NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY CAROL I CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT Advanced Joint Operations Staff Officer

Course AJOSOC

COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE NETWORK ENVIRONMENT

by Lt. col. Daniel PIRVU,

Monograph Director, Col. Stan Anton

BUCHAREST DECEMBER 2012

TABLE OF CONTENT

ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................................3 1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW...............................................................4 2 CASE STUDY..........................................................................................................................6 2.1 FREDERICK THE GREAT..................................................................................................6 2.1.1 THE ESSENCE OF COMMAND .....................................................................................6 2.2 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE ...............................................................................................8 2.2.1 THE ESSENCE OF COMMAND......................................................................................9 2.3 DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.............................................................................................12 2.3.1 THE ESSENCE OF COMMAND ...................................................................................13 3. NETWORK ENVIRONMENT.............................................................................................. 15 3.1 NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE...................................................................................15 3.2 INFORMATION SUPERIORITY......................................................................................16 4. ANALYSIS .............................................................................................................................. 18 5. CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................ 21 BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................22

ABSTRACT

Military theorists argue that information technologies will allow for wider and more rapid sharing of information. In order to take advantage of the emerging possibilities offered by information technologies, the theorists recommend changes to the structure of information age military organizations and changes to the methods for command and control of military forces. This study paper asks how contemporary military theorists account for the essence of command in information age theories of warfare. Case studies of Frederick the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte and Dwight D Eisenhower demonstrate that the essence of command is the dynamic relationship among nine imperatives. These imperatives include context, action, courage, presentation, design, intellect, expertise, coherence and the individual. The first impact of information technology on military doctrine has been the formulation of organizing principles dealing with the conduct of operations in cyberspace and the idea of information superiority. The concept of Network-Centric Warfare seeks to utilize information technology and significantly develop the functions of command and control on the battlefield. This paper will argue that a network-centric environment will not determine the spirit of command in war. Command is in essence a mission-oriented human undertaking, performed within the limits of a commanders personal attributes and guided by a framework of fundamental principles. In spite of advances in technology, command will always be limited by human attributes and capabilities, and will rely on a commanders creativity and intuition.

1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW Enormous advances in information technology have in recent years enabled the development of increasingly more capable and sophisticated military command and control systems. In the United States, a concept known as Network-Centric Warfare has been advanced as a means of transforming information superiority into an advantage on the physical battlefield. The concept has been fully approved by the United States Navy, and recognized as a capability that must be achieved. What, then, is Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), and how is it likely to affect the operational commander? The following assessment of this concept begins with an explanation of what is meant by information superiority, and is followed by a description of the essential characteristics of an NCW environment. The impact of this highly automated environment is then analyzed by means of its effects on the basic principles and functions of command. In their book, Network Centric Warfare, Alberts et al, describe NCW as an information superiority-enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self synchronization1 In its fundamental nature, NCW translates information superiority into combat power by effectively connecting informed entities in the battle space. John Keegans Intelligence in War is also useful in setting the relationship between information, decision-making and success in battle into perspective, and stands as an indirect challenge to the claims of the NCW theorists. Keegan reveals that war is ultimately about doing, not thinking2 and the information advantage in war is not necessarily decisive. He disproves the generally deterministic assumptions that the more extended commanders knowledge are of the situation, the better his decisions are. He concedes that to make war without the guidance intelligence can give is to strike in the dark, to blunder about, launching blows that do not connect with the target altogether3. On the other hand, Keegan reveals that while information in war is important, intelligence factors will rarely determine victory4. Other indisputable characteristics of war, such as human will and chance tend to have a much greater influence over events and outcomes. Keegans argument is the antithesis of the argument supported by the NCW theorists. Based on a limited interpretation of command, the NCW theorists claim that a networked force improves information sharing; information sharing enhances the quality of information and shared situational awareness; shared situational awareness enables collaboration, self-synchronization, and sustainable speed of command; and these in turn dramatically increase mission effectiveness5.

1 2

Alberts, Network Centric Warfare p.33 John Keegans Intelligence in War, p.26 3 Ibid, p.277 4 Ibid, p.302 5 Clausewitz quoted in Clausewitz-A very short introduction p.55

Critics of NCW such as Kott and Watts make strong cases against the theory through the lens of the unchangeable nature of command. Heifetz, Clausewitz, van Creveld and Keegan all suggest that there is more to command than the simple definitions used by the theorists, and van Creveld and Keegan argue that a superior information position rarely provides a decisive advantage in war, suggesting that the theorists narrow interpretation of command might constitute a major defect in NCW theory. By analyzing NCW theory through the lens of command, this study paper should provide a new approach to the debate on the influence of new information based technologies and the conduct of war. Clausewitzs On War discusses command mainly in Chapter Three of Book One titled On Military Genius. He wrote that any complex activity, if it is to be carried out with any degree of virtuosity calls for appropriate gifts of intellect and temperament. Clausewitz refers to genius as a very highly developed mental aptitude for a particular occupation. Genius consists in a harmonious combination of elements, in which one or the other ability may predominate, but none may be in conflict with the rest6. Clausewitz exemplifies several behaviors and traits that encompass military genius. The first is courage, which he argues exists in two forms - courage in the face of danger and the courage to accept responsibility for the effects of a commanders actions on his men. The second attribute of military genius is a sensitive and discerning judgment, which includes a skillful intelligence to figure out the truth and pertains to the natural uncertainty in war. The third is the quality that allows the mind to come out unmarked from the demands placed on it by uncertainty, friction and danger. Clausewitz refers to this as the combination of an inner light that even in the darkest hour leads to truth (coup doeil) and the courage to follow this light (determination). The fourth is the presence of mind to deal with the unexpected. The fifth is the will to overcome the resistance from his organization as the demands of war, mostly violence and death affecting his soldiers. The sixth is the will to endure prolonged resistance. Last is self-control. Clausewitz argues that this combination derives from a special type of mind, not necessarily a brilliant one. In the next sections the study paper analyze the nature of the commands of Frederick the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte and Dwight D Eisenhower in order to expose how the means and character of command changed due to revolution in military affairs, and to develop those features of command that appear to go beyond any change. These features form the essence of command. The analysis of each of the commanders begins with an exploration of the context in their respective times in order to filter out superficial conclusions, but more importantly, to help identify subtle similarities and differences that would not have been otherwise evident. In this view, the study paper begins with the analysis of Frederick the Great.

Ibid, p.64

2 CASE STUDY 2.1 FREDERICK THE GREAT

What is the good of experience if you do not reflect? - Frederick The Great, (Frederick II)

Frederick was born in Berlin on 24 January 1712, the son of the Prussian king FrederickWilliam I and Sophia- Dorothea, daughter of George I of England. His childhood was unhappy since his father insisted on his undergoing strict military training from his earliest years, combined with a rigid education regime. Following his fathers death, he acceded to the throne of Prussia on 31 May 1740. In October 1740, the German emperor Charles VI died and was succeeded by his daughter Maria Theresa, who inherited Hungary, Bohemia, and Austria as well as other smaller territories on their borders. Frederick revived an old claim on Silesia, lying between Prussia and Austria, and marched his army over its borders in December 1740. He defeated the Austrians at Mollwitz (10 April 1741) and at Chotusitz (17 May 1742), forcing Maria Theresa to cede Upper and Lower Silesia to him by the Peace of Breslau (11 June 1742). In the Second Silesian War (174445), Frederick acquired more of Silesia and then spent 11 years of peace in introducing radical reforms of the Prussian governments administration and improving its finances. The year 1756 saw the start of the Seven Years War in Europe, in which Frederick took the opportunity to fight the Third Silesian War, which won him more territory from the weakened Austrians. When the war ended with the Peace of Hubertushof (15 February 1763), his reputation as a military leader was known across Europe. In 1772, he joined with Russia and Austria in the first partition of Poland, by which he acquired Polish Prussia. This enabled him to join Brandenburg and Pomerania, which Prussia had long ruled, into one territory with Prussia itself. Finally, in 1778, a brief campaign won him more territory around Nuremburg, north of Bavaria, and the Treaty of Teschen gave him the Franconian principalities. 2.1.1 THE ESSENCE OF COMMAND The combination of Fredericks intellect and a scrupulous education in the art of war, along with his particular position as both monarch and commander in chief, enabled him to produce a consistent solution to the strategic problems facing Prussia at the time. This solution was not simply strategy in the sense of deciding what actions to take, but a comprehensive design, incorporating a range of factors from the organisation of the army, the nature of its training, the command system, and so much more. It was consistent with Fredericks character and with the political, social and technological constraints of the time.

Frederick was also a man of action. While it is clear that thought preceded action and decision, action was the dominant element of Fredericks command. In Fredericks case action was a continuum, acting against an enemy before and during battle, but also establishing and projecting an inspirational personality, motivating and inspiring soldiers, and maintaining high levels of discipline and training. All these things existed primarily in the realm of action rather than thought. Frederick possessed extraordinary daring in order to act in light of the uncertainty and risk intrinsic to war. Frederick reveals the imperative of context. Factors such as the causes of war, the nature of international relations, technology, domestic political circumstances, culture, commanders personality, and commanders personal desires and ambitions are inseparable from the function of command. These insights form a hypothesis as to the essence of command. Given that the basis of these insights is the analysis of just one commander, they provide a questioning foundation for making any strong conclusions about the essence of command. An analysis of Napoleon a very different commander in his own unique circumstances should strengthen, refine or disprove this hypothesis or clarify aspects of Frederick that might not seem to be significant in isolation.

2.2 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE

"I have fought 60 battles in my life. I did not learn anything from any one of them that I did not already know at the beginning -Napoleon Bonaparte

Napoleon Bonaparte (17691821) is considered the first modern military general for many reasons. First, he came of age at the very dawn of modern military history (marked by the French Revolution and industrial revolutions). Second, his military abilities and accomplishments were studied widely at West Point, where future great generals would be shaped by his influence and legacy. Third, his military campaigns inspired von Clausewitzs seminal treatise On War, which has influenced great generals and warfare ever since. In particular, we will see how Napoleon became the model and inspiration for successive generations of American and European generals. Napoleon led eleven campaigns and sixty battles. At one time or another, Napoleon defeated all his enemies at least once except for Great Britain. Historians still debate whether he represented the culmination of the French Revolution or whether he ended up perverting the ideals of the Revolution. Militarily, Napoleon was a great synthesizer. He took Enlightenment military ideas such as concentrating artillery, universal conscription, and innovative organization (including the use of divisions and corps) and ingeniously combined them to produce one of the most formidable military machines of all time. Napoleon had a humble start in life given that his family originated in provincial Corsica. The French Revolution opened up careers to ambitious young men such as Napoleon based on merit. After getting an elite military education in France, Napoleon made his name by helping to retake Toulon from the British. His subsequent expeditions to Italy and Egypt made him famous and loved throughout France. In a few short years, he made himself emperor of France (1804). Victories at Austerlitz (1805) and Jena-Auerstedt (1806) gave him mastery over central Europe and Germany. His attempt to defeat the British by excluding English trade with continental Europe ended in failure. Invasions of Spain (1807) and Russia (1812) overextended the empire and led directly to Napoleons defeat in 1814. He would attempt to return to power in 1815, but his attempt failed when he lost the battle of Waterloo. Napoleons tactical and operational wisdom on the field of battle was superb. Even Arthur, Duke of Wellington, conceded that Napoleon as a leader was worth forty thousand men on the battlefield. Napoleon wisely took advantage of the earlier revolutions in military affairs that had taken place under the old regime and the French Revolution. The use of divisions, massed artillery attacks, meritocracy in promotions, and nationalism to motivate soldiers had all been done before in some fashion. 8

Napoleons military genius was to synthesize the best military thinking of the day to create the superb Grand Armee. A typical Napoleonic battle would start with skirmishers disorganizing the opponent. Napoleon would then ideally concentrate his artillery on the opponents perceived weak point. Then, infantry attacks would be focused on this same weak point. Finally, cavalry would sweep the field to deliver the coup de grace and pursue the vanquished army. These tactics brought him many immortal battlefield successes. Austerlitz, Jena, Auerstedt, Friedland, Wagram, Borodino, and others will be studied for good reason at military academies for years to come. 2.2.1 THE ESSENCE OF COMMAND Napoleon confronted very different constraints than Frederick and a unique strategic problem. Like Frederick, Napoleon was both oligarch and military commander. Similarly, Napoleons problems were ill defined and resembling Frederick, Napoleon developed a coherent solution. Napoleons problems and their solutions incorporated so many variables that neither the problems nor the solutions could be broken down into sub-elements and analysed disjointedly. Napoleons inimitably personalised command system, for instance, was not a deliberate choice to address a specific problem; nor was the use of the assault column; nor the emphasis given to mass and battles of annihilation; nor was the levee en masse; and nor were Napoleons decisions made in the heat of battle. Therefore, command is influenced by, and in turn influences, a multitude of factors, and is perhaps as much a part of any strategic or operational problem as it is a solution. Command systems, for example, create their own unique set of advantages and solutions, but they also provide constraints. In Napoleons case, the choice to decentralize the execution of operations was a means of addressing the problems presented by friction (among others), yet this decentralized execution meant that Napoleon was unable to exercise the same degree of control over his army as Frederick was able to do. These differences do not really matter because the choices were relevant to the problems confronting the two commanders, and while not optimal, were at least applicable to their particular context. Frederick could not, for example, sub-divide his force and expect it to function as Napoleons did. What seems to matter is that all the decisions are internally logical, and are relevant to the variable conditions presented at the time. As a result, the essence of command is about establishing and maintaining internal and external coherence in the face of the unique and dynamic conditions of campaigns and battles. The importance of coherence suggests that context is also in some way related to the essence of command. Maintaining coherence is in large measure a function of mitigating the effects of friction. Both Napoleons and Fredericks command systems, stratagems, tactics, military organizations and other features of their command were in large measure designed to be compatible with friction, and therefore, to diminish its effects. However, they did so in very different ways. Napoleons primary means were the sub-division of his organization, and the greater freedom he granted to his subordinates to use their initiative.

Napoleon understood the nature of friction and developed solutions that were congruent with it and other social, cultural, political and strategic factors. Napoleons military organization and command system, as well as the way he exercised control of his forces in battle, maintained the internal unity and consistency of his forces when control had largely been lost. Frederick did this too; however, his circumstances led him to emphasize training, drill and positional advantage in order to mitigate the effects of friction. Therefore, command is, in many ways, the art of providing some structure to something that is in reality without structure. The implication is that command in battle is not separate from command before battle. The things that provide structure and coherence in the most chaotic of circumstances are as much related to organization, psychology, training, discipline, morale, culture and technology, as they are to the judgment of the commander in battle. Both Frederick and Napoleon seem to have developed unique but coherent approaches to warfare that alleviated the requirement for perfect understanding of events and detailed control of ones own forces. Design and coherence might therefore be elements of the essence of command. Napoleons genius lay in the realm of action. Consequently, despite the fact his military instrument changed little during his time, his genius was able to carry him on to meet with continued success even during the years of decline. Perhaps the key aspect of this particular genius was Napoleons ability to grasp rapidly the essentials of a highly fluid situation. He was able to hold in his mind an extraordinary array of information on many things both civil and military. Processing information, judgment and decision-making are therefore necessary, but command is above all a practical rather than a theoretical, conceptual or philosophical thing. The command system is therefore most useful to a commander if it allows him to fulfill the very practical functions of persuading, inspiring to action, explaining to soldiers why they are risking their lives, and to give their possible sacrifice meaning. To this end, the analysis reveals that personal example often speaks more than words. The command systems ability to support the commander in acquiring, processing and disseminating information; making decisions; and coordinating and controlling forces must therefore be a lesser function. Therefore, the imperatives of personal example, a strong courage and action somehow relate to the essence of command. Both Frederick and Napoleon had powerful minds. Napoleon in particular had an extraordinary capacity to hold and manipulate a complex range of things in his mind all at once. It is difficult to disregard the apparent linkage between intelligence and effective command. Given the analysis so far suggests that command is essentially an exercise in design, the essence of command must have something to do with intellect. The ability to understand the multitude of factors that confronted both Frederick and Napoleon, and then design a sound solution comprising among other things organization, command system, character and strategy required a powerful mind. Perhaps, it is a particular sort of intellect that might be different for each commander. Fredericks coup doeil was apparent prior to battle, whereas Napoleons was superior during battle.

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For that reason, intellect together with expertise might be two of the factors that constitute the essence of command. In the next section, an analysis of Eisenhower should provide further amplification and refinement of what is developing into a clearer picture of the essence of command. Eisenhowers circumstances are again unique; therefore, the analysis may disprove some of the hypotheses formed so far. The analysis of Eisenhower will limit off the search for an essence of command and provide the vehicle for synthesis of the analysis of all three commanders.

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2.3 DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

The older I get the more wisdom I find in the ancient rule of taking first things first. A process which often reduces the most complex human problem to a manageable proportion -Dwight D. Eisenhower

Americas success in World War II depended to a great extent upon Allied coordination and cooperation. Dwight D. Eisenhower (18901969) provided the leadership that ensured the Allied powers cooperated better than did the counterparts in the Axis powers. His diplomatic and political skills were honed to a fine edge during his early military career and were instrumental in keeping the grand alliance together. After growing up in humble circumstances on the Kansas prairie, Eisenhower entered West Point as an alternate candidate in 1911. After the war in 1919, Eisenhower led an important expedition across the United States to test American military mobility to show the nation that good roads were a military as well as civilian necessity in the age of the automobile. General Douglas MacArthur (18801964) noticed the talents of Eisenhower and employed him as a special assistant in the Philippines. Eisenhower said of his service with MacArthur: I studied dramatics under him for five years in D.C. and four years in the Philippines. His able leadership role in the Louisiana maneuvers of 1941 brought him to the attention of Army Chief of Staff, General George Marshall (18801959). After the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, Marshall named Eisenhower chief of plans and operations and then, in June of 1942, commander of the European Theater of Operations. Eisenhower believed in the need to focus on Germany first even though public opinion was focused with anger on Japan. In addition to grand strategy, Eisenhower had to use his diplomatic skills to keep the Allied coalition together. Eisenhower oversaw American forces as they invaded the north African territory of the Vichy French. He followed up this successful operation with the invasion of Sicily and the Italian peninsula in 1943. In February 1944, President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force. His greatest challenge lay in preparing for the D-Day invasion of German-controlled France in June 1944. Had the invasion failed, Eisenhower was prepared to take full responsibility for the action. The invasion succeeded, however, and soon Allied armies were racing to Germany until stopped by changing weather and supply problems. Eisenhower envisaged a broad-front strategy in France against the German armies. The ultimate goal was to cross the Ruhr River and encircle remaining German forces in the climactic battle for Germany. Eisenhower faced one of his greatest challenges when Hitler launched his Ardennes offensive codenamed Watch on the Rhine (later known as the Battle of the Bulge) on

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December 16, 1944. Three German armies were tasked to divide the British and American armies and deny Antwerp as a source of supply for the Allied armies. Using surprise, deception, and bad weather that kept Allied air power grounded, the Germans made significant initial gains in the offensive. Eisenhower maintained his calm and ordered Pattons Third Army to swing north into the southern portion of the bulge. When the weather cleared on December 22, Allied air power began to wear down the Wehrmacht, which was Eisenhower as already suffering because of bad logistics. The Germans lost 100,000 men and gravely weakened their defenses before the coming Allied offensives in the spring of 1945. Eisenhowers leadership style was to delegate to qualified commanders and allow them to do their job without micromanaging. However, volatile generals such as British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery and United States General George S. Patton would require Eisenhowers personal attention on more than one occasion. Eisenhower was determined to focus on military objectives even when being pressured to focus on political objectives by Winston Churchill. One example of this was that he thought it pointless to pursue capturing Berlin, since Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin had stipulated at the Yalta Conference (February 1945) that Berlin would be turned over to the Russians at the end of the war anyway. His combination of military and diplomatic skill carried Eisenhower to the presidency of the United States in 1952. He was mature enough as a soldier to understand the horror of war and the need to avoid another world war in the nuclear age. He even warned of the dangers that a permanent military industrial complex posed to democracy in America at the close of his presidency in 1961. In 1953, he stated, . . . every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed7. During his presidency, he oversaw the beginnings of the American interstate highway system (an undertaking inspired in part by his participation in the first Transcontinental Motor Convoy in 1919). 2.3.1 THE ESSENCE OF COMMAND Despite major changes to the conduct of war in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Eisenhowers command challenges were of the same kind experienced by Frederick and Napoleon. Despite Eisenhowers unavoidable disconnection from his armies because of their scale and complexity, the same things mattered. Determination and resilience were imperative for Eisenhower, as too were a superior intellect and expertise. His problems were manifold. Therefore, the design of a sophisticated solution that was congruent with his unique context was fundamental. While technology provided new efficient means of communication, it also changed warfare such that Eisenhowers capacity to be seen and heard by his soldiers was diminished.
7

Harry S. Laver and Jeffrey J. Matthews ,The Art of Command, p.116

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Realizing the imperative of presentation, Eisenhower invested considerable energy to working around the limitations of his command system. These efforts, as well as the steady improvement of Eisenhower and his armies, were largely products of trial and error, and therefore, action. In the previous section, this study paper tentatively put forward eight themes as a hypothesis for an essence of command. These themes are: context is key; there is an imperative for action; there is an imperative for resilience or nerve; there is an imperative for presentation and theatre; design is of the essence and requires a superior and specific sort of intellect; there is an imperative for study or expertise; and eliciting and maintaining the coherence of the force in relation to its context is fundamental. Eisenhower seems to confirm that these eight themes do constitute the essence of command. Moreover, taking the three case studies together, the centrality and critical importance of the commander in each context suggests that there is a ninth imperative: command is inherently of the individual.

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3. NETWORK ENVIRONMENT
First, if I could, just with respect, correct a term that I have never felt was accurate. Warfare is not network centric. It's commander centric. And that commander is enabled by networks. -Gen Petraeus

Evaluating the impact of network environment on command is difficult because, as observed by Martin Van Creveld, command is so intimately bound up with numerous other factors that shape war, the pronunciation of one or more master principles that should govern its structure and the way it operates is impossible.8 While accepting the complexity of command as noted by Van Creveld, this paper attempts to gain insight of the impact of network environment on command drawing from the work of the Canadian analysts Dr. Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann on the concepts of command and control. McCann and Pigeau define command as the creative expression of human will necessary to accomplish a mission.9 They persuasively claim that the human attributes essential for command consist of three principal dimensions: competency, authority, and responsibility. They recommend that all new command and control systems should be assessed for effects on these components. Accepting this model as a valid point of departure, this paper begins with an assessment of the effects of a network environment on the commander by analyzing its impact on these three human attributes. In particular, after the examination of the impact of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) on a commanders attributes, this paper will then turn to an analysis of the impact of NCW on his ability to exercise command. 3.1 NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE Network-Centric Warfare represents the next step in the evolution of military thinking about Information Technology (IT) and its impact on the conduct of operations. Information Operations doctrine has been limited to a depiction of how to conduct offensive and defensive action in cyberspace to gain information superiority. The emerging concept of NCW was supposed to lead to the development of a doctrine that describes how the military should organize itself to take advantage of provided information superiority in order to conduct operations in the physical space. Vice-Admiral Arthur Cebrowski from the US Navy described the NCW concept in his seminal article, Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future, where he argues that advances in information technology are causing military operations to shift from platform-centric warfare to network-centric warfare.
8 9

Maritn Van Creveld, Command in War, p.81 Re-conceptualizing command and control, Canadian Military Journal Spring 2002, p. 3-6

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In his article, Admiral Cebrowski describes the structural model required to carry out NCW, consisting of information, sensor and engagement grids. The information grid the computer and communications technology that enables the passing of large amounts of data through interconnected and interoperable networks provides the backbone for the sensor and engagement grids. Sensor grids collect data from dispersed sensors and rapidly generate battle-space awareness that is shared at all levels of operation. Engagement grids link together lethal and nonlethal weapon systems and capitalize on this situational awareness to optimize the employment of firepower, resulting in a focus on the massing of effects rather than the massing of forces. 3.2 INFORMATION SUPERIORITY In the industrialized world, the second half of the 20th century saw exponential growth in reliance on IT. Sophisticated computer and communication systems are now at the center of every aspect of traditional military operations, especially command and control, intelligence, transport and logistics. Determined by a progression of amazing advances in the civilian sector, the rate of development and integration of IT systems into military affairs is not likely to reduce. The relatively low cost of computers and software makes it possible to extend the capabilities to users at all levels of the organization, with the result that all functions, regardless of significance, can be supported by this technology. The result of this profound dependence on IT by military and civilian organizations creates new vulnerabilities that may be exploited in conflict and naturally leads to the concept of Information Warfare (IW). The term Information Warfare was first used in the 1970s, but it was not until the 1990s that the US Department of Defense revealed the existence of command and control warfare concepts as a subset of the broader field of IW. Since that time, defense agencies and the information security industry have studied the impact of IW on military and civilian organizations with a view to determining how best to protect critical infrastructure. The role of IT as the catalyst of the transformation is expressed by the idea of full spectrum dominance which will be achieved during the application of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection. All of this can be achieved only by realizing the full potential of the information revolution. Joint Vision 2020 defines Information superiority, as the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversarys ability to do the same.10 This capability is therefore similar to air superiority. One seeks to control airspace, while the other aims to dominate cyberspace. Both are a means to an end, and both are appreciated for their ability to affect the achievement of military objectives. Without air superiority, all elements
10

Joint Vision 2020, p. 8

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of a joint force are vulnerable to air attack. Similarly, without information superiority, all elements of a joint force are subject to interference and vulnerable by the fact that the theatre of operation in cyberspace is not geographically constrained. If the global information grid is penetrated, attacks in cyberspace will be able to reach civilian and military targets across the globe at the speed of light. In this, view Information operations has been defined as actions taken across the full spectrum, from peace to war, to affect adversary information and information systems while defending ones own information systems. Similarly, Information warfare is information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict. Finally, Information superiority is the outcome of successful information operations where the flow of information is enabled for friendly forces and denied to the enemy.

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4. ANALYSIS This section evaluates the core elements of NCW theory through the lens of the essence of command in order to reveal the flaws in NCW theory and ascertain the strength of the theorists claims. NCW is based upon the experiences of organizations that have successfully adapted to the changing nature of their competitive spaces in the Information Age. The analysis of the literature of NCW theory and command suggests that the NCW theorists built their theory from a narrow concept of command. The case studies conclude that there is more to command than the narrow take of the theorists. NCW theorists argue that the shared awareness, information superiority, and collaboration made possible by new information age technologies represent a reduction in the fog and friction of war. Together, they set the conditions for the attainment of selfsynchronization, improved speed of command, better decisions, and reduced risk. In the next pages, we will examine these four primary suppositions of NCW theory through the lens of the essence of command. Shared awareness is a state that exists in the cognitive domain when two or more entities are able to develop a similar awareness of a situation. Shared awareness is the idea of all relevant actors having a common understanding of a particular circumstance. Information superiority is the achievement of a superior information position. It is the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversarys ability to do the same. Alberts argue that information superiority is a comparative or relative concept analogous to air superiority in that its value lies in its potential to enable military outcomes11. Collaboration involves actors actively sharing data, information, knowledge, perceptions or concepts when they are working together toward a common purpose and how they might achieve that purpose efficiently and effectively. Alberts contend that information systems will allow for greater collaboration, which they anticipate will deliver an enormous improvement in understanding and planning12. Self-synchronization is perhaps the ultimate in achieving increased tempo and responsiveness. Self-synchronization is a mode of interaction between two or more entities. Synchronization is the meaningful arrangement of things or effects in time and space13. Self-synchronization is synchronization achieved by lower-level decision makers guided only by their training, understanding of the commanders intent, and their awareness of the situation in relevant portions of the battle space14. Self-synchronization is made possible because of the ability to establish and maintain a high degree of situational awareness at all levels of command. Operations no longer have to rely on top-down, command-directed synchronization. Each element of the force can ensure that their unique operating rhythm is in tune with the
11 12

David S. Alberts, Network Centric Warfare, p. 57-68 Ibid, p. 65 13 Ibid, p.112 14 Ibid, p. 145

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commanders intent and battle rhythm. This, in theory, eliminates the need for a force-wide friendly decision cycle, so the enemy is thus denied any operational pause and is continuously kept off balance. NCW promises the ability to have greater effect with fewer troops, less equipment, and less sacrifice. This promise is particularly attractive to contemporary armies, in which highly methodical, tactical-minded, and managerial approaches to warfare often displace creativity. The recent tendencies to view war in terms of cause and effect relationships (eg.EBAO) to use the highly methodical and pseudo-scientific targeting process for setting the course for future operations and the predominance of staff driven decision-making processes exemplifies these approaches. Any significant adaptation to NCW (particularly a flattening of the organizations hierarchy) can only lead to greater centralized control and a greater dependence on information for effective execution of operations. NCW provides a clear tactical advantage, but any attempt to optimize a force to maximize this advantage is likely to create a highly adapted organization that is difficult to command effectively and vulnerable to being made irrelevant by a change in context. According to political scientist Colin Gray, the main danger in the years ahead is that an armed force will be so committed to their own network-centric transformation that they fail to recognize the true character of potentially effective offsetting revolutionary change elsewhere. While an initial advantage is enormous, success is secured by the nation that wins the final combat in a conflict, not the opening round. Partially networked forces appear to possess an overwhelming tactical advantage over their enemies in most engagements and battles, even in the many cases where their enemies hold the initiative. However, translating this tactical advantage and tactical success into strategic success appears to be no easier for contemporary commanders than it was for Frederick, Napoleon, or Eisenhower. The translation of strategic objectives into tactical actions is an art that lies in the realm of action for which no amount of information, foreknowledge, collaboration, or command speed can guarantee success. Although it is too early to draw any firm conclusions, recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan seems to confirm the conclusions above. David Petreausachievements in Iraq seem to point to the continued importance of the commander and the transcendence of the essence of command. As previously argued, the NCW environment will not change the fact that command is a mission-oriented human endeavor performed within the limits of a commanders personal attributes. However, two features of NCW have the potential of significantly affecting the attributes of competency and authority. First, the processing and assimilation of large amounts of data can overstress the intellectual competency of commanders. This paper assumes that system designers will be successful in their goal of filtering the data and providing commanders with adequate decisionsupport tools. Arguably, a failure to design network systems in this manner will seriously

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constrain any potential advantage of a NCW environment, as any increase in awareness will be limited by the human ability to process information. Second, the effectiveness of commanders can be diminished through a loss in personal authority in situations where a commanders questionable judgment is quickly disseminated across the information grid for all to see. However, while the new technology may alter the environment to the point that personal attributes are affected, the central fact remains that command potential and effectiveness are limited by the personal attributes of the commander. In this respect at least, the essence of command is unchanged. In the words of Martin van Creveld, Far from determining the essence of command, then, communication and information processing technology merely constitutes one part of the general environment in which command operates.15 The technological component of war can never fully account for the dynamic interaction of human beings and war will remain predominantly an art, infused with human will, creativity, and judgment16 Finally, decision making will continue to be the province of commanders, and will continue to be dependant on a commanders experience and intuition. The NCW environment will not determine the essence of command in war. The technology will indeed bring a new set of variables to the command equation that must be solved by commanders.

15 16

Martin Van Creveld, Command in War, p.126 Ibid, p. 222

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5. CONCLUSION There is a correlation between command systems and warfare, and between the essence of command and the nature of war. The nature of warfare changes and evolves, whereas the nature of war does not. Similarly, command systems change and evolve, whereas the essence of command does not. Therefore, it is not surprising that emerging information technologies have already changed the tactics of many armies, yet there is little to suggest that the emerging technologies have changed operational art or the formulation of strategy in any significant way. Emerging technologies allow a soldier to acquire a target more rapidly and enable him to employ a capability beyond his primary weapon system to destroy it. Emerging technologies facilitate better cooperation between widely distributed units with loosely defined command and control relationships. NCW is certainly an emerging theory of warfare, which is okay as long as the theory also accounts for the essence of command. It does not. NCW theory derives from a very narrow view of command based on transient command systems to the virtual exclusion of the enduring essence of command. Therefore, it is a flawed theory of warfare. Western military professionals should take caution when heeding the contemporary military theorists recommendation that militaries should undergo radical change in order to exploit the opportunities provided by emerging information technologies. The recommendation has no grounding in the essence of command. By anchoring their theories to a narrow definition of command, the theorists are able to promise revolutionary changes and decisive advantages in warfare. However, when viewed through the lens of a more robust model of command, the potential falls far short of the promise. Finally, rather than optimizing a force for NCW, armies would accumulate a better return on investment by giving new and greater emphasis to the selection and education of future operational and strategic level commanders founded in an understanding of the imperatives of command.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Harry S. Laver and Jeffrey J. Matthews, The Art of Command, The University Press of Kentucky, 2008. 2. Mark R. Polelle, Command and Control - Great Military Leaders from Washington to the Twenty-First Century, 2010. 3. Christopher R Smith, Network Centric Warfare, Command, and the Nature of War, 2008 4. James R. Blaker, Transforming Military Force, Legacy of Arthur Cebrowski and network centric warfare, Westport, Connecticut - London, 2007. 5. Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future, In Proceedings, 2008. 6. Bryan Perrett, The changing face of the Batle, Cassel & Co, 2000. 7. David S. Alberts, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, University press, 2004. 8. John Keegan, Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda , Washington University Press, 2004. 9. Clausewitz-A very short introduction, Oxford University Press, 2004 10. Martin Van Creveld, Command in War, Harvard University Press; Eighth Impression edition, 1987. 11. SAMS, Network Centric Warfare: Command and the nature of war, 2009

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