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International Elsevier

Journal cf Production

Economics, 28 (1992) 107-126



Integrating design and production: submarine program*

Thomas J. Ecclesa and Henry S. Marcusb

A case study of the naval

United States Navy, Washington, DC, USA hDepartment of Ocean Engineering. Massachusetts (Received

Institute of Technolog~~, Cambridge, 1992)

MA 02139, USA

11 July 1990; accepted

in revised form 20 February

The Japanese have shown the benefits of program presents formidable challenges to organizations m a given shipyard as well Nevertheless, this paper describes how these in the Navy submarine program. integrating the design and manufacturing functions. The U.S. Naval shipbuilding implementing such ideas of integration both between the design and production as between Navy designers and personnel in the several competing shipyards. challenges were overcome in the introduction of advanced manufacturing concepts

1. Introduction In recent years, the study of product development cycles in a wide variety of technologybased companies has received much attention. The growing economy of Japan and the shrinking role of U.S. industry in the world market have been the main drivers for such research. Examinations of mechanisms of innovation, organization of product developof designing robust ment, and methods products have a recurring theme which is the importance of achieving a balanced integra-

Correspondence to: H.S. Marcus, Department of Ocean Engineering, Room 5-207, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. * This article was originally accepted by the Journal Manufacturing and Operations Management. of

tion of design for product performance and design for manufacture. In this paper, the issue of design and production integration will be addressed in terms of the conventional separation of organizational entities and the benefits which may be realized through more overlap and parallelism in the stages of design which lead to full-scale production. The importance of considering structure and methodology in the complex process of moving a ship design from concept through the details of production may not be obvious at first glance. After all, the evolution of naval architecture and ship construction seems to have been a smooth advancement over the past two hundred years, marked more by new technological innovations than by step changes in how design is done. The historical mile markers in ship design are measured as technical advancements: steam over sail, steel







and production

over wood, diesels and gas turbines over steam, etc. However, across many product lines which are distinctly defined by technology attributes, the latitude to influence the costs of production has been shown to become greatly restricted after the formative stages of design. Dixon and Duffy, citing the classic British aerospace study which showed that 80% of manufacturing costs were committed during the first 20% of the design process, describe the current focus in American manufacturing as too sharply directed at a search for solutions within the manufacturing process itself [l, 21. Instead, industry, government and educators should be examining the role of designers and the framework of the design process as it relates to manufacturing, for more leverage in improving process costs while developing product performance.

for the prevailing A common expression method of transition of a product from one design stage to the next, or from design into production, is the tlzrow it over the wall method. The implication is that tasks are segmented into stages which employ different groups of people in discrete work steps which are packaged so that when the end of a stage is recognized, the results of the work are passed to the next team. This serial organization of work and resources appeals to a sense of functional task accomplishment. But, the pitfalls of such a philosophy are that the teams and products from each stage fail to communicate with the next, or later, stages in the development process and that the delays in transmitting specifications from one stage to another will be costly in the long run in terms of lost time and the lost opportunity to incorporate advanced methods and technologies in the production process. Beyond the lack of congruency among serial development teams, the traditional methods can restrain the design in its economic use of facilities and equipment which

may be in simultaneous or recent development by manufacturing engineers. This is more significant than a lag in process technology. The capacity of design teams which are oriented solely toward product performance to adapt the design to the production process is limited by their inexperience with the manufacturing sector and the lack of incentive to enhance the overall objective of building an affordable product which meets the performance specifications. When the target is to get the performance design over the wall on schedule, the aim rarely meets the real goal of affordable performance. The full realization of the benefits of more synergistic integration of design and production requires more than consistent leadership. The proper blend of expertise within design teams, the optimal overlap from one phase to the next, and the institution of feedback mechanisms are other issues. At a very basic level, the shift from a functional organization to one which is product-oriented characterizes many modern success stories in manufacturing productivity. Also, a strong emphasis on quality and robustness must be communicated to every level of participation so that the idea of a self-improving process bridging design and production may be realized. Finally, methods of measurement of the goals and benefits need to be derived and communicated clearly so that a systematic establishment of incentives may be brought to bear on the challenging objective of getting diverse sets of players all moving toward common goals. To complicate the issues for the case of naval ship construction, the performance specifiers and some designers are part of the Navy, and the remainder of the designers, and essentially all of the manufacturers are private sector components which generally compete with one another mainly on the basis of naval ship construction contracts. Thus the Navys challenge is to institute changes which lead to more effective integration of design and production in a multiparticipatory environment which is far more complicated than within a single corporate entity.

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1.2. Synergy

in teamwork

Advantages of a product-oriented approach to design and development team structure result from synergistic coupling of the different elements making up the multi-disciplinary group. A team built of product designers and manufacturing engineers offers in-house expertise in downstream development. Early identification of conflicts which may occur later leads naturally to cost saving resolutions and more advantageous incorporation of process requirements in the earliest phases of design. Research has shown that in comparable automobile production, Japanese firms designed products in two-thirds the time, using half the engineering effort of American companies. That advantage translated into better market responsiveness and faster introduction of new technologies. The number of different models and the quantity of each produced defy traditional explanations which rely on the advantages of mass production. In this auto case, the Japanese systems of development seem to work as flexible methods suited for special production of low quantity, high variety products [3, 41. Attributes of successful product development strategy are arguably appropriate beyond the auto industry. Indeed, the focus on teamwork, interdisciplinary leadership, and parallelism is being noticed in other industries such as consumer electronics and tool manufacturing. The critical indicator of cost in design is sometimes the time to produce a design. By establishing closer associations and more open communications among different functionaries, the passage of tasks and ideas from one phase to another can occur in an overlapping, fed-forward and fed-back manner. This gives both the sender and receiver an advantage in that the proposed design is considered by the next element before reaching finalization, and perhaps most important, it gives the next stage a heads up to begin planning based on its lead knowledge of what it is about to receive. The formation of multi-functional teams within organizations which comprise the naval

shipbuilding community is only part of the solution to optimize interaction in design and production. In Navy shipbuilding, design functions are assigned to several of the major shipbuilders, as well as within the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). In several recent ship designs, NAVSEA has assembled integrated teams of Navy and shipbuilder representatives early in the process, and worked toward common, pre-competitive improvement of the design. Often, these teams focused on ship performance and the dissemination of information necessary to make competent bids for detailed design and follow-on construction, rather than on specific measures to improve productivity during the construction phase. Further development of early phase Navy/ shipbuilder cooperation on methods of integrating productivity factors into the design has been a goal of the Navys Chief Engineer [SJ. Similar reduction of barriers to essential communications between members of design and production elements may be found in some shipbuilding organizations. In others, labor agreements complicate the structure of integration of functions, and some synergy is inhibited. In the research for this report, the most advanced ideas for integration of design and production occurred in environments where production personnel were least restricted in crossing trade boundaries. Even in those cases, the interaction with design functionaries who were separately organized with respect to labor organizations or physically separated from the production site was weak. Generally, more flexible adaptation of team members to the responsibilities of others, and the ability to educate across organizational lines can contribute significantly to the effectiveness of team performance. 1.3. Producibility The design nized, United panies among and quality

significance of attention to quality in and manufacturing has become recogand received special emphasis in the States in recent years. Many comhave become aware of the differences competitors in the costs associated



Thomas, S.M. Henry!lntrgratiny


and production

with rework, and the costs of maintaining reputation in the face of poor quality products in the market. Traditional estimates of quality problem costs were unrealistically low. Taguchi and Clausing [6] have paraphrased the former vice president of Toyota, Taiichi Ohno: Whatever an executive thinks the losses of poor quality are, they are actually six times greater Taguchi is the namesake of his principles of quality engineering, the Taguchi Methods [4, 7). He and Clausing, of MIT, write about Robust Quality, and in the article of that title they condense several of Taguchis principles into a simple statement: Quality is a virtue of design

The implication is that the essence of the quality of a manufactured product is determined in the design process. Also implicit is the notion that the manufacturing process is considered in the design. A design that incorporates integrity of quality lends itself naturally to a production process which may be operated and monitored to achieve the desired standards. Statistical process control methods are basic to the concept of monitoring, identifying problems, and guiding solutions. They allow the production manager to glean the important information from an over-specified collection of parameters, and pick the attributes which may be most significant for error correction. Generally, the goal is to minimize scatter, and then guide the aim point toward a target in product performance space. All of these controls and monitoring are afteraction repairs to a system which is mostly determined during design. And that may be the most important point regarding quality in the context of this paper. The conclusion is similar to the idea, mentioned above, that the vast majority of production costs are determined in the earliest phases of the design process. So if quality and producibility should be brought into the design as early as possible, how should design teams do that? Certainly

a team cannot simply decide to increase its emphasis on manufacturing and quality and expect to automaticaIly see positive results. There must be an injection of some different perspective and experience to balance and interact with the established product designers. Logically, that input should come from the production plant. In shipyards, there typically is a group of waterfront design and planning people who maintain the link between the contracted design and the production work. They are oriented toward the facilities and work force which are particular to that shipyard. Their career evolution often involves an early phase in the skilled labor force, mastering a trade, then a move into the planning and design side of the operation. The waterfront designers and planners are, today, often brought into the detailed design process (with the main group of product designers) prior to the start of production work to bring scheduling expertise to the pre-planning effort. These experienced, process-oriented designers are probably the best group to begin cross-training for use in earlier phases of design, including the pre-competitive stages when the Navy and its builders have formed cooperative design teams. Usually however, the industry representatives on such joint groups are professionals and managers who are more detached Their from the waterfront processes. contribution is designed to enhance product adherence to specification, rather than to bring producibility concepts and discipline to the design. One method of product development architecture which is oriented toward improving quality within the framework of customer expectations is the House of Quality program described by Taguchi and Hauser [7] and first implemented by Mitsubishi. This system involves the assembly of a team of people representing major disciplines, including design, manufacturing, marketing who and cooperatively determine weighting factors asattributes. These sociated with product weights are designed to balance the customers perceptions of the product against its competitors with the companys perspective of the

J.C. Thomus, S.M. Henrgllnteyratiny

design and production


products value and the cost of adding features. The system has been adopted by various American manufacturers, including the Ford Motor Company. The House of Quality offers many ideas for creative product design paths, but it also invokes a simple discipline of combining functional resources for the common purpose of defining an optimal product description. The mere prerequisite of convening a multi-disciplined group of decision makers supplies an answer to interdepartmental communications problems. The forward looking aim of the process avoids some of the familiar problems inherent in review meetings where attribution is more emphasized than cooperation. And the equal emphasis given to each discipline within this process is crucial to enhancing the influence of production considerations.

gram management establishments is essential to optimizing a design for producibility. 2.1. Design framewlork Ship design may be considered in four classic consecutive stages: - Concept Design - Preliminary Design - Contract Design - Detailed Design With the selection of a basic set of guidelines and major characteristics of the ship set by feasibility studies and a Concept Design, a design team is formed to produce a Preliminary Design which is considerably more detailed. The Preliminary Design does not include sufficient information to allow exact cost determination in contractual terms, but it does address complex issues such as stability, survivability, manning, major systems, and life cycle considerations such as overhaul interval. As with the various feasibility studies, the Preliminary Design has historically been an in house NAVSEA function. However, since the late 1970s major shipbuilders have sometimes had some access to the preliminary design process, such as the 60 producibility concept studies conducted by seven shipbuilders interested in the Arleigh Burke (DDG-5 1) class destroyer program [S]. The Contract Design is intended to be of sufficient detail that shipbuilders can use it as the basis for precise bidding against competition for award of the production contract. The specification for every weld bead and fitting may not be spelled out, but the builder can expect that significant departures from a Contract Design will require revision or re-negotiation of any resulting production contracts. In recent shipbuilding programs, notably the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer, the Navy has included within its Contract Design team several representatives of each candidate shipbuilder. The shipbuilders participants have generally been naval architects and system design engineers. The Detailed Design is the device used as exact documentation by the shipbuilder to

2. Ship design and acquisition process In trying to apply the lessons of designproduction integration to Navy shipbuilding, one immediately sees challenges in two areas. First, the shipyard which contains both design and production functions faces the normal over-the-wall syndrome experienced in U.S. industry. Design and production may be located in different geographic areas with different unions, budgets, and organizational structures and incentive systems. Second, Navy shipbuilding has the additional problem that all the early stages of design may be performed before the production shipyard is even chosen. The Navy has established a formal process of design stages leading to construction contract award. The organization of that process has strong influence on the contracting, pricing, and competition in the naval shipbuilding industry. Methods of manufacture which may reduce production cost or lead to other performance or life-cycle cost enhancements often require long lead time recognition by many parties to ensure incorporation in the next design. The early association of bidding shipbuilders with the Navy design and pro-







and production

describe the ship to be built. It should reflect every detail expected by the Navy, and it will form the record base for all future repair and modification work to be accomplished on the ship. The Detailed Design is usually contracted to one shipbuilder from among the candidates for construction contracts. In the past, a common practice was to tie award of the detailed design to the lead ship construction contract. The result was nearly concurrent detailed design and first ship construction. 2.2. Contemporary design strategies

independent proposed contract designs. In 1986 the Chief Engineer of the Navy, Vice Admiral James H. Webber [ 1 l] referred to this close coupling of Navy and industry in all phases of design: The result will be a ship that benefits from the innovations of two experienced shipbuilders, with close Navy oversight to ensure that our performance requirements are met. Earlier association between the Navy customer/designer and the shipyard producer/ designer should improve the product and the production cost provided the Navy maintains a vigilant watch over degradation of performance or quality for the sake of cost cutting. In the past, the hierarchy of the naval ship design process appeared to be a classic over the wall situation. Traditionally, to a varying extent, this was certainly the case as the design was broken into rigid blocks with little interaction between the different government and private sector design agents and the building yard. Today, the Navy seems to recognize the value of some overlap among the stages of design and production, and of consistency in program leadership from early design through beginning production. In the most recent major ship acquisition programs, the senior leadership has been maintained through a much longer period than allowed for by the traditional turnover rate among senior officers. In the case of the Seawolf (SSN-21) class submarine, the current program manager has been involved from the earliest phases of design as the Ship Design Manager over eight years ago (as a Commander) until 1991 (as a Rear Admiral), when he presided over completion of detailed design, lead ship construction and award of follow-ship building contracts. The integration of producibility and quality concerns within the design process is also the subject of a Department of Defense research effort coordinated by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The term given to its approach to an integrated design

In the case of the new Seawolf( SSN-2 1) class submarine, the detailed design was divided by major systems between the only two U.S. submarine construction yards (General Dynamics and Newport News Shipbuilding) and it was awarded two full years before the anticipated keel laying of the lead ship. The interim period between start of detailed design and start of lead ship construction was intended to provide a maturity in the design which would presumably lead to fewer conflicts and interferences, and which was necessary given the increased design work required in zone-oriented construction. Also, teams were created for the review of producibility concepts which arose during Contract Design. The Seawolf Producibility Steering Group (PSG) included design representatives from both of the shipbuilders and from NAVSEA. Working groups focused on broad system areas to address ideas regarding standardization, uniform tolerances, and communication of digitally transferred information such as plans and specifications [9-l 11. In a special program to design a new hull application vessel called form special SWATH/T-AGOS, the Navy and twelve civilian shipyards formed a collocated team to conduct a combined preliminary and contract design. For the Seawolf, the two submarine builders started with a Navy feasibility study and derived separate preliminary designs which the Navy used to compile a best of both preliminary design. Each shipyard then used this net preliminary design to derive two

J.C. Thomas, S.M. Henry/Integrating

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methodology is concurrent engineering, and the DARPA program is called DICE (the DARPA Initiative in Concurrent Engineering). The DICE program is a consortium of defense industry representatives and university researchers. Their work has been described as intermediate-term and pre-competitive [l]. The methodology is highly coupled with information systems development to support advanced Computer-Aided Design and Manufacturing (CAD/CAM) systems which will combine three dimensional product descriptions with textual information which may be processed for database purposes. The DICE program is intended to integrate design, manuand life-cycle requirements into facture, a coordinated framework. The obstacle facing DICE concepts today is the more basic development of the computer base for such concurrent design. In a related vein, the Defense Departments CALS (Computer-Aided Logistic Support) programe is intended to support the life-cycle development of design, construction and logistical data for ships and other major weapons systems. The SeawoCf (SSN-2 1) submarine class construction is one of several initial institutions of a the CALS program in defense acquisition. A major Seawolf initiative is the development of Sectional Construction Drawings (SCD) which support direct creation of the production work packages from original design drawings transmitted between organizations through a digital data exchange. Other Seawolf program initiatives include the institution of a Producibility Steering Group of designers from the shipbuilders and the Navy to coordinate and evaluate productivity improvement proposals and standardization issues, and a Producibility Review process which requires review of each shipyards Sectional Construction Drawings by the other shipyard. Brucker describes this as a producibility review conducted . . . not only inhouse, but also by an independent and highly interested second party. The shipyards review teams include representatives from design, construction, planning and quality assurance groups. Their inputs are considered

for changes to the SCDs prior to use in production work packages [9].

3. Production: the industry and technology The idea of giving more design consideration to how a ship is built is simple enough at first glance: infuse the design process with some experienced builders. But, the way ships are built is changing today. The experience base is saddled with many years of traditional shipbuilding practice which may not provide the designer with the relevant background to improve the producibility of his design for tomorrows construction. Designers should be aware of the basic philosophical changes in ship production and the technologies which enable the methods. The ship designer has much potential to contribute to the science of ship construction through his own innovation and by recognizing design/manufacture synergies. This section will characterize the fundamental methods which distinguish contemporary ship construction from the well established, traditional systems of shipbuilding which prevailed in the United States through the 1960s.

3. I. Submarine



Beyond the special control required to ensure hull integrity for submersibles, the advent in 1955 of nuclear power plants in ships imposed stringent new technical requirements upon shipyards which would build and repair submarines. Few of the existing builders found they could afford to operate in this technically challenging and administratively formidable environment. Today there are only two commercial shipyards and six naval shipyards qualified to build or repair nuclear powered ships and submarines. The Navys shipyards moved out of the new ship construction industry in the 1960s. and today they work exclusively in ship repair and modernization. This left two commercial submarine yards in the United States: the Electric Boat Division



Thomns, S.M. Hunry/lntryrating

design md production

of General Dynamics Corporation (EB) in Groton, Connecticut, and the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company (NNS) in Newport News, Virginia. 3.2. Shipbuilding
procrss innovations

The change in worldwide shipbuilding in recent decades may be characterized generally as a transition from a systems oriented construction process to one which is zone oriented. Basic changes in welding technology in the 1940s enabled shipbuilders to shift from a sequential process of hull erection and internal systems outfitting to a more parallel approach of construction by zones. Today, the terms zone construction and group technology refer to the accepted method of building ships as assemblies of smaller subassemblies, and the organization of production work by associated products and zones. Chirillo and Chirillo [ 121 have laid out the historical foundations for this metamorphosis, tracing the Japanese leadership position in shipbuilding back to the system developed by Henry Kaiser at his American shipyards during WWII. Establishment of postwar commercial ship construction at Japanese yards which had been spared war damage brought the concept of Group Technology to Japan through Kaisers superintendent, Elmer Hann. The Japanese company Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. (IHI) eventually acquired the yard at Kure where Hann had introduced the new organization. The Kure facility was led by Dr.Hisashi Shinto, who had been Hanns Chief Engineer (and years later was the president of NTT). Shinto further refined the industrial methods using statistical process control taught by Dr. W. Edwards Deming and designed a system which Chirillo describes as CI constantly self-improving shipbuilding system with basic Kaiser logic intact. The reverse technology transfer from IHI to the United States was facilitated by the National Shipbuilding Research Program (NSRP), a government/industry consortium which sponsored exchange between industrialists and academics

and studied the system at IHI [ 13, 141. Chirillo relates the IHI evolution of product development in terms of levels, which are illustrated in Fig. 1. At each level, the organizations of the work instructions and the work force become more parallel. The construction process is improved by taking advantage of a productoriented view toward fabrication and assembly, and using analysis techniques to measure, control and improve progress. In this report, the advancement of submarine construction through the fourth of these levels, and into the fifth is observed. A basic tenet of the IHI observations is that shipbuilding technology development is not restricted to the application of physical technological systems, but also requires a systematic approach to design, work planning, and integration of resources to produce a quality product. The most significant features of the methods of shipbuilding which were transferred during the 1970s were organizational and methodological, rather than based on facility, machinery, or national work ethic [12]. The issue of a productivity disparity between American and overseas shipyards has been addressed and evidenced by Weiers [ 151. In his study for the U.S. Department of Transportation, Weiers summarizes the major construction process innovations which might account for improved productivity outside the U.S. In differentiating between systems innovations and automation, Weiers notes that systems innovations are significantly more important in explaining the productivity gap. Weiers simplified history of the development of improved shipyard work organization, and the very complete treatment of shipbuilding methods given by Starch, Hammon and others in Ship Production provide a through description of the methods and practices of modern shipbuilding, and their evolution in the past few decades 1161. In recent years, the Navy and the shipbuilding industry have developed several programs to incorporate advanced shipbuilding technologies in naval shipbuilding and to formulate new strategies for improved design and manufacturing interfaces [17-251.

J.C. Thomas, KM. Henry/Integrating Post-Implementation

Actual/Projected Savings

design and production of Sheetmetal

Savings in Direct




to Planned


Submarine m Planned Savings

Projects for Ship H)

(normalized Savings [12].

Actual/Projected* Fig. 1. Levels of shipbuilding technology development

4. Government programs to improve producibility Many projects and programs have been devised for the purpose of improving productivity in defense acquisitions. The National Shipbuilding Research Program (NSRP), which was established in about 1970 as a collaborative effort between shipbuilders and the government, was influential in transferring methods and systems technology from Japanese shipyards to the U.S. The NSRP supports research and has shared industry costs. One category of its many types of projects has been obtaining consulting services from Japanese shipbuilders [ 133. This paper will focus on a program established between the Navy and a naval shipbuilder to stimulate the incorporation of advanced manufacturing technologies in the naval ship construction process.

4.1. The shipbuilding

technology program

A cooperative relationship between the Navy and industry began in 1983 when the Shipbuilding Technology (ShipTech) program was created at the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics. Three projects within that program are used as case studies to support conclusions of this report. One distinguishing characteristic of the ShipTech program is the requirement that a detailed cost-benefit study be accomplished and documented for project proposal, and that the performance after implementation must be measured and reported. The proposal includes planned costs, benefits realizable through ship construction cost reductions and a schedule of cash transfers between the parties which demonstrates the investment feasibility of the project. For the ShipTech projects described in this report, forecast Navy ROIs (actually, internal rate of


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return - IRR) ranged from 17% to 29%. In the single case where a Post-Implementation Review was examined, the overall result was that significantly better savings were realized in practice than were forecast. The goal of the ShipTech program is to accelerate into the ship construction process the incorporation of new technologies which have the potential to decrease the costs of production. In this relationship, the Navy agreed to release funds to General Dynamics for the purpose of developing and implementing technology modernization projects which may prove beneficial ultimately to both parties. The funds to be released represent amounts earned under existing construction contracts (based on percentage of physical progress completed), but which are not yet payable due to limitations in the terms of payment of the contracts. The funds released are used for development and capital costs submitted by associated with projects General Dynamics and approved by the Navy. The funds are subsequently recovered by the Navy in accordance with a schedule based on General Dynamics pretax reductions of profit due to the development costs. The basic idea of ShipTech financing is that the Navy will release funds which cover development and implementation capital costs for the project and then the Navy recovers its initial investment plus a share of the resulting cost savings on Navy contract work. Development cost recovery by the Navy is such that over the period between release and recovery, the amount released provides a value in terms of the prevailing cost-of-money (per the Cost Accounting Standard 414 published in the Federal Register) equal to the pretax profit reductions represented by the total development costs of the project. Implementation capital amounts released by the Navy are recovered on the basis of after-tax cash flows to General Dynamics resulting from project implementation. The average value of the Navy investment in each of the roughly twenty ShipTech projects is on the order of one million dollars.

5. Examples Three examples of ShipTech projects which incorporate advanced manufacturing techniques are described in following paragraphs. Each of the examples involves some level of integration between design and production functions. The first two show how integration may be performed between design and production within the same yard. The third shows the greater complexity of integrating the Navy designers, the yard designers and the yard production personnel. 5.1. Ventilation duct manufacturing case

Sheet metal fabrication in submarine construction has traditionally been a very labor intensive, job shop oriented production process involving hundreds of different shapes and a high degree of shop floor talent and attention to product design. The ShipTech project which motivates this case was derived from a broader Navy-sponsored project at the Bath Iron Works (BIW) shipyard in Maine (a builder of Navy destroyers, cruisers and frigates). Under the auspices of the Navys Manufacturing Technology (ManTech) program, BIW was developing a standardization of ventilation systems components which would lend itself to computer aided design implementation of a limited number of product shapes which could be manufactured in higher volume. The General Dynamics project would apply the ManTech program ideas to submarine construction. Ventilation system design and construction is similar in surface combatants and submarines, but submarines are considerably more constrained in internal volume. Therefore the system designs are more complex and have historically used more unique parts. Potential gains in this costly environment were considered very significant. 5.2. Designing on the shopJEoor The process of taking very basic design guidance on ventilation system arrangement and specifications and translating it to the






and production


work process documents used in the sheetmetal shop requires a great deal of unrepeatable work. The design product traditionally provides a very efficient layout of ducting, but each run is a custom design and requires unique component shapes. The design plans do not tell the shop how to unfold the threedimensional shapes into patterns which may be laid out on sheetmetal and cut. In the past, the sheetmetal planners would create a cardboard template from full scale drawings which they would have produced by redrafting the design guidance. This pattern would represent the exact shape to be cut from the sheet stock. It was estimated that the shop stored over 40,000 of these templates. Nesting of various parts was necessarily a manual process, so the algorithms available for minimizing scrap were not applicable. The technical talent and labor involved in planning and setting up each individual piece of sheet metal was extremely costly and repetitious of previously accomplished design work. Little gain was realized from a change in volume and the system was very sensitive to a loss of experienced craftsmen. Obviously, this system of elaborate planning effort was costly and inefficient from a manufacturing perspective. 5.3. Standardizing component shapes

The solution required some method to standardize the ventilation ducting components used throughout the submarine. Standardization would make available some computing technologies which offer tremendous savings potential. In this project, an integrated CAD/CAM system including a numerically controlled manufacturing cell supported by a manufacturing control system would bring together several fundamental product and process changes with promising potential. First, a library of standard three-dimensional geometries is amenable to simple translation from final assembly shape to flat patterns. This would eliminate the costly and time consuming process of decomposing the unique shapes into one-of-a-kind cardboard

templates. The geometries would be sufficiently generic to support the high performinterior ance volume constraints in submarine arrangement. Designers would specify a system component by picking a family of shapes and listing the standard set of attribute values which completely describe the parameters of the part. These might include lengths of sides, cross-section geometry, transition length, and angular displacements of faces with respect to a baseline. A simple example is illustrated in Fig. 2. Second, by limiting the general geometries to a relatively small group, the designers and fabricators would reduce the time and effort to lay out and build the system. Standard flat patterns of various sizes could be catalogued and handled by an automated nesting system which would integrate outfitting schedules into the work planning process. The result would be time-sensitive response to the construction schedule with minimal scrap. Perhaps most significantly, families of shapes are easily communicated from design, through planning, to instruction sets for numerically controlled machine tools used to position, cut, drill, and individually label parts on the sheet metal. The numerically controlled machinery would perform at a cutting rate substantially faster than the former methods. Quality and safety considerations were also improved over the more labor intensive methods. Even the creation of work package documentation for parts assembly by a sheetmetal mechanic was made simpler because the automated planning process was able to simultaneously produce drawings of component shapes and final assembled products. This reduced the labor effort substantially from the traditional method where work preparation efforts prior to actual machining typically accounted for 30% to 40% of the total manhours in fabrication. The fabrication process moved from job-shop toward a flexible production line. Finally, the integration of design and manufacturing considerations which took place during the development stage for this effort served to bridge a gap which had formed between


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a Statistical ZONE OUTFllTlNG


! B
Systemnone System





I /


Fig. 2. Simple generic vent component

shape description.

design engineers and the shop. Incorporation of the ideas gained through the Navy-sponsored BIW destroyer work was led by production personnel. To make the plan work they needed to coordinate their generic shape ideas with the shipyard designers who specify the detailed product descriptions. Both the designers and the producers would realize new efficiencies by adopting the changes, but at first those advantages were only apparent to the production people with the ManTech case experience. The upward movement of product and prqcess improvements (from the shop to the designers) which was followed in this technology development is the basic characterization of a modern self-improving manufacturing strategy. 5.4. Structural steel plate cutting case The process of converting heavy steel plate stock into cut and labeled components for welded assembly into foundations and other structures has been a manually intensive planning effort and was, until recently, only slightly automated in the shops cutting operations. The actual cutting of pieces has, for some

time, been accomplished by several tapedriven, numerically-controlled (N/C) oxy-fuel machines. The preparatory steps of scheduling, selecting, nesting and programming the work has been done manually. The movement of sheets through the process, piece marking, layout, tape-loading, and machine monitoring are also manual operations. The oxy-fuel cutting machines typically operate at about twelve inches per minute along the-cut path. Some other machines operate by optically following a template path, and these machines are generally slower than the N/C machines. Advancements in the technologies of steel cutting and machine automation have made improvement of the process feasible. The oxyfuel methods are slower than state-of-the-art plasma arc cutting for plate thicknesses less than about two inches. Fig. 3 demonstrates the magnitude of time savings for a standard twelve inch square pattern, depending upon plate thickness. In the submarine construction environment, except for hull plate, nearly all structural steel plate to be cut is one inch thick, or less. So, the plasma arc process offered an average improvement of between 300% and 800% in

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1 .cm




Plate Thickness


to cut e

12-inci7 square

Fig. 3. Reduced cutting time for plasma arc over oxygas.

cut time over oxy-fuel. Machine control and integrated planning and nesting through digital networks of related computers also became available. The effects of instituting the program would be to take advantage to technology improvements and process automation for increased productivity.
5.5. A process automation problem

The proposed system for modernizing the steel plate processing involved several basic projects. Facility for smoother handling of plate from the entry point to the output of cut and labeled parts required overhead crane and floor layout plans. The new plasma arc technology would be fitted to a gantry system which works around the plate to be cut. The programming of schedule, parts layout and labeling would be integrated on a planners computer so that parts to be produced on demand would be brought up on a daily routine, matched by plate thickness, and automatically nested for minimum waste of material. The resulting work package may be communicated directly to the digital machine control system. Plates stacked at an entry

point are picked (the crane is sensitive, in a tactile way, to alarm if it is picking up the wrong thickness for the job at hand) and transported to a marking system which uses a dot matrix peening system to label the plate. Since the system is aware of the nested cut patterns, markings can be applied to the uncut plate so that after cutting, each component has a comprehensive label. The plate is automatically transported to the nearby plasma are cutting machine, and the cut process occurs automatically. In general, a single operator from a booth can control the entire operation. A magnetic gantry picks the cut pieces from the plasma arc machines bed and transports them to the output point where they may be transported to assembly cells. The supporting database for the design and planning establishments was converted from the previous system for parts associated with ships already in production. Additional information which had not been accommodated in the previous system, such as parts marking, was added. The new database system was designed to accept digital data transfer from incoming design documents which would arrive from the Navy sponsor, the other







and production

shipbuilder, and from in-house designers. This integration of information from internal and external sources, and the integration directly from the detailed design documents to the machine on the shop floor, are symbolic of the general trend in modern ship design and construction and have been emphasized in the design and acquisition programs for the Seawolf(SSN-21) submarines 19, lo]. This program illustrates the evolution of productivity improvements in the U.S. shipbuilding industry. First, production processes are taking advantage of group technology techniques to improve local cell efficiency. Then, designers are applying zone-oriented thinking to systems which have been specified in functional form. Finally, the design and production elements are integrating their deliverable products from one stage to another, reducing the errors and inefficiencies which may derive from interpretations and translations. The next steps are to infuse the earlier stages of design development with a motivation to innovate for producibility as well as for faster and deeper performance. 5.6. Pipe bending tax Piping systems in submarines and surface ships carry a wide variety of fluids operating at various pressures, up to 4500 psi. The equipment density in submarines is extremely high, and piping system fabrication, outfitting, and testing account for a significant part of the labor expense in submarine construction. Zone outfitting has encouraged more prefabrication of pipe assemblies by allowing sectionend access for larger assembly input to the zones. Group technology applications in most shipyards have resulted in pipe shops building and testing more complex pipe assemblies prior to moving the work to the ship than ever before. There are generally two methods available for orienting pipe runs to the shipboard layout: bending, or cutting and welding fitted joints such as sleeves and elbows. The bending option is usually preferable for several reasons. The alternative method using welded joints is

labor intensive, costs extra for special fittings, may be vulnerable to system failure at the welded joints, requires additional material control considerations for certified systems, may reduce system performance characteristics (e.g., flow obstructions), and involves substantial additional cost in non-destructive testing of the joints. Large-diameter pipe bending equipment is expensive, and some shipbuilders have historically subcontracted such work to specialized companies. Integration of modern bending technology into the shipoffers construction and building process life-cycle cost reductions, and has design implications which can improve the ships performance in terms of volume and weight. Submarine designers prefer to minimize the number of fittings installed where bending is an alternative, and installing large diameter bending equipment offers the option to bend through the full range of pipe sizes. This is an area where designers clearly can have a major impact on producibility, if the production environment is compatible and communicated. Understanding the facility and recognizing the multiple advantages of bending are essential if piping system specifiers are to maximize their potential to influence the cost effectiveness of the design. 5.7. A replacement technology

The technology of pipe bending, for large diameter pipes, has been limited in the past to a manual process of using force application to one end of a restrained pipe length, and bending to a point which results in the desired angle after accommodating spring-back. The bending operation required use of an overhead crane for large forces, and the measurement of bend angle was completely manual. For pipe diameters of 5 inches to 10 inches IPS, especially using strong materials such as Inconel and Copper-Nickel, the manual bending process is a major effort. Development of machinery for the automatic, precise bending of large-diameter pipe enables designers to consider a new set of bounds on the specification of bends rather


Thomas, S.M. Henryllntegrating

design and production


than welded joints. The submarine construction yards have been moving from manual bending methods to automatic machinery. The incorporation of a large-diameter pipe facility enables bending every diameter and material of piping which is specified in current and future submarine classes. Integration of the large diameter equipment within the computer controlled facility of smaller capacity bending machinery (which was already in place) was one of the objectives of this project. The new arrangement would have a central shop computer distributing work to machines with different pipe size capacities, as established by the automatic convergence of production schedule and design requirements. Replacement of many joints by bends, in the large diameter cases considered for this project, results in the following relative cost savings over the pre-ShipTech method of doing business: 68% to 90% Cost Savings in Direct Labor Cost Savings in Direct Material 66% These figures account for the reduction in total labor hours as well as the decreased cost of more skilled labor which was necessary for the replaced technology. Material costs reduce as the net of a minor increase in total pipe length required for bends, less the high cost of purchasing many special fittings. The increased cost in indirect labor hours is about 10% to 20% of the direct labor hours savings, depending upon which year is considered. Indirect material cost increase is less than 5% of the corresponding direct material savings. It should be noted that the cost of revising piping plans to accommodate the incorporation of bends where fittings are currently specified is not considered in the ShipTech project proposal, and this is a point of negotiation between the Navy and the builder today. An assessment of those implications is beyond the scope of this paper. 5.8. Design Implications The systems which employ high strength, large diameter pipes are typically seawater sys-

terns whose failures would place the entire submarine at risk. Improving the producibility of large diameter pipe bends, thus reducing the number ofjoints specified by the designers, can improve reliability as well as reduce construction costs. High strength, large diameter fittings are considered very expensive compared to the alternative of bending because of the specialized manufacture of the fittings welded joint area, its small numbers, and the additional quality assurance testing and documentation imposed by certification requirements. Also, the unit weights of pipe fittings are greater than the equivalent functional length of pipe, so a replacement of fittings by bends results in piping systems weight reductions. A design trade-off in the amount of volume required for piping systems arises from the substitution of bends for fittings. Bends result in the elimination of joint access requirements for repairs, but they imply some volume addition for the larger bend radius compared to a more compact fitting. Accuracy control in a welded system may require different consideration for designers than does a system with more pipe bends. Less flexibility in configuration and alignment for bent systems may require more close coupling between design and manufacturing. These considerations affect the decision-making in design, and ultimately impact on the acquisition costs, life-cycle costs, reliability, and performance characteristics of the submarine. 5.9. Performance
of the cases

The three ShipTech cases examined in this report may be summarized in terms of the Navys net cash flows and the cost reductions/ increases seen by the Navy as a result of the project investments. The figures below have been made dimensionless by dividing the dollar amounts by the total Navy investment amount for each project. The data reflect projections of performance, as they are taken from project proposals which are made to request project approval. In two of these three cases (sheetmetal cell and plate processing system),

J.C. Thomas, S.M. Henry/lntrgrating

design md production

Fig. 4. Navy cash flows for several ShipTech projects.

the projects were implemented and have met or exceeded productivity expectations. The large pipe bender project is a more recent proposal, and is still in the evaluation process. Fig. 4 shows the stream of cash flow due to the net of: - Navy share of pre-tax cost reductions or (.increases), less - Cost of money reimbursed to the shipbuilder, less - Payments or (recovery of funds) by the Navy to cover costs of development and capital implementation. This stream of payments constitutes the projected annual cost savings after payment of the initial investment during the first year or two of the plan. The project proposals contain calculations of the Navys Return On Investment {ROI) from this stream of costs and benefits. To be accurate, the particular type of return calculated is the Internal Rate of Return (IRR), which is the discount rate for which a well behaved stream of payments has Net Present Value (NPV) equal to zero. The idea behind

using such a measure in capital budgeting or project evaluation is that a projects acceptability can be determined by comparing the IRR for the project against the opportunity cost of capital for investments with equivalent risk. Thus, if the opportunity cost of capital for an investment with risk similar to a ShipTech project was 12%, and the project promised an internal rate of return of 15%, exceeding the capital rate, then the investment in that project would be advisable (as the NPV of the project evaluated at 12% would be positive). In the ShipTech projects described here, the proposals projections of Navy cash flow lead to the rates of return in Table 1. Use of IRR as a measure for such decisions is common, but it can lead to false conclusions [26]. Calculat ion of IRR does not distinguish between borrowing and lending relationships. Checking for a declining NW with decreasing discount rate solves that issue. A project which has several changes in sign of cash flows (e.g., negative followed by positive followed by another negative) may have as many solutions to the IRR as there are zero crossings, or changes in sign. The number taken as IRR may be only one of two or three solutions, none of which is really useful. In this report, all the projects have a single IRR solution. The comparison of projects which differ in scale may be misleading because different patterns of cash flow, or scales of investment can influence the IRR solution, Mutually exclusive projects, which might both be worthwhile, should be evaluated by considering the differences on an incremental basis, so that suitability of one good idea over another may be determined. Finally, the complexity introduced by uneven payment structures and different opportunity

Table 1 Project title IRR (%) 17 19 29

Plate processing Large pipe bender Sheetmetal fab

J.C. Thomas, S.M. Henry/Integrating

design and production





Net Navy

Net Positive Income






In - Line


Processing Component

System Fabrication Cell



Pipe Bender


Fig. 5. Operational

cost reductions


for the ShipTech


costs of capital leads to some ambiguity in the utility of IRR measures. Used with these issues in mind, internal rate of return may be a reasonable method of describing the value of the Navys investment in ShipTech projects, compared with related investments or programs. Fig. 5 shows the Navys production cost component after application of the share relationship for each of the projects. This figure excludes the investment amount and simply considers the cost of doing a unit amount of work during and after the new technology implementation. The early cost increases reflect the cost of implementing a change in the production system, and within several years the sign changes as the new method is predicted to provide a net decrease in production costs. After payback of the Navys cash investment, these production cost savings are essentially all of the downstream cash flow realized by the Navy.

After at least six months have passed since ShipTech project has become fully operational, a Post-Implementation Review is conducted to compare predicted performance with actual measured productivity. The original projections are made by analyzing the preimplementation methods for a unit of work, then making predictions for the proposed system, and contrasting the two costs of accomplishing the unit of work. In the PostImplementation Review, the new method introduced by the approved project is evaluated against the same standard of a unit of work, and the difference between projected and actual performance is determined. In the case of the Sheetmetal Component Fabrication Cell, the Post-Implementation Review has been conducted and some dimensionless results are presented here. The Plate Processing System has not been operational long enough to rate a completed Review, but the early indications







and production


+ reduction,

- increase)


E co ar > L= F z .I-0 a z cz a, 0 G

50% Cost Savings Realized

4 0%





-1 0% , 0 1 2


Increase 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11


In-Line Plate Processing Component System Fabrication Cell Large DNC/CNC Pipe Bender


Fig. 6. Actual/projected

savings per post-implementation


of plate throughput and parts quality indicate better performance than predicted in the project proposal. Fig. 6 provides a comparison of the actual difference in cost of producing sheetmetal ventilation system components (before and after the new process and equipment) against the difference in cost which had been predicted in the project proposal. Here, the production program is divided by ship hull rather than year. Five of the eight ships listed were measured after at least 98% of ship completion, and the other three are about 50% complete. The three which have not been completed are reported as a combination of actual costs incurred plus a remainder figured on a 94% learning curve which is based on previously completed units. These figures demonstrate that the Navy is predicted to see an excellent return for its investment in each of the projects. The PostImplementation Review results indicate as

much as a 60% better actual cost reduction than that which was expected from the project proposal. The ship projects which indicated a lower than expected cost reduction were substantially dominated by the ships which outperformed expectations. While the data presented on these programs takes aim at the direct cost improvements attributable to each, the total benefit of the cases involves more complex issues. Each of these cases introduces a technology advancement with implications in process improvement. The opportunity to maximize both the cost reductions and the performance enhancements requires application of the technologies early in design. A design process which cannot accommodate timely introduction of process and product advances will thwart potential gains. A system which enables communication between design and production organizations (in both directions) should realize schedule improvements as it becomes more responsive to

J.C. Thomas, S.M. Henry/Integrating

design and production


the need for process and product integration. In the ShipTech cases, the long term implications are still being determined. But the program can serve as a model for motivating industry/government cooperation in the integration of early Navy designs with contractor construction process innovations. Study of the organizational relationships in successful ShipTech projects would be a logical next step in capturing the full potential of design/production integration.

research performed during the preparation of this paper: CDR B. R. Brucker, USN (NAVSEA), Mr. J. Cameron (EB), CDR R.A. Celotto, USN (MIT), RADM M.S. Firebaugh, USN (NAVSEA), LCDR H.A. Malaret, USN (SupShip Groton), and CAPT B.F. Tibbitts, USN (Ret.) (MIT). This paper describes research performed under a three year contract number N00014-87-C-0466 with the Office of Naval Research. This work was supported by the Navy Research and Development Program 63564, NAVSEA Project SO408.

6. Conclusions This paper demonstrated several working production enhancements which seem to provide excellent prospects for high returned value for the modest level of investment required. It portrayed a cooperative program between government and industry which yields benefits to both parties, and in the end reduces the taxpayers outlay for a strong defense structure. In the future, it is likely that improvements on todays changing systems will be represented in a structure which uses its resources efficiently and works toward improvement through self-generated innovations, and through the intelligent incorporation of outside information, theory, and technology. The Navy should continue to provide leadership and initiative to stimulate innovation in shipbuilding technology, and adopt a strategy which places more explicit responsibility on acquisition programs to set goals for designers which drive a more producible design. The key to meeting these goals will be found in establishing a high-level focus of production and design integration which will seek out productivity improvements from the process end of development and implement those ideas at the earliest feasible time in design. References Cl1 Dixon, J.R. and Duffy, M.R., 1990. The neglect of
engineering design. California Manage. Rev., 32: 9-23. c21 Downey, W.G., 1969. Development cost estimating. Report of the Steering Group for the Ministry of Aviation, HMSO, reference from D.J. Leech and B.T. Turner, 1985. Engineering Design for Profit, Wiley, New York. c31 Clark, K.B., Chew, W.B. and Fujimoto, T., 1987. Product development in the world auto industry: Strategy, organization and performance Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3: 729-781. M.L., Lester, R.K., Solow, R.M. and c41 Dertouzos, The MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity., 1989. Made in America: Regaining the Productive Edge, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. M., 1988. Excerpts from Keynote Adc51 MacKinnon, dress of NSRP, 1988 Ship Production Symposium on 24 August 1988, reprinted by NSRP News, 1. C61Taguchi, G. and Clausing, D., 1990. Robust quality. Harvard Business Rev., 68: 65-75. c71 Taguchi, G. and Hauser, J., 1988. The house of quality. Har. Bus. Rev., 66: xxx-xxx. PI Bymes, R.N. and Marcus, H.S., 1989. Ship producibility: Navy experience and options. Paper prepared for Office of Naval Research, Department of the Navy. producibility. c91 Brucker, B.R., 1989. SEAWOLF Marine Technol., 26: 1-13. into Cl01 Brucker, B.R., 1988. Infusing producibility advanced submarine design. Paper presented at the NSRP 1988 Ship Production Symposium, Seattle. Cl11 Webber, J.H., 1987. Keynote address to the 1986 ship production symposium. Marine Technol., 24: l-3. WI Chirillo, L.D. and Chirillo, R.D., 1985. The History of Modern Shipbuilding Methods: The U.S.-Japan Interchange, testimony submitted to the U.S. House of Representatives Sub-committee on

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Merchant Marine and Fisheries on 20 June 1984. J. Ship Prod., 1: l-6. Rinehart, V.W., Brasher, J.W. and Christenson, W.L., 1986. Benefits of the national shipbuilding research program to the Navy and the industrial base: Maritime perspective, industry perspective, and Navy perspective. J. Ship Prod., 2. Barham, F.B., 1985. The SNAME Ship Production Committee-Overview. J. Ship Prod., 1: 29953. Weiers, B.J., 1985. The productivity problem in United States shipbuilding. U.S. Department of Transportation, December 1984, also in J. Ship Prod., 1: 7728. Starch, R. et al., 1988. Ship Production, Cornell Maritime Press. Bosworth, M.L. and Graham, C., 1986. Producibility as a design factor in naval ships. J. Ship Prod., 2: 90- 100. Bruce, G.J., 1988. Ship design for production ~ Some U.K. experience. J. Ship Prod., 4: I l-20. Covitch, P., 1987. Producibility in Navy ships. Paper presented at Joint ASNE/SNAME Meeting. Designers and Planners, Inc. 1988. Incorporating design for production into CONFORM feasibility studies. Paper prepared for Surface Ship Concept Formulation Program, Naval Sea Systems Command, Department of the Navy. Hofmann, H.A., Grant, R.S., and Fung, S., 1989. Producibility in U.S. Navy ship design. Paper presented at the NSRP 1989 Ship Production Symposium, Arlington, Virginia, reprinted by SNAME. Johnson, R.A., 1985. Naval ship design: the shipbuilders emerging role. Naval Eng. J., 97: 37-48. Kraine, G.L. and Ingvason, S., 1989. Producibility in ship design. Paper presented at the NSRP 1989 Ship Production Symposium, Arlington, Virginia, reprinted by SNAME. Marcus, H.S., Bymes, R.N. and Heffron, J.S., 1988. Producibility in naval ships: methodology and strategy for implementation. Paper prepared for Office of Naval Research, Department of the Navy.

1251 Piersall, C.H. and Sinche, C.J., 1988. Streamlining in a competitive environment. J. Ship Prod., 4: 267-270. [26] Brealey, R.A. and Myers, S.C., 1988. Principles of Corporate Finance. McGraw-Hill, New York. [27] Brown, C. and Reich, M., 1989. When does cooperation work? A look at NUMMI & GM-Van Nuys. California Manage. Rev., 31: 36637. [28] Duncan, F., 1990. Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The Discipline of Technology. United States Naval Institute Press. [29] Frankel, E.G., 1985. Impact of technological change on shipbuilding productivity. J. Ship Prod., I: 174- 183. [30] Gomory, R.E., 1989. From the ladder of science to the product development cycle. Harv. Bus. Rev., 67:
99-105. 311 Heffron. J.S.. 1988. The impact of group technoC

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logy-based shipbuilding methods on naval ship design and acquisition practices. Thesis for the degrees of Naval Engineer and SM. in Ocean Systems Management. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Higgins, J.A., 1987. Naval ship production in commercial shipyards: technical status and future opportunities. Stanley Associates Technical Report l-87, Alexandria. Lamb, T., 1988. Group technology in shipbuilding. J. Ship Prod., 4: 30-50. Lamb, T.. 1987. Engineering for ship production. J. Ship Prod., 3: 274-297. Nierenberg, A.B. and Caronna, S.G., 1987. Proven benefits of advanced shipbuilding Technology ~ Actual case studies of recent comparative construction programs. Paper presented at the NSRP 1987 Ship Production Symposium, New Orleans. Stumbo, S.C.. 1985. Impact of zone outfitting on ship space utilization and construction costs. Naval Eng. J., 97: 1466154. Bosley, D.B., 1967. The secret to Japanese shipbuilding success - It can work in America. Naval Eng. J., 79: 839-842.