, expressi\e qualities, repr~ Pntutional f'haracteris- ttcs. moral characteristics. and so un.

What th en

is the soJution tu the problem of rei•\ anee

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problem of which properties of work:s of art an! properly appreciated and/or c riticized, and the problem of ho\\ this i:s determined'! Beardsle y, earlier ae thetic-attitude theorists such n~ 'tolnitz. and

h,eminger s hare the vie\\ that there i::, some gt·neral. clear-eut way to do this. Rou gh ly. Beardsley claims the determination can h • made h)

Tlu· f•arlier

aesthetic-attitude theorists thought that the properties of'' orklS of art

applying the criteria of perceptibility and distinctness

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which are properly appreciated and/or crit icizcd are tho

whi c h can be the object of the aesthetic attitude. l" The mm P rec ~nt

ae~thetic-attitudcaccounts of McGregor and Kor~nW)er do not really attempt to give a coherent view of how aesthetic obje<"b are deter-

e propertie:::

mined. Iseminger claims the determination of '' hich propertie"' are

appreciated and/or criticized can he made by appl} ing the of appreciatability. None of these accouuh; i~ sati~·.factor:. It

properl y c rit e rion

may seem to some that a theory of a kind thc!:!C theori~barc "'t''t"king-

an account of u general criterion (or critt·ria) which will determine which kind of properties of works of ar1 are ue~tlwticallyrcle\·ant-

can he worked out. l am doubtful that a theory of kinds of prop

whi c h properties of a work of art are aesthf•ticall) rcle\ ant and which are not-the problem is just not one of distingui~hingkind~of proper-

ac<"ount for

rtic~scan

ties. Works of art have perceptible propertie

perceptible properties which are not: they have prop "rtie

"hich ar., rele\ant and

,,hich can

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propertie perceptible properties which are not: they have prop "rtie "hich ar., rele\ant and ,,hich can
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be appreciated and which are relevant and properties which can be appreciated and are not relevant. One can "aesthetically perceive" both relevant and nonrelevant properties of works of art. The solution to the problem of aesthetic relevance is not a

general one of the sort sought by these philosophers; the solution, I

believe, will have to be a piecemeal affa ir, and th e determination

the aesthetic-object properties of a particular work of art will have to derive from knowledge of the art form within which the particular work falls. The conventions used in presenting works of art give guidance of limited generality. For example, the fact that the stagehands in traditional Western theater are hidden backstage and the Chinese property man of classical Chinese theater is dressed unobtrusively in black are clues which guide us to exclude them as aesthetically irrelevant. But such guidance is of limited generality; nothing prevented or prevents, for example, a clever playwright of classical Chinese theater from writing a play in which the property man in some way becomes part of the performance of the play. Simi- larly. with regard to the color of the back of a painting, nothing prevents a painter from creating a work of visual art similar to a painting but which is painted on both sides of a piece of canvas. If Picasso can depict an object from two different perspectives on one side of a canvas, another artist could depict an object from one perspective on one side of a 'canvas and from another perspective on

of

the other side of the canvas . S uch two-side d paintings would require a

new way of presenting, similar perhaps to that of sculptures which are to be viewed from more than one place. As long as one is faced with traditional kinds of art, one can rely on the established conventions for guidance. When innovation oc-

curs, one will be to a certain extent on one's own to figure out what is

goi ng on , although s ince th e innovation wi ll occur within some tradi-

tional form or other, there will be some minimum of guidance.

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s ince th e innovation wi ll occur within some tradi- tional form or other, there