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Research Note

Smoke and Mirrors: The German Foreign Intelligence Service’s Release of Names of Former Nazi Employees

Stephen Tyas St. Albans, UK

After defeating the Third Reich, the Western Allies and the Soviet Bloc began their own intelligence war. Both sides recruited from among their former mutual enemies: Nazi security personnel. In the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland, BRD) the largest employer of such persons was the Gehlen Organization, which in 1956 became the core of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), the BRD’s foreign intelligence service, with Reinhard Gehlen as its first chief. In 2010 the BRD revealed career details of early officials who had Nazi backgrounds. The author of this note clarifies the identities of some Holocaust perpetrators who later served in West German intelligence, and also suggests why German authorities released only partial information and only about certain employees, most of whom been identified earlier in declassified US documents.

After sixty-five years in Pullach, outside Munich, Germany’s foreign intelligence service recently moved much of its headquarters to Berlin. This return can be seen as symbolizing the abandonment of a long-standing tacit reluctance to dwell on the Bundesnachrichtendienst’s World War II roots in the Wehrmacht intelligence agency Fremde Heere Ost (Foreign Armies East), which acquired Soviet military information for Hitler’s General Staff. In the form of the “Gehlen Organization,” this operation gained the postwar sponsorship of the US military administration and subsequently the CIA, becoming in 1956 the Bundesnachrichtendienst, the Federal Republic of Germany’s foreign intelligence agency. The same man who directed the activities of all three German agencies was Reinhard Gehlen. The Gehlen Organization carried out intelligence-gathering work against the Soviet Bloc on behalf of the West as early as 1946, eventually claiming successes from the Baltics to the Black Sea. Gehlen infiltrated agents into the Soviet Union, enlisting many from among Russian and Ukrainian emigre´ circles, continuing

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methods employed during World War II, and maintaining contacts with agents who stayed after the war. British intelligence similarly infiltrated spies into the Baltic countries and the Ukraine by sea and air. Despite successes, agents often ran up against the rigorous secret police measures that the USSR and its satellites employed to control their own populations. Operational failures led to captures, betrayals, and the execution of contacts. Writing in 1971, E.H. Cookridge claimed that “Gehlen exercised profound influence in the Anglo-American conduct of the Cold War against Communism, scoring impressive successes during the most diffi- cult stages of the confrontation between the East and the West in the 1950s.” 1 But once the program to declassify records of US intelligence agencies began in 2000, and historians gained access to extensive CIA documentation, a different view emerged. In 2004 Timothy Naftali observed that “Reinhard Gehlen [used] U.S. funds to create a large intelligence bureaucracy that not only undermined the Western critique of the Soviet Union by protecting [Nazi] war criminals, but also was arguably the least effective and secure in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” 2 Ever since the war ended, observers have expressed continuing interest in whom the Gehlen Organization was employing, especially personnel hired during its early days, when the pool of readily available candidates included former Nazis, possible war criminals, and others tainted by association with the Nazi regime. 3 Naftali has stated that “at least one hundred of Gehlen’s officers and agents had served with the SD [Sicherheitsdienst, Security Service] or the Gestapo, and the number may in fact be significantly higher.” Many of these, according to Naftali,

higher.” Many of these, according to Naftali, 1945 US Army Signal Corps photos of Generalmajor Reinhard

1945 US Army Signal Corps photos of Generalmajor Reinhard Gehlen, who went on to become the leader of the Gehlen Organization and first president of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service).

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“had participated in the worst atrocities committed by the Nazi regime.” 4 Writing in 2004, Hans Georg Wieck, BND president from 1985 to 1990 and thus someone who must have had an idea of the real numbers, acknowledged that Gehlen’s

organization might have recruited around 100 “former SS men

crimes.” Evidently Wieck had little interest in really setting the record straight 5 :

that figure probably was based on the files declassified in 2001 by the CIA in response to the efforts of the so-called Inter-Agency Working Group (IWG) of his- torians and intelligence officers appointed by Congress to review classified docu- mentation under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998. Known as the “Name Files,” this particular batch identified 110 such Nazi recruits, though they contained only limited substantive material. 6 A second IWG declassification of CIA files in 2004 added more information about the 110, and made another thirty-seven files available—in general, the work of the IWG resulted in the release of a vast amount of documentary material con- cerning postwar intelligence employment of former Nazis, some of them Holocaust perpetrators. The report the Group presented to Congress was pub- lished in 2004 as U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis . 7 It showed that the CIA spon- sored the Gehlen Organization, knowing full well that it was enlisting men with a dubious past, many of them likely war criminals. CIA personnel expressed qualms, but accepted the situation as long as Gehlen obtained results. On March 17, 2010, the BND surprised many by giving access to some of its own files to the respected German daily the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), which went on to publish a series of articles about ex-Nazis employed by Gehlen and the BND. 8 The FAZ reported that it had identified more than 200 officials with Gestapo, SS, Waffen-SS, or other Nazi pasts. Some had been enlisted personally by General Gehlen. As of 1960—arguably the height of the Cold War— more than 8 percent of the BND’s 2,450 employees (216 or more) had had earlier careers in “Himmler’s Empire.” Another former head of the BND, Hansjo¨ rg Geiger (1996–1998), admitted that “It has always been clear that the BND had a dark past. But I never would have reckoned with such a high proportion.” Geiger acknowledged that “only trans- parency about the past will clearly establish that the present-day BND has nothing in common with the service in its early years.” 9 But the present head of the BND, Ernst Uhrlau, argued in the FAZ for a balance between “necessary secrecy and a desirable transparency”: even after sixty years some material would have to remain secret. 10 One question that remains unanswered is why the BND allowed a news- paper to publish names of its former employees while at the same time keeping the files themselves in their closed archives—such material is not transferred to Germany’s national archive, the Bundesarchiv. This system differs of course from that in the USA, and to some extent Britain, where intelligence agencies routinely declassify files and send them to their national archives.

guilty of war

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Examining material from intelligence agencies in the national archives of both the US and the UK, one might overlook another public archive, that of the former Ministry of State Security of the German Democratic Republic, or the “Stasi archives.” This collection now resides in the Bundesarchiv Berlin under the name “Der Bundesbeauftragte fu¨ r die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik” (BStU; the Federal Commissioner for Documentation of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic). During the 1950s two Stasi moles in the Gehlen Organization and the BND— Hans Sommer and Hans Clemens, former Gestapo officers themselves—reported periodically to East Berlin on their former Gestapo and SD colleagues. Clemens was especially prolific, providing information on approximately 200 former Nazis taken on by Gehlen. Ironically, when East Germany first published The Brown Book: Nazi and War Criminals in the Federal Republic and in West Berlin in 1965, only one passing reference to Gehlen’s wartime career appeared; no individual officials of his organization or the BND are named. 11 Both East German and West German intelligence agencies wanted to protect their sources and employees, despite the fact that each side knew who worked for the other. The BND disclosed part of their “dark past” in a redacted (i.e., with all but the first initial of the last name blacked out) list of forty-seven ex-Nazi recruits. The release included a very short biography for each. Along with my own archival research, this information has permitted identification of most. In fact the CIA had already declassified files on thirty of these agents as a result of the IWG’s efforts; thus only seventeen had been unknown outside the BND. Why the BND chose the particular individuals on its list remains a mystery. One factor may have been that they already were dead; another could be that since CIA “Name Files” on many were already publicly available, the BND actually was giving away little. Whatever the case may have been, the information we now have allows us to identify diverse wartime careers. Twenty-seven of the forty-seven had worked in the Gestapo, two in the Kripo (criminal police), and twelve in the SD’s foreign intelligence service (RSHA VI). Another four had served in the Waffen-SS, six in the Geheime Feldpolizei (Secret Field Police), and two in senior posts in the Hitler Youth. Of those who had seen service outside the Reich, twenty-three had been in “the East” (including Czechoslovakia), seventeen in the West. Some had been involved in shootings and massacres of civilians, including Jews. The Gestapo officers were by no means junior, and several had held senior positions. SS-Captain Friedrich Busch (“Friedrich B.”) had been a departmental chief in Gestapo offices at Trier (Germany), Innsbruck (Austria), Angers (France), and Verona (Italy). In 1942 he was deputy commander of the security police in Angers; in 1945 an SS court downgraded him for “failings” as deputy Gestapo chief in Innsbruck. After the war a French military tribunal convicted Busch for

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crimes committed at Angers, but released him from prison in 1952. He was recruited to the BND not long thereafter, probably in 1953, by Heinz Felfe, with whom he worked in espionage against the Soviet Union—at least until Felfe was unmasked as a Soviet mole in 1961. 12 SS-Major Rudolf Fumy (“Rudolf F.”) worked throughout the war for Department IV of the Reich Security Main Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt, RSHA), the branch that administered the Gestapo. He had dealt “with illegal organizations and communist groups” for RSHA IV B2a until June 1941, when he was assigned to RSHA IV A1 to prepare the daily Activity Reports ( Ereignismeldungen ) of the Einsatzgruppen in the occupied

Soviet territories detailing massacres of Jews and other victims. Between 1942 and

1945 his purview had been “questions relating to Eastern workers brought to

Germany for labor.” 13 SS-Captain Heinrich Reiser (“Heinrich R.”) features widely in survivor

memoirs of the Rote Kapelle, a Soviet espionage group uncovered in 1942. A pro- fessional police officer before he transferred in 1933 to the Gestapo, Reiser was stationed in Paris in 1942. After the arrest of a wireless operator connecting Soviet intelligence with the Rote Kapelle, Reiser was made head of a special unit within the Paris Gestapo that was charged with investigating Soviet espionage in France. Between November 1942 and July 1943 Reiser commanded “Sonderkommando Rote Kapelle” and made a series of arrests that eventually led to Leopold Trepper, Rote Kapelle’s chief in France. Many of those captured were horribly tortured to extract information. Those who survived were sent to concentration camps in Germany, where most were murdered. In 1943 Reiser returned to Gestapo Karlsruhe to oversee foreign workers. After the war, Reiser went into hiding. In

1948 he was arrested by the German authorities and detained until March 1950.

That July, the US 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment interviewed Reiser on behalf of British intelligence, who were keen on interrogating him about the Rote Kapelle. But the CIC reported on July 12, 1950, that Reiser had “disap- peared”—probably recruited by the Gehlen Organization, which also was still interested in the Rote Kapelle. On behalf of Gehlen, Reiser conducted an investi- gation into surviving Rote Kapelle links. His assessment, running to 257 pages, can be found among the declassified CIA documents. According to one study, “Reiser saw conspiracies everywhere,” a fact that “showed the dangers of having a former Gestapo officer in a senior postwar intelligence position.” 14

The Gehlen Organization similarly recruited SS-Major Walter Otten (“Walter O.”), who had worked in the Gestapo from 1933 until 1943, when he transferred to the SD. In 1945 he served on the staff of Walter Schellenberg, chief of SD foreign intelligence (RSHA VI), investigating and supervising their own employees and the latters’ confidential informants. Otten thus had a wide knowledge of SD men, their capabilities, and their reliability, important knowledge for the Gehlen Organization. 15 Another long-serving Gestapo officer (1933–1942) who transferred

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to RSHA VI was SS-Captain Dr. Wilhelm Schmitz (“Dr. Wilhelm-Heinrich S.”). During the war Schmitz was a counter-espionage specialist in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and in the Balkans; he is believed to have been an early recruit to the Gehlen Organization and to have been its station chief in Prague as early as 1951. 16 Such senior Gestapo officers were joined by many former Gestapo non-commissioned officers. One of the latter was former SS-Sergeant Heinrich Hedderich of Gestapo Trier (1936–1945). His principal job had been investigating local resistance movements in this area that bordered Luxembourg and where many Poles were kept in POW camps but allowed out in working parties. According to the redacted list, Hedderich was on detached duty with an interroga- tion unit at Wittlich civil prison near Trier (1940–1941). Polish POW officers who fomented resistance or sabotage were imprisoned and interrogated here. With this record, it remains unclear whether Hedderich could offer Gehlen anything other than the ability to interrogate Poles. 17 Two others on the list had criminal wartime records. SS-Lieutenant Hans Becher (Hans. B.), an Austrian, was employed from 1938 to 1944 by the “Jewish Department” of the Vienna Gestapo, the office fulfilling Adolf Eichmann’s orders for the destruction of the Jewish population of Austria; between 1940 and 1944 Becher was on detached service with the Gestapo in Belgrade, again in the Jewish Department, carrying out Eichmann’s orders. During Becher’s tenure there, more than 30,000 Jews were murdered in Serbia itself by German and collaborationist units, and another 28,000 deported to the Germans’ concentration camps. By the end of the war Becher had returned to Gestapo Vienna; on September 20, 1945, he was arrested near Salzburg by 430th CIC Detachment and placed in Camp Marcus W. Orr at nearby Glasenbach. He escaped on July 2, 1947, but was not subsequently traced—now protected by the Gehlen Organization—by the Americans. 18 The career of SS-Lieutentant Sebastian Ranner (Sebastian R.) differed signif- icantly. Ranner had worked his way up through the ranks of Gestapo Munich from 1933, to be commissioned in 1941 and promoted again in 1943. In 1941 and 1942 Ranner worked for Gestapo Luxembourg, returning to Germany to witness the end of the war as Gestapo chief in Regensburg, where he was arrested on May 26, 1945. When questioned by US intelligence officers on June 28, Ranner readily admitted responsibility for the deaths of at least two Luxembourg resistance members. His superiors had been more than satisfied with his work there, awarding him a medal for his relentlessness and the “immense enthusiasm [that] led to the complete smashing of public and secret opposition.” 19 In May 1946 Ranner was extradited to Luxembourg for trial on war crimes charges. After his release and return to Germany, Gehlen had no scruples in enlisting this admitted war criminal. Among the SD officers recruited by Gehlen was SS-Lieutenant Dr Ju¨ rgen von Hehn (“Dr. Ju¨ rgen H.”). On the redacted list Hehn’s wartime career appears

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innocuous enough, but in fact he had spent much of the war looting millions of books, documents, art objects, and other property from libraries, archives, and museums in Poland and the occupied Soviet territories. As late as January 1944 he had been in charge of a looting unit in Minsk. After brief contacts with US intelli- gence in 1948 and 1949, Hehn was recruited by Gehlen sometime during the 1950s. 20 In all probability, after the transition from the Gehlen Organization to the BND, enlistment of former Nazis slowed. Although defenders have justified employing ex-Nazis by citing the need for their expertise on Communism, it emerges from the redacted names list that not all such recruits had had earlier careers “fighting Communism”: some had spent the war years entirely in the Netherlands and France investigating the local resistance (British, Dutch, and French agents were active in the non-communist networks). Although after the war the Gehlen Organization was focused primarily on the Soviet Bloc, at least until the transition to the BND it devoted at least some attention to the BRD’s western neighbors. Personnel devoted to this “task” included former SD France expert SS-Major Andreas Biederbick (“Andreas B.”). 21 Another Gestapo France expert was SS-Lieutenant Wilhelm Hahn (“Wilhelm H.”), who had spent the years from 1940 to 1945 at Border Police posts on the Franco-German frontier. 22 The enlistment of such men indicates that after the war Gehlen and his staff did not entirely change their geographical orientation to the East. Possibly the most sinister name on the redacted list is that of Johannes Hossbach (“Johannes H.”). Hossbach already had seven years’ service with the crimi- nal police in Berlin before posting to Slovakia in 1944, where in November and December he was a unit commander with Einsatzkommando 14 (subordinate to Einsatzgruppe H). He was stationed in Altsohl (Zvolen) when 127 Jews and Roma were shot at the local Jewish cemetery, and a further 105 persons (including at least thirteen Jews) were shot at nearby Kova´ cˇ ova. Hossbach was questioned by the West German police in Munich about these events on three occasions between 1960 and 1971. But during the course of a judicial investigation in 1964 it was noted, apparently in his favor, that Hossbach was currently employed by the BND; on December 28, 1971, the case against him was set aside because “it is not clear on what grounds and under what circumstances” the shootings had taken place. 23 We cannot document BND intervention on Hossbach’s behalf, but it seems quite possible. These forty-seven men were not the most senior Nazis enlisted by Gehlen, and not all merited prosecution for war crimes. The IWG report and the CIA “Name Files” already had documented many of the mass murderers in BND employ: Franz Six, Konrad Fiebig, and Rudolf Oebsger-Ro¨ der, for instance. Obviously, fear of potential embarrassment inhibited the BND, though in other instances it did not prevent acknowledgment of the connections of even famous war criminals such as Klaus Barbie or Adolf Eichmann with the Gehlen

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Organization. Barbie, at least, was in contact with the BND in 1966, reporting on Bolivia; 24 the BND apparently knew Eichmann’s whereabouts in Argentina as early as 1952, but regarded him as a fugitive from justice and did not seek contact with him. 25 Intelligence agencies are characteristically reticent about publicizing the resume´ s of their employees—past or present. The BND is no exception. Did the postwar change of employer really mean a completely different direction for the forty-seven former Nazis on the redacted list? Probably not. Intelligence agencies rarely find success easy; in any time theirs is typically a difficult path, one often leading to failures. Morality may have been in short supply during Europe’s Cold War:

both sides sought success at all costs. In the case of the Federal Republic of Germany (and by extension, the US) the big players seemed to care more about the intelligence skills some of their most valued employees had acquired during World War II than about how the latter had treated the peoples under their unrestricted control.

Postscript On January 13, 2011, the online version of Der Spiegel reported that a commission of four Germans would be allowed to examine the BND archives, including its top-secret files. However, there was a rider: they will not be permitted to publish everything they find. 26

Stephen Tyas is a freelance researcher who writes on the Nazi Security Police and war criminals. His publications include “Escapes of Allied Prisoners of War and Forced Labourers from German Captivity” (2010); “Im Dienste Seiner Majesta¨t: Die Nachkriegskarriere des Horst Kopkow” (2009); “Allied Intelligence Agencies and the Holocaust: Information Acquired from German Prisoners of War” (2008); “Adolf Eichmann:

New Information from British Signals Intelligence” (2006); and “Der britische Nachrichtendienst: Entschlu¨ sselte Funkmeldungen aus dem Generalgouvernement” (2004).

Notes

1. E.H. Cookridge, Gehlen: Spy of the Century (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1971), 26.

2. Timothy Naftali, “Reinhard Gehlen and the United States,” in Richard Breitman,

Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Wolfe, eds., U.S. Intelligence and the

Nazis, (Washington: National Archives Trust Fund Board for the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records, Interagency Working Group, 2004), 406.

3. These earlier attempts to identify Nazis and other war criminals enlisted by the Gehlen

Organization and the BND include: Heinz Ho¨ hne and Hermann Zolling, Pullach Intern (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe Verlag, 1971), later published in English as Network (London: Secker & Warburg, 1972); Christoper Simpson, Blowback: America’s Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effect on the Cold War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988); Mary Ellen Reese, General Reinhard Gehlen: The CIA Connection (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press, 1990); and most recently, Stefanie Waske, Mehr Liaison als Kontrolle: Die

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Kontrolle des BND durch Parlament und Regierung, 1955–1978 (Wiesbaden: Verlag fu¨ r Sozialwissenschaften, 2008).

4. Naftali, “Reinhard Gehlen,” 377.

5. Timothy Naftali, “Berlin to Baghdad: The Pitfalls of Hiring Enemy Intelligence,” Foreign

Affairs 83, no. 4 (2004); comments by Hans-Georg Wieck and Clarence W. Schmitz; and

response by Timothy Naftali, “Spies Like Us,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 6 (2004).

6. US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), RG 263, CIA “Name Files,”

first release in 2000, Entry ZZ-16; and second release in 2005, Entry ZZ-18. Both sources should be compared with the finding aid “CIA Lexicon.”

7. Breitman et al., U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis.

8. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung disclosures about the BND and its recruitment of

former Nazi officials are found at these URLs, all accessed on June 8, 2011: http://www.faz.

net/s/Rub594835B672714A1DB1A121534F010EE1/Doc~E6EA444FEEA7646A083EA1761

10 DC18E3~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html; http://www.faz.net/s/Rub594835B672714A1D

B1A121534F010EE1/Doc~EA65AAB2D1C2048249EAD3E3BC2FA6BAA~ATpl~Ecommon~

Scontent.html; and http://www.faz.net/s/Rub594835B672714A1DB1A121534F010EE1/Doc~

EE10E30E33EE74A63AE71676C68A03D14~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html.

9. The Times (London), March 20, 2010.

10. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung disclosures.

11. Executive Committee of the National Front of Democratic Germany, Brown Book: War

and Nazi Criminals in the Federal Republic and in West Berlin (Berlin: Verlag Zeit im Bild,

1968).

12. Bernhard Brunner, Der Frankreich-Komplex: Die nationalsozialistischen Verbrechen in

Frankreich und die Justiz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Go¨ ttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2004), 184–87, 322; Third Detailed Interrogation report of Dr. Klaus Huegel, CSDIC/ CMF/SD5, May 19, 1945, National Archives, Kew, UK (NA), WO 208/3258.

13. Leopold Trepper, The Great Game: The Story of the Red Orchestra (London: Michael

Joseph, 1977), 220–29, 424–25; Heinz Ho¨ hne, Codeword: Direktor. The Story of the Red Orchestra , (London: Secker & Warburg, 1971), 91–92, 232–36; Norman J.W. Goda, “Tracking the Red Orchestra: Allied Intelligence, Soviet Spies, Nazi Criminals,” in Breitman et al., U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis , 306–307; name file for Heinrich Reiser, NARA, RG 319, Investigative Records Repository (IRR).

14. Michael Wildt, Generation des Unbedingten: Das Fu¨ hrungskorps des

Reichssicherheitshauptamtes (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition HIS, 2002), 342; see also Dienstaltersliste der Schutzstaffel der NSDAP (SS-Obersturmbannfu¨ hrer bis SS-Sturmbannfu¨ hrer), Stand vom 1. Oktober 1944 (Berlin: Reichsdruckerei, 1944).

Stand vom 1. Oktober 1944; interrogation of Ernst

Schu¨ ddekopf, SIR 1728, October 1, 1945, NA, WO 208/3620.

Stand vom 1. Oktober 1944. MI5 name files for

16. Dienstaltersliste der Schutzstaffel

15. Dienstaltersliste der Schutzstaffel

Eugen Steimle, NA, KV 2/966; and MI5 name file for Herbert Kru¨ ger, KV 2/978; both

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name Schmitz as personal adviser to Walter Schellenberg, chief of SD foreign intelligence (RSHA VI), 1944–1945. CIA name file for Wilhelm Schmitz, NARA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18.

17. Befehlsblatt, No. 26/1943, dated May 29, 1943.

18. Johann (Hans) Becher, b. August 22, 1911; after the war rumor had him in Alexandria

as instructor to the Egyptian police service. See http://www.tellthechildrenthetruth.com/ where.html (accessed June 2, 2011). The Gehlen Organization sent many former Nazis to Egypt in the 1950s to train police and military units. For Becher’s wartime career see also recently declassified name file for Hans Becher, NARA, RG 319, IRR; and Holm Sundhausen, “Jugoslawien,” in Dimension des Vo¨ lkermords: Die Zahl der ju¨ dischen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch, 1996), 330. Becher does not have a CIA name file at this time.

19. Befehlsblatt des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, Berlin, No. 28/41, July 26,

1941; and No. 30/43, June 21, 1943, NARA, T175/238. Name file for Sebastian Ranner, NARA, RG 319, IRR. Award of military decoration in “Vorschlagsliste fu¨ r Kriegsverdienstkreuz II. Klasse mit Schwertern,” March 13, 1942, BStU, MfS-HA XX Nr. 3596, pp. 138–42.

20. Heyn was born in 1912 and died in 1983. Michael Burleigh, Germany Turns Eastwards:

A Study of Ostforschung in the Third Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 236, 391; also, www.ahf-muenchen.de/Forschungsberichte/Jahrbuch1996/Pistohlkors. shtml, accessed May 18, 2011.

21. Dienstaltersliste der Schutzstaffel

Stand vom 1. Oktober 1944; Wildt, Generation des

Unbedingten, 523, 842; Lutz Hachmeister, “Die Rolle des SD-Personals in der Nachkriegszeit: Zur nationalsozialistischen Durchdringung der Bundesrepublik,” in Nachrichtendienst, politische Elite, Mordeinheit: Der Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsfu¨ hrers SS , ed. Michael Wildt (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2003), 366.

22. Befehlsblatt des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, Berlin, no. 53/43, November

13, 1943, in NARA, T175/238.

23. Lenka Sindelarova, whose forthcoming Ph.D. thesis (Stuttgart University) treats the role

of Einsatzgruppe H in 1944 and 1945, graciously shared the information identifying

Johannes Hossbach.

24. “Nazi Verbrecher Barbie war BND Agent,” Spiegel Online (Der Spiegel ), January 15,

2011, at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,druck-739712,00.html (accessed

June 7, 2011).

25. “Deutscher Geheimdienst kannte Eichmann-Versteck schon 1952,” Spiegel Online ( Der

Spiegel ), January 8, 2011, at http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/0,1518,druck-738465,00.html

(accessed June 2, 2011).

26. “Historiker beim BND: Geheimdienst la¨sst sich in die Akten gucken,” Spiegel Online

(Der Spiegel ), January 13, 2011, at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,

druck-739405,00.html (accessed June 2, 2011).

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