Journal of South Asian Development

http://sad.sagepub.com Taming the Dalit Panthers: Dalit Politics in Tamil Nadu

Hugo Gorringe JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN DEVELOPMENT 2007; 2; 51 DOI: 10.1177/097317410600200103 The online version of this article can be found at: http://sad.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/2/1/51

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Journal of South Asian Development 2:1 (2007): 5173 Sage Publications Los Angeles/London/New Delhi/Singapore DOI: 10.1177/097317410600200103

Taming the Dalit Panthers: Dalit Politics in Tamil Nadu

HUGO GORRINGE Department of Sociology University of Edinburgh UK
Abstract Although Dalit orators and slogans threaten (or promise) to turn Tamil Nadu on its head, the 2006 state elections offer Dalit analysts pause for thought. In compromising its principles and allying with established parties, the Dalit Panther Iyyakkam (Movement), the largest Dalit movement in the state, has come full circle since 1999. In alternately backing the two dominant parties in the state (the DMK and the AIADMK), the DPI appears to be increasingly institutionalised. Excavating the future of Dalit action from past trends and contemporary politics, I suggest that Dalit parties are following an established political repertoire in which a phase of militant activism gives way to politics as normal. In the face of this analysis the paper asks whether such an approach is sustainable or can carry the majority of Dalits with it. If Dalit politics is a continuation of hegemonic politics, it argues, the liberatory promises of Dalit activism will have been betrayed.

INTRODUCTION: TAMIL POLITICS

AND THE

DALIT CHALLENGE

n the seemingly surreal world of Tamil politics, the southernmost Indian state, anything is possible: sworn enemies are reconciled before clashing again; film stars become politicians, turning fanclubs into party organisations; a convicted politician became chief minister before securing an appeal verdict; the leader of the opposition assured party activists that she would not attend the Assembly unless absolutely necessary (Hindu 2006a); and a key manifesto pledge of a winning alliance offered a colour TV to households meeting certain criteria. Parties routinely split, merge and reform in an endless kaleidoscope; arch-secularists ally with Hindu chauvinists; and people (claim to) vote 17 times for their candidates despite the
This paper was presented at the 2006 SAAG conference. I am indebted to respondents and especially to Chris Fuller for detailed comments. I am also immensely grateful to two anonymous reviewers of the JSAD for perceptive and constructive insights.
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indelible ink used to mark the thumbs of those cast their votes (cf. Subramani 2006). An insult (perceived or intended) to one leader can reshape political coalitions overnight, resulting in contingency and compromise. As the political stability accorded by the predominance of two main parties has been challenged, the shifting panoply of electoral alliances and the colourful jostling for position have added further complexity. Until recently, however, one feature remained constant (albeit unacknowledged) in post-independence Tamil politics: the dominance of Backward Caste (BC) parties and interests.1 Despite recognising this Subramanian (1999) claims that Dravidian parties have created an open, democratic and plural society. This paper conversely argues that egalitarian rhetoric has not translated into practice, and the incorporation of marginal groups into a system of state patronage does not equate to an extension of democratic participation (cf. Harriss 2002). T. Subramanian (2001a) notes the irony that such a large number of caste parties should sprout in Tamilnadu, the cradle of the Dravidian movement, but it is because the interests of marginal social groups were not served by established politics that they have mobilised for a share of political power. The Dalit (formerly Untouchable) and caste parties emerging over the past decade have attempted to extend or, in the case of parties inimical to Dalit assertion, limit the scope of Tamil politics. Subramani (interview)2 summed up this process: Without protest we cannot achieve anything. One cannot claim anything from the government without protest. Only if we protest is there an opportunity for our community to do anything. When the Dalit Panther Iyyakkam (DPI) Movement, the largest Dalit movement in Tamil Nadu (TN), abandoned its electoral boycott in 1999, it promised to redraw the political map of Tamilnadu (Gorringe 2005: 301). Seven years and two state elections later, the DPIs radical rhetoric looks as tattered as old election posters, clinging torn and dishevelled to walls and billboards. This paper charts the changing face of Tamil politics, focusing on the subaltern challenge. Drawing on fieldwork with Dalit movements and analysis of subsequent state elections, it assesses the entry of autonomous Dalit parties into the bodypolitic.3 Having charted the rationale behind political participation and the opportunities this offers, I argue that the radical possibilities suggested by the initial foray into electoral competition have evaporated. Rather than reforming the institutions they entered, Dalit movements have been institutionalised. In closing, therefore, I will consider where Dalit politics goes from here. First, however, a brief introduction to the intricacies of Tamil politics is required to contextualise the ensuing discussion.

DRAVIDIANISM

AND

DALITS: MARGINALISATION

AND

EMERGENCE

Tamil politics is bewildering to those familiar with its ideologies, parties and characters; for the uninitiated, it is a welter of nigh-identical acronyms and political fluidity. Any comprehension of current trends, therefore, requires the historical
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background without which Tamil politics is confusing.4 The starting point must be the non-Brahmin movement that dominated state politics in the 1920s and, in interaction with the colonial powers, set the template for subsequent engagements in the political sphere (Irschick 1986). In the protracted exchanges between Brahmins who monopolised administrative power under the British, and a rising Backward Caste elite, caste was established as the mobilising strategy par excellence and elections as the vehicle for its expression. Into this heady mix, the Self-Respect and Dravidian parties introduced the emotive issues of Tamil nationalism and autonomy from the expansionist ambitions of Hindi-speaking northern politicians, which continue to inform contemporary politics (cf. Subramanian 1999). Though the Congress Party dominated post-independence Tamil politics, each election saw their vote share eroded by the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (Dravidian Progressive Federation; DMK), a regional party that played on language nationalism and espoused populist/socialist policies that were successfully mediated to the electorate through cinema and an efficient party machine. In 1967 TN became the first Indian state to elect a regionalist party, heralding the decline of Congress preeminence and the rise of the region (Kohli 1990; Pandian 1992). Indeed, the DMK victory was hailed as ending Brahmin rule and forging a nation of Tamils. Under its founder, Annadurai, and his successor, Karunanidhi, the DMK ruled until 1976. The party became increasingly conservative and personalised, however, and the DMK split in 1972 with M.G. Ramachandran (MGR), a Tamil screen legend, founding the All India Anna DMK (AIADMK; Anna referring to Annadurai), which claimed to be closer to Annadurais ideals. The AIADMK gained power in 1977 due to MGRs popularity and populism (as typified by his provision of free school meals for children), and dominated Tamil politics until his death in 1987. Since then both parties have alternated in office. Corruption and a personalisation of politics in the personages of MGR (or his successor Jayalalitha) and Karunanidhi, have pervaded the Tamil government in this period, and populist politics (to maintain power) have prevailed over ideological or fiscal concerns (Kohli 1990; Pandian 1992). Dravidian social radicalism, thus, was strictly curtailed. Rather than envisaging inequality in class or caste terms, both Dravidian parties used the Brahmin/nonBrahmin divide to suggest a commitment to social change whilst drawing their leadership and core constituents from dominant, landowning BCs (Subramanian 1999). Stressing language rather than inequality, the DMK (and later the AIADMK) attempted to foster Tamilness and avoid politically sensitive election pledges on land reform, dowry and caste. Over time both parties abandoned their anti-centre and anti-Hindi positions, softened their anti-Brahminism (to the point where a Brahmin could succeed MGR), and failed to implement meaningful redistributive policies. The DMKs progressive reforms resembled charity from above, and the AIADMK disproportionately taxed the poor to finance populist programmes (Harriss 2002; Pandian 1992).
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Subramanians admiration for Dravidian pluralism, therefore, seems misplaced. Indeed, he shows (1999: 58) that state politics are dominated by BCs who have become jealous of their power as new entrants to Tamil politics have eroded their authority. This is evident in the increasingly overt conflict between lower-caste Hindus and Dalits (Harriss 2002: 97).5 Faced with frequent violence, Dalit movements voiced grievances and highlighted atrocities rather than campaigning proactively for social change. Their protests demanded the enforcement of the constitution, and sought to de-legitimise a polity that did not adequately represent or serve them. The subsidiary position of Dalits is evident in that 84 per cent of Dalit landholdings are marginal (under 1 hectare) and only 4 per cent are over 4 hectares, as opposed to over 10 per cent for others (Government of Tamil Nadu 2005).6 Dalit land is seldom irrigated (Gorringe 2005). Thus, while 80 per cent of Tamil Dalit workers are in the agrarian sector, 64 per cent are agricultural labourers (Rath and Konlade 2000; 1991 figures). The failure to implement effective land reform has curtailed Dalit autonomy by rendering them dependent upon others for work. This deprivation is compounded, and alternate opportunities limited, by poor education. Literacy, as Mendelsohn and Vicziany (1998: 35) observe, lends confidence and expands mental horizons. It leads to a more assertive, less compliant, community. In 1991 the 58 per cent literacy rate for Scheduled Caste (SC)7 men compared to 74 per cent for Tamil males. Thirty-five per cent of SC women were literate opposed to 51 per cent overall.8 These inequalities render Dalits vulnerable to social boycott (denied work, access to shops and common resources), intimidation, assault and murder if they resist caste norms. Faced by socio-political marginalisation, Dalit movements in the 1990s mobilised extra-institutionally before entering mainstream politics. Puthiya Tamizhagam (New Tamil Nadu; PT)the second largest Dalit Party in TNrose as a Pallar movement and remains strongest in Pallar strongholds in the south and west.9 Its leader, Krishnasamy, battled discrimination to qualify as a doctor and came to Dalit activism via Marxist-Leninism (Warrier 1998). Despite this, he is portrayed as Westernisedappearing in jeans and trainersand removed from ordinary Dalits (Gorringe 2005: 254). Krishnasamy was the first autonomous Dalit leader to win a Legislative Assembly seat in 1996. This was subsequently lost, but the PT consolidated its vote base in the 1998 national elections polling more votes than the victory margins in several seats (Wyatt 2002). Although the PT remains a significant force, and preceded the DPI into electoral competition, this paper focuses on the Panthers for two reasons. First, the DPI is the largest Dalit party in TN, and, second, it contested elections during my fieldwork, enabling analysis of the dynamics of institutionalisation. The DPI was formed in 1982, inspired by the Maharashtrian movement of the same name. Although billed as a Dalit movement, it is preponderantly Paraiyar and flourishes in the northern districts. Thirumavalavan, its leader, came from a poor family to gain a law degree and a government job, and entered Dalit politics
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through social networks (Gorringe 2005). He is famed for his oratory and for popularising the assertive slogan: A hit for a hit. Thirumavalavan lived in humble surroundings and frequently visited Dalit villages. Whilst Krishnasamy faced questions about staying in luxury hotels in one interview (Warrier 1998), Thirumavalavan cited his life situation as evidence that the DPI had no resources (Illangovan 1998). Lacking resources, the DPI relied on grassroots mobilisation to succeed. A decade of poll boycotts emphasised the movements radicalism and denied legitimacy to the Legislative Assembly, but in 1999 the DPI completed a tactical volte-face and contested the polls on the slogan: We are voting for ourselves. Why, however, did they choose the electoral route and what did they hope to achieve?

ENTERING POLITICS: RATIONALES, OPPORTUNITIES

AND

PITFALLS

The Panthers reliance on exclusive identity categories constituted a defensive response to caste repression, but effectively legitimised caste actors. Contesting elections, by contrast, raised the question of citizenship and the prospect of reform. Indias institutions are not only the bedrock of its democracy, providing an ordered process for the politicisation of previously marginalised groups, Jenkins (1999: 224) notes, but also the means by which democracys change-resistant tendencies are overcome. Whilst Dravidian dominance narrowed the political agenda, recent elections confirmed the fragmentation of Tamil politics (Yadav 2001), and this erosion of political fealty offered opportunities for Dalit movements. In 1998, Thirumavalavan averred that elections achieve little, and refused to take part in something which upholds the status quo (Illangovan 1998). The following year, therefore, Nandan (1999) pressed him on the abandoned boycott: Will you not be tainted? they asked, and Is your decision a victory for government repression? Contradictory responses insisted that this was a change in tactics, not policy; that the boycott harmed the movement; and that if Dalits are to gain official power, we have to vote. He maintained that the DPI would not put forward a representative, but that if we gain seats in the Centre [Delhi] we will be able to act against abuses.... We are not going to support opportunist or self-serving political parties (ibid.). These quotes reveal the contingency of the move to politics. Key issues and longer-term prospects were not thought through. The attractions of politics are seen in vague references to using Dalit votes and gaining Dalit power. The obvious forerunner here is the Bahujan Samaj Party (Majority Peoples Party, or BSP, the most successful Dalit-based party) in Uttar Pradesh (UP). The BSP was referred to in movement speeches as epitomising the possibilities of Dalit politics, because it united the Dalit vote in UP and forged pragmatic coalitions that enabled it to take power (Pai 2002). In brief periods of office, furthermore, the BSP expedited the employment of Dalits to positions of responsibility and instituted programmes of Dalit uplift (ibid.: 178).
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Chandra (2004) and Pai (2002) argue that the BSP successfully altered its representational profileallocating seats to higher castes for exampleto widen its appeal beyond its caste base. Pai (ibid.) shows that the Dalit vote remained fairly constant, but politically astute seat allocations and pragmatic alliances carried the party to power. Puthiya Tamizhagam echoed these tactics in Tamil Nadu, fielding non-Dalit candidates in 1999 and 2001 (Illangovan 2001), and both the DPI and PT have attempted to broaden their social base by appealing to Tamils and dropping caste terminology from their titles (the DPI renamed itself the Liberation Panthers in 1999). The BSPs experience, however, is of limited relevance in TN. Elections in UP are often contested between four strong parties (Pai 2002), but though Ananth (2006) notes that the Congress, communists and caste parties retain strong support, they have failed to establish autonomous alternatives and Tamil elections are dominated by Dravidian coalitions. Non-aligned alliances have occasionally secured a respectable vote share, but this has failed to translate into seats. Chandras (2004) account of ethnic headcounts also seems simplistic in this context where 50 years of Dravidian discourse has fostered a Tamilian identity and shattered the automatic assumption that Dalits (for instance) will vote for a Dalit party. Furthermore, Tamil Dalits are divided amongst themselves. Following the fragmentation of the Dravidian vote, therefore, Dalit parties in the 1990s attempted to create an ethnic constituency. Given the absence of strong pull factors, Nandan is right to question whether political participation is a victory for government repression. In considering DPI actions, the compulsions of politics are more obvious than its attractions. The boycott enabled the government to cast the Panthers as undemocratic extremists, thereby justifying repressive measures that alienated the movement from the people (Gorringe 2005). Thirumavalavan concedes that political engagement is important to show our strength in and commitment to democratic means (Nandan 1999). Second, despite the DPI boycott, most Dalits continued to vote. Elections are exciting times, politicians canvass support and party activists distribute largesse and promises of more if they come to power (De Wit 1996). The boycott withheld the votes of activists and offered sympathisers no electoral alternative, so they voted for established parties, including those antithetical to Dalit empowerment. Relying on negatives to justify political participation, the DPI was in a tumult preceding the 1999 Indian elections; internally they faced discontented activists, externally they confronted a casteist social environment and a political scenario in which they were isolated. Many dedicated activists were distraught: [The] government is a sewer, Subramani observed (interview). We do not want to fall in. Not everyone, he insisted, would follow Thirumavalavan into politics. The DPI emerged as a radical grassroots movement that countered caste oppression, and parliamentary parties were castigated for failing to advance social justice and conniving in continuing caste discrimination.
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Such concerns were unavoidable in 1999 because Dalits in one village were hounded from their homes by a casteist mob in March, and on the eve of the elections the police violently dispersed a Dalit demonstration in Tirunelveli killing 17 people (Gorringe 2005: 297, 350). In the light of these incidents the DPI could not ignore the records of political parties or downplay the realities of caste. The decision to contest the elections was unpopular, and these events rendered an alliance with Dravidian parties untenable. A dalliance with the (opposition) AIADMK raised such a storm that rebuttals were issued with alacrity. The identities of social activists, Jasper (1997) astutely notes, frame how they view both the world and themselves. Having invested significance in the concept of radical action, forging links with an enemy was unbearable. The electoral system, however, is based on constituencies rather than proportional representation. The practice of electing representatives according to geographical constituencies, [implies] that interests are relatively homogenous within localities (Philips 1991: 63). The polarisation of caste-based parties illustrates the naivety of such assumptions and reveals the universal citizen to be a myth. There are no geographical concentrations of Dalits sufficient to guarantee victory in any constituency, and although certain seats are reserved for Dalits (as part of affirmative action to offset inequality), such candidates are dependent on the votes of others. Whilst voting is tied to localities, therefore, Dalits cannot neglect other castes. DPI leaders, thus, were torn: to appease activists they needed to suggest radicalism, but to stand any chance of winning they needed cross-caste alliances. This latter point was particularly contentious given the problematic of representation. As Kamaraj, a DPI adherent, put it: Yes there are hundreds of Dalit MPs in India, but they do not win alone. They win as party people, as politicians. There is no opportunity for Dalit MPs to speak out about Dalit society and problems so we do not need them. We need our own MP who will speak for us. (interview) This context explains why the DPI decision seemed so momentous. Dalit politicians are commonly portrayed as political pawns or self-interested careerists (Roy and Sisson 1990). Suitcase politics was the contemptuous phrase used by respondents to denote unprincipled and self-aggrandising leaders who sell out in return for resources. Against this backdrop, DPI leaders had to persuade followers of their continuing autonomy and to justify electoral participation and alliance formation. The exoneration of the police for the violence in Tirunelveli at this point encapsulated Dalit distrust of institutions, but also facilitated a realignment of political affiliations. The protests surrounding the incident brought disparate Dalit movements on to a common platform. They were joined by the Tamil Maanila Congress (Tamil State Congress; TMC), which had been frozen out of the main coalitions.
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Contingency, thus, dictated the DPIs decision to join the (non-Dravidian) Third Front in 1999. As Viswanathan (1999) argued, the consolidation of the oppressed sectors, particularly Dalits, in Tamil Nadu constituted a significant fallout of the massacre. This solution to the DPIs political dilemma was welcomed in the media, but distrusted in the movement. The TMC, when allied to the DMK government, had overlooked anti-Dalit violence, and so the DPI cadre were sceptical of the alliance. Faced by such disaffection, Thirumavalavan belatedly insisted that the DPIs political engagement was conditional on four key demands: a share of power; political recognition; the consolidation of Dalit forces; and the attempt to force the Dravidian parties out of office. (speeches and interview) These conditions refuted prevalent projections of Dalits as a compliant vote bank and, as Viswanathan (ibid.) opined, were seen as having the potential to bring about substantial changes, not only of electoral politics in the state, but in the nature of political activism in general and the approach of mainstream political parties to organisations that represent Dalits aspirations. Dalit engagement in elections not only promised an expansion of the political sphere to include marginalised sectors of society, but also reflected the growing strength of caste-based groups and the declining appeal of Dravidian parties. Wyatt (2002) subsequently argued that a coalition government requiring Dravidian parties to share power was no longer a chimera. The DPI had abandoned revolutionary struggle, but looked set to revolutionise Tamil politics. We turn now to the impact of this move and the DPIs gradual integration into the political system.

NEGOTIATING PARLIAMENTARY PROCESSES: THE 19992006 ELECTIONS

If, after Thirumavalavan has spoken and left, you listen to what the DMK lot or the AIADMK lot or any other political party people are saying and are scattered, then the Dalit Panthers cannot protect you. It is necessary for us all to unite. It is necessary for us to cast our votes for our own sake. We need to show our opponents that we are a united political force. (Thirumavalavan, speech, 16 June 1999) After all the posturing accompanying the move to politics, how have the Panthers fared at the ballot box? To what extent have they maintained the united front that Thirumavalavan extols? As accounts of earlier elections are provided elsewhere (Gorringe 2005; Wyatt 2002), I focus on processes rather than results before analysing more recent developments. The TMC-led Third Front (mentioned earlier) fared poorly in the 1999 elections. Despite polling heavily in several constituencies, it failed to win a seat, thus emphasising the electoral pre-eminence of the Dravidian parties. Significantly, the Front was not humiliated and Thirumavalavan came second in Chidambaram constituency, forcing the AIADMK candidate into third
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place. The ability of a non-Dravidian Dalit-based coalition to mobilise significant votes was established and the easy assumption of Dalit loyalty to the status quo was shattered. Despite intimidation and violence, thousands of Dalits voted for Thirumavalavan. Press coverage increased noticeably, as did the political recognition accorded to the party. In playing on the issue of representation, the DPI persuaded many Dalits that it was their duty to support them. Sakthidasan from a remote village in Chidambaram constituency was typical, insisting that the political process was the only means for leaders to gain more respect, attention and power. Dalits here primarily depend on other castes for work as agricultural labourers, and Sakthidasan was forthright in his analysis: We do not have that much faith in democracy, but for the first time a Dalit has stood as a Dalit and we have done our duty by voting for him. Whether he does anything for us or not is the next question, but our votes are for ourselves. (interview) Sakthidasans assertion reveals both the cynicism that characterises Dalit views of politics, and the fact that the proactive election campaign succeeded in raising consciousness even if it failed in the polls. The quote also adds complexity to Chandras (2004) notion of ethnic headcounts in emphasising that material concerns need not determine electoral choices. The symbolic and emotive reasons of pride and duty can outweigh expectations of reward. The publicity and votes gained by the DPI (especially in northern districts) persuaded leaders that the electoral process was worth pursuing. The fluid nature of Tamil alliances, however, meant that the Third Front was precarious. There was no guarantee that the TMC would remain independent and without the resources and credibility of an established party the Front would be undermined. Furthermore, the question of what the DPI hoped to achieve came to the fore. Persisting with a non-Dravidian front would radicalise voters and offer a critical alternative: pursuing the same ends using institutional rather than radical (often criminal) means. Contesting elections, however, proffered new opportunities (cf. Coy and Hedeen 2005): strategic alliance building, for example, could lead to financial resources, extensive networks, a wider pool of voters, and Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) status. To be most effective, though, this path required a Dravidian alliance, which seemed impossible since neither was trusted: Yesterday the AIADMK fostered the BJP, now it is the turn of the DMK. Yesterday Jayalalitha, today Karunanidhi. We need to question which is the scoundrel and which is the rogue. (Thirumavalavan, speech, 16 June 1999) The implication was of a Hobsons choice, since both had betrayed their ideals and fostered the Hindu nationalist BJP, which is antithetical to Dalit interests.
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Furthermore, Krishnasamy reiterated the concern for autonomy: Dalit leaders should retain the leadership of Dalit campaigns and that mainstream political parties should not derive undue political mileage from the struggles of Dalits against caste oppression (Nambath 1999). Despite the compelling logic of Dalit assertion, Krishnasamys principled but unrewarding call for autonomous action was rejected by the TMC and DPI who allied to the AIADMK for several bye-elections in 2000. The DPIs dramatic volte-face invited accusations of suitcase politics and outraged activists felt betrayed, but it is worth considering the decision more dispassionately. First, the performance of the Third Front highlighted that shifting from movement to party entailed more than a tactical shift: it altered the constituency to whom the DPI appealed. The 225,000 who voted for Thirumavalavan far exceeded those prepared to engage in social protest. This wider constituency was less radical and more interested in the bread-and-butter issues of political participation. Activists spoke of Thirumavalavan turning Parliament on its head, but most voters wanted him in office as a symbol of Dalit assertion and as a source of patronage. Second, election campaigns require resources and organisational infrastructure that Dalit movements lack and established allies can provide. Finally, Pandian (1992) notes how Dravidian parties (the AIADMK in particular) have successfully mediated subaltern consciousness and secured active consent despite neglecting their interests. Whilst autonomous Dalit movements increasingly counter Dravidianism, interviews and observations confirmed his analysis. Allying with the AIADMK, therefore, was a pragmatic recognition of Dravidian hegemony. Thirumavalavan continued to critique Dravidian policy and his exhausting schedule of engagements and relatively obscure accommodation suggested that he had not profited personally from the new strategy. The AIADMK alliance was also the lesser of two evils since the DMK was portrayed as inimical to Dalit liberation and the AIADMK is traditionally more popular with Dalits and women. The main drawback was that the coalition isolated the PT (which was at loggerheads with the AIADMK) and splintered the Dalit vote. The results of the 2000 bye-elections questioned the wisdom of pragmatism, however, when the DMK gained from Dalits apathy to the AIADMK (Nambath 2000), suggesting that realpolitik could alienate principled actors and blur the distinction between a Dalit party and an established one. The DPIs political participation challenged parties that saw Dalits as pawns to be bought off before each election, and the 1999 campaign slogan (Our votes are for ourselves) resonated with many Dalits encouraging them to vote for the first time or to back an autonomous Dalit candidate. In 2000 Dalit voters showed that they would not automatically follow their own leaders either, and rejected the AIADMKDPI combine that leaders had too little time to sell. Despite failing to persuade their supporters, the Panthers remained allied to the AIADMK preceding the 2001 Legislative Assembly elections. The PT mooted a principled alternative before succumbing to the politics of pragmatism themselves when their attempt to initiate a Congress-led front failed. Unwilling to contest
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without a mainstream partner, the PT sought an electoral pact with the DMK. The fragility of alliances and electoral understandings, however, came to the fore in 2001 when disputes over seat sharing (how many seats each alliance partner was allocated) disrupted both coalitions. The DMK was not accommodating (retaining most seats for itself) and alienated its main electoral allies, who swapped sides. The major party to defect was the Vanniyar-dominated10 Paatali Makkal Katchi (Toiling Peoples Party; PMK), which holds sway in northern TN. The DPI was formed partly as a defensive reaction against Vanniyar assertion, so when the PMK joined the AIADMK, the Panthers jumped ship. Bereft of other allies, the DPI allied to the DMK, thus abandoning a key rationale for electoral contestation. In 1999 Thirumavalavan pilloried the PMK leader for rejoining the DMK despite being insulted. He also insisted that: Karunanidhis complete government has been against the downtrodden and remains so. He is only concerned in nurturing the dominant castes (speech, 1 November 1999). Previously (Gorringe 2006a) I saw the acceptance of Dalit parties into the DMK front as significant for two principal reasons. First, Karunanidhi had been the subject of personal attacks by movement orators: Karunanidhi is a scoundrel and we need to oppose him first, Thirumavalavan maintained. Granting 18 seats to the DPI and PT, therefore, constituted a loss of face for the party. Defections and splits are endemic in Indian politics, and the colourful language used at the point of departure has rarely precluded reconciliation, but swallowing the insults of an untested group is uncommon. Second, the Dalit organisations were given more seats than established parties (Hindu 2001). In retrospect, this significance was overstated. The bargaining for seats suggested the DPI would only enter alliances on the basis of a share of political power, and wresting so many constituencies from the DMK signalled that Dalit parties were considered capable of delivering votes. Beyond this, however, the import is limited. The accommodation of the Dalit parties must be viewed in context: as a desperate attempt by the DMK to attract more votes after the departure of other allies. Dalit parties have become vote banks to be won over at election time, and the asymmetry of power was emphasised by seat allocations. Though the Puthiya Tamizhagam had proved itself in previous elections, the Panthers were granted seats more readily because they opted to campaign under the DMKs rising sun symbol. The PT, which demanded its own flag, was engaged in protracted negotiations (Nambath 2001). The DPI, thus, acted as a pawn and did not gain autonomous political recognition. Its allocation of eight seats testifies to the caste-based logic of electoral competition rather than its strength. Caste informs the electoral outcomes of many constituencies, and five decades of rhetoric on Tamilness has not constrained its salience. If anything, caste figures more prominently in contemporary elections due to the emergence of caste-based parties in the past two decades. The Panthers were welcomed by the DMK as a possible counterweight to the PMK. The rise of minor parties has meant that neither Dravidian party can win unaided in several constituencies. The PMK, for instance, is seen to dominate the
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north-east and though, like Communist and Congress Parties, it has not broken the Dravidian duopoly completely, it determines which alliance wins. The Panthers heartlands are here, where they campaigned against Vanniyar caste domination. Sure enough, the DPIs lone success in 2001 was in Mangalore where Thirumavalavan emerged victorious although the DMK coalition was routed in the polls. The PT did not win a seat, but their strongholds in the south are where the DMK has struggled to make inroads. Paradoxically, far from furthering their ultimate objective of eradicating caste, the DPI victory emphasised the importance of caste considerations. This was most apparent as, with the objective of defeating the PMK, Dalits voted en masse for DMK candidates (Subramanian 2001b; Yadav 2001), whilst other caste voters shunned the Dalit-friendly parties. Even the DMK cadres neither campaigned nor voted effectively for their Dalit allies (Subramanian 2001b; Venkatesh 2001). Kamaraj (interview) insisted that BCs have an allergy to Dalit mobilisation, and his crude analysis gained credence here. The social aversion on the part of DMK candidates, mostly belonging to Mukkulathors and other OBCs, to be identified with Dalit leaders and cadres, Illangovan (2001) reported, has made the DMK an untouchable among its own rank and file.11 As Dalit organisations have entered politics, the social ostracism associated with untouchability has informed the electoral process. Indeed, caste sentiment has been exacerbated as Dalit movements have confronted BC dominance (Pandian 2000). The DMKs gamble with the Dalit card failed, Illangovan concluded, thanks to the sharp polarisation of Dalits and non-Dalits, where the party affiliations became irrelevant. Untouchability at the ballot box is part of a backlash resisting Dalit efforts at claiming their human rights and dues (Rajadurai and Geetha 2002: 119). The heightening of caste sentiment helps explain why, despite entering politics later, the Panthers have surpassed the Puthiya Tamizhagam. The social antipathy to Dalit interests dictates that Dalit parties are a default option to mitigate the loss of key allies. The Panthers have an advantage since they offset the PMK vote bank, whilst PT has no equivalent opponent. Poll results have established a pecking order based on electoral arithmetic. The DPI is a natural second choice if an alliance with the PMK fails. This secondary status became apparent when their Dravidian ally canvassed their support for the 2004 Lok Sabha elections, but denied them any representatives. The Legislative Assembly has 234 members, whereas Tamil Nadu only has 39 representatives in the Lok Sabha, but denying the Panthers even one seat was telling. Thirumavalavan resigned from Mangalur (which he won on a DMK ticket) on principle and joined an alliance of Dalit and non-Dravidian parties. He said: [In 2001] a majority of the mainstream parties in the State, such as the TMC, the Congress(I), the PMK and the two Left parties had already allied with the AIADMK. The DMK then had only the BJP with it. Karunanidhi was left with no option but to accommodate the DPI and the PT along with some small
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caste-based parties. But now, because Karunanidhi has had the support of some much bigger parties, he has ditched Dalit parties.(Viswanathan 2004) The message is clear: Dravidian parties use the DPI as a vote bank when necessary, and abandon them when more tested alliances appear. Karunanidhis call for the DPI to support the DMK from the outside was rightly perceived as an insult, but the hastily assembled Dalit alliance only managed third place in most seats except for Chidambaram where Thirumavalavan again came second. Given the repeated ability to secure 30 per cent of the vote without Dravidian support, it cannot be long before the DPI contests national polls in a Dravidian front. The reticence of the main parties to offer the Chidambaram constituency to the DPI supports the argument (earlier) that this would alienate Dravidian cadre. Until they contest national constituencies, however, the Panthers will retain a Cinderella status and lack adequate political recognition. This was emphasised in 2006 when the DMK compounded its earlier insult by requesting unconditional DPI backing for Assembly elections. The DPIs actions at this point are noteworthy. Rather than reviving the Dalit alliance that unsuccessfully contested the 2004 polls, Thirumavalavan led the DPI back into the AIADMK fold. The outset of the 2006 elections, therefore, saw a complete reversal of 2001. This time the AIADMK was isolated and its allocation of nine seats to the DPI (one more than it contested in 2001) must be read against this backdrop. The AIADMK considered us a political force and invited us to join their front, Thirumavalavan insisted, but had roles been reversed there would have been no place for them. The incremental road to political recognition took another step, however, when the DPI stood as the Viduthalai Ciruthaikal Katchi (Liberation Panther Party), not under the AIADMK banner. The Electoral Commission allotted them a bell as a campaigning symbol because the DPI has no established emblem. The political significance of visual imagery cannot be overstated in a society where most voters identify the symbol they intend to vote for rather than the party. The emotive force of such markers was apparent when the fledgling Desiya Morpokku Dravida Kazhagam (National Progressive Dravidian Federation; DMDK) was assigned a drum in 2006, leading several Dalit women to align themselves behind Vijayakant: It is our symbol, they are quoted as sayingsince beating drums made of polluting leather is traditionally a Dalit task (Hindu 2006b). The DPIs allocated marker rang no such bells. That a film star with no history of Dalit activism should elicit such a response is an indictment of Dalit parties and raises questions about the current strategy. The 2006 results favoured the DMK-led Democratic Progressive Alliance, forcing Jayalalitha to resign as chief minister. The DMK, with 96 out of the 234 seats, became the largest single party, but remained 22 short of an overall majority necessitating either a minority or coalition government. The obvious coalition partner
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(the Indian National Congress, which secured 38 seats), however, overrode the desires of the state wing of the party and agreed to shore up the minority government in return for a similar favour in Pondicherry. The AIADMK alliance gained 69 seats, of which two were won by the DPI. The remaining seven DPI candidates all finished second, but the Dravidian alliance would account for this. Did the Panthers unerringly back the loser again, or did the loser back them? Whilst they remain a second choice ally, they will be confined to the weaker coalition. So is the strategy working?

INSTITUTIONALISATION: CAGING

THE

DALIT PANTHERS?

Seven years after entering the elections, the arguments, tactics and results remain static. While the exigencies of political competition require parties to compromise and agree to a minimum common platform, if this exhausts the DPIs ambition then political participation will accomplish little whilst legitimising the political system and buttressing the politics of contingency. The repeated assurance that elections are a tactic, not a principle (Warrier 2006), is increasingly tenuous. The DPI now routinely gains press coverage of speeches, meetings and its manifesto, and the number of seats it has contested has risen. It has, however, become a stock player. Although Dalits are prevented from standing in at least four panchayats, this was not central to the partys manifesto. We may have come to the elections, Thirumavalavan insisted in 1999, when trying to persuade followers, but our warrior spirit has not changed we will not give up our struggle for liberty (speech, 7 August 1999). Political opportunism, it seems, has tamed the Dalit Panthers. The DPI, I contend, is becoming institutionalised and losing the mantle of radicalism. Institutionalisation refers to the process whereby movements develop internal organisation, become more moderate, adopt a more institutional repertoire of action and integrate into the system of interest representation (Della Porta and Diani 1999: 148). As Coy and Hedeen (2005: 407) argue, institutionalisation may lead a movement to become bureaucratized and technique centred, losing its adaptive vitality. They observe that assimilation into institutional practices can involve a dilution of movement critiques and tactics. The institutionalisation of the DPI is evident in the formalisation of the party (a rule book outlining roles and responsibilities was prepared), but also in the actions and expectations of leaders and participants: First, its willingness to support alternate Dravidian parties indicates an attenuation of ideological principles and an adaptation to the prevailing political environment. Second, the disappointment when Thirumavalavan did not stand in 2006 (Hindu 2006c) suggests that activists are increasingly focused on elections rather than sustained anti-caste activism. Third, the choice of candidates for the nine constituencies in 2006 highlighted a growing distance between the leadership and the grassroots. Dedicated local activists were passed over in the nominations (ibid.) though the party promised to bring
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the Assembly closer to the people. The four key demands on which political involvement was predicated (see earlier) have disappeared. Institutionalisation, Coy and Hedeen (2005) observe, can entail co-optation and demobilisation. Alert to this danger, Thirumavalavan argued that if the gap between the [leaders and cadre] widens too far, the people will be alienated from the movement (interview, 3 November 1999). Opportunist politics, however, will widen this rift. Already the sympathisers inspired by the DPIs radicalism in 1999 are looking elsewhere for a Dalit revival. Thirumavalavan is finished, Father J, a one-time supporter, opined (personal communication). The decision to join a Third Front in 1999 breathed air into the stultified atmosphere of Tamil politics. The failure to consolidate the Dalit vote, and the support for Dravidian parties, has reinstated the status quo. The bypassing of local activists, who cultivated constituencies and established movement strongholds, in the selection of candidates suggests that the calculations of a party machine are eroding the DPIs grassroots basis. In recounting the costs and motivations for action Subramaniam, a Dalit activist, encapsulated a problematic now confronting the DPI: None of us have saved a penny in our activism. This movement is our asset. The liberty of the people is our future. In that context it is unjust for someone to say: This is my movement (interview). The top-down allocation of seats and alliances, and the move from a movement responding to ideology and social injustice to a party, renders the DPI increasingly leader-centred. Father J noted the frustrations occasioned by this trend and spoke of DPI youth, imprisoned due to previous radicalism, plotting revenge against Thirumavalavan because they felt abandoned and betrayed (personal communication). If the groundswell of support, evident in 1999, evaporates, then the tactics will have backfired. Supporting the main parties has yet to ensure elections in reserved panchayats, let alone objectives such as land reform. Were Thirumavalavan to become an MLA or MP, then members would at least feel that they have a voice, but in 2006 the two DPI MLAs were not only on the losing side they were parachuted into the constituencies they contested. Is political engagement a failure then?

THE SOCIAL IMPACT

OF

POLITICS?

Judging the decision to contest elections solely on the basis of vote share and seats gained would be mistaken. Democracy, Lefort (1988) shows, is as much about social practice as political institutions, and it is arguably in social terms that the greatest impact of DPI politics can be seen. Dialogue with political opponents since contesting elections, for instance, has offered the potential of more inclusive politics under the banner of Tamil nationalism. Rajadurai and Geetha (2002: 121) claim that Dalits have a quarrel with the very notion of Tamilness, and Nambath (2005) regards the DPIs adoption of Tamil nationalism as a deliberate attempt to grow beyond identity politics enabled by the low social status of the dominant castes in
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Tamil Nadu who owe no allegiance to Hindutva. What they neglect is the longstanding attachment to Tamilness occasioned by Dravidian ideology and antiHindi agitation. The DPI, thus, aspires to a nation of Tamils undivided by caste (Thirumavalavan, speech, 18 July 1999). In 2000 Pandian (2000: 515) questioned the analytical utility of catch-all caste categories, arguing that the complexities of political coalitions and social mobility cannot be captured by reference to Dalits and Backward Castes. Dalit castes, for instance, have their own leaders, and we cannot assume Vanniyar, let alone Backward Caste, unity (Radhakrishnan 2002). The prevalent focus on caste categories obscures the multiplicity of identity claims: A Vanniyar, however he may assert his specific caste identity, also claims a Tamil ancestry, and in this, rhetorically at least, is willing to be part of a common nation that is transcendent of caste. (Rajadurai and Geetha 2002: 123) The contingent nature of identity formation and the possibilities of non-caste activism were emphasised between 2004 and 2006. Having been locked in implacable conflict with the PMK for a decade, the DPI began 2006 in alliance with them. The roots of this rapprochement lie in the party leaders attempt to mitigate spiralling caste violence, and their ability to forge a common identity around the supra-caste issue of Tamilness. Political identities can be re-imagined (Chandra 2004), and since 1999 the DPI have courted, and been courted by, various political interests. In this process a commitment to Tamil self-determination took Thirumavalavan to Sri Lanka to support the fight for a Tamil nation. The PMK shares this objective and both parties agreed to campaign jointly as the Tamil Protection Movement (TPI). Tapping into an emotional political current, both parties demanded Tamilmedium education and the eradication of English titles for shops and films (MyTamil.com 2004; Tamilinfodaily 2005). Political immediacy colours the cognitive template of DPI politics and the nave expectation that communities can be reimagined so speedily reflects this. Thirumavalavan outlined the TPIs contribution to harmonious social relationships: You will see that there is no brutal violence against Dalits there now. There are no law and order issues also there. The northern districts are quite peaceful (Warrier 2006). Whilst the TPI has enabled DPI/PMK (commonly seen as proxies for Paraiyars and Vanniyars) dialogue, the rosy picture painted by Thirumavalavan is misleading. The lack of physical (brutal) violence against Dalits does not mean that the structural inequalities that render Dalits dependent upon the dominant castes have been addressed. Rather, it bolsters arguments that much collective violence is politically organised. The truce between the rival parties is welcome, but unless and until the structures of mind, body and resources are reconstructed, Tamil Dalits will live under the shadow of caste discrimination. Caste clashes are not spontaneous eruptions of
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communal sentiment; rather, they feed on everyday processes of identity formation, misunderstanding and the cultural concepts of honour and shame (Gorringe 2006b). Establishing the humanity of Dalits in the eyes of caste superiors requires more than a political alliance as the 2001 results testify. Even granting the reduction in caste enmity, though, there are grounds to question whether the TPI advances Dalit objectives. In articulating a Tamilian identity, the TPI could compound the marginalisation of the most vulnerable Dalits. The politicisation of a linguistic ethnicity marginalises Telegu-speaking Chakkiliyars further, and obscures the fact that Tamil nationalism has done little to mitigate untouchability. Furthermore, the TPIs nationalism has been accompanied by a moral conservatism and ethnic chauvinism that clashes with a theoretical commitment to womens rights. The stress on chastity and the virtues of Tamil women that greeted a film actresss comments about premarital sex are in direct contrast to earlier critiques of patriarchy and the cultural constraints placed on women. All women wish to enter politics, wish to stand on the front line of such protests, do all husbands permit that? Thirumavalavan asked at a movement wedding. Addressing the Womens Struggle Committees protest against poll violence he went further still: Woman is taken to mean being the handmaid of her husband, women have yet to enter politics. Whether it be the Communist party or the Dravidian parties they see women as objects to be kept within boxes (speech, 1 November 1999). In pursuing the TPI agenda, however, Thirumavalavan has joined the morality police trying to impose an idea of virtue and rectitude onto Tamil women (cf. Anandhi 2005). This confirms the sense that the demand for womens rights was token. It is pertinent, here, that none of the DPI candidates in 2006 were women. Thirumavalavan said he would sacrifice anything for the cause of Tamil (MyTamil.com 2004), but if the Tamilian solution to exclusive identity neglects Dalit interests it constitutes a dramatic dilution of its [DPIs] radicalism (Anandhi 2005: 4876). There is also a question mark over the extent to which an appeal to a transcaste identity can be mobilised given the extent to which the political sphere has been colonised by caste concerns. Indeed, in April 2005 the joint PMK/DPI protests against the erosion of Tamil culture faltered in the face of two bye-elections (Venkatesh 2005). If the DPIs radicalism is confined to nationalist chauvinism, what has political engagement gained?

CONCLUDING REMARKS: DALITS

AND

POLITICAL OPPORTUNISM

Our people only think: If I dont like Karunanidhi, Ill vote for Jayalalitha. If I dont like the Two Leaves [AIADMK symbol], Ill vote for the Rising Sun [DMK]. But what we need to ask is: what have either government done for the downtrodden? (Thirumavalavan, speech, 7 August 1999)
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Omvedt (1994: 340) argues that Dalit protest laid the basis of an alternative Indian identity (emphasis original). In TN this alternate identity has withered as the DPI is increasingly assimilated into hegemonic politics. The centrality of caste to Tamil politics, however, makes the revival of such a project essential and overdue. Restricting such an endeavour to the Tamil nation reveals a blinkered opportunism that ignores the pan-Indian possibilities offered by the Dalit tag and the perils attending particularist nationalism. Whilst broader in scope than a reactionary Tamil identity, however, the Dalit struggle remains limited whilst Dalit is a proxy for untouchable. Anti-caste activism is undermined by caste-based mobilisation mirroring the hegemonic social relations it aims to transplant. The struggle for tolerance, as Subramanian concludes (1999: 329), will attain fuller success only if organisations less constrained by the interests of dominant or upwardly mobile groups play an important role in it. Dalit movements followed the established repertoire of protest to establish themselves on the map of Tamil politics, but the existing repertoire [also] constrains collective action (Tilly 1986: 390). Continuing repression and isolation raise the question of what politics as normal can achieve. The BSPs success makes it an obvious referent here, but Pais (2002) analysis raises similar dilemmas. Noting the compromises made by the party, she argues that it has failed to implement social change. In a question with resonance for the Panthers, she insists that the BSP is faced with a difficult decision: is it a movement with an agenda for radical social change, or a political party driven solely by the compulsion of achieving power? (ibid.: 1). Athu meeru (fight back, resist) was the DPI slogan that galvanised Dalit resistance. The radicalism of the assertion touched a nerve in rural TN, raising the prospect of significant social transformation. Chellamma, living in a village blighted by caste violence, insisted that, It is only if we return a blow for a blow that the grindstone [ammi kallu] will shift (interview). The assertion rests on the dubious assumption that counter-violence will make higher castes respect their social inferiors as equals. The empirical evidence indicates that such optimism is misplaced at best and probably counter-productive. The occasional use of violent means may have discouraged groups minded to attack Dalits, but it has not prevented antiDalit atrocities or shifted the structural inequalities that render Dalits dependent upon higher castes for land, work, water and other amenities. The DPIs transition to politics is an implicit acceptance of the failure of violent protest. Politics, as Mouffe (2000: 149) argues, is about domesticating hostility, and whilst elections have occasioned Paraiyar/Vanniyar conflict, they have also facilitated (an imperfect) dialogue and the interaction seen previously. The DPI certainly cannot hope for electoral success without reaching out to other groups, but scepticism about political involvement has deepened as the Panthers compromised their ideals. Parliamentary politics is the deciding factor, Thirumavalavan insisted in 1999, that is the centre of power (interview). The flaws in such analysis were papered over in justifying the DPIs engagement in electoral politics, but they have since come home to roost.
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Pai (2002: 244) concludes that the BSP reflects the ambitions of a class of Dalit power seekers and differentiates it from grassroots attempts to erode the bases of caste domination. Her analysis increasingly rings true for the DPI, as does her prescription for the BSP to democratise itself and articulate a new ideological perspective rooted in the material conditions of the disadvantaged. The Panthers maintain that electoral participation is a tactic, but Coy and Hedeen (2005: 418) note how rarely movements return to other forms of contention. Short of the transformation outlined by Pai, however, the DPI has institutional alternatives since, as Wyatt (2002: 753) notes: the possibility of a viable third front emerging cannot be ignored. In 2006 Vijayakants DMDK, which gained just under 10 per cent of the vote and polled more the difference between victory and second place in many instances, highlighted the viability of a serious, non-Dravidian alternative. This example suggests that the DPI could harness the politics of principle. The Dravidian parties have fomented casteism in Tamil Nadu, as Thirumavalavan avers. The eradication of caste discrimination, therefore, is not furthered by supporting them. The real prospect of a coalition government in 2006 has punctured the Dravidian parties aura of invincibility. The DMK and AIADMK can no longer assume that governing the state is their birthright. Taking steps to establish an alternative can only further the democratisation of TN and increase the credibility of the DPI. The enthusiasm accorded to autonomous Dalit candidates evaporates when our votes are for another. Making room for dissent and foster[ing] the institutions in which it can be manifested is vital for democracy, Mouffe (2000: 150) argues. Entering unstable and opportunistic alliances with political rivals is not a sustainable means of effecting social change: If a calf joins with piglets, Subramani insisted, then the two will become one and you cannot distinguish between themboth run in the gutter (interview). In striking contrast to the promise of its political debut, the DPI now constitutes an option, not an empowering alternative. Unless it can revitalise its vision and mode of operation, the DPIs political participation will do nothing for Dalit rights (Father J, personal communication). Alternately supporting the rival Dravidian parties and placing a priority on Tamil rather than Dalit issues will not shift the grindstone of caste.

POSTSCRIPT
Days after completing this paper, political developments confirmed the Panthers continuing marginalisation. The DPI was eased out of the AIADMK alliance and switched to the DMK for local body elections. The DPIs reliance on Dravidian parties was captured in Thirumavalavans assertion that: we did not want to become political orphans. The limits to Dalit acceptance, however, were highlighted when Thirumavalavanostensibly an alliance partnerwas unable to contact Jayalalitha to resolve issues after local AIADMK leaders [were] not willing to share seats (Hindu 2006d).
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NOTES
1. Backward Caste (BC) is the constitutional category of low-caste groups deemed to require positive discrimination due to their social status. Many BCs, however, are politically powerful. 2. Details of respondents follow the Notes. 3. Empirical data was collected between 1998 and 1999. The multi-sited ethnography focused on Dalit movement activists, motivations, modes of operation and ideological aspirations. The data consists of 30 group discussions, 32 formal and 30 informal interviews with activists, leaders, academics and non-participating Dalits. Interviews were complemented by participant observation. 4. For detailed accounts of Tamil politics, see Kohli (1990), Subramanian (1999), and Wyatt (2002). 5. See Harriss (2002: 1078) and Gorringe (2005) for examples of mounting anti-Dalit hostility. 6. Other groups are not disaggregated. 7. The Constitution rendered untouchability a punishable offence and reclassified Untouchables as Scheduled Castes (SCs) by reference to a schedule of castes entitled to positive discrimination. 8. Literacy rates vary, with urban Dalits more literate than the average and rural Dalits, especially in the West of the state trailing behind (Government of Tamil Nadu 2005). 9. Paraiyars, Pallars and Chakkiliyars are the largest Tamil SC groups. SCs constitute 18 per cent of the population. Paraiyars are most populous. They live throughout TN, but are concentrated in northern districts. Pallars are fewer in number, but more affluent and better organised partly due to their higher social status. They live mainly in the south and west. Chakkiliyars, the lowest of the main SCs, are traditionally landless. Many speak Telegu and are seen as outsiders. They are distributed across TN, but mainly in central and western districts. The BC groups immediately competing against SCs are Vanniyars and Thevars. Vanniyars gained Most Backward Caste status after agitating in the 1980s. They are the largest single Tamil community, accounting for 12 per cent of the population, concentrated in the northern districts. Thevars have an exaggerated sense of caste pride. Though their educational and economic achievements are negligible, they are a major landowning caste in south TN (Gorringe 2005: 5860). 10. See Note 9. 11. Mukkulathors are one of the most prominent Backward Caste groups. OBC (Other Backward Castes) refers to those castes perceived to require affirmative action to offset caste-based inequalities. They are socially backward but politically strong in Tamil Nadu.

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Cited Respondents
Thirumavalavan (interviewed 3 November 1999): Leader of the DPI. Speeches also cited. Chellamma (interviewed 20 March 1999): Landless agricultural labourer and DPI sympathiser from Madurai district.
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Father J (personal communication, 27 April 2006): Jesuit priest working for Dalit welfare. As he works closely with the DPI and other movements, he preferred not to be named. Kamaraj (interviewed 10 September 1999): Unemployed DPI activist from Madurai district. His family married him off in 1999 hoping he would settle down. Sakthidasan (interviewed 26 September 1999): Landless agricultural labourer in Chidambaram constituency. Subramani (interviewed 27 April 1999): Bricklayer and DPI activist from Cuddalore. Subramaniam (interviewed 11 October 1999): Office clerk and Tamil Dalit Liberation Movement activist.

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