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By Khurram Husain November/December 2003 pp. 62-71 (vol. 59, no. 06) 2003 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists eading the calls to war with Iraq, one was reminded of Cato the Elder, who spent his retirement urging the Roman generals to remove the thorn of Carthage permanently from Rome's side so it could never again defy Roman might. The United States has had its share of Catos--the American quest for an impregnable defense and military supremacy has a long and distinguished history. Today the effort is embodied by Paul Wolfowitz and Donald Rumsfeld in the Defense Department, key players in the Bush administration. To understand what appears to many as a revolutionary shift in U.S. foreign policy, it is useful to realize that a large part of their thinking derives from concerns with threats from weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.
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Close Help conditions of extreme uncertainty. A network of researchers was pulled in from universities--M.I.T., Princeton, and the California Institute of Technology, for example--to work together with the most advanced labs in private industry. Rand was at the cutting edge of theories on deterrence and nuclear war-fighting in the 1950s. Leading the charge was Albert Wohlstetter.
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Close Help projected that by 1984 the Soviet Union would deploy about 500 Backfire bombers--more than twice as many as were actually deployed that year. They claimed that the Soviet Union was working on an anti-acoustic submarine and, failing to find any evidence of one, stated that it may already have been deployed since it appeared to have evaded detection! Their claims were all drawn from worst-case scenarios. But the Team B reports are more significant for the thinking they reveal. The authors made projections of Soviet stockpiles and built up a picture of a Soviet Union bent on dominating the world based on wild speculation, including the writings of Field Marshal A. V. Suvorov, an eighteenth-century Russian commander. When their reports were ignored by the Carter administration, Team B members took their crusade to the press, prompting calls for congressional hearings. [6] In 1979 the Carter administration was paralyzed on the foreign policy front, under siege from military hawks, and reeling from three foreign policy disasters--a revolution sweeping Iran, another in Nicaragua, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In the editorial pages of the New York Times, Wohlstetter wrote a series of articles detailing the need to extend the U.S. security umbrella to the Persian Gulf, arguing that even if no Soviet hand could be seen behind the Iranian revolution, it still represented a threat to American interests in the Middle East and Pakistan. Two concerns merited this move in his opinion: the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the disintegration of state power in some parts of the world. [7] Meanwhile, Wolfowitz had teamed up with others in the Defense Department to submit a classified appraisal of American security policy in the Middle East that arrived at the same conclusion. [8] A new danger, more insidious and lethal, was beginning to arise: chaos from disintegrating states coupled with loose nuclear weapons in the hands of unstable parties. "How do we cope with instabilities in countries important to us?" Wohlstetter asked. "Are we saying we will use force only after an unambiguous massive Soviet attack?" [9] And what doctrines would guide the deployment of American forces in a world of chaos? What mix of hardware and software would be necessary? Was the Carter administration right to put so much emphasis on SALT II while the real military problems facing America were perilously neglected? When Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980, the members of Team B were back in business. Wolfowitz was named assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs and later served as ambassador to Indonesia. Other members found positions in the defense and state departments. Reagan's "Evil Empire" rhetoric, and the Reagan defense buildup--the largest defense budget increases in peacetime history--built on the work of Team B. The years following 1979 saw a series of interventions that did not take defense against communism as their primary justification--the deployment of U.S. Marines in Beirut, the airstrikes on Libya (perhaps the first campaign of the war on terror), the invasion of Panama (an example of "regime change" of the sort the Bush administration wishes to effect in Iraq), the deployment in Somalia, and of course, both Gulf Wars. These emerged alongside covert interventions in Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua that used local irregulars supplied through clandestine weapons merchants.
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Close Help (ONA) ever since. ONA had a murky brief. Marshall's job was to imagine every kind of threat the military might ever face. He has used the ONA to assist Team B in its efforts to access raw intelligence, follow Soviet military thinking closely, run war games involving novel scenarios, and teach a summer seminar at the Naval War College. His taste for daring ideas has not abated, and his knack for cultivating eloquent spokesmen to do his talking for him helped him spin a web that would overwhelm the defense establishment 30 years later. In the 1970s, Marshall busied himself with concepts of ballistic missile defense growing out of the Safeguard debates, and closely reading Soviet literature on nuclear war. This is where he came across the writings of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov and others on the nature of military revolutions. Soviet officers were arguing that advances in missile, communications, and sensor technologies were creating the conditions for a "military technical revolution" somewhat akin to how artillery had rendered horse-mounted cavalry obsolete. Marshall was impressed and followed the idea closely. He found that the 1920s and 1930s had been the most dynamic period in military revolutions, with new technologies like aircraft, but also new operational concepts in supply and maneuver like blitzkrieg. He became an advocate of just such a revolution, one that was operationally as well as technologically driven. He called his ideas the "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA). Failing to make much headway with top-level decision-makers in replacing containment and deterrence thinking, Marshall turned his attention to the officer corps of the Pentagon. He attracted quite a following. Barry Watts, an air force pilot and graduate of the Air Force Academy, took his ideas to Northrop Grumman Corporation and, as director of their Analysis Center, persuaded the company to look away from large fighter platforms toward high-tech avionics. Grumman was the first company to bring the idea of RMA on board. Marshall's best known supporter is probably Donald Rumsfeld; their association dates from Rumsfeld's first tenure as defense secretary in the Ford administration. Rumsfeld was an early proponent of ballistic missile defense and chaired the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States in 1998. Following the Soviet collapse, Marshall had a brief period when he argued that the Soviet Union was now at its most dangerous moment--that it might lash out in one last effort to hold its empire together. In the early 1990s Marshall became a China hawk, arguing that China's growth rate meant it could become a nuclear competitor within 25 years. By 1993, the ONA was conducting a series of roundtable discussions in which all the services discussed the military impact of advances in information technology, the value of space warfare, joint operational commands, greater coordination, and the impact of declining budgets. By 1994, Marshall's 20-year efforts to convert the Pentagon officer corps were beginning to bear fruit. Deputy Defense Secretary William Perry started a project to conduct a department-wide discussion of the RMA. The project looked at future defense needs, recommended the most promising technologies and operational concepts, and conducted war games. When George W. Bush's administration came to power, the RMA was put into practice. Rumsfeld was named defense secretary, and began by naming Barry Watts to the Program Evaluation and Assessment Office and appointing James Roche as secretary of the Air Force. He created the Force Transformation Office to drive his vision of "transforming" the armed forces. Then he surprised everyone by appointing Andrew Marshall to conduct a sweeping review and make recommendations to transform the military into a twentyfirst-century fighting force. The RMA no longer belonged to the dedicated fringe, where it had originated. Its adherents were in control, and they were going to make their presence felt. The outcome was reflected in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, which called for reshaping the armed forces to make them lighter, faster, more flexible, and able to conduct multi-theater operations simultaneously. The Bush administration announced its intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and deploy a functioning ballistic missile defense before the 2004 election, much to the dismay of its allies. In January 2002, while the world was distracted by the release of the Osama bin Laden tape in which he appears to implicate himself in the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration announced its withdrawal from ABM. Rumsfeld, guided by Marshall's ideas, envisages a military that is able to run air, land, sea, and space operations with an unprecedented level of coordination. RMA concepts seek to endow the fighting forces with a level of "asymmetric advantage" on the battlefield that denies the enemy any chance of engagement. [12] Marshall is opposed to any weapons platforms that place U.S. personnel within firing range of the enemy--unlike the 37,000 troops stationed in South Korea. Through RMA and missile defense, Rumsfeld seeks to prepare U.S. military forces to fight any sort of conflict, in any terrain, while keeping the continental United States secure from retaliation. His concepts call for armed forces that can wage war from a distance that the enemy cannot cross, with an accuracy the enemy cannot evade, at a speed the enemy cannot understand. Rumsfeld's ideal war would end before the enemy had figured out it was at war.
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Close Help sanctions, for their part, could not be maintained indefinitely, either. The status quo was the quagmire, and regime change was the only way out. And the sooner it was carried out, the lower the cost of the operation and rebuilding would be. The quest for an impregnable defense and military supremacy over the rest of the world has brought America to a perilous moment of truth. The war in Iraq is located where Wohlstetter and Wolfowitz's ideas of strategic supremacy intersect with the impregnable force that Marshall and Rumsfeld wish to build. The application of counterforce ideas to a guerrilla war pulled the United States into a colossal quagmire in Vietnam. But the doctrine of preemptive action turns the iron law of necessity in nuclear strategy into foreign policy. This time the quagmire will not be an unwinnable war in one country, but endless war across a vast stretch of the Earth--a war from which extrication will be next to impossible. As the lone superpower girds itself for a ruinous entanglement in an uncertain part of the world, it is well to remember that Cato the Elder, too, got his way. Rome did wage war on Carthage, in the Third Punic War. Carthage was obliterated. Rome reigned supreme over the Mediterranean, but at a price. The triumph heralded the death of the Republic. The Empire was left battling phantom enemies--inflation, disease, the decay of the civic life that had been the backbone of Roman society, and the deep disaffection of large numbers of its peripheral inhabitants who looked elsewhere for a power to obey--forces that eventually overwhelmed Rome itself.
1. Quoted in Fred M. Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 31. I have relied extensively on this book for material on discussions relating to Rand. For a concise summary of Wohlstetter's thinking, see John Baylis and John Garnett, eds., The Makers of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991). 2. Kaplan, pp. 97--110. 3. Kaplan, p. 102. See also The Delicate Balance of Terror, November 6, 1958, Rand Publication P-1472, for a declassified statement of Wohlstetter's ideas on the vulnerabilities of deterrence. 4. Albert Wohlstetter, Objectives of the United States Military Posture, Rand Publication RM-2373, May 1, 1959. 5. Albert Wohlstetter, On Vietnam and Bureaucracy, Rand Publication D-17276-1-ISA/ARPA, July 17, 1968. 6. See Anne Hessing Kahn, "Team B: The Trillion Dollar Experiment, Part One" and John Prados, "Team B: The Trillion Dollar Experiment, Part Two," both Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1993. For Team B politics see Jerry W. Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment (Boston: South End Press, 1983), pp. 197--204. On the impact of the Team B reports in shaping attitudes, see David Binder, "New CIA Estimate Finds Soviet Seeks Superiority in Arms," New York Times, Dec. 26, 1976. For a summary of the resurgence of militarist factions during the 1976 election, see Anthony Lewis, "The Brooding Hawks," New York Times, Feb. 10, 1977. 7. Albert Wohlstetter, "Making Peace and Keeping It," New York Times, Jan. 29, 1979. 8. Bill Keller, "The Sunshine Warrior," New York Times Magazine, Sept. 22, 2002. 9. Albert Wohlstetter, "The Uses of Irrelevance," New York Times, Feb. 25, 1979. 10. Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," New York Times, March 8, 1992. 11. Patrick E. Tyler, "Lone Superpower Plan: Ammunition for Critics," New York Times, March 10, 1992; "America Only," New York Times editorial, March 10, 1992. 12. For more on the revolution in military affairs, see comw.org/rma/index.html.
Until recently, Khurram Husain taught at the Lahore University of Management Sciences, in Lahore, Pakistan. He is also a contributor to the Pakistani press on issues connected to U.S. foreign policy. November/December 2003 pp. 62-71 (vol. 59, no. 06) 2003 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
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