Body of Reviewer, LTD Bas

Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
Prof. Dan Gatmaytan

I. A. PHILIPPINE LAND LAWS: HISTORY AND APPLICATION The General Rules
The bedrock of all Philippine land laws is the Regalian Doctrine, which is contained in Art. XII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It provides that all lands of the public domain, except agricultural lands, belong to the State and cannot be alienated. The doctrine, which was first enacted in the 1935 Constitution, was adopted to preserve the States natural resources and land in favor of Filipinos.
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS 160 SCRA 228 (1988) Facts: Jose dela Rosa sought to register a parcel of land. The land was divided into 9 lots. Lots 1-5 were purchased from Balbalio while Lots 6-9 were purchased from Alberto. Both Balbalio and Alberto claim to have acquired the lots by virtue of prescription. The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc., Atok Big Wedge Corp. and the Bureau of Forestry Development. Benguet and Atok opposed on the ground of valid mining claims, while the Bureau of Forestry objected because the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, hence, not subject to alienation. The trial court denied the application. The CA reversed TC, affirming the surface rights of dela Rosa over the land while reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims. Held: Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property by virtue of their respective mining claims. Ratio:. While it is true that the property was considered forest land, they were removed from the public domain and had become private properties from the perfection of the mining claims of Benguet and Atok. The evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession submitted by dela Rosa was insufficient to support claim of ownership. Even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of dela Rosa had really been in possession of the property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining claim but of the property as agricultural land, which it was not. The theory of the CA that the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface is erroneous. It is a well-known principle that the owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height (Art. 437, NCC). The rights over the land are indivisible and the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The rule is, once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State (the Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private land) to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private property, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein.
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This reviewer is a product of the joint efforts of the members of the LTD Class of 2 nd sem, AY 2000-2001, particularly the graduating class of 2001 (Cheryl Pena, Mona Katigbak, Jun-Jun Bautista, Harvey Braceros, Ato Pagdanganan, Aimee Villaflor, Cherell de Castro, Ian Castillo, Jerome Bonsol, Donna Dideles, Pat Cortes, Tel Recinto, Jem Camania, Ariel Tanangonan), 2002-C (Elvin Cruz, Weng Lardizabal, Tina Bayhon, Richie Raymundo), 2002-A (Toni Aguilar, Kit Belmonte), 2004-E (Pam Abalos, Jary Agbon, Mae Reyes, Chizper de Guzman, Debby Sy). As compiled, edited and annotated by Tanya Lat (2001-E).

Prof. Dan Gatmaytan
SUNBEAM CONVENIENCE FOODS, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS 181 SCRA 443 (1990)
Facts. Director of Lands issued sales patent over two parcels of land in favor of Sunbeam. After registration, the Register of Deeds issued OCT. Subsequently, OCT was cancelled and TCTs were issued in favor of Coral Beach Devt Corp. The Republic instituted before the CFI a civil action for reversion as the land was classified as forest land. Trial court dismissed the complaint on the theory that since the titles sought to be cancelled emanated from the administrative act of the Bureau of Lands Director, the latter, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the disposition of the land. CA set aside the Order of Dismissal and ordered presiding judge to receive the answers of Sunbeam and Coral Beach in the action for reversion. Ratio: The Regalian doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber and mineral lands to the dominion of the State. Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer any validity on such title if the property covered by the title or patent is part of the public forest.
Police Power
MINERS ASSOCIATION VS FACTORAN 240 SCRA 100 (1995) FACTS: The instant petition seeks a ruling from this Court on the validity of two Administrative Orders issued by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to carry out the provisions of certain Executive Orders promulgated by the President in the lawful exercise of legislative powers. Herein controversy was precipitated by the change introduced by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution on the system of exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources. The options open to the State are through direct undertaking or by entering into co-production, joint venture; or production-sharing agreements, or by entering into agreement with foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development and utilization. Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279, the DENR Secretary issued on June 23, 1989 DENR Administrative Order No. 57, series of 1989, captioned "Guidelines of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under Executive Order No. 279 where all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution except small scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or less, shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines. On November 20, 1980, the Secretary of the DENR Administrative Order No. 82, series of 1990, laying down the "Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) through Negotiation." requiring the persons or entities to submit Letter of Intent (LOIs) and Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSAs) within two (2) years from the effectivity of DENR Administrative Order No. 57 or until July 17, 1991. Failure to do so within the prescribed period shall cause the abandonment of mining, quarry and sand and gravel claims ______________________________________________________________________________________

Prof. Dan Gatmaytan
ISSUE: In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. mainly contends that respondent Secretary of DENR issued both Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 in excess of his rule-making power under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279. On the assumption that the questioned administrative orders do not conform with Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279, petitioner contends that both orders violate the non-impairment of contract provision under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution on the ground that Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates existing mining leases and other mining . HELD: Well settled is the rule that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to in this petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State. The State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police power, being coextensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest, extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution OPOSA VS FACTORAN 224 SCRA 792 (1993) FACTS: The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit (minors and parents) and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical rainforests. Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country; (2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements." HELD: All timber licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. It is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such a law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.' " In court, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state ______________________________________________________________________________________

Prof. Dan Gatmaytan
Social Justice
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. FUNTILAR (142 SCRA 57) FACTS: In 1972, Mariano Funtilar and the Heirs of Felipe Rosete applied for the registration of land in Mulanay, Quezon. Such parcel originally belonged to one Candida Fernandez whose ownership and possession began sometime during her lifetime and extended until she died in 1936. Sometime in 1940, the land was forfeited in favor of the Govt for failure to pay real estate taxes but the same was redeemed in 1942 by one of the three children of Candida. The land now in dispute was adjudicated to petitioners-respondents, as heirs of Fernandez. The Director Lands and Dir. of Forest Devt filed an opposition alleging that neither applicants nor their predecessorsin-interest possessed sufficient title to the land, not having acquired the same under any of the recognized Spanish titles under the Royal Decree of Feb. 13, 1894; that neither have they been in open, continuos, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least 30 years immediately filing the application; and that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the applicants. On appeal, the Intermediate appellate Court affirmed the lower courts decision. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON applicants-respondents have met the requirements of possession for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of their application in 1972 as to entitle them to registration Held: Yes. The Court is satisfied from the evidence that long before her death in 1936, Candid Fernandez already possessed the disputed property. This possession must be tacked to the possession of her heirs, through the administrator and later, to the applicants-respondents who are her grandchildren. It would also be absurd under the circumstances that the government would order the forfeiture of the property if the property were a forestland. As to petitioners allegation that the land was unclassified public forest until Sept. 15, 1953 when it was declared alienable and disposable, the Court said that the Regalian doctrine must be applied together with the constitutional provisions on social justice and land reform and must be interpreted in a way as to avoid manifest unfairness and injustice. A strict application of the Heirs of Amunategui vs. Dir. Of Forestry (applicant shoulders the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain) is warranted whenever a part of the public domain is in danger of ruthless exploitation, fraudulent titling, or other questionable practices. But when an application appears to enhance the very reasons behind the enactment of act 496, as amended or the land Reg. Act and CA 141 or the Public Land Act, then their provisions should not be made to stand in the way of their on implementation. The attempts of humble people to have disposable lands they have been tilling for generations titled in their names should not only be viewed with understanding but should, as a matter of policy, be encouraged. REPUBLIC VS. CA (201 SCRA 3) Private respondents, the Parans, are applicants for registration of a parcel of land in La Trinidad, Benguet which they claim to have acquired from their father Dayotao Paran and by actual, physical, exclusive and open possession thereof since time immemorial.. The Dir. of lands filed an opposition, alleging among others, that the land is part of the public domain. The Office of the Provincial Fiscal likewise opposed the registration, stating that the land is within the ______________________________________________________________________________________

Prof. Dan Gatmaytan
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve covered by Proclamation No. 217 dated Feb. 16, 1929. The trial court found in favor of the applicants. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal filed by the Sol Gen. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON land is part of the Cordillera Forest Reserve and hence not subject to registration. Ratio: The applicants are members of the Ibaloi tribe whose application for registration should be considered as falling under Section 48 (c) of CA 141, said subsection having been added by RA 3872 on June 18, 1964. Under the said section, members of cultural minorities may apply for confirmation of their title to lands of public domain, whether disposable or not. They may therefore apply for public lands although such are legally forest lands or mineral lands, so long as such lands are in fact suitable for agriculture . However, PD 1073 effective January 25, 1977 amended Section 48 (c), making the said provision applicable only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is important to note that the application of the Parans was filed in 1970 and the land registration court affirmed their long-continued possession of the lands in 1974, that is, during the time when Section 48 (c) was in legal effect. Private respondents imperfect title was perfected or vested by the required period of possession prior to the issuance of PD 1073 thus, their right in respect of the land they had possessed for 30 years could not be divested by said PD. The Court stressed its pronouncement in Dir. of Lands vs. Funtilar that the Regalian doctrine must be applied together with constitutional provisions on social justice and land reform and must be interpreted in a way as to avoid manifest unfairness and injustice. The Declarations of Real Property submitted by applicants likewise indicated that the land had become suitable to agriculture. Clearly, the requirements of Section 48 (c) were satisfied.
Time Immemorial Possession Time immemorial possession is deemed to be part of the general rule and not an exception to the Regalian Doctrine. Land held under a concept of ownership since immemorial is deemed to have been private and therefore never to have come within the ambit of the Regalian Doctrine.
CARINO VS. INSULAR GOVT (41 PHIL 935) FACTS: Plaintiff, an Igorot from Benguet, filed application to Phil. Court of land registration. For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris in 1899, the plaintiff and his ancestors had held the land as owners. They had been recognized as owners by the Igorots. No document of title, however, was issued from the Spanish crown. The application was granted on 1904. On appeal to the CFI, on behalf of the Govt of the Phils. and also of the US, the application was dismissed. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Hence, this appeal. Issue: WON plaintiff owns the land Held: Yes. Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that never was brought under the civil or military government of the Spanish crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials would not have granted to anyone that province the registration to which the plaintiff was entitled by Spanish laws, and which would have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may have been the technical position of Spain, it foes not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all the rights and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized his ______________________________________________________________________________________

Prof. Dan Gatmaytan
land. The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles throughout an important part of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power to enforce. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest and never to have been public land. If there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt. The older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for plaintiff indicate clearly that the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Phils. Into trespassers or even into tenants at will.
ANKRON VS. GOVT OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS (40 PHIL 10) FACTS: Petitioner sought to register a parcel of land which he brought from the Moros, which the latter formerly occupied, cultivated and planted under claim of ownership for more than 44 years. The only oppositor was the Director of Lands, alleging that the land was property of the US under the control and administration of the Govt of the Phil. Islands. No proof whatsoever was offered by the oppositor. The lower court ordered and decreed that said parcel be registered in Ankrons name subject however to the right of the government to open a road thereon. From that decree, the Dir. appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: WON applicant proved his possession and occupation in accordance with the provisions of section 54 (6) of act 926 Held: Yes. Under the said paragraph, the important requisites for registration are: (1) that the land shall be agricultural public land as defined by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902; and (2) that the petitioner, by himself or his predecessors-in-interest, shall have been in the open, continuos possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of the said Act. In the present case the applicant proved and there was no effort to dispute said proof, that the land in question was agricultural land and that he and his predecessors in interest had occupied the same as owners in good faith for a period of more than forty years prior to the commencement of the present action. No question is raised nor discussed by the appellant with reference to the right of the Moros to acquire absolute ownership and dominion of the land which they have occupied openly, notoriously, peacefully and adversely for a long period of years. Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry or mineral is a question to be settled in each particular case. The mere fact that land is a manglar (mangrove swamp) is not sufficient in itself to show that it is agricultural, forestry or mineral. It may belong to one or the other class. Considering that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the public lands in the Phils. are agricultural lands, the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands. ABAOAG VS. DIR. OF LANDS (45 PHIL. 518) ______________________________________________________________________________________

Prof. Dan Gatmaytan
FACTS: Petitioners are among those Igorots who, in 1884, were given by the gobernadorcillo and principalia of Sison, Pangasinan, a tract of land in order that they may cultivate the same and increase the population of the said municipality. At the time of delivery, said land was unoccupied and unimproved public land. Said Bagos or Igorots entered upon said land, took possession of it and have continued to live upon the same and have cultivated it since that date. In 1919, petitioner, et al. presented a petition for registration with the CFI of Pangasinan. Oppositors filed a motion to dismiss upon the ground that petitioners had not presented proof sufficient to show that they are entitled to the registration of the land. Said motion was granted. Hence, this appeal. Issue: WON dismissal of the case was proper. Held: No. No suggestion is made that the gobernadorcillo and the principalia of the town of Alava, now Sision, were not authorized in 1884, as representatives of the then existing Govt, to give and to deliver the land in question to the petitioners and their ancestors for the purposes for which the land was so given. Neither was it denied that it was agricultural land. No pretension is made that the land might not be registered under the Torrens system had the petitioners invoked the benefits of the public land law. No contention is made on the part of petitioners that they were ever given a title to the land. Their contention is simply that they were given the land; that they accepted the same; that they lived upon the land, and cultivated it, and improved it, and occupied it to the exclusion of all others for a period of about 39 years and that therefore they are entitled to have the same registered under the Torrens system; that they have occupied and cultivated the same for a period sufficient to give them title and to have the same registered. This is like the case of Carino vs. Insular Government. In the Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754: Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession as a valid title by prescription. To this, the Court added that every presumption of ownership under the public land laws is in favor of the one actually occupying the land for many years, and against the Government which seeks to deprive him of it. MANARPAAC VS. CABANATAN (21 SCRA 743) FACTS: Plaintiffs filed complaint against defendants, alleging that they have been, since time immemorial, in possession of two parcels of land, which were fraudulently included in the free patent application of defendant. Cabanatan filed a motion to dismiss. Such was granted by the lower court holding that the free patent having been issued on November 3, 1959 and the first complaint was filed on December 7, 1960, the action for review of the decree, was therefore filed more than one year after the issuance of the patent. Hence, this appeal. Issue: WON dismissal was proper Held: No. From the averment of facts in the complaint, it clearly appears that plaintiffs have been, since time immemorial in possession as owners of the disputed land, have declared the land for tax purposes in the names of two of them and have built their houses on the land, but that through fraud and irregularity, defendant succeeded in securing a certificate of title. The foregoing recital of facts are sufficient averment of ownership. Possession since time immemorial, carries the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain, or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. Whether this presumption should hold as a fact or not, is a question appropriately determinable only after the parties have adduced, or at least, are given the opportunity to adduce, their respective evidence. ______________________________________________________________________________________

Prof. Dan Gatmaytan
The complaint likewise states a sufficient cause for action for recovery of possession of the land. Settled is the rule that the remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for conveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of innocent purchaser for value, for damages.
B.
Exceptions
Mining Claims
REAVIS V. FIANZA 40 PHIL 1017 (1909) The Philippine Act of 1902 provides, That where such a person or association, they and their grantors have held and worked their claims for a period equal to the time prescribed by the statute of limitations of the Philippine Islands, evidence of such possession and working of the claims for such period shall be sufficient to establish a right to a patent thereto under this Act, in the absence of any adverse claim The period of prescription is ten years. Fianza and his Igorot ancestors had been in possession of the land and had been working their mining claims for more than 10 years but this was before the enactment of the Phil. Act of 1902. Reavis, an American, applied for a mining patent over the same land during the effectivity of this law. Reavis argued that first, ownership of the land surface does not automatically vest ownership over the mining rights. Second, mines can only be acquired in accordance with governmentprescribed regulations. Therefore, Fianza had no legal rights to the mines since there was no compliance with the procedural requirements laid down in the Phil. Act. of 1902. Furthermore, Fianza held no patent. The Supreme Court did not deal squarely with the first argument. However, the issue was somewhat more resolved in its disposition of the second argument. It was held that Fianza and his ancestors have, through their possession of more than 10 years under Spanish Law and their working of the mining claims within such period, acquired ownership rights over the questioned land and the mining claims. This is notwithstanding the fact that no patent was held or applied for by Fianza under the provisions of the Phil. Act of 1902 since the right to have a patent that will confer title is also a right to have the thing. MCDANIEL V. APACIBLE AND CUISIA 42 PHIL 749 On June 17, 1916, in accordance with the Phil. Act of 1902, McDaniel located 3 petroleum placer mineral claims in Tayabas. Notices of their location were recorded in the office of the mining recorder. Furthermore, there was continuous possession and annual assessment work over the said claims. Act No. 2932 which was approved on August 31, 1920 provided that all public lands containing petroleum or other mineral oils and gas, on which no patent, at the date this Act takes effect, has been issued, are hereby withdrawn from sale and are declared to be free and open to exploration, location and lease On June 18, 1921, in accordance with Act No. 2932, Cuisia ______________________________________________________________________________________

Prof. Dan Gatmaytan
applied with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for a lease of a parcel of petroleum land that included McDaniels 3 claims. However, Actd No. 2932 further provided that parties having heretofore filed claims for any mineral lands containing said minerals, shall be given preference to lease their respective claims, provided they file a petition to that effect within 6 months from the date of the approval of this Act. Therefore, all parties having mineral claims prior to the approval of Act No. 2932 had until Feb. 28, 1921 to file a petition with the Government to lease the corresponding public lands. Otherwise, their preference over other applicants shall be forfeited. McDaniel sought to prohibit the Government from granting Cuisias lease application mainly on the argument that Act No. 2932 is unconstitutional since it deprives him of his property without due process of law. The Supreme Court sustained McDaniels argument. It held that a perfected, valid appropriation of public mineral lands operates as a withdrawal of the tract from the body of the public domain, and so long as such appropriation remains valid and subsisting, the land covered thereby is deemed private property. Such perfected, valid and subsisting appropriation shall be deemed to have taken place when all the requirements of the law in making the location of the mineral placer claims have been complied with and the claims were never abandoned or forfeited. This is notwithstanding the fact that no patent has been issued since the right to a patent vests full equitable title with all the benefits, immunities, and burdens of ownership. Furthermore, the claim and the location is perfected not only against 3 rd persons but also against the Government. GOLD CREEK MINING CORP. V. RODRIGUEZ (66 PHIL 259) On Jan. 1, 1929, Gold Creek Mining Corp. located a mining claim in Benguet. Notice of the location was recorded in the office of the mining recorder. Furthermore, there was continuous possession and annual assessment work over the said claim. Before Nov. 15, 1935, the date of effectivity of the 1935 Const., Gold Creek Mining applied with the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce for a patent. However, the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and the Director of the Bureau of Mines refused to approve the application on the ground that the issuance of the patent amounted to an alienation of natural resources which is prohibited under the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the patent must be issued. It is clear that the 1935 Constitution prohibits the alienation of natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land. However, natural resources only includes mineral lands of the public domain and not mineral lands already withdrawn from the public domain prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Perfected, valid and subsisting mining claims prior to the 1935 Const., whether or not a patent has been issued therefor, are included in the latter category. They are no longer part of the public domain and therefore, are beyond the constitutional prohibition on the alienation of natural resources. STANDARD MINERAL PRODUCTS, INC. V. CA Deeunhong was a registered owner of 120 hectares of land in Antipolo under a transfer certificate of title. Standard Mineral Products, Inc. undertook the prospecting and locating of a mining claim in the said land without first securing written permission from Deeunhong. After locating a claim, SMPI applied for a mining lease with the Bureau of Mines over a portion of the land, which was opposed by the registerd owner. In a separate civil case for reversion of the land to the State, it was found that the land was essentially agricultural and not mineral land. ______________________________________________________________________________________

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The Supreme Court held that SMPI is not entitled to the surface rights due to its noncompliance with the Mining Act provision which requires written permission from the landowner prior to the prospecting and locating of mineral claims. Such written permission must also accompany the application of a mining lease with the Bureau of Mines.
Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Titles

SUSI V. RAZON AND DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 48 PHIL 427 (1925) Susi and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, adverse and public possession since time immemorial in the concept of owner and for value of a certain parcel of unregistered land in Pampanga. On the other hand, Razon was able to purchase the same parcel of land from the Government for which an original certificate of title was issued. The Supreme Court held that Susi was the absolute owner and that the sale to Razon and the corresponding certificate of title issued in her name is null and void. Reiterating the doctrine laid down in Carino v. Insular Govt., the Supreme Court held that that there is a presumption juris et du jure that all the necessary requirements have been complied with when there had been actual and physical possession, personally or through predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively, and publicly since July 26, 1894 with a right to a certificate of title to said land. Therefore, by operation of law, Susi had already acquired not only a right to a grant but a grant from the Government much prior to the application of Razon. The questioned land was already private and was not part of the public domain anymore . Therefore, the Director of Lands no longer had any control or jurisdiction over Razons application. MERALCO V. CASTRO-BARTOLOME 114 SCRA 799 (1982) A certain parcel of land was possessed by Ramos since 1941. In 1947, Ramos sold the land to the Piguing spouses. IN 1976, the Piguing spouses sold the land to MERALCO, a domestic corporation. Subsequently, MERALCO applied for the registration of the parcel of land which was opposed by the Republic of the Philippines. The trial court dismissed MERALCOS application on the ground that it is not qualified to apply for registration since the Public Land Act allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles to public land. MERALCO argued that first, the questioned land was no longer public but was now private land since its predecessors-in-interest had possessed such land in the concept of owner for more than 30 years. Furthermore, it argued that it invoked the provision of the Public Land Act in behalf of the Piguing spouses who, as Filipino citizens, could secure judicial confirmation of their imperfect title to the land. The Supreme Scourt affirmed the dismissal of MERALCOs application. It held that the questioned land was still public land and shall remain so until a certificate of title is issued to a Filipino citizen. Consequently, MERALCO, being a juridical person, is therefore disqualified to apply for registration of such public land. The doctrine enunciated in Susi v. Razon and Director of Lands that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain since time immemorial by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be public, cannot be properly invoked by MERALCO since its predecessors-in-interest had not been in possession since time immemorial or beyond the reach of memory, i.e. before 1880. ______________________________________________________________________________________

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Citing Oh Cho, the Supreme Court held that the immediate predecessors-in-interest must apply for registration of the land in order to secure a grant under the Public Land Act. Without such registration, the immediate predecessor-in-interest did not have any vested right amounting to title which was transmissible. NOTE: This ruling was subsequently overturned in the case of Director of Lands v. IAC (Acme case). DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. IAC & ACME 146 SCRA 509 (1986) In the case, the Supreme Court held that the ruling in the case of Meralco v. CastroBartolome is no longer deemed to be binding. Notwithstanding the prohibition in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except by lease not exceeding 1000 hectares, still a private corporation may institute confirmation proceedings under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act if, at the time of institution of the registration proceedings, the land was already private land. On the other hand, if the land was still part of the public domain, then a private corporation cannot institute such proceedings. The correct rule is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS & PARAN (AUGUST 21, 1991) There is no question that a positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the Executive Department of the Government is needed to declassify land which had been classified as forestal and to convert it into alienable or disposable lands for agricultural or other purposes. In the case of Director of Lands vs. Funtilar, the Court considered the reports of the District Forester and the District Land Officer as adequate proof that the land applied for was no longer classified as forestal. We consider and so hold that once a parcel of land Is shown to have been included within a Forest Reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, as in the instant case, a presumption arises that the parcel of land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent withdrawal therefrom or declassification is shown. A simple, unsworn statement of a minor functionary of the Bureau of a minor functionary of the Bureau of Forest Development is not, by itself, such evidence.
OH CHO V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS 75 PHIL 890 (1946) The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act. No. 496) or should it not be applicable to the case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A. 141) The applicant failed to show that he has title that may be confirmed under the LRA. All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be time immemorial possession, which would justify the presumption that the land had never been public land. The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880. ______________________________________________________________________________________

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As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is whether he is entitled to a decree of registration thereof under the provisions of the Public Land Act (C.A. 141). Under the provisions of the Act invoked by the applicant, he is not entitled to a decree of registration of the lot because he is an alien. The benefits provided in the Public Land constitute a grant or concession by the State. Before they could acquire any right, the applicants immediate predecessor in interest should comply with the condition precedent, which is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This is the applicants immediate predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a qualified person buy not by the applicant, since he is disqualified.
Indigenous Peoples' Rights

PD 705 Forestry Reform Code SECTION 52. Census of kaingineros, squatters, cultural minorities and other occupants and residents in forest lands. Henceforth, no person shall enter into forest lands and cultivate the same without lease or permit. A complete census of kaingineros, squatters, cultural minorities and other occupants and residents in forest lands with or without authority or permits from the government, showing the extent of their respective occupation and resulting damage, or impairment of forest resources, shall be conducted. The Bureau may call upon other agencies of the government and holders of license agreement, license, lease and permits over forest lands to participate in the census. RA 6657 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program SECTION 9. Ancestral Lands. For purposes of this Act, ancestral lands of each indigenous cultural community shall include, but not be limited to, lands in the actual, continuous and open possession and occupation of the community and its members: Provided, That the Torrens Systems shall be respected. The right of these communities to their ancestral lands shall be protected to ensure their economic, social and cultural well-being. In line with the principles of selfdetermination and autonomy, the systems of land ownership, land use, and the modes of settling land disputes of all these communities must be recognized and respected. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the PARC may suspend the implementation of this Act with respect to ancestral lands for the purpose of identifying and delineating such lands: Provided, That in the autonomous regions, the respective legislatures may enact their own laws on ancestral domain subject to the provisions of the Constitution and the principles enunciated in this Act and other national laws. ______________________________________________________________________________________

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RA 6734 Organic Act for Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
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SECTION 2. The Autonomous Region is a corporate entity with jurisdiction in all matters devolved to it by the Constitution and this Organic Act as herein enumerated: (1) Administrative organization; (2) Creation of sources of revenues; (3) Ancestral domain and natural resources; (4) Personal, family and property relations; (5) Regional, urban and rural planning development; (6) Economic, social, and tourism development; (7) Educational policies; (8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; (9) Powers, functions and responsibilities now being exercised by the departments of the National Government except: (a) Foreign affairs; (b) National defense and security; (c) Postal service; (d) Coinage, and fiscal and monetary policies; (e) Administration of justice; (f) Quarantine; (g) Customs and tariff; (h) Citizenship; (i) Naturalization, immigration and deportation; (j) General auditing, civil service and elections; (k) Foreign trade; (l) Maritime, land and air transportation and communications that affect areas outside the Autonomous Region; and (m) Patents, trademarks, trade names, and copyrights; and (10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the Region. ARTICLE XI ANCESTRAL DOMAIN, ANCESTRAL LANDS AND AGRARIAN REFORM SECTION 1. Subject to the Constitution and national policies, the Regional Government shall undertake measures to protect the ancestral domain and the ancestral lands of indigenous cultural communities. All lands and natural resources in the Autonomous Region that have been possessed or occupied by indigenous cultural communities since time immemorial, except when prevented by war, force majeure, or other forms of forcible usurpation, shall form part of the ancestral domain. Such ancestral domain shall include pasture lands, worship areas, burial grounds, forests and fields, mineral resources, except: strategic minerals such as uranium, coal, petroleum, and other fossil fuels, mineral oils, and all sources of potential energy; lakes, rivers and lagoons; and national reserves and marine parks, as well as forest and watershed reservations. ______________________________________________________________________________________

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Lands in the actual, open, notorious, and uninterrupted possession and occupation by an indigenous cultural community for at least thirty (30) years are ancestral lands. SECTION 2. The constructive or traditional possession of lands and resources by an indigenous cultural community may also be recognized subject to judicial affirmation, the petition for which shall be instituted within a period of ten (10) years from the effectivity of this Act. The procedure for judicial affirmation of imperfect titles under existing laws shall, as far as practicable, apply to the judicial affirmation of titles to ancestral lands. The foregoing provisions notwithstanding, titles secured under the Torrens system, and rights already vested under the provisions of existing laws shall be respected. SECTION 3. As used in this Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural community" refers to Filipino citizens residing in the Autonomous Region who are: (1) Tribal peoples whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sectors of the national community and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations; and (2) Bangsa Moro people regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations that inhabited the country or a distinct geographical area at the time of conquest or colonization and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own socioeconomic, cultural and political institutions. SECTION 4. The customary laws, traditions, and practices of indigenous cultural communities on land claims and ownership and settlement of land disputes shall be implemented and enforced among the members of such community. SECTION 5. The Regional Government shall require corporations, companies and other entities within the ancestral domain of the indigenous cultural communities whose operations adversely affect the ecological balance to take the necessary preventive measures and safeguards in order to maintain such a balance. SECTION 6. Unless authorized by the Regional Assembly, lands of the ancestral domain titled to or owned by an indigenous cultural community shall not be disposed of to nonmembers. SECTION 7. No portion of the ancestral domain shall be open to resettlement by nonmembers of the indigenous cultural communities. SECTION 8. Subject to the Constitution and national policies, the Regional Assembly shall enact an Agrarian Reform Law suitable to the special circumstances prevailing in the Autonomous Region. ARTICLE XIII ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY SECTION 1. Consistent with the Constitution and national policies, the Regional Government may enact regional laws pertaining to the national economy and patrimony applicable and responsive to the needs of the Region. However, nothing herein shall be construed as to authorize the Regional Government to require lesser ______________________________________________________________________________________

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standards respecting the protection, conservation and enhancement of the natural resources than those required by the National Government. SECTION 2. Except for strategic minerals such as uranium, coal, petroleum, and other fossil fuels, mineral oils, all sources of potential energy, as well as national reserves and aquatic parks, forest and watershed reservations as may be delimited by national law, the control and supervision over the exploration, utilization and development of the natural resources of the Autonomous Region is hereby delegated to the Regional Government in accordance with the Constitution and national laws. The Regional Assembly shall have the authority to grant franchises and concessions but the Regional Governor may, by regional law, be authorized to grant leases, permits and licenses: Provided, That, any lease, permit, franchise or concession shall cover an area not exceeding the limits allowed by the Constitution and shall subsist for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25) years; Provided, further, That existing leases, permits, licenses, franchises and concessions shall be respected until their expiration unless legally terminated as provided by law; and Provided, finally, That when the natural resources are located within the ancestral domain, the permit, license, franchise or concession, shall be approved by the Regional Assembly after consultation with the cultural community concerned. SECTION 3. The exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, except those enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 2 hereof, shall be allowed to all Filipinos and to private enterprises, including corporations, associations, cooperatives, and such other similar collective organizations with at least sixty percent (60%) of their capital investment or capital stocks directly controlled or owned by Filipinos who are preferably residents of the Region. SECTION 4. Small-scale mining shall receive support from and be regulated by the Regional Government, considering ecological balance, the safety and health and the interest of the communities and the miners where such operations are conducted. SECTION 5. The Regional Government may, in the interest of regional welfare and security, establish and operate pioneering utilities. Upon payment of just compensation, it may transfer the ownership of such utilities to cooperatives or other collective organizations. SECTION 6. The Regional Government may, in times of regional emergency declared by the President, when the public interest so requires and under reasonable terms and safeguards prescribed by the Regional Assembly, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. SECTION 7. The Regional Assembly shall enact laws for the just compensation, rehabilitation, relocation, and other similar measures of inhabitants adversely affected in the harnessing of natural and mineral resources in the Region. The Regional Assembly shall likewise provide for the rehabilitation of the areas affected by said harnessing of natural and mineral resources in the Region.
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SECTION 8. The Regional Government shall actively and immediately pursue reforestation measures to ensure that at least fifty (50%) of the land surface of the Autonomous Region shall be covered with trees, giving priority to land strips along eighteen percent (18%) in slope or over by providing infrastructure, financial and technical support to upland communities especially the Lumads or tribal peoples. SECTION 9. The Regional Government shall prohibit the use, importation, deposit, disposal and dumping of toxic or hazardous substances within the Autonomous Region. SECTION 10. The Regional Government shall adopt policies to promote profit sharing and broaden the base of ownership of business enterprises. SECTION 11. The Regional Government shall provide incentives, including tax holidays, for investors in businesses that will contribute to the development of the Region. It shall provide the same incentives to all companies doing business in the Region which reinvest at least fifty percent (50%) of their net profits therein, and to all cooperatives which reinvest at least ten percent (10%) of their surplus into sociallyoriented projects in the Region. SECTION 12. The Regional Government shall give priority to the establishment of transportation and communication facilities for the economic development of the region. SECTION 13. In the delivery of power services, priority shall be given to provinces in the area of autonomy which do not have direct access to such services. SECTION 14. The Regional Government is hereby empowered to create pioneering firms and other business entities needed to boost economic development in the Region. Agriculture, Fisheries and Aquatic Resources SECTION 15. The Regional Government shall recognize, promote and protect the rights and welfare of farmers, farmworkers, fishermen and fishworkers, as well as farmers, and fishworkers' cooperatives and associations. SECTION 16. The Regional Government shall encourage agricultural productivity and promote a diversified and organic farming system. SECTION 17. The Regional Government shall give top priority to the conservation, protection, utilization and development of soil and water resources for agricultural purposes. SECTION 18. The Regional Assembly shall enact on Aquatic and Fisheries Code which shall enhance, develop, conserve and protect marine and aquatic resources, and shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen to the preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources, including seaweeds. This protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds, up to and including all waters twelve (12) nautical miles from the coastline of the Autonomous Region but within the territorial waters of ______________________________________________________________________________________

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the Philippines, regardless of depth, the seabed and the subsoil that are included between two (2) lines drawn perpendicular to the general coastline from points where the boundary lines of the Autonomous Region touch the sea at low tide and a third line parallel to the general coastline. Further, it shall provide support to subsistence fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production and marketing assistance and other services. Fishworkers shall also receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources. Science, technology and other disciplines shall be developed and employed to protect and maintain aquatic and marine ecology. SECTION 19. The Regional Assembly may, by law, create a Bureau of Agriculture and Fisheries and define its composition, powers and functions. Trade and Industry SECTION 20. The Regional Government recognizes the private sector as the prime mover of trade, commerce and industry. It shall encourage and support entrepreneurial capability in the Region and shall recognize, promote and protect cooperatives. SECTION 21. The Regional Government shall promote and protect small and medium-scale cottage industries by providing assistance such as marketing opportunities, financial support, tax incentives, appropriate and alternative technology and technical training to produce semi-finished and finished products. SECTION 22. The Regional Government shall give support and encouragement to the establishment of banks in accordance with the principles of the Islamic banking system, subject to the supervision by the central monetary authority of the National Government. SECTION 23. Subject to national policies, the Regional Government shall regulate traditional barter trade and countertrade with neighboring countries. SECTION 24. The Regional Government shall encourage, promote, undertake and support the establishment of economic zones, industrial centers and ports in strategic areas and growth centers of the Region to attract local and foreign investments and business enterprises. SECTION 25. The Regional Government shall undertake measures to promote consumer education and to ensure that the rights, interests and welfare of the consumers are protected. SECTION 26. The Regional Government shall promote the preferential use of labor and locally produced goods and materials by adopting measures to increase their competitiveness. ______________________________________________________________________________________

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SECTION 27. Subject to the Constitution and national policies, the Regional Government shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its jurisdiction in accordance with its goals and priorities. Tourism Development SECTION 28. The Regional Government shall, with the assistance of the National Government and the participation of the private sector, develop tourism as a positive instrument toward accelerated regional development. Tourism development shall promote greater pride in and commitment to the nation: Provided, That the diverse cultural heritage, and moral and spiritual values of the people in the Autonomous Region shall be primarily considered and respected. SECTION 29. The Regional Assembly may, by law, create a Tourism office, and shall define its composition, powers and functions. RA 7076 People's Small-Scale Mining Act SECTION 7. Ancestral Lands. No ancestral land may be declared as a people's small-scale mining area without the prior consent of the cultural communities concerned: Provided, That, if ancestral lands are declared as people's small-scale mining areas, the members of the cultural communities therein shall be given priority in the awarding of small-scale mining contracts. RA 7586 National Integrated Protected Areas System Sec 4 d. "Indigenous cultural community" refers to a group of people sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, and who have, since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized a territory; SECTION 13. Ancestral Lands and Rights Over Them. Ancestral lands and customary rights and interest arising shall be accorded due recognition. The DENR shall prescribe rules and regulations to govern ancestral lands within protected areas: Provided, That the DENR shall have no power to evict indigenous communities from their present occupancy nor resettle them to another area without their consent: Provided, however, That all rules and regulations, whether adversely affecting said communities or not, shall be subjected to notice and hearing to be participated in by members of concerned indigenous community. RA 7611 Palawan Strategic Environmental Plan SECTION 11. Tribal Ancestral Lands. These areas, traditionally occupied by cultural minorities, comprise both land and sea areas. These shall be treated in the same graded system of control and prohibition as in the others abovementioned except for stronger emphasis in cultural considerations. The SEP, therefore, shall ______________________________________________________________________________________

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define a special kind of zonation to fulfill the material and cultural needs of the tribes using consultative processes and cultural mapping of the ancestral lands. RA 7942 Mining Act of 1995 SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. As used in and for purposes of this Act, the following terms, whether in singular or plural, shall mean: (a) "Ancestral lands" refers to all lands exclusively and actually possessed, occupied, or utilized by indigenous cultural communities by themselves or through their ancestors in accordance with their customs and traditions since time immemorial, and as may be defined and delineated by law. SECTION 4. Ownership of Mineral Resources. Mineral resources are owned by the State and the exploration, development, utilization, and processing thereof shall be under its full control and supervision. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into mineral agreements with contractors. SECTION 16. Opening of Ancestral Lands for Mining Operations. No ancestral land shall be opened for mining operations without the prior consent of the indigenous cultural community concerned. SECTION 17. Royalty Payments for Indigenous Cultural Communities. In the event of an agreement with an indigenous cultural community pursuant to the preceding section, the royalty payment, upon utilization of the minerals shall be agreed upon by the parties. The said royalty shall form part of a trust fund for the socioeconomic well-being of the indigenous cultural community. SECTION 18. Areas Open to Mining Operations. Subject to any existing rights or reservations and prior agreements of all parties, all mineral resources in public or private lands, including timber or forestlands as defined in existing laws, shall be open to mineral agreements or financial or technical assistance agreement applications. Any conflict that may arise under this provision shall be heard and resolved by the panel of arbitrators. SECTION 19. Areas Closed to Mining Applications. Mineral agreement or financial or technical assistance agreement applications shall not be allowed: (a) In military and other government reservations, except upon prior written clearance by the government agency concerned; (b) Near or under public or private buildings, cemeteries, archeological and historic sites, bridges, highways, waterways, railroads, reservoirs, dams or other infrastructure projects, public or private works including plantations or valuable crops, except upon written consent of the government agency or private entity concerned; (c) In areas covered by valid and existing mining rights; (d) In areas expressly prohibited by law; (e) In areas covered by small-scale miners as defined by law unless with prior consent of the small-scale miners, in which case a royalty payment upon the utilization of minerals shall be agreed upon by the parties, said royalty forming a trust fund for the socioeconomic development of the community concerned; and ______________________________________________________________________________________

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(f) Old growth or virgin forests, proclaimed watershed forest reserves, wilderness areas, mangrove forests, mossy forests, national parks, provincial/municipal forests, parks, greenbelts, game refuge and bird sanctuaries as defined by law and in areas expressly prohibited under the National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) under Republic Act No. 7586, Department Administrative Order No. 25, series of 1992 and other laws. RA 8425 Social Reform Agenda SECTION 4. Adoption and Integration of Social Reform Agenda (SRA) in the National Anti-Poverty Action Agenda. The National Anti-Poverty Action Agenda shall principally include the core principles and programs of the Social Reform Agenda (SRA). The SRA shall have a multi-dimensional approach to poverty consisting of the following reforms: (1) Social dimension access to quality basic services. These are reforms which refer to equitable control and access to social services and facilities such as education, health, housing, and other basic services which enable the citizens to meet their basic human needs and to live decent lives; (2) Economic dimension asset reform and access to economic opportunities. Reforms which address the existing inequities in the ownership, distribution, management and control over natural and man-made resources from which they earn a living or increase the fruits of their labor; (3) Ecological dimension sustainable development of productive resources. Reforms which ensure the effective and sustainable utilization of the natural and ecological resource base, thus assuring greater social acceptability and increased participation of the basic sectors in environmental and natural resources conservation, management and development; (4) Governance dimension democratizing the decision-making and management processes. Reforms which enable the basic sectors to effectively participate in decision-making and management processes that affect their rights, interests and welfare. The SRA shall focus on the following sector-specific flagship programs: (1) For farmers and landless rural workers agricultural development; (2) For the fisherfolk fisheries and aquatic resources conservation, management and development; (3) For the indigenous peoples and indigenous communities respect, protection and management of the ancestral domains; (4) For workers in the informal sector workers' welfare and protection; (5) For the urban poor socialized housing; and (6) For members of other disadvantaged groups such as the women, children, youth, persons with disabilities, the elderly, and victims of natural and man-made calamities the Comprehensive Integrated Delivery of Social Services (CIDSS). Additionally, to support the sectoral flagship programs, the following cross-sectoral flagships shall likewise be instituted: (1) Institution-building and effective participation in governance; (2) Livelihood programs; (3) Expansion of micro-credit/microfinance services and capability building; and (4) Infrastructure buildup and development. ______________________________________________________________________________________

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ON LEGAL MYTHS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: RE-EXAMINING CARINO VS. INSULAR GOVERNMENT (MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN)
Concept of Ownership There is nothing necessary or natural in ownership, as it is understood now under our Phil. Legal System. The concept of property and ownership arise and take shape not because of any physical or material attribute of the thing being owned. Rather, these concepts are reflections of human associations in relation to things. In other words, specific cultures create their own set of property relationships. Under the Civil Code, one is said to own a piece of land when he exercise, to the exclusion of all others, the right to use, enjoy its fruits and alienate or dispose of it in any manner not prohibited by law. Among the indigenous, unwesternized or unHispanized Phil. Population, there is no such concept of individual and exclusive ownership of land. Ownership more accurately applies to the tribal right to use the land or territorial control. Ownership is tantamount to work. At best, people consider themselves as 'secondary owners' or stewards of the land, since beings of the spirit world are considered as the true and primary or reciprocal owners of the land. There is also the concept of trusteeship since not only the present generation but also the future ones possess the right to the land. The Relevance of Legal Issues: Carino Revisited In a paper written by the Cordillera Studies Program, they point out that the Ibaloi, where Carino belonged, had no concept of exclusive or alienable ownership. Ownership, as we understand it, was only a relatively new development and which by custom applied only to pasture land. The court focused only on the issue whether plaintiff owned the land, without focusing on the kind of property tenure Carino had with respect to the land. The law, which the judge was implementing, was simply not equipped to assist him discover this important point. The ruling in Carino is so broad that when used indiscriminately as the sole ground to recognize and protect ancestral domains it will work a contradiction. At the same time that it provides an avenue to protect native titles, it opens floodgates for enterprising lowlanders to take advantage of the uplanders legal ignorance. Their land become as alienable as any other property as conceived by the national legal system. The Attempt to entrench Carino as a statutory doctrine The subsequent attempt at statutory articulation like the Public Land Act, Sec. 48 (c) of CA 141 and RA 3872 only worsened the situation. They seem to build up on the Carino doctrine. The truth is that its concept is totally different. First, unlike Carino, the provisions do not require possession by individuals under a claim of private ownership for as far back as testimony or memory goes. A mere thirty years possession is sufficient. Second, Carino establishes the precedent that the native tittle is presumed never to have been public. Sec. 48 of CA 141 starts from the presumption that the land is initially part of the public domain. Like Carino however, the concept of ownership remains. The prevailing rule is that the lapse of 30 years adverse possession is enough to vest title ipso facto. Judicial confirmation is only a formality. These rights however, can work against indigenous peoples. First, the recognition of his native title has served to make his land alienable in every sense provided by the national legal system. Its disposition is not confined only to members of his kin or of his village. Ironically, while reiterating native right to ancestral land, the decisions make it possible for a private corporation to acquire the land from the indigenous holder just
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what happened in the case of Acme. Second, the awareness of the rights provided by the outsiders laws will definitely be a tempting opportunity for a member of a community to treat land, not as something that sustains life that should be revered, but as a commodity that could be sold for profit. The Bias against indigenous concept of ownership Other laws applicable to indigenous cultural communities reveal a similar bias against indigenous concept of ownership the constitution notwithstanding. The concept of private right as defined in the Revised Forestry Code excludes orchards and forests since they are plantations of forest and trees of economic value. The Kalinga, however, would own the residential area, the sacred shrine, the burial grounds and possibly the rice terraces. Likewise, a large part of the ancestral domain is expressly excluded by the provision which reads: No land of the public domain 18% in slope or over shall be classified as alienable and disposable It is obvious that in Gran Cordillera, which is so mountainous, virtually all populated areas under this provision are inalienable and indisposable, such that the land cannot be owned by the inhabitants thereof.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (MARVIC LEONEN)

On October 29, 1997, the President signed into law Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997. Formally, the law is the legislatures interpretation of some key provisions of the Constitution directly relating to indigenous peoples particularly Sec. 22, Article II and Sec. 5, Article XII. IPRA implements these provisions in the following ways:
Civil and Political Rights

Foremost in the law is its recognition of the right to on-discrimination of indigenous peoples (IPs). Discrimination against the cultural minority, as shown in the cases of People vs. Cayat and Rubi vs. Provincial Board are not only archaic but also outlawed. IPs are entitled to the same rights and privileges as citizens and should not be discriminated against in a any form of employment and should receive more appropriate forms of basic services. The new law even goes further to ensure the rights of women, children and civilians in situations of armed conflict. There is also recognition of IPs right to self-governance. Likewise, the new law defines more precisely the concept of customary law, which will be used not only to arrive at an amicable settlement but also to process it in an acceptable manner that is, the offended party may opt to use the customary processes rather than have the offender prosecuted in the courts of law.
Social and Cultural Rights

IPRA requires that the educational system should become relevant to the needs of children and young people as well as provide them with cultural opportunities. Cultural diversity is recognized. The rights to religion as well as to cultural sites and ceremonies are guaranteed. It is now unlawful to excavate archaeological sites in order to obtain materials of cultural value as well as deface or destroy artifacts.
Recognizing Right and Tenure to Natural Resources
IPRA supplements the private vested rights recognized by the Constitution by the operation of Carnino, through rights acquired under the Public Land Act and other similar laws. It also creates by law other sources as well as a different concept of ownership. By legislative fiat, ancestral domains and ancestral lands are now legitimate ways of
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acquiring ownership. Unlike emphasis on individual and corporate holders in the Civil Code, IPRA emphasizes private but community property nature of ancestral domains. Aside from not being a proper subject of sale or any other mode of disposition, ancestral domain holders may claim ownership over the resources within their territory, develop the land and natural resources, stay in the territory, have the rights against involuntary displacement, regulate the entry of migrants, have rights to safe and clean air and water, claim parts of reservations and use customary law to resolve their conflicts. These rights however need to be qualified by the ff. provisions: 1) Sec. 56: Existing Property Rights Regimes; 2) Sec. 57: Granting only priority rights to members of indigenous cultural communities; and 3) Sec. 58: Allows the use of ancestral domains as critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas when deemed appropriate and with the full participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned.
Creating a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples

This will act as a mechanism to coordinate implementation of the law as well as a final authority that has jurisdiction to issue Certificates of Ancestral Domains/Land Titles. THE POLICY CONTEXT This includes the direct action taken by the communities themselves to ward off encroachments into their territory and threatening their existence, as assisted/organized by various POs and NGOs. There are also various responses from post EDSA governments which reveal the extent of advocacy for indigenous peoples rights. Lastly, there is the pressure from international funding institutions like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Funding for projects had a lot to do with the changing attitude of the government relinquishing control over large portions of the public domain and recognizing rights of upland migrants. THE DANGERS IPRA is not the solution to the various problems of IPs. Being a national law, it is too general to address the diversity of the indigenous communities. The premise of national law is that it can meet local problems with generalized solutions. The premise of cultural diversity is able to find creative and unique approaches to the issues as they define them. The law can also be diversionary. It can involve peoples and communities into concerns and activities which may far be removed from those which might better address their concerns bureaucratisation. Lastly, the present language and the new concept of IPRA encourage litigation. Even those situations where the law prescribes customary law will require some form of litigation to determine for instance whether a particular form is customary, to whom it will apply, etc. Normally, it is the party that has the most resources that has the greater possibility of getting a better judgment. Bsid4es, courts of law provide a culture that is radically different from that of the indigenous community. THE POTENTIALS Our own experience has shown that the laws even when they find their way to hegemony, is not a monolith that could not be challenged. It adjusts to political advocacy. They also provide for the condition for change. The use of law in many situations of IPs therefore should be marginal. Important but marginal nonetheless. Advocates need to be more strategic to understand the long term needs and aspirations of the community as the latter defines them. The challenge for advocates is to know when to use the law, not so much to maintain the status quo, but to gain leverage for a more just and fundamental change. Its potential lies not in what it really contains, but in how we decide and when to use it.
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How is IPRA different from Carino?
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(1) Carino does not distinguish between ancestral land and ancestral domain. IPRA does, however. (2) Carino refers only to land. IPRA refers to land as well as the natural resources above and below it. (3) IPRA is applicable only to indigenous peoples. Carino applies to all persons who can prove that their predecessors-in-interest occupied lands since time immemorial. II. LAND CLASSIFICATION
Lands of the public domain are classified into 4 categories: (1) (2) (3) (4) Agricultural land Forest or timber land Mineral land National parks
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION ARTICLE XII National Economy and Patrimony Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant. Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor. Section 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine by law the specific limits of forest lands and national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and national parks shall be conserved and may not be increased nor diminished, except by law. The Congress shall provide, for such period as it may determine, measures to prohibit logging in endangered forests and watershed areas.
A.
Classes of Lands
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Public Agricultural Lands
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 141* AN ACT TO AMEND AND COMPILE THE LAWS RELATIVE TO LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
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SEC. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into (a) Alienable or disposable, (b) Timber, and (c) Mineral lands, and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition. SEC. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alien-able or disposable public lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act. SEC. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, is intended to be used for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural, and is open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the pro-visions of this chapter and not otherwise. SEC. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows: (a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filing, or other means; (b) Foreshore; (c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers; (d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes. MONTANO V. INSULAR GOVERNMENT 12 PHIL. 572 Lands under the ebb and flow of the tide, being reserved for public uses of navigation and fishery and subject to Congressional regulation, are not understood as included in the term "public lands" when used in general laws authorizing private appropriation thereof as homesteads or otherwise. Swamps and marshes not available for the purpose of navigation or public uses may be subjected to private appropriation although covered by the tides. Of this character are the manglar or mangrove swamps of the Philippine Islands in which grow aquatic trees cultivated and in common use for domestic or commercial purposes. Such manglares when converted by man into fisheries and used as such for the statutory period are the subject of private ownership.
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JOCSON V. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY 39 PHIL. 560
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That manglares are not forestry lands, within the meaning of the words "timber lands" in the Act of Congress, has been definitely decided by this court in the case of Montano vs. Insular Government. Whatever may have been the meaning of the term "forestry" under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, classifies the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares [mangroves], fisheries or ordinary farm lands. ANKRON V. GOVERNMENT 40 PHIL. 10 (1919) The Torrens system does not provide for registration of public forestry and mineral lands. Under certain conditions, public agricultural lands may be registered. (Sec. 54, Act No. 926.) Considering that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands, the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands . The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral wealth within it, is not in itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the mineral. The proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the minerals which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question to be settled in each particular case, unless the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority conferred upon it, prior to the intervention of private interests, set aside for forestry or mineral purposes the particular land in question. HEIRS OF AMUNATEGUI V. DIRECTOR 126 SCRA 69 A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other tress growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. Possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. A positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. REPUBLIC V. DE PORKAN 151 SCRA 88 It is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government to classify public lands. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be ______________________________________________________________________________________

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descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Since the disputed tract of public land is neither timber nor mineral lands, the same is alienable or open to disposition as public agricultural lands, under Section 11, C.A. 141 thru homestead settlement or free patent. Where the possession of a public land dates back to the time of the Spanish colonial period, such possession of the said tract of public land has attained the character and duration prescribed by law as the equivalent of an express grant from the Government. The mandate of the law itself is that the possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and by legal fiction, the land ceases to be public and thus becomes private land. Title over the land has vested on the possessor so as to segregate the land from the mass of the public domain. It is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sustained by the courts, an application therefor being sufficient. When a homesteader has complied with all the terms and conditions which entitle him to a patent for a particular tract of public land, he acquires a vested interest therein, and is to be regarded as the equitable owner thereof, and once the right to a patent has become vested in a purchaser of public lands, it is equivalent to a patent actually issued. From that point the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private. The Director of Lands is divested of control and possession when homestead applications are approved and recorded.
Forest Lands
May 19, 1975 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 705 FORESTRY REFORM CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Sec. 15. Topography. - No land of the public domain eighteen per cent (18%) in slope or over shall be classified as alienable and disposable, nor any forest land fifty per cent (50%) in slope or over, as grazing land. Lands eighteen per cent (18%) in slope or over which have already been declared as alienable and disposable shall be reverted to the classification of forest lands by the Department Head, to form part of the forest reserves, unless they are already covered by existing titles or approved public land application, or actually occupied openly, continuously, adversely and publicly for a period of not less than thirty (30) years as of the effectivity of this Code, where the occupant is qualified for a free patent under the Public Land Act: Provided, That said lands, which are not yet part of a well-established communities, shall be kept in a vegetative condition sufficient to prevent erosion and adverse effects on the lowlands and streams: Provided, further, That when public interest so requires, steps shall be taken to expropriate, cancel defective titles, reject public land application, or eject occupants thereof. Sec. 16. Areas needed for forest purposes. - The following lands, even if they are below eighteen per cent (18%) in slope, are needed for forest purposes, and may not, therefore, be classified as alienable and disposable land, to wit: 1) Areas less than 250 hectares which are far from, or are not contiguous with, any certified alienable and disposable land; 2) Isolated patches of forest of at least five (5) hectares with rocky terrain, or which protect a spring for communal use; 3) Areas which have already been reforested; ______________________________________________________________________________________

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4) Areas within forest concessions which are timbered or have good residual stocking to support an existing, or approved to be established, wood processing plant; 5) Ridge tops and plateaus regardless of size found within, or surrounded wholly or partly by, forest lands where headwaters emanate; 6) Appropriately located road-rights-or-way; 7) Twenty-meter strips of land along the edge of the normal high waterline of rivers and streams with channels of at least five (5) meters wide; 8) Strips of mangrove or swamplands at least twenty (20) meters wide, along shorelines facing oceans, lakes, and other bodies of water, and strips of land at least twenty (20) meters wide facing lakes; 9) Areas needed for other purposes, such as national parks, national historical sites, game refuges and wildlife sanctuaries, forest station sites, and others of public interest; and 10) Areas previously proclaimed by the President as forest reserves, national parks, game refuge, bird sanctuaries, national shrines, national historic sites: Provided, That in case an area falling under any of the foregoing categories shall have been titled in favor of any person, steps shall be taken, if public interest so requires, to have said title cancelled or amended, or the titled area expropriated.
Mineral Lands
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in and for purposes of this Act, the following terms, whether in singular or plural, shall mean: (aa) "Minerals" refers to all naturally occurring inorganic substance in solid, gas, liquid, or any intermediate state excluding energy materials such as coal, petroleum, natural gas, radioactive materials, and geothermal energy. (ab) "Mineral agreement" means a contract between the government and a contractor, involving mineral production-sharing agreement, co-production agreement, or joint-venture agreement. (ac) "Mineral land" means any area where mineral resources are found. (ad) "Mineral resource" means any concentration of minerals/rocks with potential economic value. (ae) "Mining area" means a portion of the contract area identified by the contractor for purposes of development, mining, utilization, and its sites for support facilities or in the immediate vicinity of the mining operations. (af) "Mining operation" means mining activities involving exploration, feasibility, development, utilization, and processing.
National Parks
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7586 National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992
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Sec. 4. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows: (b) "Protected area" refers to identified portions of land and water set aside by reason of their unique physical and biological significance, managed to enhance biological diversity and protected against destructive human exploitation; (c) "Buffer zones" are identified areas outside the boundaries of and immediately adjacent to designated protected areas pursuant to Section 8 that need special development control in order to avoid or minimize harm to the protected area; (e) "National park" refers to a forest reservation essentially of natural wilderness character which has been withdrawn from settlement, occupancy or any form of exploitation except in conformity with approved management plan and set aside as such exclusively to conserve the area or preserve the scenery, the natural and historic objects, wild animals and plants therein and to provide enjoyment of these features in such areas; (f) "Natural monument" is a relatively small area focused on protection of small features to protect or preserve nationally significant natural features on account of their special interest or unique characteristics; (g) "Natural biotic area" is an area set aside to allow the way of life of societies living in harmony with the environment to adopt to modern technology at their pace; (h) "Natural park" is a relatively large area not materially altered by human activity where extractive resources uses are not allowed and maintained to protect outstanding natural and scenic areas of national or international significance for scientific, educational and recreational use; (i) "Protected landscapes/seascapes" are areas of national significance which are characterized by the harmonious interaction of man and land while providing opportunities for public enjoyment through recreation and tourism within the normal lifestyle and economic activity of these areas; (j) "Resources reserve" is an extensive and relatively isolated and uninhabited are normally with difficult access designated as such to protect natural resources of the area for future use and prevent or contain development activities that could affect the resource pending the establishment of objectives which are based upon appropriate knowledge and planning; (k) "Strict nature reserve" is an area possessing some outstanding ecosystem, features and/or species of flora and fauna of national scientific importance maintained to protect nature and maintain processes in an undisturbed state in order to have ecologically representative examples of the natural environment available for scientific study, environmental monitoring, education, and for the maintenance of genetic resources in a dynamic and evolutionary state; (l) "Tenured migrant communities" are communities within protected areas which have actually and continuously occupied such areas for five (5) years before ______________________________________________________________________________________

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the designation of the same as protected areas in accordance with this Act and are solely dependent therein for subsistence; and (m) "Wildlife sanctuary" comprises an area which assures the natural conditions necessary to protect nationally significant species, groups of species, biotic communities or physical features of the environment where these may require specific human manipulation for their perpetuation. Sec. 5. Establishment and Extent of the System. - The establishment and operationalization of the System shall involve the following: (a) All areas or islands in the Philippine proclaimed, designated or set aside, pursuant to a law, presidential decree, presidential proclamation or executive order as national park, game refuge, bird and wildlife sanctuary, wilderness are, strict nature reserve, watershed, mangrove reserve, fish sanctuary, natural and historical landmark, protected and managed landscape/seascapes as well as identified virgin forests before the effectivity of this Act are hereby designated as initial components of the System. The initial components of the System shall be governed by existing laws, rules and regulations, not inconsistent with this Act; (b) Within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, the DENR shall submit to the Senate and the House of Representatives a map and legal description or natural boundaries of each protected area initially comprising the System. Such maps and legal descriptions shall, by virtue of this Act, constitute the official documentary representation of the entire System, subject to such changes as Congress deems necessary; (c) All DENR records pertaining to said protected areas, including maps and legal descriptions or natural boundaries, copies of rules and regulations governing them, copies of public notices of, and reports submitted to Congress regarding pending additions, eliminations, or modifications shall be made available to the public. These legal documents pertaining to protected areas shall also be available to the public in the respective DENR Regional Offices, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENROs) and Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENROs) where NIPAS areas are located; (d) Within three (3) years from the effectivity of this Act, the DENR shall study and review each area tentatively composing the System as to its suitability or nonsuitability for preservation as protected area and inclusion in the System according to the categories established in Section 3 hereof and report its findings to the President as soon as each study is completed. The study must include in each area: (1) A forest occupants survey; (2) An ethnographic study; (3) A protected area resource profile; (4) Land use plans done in coordination with the respective Regional Development Councils; and (5) Such other background studies as will be sufficient bases for selection. The DENR shall: ______________________________________________________________________________________

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(i) Notify the public of the proposed action through publication in a newspaper of general circulation, and such other means as the System deems necessary in the area or areas in the vicinity of the affected land thirty (30) days prior to the public hearing. (ii) Conduct public hearing at the locations nearest to the area affected; (iii) At the least thirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing advise all local government units (LGUs) in the affected areas, national agencies concerned, people's organizations and nongovernment organizations and invite such officials to submit their views on the proposed action at the hearing not later than thirty (30) days following the date of the hearing; and (iv) Give due consideration to the recommendations at the public hearing; and provide sufficient explanation for his recommendations contrary to the general sentiments expressed in the public hearing; (e) Upon receipt of the recommendations of the DENR the President shall issue a presidential proclamation designating the recommended areas as protected areas and providing for measures for their protection until such time when Congress shall have enacted a law finally declaring such recommended areas as part of the integrated protected area system; and (f) Thereafter, the President shall send to the Senate and the House of Representatives his recommendations with respect to the designations as protected areas or reclassification of each area on which review has been completed, together with maps and legal description of boundaries. The President, in his recommendation, may propose the alteration of existing boundaries of any or all proclaimed protected areas, additional of any contiguous area of public land of predominant physical and biological value. Nothing contained herein shall limit the President to propose. as part of this recommendation to Congress, additional areas which have not been designated, proclaimed or set aside by law, presidential decree, proclamation or executive order as protected area/s. Sec. 6. Additional Areas to be Integrated to the System. - Notwithstanding the establishment of the initial component of the System, the Secretary shall propose the inclusion in the System of additional areas with outstanding physical features, anthropological significance and biological diversity in accordance with the provisions of Section 5(d). Sec. 7. Disestablishment as Protected Area. - When in the opinion of the DENR a certain protected area should be withdrawn or disestablished, or its boundaries modified as warranted by a study and sanctioned by the majority of the members of the respective boards for the protected area as herein established in Section 11, it shall, in turn, advice Congress. Disestablishment of a protected area under the System or modification of its boundary shall take effect pursuant to an act of Congress. Thereafter, said area shall revert to the category of public forest unless otherwise classified by Congress: Provided, however, That after disestablishment by Congress, the Secretary may recommend the transfer of such disestablished area to other government agencies to serve other priority programs of national interest.
B.
The Power to Classify Lands
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EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292 Title XIV - ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES Sec. 4. (10) Powers and Functions. - The Department shall:
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Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to: (a) Accelerate cadastral and emancipation patent surveys, land use planning and public land titling:
(13) Assume responsibility for the assessment, development, protection, licensing and regulation as provided for by law, where applicable, of all energy and natural resources; the regulation and monitoring of service contractors, licensees, lessees, and permit for the extraction, exploration, development and use of natural resources products; the implementation of programs and measures with the end in view of promoting close collaboration between the government and the private sector; the effective and efficient classification and subclassification of lands of the public domain; and the enforcement of natural resources and environmental laws, rules and regulations; (15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for classification, subclassification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies; Chapter 4 - THE DEPARTMENT FIELD OFFICES Sec. 22. Provincial and Community Offices. - The Natural resources provincial and community offices shall each be headed by a provincial natural resource officer and community natural resource officer, respectively. They shall take over the functions of the district offices of the former Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, and Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences.
Title III - JUSTICE Chapter I - GENERAL PROVISIONS Sec. 4. Organizational Structure. - The Department shall consist of the following constituent units: (1) Department proper; (2) Office of the Government Corporate Counsel; (3) National Bureau of Investigation; (4) Public Attorney's Office; (5) Board of Pardons and Parole; (6) Parole and Probation Administration; (7) Bureau of Corrections; (8) Land Registration Authority; (9) Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems. Chapter 9 - LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY Sec. 28. The Land Registration Authority. - The Land Registration Authority, hereinafter referred to as the Authority shall continue to exercise its powers and ______________________________________________________________________________________

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functions under existing law on the Land Titles and Deeds Registration Authority and those which may hereafter be provided by law. Sec. 29. Organizational Structure. - The Authority shall be headed by an Administrator who shall be assisted by two (2) Deputy Administrators, all of whom shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary. Sec. 30. Reorganization of Registry Offices in the National Capital Region. - The Registries of Deeds in the National Capital Region is hereby reorganized as follows: (1) The Registries of Deeds in the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan shall be maintained; (2) There is hereby created Registries of Deeds in the Municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, Valenzuela, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Marikina, Las Pinas and Paranaque with jurisdiction over their respective municipalities; (3) The Registry of Deeds of Pasig shall be maintained with jurisdiction over the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig and Pateros; and (4) The Registry of Deeds of Makati shall have jurisdiction over the municipalities of Makati and Muntinlupa.
C.
The Power to Reclassify

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160 Local Government Code
Sec. 20. Reclassification of Lands. - (a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance: (1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen percent (15%);
(2) For component cities and first to the third class municipalities, ten percent (10%); and (3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided, further, That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act Numbered Sixty-six hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657). otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law", shall not be affected by the said reclassification and the conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act. ______________________________________________________________________________________

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(b) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority, authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in excess of the limits set in the next preceding paragraph. (c) The local government units shall, in conformity with existing laws, continue to prepare their respective comprehensive land use plans enacted through zoning ordinances which shall be the primary and dominant bases for the future use of land resources: Provided. That the requirements for food production, human settlements, and industrial expansion shall be taken into consideration in the preparation of such plans. (d) Where approval by a national agency is required for reclassification, such approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. Failure to act on a proper and complete application for reclassification within three (3) months from receipt of the same shall be deemed as approval thereof. (e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
III.
THE TORRENS SYSTEM
A. General Themes Modes of Acquiring Land Titles

(1) Public Grant The conveyance of public land by the government to a private individual. (i.e. Spanish distribution of Public Lands by issuance of royal grants and concessions) No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from government. (2) Adverse Possession / Prescription A possessor of land who may not be the owner, after the lapse of a certain period prescribed by law, may assert ownership thereof as against anyone except the true owner or one with a better title based on an earlier possession which he had not abandoned. Occupancy must be actual or physical, adverse, open and notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted, coupled with the fact that it must be under claim of ownership. It does not run against private lands brought under the operation of the Torrens system, nor against public lands except where the law expressly so provides. It is different from laches.
(3) Accretion When soil and earth, weeds and other deposits are washed away from other places and gradually settle down and attach themselves to ones land that used to border on a stream or local body of water, the owner of the land becomes the owner of the additional areas thus formed. ______________________________________________________________________________________

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(Art. 457 NCC) It can not be invoked for areas fronting the seashore as alluvial formations become part of the public domain. Does not apply also to lands adjoining a pond or lagoon with respect to land left dry by the natural decrease of water. If the accretion is formed with the intervention of man, becomes part of the public domain. Lands acquired by accretion must still be registered to confirm and protect the title of the owner. (also Art 461 NCC re: shifting course of riverbeds) (4) Reclamation Filling of submerged land by deliberate act and reclaiming title thereto. In the Philippines, it is only the government that can assert title to reclaimed land. (5) Private Grant or Voluntary Transfer It is the usual means by which title to land is transferred by the owner himself or his duly authorized representative. Consent of the grantor is an essential element. This transfer is given effect by the voluntary execution of a deed of conveyance in certain prescribed form, completed by recording or registration thereof in a public office. The legal title to the land does not pass until the conveyance shall have been registered or made of public record. (6) Involuntary Alienation Transfers that do not require the consent or cooperation of the owner of the land. (i.e. expropriation, condemnation, eminent domain, escheats, forfeiture, foreclosure,) Under this mode of acquiring land, the purchasers are generally subject to the rule of caveat emptor. (7) Descent or Device May be acquired by virtue of hereditary succession to the estate of a deceased owner, or by devise if appropriate dispositions were made in the testators will. (8) Emancipation Patent or Grant Land Reform: - P.D. 27 / P.D. 266 making tenant farmers owners of the lands they till upon the fulfillment of certain conditions. - R.A. 6657 The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program ( Note, however, that according to Prof. Gatmaytan, CARP falls under the mode of involuntary alienation.)
Purpose The purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quiet title to land: to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except as to claims which were noted at the time of registration in the certificate or which might arise subsequent thereto. ( Umali v. CA, Cruz v. CA) The Torrens system facilitates transactions involving real estate by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens Certificate of Title, and to dispense of the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned had actual knowledge of facts and
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circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. (Pino v. CA) Every registered owner and purchaser holds title to the property free from all encumbrances not noted in the deed. In cases where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when the land is sold, in the absence of anything to excite or arouse suspicion, the vendee has the right to rely on what appears on the certificate of title and is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of the certificate. (Pino v. CA) It must be stressed that the Torrens system does NOT create or vest title, and has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership.
ALBA V. DE LA CRUZ 17 PHIL 49 (1910) FACTS: Agricultural land in Bulacan was registered in the names of the petitioners Grey y Alba on Feb. 12 1908 by TC decree. Their parents had obtained the land by purchase in 1864 as evidenced by a public document. On June 16, 1908 de la Cruz asked for a revision of the case on the grounds that he is the absolute owner of two of the lands in question, alleging that the degree of registration over those lands was obtained maliciously and fraudulently. He claimed that he had inherited the lands from his father who had obtained them via state grant in 1895 as inscribed in the old register of property in Bulacan. TC reopened the case, noting that the petitioners neglected to mention de la Cruzs occupancy of the land, it modified its earlier decree by excluding the two parcels of land. ISSUE: WON the TC could reopen the case after its decree of registration had already been entered earlier. RULING: No. By express provisions of law all parties are deemed served notice by publication to all whom it may concern. The decree of registration must be held to be conclusive against all persons whether his name is mentioned in the application, notice, or citation. Such decree could only have been opened on the ground that it had been obtained by fraud. Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient, there must be actual or positive fraud to reopen a case. This is not so in this situation, the petitioners honestly believed that the appellee was occupying the lands as their tenant. REPUBLIC V. UMALI 171 SCRA 647 (1989) FACTS: The original sale from the government was tainted with fraud because it was based on a forgery. However the original OCT was canceled and valid a TCT was issued. The properties were subsequently transferred to purchasers in good faith and for value. ISSUE: WON the land could revert back to the state. RULING: No. A certificate of title fraudulently secured is not null and void ab initio, it was only voidable and the land remained private as long as title thereto had not been voided. There is no ______________________________________________________________________________________

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allegation in the complaint filed by the petitioner that any one of the defendants was privy to the fraud or that they had acquired the subject land in bad faith. Their status as innocent transferees for value was never questioned nor disproved. That status now accords to them the protection of the torrens system and renders the titles obtained by them indefeasible and conclusive despite the flaw in the TCT. The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quiet title to land: to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title except claims which were noted at the time of registration in the certificate or which may arise subsequent thereto. PINO V. CA 198 SCRA 434 (1991) FACTS: Subject lot was originally owned by spouses Juan and Rafaela. When Juan died ownership was transferred to Rafaela and her two sons: Raymundo and Cicero. The lot was then sold to Rafaela who acquired title thereto. She first sold a portion of the lot in 1967, then sold the other portion later. Ownership was eventually sold to Pino who registered the sale in 1970. In 1980 Cicero died and his heirs instituted suit for nullity and reconveyance against Pino. ISSUE: WON Pino is an innocent purchaser for value. RULING: Yes. Where the certificate of title is in the hands of the vendor when the land is sold, the vendee for value has the right to rely on what appears on the certificate of title. In the absence of anything to excite or arouse suspicion, the vendee is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor. The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the TCT and dispense with the need for inquiring further except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. The action had already prescribed because it was filed 15 years after the sale and issuance of TCT in 1967. The remedy for the petitioner is to bring action for damages against those who caused the fraud. CRUZ V. CA (NOV. 6, 1997) When the sale was executed, nothing was annotated in the certificate. There can be no reconveyance because the property had already been acquired by an innocent purchaser for value. The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title except claims which have been recorded in the certificate of title. Every registered owner and purchaser holds the title to the property free from all encumbrances not noted in the deed.
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DELOS REYES V. CA 285 SCRA 81 (1998) FACTS: In 1942 de los Reyes sold only 10,000 sqm to Penas who in 1943 registered all 13,405sqm. After 4 subsequent sales the land was eventually acquired by Cainas. In 1978 the heirs of de los Reyes filed action for reconveyance. ISSUE: WON an action for reconveyance filed after more than 30 years may prosper against the holder for value. RULING: NO. When respondents Cainas as fourth transferee in ownership dealt with the land in question they were not required to go beyond what appeared in the TCT in the name of their transferor. They were innocent purchasers for value having acquired the property in due course and in good faith under a clean title i.e. there were no annotations of encumbrances or notices of lis pendens at the back. They had no reason to doubt the validity of the title to the property. It would be the height of injustice if a valid transaction transferring property to them would be set aside just to accommodate parties who heedlessly slept on their rights for more then a third of a century- having brought action to recover the land only after 36 years from the accrual of their cause of action. HEIRS OF DELA CRUZ, CA FACTS: Petitioners were in actual, physical, continuous and open possession of the land since 1959, when their predecessor in interest allegedly bought it from the Madrids. Petitioners only had a photocopy of the deed of sale. The Madrid brothers allegedly sold the land to Marquez in 1976. The Madrids and Marques obtained TCTs in 1986, the petitioners then filed this action for reconveyance and damages in the same year. RULING: The fact that the Madrids and Marquez were able to secure their respective TCTs did not operate to vest upon them ownership of the property. The Torrens system does not create or vest title. It has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership especially considering the fact that both the Madrids and Marquezes obtained their respective TCTs only in 1986 27 long years after petitioners first took possessions of the land. If the Madrids and the Marquezes wished to assert their ownership they should have filed a judicial action for recovery of possession and not merely to have the land registered under their respective names. The Madrids long inaction or passivity in asserting their rights will preclude them from recovering the same. Marquez is also not an innocent purchaser for value as he must have been fully aware of another persons possession of the lot he purchased. One who buys without checking the vendors title takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure.
Nature of proceedings A land registration proceeding is in rem, and therefore, the decree of registration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons, including the Government and its branches. This is irrespective of whether or not they were personally notified of the filing of the application for registration or have appeared and filed an answer to said application since all persons are considered as notified by the publication required by law. ( Cacho v. CA) Note however, that in instances where the property sought to be registered is occupied by
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persons other than the registrant , mere notice by publication is not sufficient: they must be given actual and personal notice. Moreover, an allegation of occupancy by such persons must be stated in the petition for registration. Failure to comply with these requirements will render the issued decree susceptible to a petition for reopening or review of the decree of registration. See subsequent discussion under Part IV. F. (4). A decree of registration acquires finality and thereby becomes indefeasible upon the lapse of one year from entry thereof. Once such decree becomes final, it is deemed conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and determined but also upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the land registration proceedings. ( Cacho v. CA)
SAJONAS V. CA FACTS: Uychocde spouses sold the land to spouses Sajonas in 1984 who had their adverse claim duly registered. Upon full payment, the sale was registered in Aug. 28, 1985. However the land was also subject to a notice of levy and execution in Feb 12, 1985 for debts owed by the Uychocdes to Pilares. The notice of levy and execution was carried over to the new title. Sajonas filed a complaint to have the notice removed from the new title. Noting their earlier claim, the TC agreed. Their decision was reversed by the CA on the grounds that PD1529 limits the validity of adverse claims to 30 days.. ISSUE: WON the earlier adverse claim was invalid. RULING: No. Sec. 70 of PD 1529 does not the limit the effectivity of adverse claims to 30 days. To interpret the effectivity period as absolutely limited to 30 days defeats the purpose why the law provides for the remedy of inscription of adverse claim. Annotation is a measure designated to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by Act 496, now PD 1529. It serves as warning to third parties dealing with the said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right then registered owner. Under the Torrens System registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. A person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or certificate of title. CACHO V. CA In the case of Cacho v. US decided in 1912, the court reserved making a final decision on the registration of two parcels of land bought by decedent Cacho. Registration decrees were allegedly subsequently issued in 1915. In 1978 heir Cacho filed a petition for reconstitution of title. After first going up to the SC, reconstitution was granted by the TC over RP and National Steel as well as the city of Iligan opposition. CA reversed, requiring petitioner to first fulfill the conditions set forth in the Cacho v. US decision. . A land registration proceeding is in rem and therefore the decree of registration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the Government and its branches irrespective whether or not they were personally notified of the filing of the application for registration or have appeared and filed an answer to said application because all persons are ______________________________________________________________________________________

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considered as notified by publication required by law. Further more, a decree of registration that has become final shall be deemed conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and determined but also upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the land registration proceedings with the certification duly issued by the then Land Registration Commission (now National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration) there is no doubt that decrees of registration have in fact been issued in the case at the bench. Also, such decrees attained finality upon the lapse of one year from entry thereof. To allow the final decrees to once again be subject to the conditions set forth in Cacho v. US would be tantamount to setting aside the decrees which cannot be reopened after the lapse of one year from the entry thereof. Such action would definitely run counter to the very purpose of the Torrens System. SPOUSES LEBURADA V. LRA 287 SCRA 333 (1998) FACTS: TC ordered LRA to issue a degree of registration in favor of the spouses Leburada. LRA refused on the grounds that its immediate issuance would result in the duplication of titles over the same parcel of land. LRA found that the title issued for the lot could not be found because the TCT covering them was incomplete/ unreadable. It was waiting for better copies from the Pasig register of deeds before proceeding further. ISSUE: WON LRA can be compelled by mandamus to issue the decree. RULING: NO. A judgment of registration does not become executory until after the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree of registration. True, land registration is an in rem proceeding and is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the government, however a court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of a land already decreed in an earlier land registration case. The LRA is mandated to refer to the TC any doubt it may have in regard to the preparation and issuance of a decree of registration. As the issuance of the decree is a judicial act and not merely ministerial, it may not be compelled through mandamus. Given the above, that LRA hesitates to issue a decree of registration is understandable. (But to avoid multiplicity of suits, SC ordered LRA to submit its report to the TC within 60 days)
B. The Land Registration Administration B. THE LAND REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1529 AMENDING AND CODIFYING THE LAWS RELATIVE TO REGISTRATION OF PROPERTY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES ______________________________________________________________________________________

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SECTION 9. Qualifications of Registers of Deeds and Deputy Registers of Deeds. No person shall be appointed Register of Deeds unless he has been admitted to the practice of law in the Philippines and shall have been actually engaged in such practice for at least three years or has been employed for a like period in any branch of government the functions of which include the registration of property. The Deputy Register of Deeds shall be a member of the Philippine Bar. Provided, however, that no Register of Deeds or Deputy Register of Deeds holding office as such upon the passage of this Decree shall by reason hereof, be removed from office or be demoted to a lower category or scale of salary except for cause and upon compliance with due process as provided for by law. SECTION 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. The office of the Register of Deeds constitutes a public repository of records of instruments affecting registered or unregistered lands and chattel mortgages in the province or city wherein such office is situated. It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. He shall see to it that said instrument bears the proper documentary and science stamps and that the same are properly cancelled. If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason therefor, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree. SECTION 11. Discharge of duties of Register of Deeds in case of vacancy, etc. (1) Until a regular Register of Deeds shall have been appointed for a province or city, or in case of vacancy in the office, or upon the occasion of the absence, illness, suspension, or inability of the Register of Deeds to discharge his duties, said duties shall be performed by the following officials, in the order in which they are mentioned below, unless the Secretary of Justice designates another official to act temporarily in his place: (a) For the province or city where there is a Deputy Register of Deeds, by said Deputy Register of Deeds, or by the second Deputy Register of Deeds, should there be one; (b) For the province or city where there is no Deputy or second Deputy Register of Deeds, by the Provincial or City Fiscal, or any Assistant Fiscal designated by the Provincial or City Fiscal; (2) In case of absence, disability or suspension of the Register of Deeds without pay, or in case of vacancy in the position, the Secretary of Justice may, in his discretion, authorize the payment of an additional compensation to the official acting as Register of Deeds, such additional compensation together with his actual salary not to exceed the salary authorized for the position thus filled by him. (3) In case of a newly-created province or city and pending establishment of a Registry of Deeds and the appointment of a regular Register of Deeds for the new province or city, the Register of Deeds of the mother province or city shall be the exofficio Register of Deeds for said new province or city. ______________________________________________________________________________________

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SECTION 12. Owner's Index; reports. There shall be prepared in every Registry an index system which shall contain the names of all registered owners alphabetically arranged. For this purpose, an index card which shall be prepared in the name of each registered owner which shall contain a list of all lands registered in his name. The Register of Deeds shall submit to the Land Registration Commission within ten days after the month to which they pertain his monthly reports on collections and accomplishments. He shall also submit to the Commission at the end of December of each year, an annual inventory of all titles and instruments in his Registry. SECTION 13. Chief Geodetic Engineer. There shall be a Chief Geodetic Engineer in the Land Registration Commission who shall be the technical adviser of the Commission on all matters involving surveys and shall be responsible to him for all plats, plans and works requiring the services of a geodetic engineer in said office. He shall perform such other functions as may, from time to time, be assigned to him by the Commissioner.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987 BOOK IV, TITLE III CHAPTER 9 LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY SECTION 28. The Land Registration Authority. The Land Registration Authority, hereinafter referred to as the Authority shall continue to exercise its powers and functions under existing law on the Land Titles and Deeds Registration Authority and those which may hereafter be provided by law. SECTION 29. Organizational Structure. The Authority shall be headed by an Administrator who shall be assisted by two (2) Deputy Administrators, all of whom shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary. SECTION 30. Reorganization of Registry Offices in the National Capital Region. The Registries of Deeds in the National Capital Region is hereby reorganized as follows: (1) The Registries of Deeds in the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan shall be maintained; (2) There is hereby created Registries of Deeds in the Municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, Valenzuela, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Marikina, Las Pias and Paraaque with jurisdiction over their respective municipalities; (3) The Registry of Deeds of Pasig shall be maintained with jurisdiction over the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig and Pateros; and (4) The Registry of Deeds of Makati shall have jurisdiction over the municipalities of Makati and Muntinlupa.
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C. JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS
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BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129 AN ACT REORGANIZING THE JUDICIARY, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES SECTION 34. Delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases . Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots the value of which does not exceed twenty thousand pesos, such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. CIRCULAR NO. 38-97 SUBJECT: Clarification of the Extent of Delegated Jurisdiction under Administrative Circular No. 6-93-A of METCs, MTCCs, MTCs and MCTCs to Hear and Determine Cadastral and Land Registration Cases The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 6-93-A is that only original cadastral or land registration cases are covered. The jurisdiction of the First Level Courts, being merely delegated, should be limited to what is expressly mentioned in the delegation. 1. There are limits to the delegation, i.e., either the subject matter is an uncontested lot or if contested the value of the lot should not exceed One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos. There will be difficulty in the determination of these limits if and when the First Level Courts are required to exercise delegated jurisdiction over petitions subsequent to original registration. 2. A First Level Court should not be placed in a situation where, in disposing of a matter subsequent to registration, it will have to consult the records of another Court which granted the original registration. 3. To require First Level Courts to handle petitions after original registration would unduly increase their dockets already loaded with cases covered by RA 7691, the law on their expanded jurisdiction. Therefore, matters subsequent to the original registration determined by Second Level Courts, including petitions for reconstitution of lost titles, should not be unloaded to the First Level Courts. The Second Level Courts are hereby directed to take cognizance of and exercise jurisdiction over such matters.
MOSCOSO VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Petitioner applied for land registration of a 1,147 square meters residential lot, claiming that she inherited the same from her father. The written opposition however substantially allege that the oppositors acquired ownership of the same through a deed of donation. The trial court rendered a decision directing that the title over the land should be registered in the name of the co-ownership of: (1) Andrea M. Moscoso for 13/14 share; and (2) Maximina L. Moron for 1/14 share, subject to the reservation of a road right-of-way in favor of the ______________________________________________________________________________________

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government of the Philippines. Maximinas share was based on a power of attorney executed in her favor which was treated as a recognition of her status as a natural child. ISSUE: WON the Court of First Instance, acting as a land registration court, has jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of whether the oppositor is the acknowledged natural child of Pascual Monge HELD: untenable RULING: Firstly, the otherwise rigid rule that the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court, being special and limited in character and proceedings thereon summary in nature, does not extend to cases involving issues properly litigable in other independent suits or ordinary civil actions. Such is based the following premises: (1) Mutual consent of the parties or their acquiescence in submitting the aforesaid issues for the determination by the court in the registration proceedings; (2) Full opportunity given to the parties in the presentation of their respective sides of the issues and of the evidence in support thereto; (3) Consideration by the court that the evidence already of record is sufficient and adequate for rendering a decision upon these issues. In addition, considerations of speedy justice and avoidance of multiplicity of suits impel Us to hold and rule that under the facts of the case at bar, the trial court, acting as a land registration court, may adjudicate the land sought to be registered to either or both of the applicant and oppositor, in whole or in part, based on evidence submitted to the court showing that the party has proper title for registration. (Section 37, Act 496.) In any event, as the Supreme Court said in Nicanor T. Santos vs. Rosa Ganayo, L31854, Sept. 9, 1972, 116 SCRA 431, "Whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (Probate, Land Registration, etc.) is in reality not a jurisdictional question. It is in essence a procedural question involving a mode of practice which may be waived." OBITER: The proceedings for the registration of title to land under the Torrens system is an action in rem, not in personam , hence, personal notice to all claimants of the res is not necessary to give the court jurisdiction to deal with and dispose of the res, and neither may lack of such personal notice vitiate or invalidate the decree or title issued in a registration proceeding, for the State, as sovereign over the land situated within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem or in the nature of a proceeding in rem, which shall be binding upon all persons, known or unknown. AVERIA JR. VS. CAGUIOA 146 SCRA 459 (1986) FACTS: The petitioner-oppositor refused to participate in the hearing of the registration proceedings below, claiming the respondent court, acting as a cadastral court, had no competence to act upon the said case under Section 112 of Act 496, because of the absence of unanimity among the parties as required under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act. The respondent court then held the hearing ex parte and later rendered a decision ordering the registration prayed for on the basis of the evidence presented by the private respondent herein. ISSUE: whether or not the court has jurisdiction to order the registration of a deed of sale which is opposed on the ground of an antecedent contract to sell. HELD: Yes. Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529 has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the ______________________________________________________________________________________

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change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for "original registration" but also "over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions." Under the amended law, the court is now authorized to hear and decide not only such non-controversial cases but even the contentious and substantial issues, such as the question at bar, which were beyond its competence before. HEIRS OF GONZAGA vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Eugenio, claiming title under (TCT) No. 17519, sold two lots to Gonzaga.for which TCT No. 81338 was issued on November 29, 1960. In 1981, Gonzaga sold the two lots to petitioner Mascarias and TCT No. 48078 was issued in the latters favor. However, another subsisting Torrens title covers the same two lots, TCT No. C-26086, in the name of private respondent Sevilla issued on August 2, 1979 and is a transfer from (OCT) No. 994 which was registered on April 19, 1917. Both conflicting TCTs were derived from one common OCT, viz., OCT No. 994. However, while both the court a quo and the respondent appellate court found that OCT No. 994 was registered on May 3, 1917, we find that on the one hand, petitioners' titles indicate original registration to have been made on May 3, 1917, but on the other hand, private respondents' title indicates original registration to have been made on April 19, 1917. The court a quo resolved the conflicting claims in favor of private respondents. ISSUE: Between petitioners and private respondents, who have the legal and valid title to the two lots. (OVERLAPPING TITLES) HELD: Private respondents. Although petitioner's title was issued in 1940, it will be noted that petitioner's title over Lots 2693 and 2695 both with an area of 599 square meters was based on the Cadastral Survey of Kaloocan City, Cadastral Case No. 34, while private respondents' title was derived from OCT No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917. In the case of Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, this Court ruled that where two certificates (of title) purport to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails. . . . In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and the person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. Hence, in point of priority of issuance, private respondents' title prevails over that of petitioner MWSS. Lastly, a certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already been registered and an earlier certificate for the same is in existence . Since the land in question has already been registered under OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, the subsequent registration of the same land on May 3, 1917 is null and void." Though petitioner Mascarias may be a purchaser for value and in good faith, but whose title, which is only a derivative of the void OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917, his title could not possibly be of force and effect more than its parent title.
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TAGAYTAY-TAAL TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS (273 SCRA 182; 1997)
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FACTS: Petitioner was the registered owner of four (4) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. T9816, T-9817, T-9818 and T-9819. The properties were mortgaged on June 7, 1976 to Filipinas Manufacturers Bank and Trust Company by Benjamin Osias, representing himself as President and Chairman of the Board of petitioner. Because of a dispute regarding the true set of officers of the petitioner, the parcels of land allegedly became delinquent in the payment of real estate taxes resulting in the sale of the said properties in a public auction. Respondent City itself was the successful bidder. On July 14, 1989, respondent City filed for the entry of new certificates of title over the lots in its name. Said petition was opposed by herein petitioner, alleging that the tax delinquency sale was null and void for lack of valid and proper notice to petitioner. On December 5, 1989, the trial court dismissed on the ground of laches. CA affirms. On July 19, 1991, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, sitting as a regular court, a petition assailing the authority of respondent City to levy real estate tax on the ground that said properties are located in the Province of Batangas. RTC rules in favor of petioner. No appeal was filed. ISSUES (a) whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, sitting as a land registration or cadastral court, had jurisdiction to hear and decide respondent City's petition for the cancellation of TCT No. T-9816 and TCT No. T-9817 in the name of petitioner and the issuance of new ones in the name of respondent City despite serious opposition by petitioner HELD: negative. RULING: Here, petitioner had the right to avail of its legal and equitable remedies to nullify the delinquency sale because, firstly, there was lack of notice to it; secondly, the properties in question became subject of serious controversy before RTC -Cavite and the SEC; and thirdly, respondent City had no authority to impose realty tax on petitioner as the properties are actually located in Talisay, Batangas. Given such facts, The issues raised before the RTC sitting as a land registration or cadastral court, without question, involved substantial or controversial matters and, consequently, beyond said court's jurisdiction. The issues may be resolved only by a court of general jurisdiction. It is clear that petitions under Section 75 and Section 108 of P.D. 1529 (formerly Sec. 78 and Sec. 112 of Act 496) can be taken cognizance of by the RTC sitting as a land registration or cadastral court. Relief under said sections can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or that there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise, the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the incident properly belongs. 15 Also, RTC-Cavite, sitting as a land registration or cadastral court, could not have ordered the issuance of new certificates of title over the properties in the name of respondent City if the delinquency sale was invalid because said properties are actually located in the municipality of Talisay, Batangas, not in Tagaytay City. ESTATE OF JACOB VS. COURT OF APPEALS (283 SCRA 474; 1998)
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FACTS: Jacob left for the United States, but before she did, she asked her son-in-law Quinto Jr., to pay the real estate taxes on her property. However, Luciano Jr. was not allowed to pay by the City Treasurer's Office as he had no written authorization from her. In 1984 respondent City Treasurer of Quezon City sent a notice to Mercedes Jacob that her real estate taxes on the property were delinquent and that the land was already sold at public auction on 24 August 1983 to private respondent Virginia Tugbang for P6,800.00. Jacob came to know of the sale on 6 September 1983 when she received from respondent City Treasurer a Notice of Sale of Real Property addressed to her husband. They tried to redeem the property from Tugbang but she evaded them until the Final Bill of Sale was issued. On 3 March 1989 TCT No. 81860 was issued in the name of Tugbang. On 17 May 1993 petitioners filed a complaint for annulment or cancellation of the auction sale, the final bill of sale, TCT No. 81860, and for redemption of the property plus damages. However, the trial court dismissed the petition purportedly for lack of jurisdiction as the petition was deemed to be a petition to annul and set aside the Decision canceling Jacob's TCT No. 39178. The appellate court dismissed the appeal. ISSUE: the nature of the petitioners action HELD: It is an action for reconveyance. The complaint alleges that respondent Tugbang procured a transfer certificate of title upon her fraudulent representation in her petition for cancellation of title. This way of acquiring title creates what is called "constructive trust" in favor of the defrauded party and grants to the latter a right to the reconveyance of the property. As the petition makes out a case for reconveyance and not a mere annulment of an RTC judgment as viewed under par. (2), Sec. 9, BP Blg. 129, jurisdiction over the case is clearly vested in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City as provided in par. (2), Sec. 19, BP Blg. 129. Moreover, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the petition as it may be considered only as a continuation of the original proceeding for cancellation of title which in view of its non-litigious character is summary in nature . Furthermore, under Sec. 2 of PD 1529, a Regional Trial Court, like the RTC of Quezon City which issued a new title to respondent Virginia Tugbang in lieu of the old one, has the authority to act not only on applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications or petitions. As to whether such an action should be granted requires further evidence culled from a full-blown trial. G.R. No. 120974 (substantially the same facts) Under Sec. 55 of the Land Registration Act, as amended by Sec. 53 of PD No. 1529, 14 an original owner of registered land may seek the annulment of the transfer thereof on the ground of fraud and the proper remedy is reconveyance. However, such remedy is without prejudice to the rights of an innocent purchaser for value holding a certificate of title. The other controversy lies in the failure of petitioner City Treasurer to notify effectively the delinquent taxpayer (Valencia), under the wrong premise that the property was still owned by the former registered owner, Alberto Sta. Maria. In ascertaining the identity of the delinquent taxpayer, for purposes of notifying him of his tax delinquency and the prospect of a distraint and auction of his delinquent property, petitioner City Treasurer should not have simply relied on the tax declaration.
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IV. A. ORIGINAL REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS Who May Apply
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PD 1529, Sec. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws. (3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws. (4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
Where the land is owned in common: all the co-owners shall file the application jointly. Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro : the vendor a retro may file an application for the original registration of the land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings. A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust. Sec. 16. Non-resident applicant. - If the applicant is not a resident of the Philippines, he shall file with his application an instrument in due form appointing an agent or representative residing in the Philippines, giving his full name and postal address, and shall therein agree that the service of any legal process in the proceedings under or growing out of the application made upon his agent or representative shall be of the same legal effect as if made upon the applicant within the Philippines. If the agent or representative dies, or leaves the Philippines, the applicant shall forthwith make another appointment for the substitute, and, if he fails to do so the court may dismiss the application. CA 141, Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act , to wit: (a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the prior United States have applied for the purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force and have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith, but have with or without default upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title therefor, if such applicants ______________________________________________________________________________________

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or grantees and their heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their applications. (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof.
DAIS V. CFI 51 PHIL. 396 (1928) The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs immediately succeed to the dominion, ownership and possession of the property of their predecessor. The fact that the law provides for the appointment of a legal administrator for the liquidation of the deceased's property, and the partition among his heirs, does not deprive the heirs of the right to intervene in the administration of said property for the protection of their interests. Heirs have the right to intervene in a cadastral proceeding for the purpose of objecting to the striking out of an answer filed by the judicial administrator of the intestacy of the petitioners' predecessor in interest, claiming several parcels of land as the property of said estate, even when the aforementioned administrator consents to its being stricken out SANTIAGO V. CRUZ 19 PHIL. 145 (1911) Because applicants own merely an undivided share, less than fee simple, in the land described in the application, the application should be dismissed, without prejudice to the right of the various owners of the undivided interests in the land, jointly to present a new application for registration.
Citizenship As a general rule, only individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain are qualified to be transferees of private lands, i.e. Filipino citizens. (Sec. 12, Art. XII, 1987 Const.) However, this is subject to the ff. exceptions: (1) Aliens can acquire private lands, but only through hereditary (not testamentary) succession (Ramirez v. Vda. de Ramirez, 111 SCRA 704) (2) Natural-born Filipino citizens who lost their Phil. citizenship may be transferees of private lands of up to a maximum of 5,000 sq. m. of urban land and 3 hectares of rural land for residential, business or other purposes. ( BP 185, as amended by RA 8179) ______________________________________________________________________________________

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There are 3 remedies by which private land may be recovered from disqualified aliens: (1) Escheat proceedings (see Rule 91 of the Rules of Court); (2) Actions for reversion under the Public Land Act; and
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(3) Actions for recovery filed by the former (Filipino) owner. Note that the in pari delicto doctrine was abandoned in the case of Phil. Banking v. Lui She.
Natural Persons
Const. Art. XII., Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.. Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor. Sec. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being. The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain. Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost its Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
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SEC. 12. Any citizen of the Philippines over the age of eighteen years, or the head of a family, who does not own more than twenty-four hectares of land in the Philippines or has not had the benefit of any gratuitous allotment of more than twenty-four hectares of land since the occupation of the Philippines by the United States, may enter a homestead of not exceeding twenty-four hectares of agricultural land of the public domain. SEC. 22. Any citizen of lawful age of the Philippines, and any such citizen not of lawful age who is a head of a family, and any corporation or association of which at least sixty per centum of the capital stock or of any interest in said capital stock belongs wholly to citizens of the Philippines, and which is organized and constituted under the laws of Philippines, and corporate bodies organized in the Philippines authorized under their charters to do so; may purchase any tract of public agricultural land disposable under this Act, not to exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares in the case of an individual and one thousand and twenty-four hectares in that of a corporation or association, by proceeding as prescribed in this chapter: Provided, That partnerships shall be entitled to purchase not to exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares for each member thereof. but the total area so purchased shall in no case exceed the one thousand and twenty-four hectares authorized in this section for associations and corporations. SEC. 23. No person, corporation, association, or partnership other than those mentioned in the last preceding section may acquire or own agricultural public land or land of any other denomination or classification, which is at the time or was originally, really or presumptively, of the public domain, or any permanent improvement thereon, or any real right on such land and improvement: Provided, however, That persons, corporations, associations or partnerships which, at the date upon which the Philippine Constitution took effect, held agricultural public lands or land of any other denomination, that belonged originally, really or presumptively, to the public domain, or permanent improvements on such lands, or a real right upon such lands and Constitution took improvements, having acquired the same under the laws and regulations in force at the date of such acquisition, shall be authorized to continue holding the same as if such persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships were qualified under the last preceding section; but they shall not encumber, convey, or alienate the same to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships not included in section twentytwo of this Act, except by reason of hereditary succession, duly legalized and acknowledged by competent courts. SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, nineteen hundred and twenty-six or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition, or who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while same has not been occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares. A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right ______________________________________________________________________________________

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granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time he files his free patent application he is not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under this provision of the Public Land Law Sec. 48, supra. KRIVENKO V. REGISTER OF DEEDS 79 PHIL. 461 (1947) There is absolutely no difference in nature, character, value or importance to the nation between a residential land of the public domain and a residential land of private ownership, and, therefore, both should equally be considered as agricultural lands to be protected as part of the national patrimony. Specially is this so where the prohibition as to the alienation of public residential lots may become superfluous if the same prohibition is not equally applied to private residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to private residential lands will eventually become more important, for time will come when, in view of the constant disposition of public lands in favor private individuals, almost all, if not all, the residential lands of the public domain shall have become private residential lands. If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities, and that they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural. That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question. SAN JUAN V. INTESTATE ESTATE OF SPOUSES SOCCHI, GR L-19467 (1966) An alien who validly owns agricultural land in the Philippines, which land is sold at public auction for tax delinquency, may avail of the right to repurchase the same within one year pursuant to Section 38 of the Assessment Law. Such right is but an incident of the right of ownership and its exercise by the owner, who happens to be an alien, does not fall within the purview of the terms "shall be transferred or assigned" used in Section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution, or of the terms "encumbered, alienated or transferred" used in the implementing provision of Section 122, Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as Public Land Act. Moreover, the sale at public auction by reason of tax delinquency under the Assessment Law does not immediately divest the rights of the owner to the property sold. Indeed it is provided in section 39 of said law that after the sale and before repurchase or before the expiration of the term of one year fixed for such repurchase, the real property shall remain in the possession of the delinquent taxpayer who shall have the right to the usufruct thereof. It is only after failure to redeem within that period and after the final bill of sale is issued to the purchaser by the Provincial Treasurer that the rights of the owner are definitely divested. PHIL. BANKING V. LUI SHE 21 SCRA 52 (1967) If an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi jus utendi, ______________________________________________________________________________________

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just fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to dispose of it (jus disponendi) rights the sum total of which make up ownership. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the Philippines, as announced in Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, is indeed in grave peril. The contract giving the above rights to the alien is therefore void. RAMIREZ V. VDA. DE RAMIREZ 111 SCRA 704 The usufruct in favor of an alien is upheld, because the same, albeit a real right, does not vest title to land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution. CHEESMAN V. IAC 193 SCRA 93 The fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have. RELLOSA V. GAW CHEE HUN 93 PHIL. 827 Sale to alien by Filipino vendor during Japanese occupation null and void, for being contrary to the Constitution. But vendor can no longer recover the land, because of doctrine of pari delicto. (Note however that the pari delicto doctrine was subsequently abandoned in the case of Phil. Banking v. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52.) Corporations REGISTER OF DEEDS V. UNG SUI SI TEMPLE, 97 PHIL. 58 (1955) A deed of donation of a parcel of land executed by a Filipino citizen in favor of a religious organization whose founder, trustees and administrator are non-Filipinos, can not be admitted for registration. ______________________________________________________________________________________

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ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF DAVAO V. LRC, 102 PHIL. 596 (1957)
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A corporation sole is a special form of corporation usually associated with clergy, designed to facilitate the exercise of the functions of ownership of the church which was regarded as the property owner. It consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at a time), in some particular, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal advantages particularly that of perpetuity which in their natural persons they could not have. Through this legal fiction, church properties acquired by the incumbent of a corporation sole pass, by operation of law, upon his death not to his personal heirs but to his successor in office. A corporation sole, therefore, is created not only to administer the temporalities of the church or religious society where he belongs, but also to hold and transmit the same to his successor in said office. Although a branch of the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, every Roman Catholic Church in different countries, if it exercises its mission and is lawfully incorporated in accordance with laws of the country where it is located, is considered an entity or person with all the rights and privileges granted to such artificial being under laws of that country, separate and distinct from the personality of the Roman Pontiff or the Holy See, without prejudice to its religious relations with the latter which are governed by the Common Law or their rules and regulations. Even before the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and of the Republic of the Philippines every corporation sole then organized and registered had by express provision of law (Corporation Law, Public Act. 1459) the necessary power and qualification to purchase in its name private lands located in the territory in which it exercised its functions or ministry and for which it was created, independently of the nationality of its incumbent unique and single number and head, the bishop of the diocese. The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines has no nationality and that the frames of the Constitution did not have in mind the religious corporation sole when they provided that 60 per centum of the capital thereof be owned by Filipino citizens. Thus, if this constitutional provision were not intended for corporation sole, it is obvious that this could not be regulated or restricted by said provision. A corporation sole or "ordinary" is not the owner of the properties that he may acquire but merely the administrator thereof and holds the same in trust for the church to which the corporation is an organized and constituents part. Being mere administrator of the temporalities or properties titled in his name, the constitutional provision requiring 60 per centum Filipino ownership is not applicable. The said constitutional provision is limited by it terms to ownership alone and does not extend to control unless the control over the property affected has been devised to circumvent the real purpose of the constitution. In determining, therefore, whether the constitutional provision requiring 60 per centum Filipino capital is applicable to corporations sole, the nationality of the constituents of the diocese, and not the nationality of the actual incumbent of the parish, must be taken into consideration. In the present case, even if the question of nationality be considered, the aforesaid constitutional requirement is fully met and satisfied, considering that the corporation sole in question is composed of an overwhelming majority of Filipinos. REGISTER OF DEEDS V. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, 4 SCRA 1146 (1964) The prohibition in the Constitution against the acquisition of lands by aliens is absolute in its terms. It cannot be limited to the permanent acquisition of real estate by aliens, whether natural or juridical persons. A deed of transfer in favor of an alien bank, even if it was subject to the obligation that the bank dispose of the property within five years from the date of acquisition, is unregisterable.
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DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT & ACME, 146 SCRA 509 (1986) Supra.
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Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acme's right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper, This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
B.
PD 1529
Where to File
Sec. 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts . Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system. Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof. Sec. 17. What and where to file. - The application for land registration shall be filed with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the land is situated. The applicant shall file together with the application all original muniments of titles or copies thereof and a survey plan of the land approved by the Bureau of Lands. The clerk of court shall not accept any application unless it is shown that the applicant has furnished the Director of Lands with a copy of the application and all annexes. Sec. 18. Application covering two or more parcels. - An application may include two or more parcels of land belonging to the applicant/s provided they are situated within the same province or city. The court may at any time order an ______________________________________________________________________________________

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application to be amended by striking out one or more of the parcels or by a severance of the application. Sec. 19. Amendments. - Amendments to the application including joinder, substitution, or discontinuance as to parties may be allowed by the court at any stage of the proceedings upon just and reasonable terms. Amendments which shall consist in a substantial change in the boundaries or an increase in area of the land applied for or which involve the inclusion of an additional land shall be subject to the same requirements of publication and notice as in an original application. Sec. 20. When land applied for borders on road . - If the application describes the land as bounded by a public or private way or road, it shall state whether or not the applicant claims any and what portion of the land within the limits of the way or road, and whether the applicant desires to have the line of the way or road determined. Sec. 21. Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocular inspection . - The court may require facts to be stated in the application in addition to those prescribed by this Decree not inconsistent therewith and may require the filing of any additional paper. It may also conduct an ocular inspection, if necessary. Sec. 22. Dealings with land pending original registration. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree of registration, the land therein described may still be the subject of dealings in whole or in part, in which case the interested party shall present to the court the pertinent instruments together with a subdivision plan approved by the Director of Lands in case of transfer of portions thereof and the court, after notice to the parties, shall order such land registered subject to the conveyance or encumbrance created by said instruments, or order that the decree of registration be issued in the name of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments.
AGUILAR V. CAOGDAN, 105 PHIL. 661 The court that should take cognizance of a registration case is that which has territorial jurisdiction over the property. The Pangasinan court of first instance dismissed the registration case when it found that the portions of the land covered by it were actually situated within the municipality of San Clement, province of Tarlac, and the dismissal was without prejudice. This dismissal has the effect or relinquishing the jurisdiction originally acquired by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and of transferring it to the court of Tarlac was filed sometime before the dismissal of the Pangasinan case can have no legal adverse consequence. On the contrary, it was a rectification of an error committed as to venue for indeed the court that should take cognizance of this registration case is that which has territorial jurisdiction over the property. This court is the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. MANILA V. LACK, 19 PHIL. 234
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Before the creation of the Court of Land Registration, jurisdiction to determine the nature, quality, and extent of land titles, the rival claims of parties contending therefor, of their registration (in its former sense), and the legality and effect thereof was vested in the Courts of First Instance of the Islands. They had complete and exclusive jurisdiction thereover. By the passage of Act No. 496 these courts were deprived under certain conditions of the power of determining some of these questions and of adjudicating in relation to certain aspects of others. By that Act, two things occurred. First, a court of limited jurisdiction, with special subject matter, and with only one purpose, was created. Second, by reason thereof courts, theretofore of general, original, and exclusive jurisdiction, were shorn of some of their attributes and deprived of certain of their power. However, the purpose of the Court of Land Registration is not to create or vest title, but merely to confirm title already created and vested. The Court of Land Registration has no authority or jurisdiction to adjudicate rights in lands not registered. Therefore, a judgment of the Court of Land Registration, after trial, declaring that a parcel of land, excluded from the petition and from registration, was owned by the respondent and that such ownership was the reason for the exclusion of said parcel from registration, is not res adjudicata in an action of ejectment in the Court of First Instance, between the same parties, for the recovery of said parcel. Such judgment has no force or effect as evidence of title in such action.
Form and Contents of Application

PD 1529, sec. 15. Form and contents. - The application for land registration shall be in writing, signed by the application or the person duly authorized in his behalf, and sworn to before any officer authorized to administer oaths for the province or city where the application was actually signed. If there is more than one applicant, the application shall be signed and sworn to by and in behalf of each. The application shall contain a description of the land and shall state the citizenship and civil status of the applicant, whether single or married, and, if married, the name of the wife or husband, and, if the marriage has been legally dissolved, when and how the marriage relation terminated. It shall also state the full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those of the adjoining owners, if known, and, if not known, it shall state the extent of the search made to find them. REPUBLIC V. ALON, 199 SCRA 396 The following are the essential requisites for original registration proceedings in accordance with the Land Registration Act: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private surveyor. Filing of application for registration by the applicant. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court. Transmittal of the application and the date of the initial hearing together with all the documents or other evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land Registration Commission. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and place of hearing in the Official Gazette. Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those known to have interests in the property by the sheriff. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the notice or not. Hearing of the case by the Court.
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Amendments to Application
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PD 1529, Sec. 19. Amendments. - Amendments to the application including joinder, substitution, or discontinuance as to parties may be allowed by the court at any stage of the proceedings upon just and reasonable terms. Amendments which shall consist in a substantial change in the boundaries or an increase in area of the land applied for or which involve the inclusion of an additional land shall be subject to the same requirements of publication and notice as in an original application. Sec. 21. Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocular inspection. - The court may require facts to be stated in the application in addition to those prescribed by this Decree not inconsistent therewith and may require the filing of any additional paper. It may also conduct an ocular inspection, if necessary. ORTIZ V. ORTIZ, 26 PHIL. 250 While an application for the registration of various parcel real was pending in the Court of Land Registration, the petitioner sold the property under pacto de retro to a corporation with juridical personality, and owing to the lapse of redemption period, ownership became consolidated by operation of law and the vendor lost all his rights in the properties. Therefore the new and lawful owner in entitled to be subrogate in place of the petitioner, the previous owner, pending registration, and he may continue the proceedings in the case and finally obtain title as owner. (Sec. 29, Act No. 496, and arts. 1507 and 1508, Civil Code). ESCUETA V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS 16 PHIL. 482 It is not permissible to make amendments or alterations in the description of the land after its publication in the newspapers and after the registration of the property has been decreed, without the publication of new notifications and advertisements making known to everyone the said alterations and amendments. Otherwise, the law would be infringed with respect to the publicity which characterizes the procedure, and third parties who have not had an opportunity to present their claims, might be seriously affected in their rights, through failure of opportune notice. The agreement of the owners, merely designated in an amendment of the description of the land, is not sufficient, because there may be other persons who might be injured by the alteration of the description and of the plan of the land, and a third party who did not appear at the trial, in view of the previous publication of the description of the property before its alteration and amendment might afterwards be damaged by the subsequent decree of the court based on the altered or amended description of which he was not opportunely informed, or because he had no knowledge of the amendment which was not published. The real property to be inscribed in the registry by virtue of the decree of the court must be identical in its description with that which was the subject of the application of its owner and of the proceedings had in the court. DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. CA 276 SCRA 279 (1997)
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Absent publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court cannot validly confirm and register title. Note, though, that the court already acquires jurisdiction upon mere publication in OG. Due process, however, mandates publication, mailing and posting. The in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world, and the objective of dissemination of the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
Dealings Pending Original Registration See Sec. 22 of PD 1529.
C.
Notice of Application, Opposition and Default
Application
OMANDAM VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS (1954) Facts. Omandam applied for registration, under the Land Registration Act, a parcel of land subject to a mortgage in favor of PNB for the sum of P600. On the date of hearing, representatives of the Bureau of Lands, PNB and other opponents appeared. Representatives of Bureau of Lands and PNB were given 15 days to file written opposition to the application. Except as to those who had made their appearance a general default was entered. After hearing, court decreed registration in favor of Omandam. Director of Lands filed an opposition and ten days later, a motion for reconsideration was filed by him predicated upon newly discovered evidence and lack of notice of the hearing. This was denied by the Court. Director of Lands filed a motion for relief from judgment on the ground of excusable neglect. Also denied by the Court. Held. Order appealed from is affirmed. Ratio. Appellant points to the lack of hearing on the petition for relief, as provided for in sections 4 and 6, Rule 38. According to the rule the Court is to require "those against whom the petition is filed to answer the same within fifteen days from the receipt thereof" "if the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify such process." Granting that the means of communication between Occidental Misamis and Manila was faulty as alleged by the appellant, still there is no justification for the delay in filing his opposition to the application. The fact that he did not file his opposition within the period granted or within a ______________________________________________________________________________________

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reasonable time thereafter led the Court to believe that he abandoned his opposition to the application. The motion for relief, apart from failing to show excusable neglect, does not have an affidavit of merits. Hence, being an insufficient petition not only in form but also in substance to justify the Court to require those against whom it is filed to answer within fifteen days from the receipt thereof, as provided for in section 4, Rule 38, the hearing provided for in section 6 of the rule was not available to the party seeking the relief.
Opposition
See Sec. 25 of PD 1529. NICOLAS VS. PRE, ET AL. 97 PHIL 766 (1955) Facts. Nicolas filed for registration a vast tract of land. Pre, et al., opposed the application with respect to a portion of the entire land claiming to be the owners thereof. During the hearing, on which date Nicolas was able to submit his evidence, the parties agreed to come to an amicable settlement. The court gave them 5 days. Instead of submitting the proposed settlement, Nicolas moved to dismiss the registration proceeding, which was favorably acted upon. Pre moved to reconsider the order to give them an opportunity to present their evidence. Pres motion was granted. However, Nicolas failed to appear for the reception of evidence. The court declared Pre as owners of the portion of land claimed by them as owners. No appeal was taken. 4 years later, Nicolas sought to declare the order null and void for lack of jurisdiction and for violation of Sec. 37 of Act 496. TC sustained motion to dismiss filed by Pre. CA affirmed TC. Held. CA decision affirmed. With the enactment of Act No. 3621, the oppositor may now not only allege in his answer his objections to the application but also to ask for any affirmative relief he may desire (e.g., ask for the land to be registered in his name in the same proceeding). But the adverse claimant to whom a portion of the land applied for has been awarded has to pay to the applicant such part of said expenses as may be in proportion to the area awarded. And inasmuch as the applicant (Nicolas) had asked for the dismissal of his application, the oppositors (Pre, et al.) ipso facto acquired the role of applicants on the portion they claim without any opposition whatsoever. ROXAS, ET AL., VS. CUEVAS, ET AL. 8 PHIL. 469 (1907) Facts. An application for registration of Hacienda Calauang in Laguna was filed. The government and several residents in the adjoining towns, cities and municipalities opposed the application. Some oppositors maintained that the land is the property of the government and a portion thereof is occupied by them. The lands in question were originally Crown lands conveyed to Salgado by a royal grant. Upon his death, it was sold at auction to Benito Machado as agent of Domingo Roxas. The applicants herein acquired the property by succession.
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The lower court found that active possession was exercised by Salgado and his successors for a period of 130 years while oppositors possession was precarious and doubtful. Court of Land Registration thus overruled the oppositions of private respondents. The Court adjudged the land to the applicants except for a portion of the land held to be public forest. Held. Judgment of lower court affirmed. If the land as claimed by the oppositors belongs to the government, it follows that the oppositors cannot have interest in the land as they are not the government but mere citizens. Since the land belongs to the State, and since the lower court has not so held it in its judgment, the aggrieved party would be the State and not a mere citizen, and it is the State that would have been entitled to appeal from the judgment and not any private individual. But the Insular Government did not appeal. In order that an application for registration of the title of ownership in the Court of Land Registration may be object to, the opposition must be based on the right of dominion or some other real right opposed to the adjudication or recognition of the ownership of the petitioner, whether it be limited or absolute.
Order of Default The court may, upon motion of the applicant, order a default to be recorded if no person appears and answers within the time allowed, and there appears to be no reason to the contrary. The court shall then require the applicant to present evidence. Partial defaults are allowed in land registration proceedings. (Sec. 26, PD 1529)
YABUT LEE VS. PUNZALAN 99 SCRA 567 (1980) Facts. Spouses Yabut Lee filed an application for registration 2 parcels of land. No opposition having been interposed despite due publication, TC issued an Order of General Default. Due to the transfer of the presiding judge, however, application was not acted upon. Subsequently, Punzalan filed a petition for reopening and/or review. He claimed that the applicants committed fraud in not disclosing that he is the owner of a house standing on the lots applied for and that he has usufructuary rights over said properties. TC denied reopening. Held. Order of General Default set aside. No judgment has yet been rendered by the lower court, much less a decree of registration issued. Petition for reopening is thus premature. In the absence of any decision and/or decree, there is nothing to be reviewed or reopened. But in the interest of substantial justice and the speedy determination of the controversy, the TC should have lifted the Order of General Default to allow the Punzalan to file an Opposition to the Application and present his evidence. An Order of General Default is interlocutory in character and may be modified or amended at any time prior to the rendition of the final judgment. MANDIAN VS. LEONG 103 PHIL 431 (1958) Facts. Dionisio Leong was sued by Mandian, widow and second wife Dionisios late father, for usurpation. In answering the complaint, Dionisio pleaded that he possessed and administered the ______________________________________________________________________________________

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property as part of the estate of his late father by agreement with Mandian. Celestino, brother of Dionisio, filed an answer in intervention pleading that the lot was acquired during his second marriage to Mandian but title was placed in her name because the husband was not a Filipino citizen. Celestino filed cross-claim against Dionisio for his failure to give his co-heirs any share in the estates fruits. No answer having been filed by Dionisio notwithstanding the lapse of 26 days after he was served a copy of the cross-claim, court declared him in default. Dionisio sought reconsideration on the ground that the period to answer must be counted not from the time he was served a copy but from the time the court admitted it. Lower court denied reconsideration. Held. Appeal dismissed and trial court ordered to proceed with the hearing of the case. Ratio. The order declaring Dionisio in default is interlocutory and preliminary to the hearing of the case, and remains under the control of the court, and may be modified or rescinded by it on sufficient ground at any time before final judgment. Thus, appeal is premature and improper. A prerequisite to defendants right to appeal is that he file a motion under Rule 38 asking that the order of default entered against him be set aside. Once such motion is filed, the defendant, even if his motion is denied, becomes entitled to all further proceedings including final judgment and may duly appeal therefrom. MALAGUM AND ORNOPIA VS. PABLO 46 PHIL 19 (1924) Facts. Andrin and Anacleta Lopez were the applicants for registration of a parcel of land while Malagum and Ornopia appeared as opponents (petitioners in this case). Lower court granted opponents 24 hours to file written opposition. Oppositors presented a written opposition which was not verified under oath. When the case was again called for hearing, the opponents presented an amended opposition in exactly the same language as the previous opposition but verified in the proper form. Applicants opposed. Judge denied admission of said amendment and declared opponents in default. Motion for reconsideration was filed. On the same date, court decreed the land in favor of applicants. Petitioners pray that a writ of mandamus issue ordering the respondent judge to reinstate the opposition. Held. Demurrer sustained. Petition suffers from defects not curable by amendment. Ratio. Mandamus will not lie when there is another plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Petitioners should have taken an exception to the order rejecting their amended opposition or answer and after the denial of their motion for reconsideration, could have taken their appeal to the Supreme Court. The order excluding their answer was not a minor order within the meaning of Sec. 141 of the Civil Procedure to which no exception could be taken. It was in effect a final determination of their rights and may be appealed as soon as the decision ordering the issuance of the decree in favor of the adverse party was rendered.
D. Hearing, Judgment and Decree of Registration

PD 1529
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Sec. 27. Speedy hearing; reference to a referee. - The trial court shall see to it that all registration-proceedings are disposed or within ninety days from the date the case is submitted for decision. The Court, if it deems necessary, may refer the case or any part thereof to a referee who shall hear the parties and their evidence, and the referee shall submit his report thereon to the Court within fifteen days after the termination of such hearing. Hearing before a referee may be held at any convenient place within the province or city as may be fixed by him and after reasonable notice thereof shall have been served the parties concerned. The court may render judgment in accordance with the report as though the facts have been found by the judge himself: Provided, however, that the court may in its discretion accept the report, or set it aside in whole or in part, or order the case to be recommitted for further proceedings: Sec. 28. Partial judgment. - In a case where only a portion of the land subject of registration is contested, the court may render partial judgment provided that a subdivision plan showing the contested and uncontested portions approved by the Director of Lands is previously submitted to said court. Sec. 29. Judgment confirming title. - All conflicting claims of ownership and interest in the land subject of the application shall be determined by the court. If the court, after considering the evidence and the reports of the Commissioner of Land Registration and the Director of Lands, finds that the applicant or the oppositor has sufficient title proper for registration, judgment shall be rendered confirming the title of the applicant, or the oppositor, to the land or portions thereof. Sec. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree. - The judgment rendered in a land registration proceedings becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days to be counted from the data of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal may be taken from the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases. After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the court to forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of this Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged entitled to registration. Sec. 31. Decree of registration. - Every decree of registration issued by the Commissioner shall bear the date, hour and minute of its entry, and shall be signed by him. It shall state whether the owner is married or unmarried, and if married, the name of the husband or wife: Provided, however, that if the land adjudicated by the court is conjugal property, the decree shall be issued in the name of both spouses. If the owner is under disability, it shall state the nature of disability, and if a minor, his age. It shall contain a description of the land as finally determined by the court, and shall set forth the estate of the owner, and also, in such manner as to show their relative priorities, all particular estates, mortgages, easements, liens, attachments, and other encumbrances, including rights of tenant-farmers, if any, to which the land or owner's estate is subject, as well as any other matters properly to be determined in pursuance of this Decree. The decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to such exceptions or liens as may be provided by law. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the National Government and all branches ______________________________________________________________________________________

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thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application or notice, the same being included in the general description "To all whom it may concern". Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. - The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud. Sec. 33. Appeal from judgment, etc. - The judgment and orders of the court hearing the land registration case are appealable to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the same manner as in ordinary actions: Sec. 34. Rules of procedure. - The Rules of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provision of this Decree, be applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. cdasia BP 129 Sec. 34. Delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lot the value of which does not exceed twenty thousand pesos, such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. Rule 143, Rules of Court These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
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BALTAZAR VS. LIMPIN 49 PHIL. 39
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Facts: M. Baltazar and J. Limpin filed an application for registration. Opposition was filed by B. Limpin and the Dir of Lands. David was named as referee and he made a report favorable to the applicants. No exception was made to the referees report so the judge handed down a decision in which he concurred in part and dissented in part with the referees report. Decision was unfavorable to applicants. Applicants appealed and filed a petition to order stenographer to transcribe the notes of the testimony of the referee. TC denied pet bec. referees report has become unassailable. Issue: WON petition to order stenographer should be granted. Held: Yes. GENERAL RULE: If a party fails to make timely and specific exceptions to the report of a referee and the report is confirmed by the trial judge, he is bound by the findings and cannot be heard to dispute their truthfulness or escape the legal consequences flowing therefrom. BUT by virtue of sec 140 of the Code of Civil Procedure and sec 36 of the Land Registration Law, the trial judge retains a discretion to accept the report of the referee in part and set it aside in part or reverse it entirely even where no exceptions to the referee's report are taken (see sec 27 of PD 1529). When the trial judge accepts the referees report in part, the general rule does not apply such that the referees report does not become unassailable. Petition granted. DURAN VS. OLIVA 113 PHIL 144 Facts: Duran and Vda. De Duran filed an application for registration of land and Oliva et al filed their opposition and MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because the lands were already registered. TC granted MTD. P claims there in no such thing as MTDs in land registration cases. Issue: WON MTDs are allowed in land registration cases. Held: Yes. By express provision of Rule 132 (now R143) of the Rules of Court, the rules contained therein apply to land registration and cadastral cases in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. The Land Registration Act does not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. As a motion to dismiss is necessary for the expeditious termination of land registration cases, said motion contained in the Rules of Court can be availed of by the parties. Petition denied.
Evidence Necessary to Prove Title

RODRIGUEZ VS. DIR OF LANDS 31 PHIL 272 Facts: Rodriguez filed an application for registration of land and the Dir of Lands and several homesteaders filed their opposition. TC denied the application because the area and boundaries of the land applied for is too uncertain. Issue: WON the P are entitled to a new trial.
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Held: Yes. Only under exceptional circumstances should an application for registry in the Court of Land Registration be dismissed. Applicants should be granted a new trial, upon such terms as the court may deem just and reasonable and to submit additional evidence in support of his claim of title, when there are strong or reasonable grounds to believe that he is the owner of all or of any part of the land described in his application. This especially when the only ground for the dismissal of the application, as is in the CAB, is the lack of formal or perhaps even substantial proof as to the chain of title upon which applicant relies, or as to the precise location of the land, which there is reasonable ground to believe can be supplied by the applicant upon his being advised as to the nature of the defects or omissions in the evidence offered by him, such defects or omissions having been the result of oversight or excusable error on his part in submitting his evidence in support of his claim of title to the land described in his application. REPUBLIC VS. LEE Facts: Lee filed an application for registration of land on the bare statement that the land applied for has been in the possession of her predecessor-in-interest for more than 20 years. Director of Lands opposed. TC granted the application. Issue: WON Lees bare statement constitutes the well-nigh incontrovertible and conclusive evidence required in land registration cases. Held: No. The most basic rule in land registration cases is that "no person is entitled to have land registered under the Cadastral or Torrens system unless he is the owner in fee simple of the same, even though there is no opposition presented against such registration by third persons . . In order that the petitioner for the registration of his land shall be permitted to have the same registered, and to have the benefit resulting from the certificate of title, finally issued, the burden is upon him to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple." Lee must prove the alleged 20 year or more possession of his predecessors-in-interest by means of factual support and substantiation. Lee failed to discharge this burden to the satisfaction of the Court. That the representing fiscal did not cross-examine her on this point does not help her cause because the burden is upon her. Petition granted. REPUBLIC CEMENT CORP. VS. CA, CORREA, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN (198 SCRA 734) Facts: Republic Cement Corp (RCC) filed an application for registration of land. Rayo, Mangahas and Legaspi opposed as to a portion of the land applied for based on ownership. Oppositors were later substituted by the purchaser Correa. TC denied application based on new SC ruling that a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under Section 48 (b) of she Public Land Law and when its predecessors-in-interest did not apply for land registration, they did not have any vested right or title which was transmissible to the juridical person. Correa filed an action for recovery. RCC filed a MTD on the ground that the land registration case is on appeal. TC granted MTD. The CA, as regards the land registration case on appeal, ruled that the SC ruling used by TC was already overturned, such that juridical persons like RCC can now apply for registration. CA ordered registration in favor of RCC but excluding certain portions in favor of Correa. RCC appeals CA decision. Issue: WON CA was correct in giving a portion to Correa. Held. Yes. Petitioner raises questions of fact which are not within the province of the present recourse. Settled is the rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and binding upon ______________________________________________________________________________________

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the Supreme Court if borne out by the evidence on record. A review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals is not a function ordinarily undertaken by the Supreme Court, the rule admitting of only a few exceptions recognized under decisional law, which exceptions are not obtaining in the case at bar. After the death of RCCs predecessor-in-interest Felix Mangahas, one-half (1/2) of said land was adjudicated and partitioned among his five (5) daughters in a deed of extrajudicial partition. Later, RCC boought the land form the daughters. Based on said transfers, petitioner is now seeking the registration of the whole of Lot No. 2880 in its name. This we cannot allow. The deeds of sale relied upon by petitioner do not constitute sufficient legal justification for petitioner's claim over all of Lot No. 2880. Petitioner's title over said lot, as the successor in interest of said heirs, is limited only to whatever rights the latter may have had therein. It is elementary that a grantor can convey no greater estate than what he has or in which he has an alienable title or interest. Petitioner's claim over the excess area is premised on the survey allegedly made by surveyor Villaruz, but the resultant areas depicted in said survey do not tally with, but supposedly consist of expanded areas very much larger than, those indicated for the lots involved in their respective tax declarations. These facts are expressly stated by the foregoing parties in the deeds of sale they executed in favor of petitioner over the lots covered by the aforestated tax declarations. We do not find satisfactory the stilted explanation advanced to justify the glaringly excessive disparity of areas resulting after the supposed survey. It does not appear from our scrutiny of the records, despite petitioner's representations in its written offer of evidence filed in the court a quo, that the purported survey plans of the lots involved were actually submitted in evidence therein. Neither was it alleged and proved that they were approved by the Director of Lands. It has long been held that unless a survey plan is duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same is of dubious value and is not acceptable as evidence. Indubitably, therefore, the reputed survey and its alleged results are not entitled to credit and should be rejected. An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document evidencing his title thereto, must prove not only the genuineness of said title but also the identity of the land therein referred to. If he only claims a portion of what is included in his title, he must clearly prove that the property sought to be registered is included in that title.
Spanish Titles
PD 1529, Sec. 3. Status of other pre-existing land registration system. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is hereby discontinued and all lands recorded under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered lands. Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 113 of this Decree, until the land shall have been brought under the operation of the Torrens system. The books of registration for unregistered lands provided under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344, shall continue to remain in force; provided, that all instruments dealing with unregistered lands shall henceforth be registered under Section 113 of this Decree.
REPUBLIC VS. FELICIANO 148 SCRA 424 (1987)
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Facts: Feliciano filed a complaint with the CFI of Camarines Sur against the Republic of the Philippines for recovery of ownership of a parcel of land. Feliciano alleges that he bought the property from Victor Cardiola who in turn acquired the property from a Francisco Abrazado. Abrazados claim to ownership is by virtue of an informacion posesoria. Feliciano took actual possession of the land and introduced improvements. Government claimed ownership by virtue of Proclamation 90 which reserved for settlement purposes a tract of land which includes Felicianos land. Feliciano filed an action praying that he be declared rightful and true owner by virtue of the informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-interests. Issue: WON ownership is vested by virtue of the informacion posesoria. Held/ Ratio Decidendi : No. The inscription in the property registry of an informacion posesoria under the Spanish Mortgage law was a means provided by the law then in force in the Philippines prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to US, to record a claimants actual possession of a piece of land, established through an ex parte proceeding. Such inscription merely furnishes, at best, prima facie evidence of the fact that at the time the proceeding was held, the claimant was in possession of the land under a claim of right. The possessory information could ripen into a record of ownership after the lapse of 20 years upon the fulfillment of the requisites. There is no showing in the case at bar that the informacion posesoria held by the respondent had been converted into a record of ownership. Such possessory information, therefore, remained at best mere prima facie evidence of possession.
Tax Declarations Tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in land registration cases.
PALOMO VS. CA JANUARY 21, 1997 Facts: Gov General Forbes issued EO 40 w/c reserved for provincial park purposes an area of land. Subsequently the CFI of Albay ordered registratiion of 15 parcels of land covered by EO40 in the name of Diego Palomo. In 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proc. 47 converting the area of EO40 into the Tiwi Hot Spring National Park. The Palomos continued in adverse possession, paying real estate taxes thereon, and making improvements. In 1974, the Govt of the Phils. Filed a case for annulment and cancellation of Certificates of Title involving the 15 parcels. Jundgment was rendered in favor of the Republic. Issue: WON the certificate of titles to the 15 parcels are valid and binding. Held/ Ratio Decidendi: NO. The tax receipts which were presented in evidence do not prove ownership of the parcels of land inasmuch as the weight of authority is that tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in land registration cases.
Possession
SOUTH CITY HOMES VS REPUBLIC 185 SCRA 693 (1990) ______________________________________________________________________________________

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Facts: Lot No. 5005 is a strip of land between 2 lots owned by the petitioner. Registration of the strip was issued in the name of the petitioner, but the order was reversed by special division of the respondent court. Petitioner argues that the reversal is erroneous. The 2 adjacent lots are Lot 2381 and 2386. Both are now registered with the petitioner. He submits 2 theories as to why lot 5005 should also be registered in his name. First, the strip of land formed part of the 2 lots but was ommitted therefrom only because of the inaccuracies of the old system of cadastral surveys. Second, it had acquired the property by prescription through uninterrupted possession in the concept of owner. Issue: WON petitioner has acquired ownership over lot 5005 through prescription. Ratio: NO. It is obvious that the technical descriptions of the two lots do not include the strip of land between them. Furthermore, the testimony and the evidence presented falls short of establishing the manner and length of possession required by law to vest prescriptive title in the petitioner to lot No. 5005. For one thing, as the SolGen points out in his comment, the claim of adverse ownership to the strip of land between their respective lots was not exclusive but shared by the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner. The petitioner merely occupied the disputed strip believing it to be included in the 2 lots. However, even if it can be conceded that the previous owners of the lots possessed the strip, the possession cannot be tacked to the possession of the petitioner. Possession cannot be transferred.
Prescription
PARCOTILO VS PARCOTILO 120 PHIL. 1231 Facts: The plaintiffs alleged that Pablo owned two parcels of land during his lifetime in Misamis Occidental. In 1918, Pablo and his wife died of cholera, leaving no ascendant or descendant. So it was claimed by the plaintiffs herein that they are co-owners of the land with the defendants involved. On January 1956, plaintiffs filed a complaint for partition, claiming that in 1936, defendant Demetrio swore to an affidavit that he was the only son and heir of Pablo and in so doing, procured the transfer to his name of the tax declarations of Pablos lands. Demetrio then sold a portion of the property to a third party, Crispin Prieto. The defendants raised various defenses: claiming that it was donated to them since 1917 and took possession thereof in 1918 in the concept of an owner, introducing improvements to it; the third party claims innocent purchaser for value. The trial court dismissed the complaint, upholding defendants assertion that it was donated mortis causa through a testament (without requisite of law) exh 1 conveying it to defendant. And it was also found that defendant possessed the land without any protesting his occupation thereof, and only recently did plaintiffs raise this claim. The TC ruled that exh 1 has no probative value but it serves as a good ground to base acquisitive prescription. Hence, this appeal. Held/ Ratio Decidendi : The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the TC. Even if exh 1 was not executed with all the requisites of a valid will or of a valid donation mortis causa, the said document supplied the basis for the claim for the defendant. This claim of ownership by Demetrio coupled with his open, continuous and adverse possession for a period of 38 years had ripened into a title by prescription. And where the lands involved are unregistered and the rights thereto by prescription accrued before the New Civil Code went into effect, the law applicable is Sec 41 of Act 190 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure (10 year- period and concept of actual, open, ... possession). Even the ______________________________________________________________________________________

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Art 1137 of the New Civil Code, nevertheless, upholds the claim of defendant since he held on the property through uninterrupted adverse possession for more than 30 years. SEMINARY OF SAN CARLOS VS THE MUNICIPALITY OF CEBU (19 PHIL 32) Facts: The Seminary of San Carlos asks for the registration of two pieces of land located in Cebu, alleging as its source of title a royal cession from the King of Spain. The City of Cebu denies the title of the petitioner and alleges in itself ownership of the land in question, stating that its title is based upon possession thereof required by law to effect title by prescription. The land in question as claimed by the seminary, includes a portion of one of the public squares of that city. So aside from the question of ownership, the two related matters resolved by the court involved the quantity of the land and its precise location. Held/ Ratio Decidendi: After looking at the exhibits to ascertain the exact plan of the land, the Court found that the land described in petitioners exhibits far exceeds the land it was allowed to claim. It was shown that indeed, there appears to be a large difference between the amount of land as described in one of the petitioners exhibits and that included in the plan. But still, there are enough documents to show that it owns part of the land. Under the evidence, therefore, the Court concluded that a portion of the land now occupied by the City of Cebu as a public plaza is a land described in the petitioners exhibits and so much said land is contained in petitioners plan, and to that land, no documentary record or title appears except that of petitioners paper title which the City fails to contradict. The Citys contention is based solely on long years of actual occupation (prescription). It then signifies no source from which comes any right or interest and asserts no ability to disclose any. In fact, exh k was even presented by petitioner to show that the Citys occupation was permissive and not adverse, was under license and not under claim of right, and could not therefore be made the basis of a prescriptive title. Any express or implied acknowledgment which the possessor makes with regard to the dominant rights of the true owner interrupts the possession held for prescriptive purposes and defeats the operation of the law granting such rights. Also, the spanish grant (a written instrument acknowledging the superior title of the Seminary and limited the purpose of the Citys possession of the land) given by the governor-general then, recognizing the Seminarys right was binding upon the City and conclusive as to the character thereof. But the Seminary is likewise bound to honor the purposes for which the City can occupy the land (so long as the paseo exists). RAMOS VS CA (FEB. 3, 1999) Facts: supra Held/ Ratio Decidendi: Under the law, an action for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud prescribes in four years from the discovery of fraud. Discovery of the fraud must be deemed to have taken place when Lucia Bautista was issued OCT Nos. 17811 and 17812 because registration of real property is considered constructive notice to all persons and it chall be counted from the time of such registering, filing, or entering. An action based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years. This means that petitioners should have enforced the trust within 10 years from the time of its creation or upon the alleged fraudulent registration of property. But as it is, petitioners failed to avail of any of the aforementioned remedies within the prescribed periods. With NO remedy in view, their claims should forever be foreclosed. ______________________________________________________________________________________

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Likewise, the Court reiterated on the protection afforded by the Torrens System (once its title is registered, owner may rest secure.. so no abandonment can work against the private respondents.
E. Hearing, Judgment and Decree Hearing and Notice

GOVT OF THE PHIL, VASQUEZ, GAYARES VS ABURAL (39 PHIL 996) Facts: Cadastral proceedings were commenced in Negros Occidental upon an application of the Director of Lands in 1916. Notices were issued. Vasquez and Gayares, although residing in the same municipality and participated in other cadastral cases, did NOT enter any opposition. Hearing then issued, and the lower court issued a final decree ordering the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the decrees corresponding to the lots adjudged in the decision. Eight months later, but before the issuance by the Land Registration Office of the so-called technical decree, Vasquez and Gayares came into the case for the first time, claiming complete ignorance of the proceedings. The lower court however, denied their motion for new trial, saying that there was already a decree rendered by the Court and there being no allegation of fraud, the Court has no jurisdiction to consider this case. Hence, this appeal. Held/ Ratio Decidendi: The main question is : When does the registration of title, under the Torrens System of Land Registration, especially under the different Philippine laws, establishing the Cadastral System, become final, conclusive and indisputable? As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final, conclusive and indisputable after the passage of the 30 day period allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any step having been taken to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then have execution of the judgment as a matter of right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is the special provision providing for fraud. In this case, the Court explained that there are 3 actions taken after trial in a cadastral case. First, adjudicates ownership in favor of claimants. Second, declaration by the court that the decree is final and its order for the issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the Land Registration Office (such order is made within 30 days from date of receipt of a copy of the decision, there being no appeal made). Third, devolves upon the General Land Registration Office to prepare the final decrees in all adjudicated cases. Indeed, the judgment in a cadastral survey, including the rendition of the decree, is a judicial act. As the law says, the judicial decree when final is the basis of the certificate of title. The issuance of a decree by the LRO is ministerial act. The date on which the defeated party receives a copy of the decision, begins the running of the time for the interposition of a motion for new trial or appeal. Herein, the claim after 8 months will not be allowed by the Court. MAGBANUA, PINEDA VS DIZON, DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND FORESTRY (73 PHIL. 622) Facts: Petitioners applied in the CFI of Iloilo for the registration of a parcel of land. This was opposed by the DOL and DOF claiming that the applicants have no sufficient title to the land, and that a portion thereof formed part of the provincial road. Hearing ensued, and in there, an agreement was reached wherein the applicants ceded to the government the land claimed by it (excluding it in their application). As such, the Court rendered a decision bestowing parcels A and C to applicants and ceding parcel B to the government. The decision was silent however to ______________________________________________________________________________________

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one parcel of land (parcel D). In the decision, the applicants were ordered to submit an amended plan duly approved by the BOL corresponding to the technical description as agreed upon. The DOL however filed a motion for reconsideration based on the Courts failure to include parcel D in its claim. Petitioners opposed the MFR, saying that the judge no longer has jurisdiction because the decision had become final. Held/ Ratio Decidendi: DOL can file MFR because decision is NOT yet final. In view of the necessity for the applicants to present a new plan as a result of their agreement whereby it was agreed that parcels B and D were to be excluded in favor of the government. The decision could not acquire finality until the amended plan was presented. Indeed, such decisions which leave something yet to be done by the parties and the court before it can be enforced, has in various cases been declared by the Court as interlocutory and not appealable. ALINSUNURIN VS. DIR OF LANDS (68 SCRA 177) FACTS: On Feb. 24, 1964, Alipinoi Alinsunurin filed an application for registration under Act No. 496 of a vast tract of land in nueva Ecija. The director of lands opposed the application, claiming that the applicant was not in open, continuous possession of the land for at least 30 years, and that part of the land was a military reservation, therefore inalienable land. On Nov. 19, 1966, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of the applicants, ordering the registration of the land in the names of: (Paranaque Investment and Devt. Corp. (PIDC/ successor-in-interest of Alinsunurin); and (2) Roman Tamayo as to 1/3 portion of the land. The DOL filed a notice of appeal with the SC. PIDC was furnished a copy of the notice, but no copy was sent to Roman Tamayo. Pending approval of the records of appeal, PIDC and RT filed a motion for the issuance of a decree of registration pending appeal. The DOL opposed. The lower court on March 11, 1967 ordered the issuance of a decree of registration of the entire land, 1/3 pro indiviso in favor of RT, and 2/3 in favor of PIDC the latter subject to the final outcome of the appeal, while the former absolute since RT was not furnished a Notice of Appeal. OCT No. 0-311 was isued by the register of deeds on March 14, 1967. The DOL filed a petition to nullify the LCs order dated march 11, 1967, the decree of reg issued pursuant thereto, and the OCT No. 0-311 issued by the ROD. ISSUE: WON the OCT No. 0-3151 may be nullified. HELD: Yes. Under the circumstances of the case, the failure of the appellants to serve a copy of their Notice of Appeal to RT is not fatal to the appeal because, admittedly, he was served with a copy of the original, as well as the Amended record on appeal in both of which the Notice3 of Appeal is embodied. Hence, such failure cannot impair the right of appeal. What is more, the appeal taken by the gov't was from the entire decision, which was not severable. Thus, the appeal affects the whole decision. In any event, We rule that execution pending appeal is NOT applicable in land registration proceedings. It is fraught with dangerous consequences. Innocent purchasers may be misled into purchasing real properties upon reliance on a judgment which may be reversed on appeal. A Torrens title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final is a nullity, as it is violative of the express provision of the LRA w/c requires that a decree shall be issued only after the decision adjudicating the title becomes final and executory, and it is on the basis of said decree that the ROD concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title. Consequently, the LC acted w/o jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the issuances of a decree of reg. Despite the appeal taken from the entire decision a quo. ______________________________________________________________________________________

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DE LOS REYES VS. DE VILLA (48 PHIL 227)
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FACTS: Delos Reyes filed an application for the registration of 2 parcels of land situated in the municipality of Mariaya, Tayabas. The CFI rendered a decision in favor of delos Reyes, ordering the issuance of a decree of registration and OCT as soon as the decision becomes final. The court issued an order directing the Land Reg Office to prepare a final decree of registration. Such was issued on Nov 22, 1923. Braulio de Villa filed a petition for review of the decree under Sec 38 of the LRA, alleging that the registration of land was obtained by fraud. The petition was opposed by delos Reyes on the ground that it had been presented after the expiration of the time allowed under sec 38. DLR maintains that the decree of March 31, 1923 was the reckoning point of the 1-year period under Sec. 38, hence the petition was presented out of time. Appelant de Villa contends that the 1-yr period commenced on Nov. 22, 1923 when the final decree of registration was issued by the GLRO; therefore, the petition was presented well within the one year period provided for in Sec. 38. ISSUE: When does the one-year period for the petition for review commence? RATIO: Upon the issuance of the final decree of registration, as described under Section 40, by the chief of the general Land Reg. Office. De Villas petition was timely presented. The petition for review under Sec. 38 of the LRA must be presented within one year after the entry of the decree of registration described and defined in Sec. 40 of the same act. The LRA expressly recognizes 2 classes of decrees in land registration proceedings, namely, decrees of confirmation and registration dealt with in sections 30-41 of the Act, and the decrees dismissing the application. It will be noted that Sec. 38 speaks of the former class. Sec. 40 defines and describes the form and contents of such decrees. The decision of the trial court in a land registration case, ordering the issuance of a decree of registration within the meaning of Sec. 38 of the LRA. In preparing and signing the final decree of registration, the chief of the GLRO acts in his capacity as Chief Clerk of the CFI in land registration matters, and not as an administrative one. It is the last word of the court to the registration and is the basis for the issuance of the certificate of title. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the date noted on the final decree of registration, as the date of its issuance and entry, must be regarded as the true date of such entry, and the year within which a petition for review must be presented begins to run from that date. YUSON VS. DIAZ (42 PHIL. 22) Facts: Yuson purchased a parcel of land from Lopez, to whom OCT no. 999 was issued by the CFI (Lopez was the applicant for registration). When Yuson took possession of the land, they found the respondents in possession of the part of the land. The latter were asked to leave the land, but they refused. The respondents claim that they purchased the land in good faith from one Graciano Garcia. The Land Reg. Court issued a writ of possession in favor of Lopez, by virtue of which Lopez was placed in possession of the land. In the case at bar, Yuson filed petition/motion to issue a writ of possession to compel the respondents to surrender the land to Yuson. ______________________________________________________________________________________

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The respondents maintain that, in view of the right of possession which they claim to have acquired over the parcel of land, they cannot be dispossessed thereof by means of a simple motion. Yuson claims that it is entitled to a writ of possession, relying on Sec. 39 of the LRA. It is claimed that Sec. 39 guarantees that the purchaser of registered land for value shall hold the same free and clear from any and all prior claims and encumbrances, except those set forth in the decree of registration and those expressly mentioned in the Act as having been reserved against it. The CFI Judge refused to issue the writ of possession. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON the successors-in-interest of the applicants can acquire possession of said parcel of land actually occupied by the respondents by means of a petition asking for a writ of possession? Held: No. An independent action for reconveyance or unlawful detainer is necessary. Under the facts stated in the decision, it is improper to issue the peremptory writ of mandamus against a judge to compel him to issue a writ of possession in favor of the owner of the registered land occupied by a third person who has not been defeated after trial. Sec. 39 of the LRA w/c states that an OCT issued by virtue of a decree of reg. And every subsequent purchaser for value receives a certificate and those mentioned in Sec. 39. The meaning of the words free from all encumbrances does not include adverse possession of a third person who subsequent to the decree entered and occupied the said land. By virtue of Sec. 17 of the LRA, the Land Registration Court may, in cases falling within its jurisdiction, enforce its orders, judgments or decrees in the same manner as the CFI, including a writ of possession. But when OTHER persons have subsequently entered the property, claiming right of possession, the owner of the registered property or his successors in interest CANNOT dispossess such persons by merely asking for a writ of possession. He who believes himself entitled to deprive another of the possession of real property must come to the courts of justice, instituting, as the case may be, and action for unlawful entry or detainer, or the reinvindicatory action authorized under the Civil Code. BLAS, SIMEON VS. DELA CRUZ (37 PHIL. 1) Facts: Dela Cruz filed an application for registration of a parcel of land under the Torrens system. Blas presented an opposition, claiming that he was the owner of a portion of land described in the petition. Lower court ruled in favor of Blas, but the SC ruled otherwise. The SC ordered that the portion w/c was claimed by Blas be registered in the name of V. dela Cruz. Blas filed this present petition to obtain an injunction against dela Cruz to prevent him from destroying the buildings and improvements over the subject land. Blas claims that these byuildings fall under exceptional encumbrances provided for under Sec. 39 of Act 496. Therefore, despite the absence of any notation in the certificate of title as to these buildings, these encumbrances must be recognized by dela Cruz. Issue: 1. Does the decree ordering the registration of land under the Torrens system include the buildings and improvements thereon, when they have not been expressly excluded in said decree? Ans: YES 2. May Blas claim said buildings as his property and remove the same or prevent the owner of the land under said decree from removing or destroying the same, even if he had not made any claim to said improvements during the proceedings for registration? Ans: No.
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Held: The general purpose of the Torrens System is to forever foreclose litigation concerning the title to land. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated by law. If the objector (Blas) may, during the pendency of the case, remain silent as to certain rights, interests or claims existing in or upon the land, and then later, by a separate action, have such interest litigated, then the purpose of the Torrens System will be defeated. IN RE MANILA BUILDINGS AND LOANS ASSOCIATION (13 PHIL 575) Facts: MBLA leased a parcel of land owned by Benito Legarda, and erected a building of strong materials thereon. On Jan. 14, 1908, MBLA applied to the Court of Land reg. For the registration of a building of strong materials erected on ground belonging to another. The application was denied by the CLR. MBLA filed an amended application alleging that the land was registered in the name of Legarda; and that the lease contract between MBLA and Legarda was registered/indorsed on the title deed of the latter. On April 14, 1908, the CLR ruled that an annotation that the building thereon belongs to the lessee (MBLA) is sufficient registration. MBLA appealed to the SC, claiming that Sec. 2 of the LRA allows the registration of title to land or buildings or interest therein Held: The use of the phrase land or buildings or an interest therein, instead of the single word land, is no reason for construing the law as authorizing the registration of buildings erected on land belonging to another separately and independently from the registration of the land. The natural and logical interpretation of such language of the LRA being natural and logical interpretation of such language of the LRA being that it authorizes the owner of the land to register together with the land all the improvements. But under NO circumstances can registration be applied for separately and independently by the owner of the land and by the owner of the buildings; that is to say that the land of one person and the building of another erected thereon can have no separate legal existence in the registry as property independent in themselves. At the expiration of the lease, the owner of the land has the right, not merely a contingent one but a definite right under the law, to cause the building erected on his estate to be taken down without incurring any obligation whatsoever, enforcing against the lessee the obligation imposed by article 1561 (Civil Code), to return the estate in the same condition in w/c he received it.
D. Remedies An aggrieved party may take any of the following remedies to challenge the judgment in a land registration case or the validity of title issued pursuant thereto: (1) (2) (3) (4) Motion for New Trial Petition for Relief from Judgment Appeal Petition for Review of Decree of Registration (5) Action for Reconveyance (6) Action for Damages (7) Action for Compensation from the Assurance Fund
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(8) Cancellation Suit (9) Quieting of Title (1) New Trial
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Within the 15-day reglementary period for perfecting an appeal, the aggrieved party may file a motion for new trial under Rule 37 of the Rules of Court for one or more of the following causes: (a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or (b) Newly-discovered evidence which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.
(2)
Relief from Judgment
A petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court can be resorted to in instances where the judgment was entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence (FAME for short). This petition must be verified and filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment to be set aside, but not more than 6 months after such judgment was entered. It must be accompanied by affidavits showing the FAME relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense. This remedy can be availed of only when the judgment has become final and the remedies of new trial or appeal are no longer available. (3) Appeal
The judgment and orders of the court hearing the land registration case are appealable to the Court of Appeals in the same manner as in ordinary actions. (4) Petition for Review of Decree of Registration
A petition for reopening and review of decree of registration under Sec. 32 of PD 1529 may be resorted to provided that the ff. requisites are present: (1) (2) (3) (4) the petitioner has a real and dominical right; that he has been deprived thereof; through fraud; that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; and
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(5) the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value
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Once the 1-year period lapses, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued become incontrovertible, and the person aggrieved loses his recourse to this remedy. However, even if a petition is filed within 1 year from the entry of the decree, the courts cannot entertain such petition if the rights of an innocent purchaser for value may be prejudiced.
MERCEDES ANICETA GARCIA, ET AL VS. DOMINADOR G. MENDOZA 14 SCRA 691 (1965) FACTS: Petitioner Mercedes A. Garcia claims that she and her husband, Cirilo Mendoza, had purchased Lot No. 32080 located in San Carlos City, Pangasinan on April 24, 1938. They subsequently sold it under a Pacto de Retro sale to co-petitioners Sps. Dulcesimo Rosario and Violeta Reyes and Erlinda O. Rosario (Petitioners), who then took possession of said lot. On February 23, 1988, the cadastral court issued a decision adjudicating Lot No. 32080 in favor of Dominador G. Mendoza (hereafter, Mendoza), their son. Petitioner Garcia claims that there was actual fraud because Mendoza falsely claimed that his father, Cirilo Mendoza, inherited the property from Hermenegildo Mendoza (Cirilo's alleged father); that Mendoza made it appear that Lot 32080 was an exclusive property of Cirilo Mendoza, who had been in possession of the lot since October 15, 1987, and subsequently, donated the same to his son, Mendoza. On September 2, 1988, the petitioners filed with the court a petition for review of judgment. This was denied in an Order dated December 6, 1988. Mendoza countered that a petition for relief from judgment under Sec. 38, Act No. 496, does not apply to a cadastral proceeding. Moreover, Mendoza alleged that he had filed his claim over Lot No. 32080 ISSUE: WON the remedy of petition for review of judgment exists or is warranted by Act No. 2259 (Cadastral Act): HELD: Sec. 11, Act 2259 clearly states that except as otherwise provided by the Cadastral Act, all the provisions of the Land Registration Act are applicable to cadastral proceedings as well as to the decree and certificates of title granted and issued under the Cadastral Act. SOLEDAD DE G. CRISOLO, IN HER BEHALF AND AS GUARDIAN OF NOEL CRISOLO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 68 SCRA 435 (1975) FACTS: Within a year from the issuance of a decree of registration in a land registration case, respondent-ward, represented by his guardian, filed a petition for review of the decree under Section 38 of Act 496 on the ground of fraud which allegedly consisted in petitioner's taking advantage of the insanity of respondent-ward to secure the execution of a deed of exchange of properties by and between the petitioner and said respondent-ward, and in petitioner's instituting the land registration proceedings while said ward was confined at the National Psychopathic Hospital. The trial court dismissed the petition and held that Section 38 of Act 496 was not applicable because respondent had opportunity to oppose the registration proceedings but abandoned his opposition. Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals and when petitioner moved to have the appeal certified to the Supreme Court because it involved purely questions of law, the Court of Appeals denied the motion and instead sustained the allegation of fraud. It rendered a decision ______________________________________________________________________________________

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reversing that of the trial court and remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Hence, this petition for certiorari on the grounds that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction since only questions of law are involved and private respondent is not entitled to the re-opening of the land registration proceedings because he was not denied fraudulently of his day in court but merely abandoned his opposition thereto despite the opportunity given to him to oppose the registration. ISSUE: whether or not an oppositor, after abandoning his opposition in a land registration case and after a decision had been rendered and a decree of registration issued thereunder, is entitled to a reopening of the proceedings by means of a petition for review based on fraud under Section 38 of Act 496 HELD: The record shows that private respondent had been duly afforded the opportunity to object to, the registration and substantiate the same. The person(s) contemplated under Section 38 of Act 496, to be entitled to a review of a decree of registration, are those who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original registration case. Such is not the situation of the private respondents here. They were not denied their day in court by fraud, which the law provides as the sole ground for reopening of the decree of registration. In fact they opposed the registration but failed to substantiate their opposition. Mere allegation of fraud is not enough. Specific, intentional acts to deceive and deprive another of his right, or in some manner injure him, must be alleged and proved. There must be actual or positive fraud as distinguished from constructive fraud to entitle one to the reopening of a decree of registration. And it must be extrinsic and not intrinsic fraud. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, supra, 17 Phil. 49, 57). SPOUSES RODOLFO YABUT LEE AND LYDIA LISCANO, VS. FLORENCIO P. PUNZALAN, 99 SCRA 567 (1980) FACTS: On May 14, 1968, applicants-appellees had filed before the CFI an application for the registration of two parcels of land (Land Reg. Case No. N-345, LRC Record No. 34956). No opposition having been interposed despite due publication, the trial Court issued an Order of General Default. In due time, the applicants presented their evidence before the Clerk of Court who was duly commissioned to receive the same. The latter submitted his Report to the Court for proper action but due to the transfer of then Presiding Judge Julian E. Lustre to another district, the Application was unacted upon. On November 26, 1968, appellant Florencio Punzalan filed a "Petition for Reopening and/or Review" on the claim that applicants had committed fraud in not disclosing in their Application that he is the owner of a house standing on the lots applied for, that he has usufructuary rights over said properties, and prayed that the Petition be admitted, the case reopened and a new trial ordered so that he could have his day in Court. The trial Court, presided by Judge Jose C. de Guzman, rendered an Order denying reopening and/or review "for not having been well taken and for lack of merit since "there is nothing to reopen and/or review at the moment." ISSUE: WON the CFI was correct in denying reopening/review of the case HELD: The petition for review contemplated in the law clearly envisages the issuance of a decree of registration. It presupposes the rendition of a Court's decision. In fact, it has even been held that a petition for review under the law "may be filed at any time after the rendition of the Court's ______________________________________________________________________________________

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Decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration". In the case at bar, no judgment has as yet been rendered by the lower Court, and much less has any decree of registration been issued. The filing of a Petition for Reopening and/or Review by appellant, therefore, is decidedly premature. Indeed, in the absence of any decision and/or decree, there is nothing to be reviewed or reopened.
Innocent Purchaser for Value One is considered an "innocent purchaser for value" only if, relying on the certificate of title, he bought the property from the registered owner, "without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property." (Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. v. IAC, 154 SCRA 328) He is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title indicates upon its face. ( Fule v. De Legare, 117 Phil 367) The phrase "innocent purchaser for value" is deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. (Sec. 32, PD 1529)
REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE, INC. AND MACONDRAY FARMS, INC. VS. IAC, 154 SCRA 328 (1987) FACTS: Morris Carpo filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, presided over by Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera thereafter referred to as Vera Court, for declaration of nullity of Decree No. N-63394 and TCT No. 20408 issued in the name of Realty Sale. It was alleged that the court (Reyes court) that adjudicated title in favor of Realty had no jurisdiction as a land registration court. It was further alleged that the original records of LRC Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. 29882 which was the basis for the issuance of said order of May 21, 1958, were lost and/or destroyed during World War II and were still pending reconstitution; hence, the Reyes Court had no authority to order the issuance of a certificate of title. The court of first instance decided in favor of Carpo. Realty appealed. CA affirmed CFI. The Court of Appeals further held that Morris G. Carpo is a purchaser in good faith and for value. ISSUE: 1. WON the court that adjudicated title in favor of Realty had jurisdiction 2. WON Carpo is an innocent purchaser for value was never raised as an issue in the trial court. HELD: 1. The parties thereto did not have to commence a new action but only had to go back to the preceding stage where records are available. The land registration case itself remained pending and the Court of First Instance of Rizal continued to have jurisdiction over it. The records were destroyed at that stage of the case when all that remained to be done was the ministerial duty of the Land Registration Office to issue a decree of registration (which would be the basis for the issuance of an Original Certificate of Title) to implement a judgment which had become final There are however authentic copies of the decisions of the CFI and the Court of Appeals adjudicating Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035 to Estanislao Mayuga. Moreover, there is an official report of the decision of this Court affirming both the CFI and the CA decisions. A final order of adjudication forms the basis for the issuance of a decree of registration. ______________________________________________________________________________________

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Considering that the Reyes court was actually in the exercise of its jurisdiction as a land registration court when it issued the order directing the issuance of a decree of registration, "substituting therein as registered owner Dominador Mayuga, in lieu of the original adjudicates, Estanislao Mayuga, based on the affidavit of self-adjudication, subject to the provisions of Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court," which order is in consonance with the ruling of this Court in the Guico decision, and the decisions of the CFI-Rizal and the CA dated August 19, 1935 and November 17, 1939, respectively, We uphold the validity of said order and rule that Judge Vera was without jurisdiction to set it aside. 2. A perusal of the records of the case reveals that no factual basis exists to support such a conclusion. Even Carpo himself cites no factual proof of his being an innocent purchaser for value. He merely relies on the presumption of good faith under Article 527 of the Civil Code. It is settled that one is considered an innocent purchaser for value only if, relying on the certificate of title, he bought the property from the registered owner, "without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property." (Cui v. Henson, 51 Phil. 606 [1928], Fule v. De Legare, 117 Phil. 367 [1963], 7 SCRA 351.) He is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates. (Fule v. De Legare, supra.) At the time of sale there was as yet no Torrens title which Carpo could have relied upon so that he may qualify as an innocent purchaser for value. Not being a purchaser for value and in good faith, he is in no better position than his predecessors-in-interest. HILDA WALSTROM VS. FERNANDO MAPA, 181 SCRA 431 (1990) FACTS: Petitioner alleges that her predecessor in interest (Dianson) filed a free patent application. On April 10, 1933 free patent was issued in Diansons name. On the other hand, Mapa, predecessor in interest of private respondents filed Miscellaneous Sales Application. On May 12, 1934, the Director of Lands awarded Josefa Abaya Mapa a tract of land. Dianson filed a protest against the construction made by Mapa on the said land. The Director of the Director of Lands awarded Josefa Abaya Mapa a tract of land. The Director of Lands decided in favor of Mapa. Nearly two years later, on July 8, 1966, Gabriela Walstrom filed a motion for reconsideration with the Director of Lands of the decision dated August 12, 1964 of the regional land officer, claiming that she had acquired the rights and interests of Cacao Dianson to the subject parcel of land by virtue of a transfer of said rights and interests. by Dianson to one Agripino Farol who, in turn, transferred the same rights and interests to Gabriela Walstrom. The Director set aside the previous order, Mapa appealed to DANR Secretary. DANR restated the decision of the reional land officer in favor of Mapa. Petitioner Hilda Walstrom filed a civil complaint against the respondents praying for the nullification of the Mapas' sales patent and certificates of title issued by the register of deeds of Benguet Province 11 under Section 38 of Act 496 or the Land Registration Act. Court dismissed petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. ISSUE: WON the court was correct in dismissing Walstroms petition HELD: It is the teaching of the foregoing provisions that a decree of registration may be reopened or renewed by the proper Regional Trial Court upon the concurrence of five essential requisites, to wit: (a) that the petitioner has a real and a dominical right; (b) that he has been deprived thereof; (c) through fraud; (d) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; and (e) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value. ______________________________________________________________________________________

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An examination of the records of the case shows non-concurrence of the essential elements enumerated above. The first element is patently not present because the petitioner can not allege that she has already a real and dominical right to the piece of property in controversy. The latest order of the DANR Secretary, dated June 13, 1968, was to give full force and effect to the regional land officer's decision, dated August 12, 1964. 13 The regional land officer held that the petitioner's Free Patent Application No. 3-74 shall exclude the disputed portion "A" of Lot No. 1, which, instead, shall be included in the Mapas' Miscellaneous Sales Application. The second element is also absent since corollary to the aforecited ruling of the DANR Secretary, the petitioner can not aver that she was deprived of property because she did not have a real right over portion "A". Apropos the third element, the records are bereft of any indication that there was fraud in the issuance of the certificates of title. As matters stand, the prerequisites have not been complied with. The petitioner's recourse to Section 38 would not have prospered; accordingly, the respondent court's dismissal of petitioner's complaint was proper. Instead of invoking Section 38, the petitioner should have pressed for the speedy resolution of her petition with the DANR. The petitioner avers that since the one-year prescriptive period for seeking judicial relief provided for in Sec. 38 of the Land Registration Act was about to lapse, she was compelled to file the action to nullify said patent. 15 The petitioner's submission is not correct. Her fear of the futility, or even only inefficacy, of exhausting the administrative remedies granted her by law is clearly unfounded.
Actual or extrinsic fraud For fraud to be ground for nullity of a judgment, it must be extrinsic to the litigation. Extrinsic fraud (also known as collateral fraud) refers to any fraudulent act of the successful party in a litigation which is committed outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. Or more simply, a deprivation of a party of his day in court. Examples of extrinsic fraud include the following: failure and intentional omission on the part of respondents to disclose the fact of actual physical possession of the premises by petitioner ( Nicolas v. Director of Lands, 9 SCRA 934) deliberate failure to notify a party entitled to notice ( Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi, 316 SCRA 523)
On the other hand, intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party in a litigation during the trial which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case. Examples of such acts are the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony. It has also been said that if the fraud alleged in the petition is involved in the same proceedings in which the party seeking relief had ample opportunity to assert his right, to attack the document presented by the applicant for registration, and to cross-examine the witnesses who testified thereto, then the fraud relied upon is intrinsic. ( Frias v. Esquivel, 5 SCRA 770)
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STERLING INVESTMENT CORPORATION, ET AL VS. HONORABLE V. M. RUIZ, 30 SCRA 318 (1969) FACTS: Alejandro Cabasbas filed a complaint to recover land registered in his name. A compromise agreement was entered into by the parties. A decision was rendered based thereon. Later on Cabasbas filed an amended complaint asking for the annulment of the compromise based on fraud. He alleged that it was obtained through fraud as it was made to appear before the court of first instance that the conveyance of title was made on February, 1946 when in fact it took place on September 14, 1944, in violation of the Homestead Law. The RTC dismissed the complaint. HELD: Fraud relied upon is intrinsic. It suffices to refer to the leading case of De Almeda v. Cruz, 8 a 1949 decision. As Justice Tuason speaking for the Court made clear: "Fraud to be ground for nullity of a judgment must be extrinsic to the litigation. Were not this the rule there would be no end to litigations, perjury being of such common occurrence in trials. In fact, under the opposite rule, the losing party could attack the judgment at any time by attributing imaginary falsehood to his adversary's proofs. But the settled law is that judicial determination however erroneous of matters brought within the court's jurisdiction cannot be invalidated in another proceeding. It is the business of a party to meet and repel his opponent's perjured evidence." The latest case in point, decided in 1968, this time in an opinion penned by Justice Zaldivar, reiterates the above doctrine. 10 Thus: "Not every kind of fraud, however, is sufficient ground to set aside a judgment. This Court has held that only extrinsic or collateral, as distinguished from intrinsic, fraud is a ground for annulling a judgment. Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the successful party in a litigation which is committed outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. On the other hand, intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments on perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case." ALFREDO FRIAS, ET AL., VS. SANTIAGO ESQUIVEL, ET AL. FACTS: Appellee spouses Alfredo N. Frias and Belen Lustre filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija an application to register a residential lot. Respondents Esquivels opposed the application claiming ownership of a portion of 1,357 square meters of the land sought to be registered, having inherited the same from their parents, Victoriano Esquivel and Catalina Villamanca. They also sought the postponement of the proceedings pending final determination of Civil Case No. 998 of the same court between themselves as plaintiffs and the applicants as defendants, involving the ownership and possession of the land subject of their opposition. In the civil case mentioned above, the plaintiffs alleged that they, together with their youngest sister, Anastacia Esquivel de Yambao (who refused to be joined as a party in the action), inherited pro-indiviso from their parents, Victoriano Esquivel and Catalina Villamanca, a parcel of land with improvements thereon situated at Jaen, Nueva Ecija, containing an area of about 1,357 square meters; that while said property was still owned in common, on or about July 16, 1951, without their knowledge and consent, Anastacia Esquivel de Yambao sold the whole of it to the defendants, the Frias spouses, who knew, at the time of the sale, that their vendor owned only a part thereof; that the defendants had taken possession of the land and had refused to reconvey it to them despite repeated demands therefor. The Court issued an order postponing the hearing on the application until after final adjudication of Civil Case No. 998, but on March 24, 1953 issued an order of general default ______________________________________________________________________________________

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except as against the oppositors and the Director of Lands. On April 20, 1956 we rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 998 (G.R. No. 8825) declaring the deed of sale executed by Anastacia Esquivel valid insofar as Santiago, Felisa, Ceferina and Anastacia, all surnamed Esquivel, were concerned, but invalid with respect to the minor heirs of the late Alvaro Esquivel. It appears that, subsequent to our decision, that is, on February 15, 1957, the children of the deceased Alvaro Esquivel who had attained the age of majority, with the exception of Alvaro and Reynaldo and their mother, Perpetua Pada de Zaragosa (remarried to Eduardo Zaragosa), as natural guardian of the two minors, executed a deed of sale conveying their oneseventh participation in the land to the Frias spouses. (Exhibit I) On October 2, 1957, in the aforesaid registration proceedings, after due notice and hearing, the Court rendered judgment adjudicating the land described in the plan Exhibit A in favor of the applicants and ordering its registration in their name. After the same had become final and executory, the Court ordered the issuance of the Decree of Registration, and on December 11, 1957 the Chief of the General Land Registration Office issued Decree of Registration No. 60798 in favor of the Frias spouses. On December 8, 1958, Rosario Esquivel-Gonzales, as the duly appointed guardian of the minors Reynaldo and Ricardo Esquivel, filed a verified petition to reopen the decree of registration on the ground of fraud becauseIt appears that, subsequent to our decision, that is, on February 15, 1957, the children of the deceased Alvaro Esquivel who had attained the age of majority, with the exception of Alvaro and Reynaldo and their mother, Perpetua Pada de Zaragosa (remarried to Eduardo Zaragosa), as natural guardian of the two minors, executed a deed of sale conveying their one-seventh participation in the land to the Frias spouses. (Exhibit I) On October 2, 1957, in the aforesaid registration proceedings, after due notice and hearing, the Court rendered judgment adjudicating the land described in the plan Exhibit A in favor of the applicants and ordering its registration in their name. After the same had become final and executory, the Court ordered the issuance of the Decree of Registration, and on December 11, 1957 the Chief of the General Land Registration Office issued Decree of Registration No. 60798 in favor of the Frias spouses. On December 8, 1958, Rosario Esquivel-Gonzales, as the duly appointed guardian of the minors Reynaldo and Ricardo Esquivel, filed a verified petition to reopen the decree of registration on the ground of fraud that applicants committed fraud in obtaining said decree of registration, and such fraud consists of the following: the herein applicants had falsely represented to this Honorable Court during the hearing of their application that they were the owners of the entire residential lot included in their plan marked as Exhibit "A" and now covered by the decree of registration, when at that time they knew fully well they were not the owners thereof in its entirety; that they were aware of such fraudulent representation when they made it because they were parties in Civil Case No. 998 of this Court involving precisely the validity of their title to the aforementioned lot; they also knew that on appeal the case became G.R. No. L8825 of the Supreme Court which, in a decision promulgated on April 20, 1956, held that the title (a deed of sale) to that residential lot claimed by the herein applicants is invalid with regard to the minor heirs of the late Alvaro Esquivel', one of them being Reynaldo Esquivel, your petitioner's ward, in whose behalf this petition is being presented. ISSUE: WON there was actual fraud HELD: To justify the setting aside or review of a decree of registration under Section 38 of Act No. 496, the party seeking relief must allege and prove, inter alia, that the registration was procured through fraud actual and extrinsic. It has been held in this connection that if the fraud alleged in the petition to set aside the decree is involved in the same proceedings in which the party seeking relief had ample opportunity to assert his right, to attack the document presented by the applicant for registration, and to cross- examine the witnesses who testified relative thereto, then the fraud relied upon is intrinsic. The fraud is extrinsic if it was employed to deprive a party of ______________________________________________________________________________________

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his day in court, thus preventing him from asserting his right to the property registered in the name of the applicant (Bagoyboy vs. Director of Lands, 37 Off. Gaz., 1956) Upon consideration of the facts relied upon by appellants to justify a review of the decree in question, we find that the same do not constitute the extrinsic fraud required as justification for the granting of the relief sought by them. ALBINO NICOLAS, ET AL. VS. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 9 SCRA 934 (1963) FACTS: Albino Nicolas, filed an application to register under the Torrens System two parcels of land. On December 19, 1951, Eusebio Coloma, also applied for registration in favor, under the system, the ssame parcels. Before the initial hearings of the two applications, Guillermo Camungao (petitioner herein), presented with the Registration Court, a written appearance, opposing the registration of Lots 2, of both PSUS, alleging that said lots belonged to him, having been awarded to him in Sales Application No. 2091 (E-3989). The Provincial Fiscal, representing the Director of Lands, filed an opposition to the applications for registration, alleging that the lots, are public lands and covered by Sales Application No. 2091 (E-3989) of Guillermo Camungao. On August 22, 1952, the lower court issued an Order of General Default in both cases, except as to the Director of Lands. A hearing was subsequently held, with notice thereof, sent only to the Provincial Fiscal, as representative of the Director of Lands. No notice to Guillermo Camungao, was given, in spite of his written appearance and opposition to the registration. Judgment was rendered on September 20, 1955, adjudicating the lands applied for, in favor of the applicants. The judgment having become final and executory the court a quo issued an order for the issuance of a decree of registration. On January 21, 1956, an Order of eviction was directed against appellant, and it was the first time he came to know that a decision and decree had been rendered and issued in the registration cases. Camungao filed a petition to set aside the decision. The court dismissed the petition for review. ISSUE: WON there was actual fraud HELD: It is contended that, in cases of the nature of the one at bar, the only basis for the reopening of the case, is actual fraud. There was allegation of actual fraud in the petition, such as the failure and intentional omission on the part of the respondents to disclose the fact of actual physical possession of the premises by petitioner herein. It is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person (Estiva vs. Alvero, 37 Phil. 498). In short, the series of allegations contained in the petition, portions of which are quoted heretofore, describe fraudulent acts, actual and otherwise. Perhaps, the trial judge had reasons to doubt the veracity of the supposed fraudulent acts, attributed to respondents. This doubt, however, should not have been made the basis of dismissal, because if a court doubts the veracity of the allegations in the petition, the best thing it could do, would have been to deny the motion to dismiss and proceed with the hearing on the merits, of the petition (De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 50 O.G., p. 3064). This is specially true in the instant case, where the ground for the motion to dismiss the petition for review, is lack of cause of action, which is not indubitable. The written appearance with opposition presented by petitioner herein, on November 7, 1951 (R.A.) was a valid one, and sufficient to give him a legal standing in court and would entitle him to notice, as a matter of right. The lower court erred in having chosen to ignore the written appearance with opposition, which was a substantial compliance with the law, that requires a formal answer.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. TEODOCIA LOZADA, 90 SCRA 503 (1979)
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FACTS: In her application for the registration of the lots in question, applicant did not disclose the vital facts that her husband's previous application for a revocable permit and to purchase the lands in question from the Bureau of Lands had been rejected, because the lands were already reserved as a site for school purposes. She concealed the fact that the lands were part of the public domain and stated the deliberate falsehood that the lands were allegedly inherited by her from her parents, which allegation misled the Bureau of Lands into not filing an opposition to her application and thus effectively deprived the Republic of its day in court. Applicant succeeded on ex parte evidence in securing registration of the property. Within one year from entry of decree, the Solicitor General filed a petition for review of the decision and decree of registration on the ground of actual fraud. The Court of First Instance gave due course to the petition and after hearing ordered the cancellation of the certificate of title in favor of applicant-appellant. Applicant-appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals which certified the appeal to the Supreme Court as involving only questions of law. ISSUE: WON there was actual fraud HELD: The fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud which connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant outside of the trial of a case against the defeated party, of his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. But even assuming that such fraud could be technically considered as "intrinsic fraud [which] takes the form of 'acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case,'" it would not alter the result, because the mistake and error into which the officials of the Bureau of Lands were misled by such a deliberately false application, suppressing the facts known to the applicant that the lands sought to be registered were lands of the public domain (and not private property) and having been reserved for a school site were not susceptible of private registration (as in fact her husband's application to purchase the same had been rejected) cannot operate to bar the Republic's timely petition to review and set aside the decree, since the State cannot be estopped by the mistake or error of its officials and agents. Besides, the registration decree was properly voided by the lower court since it had no jurisdiction over the lands of the public domain subject matter of the proceedings which were portions of the bed or foreshore of the Las Pias river and were not open to registration proceedings.
Other Grounds Other grounds for a petition for review or reopening of a decree of registration include want of due process as a result of machinations of the clerk of court ( Tiongco v. de la Merced, 58 SCRA 89) and the fact that the land sought to be registered is part of the public domain and incapable of registration, as when it is part of a military reservation ( Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648).
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(5) Action for Reconveyance
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Notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title already issued in the name of another person, he can still be compelled under the law to reconvey the subject property to the rightful owner. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right. ( Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr., 181 SCRA 431) The property registered is deemed to held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is registered. In filing an action for reconveyance, it is not necessary that the 1-year period lapse first. Such an action can be filed anytime after the entry of decree of registration provided that is within the prescriptive period. An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years. However, an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust for co-heirs is imprescriptible. An action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud must be filed within 4 years from discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of an original certificate of title. An action for reconveyance which in effect seeks to quiet title to property in one's possession is imprescriptible. (Almarza v. Arguelles, 156 SCRA 718)
MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS V. COURT OF APPEALS (MARCH 31, 1987) Facts: Respondent Norma Leuenberger inherited Lot No. 140 (27.246 has.) from her grandmother Simeona Vda. De Ditching. In 1952, she donated a portion (3 has.) of the property to the Municipality of Victorias for the ground of a high school. The 4 hectares of the land was converted into a subdivision. Later, she discovered that part of the remaning portion was being used by the Municipality as a cemetery from 1934. She wrote the Mayor demanding payment of rentals and delivery of the area. The Mayor, however, showed her documents showing that the Municipality purchased the land. Respondents then filed a complaint for recovery of possession. Municipalitys defense is that of ownership claiming that the land was purchased by it from Simeona Vda. De Ditching. TC decided in favor of Municipality. CA reversed. HELD: It is undisputed that petitioner had been in open, public, adverse and continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years. Evidence established without debate that the property was originally registered in 1916. When Gonzalo Ditching died, Simeona became the administratrix of the property and it was while she was serving as such that she executed the document of sale in favor of the municipality. Unfortunately, the Municipality failed to register the Deed of Sale. Thus, respondent was able to register the property under the Torrens System. However, since she inherited the same from her grandmother only after the latter had already sold the portion to the petitioner, she had no legal right which may serve as basis for her to register the land. While an inherently defective Torrens title may not ordinarily be cancelled even after proof of its defect, the law nevertheless safeguards the rightful partys interest in the titled land from fraud ______________________________________________________________________________________

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and improper use of technicalities by allowing such party to judicially seek reconveyance to him of whatever he has been deprived of as long as the land has not been transferred to a purchaser in good faith. (Pascua v. Capuyoc). As the land in dispute is held in trust by private respondent in favor of the Municipality, the latter cannot be deprived of its possession nor can it be made to pay past rentals. Private respondent is in equity bound to reconvey the property to the cestui que trust, the Municipality. ESCONDE V. BARLONGAY, 152 SCRA 603 (1987) Facts: Private respondent Delfin applied for registration of title of the land subject of the present petition. His application was granted in 1969 and an OCT was issued in his favor in 1971 by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. In Feb of 1978, he filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession against the spouses Esconde. The spouses opposition to the motion was denied. Subsequently in Oct 1978, petitioner, Basilisa Esconde filed an action for reconveyance against Delfin. Judge Sammy Barlongay dismissed the action for reconveyance on the grounds of res judicata. Hence, this petition. HELD: Petition is devoid of merit. Petitioner and her husbands failure to appear before the land registration proceedings despite notice of the scheduled survey of the land and notice of the publication and posting by the sheriff of the notice of hearing to oppose the defendants application, bars the petitioner from filing this action. Section 38 of Act 496 provides that a decree of registration once issued, binds the land and quiets title thereto. It is conclusive against all persons one year from the date of entry. However, it is a settled doctrine that when a decree of registration was obtained by fraud, the party defrauded has only one year from date of entry to file a petition for review thereof. An action for reconveyance, on the other hand, is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful owner of land w/c has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer of reconvey the land to him. This action may be filed even after one year from the issuance of the decree. Its aim is not to re-open the registration proceedings but to show that the person who secured the registration of the questioned property is not its real owner. In the case at bar, reconveyance is not the proper remedy as there was no proof of irregularity in the issuance of the title nor in the proceedings incident thereto. It was also not established that fraud had intervened in the issuance of the title and the period of one year within w/c intrinsic fraud could be claimed had long expired. Furthermore, the petitioners action had also prescribed as an action for reconveyance must be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. ALZONA V. CAPUNITAN, 4 SCRA 450 (1962) Facts: Plaintiffs instituted an action for the recovery of two registered parcels of land and for the cancellation of the corresponding certificates of title in the names of the defendants and the issuance of the proper certificates in their names. The TC dismissed the complaint on the grounds of estoppel and prescription of action. On appeal, the CA found that the subject land was the conjugal property of Arcadio Alomia and Ildefonsa Almeda. Said land was bought by Arcadio from the Friar Lands Administration and a Patent Title was issued in his favor. However before completing payment of the installments, Arcadiio died. Upon Arcadios death, Ildefonsa executed an affidavit that she was the sole heir of Arcadio. She was made the assignee thereof ______________________________________________________________________________________

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and after completion of the installment payments, a Certificate of Title was issued in her favor. Defendant Capunitan was a niece of Ildefonsa who bought the property from the latter. The CA also found that plaintiffs, nieces and nephews of Arcadio, are entitled to the other half of the disputed property and that Ildefonsa exercised a legal fraud when she executed said affidavit. She, therefore, held in trust the other half of the property in favor of the plaintiffs. The case, however, was remanded to the TC. TC later held that although the plaintiffs have the right to ask for reconveyance, their cause of action has already prescribed. HELD: The case involves an implied or constructive trust upon the defendants-appellees. The CA declared that Ildefonsa held in trust the of the property legally belonging to the plaintiffs, of which the defendants had full knowledge. The sale in favor of defendants, however, is not void or inexistent, action on which is imprescripltible. It is voidable, at most, and as such valid until revoked within the time prescribed by law for its revocation.. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years. The plaintiffs cause of action accrued in 1928 when the defendants bought the land and took possession thereof from Ildefonsa. However, plaintiffs-appellants only filed the present action for reconveyance on November of 1949 or 13 years after the COA accrued. Thus, the action had long prescribed. VDA DE JACINTO V VDA DE JACINTO, 5 SCRA 371 (1962) Facts: The land in question originally belonged to the now deceased spouses Jacinto, both of whom died intestate survived by their children named Melchor and Pedro. Melchor also died intestate before the estate of their parents could be partitioned. After the partition, Pedro, besides receiving his share, continued administering the properties which corresponded to the heirs of his deceased brother. Pedro applied for the registration and succeeded in having the properties registered in his name When the widow of his deceased brother decided to sell the parcel of land, she realized for the first time, that the parcel delivered to her by Pedro had a smaller area than that which rightfully belonged to her and her son. HELD: In view of these facts, it would be against reason and good conscience not to hold that Pedro committed a breach of trust which entitled him to secure registration of the land in question to the prejudice of his coheirs. In an action like the present, he may be ordered to make reconveyance of the property to the person rightfully entitled to it. In fact, it has been held that even in the absence of fraud in obtaining registration, or even after the lapse of one year after the issuance of a decree of registration, a co-owner of land who applied for and secured its adjudication and registration in his name knowing that it had not been allotted to him in the partition, may be compelled to convey the same to whoever received it in the apportionment, so long as no innocent third party had acquired rights therein, in the meantime, for a valuable consideration. An action to enforce a trust is imprescriptible. Consequently, a coheir who, through fraud, succeeds in obtaining a certificate of title in his name to the prejudice of his coheirs, is deemed to hold the land in trust for the latter, and the action by them to recover the property does not prescribe. ALMARZA V ARGUELLES, 156 SCRA 718 (1987) ______________________________________________________________________________________

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Facts: Lot No. 5815 originally belonged to private respondents predecessor-in-interest, Grana. The latter sold a portion thereof to petitioner. Said portion was physically segregated from the whole lot and was taken possession of by petitioner. In a cadastral case, the court declared private respondents owner of undivided share of Lot No. 5815 and a certain Pancrudo (deceased) as owner of the other . OCT was issued in the name of said adjudicatees. Private respondents instituted a complaint for recovery against the petitioner. The latter interposed a counterclaim for reconveyance of the disputed portion of Lot No. 5815. The LC ordered petitioner to vacate and dismissed the counterclaim of the petitioner fo the reason that although a constructive or implied trust was constituted in favor of petitioner when the disputed portion was included in the OCT issued to private respondents, petitioners action for reconveyance had prescribed, more than ten years having elapsed from the issuance of said certificate of title. HELD: SC reverses. The remedy of a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. Petitioner availed herself of this remedy seasonably. Prescription cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance which is in effect an action to quiet title, against the plaintiff therein who is in possession of the land in question. The reason is that as lawful possessor and owner of the disputed portion, her cause of action for reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to property in ones possession, is imprescriptible. The petitioners undisturbed possession over a period of 48 years gave her a continuing right to seek the aid of a Court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and the effect on her title. If ever prescription may be invoked, it may be said to have commenced to run only from the time the possessor was made aware of a claim adverse to his own. In the case at bar, petitioner was made aware of such adverse claim only upon service on her of the summons in the civil case. As her action for reconveyance, or to quiet title was contained in her counterclaim, the same cannot be said to have already prescribed. TAMAYO V CALLEJO, 46 SCRA 27 (1972) Facts: A parcel of land was previously owned by spouses Vicente Tamayo and Cirila Tamayo. They sold the northern portion of said land to Fernendo Domantay, who took possession thereof. Vicente died and Cirila waived her rights to the remaining portion of their original property to their children, Marcos and Mariano. These brothers were declared the sole heirs of the deceased. The brothers applied in a cadastral proceeding for the registration of the land. The application was granted and OCT was issued in favor of the brothers. Domantay sold his property in favor of Callejo who took possession thereof. Marcos sold his undivided share to Mariano. Callejo filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages against Mariano. CFI dismissed the complaint on the ground that the land purchased by Domantay from the parents of Mariano is not included in said titles of Mariano. The CA reversed and overruled the plea of prescription set up by Mariano upon the theory that the title to said portion of land now claimed by Callejo is held in trust by the Tamayos and that the action to enforce said trust does not prescribe.
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HELD: CA affirmed with modification. CA did not err in overruling the plea of prescription. Prescription of action for reconveyance is reckoned from the date of creation of the express trust. Although the trust created by the application for registration filed by Mariano and Marcos in 1913, and the inclusion in the OCT issued in their names of the tract of land previously sold to Domantay and later conveyed to Callejo may have had a constructive or implied nature, its status was substantially affected in 1918 by the following facts, namely: On the date last mentioned, Domantay and Mariano the latter acting on his own behalf and on that of his brother Marcos executed a public instrument whereby Mariano EXPLICITLY acknowledged that his deceased parents had sold to Domantay the parcel of land then held by the latter, and stipulating that Domantay is the absolute owner of said land, free from any lien or encumbrance thereon. This express recognition by Mariano on his behalf and that of his brother Marcos of the previous sale made by their parents to Domantay, had the effect of imparting to the aforementioned trust the nature of an express trust it having been created by the will of the parties, no particular words being required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended. This express trust is a continuing and subsisting trust, not subject to the statute of limitations, at least, until repudiated, in which event the period of prescription begins to run only from the time of the repudiation. The latter did not take place in the case at bar, until early in June, 1952, when Mariano rejected Callejos demand that the now disputed portion be excluded from the TCT in the formers name. But then, the case at bar was filed weeks later when the period of prescription had barely begun to run. The CA declared that the land in question is declared reconveyed to Callejo. Such reconveyance cannot, however, be deemed made without a survey defining with precision the metes and bounds of the area to be segregated for Callejo. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the court of origin for the preparation of the subdivision plan of the portion to be segregated and the judicial approval of said plan, and only after such approval has become final and executory may the reconveyance be either made or deemed effected. JOAQUIN V COJUANGCO, 20 SCRA 769 (1967) Facts: The OCT of the first parcel of land involved in this case was issued as early as 1921. Said parcel was transferred in favor of the defendants who obtained a TCT in their own names in 1928. With respect to the second parcel, OCT was acquired in 1925 and the land was subsequently transferred to defendants also in 1925. TCT was issued to the transferees in 1936. HELD: The action in this case is one for reconveyance, on the theory that the original registered owners were the administrators of those lands, and hence held them in a fiduciary capacity. Even assuming that this was true, the disabilities imposed by such relationship did not extend to the transferees of said administrators, who acquired the land for value and claimed adverse title in themselves. The action for reconveyance on the theory of trust might prosper, if at all, as against the trustees and provided they still hold the properties, but not as against third persons who do not occupy the same fiduciary position.
(6)
Action for Damages

PINO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 198 SCRA 434 (1991)
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FACTS: Rafaela Donato, Raymund Gaffud and Cicero Gaffud were co-owners of a lot. The title of the lot was only in the name of Rafaela Donato. Donato sold to Pino the lot. A TCT was issued in the name of Pino. The Gaffuds filed a complaint for nullity of sale and reconveyance against Pino. HELD: The Supreme Court said that the complaint for nullity of sale and reconveyance must fail. Pino is a purchaser in good faith. Where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when the land is sold, the vendee for value has the right to rely on what appears on the certificate of title. In the absence of anything to excite or arouse suspicion, said vendee is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. If an action for reconveyance based on constructive trust cannot reach an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy of the defrauded party is to bring an action for damages against those who caused the fraud or well instrumental in depriving him of the property. And it is now well-settled that such action prescribes in 10 years from the issuance of the Torrens Title over the property. DE LOS REYES V. COURT OF APPEALS, 285 SCRA 81 (1998) FACTS: De los Reyes sold to Pena property which had an area of 10,000 square meters. However, Penas title did not cover only the 10,000 square meters but also an additional 3,405 which De los Reyes did not sell. The property passed to five owners successively in a span of more than twenty years. De los Reyes filed an action for reconveyance of the 3,405 square meter property. HELD The Supreme Court said that the complaint for reconveyance must fail. The property passed to four owners successively in a span of more than twenty years before it reached the current owners. Surely, the rights of innocent purchasers of real property must be protected. In Avecilla v. Yatco, the Supreme Court ruled that the only remedy of an owner who was fraudulently deprived of his land, which was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser for value, is to file an action for damages against the person who perpetrated the fraud within 4 years after the discovery of the deception.
(7)
Assurance Fund
Sec. 93. Contribution to the Assurance Fund Imposed upon the entry of a certificate of title in the name of the registered owner (also applies to registration of building and other improvements on the land covered by the certificate) Amount imposed is .25% of the assessed value of the real estate. The assessed value shall be based on the last assessment for tax purposes. If there has be no previous assessment, then the assessment shall be determined by the sworn declaration of 2 disinterested persons. However, in any event, if the value of the property is too small, then the court can always increase the valuation of the property.
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All contributions to the assurance fund which are received by the Register of Deeds shall be turned over to the National Treasurer. The National Treasurer can invest the money as may be provided for by law.
Sec. 95. Action for Compensation from Fund Only the following persons can recover from the assurance fund: 1. Any person who sustains loss or damage under the following conditions: a) that there was no negligence on his part; and b) that the loss or damage sustained was through any omission, mistake or malfeasance of the court personnel, or the Register of Deeds, his deputy, or other employees of the Registry in the performance of their respective duties under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree; or 2. Any person who has been deprived of any land or interest therein under the following conditions: a) that there was no negligence on his part; b) that he was deprived as a consequence of the bringing of his land or interest therein under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree; or by the registration by any other person as owner of such land, or by mistake, omission or misdescription in any certificate of owners duplicate, or in any entry or memorandum in the register or other official book or by any cancellation; and c) that he is barred or in any way precluded from bringing an action for the recovery of such land or interest or claim upon the same.
Sec. 96. Against whom Action Filed. Against the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land is situated and the National Treasurer if it is brought to recover for loss or damage or for deprivation of land or any estate or interest therein arising wholly through fraud, negligence, omission, mistake or misfeasance of the court personnel, Register of Deeds, his deputy or other employees of the Registry in the performance of their respective duties, the action shall be brought Against the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land is situated and the National Treasurer, and other person or persons as co-defendants if it is brought to recover for loss or damage or for deprivation of land or of any interest therein arising through fraud, negligence, omission, mistake or misfeasance of a person OTHER THAN court personnel, the Registry of Deeds, his deputy or other employees of the Registry The Solicitor General must defend all such suits. Nothing in this law shall be construed to deprive the plaintiff of any right of action which he may have against any person for such loss, or damage or deprivation without joining the National Treasurer as party defendant. All actions against the Assurance Fund must be reported to the Commissioner of Land Registration. Sec. 97. Judgment, how satisfied. ______________________________________________________________________________________

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If there are other defendants besides, the National Treasurer and Register of Deeds, execution shall first issue on the other defendants. If the judgment cannot be satisfied by the other defendants in whole or in part, then the assurance fund will answer for that part unsatisfied. The plaintiff cannot recover more than the fair market value of the land at the time he suffered the loss, damage or deprivation.
Sec. 98. General Fund when liable. The General Fund is liable if there are not enough funds to satisfy the judgment from the Assurance Fund. Take note however that those funds from the general fund must not have been otherwise appropriated for other purposes. Sec. 99. Subrogation of government to plaintiffs rights The government shall be subrogated to the rights of the plaintiff against other persons if payment has been made by the National Treasurer. The amount recovered shall be paid to the Assurance Fund. Sec. 100. Register of Deeds as party in interest. If it appears that the Assurance Fund is liable due to the unlawful or erroneous issuance of a title, the Register of Deeds shall be deemed a party in interest, who shall upon the authority of the Commissioner of Land Registration, file the necessary action in court to annul or amend the title. The court may order the Register of Deeds to amend or cancel a title or to do any other acts which are just and equitable. Sec. 101. Losses not recoverable. The Assurance Fund is not liable for any loss, damage or deprivation caused or occasioned by 1. breach of trust (express, implied or constructive) or 2. by any mistake in the resurvey of registered land resulting in the expansion of area in the title. Sec. 102. Limitation of Action. Action against the Assurance Fund must be instituted within 6 years from the time the right to bring such action first occurred. The right to bring action shall be transmitted to the legal representatives of the person sustaining loss or damage unless the same is barred in his lifetime. Notwithstanding the expiration of the 6 year period, if at the time the right of action first accrued the person entitled to bring such action was incapacitated to do so, such person or any person claiming from, by or under him may bring the proper action at any time within 2 years after the incapacity has been removed.
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Prof. Dan Gatmaytan
TORRES V. COURT OF APPEALS, 186 SCRA 672 (1990)
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FACTS: Mariano Torres was the owner of a lot and building. Fernandez, Torres brother-in-law, filed a petition with the CFI of Manila where he misrepresented to be Torres attorney-in-fact. He alleged that the owners duplicate of copy of the title to the lot and building was lost. Fernandez succeeded in obtaining a court order for the issuance of another copy of the certificate. Fernandez forged a simulated deed of sale in his favor. Thus, the TCT in the name of Torres was cancelled in favor of Fernandez. Fernandez mortgaged the property to Mota. Torres found out about Fernandezs TCT. Torres brought an action to annul Fernandezs TCT. Fernandez was unable to pay his loan obligations. Mota was the highest bidder in the public auction of the property mortgaged. ISSUE: Who has a better right to the property Torres or Mota HELD: Torres has a better right over the property. As between two persons both of whom are in good faith and both innocent of negligence, the law must protect and prefer the lawful holder of registered property over the transfer of a vendor bereft of any transmissible rights. In view of the foregoing, to hold, for the purpose of enforcing the mortgage, that Mota was an innocent mortgagee would be futile because as above shown, no certificate of title covering the subject realties in derogation of Torres certificate of tile may validly be issued. The only possible remedies of Mota would be to go against Fernandez or the Assurance Fund. However, Mota cannot go after the Assurance Fund since Mota was negligent in protecting her interest. Mota as a creditor and mortgagee should have inquired as to all the related facts and circumstances regarding the rentals and tenants. Mota should have looked at the payment of taxes on the property. It was not enough that Mota should have merely relied on the title. Thus, Motas only remedy is to go after Fernandez.
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Prof. Dan Gatmaytan
FRANCISCO V. NATIONAL TREASURER, (AUGUST 3, 2000)
95
FACTS: The spouses Milambiling were the owners of a parcel of land. It appears that a couple impersonated themselves as the spouses Milambiling. The imposters were able to somehow acquire a duplicate TCT over the land. The imposters sold the land to De Guzman. Milambiling filed an action against De Guzman for declaration of nullity of sale. Milambiling won the suit. De Guzman thus filed an action for damages against the Assurance Fund. HELD De Guzman cannot recover from the Assurance Fund. Only the following persons can recover from the assurance fund: (3) Any person who sustains loss or damage under the following conditions: d) that there was no negligence on his part; and e) that the loss or damage sustained was through any omission, mistake or malfeasance of the court personnel, or the Register of Deeds, his deputy, or other employees of the Registry in the performance of their respective duties under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree; or Any person who has been deprived of any land or interest therein under the following conditions: f) that there was no negligence on his part; g) that he was deprived as a consequence of the bringing of his land or interest therein under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree; or by the registration by any other person as owner of such land, or by mistake, omission or misdescription in any certificate of owners duplicate, or in any entry or memorandum in the register or other official book or by any cancellation; and h) that he is barred or in any way precluded from bringing an action for the recovery of such land or interest or claim upon the same. De Guzman does not fall under any of these two cases. The loss or damage was not due to the omission, mistake or malfeasance of the court personnel or Register of Deeds, his deputy or other employees. Furthermore, they were not deprived of their land as a consequence of bringing of the land or interest therein under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree. Neither was there deprivation due to the registration by any other person as owner of such land or by mistake, omission or misdescription in any certificate or owners duplicate or in any entry or memorandum in the register or other official book or by any cancellation. The Assurance Fund is intended to relieve innocent persons from the harshness of the doctrine that a certificate is conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to land. De Guzman did not suffer any injury because of the operation of this doctrine. De Guzman sought to avail of the benefits of the Torrens System by registering the property in his name. That De Guzman eventually lost the property to Milambiling does not entitle him to compensation under the Assurance Fund. De Guzmans recourse is against the persons who duped him.
(8)
Others
Cancellation suit involving double title
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Prof. Dan Gatmaytan
PAJOMAYO V. MANIPON, 39 SCRA 676 (1971)
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FACTS:Both parties claims that they are the exclusive owners of the land in dispute. Pajomayos had with them OCT No. 1089 issued by the register of deeds on November 27, 1931 in virtue of the homestead patent. The Manipons on the other hand had OCT No. 14043 issued on April 1, 1957, in connection with the cadastral proceedings. ISSUE : Which of the two OCTs should prevail? HELD : OCT No. 1089 should prevail. The decree of registration issued in the cadastral proceedings does not have the effect of annulling the title that had previously been issued in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Law (Act 496). The law requires that the homestead patent must be registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the province where the land covered by the patent lies (sec. 122 of Act 496 Land Registration Law). Thus once a homestead patent granted in accordance with the Public Land Act is registered pursuant to sec. 122 of Act 496, the certificate of title issued in virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens under the Land Registration Act. Where two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between the original parties, and in case of successive registration where more than one certificate is issued over the land the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who relies on the second certificate.
Cancellation suit involving non-registrable property (reversion suit)

REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS, 99 SCRA 743 (1980) FACTS : A motion to reopen cadastral case was filed by Alpuerto. After trial the court rendered its decision adjudicating to him the subject lot and ordered the issuance of a decree of registration over the said lot. Hence, Land Registration Commission issued a decree. This was the basis of the issuance of the OCT. Portions of the lot were subsequently transferred to various persons. Later the provincial fiscal of Quezon filed a MFR on the ground that the said decision was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation and deciet. The Director of Land joined the fiscal, on the ground that the same was issued on the wrong premise that i.e. that the decision of the court had already become final and executory when in fact it had not. Later the SolGen filed for the government a complaint for annulment, cancellation of titles and for reversion on the ground that the decision of the lower court adjudicating the lot to Alpuerto, its order for the issuance of the decree of registration as well as the OCT and all the TCTs derived therefrom are all null and void and w/o legal effect because the court had no jurisdiction to allocate the subject land, which is inalienable. RATIO : CA 141 explicitly states that timber and mineral lands shall be governed by special laws. And the Forestry Law now vests in the Director of Forestry the jurisdiction and authority over forest or timberland. In one case the SC held that if the land covered by the homestead application of petitioner was still within the forest zone or under the jurisdiction of the Bu. of Forestry, the ______________________________________________________________________________________

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Director of Lands has no jurisdiction to dispose of said land under the provisions of the Public Land Law and the applicant acquired no right to the land. Also, if a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act w/c includes, by oversight, lands w/c cannot be registered under the Torrens System, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of the said certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land illegally included. The patent of title thus issued is void at law, since the officer who issued it had no authority to do so. Under this circumstances, the certificate of title may be ordered cancelled and the cancellation may be pursued through an ordinary action therefor. The doctrine of estoppel cannot operate against the State. It is a well-settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic or its government is usually not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents. The state may still seek the cancellation of the title issued to Alpuerto pursuant to Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act. Such title has not become indefeasible, for prescription cannot be invoked against the State.
(9) Quieting of Title

Art. 476, Civil Code. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein. Sec. 1, Rule 63, Rules of Court. An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Art. 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. REALTY SALES ENTERPRISES V. IAC, 154 SCRA 328 (1987) Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in personam, but being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem. The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. MAMADSUL V. MOSON, 190 SCRA 82 (1990) An action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are in possession of the property. The right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted, as against one who is asserting some adverse claim or lien thereon, is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession of the land, claiming to be owners thereof, the reason for this rule being that while the owner in fee continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity in his favor to ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and its effect on his title, or to assert any superior equity in his favor. He may wait until ______________________________________________________________________________________

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his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. But the role that the statute of limitations is not available as a defense to an action to remove a cloud from title can only be invoked by a complainant when he is in possession. One who claims property which is in the possession of another must, it seems, invoke his remedy within the statutory period. Petitioners may wait until their possession is disturbed or their title is attacked before they may take steps to vindicate their right. The statute of limitation is not available as a defense to an action to remove a cloud from title over property in possession of the petitioners. It is not necessary that the person seeking to quiet his title is the registered owner of the property in question. "Title" to property does not necessarily mean the original transfer certificate of title. It can connote acquisitive prescription by possession in the concept of an owner thereof. One who has an equitable right or interest in the property may also file an action to quiet title under the law. TAN V. VALDEHUEZA, 66 SCRA 61 (1975) Relying on Section 3 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court which pertinently provides that a dismissal for failure to prosecute "shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits," the Valdehuezas submit that the dismissal of civil case 2002 operated, upon the principle of res judicata, as a bar to the first cause of action in civil case 2574. This contention is untenable as the causes of action in the two cases are not identical. Case 2002 was for injunction against the entry into and the gathering of nuts from the land, while case 2574 seeks to "remove any doubt or cloud of the plaintiff's ownership . . ." with a prayer for declaration of ownership and recovery of possession. Applying the test of absence of inconsistency between prior and subsequent judgments the failure of Tan, in case 2002, to secure an injunction against the Valdehuezas to prevent them from entering the land and gathering nuts is not inconsistent with her being adjudged, in Case 2574, as owner of the land with right to recover possession thereof. Case 2002 involved only the possession of the land and the fruits thereof, while case 2574 involves ownership of the land, with possession as a mere attribute of ownership. The judgment in the first case could not and did not encompass the judgment in the second, although the second judgment would encompass the first. Moreover, the new Civil Code provides that suitors in actions to quiet title "need not be in possession of said property." FAJA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 75 SCRA 441 (1977) An action to quiet title to property in the possession of plaintiff is imprescriptible. One who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. The right to quiet title to the property, to seek its reconveyance and annul any certificate of title covering it, accrues only from the time the one in possession was made aware of a claim adverse to his own, and it is only then that the statutory period of prescription commences to run against such possessor.
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Prof. Dan Gatmaytan
Decree of Registration See Sec. 31, 32, 39 of PD 1529.
GOMEZ V. CA 168 SCRA 503 (1988)
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FACTS: Petitioners applied for the registration of their land. After notice and publication, there being no opposition to the application, the trial court issued an order of general default. Later the court issued an order stating that the decision had become final and directed the Land Registration Office to issue the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated in the decision. Later it was reported to the court a quo that some of the lots subject of the registration were already covered by homestead patents, issued in 1928 & 29 and registered under the Land Registration Act. Hence the decision was recommended to be set aside. Lower court set aside the decision. ISSUE : WON respondent Judge had jurisdiction to issue the decision setting aside the its earlier decision? HELD : YES. It is not disputed that the first decision had become final and executory. However unlike ordinary civil actions the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. As long as the final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it. Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registratoin officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They are in this respect as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are in specifically called upon to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings.
RAMOS V. RODRIGUEZ, 244 SCRA 418 (1995) Ramos applied for the registration of a parcel of land. After issuing an order of general default judge rendered decision adjudicating said lot to the petitioners; ordered issuance of decree and directed NLTDRA to prepare the decree and certificate of registration. NLTDRA however recommended that the order be set aside because the said subject lot is already covered by a TCT. The court opined that it cannot set aside its decision on the basis of the report after the finality of its decision. It added that the proper remedy of the government was an action for annulment of judgment. Later however the court set aside its order and denied ______________________________________________________________________________________

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petitioners application for registration. The court noted that the subject lot is already covered by an existing TCT and that no final decree has yet been issued by the LRA. Petitioner assailed this decision on the principle of finality of judgments. RATIO: This issue has already been settled in a similar case where the court declared that: However unlike ordinary civil actions the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. As long as the final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it. They also raised the issue of the function of LRA as only ministerial. In Gomez the SC squarely met this issue: Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registratoin officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They are in this respect as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are in specifically called upon to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings. In the case at bar, the LRA is not legally obligated to follow the courts order because the subject land sought to be registered was found to be already decreed and titled under the Payatas Estate. The one-year period stated in Sec. 32 of PD 1529 within which a petition to reopen and review the decree of registration is described in Sec. 31 of the said PD which decree is prepared and issued by the Commissioner of Land Registration.
E. Certificate of Title
PONCE DE LEON VS. REHABILITATION FINANCE CORP., 36 SCRA 289 (1976) Facts: Ponce procured an industrial loan from RFC in 1951. As security, Ponce mortgaged a parcel of land in Paranaque which was registered in the name of Francisco Soriano (FS) OCT No. 8094 married to Tomas Rodriguez. At the time of signing of the mortgage deed, Tomasa was already dead leaving her heirs, her children. None of Tomasas children signed the mortgage deed. Ponce failed to pay the amortizations due. RFC took steps to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. Upon foreclosure, RFC purchased the Paranaque lot. Prior to the expiration of the one-year period redemption period, FS offered to repurchase the PQUE lot for P14,000, but the bank (RFC) rejected the offer. RFC scheduled the public sale of the lot. In 1956, Ponce filed the present action questioning the validity of the sheriffs foreclosure sale, and requesting a writ of P.I. to restrain RFC from carrying out its schedule sale. ______________________________________________________________________________________

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The Sorianos filed a 3rd party complaint contending that the mortgage was void insofar as FS is concerned for lack of consideration; and that the PQUE lot belonged to the conjugal property, and that Tomasa was already dead at the time and the heirs who have inherited it have not signed the mortgage contract. The TC dismissed Ponces complaint, and declared the mortgage of 1/2 of the PQUE lot of void because it belongs to the heirs of Tomasa. All the three parties appealed. Issues: WON the TC erred in voiding the sale to the RFC of the PQUE lot, upon the ground that the same formed part of the conjugal partnership of the Soriano spouses. Held/ Ratio Decidendi : The TC erred in applying the said presumption. The sale to RFC is valid. It appears that the property was registered in the name of Francisco Soriano married to Tomasa Rodriguez, and that based on this fact alone, the TC presumed that it belongs to the conjugal partnership. The TC erred in applying the said presumption. We should not overlook the fact that the title to said property was not a transfer certificate of title, but an original one, issued in accordance with a decree which, pursuant to law, merely confirms a pre-existing title. Said OCT does not establish, therefore, the time of acquisition of the PQUE property by the registered owner thereof. REYES VS. REYES, 17 SCRA 1099 (1966) Facts: Mateo, Juan and Francisco Reyes are the registered owners of several parcels of land covered by OCT No.s 22161 and 8066. In 1962, Mateo and Juan filed a motion for the issuance of writs of possession over all the lots against Raval. Raval adnmitted that he was in possession of 22161 but not of 8066, although he is entitled to the possession of both, having acquired by way of absolute sale from Francisco the latters undivided 1/3 interest to these discputed lots. The CFI issued the writes of possession. Raval did not appeal. Subsequently, petuitioners filed an action to recover the products of the disputed land against Raval. Raval filed a counter-claim for partition of the said lots, alleging that he is the co-owner of the properties. Issues: Who between the petitioners or respondent has a better right to the possession or custody of the disputed owners duplicate of certificates of title? Held/ Ratio Decidendi : Petitioners are entitled to the possession. While we agree that the disputed lots are subjects of litigation, we see no valid reason to justify, on this ground, the withholding from the registered owners, such as the petitioners herein, the custody and possession of the owners duplicates of certificates of title. In a decided case, this court has already held that the owner of the land in whose favor and in whose name said land is registered and inscribed in the certificate of title has more preferential right to the possession of the owners duplicate than one whose name does not appear in the certificate and has yet to establish his right to the possession thereto. It being undisputed that respondent had already availed of an independent civil action to recover his alleged co-owners share in the disputed lots by filing a counterclaim for partition, his rights appear to be amply protected; and considering that he may also avail of the provision on notice of lis pendens for the purpose of recording the fact that the lots covered by titles in question are litigated in the said Civil case, we again see no justifiable reason for reason for respondent to retain the custody of the owners duplicates of certificates of title.
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Prof. Dan Gatmaytan
NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY VS. IAC, 157 SCRA 380 (1991)
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Facts: In 1971, spouses Vivas executed a deed of sale with a right of repurchase in favor of spouses Magcamit, with a condition that the balance of P40,000 was to be paid the moment the certificate of title is issued and delivered to the vendees. The Magcamits have remained in peaceful possession of the property since then. In 1975, the OCT covering the subject property was issued in the names of spouses Vivas w/o the knowledge of the Magcamits. Vivas mortgaged the property to the petitioner. NGA foreclosed the property, and was able to purchase the same during the auction. TCT No. T-75171 was issued in the name of NGA. Upon learning this, Spouses Magcamit offered to pay P40,000 to Vivas but the latter refused. NGA claims it is now the owner of the property in question. NGA filed an ejectment suit against Magcamit. Issues: WON violation of the terms of agreement between the Vivas and the Mgcamits to deliver the certificate of title to the vendees upon its issuance, constitutes a breach of trust sufficient to defeat the title and right acquired by NGA, an innocent purchaser for value. Held/ Ratio Decidendi : No. NGA won. It is axiomatic that while the registration of the conditional sale with right of repurchase may be binding on third persons, it is by provision of law understood to be without prejudice to a 3 rd party who has a better right. In this case, it will be noted that the 3rd party NGA is a registered owner under the Torrens System and has obviously a better right than private respondents, and that the deed of sale with the suspensive condition is not registered and is necessarily binding only on the spouses Vivas and Magcamits. Registration of title to land under the Torrens System is an action in rem, not in personam. Hence personal notice to all is not necessary.. Where there is nothing on the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser need not explore further than what the torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right.
Indefeasibility
HEIRS OF VENCILAO VS. CA, (APRIL 1, 1998) Facts: In 1990, Vencilao filed an action for quieting of title against the spouses Gepalago. Complaint was amended to include an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title. LV claims to have purchased the land from PNB; and that they are the registered owners of the land. The TC appointed a commissioner to survey the property. The commissioner reported that out of the 22,400 sq. m. property claimed by the Vencilaos, Gepalagos were the registered owners. TC ruled in favor of the Vencilaos, since they have been in possession for more than 30 years. CA reversed. Issues: Who is entitled to the land? Held/ Ratio Decidendi : Gepalagos are entitled to the land. As a general rule, where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when the land is sold, the vendee for value has the right to rely on what appears on the face of the title. He is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate of title. Exception is when there is anything in the certificate w/c indicates any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property. ______________________________________________________________________________________

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LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY V DUMYUNG, ROD OF BAGUIO & CFI OF BAGUIO, 89 SCRA 532 Facts: Republic of the Phil filed a case for annulment of 3 free patents on the ground of misrepresentation and false dates and informations furnished by defendants, Manuel Dumyung, Fortunato Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan. The Rod was made a formal party defendant. Leopant filed motions for intervention, alleging that a portion of the titled lands in question is within the intervenors ordinary timber license, and the other portion being embraced in its mineral claims. Before the hearing on the 3 civil claims, Republic filed 3 criminal cases for falsification of public documents, for allegedly making untrue statements in their applications for free patents. The civil cases were then suspended. The trial court then dismissed the criminal case for insufficiency of evidence. As a result, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the 3 civil cases saying that: (1) the dismissal of the criminal cases also resulted in the dismissal of these civil cases; (2) the court has no jurisdiction over the case because the certificates of title can no longer be assailed; (3) Leopanto has no legal interest in the matter. The CFI then DISMISSED the civil cases ruling that the free patents duly registered were indefeasible, as in the Torrens system. Hence, this petition. Issues: WON the original certificates of title held by respondents were indefeasible WON the respondents are entitled to the benefits of RA 3872 WON the acquittal of the respondents in the criminal cases also meant extinction of civil cases Held/ Ratio Decidendi : Case REMANDED to TC for reception of evidence. (1) and (2) No. Under CA 141. timber and mineral lands are NOT alienable or disposable. The principal factual issue raised by the Republic and the intervenor is that the lands covered by the patents and certificates of title are timber and mineral lands and, therefore, inalienable. Without receiving evidence, the TC dismissed the 3 civil cases on the ground that the free patents were duly registered in the ROD and as such, enjoy the same privileges and safeguards as the torrens title. And even in its dismissal of the Motion for Reconsideration, it used RA 3872, liberalizing the free patent provisions of the Public Land Act in favor of the national cultural minorities. The SC emphasized that the trial courts assumption that the respondents are protected by RA 3872 is WITHOUT any factual basis. There is no evidence that respondents are members of the national cultural minorities, that they have continuously and cultivated the lands and that they are not the owner of any land secured or disposable under the Public Land Act. These QUALIFICATIONS must first be established. Thus, it was premature for the trial court to render that decision. It is well-settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. (3) No. The acquittal of the respondents in the criminal cases for falsification is NOT a bar to the civil cases. The criminal cases dealt with falsification using evidence to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt. Herein, the factual issues are WON lands in question are timber or mineral lands and WON respondents are entitled to the benefits of RA 3872 . ______________________________________________________________________________________

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FLORENTINO REYES, ET AL V COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTA, PAULA, PETRA REYES, 258 SCRA 651 (1996) Facts: On July 29, 1970, a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement was allegedly entered into between petitioner Florentino and his sisters (Jacinta, Paula and Petra). The subject of the alleged partition was a parcel of land located in Makati, originally registered in the name of their father, Bernardino Reyes. The Deed stipulated that the sisters waived their rights, interests and participation in favor of Florentino. In the deed, a share of 50 m 2 was given to Paula. Petitioner then regisitered the deed and obtained a TCT in his name, leaving the 50 m 2 in the name of Paula. May 1985, respondents discovered the registration of said deed and denied having any knowledge of its execution and disclaimed having signed the deed and having waived their rights. Paula likewise denied any participation and reiterated that it was fraudulently prepared by petitioner and that their signatures were forged. It was also asserted that the Notary Public who signed was not listed as accredited Notary Public. Petitioner, however, even executed a Deed of Absolute Sale and sold some portion to his children. Later on, there was allegedly another Deed of Partition dividing the property (participated by Florentino, his children and Paula). As a result, private respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction/ Restraining Order. The Lower Court enjoined the ROD from issuing and delivering the TCTs and subsequently ruled that Florentino forged and simulated the controversial documents, thereafter ordering that the documents involved are null and void. CA affirmed this decision. Hence, this petition. Issues: WON the lower court erred in ruling that the deed was forged WON the petitioner acquired the land by prescription, despite the forgery Held/ Ratio Decidendi: PETITION DISMISSED. (1) No. Petitioners failed to convincingly overturn the factual findings of the lower court -- (a) the signatures were done by one person; (b) the acknowledgment was signed by a notary public who was never commissioned as such and no record of the deed was ever done; (c) the word Pasay, Rizal was superimposed on the word Makati; (d) the residence certificates were obtained in Pasay City instead of Makati; (e) the group picture shown could have been taken on another occasion and not necessarily before signing the deed. Clearly, the question to be resolved here is a question of fact beyond the SCs power to decide. (Question of Law: when doubt or difference arises as to what the law is pertaining to the case vs Question of Facts: when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of alleged facts) As cited in Chua Tiong Tay, the SC can only review factual findings on 10 occasions. Thus, this being a purely question of fact and not covered in the exceptions, the SC cannot take cognizance of this case. What further strengthens the case of forgery is the fact that CA affirmed the findings. As to the claim that there was no allegation of deception, the SC held that forgery and simulation was precisely arrant deception. And as regards the allegation that a document duly notarized cannot be impugned, the SC deemed it baseless, saying that there was a finding of fact that it was notarized by an unaccredited Notary Public and was not recorded accordingly. (2) No. The provisions on acquisitive prescription (Arts 1117 and 1134) will not apply in this case. Petitioners cannot justify their ownership and possession of the land since they did not meet an essential requisite, cited in Art 526 -- that of GOOD FAITH. The forgery and simulation cannot be the basis for issuing a just title. Likewise, there can be no acquisitive prescription considering that the parcel of land in dispute is titled property -- in the name of their father Bernardino, which ______________________________________________________________________________________

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Florentino does not deny. As such, their title cannot defeat the real rights of the respondents through their father. In fact, there was not even any adverse possession since respondents continued to reside in the property.
Prescription Art. 47 of PD 1529 explicitly provides that title to registered land cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. This is to be contrasted from unregistered lands and/or public agricultural lands which can be acquired through adverse, notorious continuous possession under a claim of ownership for the period fixed by the Public Land Act (CA 141).
SULPICIA JIMENEZ AND TORIBIO MATIAS V VICENTE FERNANDEZ AND TEDORA GRADO, 184 SCRA 190 (1990) Facts : The land in question is the eastern portion of a 436 m 2 residential land located in Pangasinan, covered by a TCT under the name of Suplicia Jimenez. The entire land was originally owned by Fermin Jimenez who had two sons (Fortunato and Carlos). Fortunato predeceased his father and had only one child (Sulpicia). After Fermins death, the entire land was registered in the name of Carlos and Sulpicia in equal shares pro-indiviso. Later on, Carlos died and passed possession of the eastern part to his illegitimate daughter (Melecia) who later sold it to Cagampan then to Grado. Sulpicia, on the other hand, executed an affidavit adjudicating unto herself the other half of the property appertaining to Carlos upon manifestation that she is the only legal heir of Carlos. Consequently, TCT was issued in Sulpicias name alone. Sulpicia then filed a case to recover possession of said land from Melecia. The lower court dimissed Sulpicias claim, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. Hence, this petition. Issues: WON Melecia Jimenez has a right over the parcel of land WON the lower court erred in declaring Grado as the absolute owner citing Arcuico case (prescription) and laches Held: Petition GRANTED. (1) Melecia has no right. Melecia is an illegitimate daughter of Carlos and could not have validly acquired the land nor legally effect any transfer of it. Only a legitimate, legitimated, adopted or acknowledged natural child has successional rights. This was embodied in the law then in force (1889 Civil Code). (2) The court erred in relying on the Arcuino case, concluding that respondents acquired the property under litigation by prescription. This cannot be applied in this case because herein, Suplicia was a title holder since 1933 while in the Arcuino case plaintiffs were not registered owners. As such, Sulpicias title over the property remained good and continued to be good when she segregated into a new title. Sulpicias title being covered by the Torrens System could never be defeated by Melecias possession no matter how long. The right of Sulpicia, therefore, is imprescriptible and not barred under the doctrine of laches. Laches is an equity case, whose application depends on a case-to-case basis and depends on the courts discretion. In the case at bar, the doctrine is NOT applicable. After all, the professed objective of Act 496 (LRA, Torrens System) is to establish the stability of the landholding system in the Philippines (maintaining the confidence of the people in their titles). And to this end, the Court ruled that the right of the appellee to file an action to recover possession based on its Torrens title is imprescriptible and not barred under the doctrine of laches. ______________________________________________________________________________________

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URBANO JAVIER, LEONILA ALBIELA V HON. CONCEPCION, HON. A REYES, HON. L REYES, LIM CHUA, TAN TIAN ON,TAN SIOK TAN, 94 SCRA 212 (1979) Facts: On October 17, 1959, respondents as plaintiffs (Chua, Tan Tian On, Tan Siok Tan) filed against herein petitioners with the CFI of Quezon, for reconveyance of a parcel of land with improvements thereon known as Lot 12 and an accounting and recovery of the produce of the land possessed by herein petitioners since 1945. Lot 12 is allegedly part of Lot 6 covered by TCT 16817. In Expediente Nos. 1509 and 1679, said Lot 12 was ordered excluded for the reason that respondents then were deemed owners of said land. Defendants then, now petitioners, denied the material averments of the complaint and pointed out that Lot 12 could never be a part of Lot 6 because between the two lots there exists a big river. It was also alleged that Lot 6 was situated within the jurisdiction of Dolores, Quezon while Lot 12 was situated within the jurisdiction of Candelaria, Quezon. As special defenses, defendants-petitioners alleged that they acquired Lot 12 partly by purchase and partly by inheritance; that they have title granted by the Spanish government; that the lot was adjudicated to them by CFI of Tayabas; that they have declared the land for tax purposes; that they have cleared, cultivated and planted on these lands; that plaintiffs were never the owners of this land, and even if a portion thereof was included in their title, it was done thru fraud and deceit by making it appear in the application and in the notices that said Lot 6 belonged to them and is within the jurisdiction of Dolores, Quezon. The Lower Court found that Lot 12 is part of Lot 6 and was accordingly adjudicated to plaintiffs. This is confirmed by the Commissioners Report as maifested by the Chief Surveyor. Also, it was pointed out that defendant knew that the land is within Lot 6 and covered by a title in favor of palintiffs since 1924 -- so, when he filed his opposition, he did not act in good faith and did not occupy the land for 30 years(so no prescription). Indeed, no title to registered land may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. The CA affirmed this finding. Hence, this petition. Issues: WON there was fraud or misrepresentation in the procurement of the TCT WON the case is barred by statute of limitations or by laches Held/ Ratio Decidendi: Decision affirmed, with modification (1) No. The existence of actual or positive fraud is a question of fact, and respondent court having ruled out the same, the SC has no basis to sustain the defendants-petitioners contention. Lot 12 was clearly found to be part and parcel of Lot 6, for which TCT was issued to plaintiffsrespondents and registered in 1941. Likewise, the decree of registration has long become final, absent a showing that the same was questioned within one year after thereof was made. Under Sec 38, a person allegedly defrauded has a year to file a case. Thus, even assuming arguendo that there was actual or positive fraud in securing the title, the defendants-petitioners are now barred from questioning the same. (2) No. As the land in registration was covered by the Torrens System and duly registered, the decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of fraud, error or lack of notice, AFTER the lapse of one year. Indeed, it is an established rule that one cannot acquire title to a registered land by prescription or adverse title when covered by a Torrens tile. Adverse, notorious, continuous possession under claim of ownership fo rthe period fixed by the law is ineffective against a torrens title and it is likewise settled that the right to secure possession under a decree of registration does not prescribe (Tuason Case) ______________________________________________________________________________________

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As regards equitable doctrine of laches, it will NOT apply as against the registered owners. The reliance on Mejia de Lucas Case was misplaced becaus ethe circumstance attendant in that case was not present in this case. The 37 year possession in the case cited and intervening rights of third persons who may be prejudiced due to series of transfers effected allows the application of laches. But this was not the case herein. * Petitioners, however did not act in bad faith in occupying the land in question (finding of fact), and possession in bad faith only started in 1959 when judicial summons were served. As such, in the interest of justice, petitioners are entitled to accounting and reimbursement of necessary and useful expenses during its occupation of the land in good faith.
Collateral Attack A certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. (Sec. 48, PD 1529)
HALILI VS. CIR, 257 SCRA 174 FACTS: The original controversy arose when the Halili Bus Drivers and Conductors Union (PTGWO) filed claims for unpaid overtime pay for 897 Union members against Fortunato Halili. The latter died, thus the claims were made against his estate. The Union and the administratrix of the estate reached an amicable agreement whereby the Administratrix would transfer to the employees title to a tract of land covered by TCT36389 in Caloocan + additional amount of P25,000. The administratrix executed a Deed of Conveyance of Real Property, transferring it to the Union. The Union requested from the Minister of Labor the authority to sell and dispose of the property. Granted. Atty. Pineda, representing the Union, filed a motion with MOLE praying for authority to sell the land to Manila Memorial Park Cemetary (MMPCI). Granted by labor arbiter Valenzuela. Title was transferred in the name of MMPCI. In a resolution, the SC set aside the orders of labor arbiter Valenzuela saying it was issued w/o due process of law. Union filed a complaint with NLRC to compel MMPCI to reconvey the property. NLRC refused to take cognizance of the case (outside of jurisdiction). Petitioners thus filed the instant petition seeking reconveyance. ISSUE: 1. WON there was jurisdiction --- no, there was none. 2. WON validity of MMPCIs title can be attacked. no! RATIO: The petition should definitely be dismissed because the property was registered under the Torrens System of registration in the name of MMPCI. The best proof of ownership is the Certificate of Title. Sec 48 of PD 1529 (Prop Reg Decree) provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. The Certificate of title, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows the real interest of its owner. The petition of the Union seeks for reconveyance, thus in effect seeking the nullification of MMPCIs title aba di pwede yan! This is a collateral attack w/c is not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.
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* additional: 1. The portions of the land have already been sold out to individual lot buyers (innocent purchasers for value).
H. Cadastral Proceedings A cadastral proceeding, as distinguished from a land registration proceeding, is one where the petition for registration is filed by the government and not by the persons claiming ownership of the lands subject thereof. However, as in land registration proceedings, the objective in cadastral proceedings is the adjudication of title to lands involved in said proceeding. Cadastral proceedings are in rem, and judgments therein are binding on the whole world.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS BENITEZ, 16 SCRA 557 (1960) FACTS: In cadastral proceedings by the Director of Lands before the CFI, Spouses Benitez and Brillo were declared owners of a parcel of land in tacloban. Decision was rendered on Dec 29, 1932. 26 years after, they filed a petition before the same cadastral court for reopening of the proceedings. They claim that through inadvertence, they failed to include a portion (1,805sq m) thus it should be adjudicated to them pursuant to RA 931. Court admitted the petition and set the petition for hearing. It ordered copies of the petition be furnished to the Solgen, provincial fiscal of Leyte and Tacloban. Cadastral Court granted the petition. It declared the couple as owners of the additional portion. Spouses moved for writ of execution. Occupants of the additional portion opposed, disputing the validity of the decision. They were 62 occupants by virtue of permits granted by the Dir. of Lands. Solgen also opposed citing lack of jurisdiction for the reopening of the proceedings because there was no requisite publication. Both were denied. MFR. Denied. Present petition. ISSUE: was there Jurisdiction? RATIO: The petition to reopen cadastral proceedings is a matter of right granted by RA 931 as long as it is filed within due time. RA 931, parties are given a period of 10 years to file a petition for reopening the proceedings in case there was failure to file a claim in the first proceedings. However, the petition must be filed in the same cadastral proceedings, with the same procedures. Thus, it is necessary that notice be given to those persons who claim an adverse interest in the land sought to be registered, as well as to the general public, by publishing such notice in 2 successive issues of the OG, and posting it in a conspicuous place in the land to be surveyed, as well as in the municipal building. Publication is one of the essential bases of the courts jurisdiction. VALISNO VS PLAN FACTS: In 1964, petitioner-spouses Flordeliza and Valisno purchased 2 parcels of land from the legal heirs of Agapito Blanco. They declared the two parcels in their name for taxation purposes and exercised exclusive possession thereof in the concept of owners by installing a caretaker ______________________________________________________________________________________

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(Fermin Lozano). In 1968, private respondent Cayaba ousted Lozano from the land. He claims ownership by virtue of a deed of sale in his favor. He then erected a 6-door apartment on the land. Petitioner filed complaint for recovery of possession. Resolved in favor of petitioners. CA reversed the decision and dismissed complaint, ruling that the land occupied by Cayaba has not been successfully identified with the land described in the complaint. CA also ruled that being the actual possessor of the property, Cayaba possesses it with a just title. CA gives more weight to Cayabas evidence. In 1979. Cayaba applied for registration in his name. Petitioners filed opposition. MTD (ground: prior judgment). Granted. Opposition was dismissed. Instant petition. ISSUE: WON dismissal was proper. YES. RATIO: It must be noted that the opposition partakes of the nature of an answer with a counterclaim. In ordinary civil cases, the counterclaim would be considered a complaint, this time with the original defendant becoming the plaintiff. The original plaintiff, who becomes defendant in the counterclaim may either then answer the counterclaim or be declared in default, or may file a motion to dismiss the same. The latter choice was what respondent Cayaba opted for. Although such situation rarely, if ever, happens in land registration cases, the irregularity that petitioners complain of stems basically from the infrequent use of a motion to dismiss in land registration cases, and not from it being unauthorized. There was, in fact, res judicata. With respect to the subject matter, there can be no question that the land sought to be recovered by petitioners are the very same parcels of land being sought to be registered in Cayaba's and Noriega's names. While the complaint in the first action is captioned for recovery of possession, the allegations and the prayer for relief therein raise the issue of ownership, In effect, it is in the nature of an action reinvidicatoria. The second case is for registration of title. Consequently, between the two cases there is identity of causes of action because in action reinvidicatoria, possession is sought on the basis of ownership and the same is true in registration cases. Registration of title in one's name is based on ownership. In both cases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek to exclude other persons from ownership of the land in question. The only difference is that in the former case, the exclusion is directed against particular persons, while in the latter proceedings, the exclusion is directed against the whole world. Nonetheless, the cause of action remains the same. * Abellera vs. Farol ruled that "while in a cadastral case, res judicata is available to a claimant in order to defeat the alleged rights of another claimant, nevertheless, prior judgment can not be set up in a motion to dismiss." This ruling is now abandoned; reversed by this case. DURAN VS. OLIVA, 3 SCRA 154 (1961) Facts: (SUPRA) Held: By express provision of Rule 132 of the ROC, the rules contained therein apply to land registration and cadastral cases in suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. The LRA does not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismis. As a motion to dismiss is necessary for the expeditious termination of land registration cases, said motion can be availed of by the parties. The primary and fundamental purpose of the Torrens System of registration is to finally settle the titles to land and put to stop any question of legality of title thereto. Pursuant to this ______________________________________________________________________________________

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purpose, a homestead patent once registered under the LRA cannot be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, and any title issued thereon is null and void.
Hearing, judgment and Decree (Sec. 38)

WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION INC., (WIDORA) VS. CA, ORTIGAS & CO., 201 SCRA 165 (1991) Facts: Widora filed an application for registration of a land they acquired from the heirs of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. Molina and Oritgas & Co. separately opposed claiming ownership. Ortigas filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the court had no jurisdiction, the land being applied for having been already registered under the Torrens System (TS). MTD denied and the case was set for hearing. TC believes Ortigas TCTs were derived form OCT 337, 19, 336, 334 (as it appears on its face) pursuant to Decree 1425, NOT OCT 351 as claimed by Ortigas. If it were really derived from OCT 351 then why didnt Ortigas have the same corrected? And besides, Decree 1425 covers land which is 4 km. away from the land being applied for. So if there was no valid decree of registration, Ortigas TCTs cannot be valid. Ortigas brought the case to the CA on certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and the CA reversed the TC decision and dismissed the case. The CA believed Ortigas TCTs are actually derived from OCT 351, the latter being issued pursuant to Decree 1425 and that since OCT 351 is a copy of Decree 1425, even though a copy of Decree 1425 cannot be presented in court does not mean Decree 1425 was not issued and OCT 351 would suffice to show that a decree of registration was made. So according to the CA, as far as Lots 7 and 8 are concerned Ortigas TCTs refer to OCT 351 and the CA ordered that the mistake in the TCTs be corrected. Issue: WON Ortigas TCTs are valid despite the absence of a supporting decree of registration. Held: No. CA judgment set aside. Ratio: The evidence presented by Ortigas to prove the existence of a decree of registration is merely secondary (i.e. the plan, testimony of surveyor and OCT 351). Ortigas must satisfy requisites to justify admission of secondary evidence (1. Execution 2. Lost or destroyed or possession of adverse party). Ortigas evidence should not have been admitted in the first place. A ground for dismissal based on disputed facts (WON the TCTs of Ortigas was supported by a decree of registration specifically by Decree 1425) is not a ground for dismissal. The resolution of this controversy calls for a full-blown trial to afford the parties a day in court. An order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory thus not proper for the an extraordinary writ of prohibition. Interlocutory orders cannot be reviewed by the CA until the LC shall have decided the merit of the case. The mistakes that appear in Ortigas TCTs cannot be corrected except by order of the court in a petition filed for the purpose and entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was entered. The court is not authorized to alter or correct a certificate of title if it would mean the reopening of the decreed of registration beyond the period allowed by law. Respondent court committed a procedural lapse. The rule that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by certificate of Title applies only where there exists no serious controversy as to the certificates authenticity vis-a-vis the land covered therein.
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GABRIEL VS. CA, PETRITA PASCUAL, RUDYARDO SANTIAGO, 159 SCRA 461 (1988)
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Facts: A survey was made for Santiago Quimson. Land was registered under his name and an OCT was issued by the Registry of Deeds. Subsequently a cadastral survey (Orani survey) was conducted which resulted in an increase in the land. The Cadastral court confirmed Quimsons title. The lot was subdivided and subsequently acquired by Eligio Naval. Potenciano Gabriel had a parcel of land surveyed (2,792,712 sq m designated as Psu 9742) and later it was amended to exclude portions of land owned by Quimson. OCT 1264 with a reduced area (2,436,280 sq m) was issued to Gabriel. Another cadastral survey was conducted (Hermosa survey) and Gabriels lot covered by Psu-9742 became Lot No. 557 with a further reduced area (2,096,433 sq m) but no new certificate of title was issued such that the OCT 1264 continued to subsist with an area of 2,436,280 sq m. Gabriel passed away and his heirs (petitioners) divided the land according to Psu 9742 under OCT 1264 (includes land owned by Naval). Petitioners filed a complaint against Pascual and Santiago (administrators of Naval estate) claiming that respondents usurped the land and that the land was merely loaned to the respondents for dike and water control purposes of the latters fishpond. The TC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the land was in the possession of Naval in the concept of an owner and the petitioners claim that the land was loaned to Naval was not supported by sufficient evidence. Further the TC found that the right of petitioners was lost by prescription and that they were guilty of laches. TC ORDERED THE NECESSARY CORRECTION OF THE TECHINICAL DESCRIPTION TO MAKE IT CONFORM TO THE CORRECT AREA. CA affirmed. Issue: WON the courts have the authority to order the necessary corrections of an erroneous techinical description and make it conform to the correct area. Held: Yes. Petition dismissed. Decision affirmed. Ratio: In cadastral cases, jurisdiction of the court over lands already registered is limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in the description of lands, provided such corrections do not impair the substantial rights of the registered owner, and that such jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his title. The court also has the power to determine the priority of overlapping or over-laying registered title. This power is necessary for a complete settlement of the title to the land, which is the express purpose of cadastral proceedings. Furthermore, in the case at bar, it was not as if the court reopened or set aside a final decree. Therefore the action of the lower court in correcting the error in the technical description appearing in Psu 9742 is well within its jurisdiction. The fact that Gabriel did not own the land is shown by the Hermose and Orani Cadastre, and by the behavior of Gabriel himself (even after discovering occupation he allowed Naval to use and occupy the land). The claim that the land was loaned was supported by mere oral evidence which the SC believes to be insufficient to defeat title and possession of registered owners. For failure to prosecute their claims for 20 years, petitioners have lost by laches their right to recover their property. REPUBLIC AND DIR. OF LANDS VS. JUDGE ESTENZO 158 SCRA 282 (1988) Facts: Oct. 31, 1940 Cadastral Court declared Lot No. 8423 of the Ormoc Cadastral as public land. 32 years later (Jan 12, 1972) spouses Adolfo filed a petition to re-open the Oct. 31, 1940 ______________________________________________________________________________________

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decision. Spouses claimed ownership by virtue of having purchased it and as evidenced by a deed of quitclaim and confirmation dated August 28, 1969, likewise alleging that due to accident, mistake, and excusable neglect of the previous claimant, the land was declared public. Director of Lands appeared as oppositor. Judge adjudicated Lot No. 8423 in favor of spouses. Rep. and Dir. appeals by certiorari. Petitoner claims spouses petition is barred by the expiration of the period for reopening of cadastral proceedings under RA 931 (Dec. 31, 1968). Issue: WON spouses are barred. Held: Yes. Decision set aside. Ratio: Spouses filed their petition more than 3 years after the lapse of the reglementary period required by the law. The period having expired, respondent judge was without jurisdiction when he entertained spouses petition to re-open the decision of the cadastral court. Spouses claim that assuming the LC has no jurisdiction to re-open the cadastral proceedings their petition may be taken as one for confirmation of imperfect title considering the allegation contained in the complaint. But looking into their petition, the spouses cause of action is premised on RA 931 because it conforms with the conditions to be met before one can avail of the provisions of RA 931 therefore the petition filed by the spouses cannot be one for confirmation of imperfect title. If it were a confirmation of imperfect title, spouses can take advantage of the extension of period granted by RA 6236 (Dec. 31, 1976) but that law does not apply to re-opening of cadastral cases. Requirements of the rules relative to perfection of appeal in an ordinary case apply in the same manner to appeals from a decision of a court of first instance in registration and cadastral proceedings. Hence, from Aug. 28, 1972 when the assailed decision was received by herein petitioners until Sept. 15, 1972 when the petition was filed, the 30 period had not yet elapsed.
I.
Lost or Destroyed Certificates
Lost or Destroyed Certificates (Sec.109, PD 1529) - In case of loss or theft of an owners duplicate certificate of title -Due notice under oath is required to be sent to Reg. of Deeds where land is situated as soon as loss or theft is discovered -Petition to be filed by registered owner or other person in interest -Notice and hearing required Reconstitution of Lost or Destroyed Original Copies of Certificate of Title -Denotes restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition
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-Purpose is to have the same reproduced, after proper proceedings, in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred.
OCAMPO V. GARCIA, 105 PHIL. 533 FACTS: Appellees ask for the issuance of another duplicate certificate TCT which was lost in the liberation of Manila. They ask as well that the two encumbrances (re appointment of special administrator and sum due to a judgment creditor) thereon because such encumbrances no longer exist or have been satisfied. HELD: There is no question that under the foregoing quoted provisions of Act No. 496, the court of first instance, acting as land registration court, may, upon petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, after notice and hearing, and upon satisfactory proof, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate of title in lieu of a lost or destroyed one, and the cancellation of encumbrances on a certificate of title which have terminated or ceased. Having shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the owner's duplicate of transfer certificate of title No. 28709 had been lost or destroyed during the battle for liberation of Manila, the appellees are entitled to the issuance of another owner's duplicate TCT. Having also shown to the Court's satisfaction that Mariano Ocampo y Zamora, who had been appointed by the probate court to administer the estate of the late Manuel Rivera y Angeles, died in 1938, and the record of that fact on the back of the certificate of title would serve no useful purpose, the appellees may ask for the cancellation thereof and the Court commits no error in directing the cancellation of the annotation on the certificate of title of the administrator's appointment by the probate court. SERRA V. CA, 195 SCRA 482 RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE; PURPOSE. The purpose of the reconstitution of any document, book or record is to have the same reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred. The reconstitution of certificates of title should be made, as just stated, in the same form and exactly as they were at the time they were lost or destroyed. A person who seeks a reconstitution of a certificate of title over a property he does not actually possess cannot, by a mere motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, which is summary in nature, deprive the actual occupants of possession thereof. Possession and/or ownership of the property should be threshed out in a separate proceeding RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE; ACTUAL AND PERSONAL NOTICE TO ACTUAL POSSESSORS, INDISPENSABLE. Private respondents argue that the herein petitioners are bound by the order granting reconstitution because the reconstitution proceedings was heard after notices were sent to alleged boundary owners and the petition was published in the Official Gazette. However, the petitioner who were in actual possession of the properties were not notified. Notice by publication is not sufficient as regards actual possessors of the property. In the case of Alabang Development v. Valenzuela, No. 54094, August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA 277, We held that in petitions for reconstitution of titles, actual owners and possessors of the lands involved must be duly served with actual and personal notice of the petition. RECONSTITUTED TITLE A NULLITY WHERE NO ORIGINAL TITLE EXISTS. If no such original title in fact exists, the reconstituted title is a nullity and the order for its reconstitution does ______________________________________________________________________________________

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not become final because the court rendering the order has not acquired jurisdiction. It may be attacked at any time. The same rule applies if in fact there is an earlier valid certificate of title in the name and in the possession of another person/s. REPUBLIC V CA AND YUPANGCO, OCTOBER 26, 1999 Issue: The question for decision in this case is whether in a proceeding for the issuance of an owners duplicate certificate of title, the Solicitor General is required to be notified, such that failure to give such notice would render the proceedings void. Held: Nothing in the law requires that the Office of the Solicitor General be notified and heard in proceeding for the issuance of an owners duplicate certificate of title. In contrast, 23 of the same law(PD 1529), involving original registration proceedings, specifically mentions the Solicitor General as among those who must be notified of the petition. Similarly, 36 provides that the petition for registration in cadastral proceedings must be filed by the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director of Lands. It is only now that the Solicitor General is claiming the right to be notified of proceedings for the issuance of the owners duplicate certificate of title. Indeed, the only basis for such claim is that the Office of the Solicitor General represents the government in land registration and related proceedings. Even so, however, the request for representation should have come from the Registrar of Deeds of Makati who was the proper party to the case. Considering that the law does not impose such notice requirement in proceedings for the issuance of a new owners duplicate certificate of title, the lack of notice to the Solicitor General, as counsel for the Registrar of Deeds, was at most only a formal and not a jurisdictional defect. M
J. Reconstitution of Lost or Destroyed Certificates What is the purpose of reconstitution? The purpose of the reconstitution of any document, book or record is to have the same reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred. The reconstitution of certificates of title should be made in the same form and exactly as they were at the time they were lost or destroyed. (Serra Serra v. CA, 195 SCRA 482) How is reconstitution done? Reconstitution may be done either judicially or administratively / extrajudicially, depending on the source document which is the basis for the reconstitution. ( See Sec. 5 of RA 26, as amended by RA 6732, as well as Sec. 10-12 of RA 26.) What is the force and effect of a reconstituted title? A reconstituted certificate of title has the same validity and legal effect as the original thereof. (Sec. 6, RA 26) This is without prejudice to any party whose right or interest in the property was duly noted in the original at the time it was lost or destroyed, but entry or notation of which was not made on an extrajudicially reconstituted certificate of title.
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Judicial Reconstitution
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Judicial reconstitution partakes of a land registration proceeding and is perforce a proceeding in rem. The procedure for judicial reconstitution is laid down in Sec. 12 ( contents of the petition) and 13 (publication, posting, and sending by mail of the petition) of RA 26. These requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional, and non-compliance therewith voids the reconstitution proceedings. What are the sources for judicial reconstitution of title?
I) For Original Certificate of Title (C.T) In the following order: a) Owners duplicate of the CT b) Co-owners mortgagees or lessees duplicate of said C.T. (Note that reconstitution based on (a) and (b) can be done administratively. However, Sec. 10 of RA 26 allows a petitioner to file directly with the RTC. Moreover, such certificates of title reconstituted under Sec. 10 are not subject to the encumbrance provided under Sec. 7 of RA 26.) c) Certified copy of such certificate, previously issued by the Reg. Of deeds or by legal custodian thereof d) Authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, which was the basis of the certificate of title e) Deed of mortgage, lease or encumbrance containing description of prop covered by the CT and on file with Reg. of Deeds, or an authenticated copy thereof indicating that its original had been registered f) II) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is a sufficient and proper basis for reconstitution. For Transfer Certificate of Title In the following order: a) The same as sources a, b and c for reconstitution of original CT b) Deed of transfer or other document covered by TCT and on file with the Reg. of Deeds, or an authenticated copy thereof indicating that its original had been registered and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed CT was issued c) The same as sources (e) and (f) for reconstitution of original CT
Can liens and encumbrances be reconstituted?

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YES. The sources for such reconstitution are provided under Sec. 4 of RA 26. Also see Sec. 8-9 of the same law. Who may file a petition for reconstitution? A petition for reconstitution may be filed with the Register of Deeds by: (1) the registered owner; (2) his assigns; or (3) any other person having an interest in the property (Sec. 5, RA 26) Can the Register of Deeds reconstitute a certificate of title motu proprio? NO. Sec. 6 of RA 26, which gave the Register of Deeds such power, has been expressly repealed by RA 6732. When does the order of reconstitution become final? Upon 15 days from receipt by the Register of Deeds and by the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority of a notice of such order or judgment without any appeal having been filed by any of such officials. (Sec. 110, PD 1529, as amended by RA 6732) What is the force and effect of a fraudulently reconstituted title? It is void ab initio as against the party obtaining the same and all persons having knowledge thereof. (Sec. 11, RA 6732) What is the remedy of an aggrieved party to a fraudulently reconstituted title? Sec. 10 of RA 6732 provides that any interested party who by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence (FAME; note, these are the same grounds for a motion for new trial as well as a petition for relief from judgment) has been unjustly deprived or prevented from taking part in the proceedings may file a petition in the proper court to set aside the decision and to reopen the proceedings. The petition must be verified and filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the decision but not more than 6 months from the promulgation thereof. ( This is the same as a petition for relief from judgment.) Can a writ of possession issue in reconstitution cases? NO. Reconstitution does not confirm or adjudicate ownership over the property covered by the reconstituted title, unlike in original land registration proceedings. Thus, a person who seeks a reconstitution of a CT over a property he does not actually possess cannot, by a mere motion for the issuance of a writ of possession ( which, it must be noted, is summary in nature) deprive the actual occupants of possession thereof. ( Serra Serra v. CA, 195 SCRA 482)
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND ISABEL LASTIMADO, 94 SCRA 865 FACTS: 1. September 11, 1967 - Lastimado filed in the CFI a Petition for the reopening of cadastral proceedings over a portion of Lot No. 626 of the Mariveles Cadastre. 2. In the absence of any opposition, whether from the Government or from private individuals, Lastimado was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte. 3. October 14, 1967- the trial Court granted the Petition and adjudicated the land in favor of Lastimado. 4. The trial Court issued an order for the issuance of a decree of registration on November 20, 1967, and on November 21, 1967, the Land Registration Commission issued Decree No. N117573 in favor of private respondent. Eventually, OCT No. N-144 was also issued in her favor. 5. Lastimado thereafter subdivided the land into ten lots, and the corresponding titles, TCT Nos. 18905 to 18914 inclusive, were issued by the Register of Deeds. 6. June 3, 1968 - or within one year from the entry of the decree of registration, RP filed a Petition for Review pursuant to Sec. 38, Act No. 496, on the ground of fraud alleging that during the period of alleged adverse possession by private respondent, said parcel of land was part of the U.S. Military Reservation in Bataan, which was formally turned over to the Republic of the Philippines only on December 22, 1965, and that the same is inside the public forest of Mariveles, Bataan and, therefore, not subject to disposition or acquisition under the Public Land Law. 7. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that the Solicitor General had failed to file opposition to the original. Petition for reopening the cadastral proceedings, and was therefore estopped from questioning the decree of registration. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's dismissal. 8. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals as well as the order of the trial court, and held that the trial court should have afforded petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support of the facts alleged to constitute actual and extrinsic fraud committed by private respondent. Moreover, the inaction of the Solicitor General cannot operate to bar the action of the State as it cannot be estopped by the mistake or error of its official or agents. Case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. HELD: The essential elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of a decree are: (1) that the petitioner has a real and dominical right; (2) that he has been deprived thereof; (c) through fraud; (d) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; and (e) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser. For fraud to justify the review of a degree, it must be extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The fraud is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the Court. It is error for the lower court to deny the petition for review of a decree of registration filed within one year from the entry of the decree, without hearing the evidence in support of the ______________________________________________________________________________________

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allegation and claim that actual and extrinsic fraud has been committed by the applicants. The lower court should afford the petitioner an opportunity to prove it. If the allegation of the government that the land in question was inside the military reservation at the time it was claimed is true, then, it cannot be the object of any cadastral proceeding nor can it be the object of reopening under Republic Act No. 931. Similarly, if the land in question, indeed, forms part of the public forest, then, possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it into private property as it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral Court to register under the Torrens System. The inaction or neglect of government agencies cannot operate to bar the action by the State as it cannot be estopped by the mistake or error of its officials or agents. The State as a persona in law is the juridical entity, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land under basic Constitutional precepts, and is charged with the conversation of such patrimony. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MALABON VS. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MALABON, 181 SCRA 788 1. March 17, 1988 - a Deed of Absolute Sale of a property covered by TCT No. R-3899 in the name of Salome Castillo in favor of Jose M. Castillo, was presented to the Register of Deeds in Caloocan City for registration. It could not be given due course because the original of said TCT in the Registry of Deeds was missing. 2. As the missing title covered a parcel of land in Malabon, Atty. Gaudencio Cena, the Register of Deeds for Malabon, filed on April 12, 1988 in the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, a verified petition for reconstitution of the original of TCT No. R-3899 under Rep. Act No. 26, which was given due course on April 22, 1988. The courts order setting it for hearing on August 17, 1988 was ordered to be published in two (2) consecutive issues of the Official Gazette as provided in Section 9 of Republic Act No. 26. 3. At the hearing for the purpose of establishing the jurisdictional requirement of publication of the notice of the hearing of the petition, the petitioner submitted the following exhibits: a) a certification dated August 10, 1988, of the Director of the National Printing Office certifying that the order dated April 22, 1988 was included in Volume 84, Nos. 21 and 22, May 23 and May 30, 1988 issues of the Official Gazette; b) the sheriffs certificate of posting; and c) the registry return receipts for the copies of the notices which were sent to the Director of Lands, the Office of the Solicitor General, the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA), Salome Castillo, and Jose Castillo. 4. November 3, 1988 - the petitioner caused to be marked as Exhibit G the certificate of publication issued by the Director of the National Printing Office stating that the order of the court dated April 22, 1988 was published in Volume 84, Nos. 21 and 22, May 23 and May 30, 1988 issues of the Official Gazette and that the May 30, 1988 issue was released for circulation on October 3, 1988. The May 23 and May 30 issues of the Official Gazette were also marked as Exhibits B-1 and B-2, respectively. 5. The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City testified that the original TCT No. R-3899 had been missing from the files of his office since 1981; that the Deed of Sale of the property of Salome Castillo in favor of Jose Castillo was presented for registration but it could not be registered because the original of TCT No. R-3899 could not be found; and that he was authorized by the ______________________________________________________________________________________

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administrator of the NLTDRA to file a petition for reconstitution of the lost original copy of TCT No. R-3899. 6. The Regional Trial Court in Malabon dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of the petition was not published in the Official Gazette "at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing" (Sec. 9, R.A. No. 26) which had been set on August 17, 1988. The May 23 and May 30 issues of the Official Gazette were actually released for circulation on October 3, 1988, or forty-seven (47) days after the scheduled hearing of the petition. 7. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 26 provides:
"Sec. 9. A registered owner desiring to have his reconstituted certificate of title freed from the encumbrance mentioned in section seven of this Act, may file a petition to that end with the proper Court of First Instance, giving his reason or reasons therefor. A similar petition may, likewise, be filed by a mortgagee, lessee or other lien holder whose interest is annotated in the reconstituted certificate of title. Thereupon, the court shall cause a notice of the petition to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land lies, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing, and after hearing, shall determine the petition and render such judgment as justice and equity may require. The notice shall specify, among other things, the number of the certificate of title, the name of the registered owner, the names of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title, the location of the property, and the date on which all persons having an interest in the property must appear and file such claim as they may have. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication and posting of the notice." ISSUE: Whether the actual publication of the notice of the petition in the Official Gazette fortyseven (47) days after the hearing, instead of "at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing" was sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the court to hear and determine the petition. HELD: Evidently, it did not. The purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. In Director of Lands vs. The Court of Appeals and Demetria Sta. Maria de Bernal, Greenfield Development Corporation, Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon Bagatsing (102 SCRA 370), this Court ruled that "in all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void." Where there is a defect in the publication of the petition, such defect deprives the court of jurisdiction (Po vs. Republic, 40 SCRA 37). And when the court a quo lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, it lacks authority over the whole case and all its aspects (Pinza vs. Aldovino, 25 SCRA 220, 224). Apart from the defective publication of the petition, another reason for its dismissal is that the Register of Deeds for Malabon is not the proper party to file the petition for reconstitution. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 26, which allowed the Register of Deeds to motu proprio reconstitute a lost or destroyed certificate of title from its corresponding owner's duplicate ______________________________________________________________________________________

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certificate, was expressly repealed or declared to be "inoperative" by Section 6 of Republic Act 6732, approved on July 17, 1989. A petition for reconstitution may now be filed only by "the registered owner, his assigns, or any person who has an interest in the property" ( Section 12, Republic Act No. 26). In other respects, the special procedure provided in Republic Act No. 26 remains unchanged and therefore still applies (Zuiga vs. Vicencio, 153 SCRA 720). JOSE MANUEL STILIANOPULOS VS. THE CITY OF LEGASPI [G.R. NO. 133913. OCTOBER 12, 1999.] FACTS: 1. September 26, 1962 - Legaspi City filed a petition for the judicial reconstitution of its titles to twenty parcels of land, including Lot 1, the certificates of which had allegedly been lost or destroyed during World War II. 2. September 16, 1964 -, the trial court ordered the Register of Deeds to reconstitute the OCTs over these lots including OCT No. 665 in favor of the City. 3. August 4, 1970 - the City filed a Complaint for quieting of title over Lot 1 against Carlos V. Stilianopulos alias Chas V. Stilianopulos, Ana Estela Stilianopulos, and the American Oxygen and Acetylene Company. While this case was pending, Carlos V. Stilianopulos died. As a consequence, TCT No. T-1427 which was registered under his name was cancelled, and TCT No. 13448 was issued in the name of his son, petitioner herein, on July 12, 1974. 4. February 29, 1984 - the trial court rendered its Decision, which upheld the validity of TCT No. 13448 and its superiority to OCT No. 665. Thus, Stilianopulos was declared the lawful owner of the disputed property, Lot 1, Psd-3261. 5. The CA reversed the trial court and ruled in favor of the City. Stilianopulos recourse to this Court was dismissed in a Minute Resolution promulgated on August 17, 1988, 12 on the ground that the issue raised was factual in nature. 6. Stilianopulos filed an action for the cancellation of OCT No. 665, which the trial court subsequently dismissed on August 15, 1989 on the ground of res judicata. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court, reasoning that petitioners action was "an action for annulment of the order" of the reconstitution of OCT No. 665 and was therefore not cognizable by the trial court. 7. June 13, 1994 - Stilianopulos again filed before the CA a new action for annulment of the September 16, 1964 Order based on three grounds: "(1) that the Respondent City of Legaspi procured OCT No. 665 fraudulently; (2) that the original certificate of title which was judicially reconstituted was non-existent: and (3) that the court which ordered the reconstitution lacked jurisdiction." 8. The Court of Appeals ruled that "the prescriptive period for extrinsic fraud has lapsed [and] the petitioner is likewise guilty of laches in the filing of this case for annulment." Res judicata had also set in against petitioner, as there was an identity of parties and causes of action ownership and possession of the lot covered by OCT No. 665 between the earlier case for quieting of title and his Petition for Annulment. Further, petitioner did not raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction in the earlier case; thus, he was guilty of laches. ISSUES: (1) WON the prescriptive period for extrinsic fraud has [not] lapsed" and ______________________________________________________________________________________

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(2) WON the reconstitution court had no jurisdiction and "petitioner is [not] guilty of laches." In addition, the Court will pass upon the CA holding that this case is also barred by res judicata. HELD: The Petition has no merit. For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated. It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a party from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case such that there is no fair submission of the controversy. Our examination of the facts shows that, indeed, respondent failed (1) to state in its Petition for Reconstitution that Lot 1 was occupied and possessed by petitioners predecessor-in-interest and (2) to give him notice of such proceedings. Deliberately failing to notify a party entitled to notice constitutes extrinsic fraud. Although the CA and the respondent impliedly admitted the presence of extrinsic fraud, both contend, however, that the prescriptive period for filing an action based thereon had already run out on the petitioner. The appellate court said: "If the ground for the annulment is extrinsic fraud, the action has to be filed within four (4) years from the time the fraud is discovered pursuant to the provisions of Article 1891 of the Civil Code. . . Petitioners arguments are untenable. He could and should have raised the issue of extrinsic fraud in the action for quieting of title. It was then that he became aware of the reconstituted title in the name of respondent. A simple check on the records of the reconstitution proceedings would have revealed that it was conducted without notice to the petitioners father. Thus, we find no sufficient explanation why March 24, 1988 should be reckoned as the date when the prescriptive period should begin. Simply unacceptable is the contention that petitioners counsel discovered the extrinsic fraud "shortly after March 24, 1988" only. Granting arguendo that the prescriptive period should begin when petitioners counsel read the Land Registration Commission Report, the "discovery" should have been made earlier, because the Report had been made available to the said counsel when it was attached to the respondents Appeal Brief on April 5, 1986, or at the latest, when the CA Decision was promulgated on October 16, 1987. There was absolutely no excuse why petitioner had to wait until the finality of the Decision in the case for quieting of title, before raising the issue of extrinsic fraud in order to annul the Decision in the reconstitution proceedings. Clearly, the facts constituting the fraud should have been known to petitioners predecessor-in-interest, when the Petition to quiet the title was filed in 1970. It appears that the trial court had no jurisdiction. First, under Section 13 of RA 26, the sending of notice to the occupant of the land covered by the title sought to be reconstituted is mandatory and jurisdictional. If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on the possessor or anyone else having interest in the property involved, the order of reconstitution is null and void. Second, reconstitution of title is simply the reissuance of a new duplicate certificate of title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. Thus, it arises from the loss or destruction of the owners copy of the certificate. In the case at bar, the title to Lot 1 was not lost or destroyed. It remained in the possession of the petitioners father and was eventually passed on to him. If a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted title is void and the court that rendered the Decision had no jurisdiction. However, the CA ruled that the delay of more than twenty years since petitioner learned of the reconstituted title was unreasonable, giving rise to the presumption that he had abandoned the idea of seeking annulment of the proceedings on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and that he had opted to take other actions instead. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an ______________________________________________________________________________________

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unreasonable or unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, warranting the presumption that the right holder has abandoned that right or declined to assert it. This inaction or neglect to assert a right converts a valid claim into a stale demand. Laches prevents a litigant from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction. True, petitioner filed the annulment Complaint right after the dismissal of the cancellation-of-title case, but it is equally true that it was filed only after the quieting-of-title case had been decided in favor of the respondent. By participating in the quieting-of-title case and arguing therein his defenses against the legality of the title of the respondent in order to establish his rights over the disputed property, petitioner is deemed to have chosen this action over the annulment of the reconstitution proceedings. Annulment of the reconstitution proceedings was belatedly resorted to only after the CA had reversed the trial court and upheld the reconstituted title of respondent. Laches bars a party from invoking lack of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal for the purpose of annulling everything done, with his active participation, in the case below. It cannot be said either that the application of laches would work an injustice against petitioner, because he was given a fair chance in the quieting-of-title case to prove his ownership of the disputed lot. Furthermore, by seeking the reexamination of the ownership of the disputed lot, petitioner accepted the jurisdiction of the court which heard the action for quieting of title. A litigant cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief and, after failing to obtain such relief, to repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. Clearly, laches has attached and barred the petitioners right to file an action for annulment. We are convinced that indeed res judicata has already set in. This conclusion is the most persuasive argument raised by the appellate court. The principle applies when the following elements are present (1) a judgment has became final; (2) such judgment was rendered on the merits; (3) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there was identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action between the previous and the subsequent action. There is identity of cause of action between a case for annulment of title and one for annulment of judgment. Causes of action are identical when there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions, or where the same evidence will sustain both actions. If the same facts or evidence can sustain either, the two actions are considered the same so that the judgment in one is a bar to the other. The underlying objectives or reliefs sought in both the quieting-of-title and the annulment-of-title cases are essentially the same adjudication of the ownership of the disputed lot and nullification of one of the two certificates of title. Thus, it becomes readily apparent that the same evidence or set of facts as those considered in the quieting-of-title case would also be used in this Petition. The difference in form and nature of the two actions is immaterial and is not a reason to exempt petitioner from the effects of res judicata. The philosophy behind this rule prohibits the parties from litigating the same issue more than once. When a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. Verily, there should be an end to litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject, once it is fully and fairly adjudicated.
Administrative Reconstitution Administrative reconstitution is the putting together again/ restoration of the original copies of Original and Transfer Certificates of Title that were lost or destroyed due to fire, flood or other natural calamities without necessity of court proceeding. It may be availed of only in case of substantial loss or destruction of land titles due to fire, flood or other force majeure where the number of certificates of titles lost or damaged, is
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at least 10% of the total number in the custody of the Register of Deeds, but in no case shall the number of the lost or damaged titles be less than 500 as determined by the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority. What are the source documents on which administrative reconstitution may be based? (1) (2) (3) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title; (Sec. 2a, RA 26) The co-owner's mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title; ( Sec. 2b, RA 26)
For liens and other encumbrances affecting the destroyed or lost CT, the annotations or memoranda appearing on the owner's co-owner's mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate. (Sec. 4a, RA 26) What are the requirements for administrative reconstitution? 1. Owners duplicate copy of the OCT or TCT and 3 clear xerox copies. If the owners duplicate is lost or unavailable, then the co-owners duplicate of title and 3 clear/legible xerox copies may be submitted; Real estate tax receipt representing full payment for the last 2 years prior to the application/petition; Tax declaration or real property; and Others (e.g. power of attorney).
2. 3. 4.
What is the procedure for administrative reconstitution? (1) The registered owner, his assigns, or other persons having an interest in the property files a petition with the Register of Deeds, complying with the requirements imposed by Sec. 5 of RA 26. (2) If the Register of Deeds has no valid reason to deny the petition, he/she shall reconstitute the certificate of title accordingly.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ANTONINA GUIDO, 204 SCRA 160 FACTS: 1. August 22, 1979 The RP, represented by the SolGen, filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Decreto No. 6146, the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 2337 and all titles derived from said decree; and the declaration of the parcel of land covered by the decree as belonging to the state, except so much thereof as had been validly disposed of to third persons. The complaint alleged inter alia, that: "15. The alleged Decree No. 6146 issued on September 10, 1911 and the alleged owner's copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23377 issued on May 12, ______________________________________________________________________________________

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1933, both in the name of Francisco and Hermogenes Guido, and which supposed owner's duplicate was made the basis of the administrative reconstitution of TCT No. (23377) RT-M-0002 on March 29, 1976, or about 43 years later, are false, spurious and fabricated and were never issued by virtue of judicial proceedings for registration of land, either under Act No. 496, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, or any other law, . . ."
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2. The defendants denied that Decreto No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377 were false and spurious. They consistently claimed (from the trial court up to this Court) that the parcel of land covered by the questioned document is a portion of the vast Hacienda de Angono owned by their predecessor-in-interest, Don Buenaventura Guido y Sta. Ana; that Don Buenaventura Guido left a portion of the hacienda (porcion del plano 11-627) to his heirs, Francisco and Hermogenes Guido; that the subject matter of the petition is only a portion of plano 11-827, and covered by Decreto No. 6145, issued on September 1, 1911 in the name of the heirs of Buenaventura Guido y Sta. Ana (Francisco and Hermogenes Guido); that on June 12, 1912, OCT No. 633 was issued on the basis of Decreto No. 6145; that the original title was subsequently cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 23377 was issued on May 12, 1933; that the heirs of Francisco and Hermogenes Guido adjudicated among themselves the estate left by their predecessors and transferred one-half portion thereof to Jose Rojas sometime in 1942, as contained in an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Quitclaim dated December 17, 1973. 3. The parties, however, admit that on August 20, 1974, the heirs of Buenaventura Guido, requested the then Land Registration Commission (now Land Registration Authority) to issue the corresponding original certificate of title based on Decreto 6145, which was denied on January 8, 1976. 4. March 29, 1976 - Alfredo Guido, representing the other heirs, filed a petition for reconstitution of TCT No. 23377 with the Registry of Deeds of Morong. The petition alleged that the original could not be located in the files of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal after he and his co-heirs sought the registration of their Extra-judicial Settlement with Quitclaim dated December 17, 1973. The petition was supported by the owner's duplicate copy of the title. 5. The petition for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 23377 was granted and a reconstituted certificate of title [TCT (23377) RT-M-0002] was issued dated March 29, 1976. 6. After the reconstitution, the heirs presented before the Registry of Deeds of Morong the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Quitclaim which they executed on December 17, 1973 in favor of Jose Rojas and which they had earlier presented for registration. 7. Subsequently, the entire parcel of land covered by the decree was subdivided into twenty-one (21) lots and twenty-one (21) different certificates of titles were issued in lieu of the reconstituted TCT No. 23377. On August 25, 1978, fourteen (14) of these twenty-one (21) lots were exchanged with shares of stocks of Interport Resources Corporation. On April 21, 1980, all the named heirs renounced their rights over the property in favor of their co-heir Alfredo Guido, Sr. in exchange for monetary considerations. 8. The court a quo rendered judgment dismissing the complaint and declaring Decree No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377, genuine and authentic. 9. The decision of the trial court was appealed by the Solicitor General to the Court of Appeals which affirmed said decision on July 12, 1988.
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ISSUES: It is the contention of petitioner that respondent Court of Appeals committed serious errors in the assessment of the evidence on record and acted with grave abuse of discretion in concluding that the Republic failed to satisfy the requirements of preponderant proof in support of its theory. HELD: 1. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. The general rule in civil cases is that a party having the burden of proof of an essential fact must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon. By preponderance of evidence is meant simply evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. The term 'preponderance of evidence' means the weight, credit and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the terms 'greater weight of evidence' or 'greater weight of the credible evidence.' 2. The matter of determining which party had the preponderant evidence is within the province of the trial court before whom the evidence of both parties are presented. The decision of who to believe and who not to believe goes to the credibility of a witness which, likewise, is within the province of the trial court. 3. We have carefully gone through the records of this case and there is no reason for this Court to reverse the decisions of both the court a quo and the appellate court. Both courts were one in concluding that the preponderance of evidence is in favor of the theory presented by the private respondents, i.e., the authenticity of the questioned documents. 4. The fact alone that the petition for reconstitution was approved on the same day that it was filed did not render the approval suspect. In administrative reconstitution of a certificate of title supported by the owner's duplicate copy of the title, no other requisite was required under Section 6 of Republic Act 26 unlike in judicial reconstitution under Section 12 of the same law. The Register of Deeds correctly granted the reconstitution on the basis of private respondents owners' duplicate copy of TCT No. 23377. 5. We find no legal basis for the declaration of the questioned documents as valid only with respect to such portions of the property not possessed and owned by bonafide occupants with indefeasible registered titles of ownership or with lengths of possession which had ripened to ownership. Having been found valid and genuine, Decreto No. 6145 therefore, possessed all the attributes of a decree of registration. Section 31 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529), second paragraph provides:. The decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to such exceptions or liens as may be provided by law. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the National Government and all branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application or notice, the same being included in the general description "To all whom it may concern." 6. Likewise, TCT No. 23377, having been found true and authentic also possessed all the attributes of a torrens certificate of title. By express provision of Section 47 of P.D. 1529, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. To declare that the decree and its derivative titles is valid but only with respect to the extent of the area described in the decree not possessed by occupants with indefeasible registered titles or to possessors with such lengths of possession which had ripened to ownership is to undermine the people's faith in the torrens title being conclusive as to all matters contained therein. The certificate serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose names appear therein. After the expiration of the one year ______________________________________________________________________________________

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period from the issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is based, it becomes incontrovertible, unless subsequent to the issuance of the decree a third party may be able to show that he acquired title thereto by any of the means recognized by law.
V.
SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION
The act of registration is the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned. Thus, the mere execution of deeds of sale, mortgages, leases or other voluntary documents serves only as (1) a contract between the parties, and (2) as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to register such documents. They do NOT, in themselves, effect a conveyance or encumbrance on the land. The exception to this rule is if the instrument is a will. The act of registration creates a constructive notice to the whole world of such voluntary or involuntary instrument or court writ or process.
CAMPILLO VS CA 129 SCRA 513 (1984) The De Vera spouses sold 2 parcels of land to Santos. Sale was not registered. About a year later, Campillo obtained a judgment for a sum of money against De Vera. The parcels, still in the De Veras name, were levied upon on execution and Campillo was able to purchase them at a public auction. TCT was issued to Campillo. Santos sought to annul sale at public auction, claiming to be the owner. HELD: Registration of the sale shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned. The properties were still in the name of the De Veras. Campillo was not required to look behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens system. RATIO: A bona fide purchaser for value of such property at an auction sale acquires good title as against a prior transferee of same property if such prior transfer was unrecorded at the time of the auction sale. HEIRS OF MARASIGAN VS IAC 152 SCRA 253 (1987) Who has a better right to the property in question, the party (Marasigan) who bought it with a notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of her title or the party (Marron) in whose favor the notice of lis pendens was made? The appellate court answered this question in favor of the party who had the notice annotated and who won the litigation over the property. Marrons cause of action had not prescribed. While Marasigan acquired the property in 1974, it was only in 1977 that the sale was registered. It is the act of registration which creates constructive notice to the whole world. (Sec 52, PD 1529) ______________________________________________________________________________________

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Also when Marasigan was issued her TCT the notice of lis pendens in her predecessors title was carried over to her title. In case of subsequent sales or transfers, the Registrar of Deeds is duty bound to carry over the notice of lis pendens on all titles to be issued. Otherwise, if he cancels any notice of lis pendens in violation of his duty, he may be held civilly and even criminally liable for any prejudice caused to innocent third persons. A notice of lis pendens means that a certain property is involved in a litigation and serves as notice to the whole world that one who buys the same does it at his own risk. It was also a clear notice to Marasigan that there was a court case affecting her rights to the property she had purchased. Consequently, Marasigan was bound by the outcome of the litigation against her vendors or transferors. GARCIA VS CA 95 SCRA 380 (1980) In this case two sets of certificates of title were issued to different people for the same lots. The 1st set was issued sometime in 1920 to Lapus who had bought the parcels in 1918. However, despite this registered sale, the OCT was not cancelled and the sale to Lapus was not annotated thereon. The 2nd set of titles was issued in 1963 when heirs of the original owner, relying on the clean OCT, were able to succeed in having TCTs issued to them. Eventually, both sets of owners entered into transactions with other people who in turn secured TCTs in their favor. Whose successors in interest would have a better right? HELD: Where two certificates (of title) purport to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails. And the rule that in case of double registration the owner of the earlier certificate is the owner of the land applies to the successive vendees of the owners of such certificates. The vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate. There can be no doubt that Lapus was an innocent purchaser for value. He validly transmitted to his successors-in-interest his indefeasible title or ownership over the disputed lots or parcels of land. That title could not be nullified or defeated by the issuance forty-three years later to other persons of another title over the same lots due to the failure of the register of deeds to cancel the title preceding the title issued to Lapus. This must be so considering that Lapus and his successors-in-interest remained in possession of the disputed lots and the rival claimants never possessed the same. MINGOA VS LAND REG COM 200 SCRA 782 (1991) A deed of donation of several parcels of land was executed by petitioner in favor of his children on July 15, 1987. The deed was forwarded to the Register of Deeds for registration by registered mail on September 9, 1988. It was entered in the primary entry book of the Register of Deeds on September 20, 1988 under Entry No. 181. Said Register of Deeds suspended registration of the donation until the petitioner has secured the proper clearances from the Department of Agrarian Reform on the ground that under Section 6 of Republic Act 6657 any disposition of private agricultural lands made prior to June 15, 1988, when the Act took effect, must be registered within three (3) months from said date or on before September 13, 1988 to be valid. ______________________________________________________________________________________

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HELD: Sec. 56 of PD 1529 requires the Register of Deeds, upon payment of the entry fees, to enter in the primary book of entry, in the order of reception, all instruments including copies of writs and processes filed with him relative to registered land the date, hour and minute shall be noted in said book which shall be regarded as the date of registration of the instrument and the memorandum of each instrument on the certificate title shall bear the same date. Sec. 34 of PD1529 makes the Rules of Court suppletorily applicable to land registration and cadastral cases. Pursuant to Sec 1, Rule 13 of the ROC, in case of filing by registered mail, it is the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt w/c shall be considered as the date of their filing, payment, or deposit in court. In the present case, September 9 should be considered the date of filing and thus the deed of donation was filed within the three-month statutory period.
A.
Voluntary Registration
Conveyances and other Dealings by Registered Owner Voluntary dealings with land refer to deeds, instruments or documents which are the results of the free and voluntary acts of the parties thereto. These include: Sales, conveyances or transfers of ownership over the titled property; Mortgages and leases; Powers of attorney; Trusts
In voluntary registration, when does an innocent purchaser for value become the holder of a certificate of title? He becomes the holder of a CT at the moment he presents and files a duly notarized and valid deed of sale, and the same is entered in the day book (primary entry book) AND at the same time he surrenders or presents the owner's duplicate certificate of title covering the land sold, and pays the registration fees. (Garcia v. CA, 95 SCRA 380. Contrast this from involuntary registration, which will be discussed in the following section.) It must be noted that an executed document or transfer of registered land placed by the registered owner thereof in the hands of another operates as a representation to a third party that the holder of the document of transfer is authorized to deal with the land.
PD 1529, Sec. 51. Conveyances and other dealings by registered owner- An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, transfer, lease, charge, or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land; shall take effect as conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies. ______________________________________________________________________________________

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Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration- every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien attachment, order, judgement, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing, or entering. VILLALUZ V. NEME 7 SCRA 27 (1963) Facts: Maria Rocabo died intestate, leaving three daughters( Maria, Patricia, and Sinforosa)and grandchildren (from her other children who predeceased her), the plaintiffs in this case. She left a parcel of land granted her under homestead patent and with original certificate of title. After approval of her application but before the granting of patent, Maria donated the southern portion of the land to her daughter, also named Maria, and donated the northern part to Patricia in two notarial deeds of donation giving them the right to present the deeds of donation to the Bureau of Lands. The daughters forgot to present the deeds of donation and patent was granted in the name of their mother, Maria Rocabo. After their mothers death, the daughters, Sinforosa included, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition among themselves to the exclusion of plaintiffs. They later declared the land for tax purposes and sold it to Pajarillo, who thereafter sold it to Neme. Plaintiffs came to know that the lands were in the possession of Neme. They filed a complaint for partition of land and recovery of their share. It also appeared that the deeds of sale of the land were not registered in favor of defendant Neme and not recorded in compliance with the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Law; the vendees even failed to have their deed of sale annotated on the said TCT or have the title transferred in their names. HELD: A deed of extra-judicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same is fraudulent and vicious, and sale of the land subject of the partition did not prejudice and affect the interest and participation of the heirs excluded. Moreover, the acquisition of the land in question is governed by the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Law. Considering that the deed of sale had not been registered in accordance with the same laws, the same did not constitute a conveyance which would bind or affect the land because the registration of a voluntary sale of land is the operative act that transmits or transfers title (Tuason vs. Raymundo, 28 Phil 635). ALARCON V. BIDIN 120 SCRA 390 (1983) FACTS: Roberto Alarcon leased Sargas a parcel of land he co-owned with a certain Trinidad. In 1926, Alarcon sold a portion of his undivided share to Sergas. The date of the instrument of sale was entered on the title as January 5, 1926 and the date of inscription as May 3, 1963, with the name of the vendor in the text of the Escritura de Venta as Roberto Alarcon while the typewritten name at its bottom read Alberto Alarcon with a thumbmark above it. Alarcon sold another portion of his share to Alvarez in 1928. Alvarez sold it to Francisco, one of the private respondents. The heirs of Alarcon filed a suit for recovery and questioned the genuineness if the Escrituras de Venta, that the thumbmark is not Robertos, nor is he Alberto Alarcon,and that the ______________________________________________________________________________________

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documents in favor if Alvarez was not signed by Roberto. The lower court dismissed on the ground of laches. HELD: Decision sustained. The heirs allegation that their father never sold the disputed land is belied by the Escrituras de Venta he executed, one in favor of Sergas, another in favor of Alvarez. Furthermore, Sergas and Alvarez had taken adverse possession of the property under the claim of ownership from the time the property was sold to them. More than 50 years had elapsed since the execution of the deed of sale in 1926 and 1928 when the heirs instituted their cause of action in 1978. Land registered under the Torrens system may not be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. The presumption given by law is in favor of registered owners. Although title to property is still in the name of Roberto Alarcon, it has been subjected to registration in 1963 if the sale made by him to Sergas. Technically, Sergas became the owner in 1963 of the portion sold to him. PNB V. CA 98 SCRA 207 (1980) FACTS: Spouses Inigo Bitanga and Rosa Ver owned a parcel of land. The husband died before the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title. He was survived by his wife and children. The wife mortgaged the entire property to PNB. The mortgage document was registered in the day book of the Register of Deeds if Ilocos Norte but was not annotated in the Register of Deeds when the OCT was issued. The wife defaulted on her obligations to Manila Trading Company. The company levied upon the property and was able to buy the same in a public auction. It thereafter sold its rights over the property to Sambrano who secured annotation of the said sale. She also failed to settle her obligation to PNB, who sold the land at public auction with the PNB as the highest bidder. The period for redemption expired and PNB consolidated title over it, but the document of consolidation was not annotated in the owners duplicate certificate of title since the wife failed to surrender the same. Upon PNBs petition, a owners duplicate certificate was issued in its favor. It later sold the land to Reyes. The heirs of Bitanga filed a complaint against PNB for reconveyance of real property and damages and sought to enjoin PNB and Reyes from consummating the sale of the property in question and prohibiting the Register of Deeds from registering the sale. HELD: The land was conjugal property, hence, only belongs to the wife and it was only this half which was acquired by PNB. The conjugal character of the land was not changed even if the tax declaration on the lot was in the name of the wife only. Declaration of ownership for purpose of taxation is not sufficient evidence of title. The lien by reason or on account of the mortgage executed by Rosa Ver over the entire parcel of land which was not annotated on the original certificate of title could not have attached to the land. Otherwise stated, the failure of the interested party to appear during the registration proceedings and to claim such interest in the land barred him from having such interest on the certificate of title.
Double Sale
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In cases of double sale, the property belongs to the purchaser who first registers the transaction in his name in the registry of property. Forged Documents Although forged documents are generally null and void, they can legally be the root of a valid title when an innocent purchaser for value intervenes. Mortgages and Leases Sec. 60, PD 1529 requires deeds of mortgage or lease and all instruments which assign, extend, discharge or otherwise deal with the mortgage or lease to be registered, and such deeds shall take effect upon the title only upon registration. Unless recorded, such deeds are not binding on third persons even though they are binding between the parties. Powers of Attorneys; Trusts Sec. 64, PD 1529 provides that any person may convey or otherwise deal with registered land through a power of attorney. The instrument granting or revoking the power of attorney must be registered with the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies. Note the special provisions in the Civil Code dealing with the requirements for powers of attorney in transactions involving land, particularly Art. 1874, Art. 1879, and Art. 1878. B. Involuntary Dealings
Involuntary dealings refer to writs, orders or processes issued by a court of record affecting registered land which by law should be registered to be effective. They likewise refer to instruments which are not the wilful acts of the registered owner and which may have been executed even without his knowledge or against his consent. These dealings include: Writs of attachment, injunction or mandamus; Sales on Execution of judgment; Sales for taxes; Adverse claims; Notices of lis pendens In contrast to voluntary registration, a mere entry in the day book (primary entry book) of the Registry of Deeds in cases of involuntary registration is a sufficient notice to all persons even if the owner's duplicate CT is not presented to the Register of Deeds. ( Because the proceedings were involuntary, the owner's CT may not be available because the owner did not freely enter into the transaction involved.) What is annotation? What is the purpose of annotating adverse claims? Annotation is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by Act ______________________________________________________________________________________

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496, now PD 1529. It serves as a warning to third parties dealing with the said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than the registered owner. What are the requisites for a valid adverse claim? (1) The claimant's right or interest in registered land must be adverse to the registered owner; (2) Such right or interest must have arisen subsequent to the date of original registration; and (3) No other provision is made in the Decree for the registration of such right or claim. (Sec. 70, PD 1529; Arrazola v. Bernas, 86 SCRA 279) Note that a mere money claim CANNOT be registered as an adverse claim. When is notice of lis pendens proper? A notice of lis pendens is proper in actions: (1) to recover possession of real estate; (2) to quiet title thereto; (3) to remove clouds upon the title thereof; (4) for partition; and (5) any other proceeding of any kind in court directly affecting the title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the building thereon. ( Sec. 76, PD 1529, Sec. 14, Rule 13, Rules of Court) What is the nature and purpose of a notice of lis pendens? The notice of lis pendens, i.e. that real property is involved in an action, is intended to constructively advise or warn all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determined and laid down therein. Such notice is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court where the action is pending, as it is but an extrajudicial incident of the pending action which does not affect the merits thereof. It must be noted that a notice of lis pendens can subsist concurrently with an adverse claim.
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MAGDALENA HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION VS CA, 184 SCRA 3 (1990)
133
Facts: A part of Lot 15 of Magdalena Rolling Hills Subdivision, had initially been set aside as the subdivision's "open space," i.e., reserved for use as a park, playground or recreational zone.However, an amendment of the plan of the subdivision substituting the area earlier designated as open space, was approved by the City Council of Quezon City. The Council also authorized the subdivision for disposition to the public of the former open space. Subsequently, the CFI of Quezon City also approved the same amended subdivision plan. The entire Lot 15, including that part thereof originally designated as open space was subsequently conveyed to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) by way of dacion en pago and to third parties who thereafter constructed houses thereon. The purchasers of the other subdivision lots, who had organized themselves into a nonstock corporation known as the Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc., believed that the act of the Quezon City Government of authorizing the release of said Lot 15 as open space, after it had been so declared and earlier dedicated as such and its substitution by another portion of the subdivision was beyond the City Government's authority. They therefore brought suit against the Magdalena Estate, Inc. (MEI) in the court of First Instance at Quezon city for the recovery of said Lot 15 as "open space" for public use of the residents of the subdivision. While the case was pending, notices of lis pendens were, at the plaintiffs' instance, inscribed by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on the Torrens titles of all the lots. The Trial Court then dismissed the case. The petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending adjudgment, the subdivision owner and DBP filed separate motions with the Court of Appeals praying for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens. These motions were granted by resolution. Reconsideration was sought and denied by. Hence, the petition at bar. Issue: WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to take cognizance of and grant the motion to cancel notice of lis pendens although no such motion had ever been filed in the lower court. Held: YES. The notice of lis pendens i.e., that real property is involved in an action is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court where the action is pending. The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or removal like the continuance or removal of a preliminary attachment or injunction is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof. In the CAB, the case had properly come within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in virtue of the perfection of the plaintiffs' appeal. It therefore had power to deal with and resolve any incident in connection with the action subject of the appeal, even before final judgment. The rule that no questions may be raised for the first time on appeal have reference only to those affecting the merits of the action, and not to mere incidents thereof, e.g., cancellation of notices of lis pendens, or, to repeat, the grant or dissolution of provisional remedies. Now, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the court, "after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded." ______________________________________________________________________________________

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The Court of Appeals found as a fact that the case had dragged on and had been unnecessarily prolonged by repeated amendments of the complaints by the plaintiffs, and that the circumstances on record justified the conclusion that the annotation of the notice of lis pendens was intended to molest and harass the defendants. SEVESES VS CA, OCTOBER 13, 1999 Facts: Rexcon Philippines, through its president, Reynaldo Reyes entered into a contract of sale on installments of a parcel of land, with private respondent Carreon. He then learned that 3 days later, a mortgage in favor of Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation was annotated on the title. This was later cancelled. But a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Reyes and another mortgage in favor of Ayala Investment and Dev't Corp. were subsequently annotated. Carreon then demanded that title to the land be restored in the name of Rexcon. Due to Carreon's failure to pay the other installments, Reyes considered the sale rescinded and instituted an action for rescission before the RTC. Meanwhile, Carreon caused a notice of lis pendens to be annotated on Reyes' title. The RTC affirmed Reyes' extra-judicial foreclosure. Seveses then acquired the land from Reyes. Although the notice of lis pendens was carried over to Seveses' title, Reyes informed him that the pending case had been terminated inasmuch as no appeal was filed by Carreon. He then obtained a Certificate of Finality from the court. Thus the notice of lis pendens was cancelled. However, because he was served a notice of eviction, Seveses learned that Carreon indeed appealed the decision of the RTC to the CA, wherein he obtained a favorable judgment. This CA decision became final. Issue: WON a Certification of Finality will suffice to have a notice of lis pendens cancelled (and save the day for Seveses). Held: NO. The rules dictate that cancellation of the notice of lis pendens should be done with judicial authority. Thus, by virtue of the notice of lis pendens, Seveses is bound by the outcome of the litigation subject of the lis pendens. As a transferee pendente lite, he stands exactly in the shoes of the transferor and must respect any judgment or decree which may be rendered for or against the transferor. His interest is subject to the incidents or results of the pending suit, and his Certificate of Title will, in that respect, afford him no special protection. YARED VS TONGCO, AUGUST 1, 2000 Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint alleging that private respondent succeeded in having the subject properties registered in his name, to the prejudice of the other surviving heirs of the previous owners, petitioner among them. Petitioner caused the annotation of notices of lis pendens on the titles of respondent. The trial court dismissed the case on the ground of prescription. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal while Tongco then sought to cancel the notices of lis pendens which was denied. After 3 Motions for Recon, Tongco succeeded. When petitioner then sought to reconsider the cancellation, the judge reversed himself. But when Tonco filed another MR, he was sustained (Leche! Make up your mind, judge!). Hence, this certiorari to the SC. Held: Eto raw ang importante sa case nito as per Dan Gat: All petitioner has to do is to assert a claim of possession or title over the subject property to put it under the coverage of the rule on lis ______________________________________________________________________________________

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pendens. It is not necessary for her to prove ownership or interest over the property sought to be affected by lis pendens. (But the petition was dismissed by the SC for violating the doctrine of judicial heirarchy. Puede naman kasing dumaan muna sa CA eh dumiretso agad sa SC. )
VI.
REGISTRATION OF PATENTS
Sec. 103. Certificates of title pursuant to patents. - Whenever public land is by the Government alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Decree. It shall be the duty of the official issuing the instrument of alienation, grant, patent or conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause such instrument to be filed with the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies, and to be there registered like other deeds and conveyance, whereupon a certificate of title shall be entered as in other cases of registered land, and an owner's duplicate issued to the grantee. The deed, grant, patent or instrument of conveyance from the Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land but shall operate only as a contract between the Government and the grantee and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. It is the act of registration that shall be the operative act to affect and convey the land, and in all cases under this Decree, registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies. The fees for registration shall be paid by the grantee. After due registration and issuance of the certificate of title, such land shall be deemed to be registered land to all intents and purposes under this Decree.
ORTIGAS V. HIDALGO, 198 SCRA 635 (1991) FACTS: Estate of Villa claims ownership of subject land. It appears that a certain Teresio Villa applied for the land. However, land was not registered nor decreed to anybody. No attempt was made to have judicial or administrative confirmation of title over the land. Estate of Villa filed criminal charges against settlers in the land, petitioners herein. Petitioners were convicted of squatting. Order of demolition was issued. Petitioners, meanwhile asked OP to give the land to them. OP ordered Director of Lands to look into the issue. Director of Lands dismissed claim of Estate of Villa and gave due course to application of petitioners. Petitioners went to SC on certiorari with prayer for TRO. HELD: It is clear, therefore, that private respondent (estate of Villa) is not the registered owner of the disputed parcel of land. Assuming arguendo that respondent had been granted a patent to the land in question, the same has never been registered with the Registry of Deeds of the province where the property is located. Indeed, respondent could offer no proof to show that the same was registered. All patents that may be granted must be registered since the conveyance of the land covered thereby is effective only upon such registration which shall be the operative act to convey ______________________________________________________________________________________

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and affect the land (CA 141, Sec. 107). Registration is mandatory under the law to affect third parties. Absent the fact of registration of a patent, title to the land covered thereby, whether it be by sales or homestead, may not be said to have been perfected and, therefore, not indefeasible. A patent becomes indefeasible as a Torrens Title only when said patent is registered with the Register of Deeds pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration Act. DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. CA, 17 SCRA 71 Sales application was filed. The land was advertised to highest bidder and was awarded to applicant (1928). Having complied with the requirements, Director of Lands signed sales patent in favor of applicant Tolentino (1950). Later, Tolentino learned that portion of land awarded to him was covered by homestead application of Braulio Cosme and that homestead patent and OCT was issued to him (1949). Director of Lands verified that homestead patent embraced land covered by sales patent to Tolentino. Director filed action for cancellation of homestead patent and OCT. An intervenor came out and asked that he be declared a buyer in good faith and be recognized owner of the property. RTC cancelled homestead patent and OCT and ordered reversion of land. CA upheld RTC but upon MR reconsidered its decision and reversed RTC. HELD: The present action is for the cancellation of the patent and certificate of title of the defendant on the ground that they are an absolute nullity, because the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue them at all. The Government is the proper party to bring an action to cancel a patent and a certificate of title issued in accordance therewith. A certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding as long as the land of the domain (Lucas vs. Durian, supra). A certificate of title issued pursuant to a decree of registration and a certificate of title issued in conformity therewith are on a higher level than a certificate of title based upon a patent issued by the Director of Lands. Prior to the issuance of a patent and its registration, the Government retains the title to the land. The award thereof, however, confers on the awardee the right to take possession of the land so that he can comply with the requirements prescribed by the law before said patent can be issued in his favor. Being protected by law, under which it cannot be taken away without due process said right has the effect of withdrawing the land of the public domain that is "disposable" by the Director of Lands under the provisions of the Public Land Act. DAVID V. MALAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1999 FACTS: Andres Adona applied for homestead patent over parcel of land. Application was perfected before he died. However, OCT was issued in the name of his mistress after his death. ______________________________________________________________________________________

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His children by his mistress partitioned the land among themselves. One of them bought the interests of the others. Andres Adonas children, private respondents herein, by his legal wife sought to annul this sale. The action was treated as action for reconveyance. RTC dismissed case on the ground of lack of cause of action and prescription. CA reversed RTC. CA said property belongs to estate of Andres Adona, whose incontestable right is derived from perfected homestead application before his death. HELD: Estate of Andres Adona is entitled to the property. OCT in the name of the mistress to be cancelled, property to be reconveyed to the private respondents. Section 32 of PD 1529 is also applicable to patents. The date of issuance of the patent corresponds to the issuance of decree in regular cases. OCT would have become indefeasible a year after it was issued had not its issuance been attended by fraud. Fraud created implied trust. Fraud gave private respondents right of action. Prescription of this right of action reckoned from the time right is disturbed. FONTANILLA V. CA, NOVEMBER 29, 1999 FACTS: Crisanto and Felician Duanan are homestead grantees. Their son Luis Duanan inherited 4 has of the land. Luis Duanan gave two of his children 2 has of his inheritance. Luis children mortgaged the land. Later, Luis children sold the land to Eduardo Fontanilla and Ellen Fontanilla. Luis wanted to repurchase the land from the Fontanillas. The latter refused on the ground that Luis, not being the vendor, cannot exercise the right of redemption. Also, the right to redeem has prescribed since over 5 years has lapsed from the time Luis conveyed the property to his two children. HELD: Section 119 of the PD 1529 does not say that the applicant/legal heir must be the vendor before he can exercise the right of redemption. It only says that the applicant/legal heir may repurchase the land. The prescriptive period is reckoned from the time the homestead was conveyed to someone outside the family of the grantee. Thus, the reckoning period is from the time land was sold to the Fontanillas. The conveyance to Luis son is not the conveyance contemplated in Section 119 of the Public Land Act. Luis conveyance to his son did not violate the policy that the homestead be kept within the family.
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Prof. Dan Gatmaytan

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Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

The Power to Classify Lands

Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

The Power to Reclassify

Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

THE TORRENS SYSTEM

A. General Themes Modes of Acquiring Land Titles

Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

B. The Land Registration Administration B. THE LAND REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION

Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds