Nagpur District Offsite Emergency Plan PDF

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN
OFFSITE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR NAGPUR MAHARASHTRA
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OFFSITE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR NAGPUR DISTRICT MAHARASHTRA September 2012
Directorate of Industrial Safety and Health Nagpur
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General Observations S No 1 Observation Qff-sile effects to be enumerated so as to include the number of people likely to be affected for each identified scenario. Refer to Please refer Page No. 30 to 33(Chapter-3) Volume- I
MoEF to direct the state Factories No Action on TSC department for conducting Mock Drills of the approved plans with a reasonable time frame of 6 months. Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS] of relevant hazardous chemicals to be provided in the format given at Schedule 9 of the MSIHC Rules MSDS of all relevant chemicals provided in the MoEF's format at Annexure 9
Specific Observations 1 No specific observations Report approved subject to incorporation of the General Recommendations. General observations incorporated.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS NAGPUR OFFSITE DMP TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER SECTION TITLE 1 1.1 1.1 1.2 BASIS OF THE PLAN INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES SCOPE OF PLAN AND MICROMETHODOLOGY CHEMICAL HAZARDS 1,2.1 -Fires 1.2.2- Explosions 1.2.3- Toxic releases 2 2.1 2.2 DISTRICT DETAILS INTRODUCTION DISTRICT ORGANIZATION AND AVAILABLE RESOURCES 2.2.1- DC (District Collector) Office 2.2.2- Police resources 2.2.3- Fire Brigade 2.2.4- Health services 2.2.5- Public works Department (PWD- Roads) 2 2.6- Telecom 2.2.7- Electricity 2.2.8- Food and Civil Supplies 2.2.9- Railways 2. 2. 10- Technical 2.2.1 1- NGOs and other voluntary organizations MAH UNITS AND CLUSTERS IN THE DISTRICTTHE HAZARD POTENTIAL PAGE NO. - CH. No. P1-Ch. 1 P1-Ch. 1 P3-Ch. 1 P5-Ch, 1 P5-Ch, 1 P6-Ch. 1 P7-Ch. 1 P1-CH. 2 P1-Ch. 2 P2-Ch. 2 P2-Ch. 2 P3-Ch. 2 P3-Ch. 2 P4-Ch. 2 P4-Ch. 2 P4-Ch. 2 P5-Ch. 2 P5-Ch. 2 P5-Ch. 2 P6-Ch. 2 P6-Ch. 2 P1-Ch. 3
3.1
CLUSTERS IN THE DISTRICT 3. 1.1 -Clusters Details VULNERABILITY DISTANCES- CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS- TOXIC AND FIRE/ EXPLOSION SCENARIOS ROAD TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS RAIL TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS
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3.2
3.3
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3.4
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS AND ROLES

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CHAPTER
SECTION TITLE 4.1 OVERALL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE COMPOSITION & FUNCTION OF DISTRICT CRISIS GROUP COMPOSITION & FUNCTION OF LOCAL CRISIS GROUP EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS
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4.2
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4.3
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4.4
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4.5
CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF LOCAL COMMAND POSTS EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS- CLUSTER WISE ACTIONS DISTRICT EMERGENCY RESOURCES
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4.6
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5 5.1
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FIRE FIGHTING RESOURCES 5.1.1- Fire fighting resources with the district administration 5.1.2- Fire fighting resources with MAH Units 5.1.3- Types of Personnel Protective Equipment MEDICAL FACILITIES 5.2.1- Medical facilities within the district 5.2.2- Medical facilities with MAH Units ROADS AND VEHICLES WARNING AND COMMUNICATION POLICE RESOURCES ESTABLISHMENT OF EMERGENCY CONTROL ROOMS AND FIELD COMMAND POSTS COMMUNITY INFORMATION AND EVACUATION ASPECTS 5.7.1- Overview of "shelter in place" concepts
5.2
5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6
5.7
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5.8
CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF REHABILITATION P13-Ch. 5 CENTERS FOR EVACUATION TRAINING OF RESPONDERS PRE-EMERGENCY PLANNING
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5.9 6
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CHAPTER SECTION TITLE 6.1 6.2 DISTRICT EMERGENCY AUTHORITY (DC) MEMBER SECRETARY- JT. DIRECTOR OF FACTORIES COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR- GM TELEPHONES TECHNICAL COORDINATORS- EXPERTS ON INDUSTRIAL SAFETY AND HEALTH SAFETY COORDINATOR- ENVIRONMENT ENGINEER-PCB
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6.3
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6.4
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6.5
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6.6
FIRE SERVICES COORDINATOR- DISTRICT FIRE P8-Ch. 6 OFFICER (DFO) RESCUE COORDINATOR- COMMANDANT, HOME P8-Ch. 6 GUARDS MEDICAL COORDINATOR- DISTRICT MEDICAL AND HEALTH OFFICER UTILITIES COORDINATOR- SE, SEB MATERIAL COORDINATOR- ADM/ SDM EVACUATION AND REHABILITATION COORDINATOR TRANSPORT COORDINATOR- RTO RAIL TRANSPORT COORDINATOR SECURITY COORDINATOR- SP P9-Ch. 6
6.7
6.8
6.9 6,10 6.11
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6.12 6.13 6.14 6.15 6.16
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PUBLIC WORKS COORDINATOR- EE, PHE DEPT. P15-Ch. 6 LIAISON AND PUBLIC RELATIONS COORDINATOR-DISTRICT PRO COORDINATION WITH LOCAL CRISIS GROUP ACTION PLAN FOR OFFSITE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT P16-Ch. 6
6.17 7
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7.1
SCENARIO - 1: CHLORINE RELEASE FROM A P6-Ch. 7 TONNER AT KANHAN WATER WORKS, KAMPTEE 7.1.1- Notification to Offsite authorities P7-h. 7 PAGE NO. - CH. No. P8-Ch. 7 P9-Ch. 7 P36-Ch. 7
CHAPTER SECTION TITLE 7.1.2- Notification to Response organisations and public authorities 7.1.3- Emergency Response 7.2 BLEVE / EXPLOSION EVENTS (HPCL LPG BOTTLING PLANT, KHAPRI, BPCL LPG BOTTLING PLANT, BUTIBORI) FIRE INCIDENTS AT OIL DEPOTS (IOCL / HPCL KHAPRI) POST EMERGENCY ACTIVITIES STRUCTURAL INSPECTIONS AFTER FIRES OR EXPLOSIONS POST INCIDENT TESTING FOR CONTAMINATION WASTE DISPOSAL
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8 8.1
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8.2
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8.3
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8.4
CLEANUP OF DEAD OR CONTAMINATED LIVESTOCK OR WILDLIFE
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8.5 8.6
PROVISION OF ALTERNATE WATER SUPPLIES P2-Ch. 8 RE-ENTRY INTO EVACUATED AREAS ' P3-Ch. 8
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
NAGPUR OFFSITE DMP PAGE NO. -CH. No.
CHAPTER
SECTION TITLE
LIST OF ANNEXES
I II
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION SET UP (UP TO TALUKA LEVEL)
P1 to 5,Annex-1 P1,Annex-2
III
TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF KEY DISTRICT P1 to 11, Annex-3 OFFICIALS AND RESPONSE/ OTHER AGENCIES EMERGENCY ACTION GROUPS DISTRICT EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION SYSTEM FIRST AID GUIDELINES VULNERABILITY TEMPLATES MAH INDUSTRIES DATA AND RESOURCES MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEETS (MSDS)/ RESPONSE INFORMATION DATA SHEETS (RIDS) P1 to 9,Annex-4 P1, Annex-5
IV V
VI VII VIII IX
P1 to 6,Annex-6 P1 to 41, Annex-7 P1 to 3,Annex-8 P1 to 27,Annex-9
IMPORTANT TECHNICAL ACTIONS FOR MAJOR P1 to 19,Annex-1Q CHEMICALS HANDLED IN THE DISTRICT
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CHAPTER -1
BASIS OF THE PLAN
1.1
INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES An "Offsite" emergency is defined as an incident that has the potential to cause injury and / or death beyond the factory "boundary". It typically includes incidents originating within factories with an Offsite effect and transportation incidents. Such accidents, despite the most modem systems, procedures, hardware and other factors, have occurred in the country and around the world in the past. Offsite emergency plans require the concerted and well co-ordinated response from multiple agencies to prevent undue damage and escalation.
The emergency plan contained herein is site and chemical specific- it addresses critical/ important elements related to the hazardous nature of the chemicals in question; consequence effects in case" of accidental releases; extent of
vulnerable zone; how the release can be contained; how the effects can be minimised; preventive measures that can be taken; preactive actions to be taken and other such information.
Chemical incidents over the last 2-3 decades have thrown up many areas where better and more co-ordinated preparedness could have saved numerous precious lives- large scale examples include the Bhopal Gas tragedy where so many systems failed at the same time. In addition, major flaws in the entire chain of emergency management were identified later. Technically and administratively sound emergency preparedness can only be achieved through a highly thought out, structured and co-ordinated process involving the authorities, industry, the public at large and other emergency agencies.
Preparation of a district Offsite plan is mandatory under the EP Act (MSIHC Rules). This Plan is sponsored by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, the Nodal Ministry for Chemical Disasters, in order to assist
the district administration in combating major Qffsite emergency situations. As

mentioned, Offsite incidents could arise due to large-scale incidents originating
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from within the industry (say a storage tank rupture) or outside, say from road, rail or hazardous chemicals pipeline transportation incident. The enclosed plan closely addresses these issues. The plan does not however discuss natural calamities (though the findings presented herein could be helpful during these calamities as well!). Other statutory issues addressing emergency planning are given vide Annex I.
The overall objectives of an effective Offsite Plan are: To safeguard lives, property and environment- saving human life has to be the highest priority in any chemical emergency. Any evacuation, medical treatment required for vulnerable persons, welfare assistance etc. must be ensured at the district level to ensure fulfilment of this objective. To contain the incident and bring it under control within the shortest possible time- this may involve a multidisciplinary or multi-agency effort. To restore normalcy at the earliest.
The above objectives may be achieved through some or all of the following measures: Providing information to all concerned on the estimated consequences of the events that are likely to develop as a result of the emergency a Warning and advising people who are likely to be affected a Mobilising on-site resources available in the industry to' contain the emergency or diffuse the crisis Calling up assistance from district agencies Initiating and organising effective evacuation of affected people a Providing necessary first aid arid other medical services that may be required a Collecting data on the latest developments, other information
and requirements and deciding future course of action based on the same Co-ordinating action taken by various agencies.
This offsite plan addresses the above issues in detail. It must be remembered that a plan is just the beginning of the activity of emergency preparedness. The plan is more of a guideline than a ready recipe for handling a chemical emergency. The number of possible incidents leading to an emergency is infinite (leakage could occur theoretically anywhere!) and the plan cannot possibly include all.
In addition to a "book plan", emergency actions must be rehearsed extensively and regularly for sound performance on demand and for ensuring better coordination at all levels. Ensuring emergency preparedness at ALL times is essential- this can be achieved through regular mock drills and continuously raising the level of awareness at the field level.
The plan should be regularly updated when there are changes occurring in the industrial set up, transportation aspects, key manpower/ administrative changes etc. A plan cannot possibly be static for all time to come! Regular drills, training of key persons, increasing safety awareness etc. is extremely important areas that MUST be looked at for sound preparedness.
The Offsite plan presented is based on the hazard analysis study carried out in the year 2004 wherein the chemical hazard inventory was identified in the district. The hazard aspects have been upgraded based on prevalent conditions.
1.2
SCOPE OF PLAN AND MICRO-METHODOLOGY
The broad scope of work parameters and micro-methodology as described in the terms of reference are reproduced below. As mentioned, the study was based on the Hazard analysis study carried out in 2004. The study inventorized the hazards in the district and Maximum Loss Scenario assessments were made for catastrophic failures for 2 meteorological conditions, namely D, 3 m/s and F, 1.5 m/s representing two extremes. The study also identified risk reduction recommendations through a Rapid Safety Audit. This study formed the base for the Offsite plan. The methodology adopted for carrying out the work in question is described next:
INITIAL VISITS- DATA COLLECTION This included the following activities: o o Survey of industries and the hazardous chemicals being stored, used, manufactured and transported by them Organisation structure and available manpower of various district authorities
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o o o o
Enumeration of available resources in terms of communication, fire fighting, transportation etc. General layout of the district Road map of the district Discussions with concerned district and industry officials for a better appreciation of the hazards involved the existing infrastructure etc.
DESK ACTIVITY o Compilation of all data collected from different authorities such as Fire departments, medical agencies (hospitals, nursing homes, health care centres etc.), telecom, electricity board o o o Updating of hazard data from each MAH unit, Summarising the existing organisation structure existing at the district level to assess the working of the same under a real emergency situation. Based on industry data collected on chemical Inventories, transportation issues (mainly by road) etc. different fire, explosion and toxic gas release scenarios were modelled to find out range of affected area for damage based on the TOR (IDLH value for toxic dispersions, first degree bums (4 kW/m2) for heat radiation and 0.1 bar overpressure for explosions). o o o Assessment of evacuation strategy to be adopted for maximum benefit Optimum utilisation of available resources was worked out/ identified, bearing in mind the nature of hazard. Structuring various District Offsite Teams under the co-ordination of District Collector for "managing" the emergency, defining their roles, functions etc. to ensure all key tasks are accomplished and that there is no duplication or confusion in implementation.
REPORT PREPARATION AND INTERACTION WITH DISTRICT AUTHORITIES AND MoEF EXPERT COMMITTEE After preparing the Offsite Plan, the findings were subsequently presented to the district authorities in the Draft report form and their valuable comments and suggestions incorporated. FINAL REPORT PREPARATION The final report considers comments from the Expert Committee and the district agencies. MOCK DRILL
Mock drills ensure that the plan remains free from implementation errors, remains updated and remains or becomes efficient based or practical application. Items appearing good on paper may not be so at site! Hence, Mock Drills are certainly one of the key elements and such drills MUST be conducted by the district authorities periodically.
1.3
CHEMICAL HAZARDS
Chemical hazard is the potential of chemicals, chemical processes or operations to cause accidents that could damage or endanger human life, environment or property in that order. As mentioned earlier, releases or "losses of containment" are a result of accidents or component/ equipment failures. Chemical hazards identified for the district based on study of the MAH Units activities are of either: Fire hazard due to petroleum products such as high speed diesel, kerosene, motor spirit, aviation turbine fuels and others used/ handled in the district. Explosion or BLEVE due to LPG, C9, Aromax and others used/ handled in the district. Toxic hazard due to Technical pesticides, chlorine and others used/ handled in the district.
The hazards or scenarios arising out of these chemicals under different loss of containment situations are detailed next:
1.3.1
Fires
There are different types of fires that are of concern Jet fires Fireballs/BLEVE Vapour cloud or flash fires Liquid Pool fires
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1.3.1.1 Jet fires Releases at high velocity through holes or apertures (as in the case of compressed liquefied gases) would entrain air and mix with it rapidly and dilute to below LEL (tower explosive limit). However, there would be a distinct sector over which the jet is in the flammable zone. In case of ignition therein, there is a likelihood of a jet flame (sometimes of considerable length). Jet flames are characterised by high heat intensity and fatalities of 100% within the direct flame zone. Beyond the flame zone, the radiation would drop with distance. However, in case the flame impinges on a vulnerable vessel, there is possibility of escalation of emergency as it increases the pressure inside the vessel at the same time weakening its outer wall.
1.1.2 Fireballs/ BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Cloud Explosion (BLEVE), these involve the violent rupture of hydrocarbon vessels due to heat impingement from say a jet fire on the vapour section (where no heat pick up by the liquid which in turn vaporises is possible) of the vessel. The material released from the vessel is thrown out and vaporising or boiling at the same time- BLEVEs are considered the most dreaded of all LPG / Propane incidents. Though fireballs or BLEVE are of very short duration, the heat radiation is so high that even on short exposure, major damage is possible. The blast wave phenomenon associated with a BLEVE is considered secondary in nature compared to the extensive heat radiation.
1.3.1.3 Vapour or Dust Cloud Fires/UVCE Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion/Vapour/Dust Cloud, these are the fires resulting from delayed ignition of flammable vapours evolved from a pool of volatile liquid or gases venting from a punctured or damaged vessel. The unignited vapour cloud or plume moves in the downwind direction and when it encounters a source of ignition and when its concentration is within upper and lower flammable limits, a wall of flame may flash back towards the source of the gas or vapour engulfing everything in its path.
1.3.1.4 Liquid Pool Fires
As the name suggests, these are the fires involving liquid fuels spilled on the surface of land or water. The primary hazards due to these are thermal radiation and/or toxic or corrosive products of combustion. Complications however arise because of the terrain, which may aid the movement of the liquid fuel into sewers, drains, surface water or other catchments spreading the fire and involving more combustibles. The damage can be reduced very much if the Storage tanks have dykes. Thus, the area of spread of the liquid spill gets restricted and so does the area of the pool fire.
1.3.2
Explosions
Explosions occur because of the rapid equilibration of combustion gases in a confined volume due to a rapid combustion- flame or flame fronts of explosions travel very fast. The flame propagation is so fast that it could exceed the speed of sound (resulting in a detonation).
There are two types of explosions possible:
Thermal Explosions
Non Thermal Explosions
1.3.2.1 Thermal explosions
These occur because of ignition of flammable gases or vapours within confined space. Hence the terms lower and upper flammabiiity limits are used interchangeably with lower and upper explosive limits. It follows that virtually all substances handled under conditions of air-fuel mixtures within the explosive or flammable limits in an enclosed space have a high probability of exploding rather than simply burning upon ignition.
There are also unconfined vapour cloud explosions involving gaseous mixtures in an open environment causing devastating damage and widespread injuries, especially when the weight of airborne gas or vapours exceeds 1000 Ibs.
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There are also many solids and liquids which may explode or detonate if ignited, shocked, or subjected to heat or friction. However, there is no specific property or characteristic that sets explosives apart from other materials - manufacturers' information and material databases need to be referred.
The power or strength of a thermal explosion, however, depends on: Amount of fuel present that is capable of exploding Amount of energy available in this portion of the fuel Fraction of available energy (YIELD) expected to be released in the explosion process.
1.3.2.2 Non Thermal Explosions These generally occur due to over-pressurisation of a vessel and the strength of this explosion is a function of the pressure at which the walls of the container burst and the nature of the walls (brittle or ductile). 1.3.3 Toxic Releases Most chemicals are toxic through different routes and to different extents. Toxicity is an important aspect when related to human life and environment. There are several important aspects of toxicity but essentially there are three entry routes for toxic materials into the human body, namely oral, dermal and inhalation.
Toxic exposure is a function of the exposure level or concentration and the exposure duration. It is accepted that there are certain toxic threshold values, below which the toxic effect could be insignificant to warranty attention (even for highly toxic materials). The rate of exposure or dose for inhalation for example is a function of many parameters including the airborne concentration, rate of breathing or air intake rate, exposure duration (time present in a given concentration), contaminant properties etc. Similarly, the effect of an ingestion or oral intake could be a function of the intake rate- small doses over a time or a large dose at once. Some poisons are known to accumulate in the body with devastating effect.
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For the purpose of this study, the IDLH value (based on 30 minutes exposure duration) is considered (based on TOR) for estimating the vulnerable distance. MSDS for various chemicals are given vide Annex IX.
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CHAPTER- 2
DISTRICT DETAILS
This chapter describes the district infrastructure. The departments which are not directly involved in emergency containment and control have not been described. 2.1 INTRODUCTION Please refer Map in Section 3,1, Chapter-3. Nagpur district lies between the north latitudes 2035' and 2144' and east longitudes 7815' and 79*40'. It covers an area of 9892 sq. km, which is 3.12% of the total area of Maharashtra. The general elevation of the district ranges between 150 - 600 m above MSL. The western and south-western parts of the district are drained by Wardha and its tributaries. The Wainganga and its tributaries drain the eastern and east-central part of the district.
The climate of the district is mainly characterised by dry sub humid climate withot summer and mild winter. About 90% of the total rainfall is received during June September.
Nagpur is well connected with other metropolitan cities of India by trunk rail routs and roadways. It has good infrastructure facilities in terms of land, water and power. The major industries in the district include cotton textile, cotton ginning and pressing, saw milling, paper and straw board, ceramic, ferro manganese and steel re-rolling.
Clusters of MAH industries are present mainly at the Khapri Taluka, Kalmeshwar, Taluka Ramtek, Kamptee, MIDC Butibori, MIDC, Hingna Road, Uppalwadi Industrial Estate. A map showing the district clusters is attached in Chapter-3. 2.2 2.2.1 DISTRICT ORGANISATION AND AVAILABLE RESOURCES DC (District Collector) Office The District Collector (DC) is the administrative head of the district and also the chairman of the District Crisis Group (DCG) and is based at Nagpur. The DC is responsible overall for the Emergency Management in the district. The SDMs
under the DC (refer Annex II) have specific areas of jurisdiction. The administrative setup is distributed division wise. The divisional administration should be the first administrative responder depending on the location of emergency. The Mandal level Administration will be responsible for handling emergency till the Divisional Administration takes over.
The DC's office (District Headquarters) is located in the district headquarters at Nagpur. During an emergency situation, the police communication network through wireless is available. The DC's office has an updated list of addresses, phone numbers etc. of top officials of major departments and offices in the district. A district handbook of statistics (revised annually) has been compiled by the Chief Planning Officer of the District and a copy is available at the District Headquarters.
The contact numbers of various officials and departments as well as experts are given vide Annex III.
Once this offsite plan comes into force, DC's office will be designated as Emergency Control Centre. This ECC should be suitably equipped. The area police station where the incident occurs would be the LECC or the Local Emergency Control Centre- it would establish communication with the ECC.
Tehsils in the district are headed by Tehsildars. Annex II describes the locations of the Tehsils. 2.2.2 Police Resources The police plays a vital role during chemical emergency- control of traffic, mob control, directing evacuation efforts and other functions can only be accomplished under leadership from the police force. The public would also be amenable to listen to advice and instructions from the police rather than say a lorry driver in the event of an LPG truck overturn!
The communication network of the police force is based on conventional wireless sets. All the police stations have the base sets while the Jeeps have the mobile sets. Public warning/ announcement systems such as megaphones, loudspeakers
and other devices are also available with the police and all their vehicles are equipped with these. These can be used for relaying instructions to the publiclight vehicles also have siren. Mob dispersal and control gear is also available with the state police. In addition, the police have access to jeeps, vans and buses for emergency use. The emergency phone no. is 100 which will connect to the local police station. Contact details of important police stations close to the clusters are given in Annex III
2.2.3 Fire Brigade

There are fire stations spread around the District and these also cover the major industrial clusters. Each fire station has water tenders, portable pumps, bore wells fitted with electric motors, trained manpower and necessary fire fighting resources. The fire stations are single unit fire stations with station fire officers, leading firemen, driver operators and firemen. The staff has undergone state fire fighting training and works round the clock. The communication facilities include P & T lines, wireless sets for each station and tender. In addition, departmental wireless system operates from headquarters. Various officers have been provided with handsets. Details of fire stations are given in Annex III.
As for help from neighbouring districts, the ones in proximity include Wardha, Bhandara, Akola having foam tenders and stock and other resources which may be made available if required.
Apart from fire fighting and rescue operations, help is sought from the district fire brigade in rescue operations associated with floods and other calamities. The fire brigade played an important role in the recent flood incidences in the state.
Industrial Fire Fighting Resources: Most of the industries (MAH Units) do not have excess fire fighting resources that could be spared out through mutual aid. Some large MAH industries such as IOCL Khapri bulk depot, HPCL Wardha bulk depot, BPCL are equipped with fire tenders and trained personnel. Details of resources available with MAH industries are given in Annex VIII.
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2.2.4 Health Services The administration of medical assistance is vital in chemical emergency. Assistance by medical and paramedical staff for intoxication, burns etc. must be immediate on demand. Nagpur has 23 hospitals and 129 Dispensaries. Details of important hospitals are given in Annex ///.
2.2.5
Public Works Department (PWD- Roads)
The district map shows the road network in Nagpur. Major villages have motorable roads. 2.2.6 Telecom
The Telecom Office (directly under Central Government) forms an important part of emergency management.
The communication has improved markedly with the IT boom and the state's growth in general. Many District level officials have been provided with mobile phones. Several cellular service providers operate in the district, and, the industrial estates are well covered by the communication system. The communication system is strong and state of the art.
With some modification, it would be possible to provide some Emergency communication system to the Public that could include: Recorded message announcement for those phoning up the exchange a Simultaneous ringing only for consumers for emergency communication/ relaying evacuation decision etc. 2.2.7 Electricity
Cutting off and later restoration of power supply during / after emergency is a critical issue, particularly when flammable gases/ vapours are involved and also when electrocution is imminent. The electricity transmission and distribution system is important. Important SEB contact numbers are given in Annex III.
2.2.8
Food and Civil Supplies
Allocation of food resources to stranded victims, evacuated personnel etc. is an important part of emergency managemept. Immediate relief in terms of food aid may be necessary during/ post emergency. The District Supply Officer would be in-charge of this function.
In case of any emergency, the immediate decision is taken by the MRO to keep the food supplies readily available for distribution / procurement. 2.2.9 Railways
Railway co-operation would be necessary to halt incoming and outgoing passenger trains around the affected zone. It may also become necessary to utilize its manpower and hardware infrastructure for miscellaneous purposes. NAGPUR HAS A MAJOR LOAD OF HAZCHEM CARGO TRANSPORTED BY RAIL INCLUDING LPG AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
2.2.10 Technical
Critical technical aspects and inputs may be entrusted to the Factories Directorate as they are knowledgeable regarding hazard issues in the various factories and also mitigative measures for chemical emergency. The main responsibility for this function lies with the Joint Director of Factories and the Inspector of Factories. The Directorate may arrange for detailed accident investigation, analysis, analysis of past accidents, search for less hazardous technologies, estimating the effective control measures for various scenarios and other important technical functions. A list of experts along with their contact numbers is given in Annex ///.
2.2.11 NGOs and other voluntary organisations NGOs are considered an effective way of communicating with the public. In addition, they can be used for public training, motivation and similar functions, it is felt necessary to involve the active ones before and during a chemical emergency situation. Some contact numbers for important NGOs involved in blood camps etc. is given in Annex III.
CHAPTER-3
MAH UNITS AND CLUSTERS IN THE DISTRICT- THE HAZARD POTENTIAL
The "chemical "hazard potential in the district, as explained earlier, has been inventorized based on the MAH units. Nagpur district has a prominent "chemical " industrial component and is a moderately industrialized district supporting a wide range of chemical, mechanical, electrical and other sectors of industry. These "MAH" industries in Nagpur are spread over the following clusters:
MIDC industrial area, Butibori P.O Shiva (Taluka Katol) Patgowari (Taluka Mansar- Tehsil Ramtek) MIDC Estate (Taluka Kamleshwar) . Wardha Bulk Depot (Taluka Wardha) MIDC Industrial Estate (Taluka Hinga),
There are other MAH units located in village Utty, Umred road and Nagpur cooperative Industrial Estate Uppalwadi, Kamptee road.
Important cluster MAH units information is provided in Annex III.
3.1 CLUSTERS IN THE DISTRICT
Details of the MAH Units such as their address, contact numbers, key personnel for emergency action, chemical inventory etc. is given in Annex- VIII. The distribution of the units is given next. The main cluster is at Khapri- other MAH Units are spread over different parts of the district.
These are also shown in the form of a map- see Map given next at Figure 3.1. Apart from Figure 3.1, selected MAH Units with surroundings based on Satellite imagery are also indicated vide Figures 3.1 A-E- these provide a current idea about the locations and surroundings.
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FIGURE-3.1 OVERALL MAP OF NAGPUR SHOWING MAH UNITS
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FIGURE-3.1A BPCL, LPG BOTTLING PLANT, BUTIBORI AND SURROUNDINGS
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FIGURE-3.1B HPCL, LPG BOTTLING PLANT, BUTIBORI AND SURROUNDINGS
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FIGURE-3.1C HPCL, POL DEPOT, KHAPRI AND SURROUNDINGS
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FIGURE-3.1D IOCL, POL DEPOT, KHAPRI AND SURROUNDINGS
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FIGURE-3.1E ISPAT INDUSTRIES, KALMESHWAR AND SURROUNDINGS
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FIGURE-3.1E KANHAN WATER WORKS, KANHAN RIVER AND SURROUNDINGS
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3-1.1 Cluster Details INDUSTRY HPCL LPG Plant HPCL, bulk depot Khapri IOCL Khapri bulk depot. BPCL Ispat industries Ltd. Yavalkar Pesticides
LOCATION AREA Near Khapri railway station Khapri Near Khapri railway Khapri station. Near Khapri railway Khapri station. D-1 MIDC, Industrial area Butibori A- 10/1 MIDC Estate area Kamleshwar Nagpur co-operative Industrial Estate Hingna Mahuli road Mansar , Ramtek Umred road Nagpur Amravati Highway, Katol Kamptee Hingna Mouda Vadoda Bhandara Road Nagpur
51-59 Uppalwadi, Kamptee road Khandelwal pesticides Pvt Ltd. C-11 MIDC Industrial Estate Roopsons Petrochemicals Pvt. Ltd Patgowari Gas Suvidha Petrochemicals Ltd. Indo Flame Petrochemicals Ltd. Kanhan Water works Mahindra and Mahindra Limited Hindalco Industries Limited Murli Industries Limited Economic Explosive Limited 30 milestone, Vill. Utty P.O. Shiva, Rinqnabodi Located on banks of Kanhan river MIDC area Hingna Road Nagpur Dahali Mouda Vadoda Bhandara Road Nagpur Shiva Sawanga
3.2
VULNERABILITY DISTANCES- CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS-TOXIC AND FIRE/ EXPLOSION SCENARIOS The Vulnerability distances for the various scenarios are given next in Table 3.2A,
which gives the consequence analysis result for the Toxic scenarios along with a reference template (TMP-1,2.....) which are provided in Annex VII. The reference template indicates the plume size and shape and would serve as a guide for the evacuation effort, which would need to be made at the spot. They also serve as a guide for planning. The MSDS for the main materials handled in Nagpur may be found in Annex XI. As can be seen, the distances for fire and explosion scenarios also result in offsite consequences, though the damage distances are much less than in the case of a toxic release. The possibility of a knock on effect has been evaluated in the district qualitatively
and the probability of an incident in one unit causing failure at the other unit is assessed to be unlikely, (except in the Khapri cluster) due to the relatively remote Iocation of the MAH Units (separation distances well beyond the immediate secondary fire zone). Table 3.26 indicates the storage quantity at each MAH Unit with respect to threshold values as per MSIHC Rules and also applicability against Rules 10-12 (Safety Report and External Safety Audit).
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TABLE 3.2A CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS TABLE
Kanhan Water Works
Chlorine (Toxic Hazard)
8X0.9 MT, Catastrophic NA atm. T, 12- Rupture 16 barg pr. Chlorine Tonner Process NA hazard/ minor release from liquid chlorine tube
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
1000 (T-1)
1400 (T-2)
20/120
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
252 (T-3)
463 (T-4)
5/40
Gas Suvtdha Petrochemicals India Ltd.
LPG (explosive hazard)
4X25 Catastrophic 315 MT, amb.T, Rupture (T-5) 8-1 2 barg Pr. LPG transfer pipeline Process hazard/ minor pipeline release NA
445 (T-5)
441 (T-7)
484 (T-8)
542 (T-9)
610 (T-9)
136(JF) (T-6)
199 (JF) (T-6)
NA
NA
20/120
NA
'
NA
NA
NA
NA
23(JFX T-10)
34(JF) (T-10)
NA
NA
OS
Roopsons Petrochemicals Pvt. Ltd.
1X30 MT, Catastrophic 315(T-5)V amb.T, 8- Rupture 12 barg pr.
445 (T-5)
441 (T-7)
484 (T-8)
542 (T-9)
610 (T-9)
136(JF) (T-6)
199 (JF) (T-6)
NA
NA
25/130
LPG transfer pipeline
Process hazard/ minor pipeline release
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
23(JFX T10)
34(JF) (T-10)
NA
NA
OS
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Ispat Industries limited
LPG/ Propane (explosive hazard)
Propane: 3X75 MT, amb. T, 10-15 kg/cm2g pr, LPG: 1 X75 MT.2X 50 MT LPG transfer pipeline
Catastrophic Rupture
505(T-14)
71 2 (T14)
560(T13)
871 (T-14) 954(T-15)
1100 (T-15)
137(JF) (T-12)
200(JF) (T-12)
NA
NA
30/150
LPG/ Propane(explosion hazard)

*
Hindustan LPG (explosive Petroleum hazard) Corporation Ltd., Khapri
4X606 MT, amb.T, 812barg pr.
Process hazard/ minor pipeline release Catastrophic Rupture
NA
NA
NA
'
NA
NA
NA
23(JFXT35)
34(JF) (T-35)
NA
NA
OS
1000(T-17)
1500 (T-17) it.
453 (T-19)
924 (T20) '.
467(T-21)
620 (T-21) 129 (JF) (T-18)
188 (JF) (T-18)
NA
NA
250/1250
NA Process hazard/ minor pipeline release
NA
'
NA
NA
NA
NA
23(JFXT-17) 34(JF) (T-17)
NA
NA
OS
Bharat LPG (explosive Petroleum hazard) Corporation Ltd., Butibori
3X150 MT, amb.T, 812barg pr.
654 (T23)
923 (T23)
440 (T-25)
883 (T-26)
468 (T-27)
6107 (T-27)
127(JF) (T-24)
184 (JF) NA (T-24) '
NA
40/300
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
23(JFXT -28)
34(JF) (T-28)
NA
NA
OS
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NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN Indo Flame LPG (explosive Petrochemicals hazard) Ltd. 2X50 MT, amb.T, 812 barg pr. LPG transfer pipeline Catastrophic 461 (T-29) Rupture 650 (T29) 430 (T-31) 702 (T-32) 456 (T-33) 593 (T-33) 126 (JF) (T-30) 183 (JF) (T-30) NA NA 20/70
MA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
23(JF) (T-34)
34 (JF) (T-34)
NA
NA
OS
Indian Oil MS (fire hazard) Corporation Limited, Khapri HSD (fire hazard)
2X740 MT
Catastrophic NA Rupture
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
42 (T-35)
57 (T-35)
NA
NA
OS
2X2544 MT Line leak
Catastrophic NA Rupture Process hazard/ minor pipeline release NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
42 (T-36)
57 (T-36) LOCAL
NA
NA
OS
HSD/MS/SKO
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
LOCAL
NA
NA
OS
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Wardha
MS (fire hazard)
1 X703 MT
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
42 (T-37)
57 (1-37)
NA
NA
OS
HSD (fire hazard)
2X3900 MT
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
42 (T-36)
57 (T-36)
NA
NA
OS
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NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN Yavalkar Pesticides Technical grade pesticides <10 WT (in Catastrophic drums) Rupture Solvent pipeline NA
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA LOCAL LOCAL LOCAL LOCAL LOCAL NA LOCAL NA OS OS
MA Process hazard/ minor solvent release
Khandelwal Pesticides Pvt, Ltd.
Technical grade pesticides
<10MT (in drums) Solvent pipeline
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
LOCAL
LOCAL
LOCAL
LOCAL
OS
NA . Process hazard/ minor solvent release
NA *,
NA
:NA
NA
NA
LOCAL
LOCAL
NA
NA
OS
Mahindra & Mahindra
LPG/ Propane(explosion hazard)

*
Propane: 2X15 MT, amb. T, 10-15 kg/cm2g pr, Propane: .2X 15 MT LPG /Propane transfer pipeline Propane: 16.75 MT
505(T-14)
71 2 (T14)
560(T13)
871 (T-14) 954(T-15)
1100 (T-15)
137(JF) (T-12)
200(JF) (T-12)
NA
NA
30/150
Process hazard/ minor pipeline release Catastrophic Rupture
NA
NA
NA
'
NA
NA
NA
23(JFXT35)
34(JF) (T-35)
NA
NA
OS
Hindalco Industries Limited
505(T-14)
71 2 (T14)
560(T13)
871 (T-14) 954(T-15)
1100 (T-15)
137(JF) (T-12)
200(JF) (T-12)
NA
NA
30/150
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NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN LPG/ Propane(explosion hazard)

*
NA
NA
NA
'
NA
NA
NA
23(JFXT35)
34(JF) (T-35)
NA
NA
OS
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TABLE 3.2B- SUMMARY TABLE- APPLICABILITY OF RULES 10-12, STATUS AND REPORTABLE ACCIDENTS INVOLVING HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS
S. No.
Name of the Unit
Hazardous Chemical
Total Storage Threshold for application of MSIHC Rules 10-12 quantity

2424 MT
Safety Report required and status Yes- prepared and kept updated No Yes- prepared and kept updated No Yes- prepared and kept updated Yes- prepared and kept updated No No
Reportable accidents involving hazardous chemicals

Nil
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Khapri Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Wardha
Liquefied Petroleum Gas
200 MT
Motor Spirit
1000 MT 10000 MT
5000 MT 10000MT
Nil
High Speed Diesel, Superior Kerosene Oil

3
Indian Oil Corporation Limited
Motor Spirit High Speed Diesel, Superior Kerosene Oil, Aviation Turbine Fuel Liquefied Petroleum Gas,
Propane
2000 MT 1000QMT
5000 MT 10000 MT
Nil
Ispat Industries limited
400 MT
200. MT
Nil
5 6
Kanhan Water Works Yavalkar Pesticides
Chlorine
8MT 2MT
25 MT
Nil
Technical Grade Pesticides (malathion, methyl parathion) Aromax, C-9 solvent Liquefied Petroleum Gas Liquefied Petroleum Gas Liquefied Petroleum Gas
Nil
55 MT 30 MT 100 MT 150 MT
50,000 MT 200 MT 200 MT 200 MT
No No.
No. Nil
7 8 9
Roopsons Petrochemicals Pvt. Ltd. Gas Suvidha Petrochemicals

Ltd.
Nil
Nil
Indo Flame Petrochemicals Ltd.
No
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NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN 10

Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Liquefied Petroleum Gas 450 MT 200 MT
11
Khandelwal Pesticides Pvt. Ltd.
Technical Grade Pesticides (acephate, methyl parathkjn) Solvents LPG LPG / Propane
1-2 MT
Yes- prepared and kept updated No
Nil
Nil 500kg 20 MT 30 MT 50000 MT 200 MT 200 MT
No No Yes- prepared and kept updated Yes- prepared and kept updated NO
Nil Nil
12 13
Morarji Textiles ltd, (non MAH) Mahindra and Mahindra Limited
14
Propane / LPG
16.75 MT
200 MT
Nil
15
Murli Industries Limited
Chlorine
15 T
25 MT
Nil
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3.3
ROAD TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS
Transportation sector is an extremely important sector contributing to offsite effects involving hazardous chemicals. Any incident in these areas is likely to render significant population clusters vulnerable due to: The public is not aware of the hazardous nature of the chemicals nor is it trained in precautionary and preventive measures to avoid exposure. There could be high density of population pockets. The driver and cleaner of the tanker are unable to impress the gravity of the situation upon the public and are unsuccessful in preventing thronging of people at the incident site. The transportation of hazardous goods to and from the MAH units includes the following: LPG by tankers POL products (MS, SKO, HSD etc.) by road tanker and rail tankers Required equipment, technology and manpower are lacking at the site of incident (they have to be procured from the nearest relevant industrial unit) Fire fighting or spill containing or leak rectifying resources are not immediately available and a small incident might ultimately lead to a large scale incident.
- Other hazardous materials such as pesticides by truck in packaged form (carboys, drums etc.), Chlorine in tonners
Other toxic, flammable and explosive materials are also commonly transported by road. The Vulnerability distances in case of common chemicals leakage during road transportation are given next in Table 3.4. The IDLH value is selected for toxic releases and first degree burns for fire scenario and 0.1 bar over pressure for explosions (as per MoEF guidelines) for vulnerability.
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TABLE 3.3
SI. No.
Consequence Analysis for common Hazchem transported

Typical transported Quantity (MT) 1 14 14 14
Hazchem
Scenario
Damage Distance
Chlorine
2 3 4 5 6
Diesel
Toxic Release Pool Fire Fire Pool Fire BLEVE VCE

Unconfined Pool fire
1.4 Km 28m
30m 28m 150m 200m 15m
*
Toluene
Kerosene LPG
Spill/leak of solvents and other Flammable chemicals followed by fire.
18
Corrosive chemicals such as acids and alkalies will cause damage only through physical contact or when in very close proximity to the spill of volatile chemicals. Adequate protection is available by using common PPE such as gloves, goggles, facemask, nose mask, etc.
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3.4
RAIL TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS
In addition to the hazchem transportation by road trucks/tankers, some materials, particularly petroleum products, are also transported by rail tankers. Nagpur district has major bulk oil depots and LPG Bottling plants using rail transportation undertaken by rail tankers. The typical capacities for different petroleum products along with the damage distances under worst case scenario are tabulated below:
Consequence Analysis for common Hazchem transported
s. No. 1 2 3 4
Product
Raii Tank Scenario Wagon Capacity (MT) 47 53 51 51 ' Pool Fire Pool Fire Pool Fire Pool Fire
Damage Distance (m) 142 112 121 121
Motor Spirit Diesel Kerosene Aviation Turbine Fuel Furnace Oil Liquefied Petroleum Gas
5 6
52 35
Spill BLEVE
__ 515
BLEVE : Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion Damage Distance is calculated for Injury zone radius corresponding to first degree bums Furnace oil needs an initiator to burn, will not catch Tire in presence of spark
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CHAPTER-4 EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS AND ROLES

4.1 OVERALL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE The District Collector (DC) is the overall in charge for planning, execution and coordination of off-site emergency management activities as per the MSIHC Rules. DC has constituted the District Crisis Groups (DCG) for Nagpur and Local Crisis Groups (LCGs) district hazard pockets at the local level are under consideration. The LCG would consist of task-specific coordinators who in-turn formulate and mobilize requisite number of action teams to provide emergency response. The DC is also required to communicate with state, national and international emergency agencies for information and support on response strategies. 4.2 COMPOSITION & FUNCTION OF DISTRICT CRISIS GROUP
Composition District Crisis Group has been constituted for Nagpur District, in line with the guidelines given in Chemical Accident (CA), Emergency Response and Preparedness Rules 1996.
Functions The DCG is the apex body in the district to deal with major chemical accidents and to provide expert guidance for appropriately handling them. As per CA Rules, 1996, the DCG will: assist in the preparation of the District Off-site Emergency Plan review all the on-site emergency plans prepared by the occupiers of respective MAH installations as inputs for the preparation of the District Offsite Emergency Plan assist the district administration in the management of chemical accidents at a site tying within the district continuously monitor every chemical accident
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ensure continuous (information flow from the District to the Center and State Crisis Groups regarding accident situation and mitigation efforts conduct at-least one full scale mock-drill of a chemical accident at a site each year and forward a report of the strengths and weaknesses of the plan to the state crisis group
4.3
meet every 45 days and send a report to the State Crisis Group
COMPOSITION & FUNCTION OF LOCAL CRISIS GROUP
Composition Local Crisis Groups (LCGs) are being constituted for different regions of the District, in line with the guidelines given in CA rules 1996. The suggestive composition of the LCG is given next. The contact numbers of suggested members of LCG (latest constitution and members and to be kept updated periodically) are to be filled. The interaction and overall flow/ organogram are indicated vide Annex V. Functions The LCG is an apex body in the industrial pocket to deal with major chemical accidents and coordinate efforts in emergency planning, preparedness and their mitigation. As per CA Rules, 1996, the LCG will: Update local level emergency plan for the industrial pocket. Ensure dove-tailing of local emergency plan with District Off-site Emergency Plan. Train personnel involved in chemical accident management. Educate the population likely to be affected in a chemical accident about the remedies and existing preparedness in the area. Conduct at-least one full scale mock-drill of a chemical accident at a site every six months and forward the report to the DCG. Respond to all public inquiries on the subject. Meet every month and forward a copy of the proceedings to the DCG.
The LCG is also responsible for providing information regarding possible chemical accident at a site in the industrial pocket and other related information to the public on request. It will also assist the MAH units in the industrial pocket in taking
appropriate steps to inform persons likely to be affected by a chemical accident. The MAH installations in the industrial pocket will assist and facilitate the functioning of LCG.
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EMERGENCY ORGANISATION OF THE AREA LOCAL CRISIS GROUP (LCG)

ADM/SDM. Area Emergency Authority Chairman of LCG Inspector of Factories Member Secretary of LCG
Fire Office/ Fire Services Coordinator
2 Eminent Doctors in the Area Medical Coordinators
Representatives of Industries Material coordinators
1 Representative of Civil Defence Rescue Coordinator
Station House Officer Security Coordinator
2 Transporters of Hazardous Chemicals Transport Coordinators
Community Leader/Sarpanch/ Village Pradhan Evac, & Rehab. Coordinators
Social Workers Food & Water Supply Coordinators at Temporary Shelters
Block Development Officer Utilities Coordinator
1 Representative of an NGO Medical aid at Temporary Shelters
Primary Health Officer Public Works Coordinator
Editor of Local Newspaper Communications Coordinator
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4.4
EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS
The most important requirement during an emergency situation is wellcoordinated efforts for effective management and control. This calls for identification of personnel and resources that will be involved in each function of emergency planning such as fire fighting, medical management, rescue and combat, evacuation communication, etc.
Special teams need to be constituted for the following activities:
Fire Fighting functions Medical management Technical functions Security functions Communication functions Welfare functions Rescue functions
The charts for these are given vide Annex IV.
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4.5
CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF LOCAL COMMAND POSTS
REQUIREMENT: Wherever a coordinated large-scale response may become necessary due to a major spill or discharge of hazardous material, it is required to quickly establish one or more command posts from where the emergency actions can be directed and coordinated.
ACTION ITEMS:
Select an appropriate location (and possible alternate) for rapid establishment of a primary command post or emergency operations center. Plan for a field command post near the site of the emergency from which spill containment and countermeasure operations may be conducted when necessary. Designate the individuals who should immediately report to each site in the event of a major emergency. Establish a "check-in" location where key officials can be "logged in" and their movements tracked once they appear on the scene. Establish an ID system to control and track entry and movement of public authorities and emergency crews. Equip sites with the office equipment, maps, data sources, communication systems, and other supplies and resources for command and control of response activities. Provide security and access control at vital sites such as the emergency operations center, communications center, media center, emergency supply center or depot, and the incident site itself.
One of the first steps of a response action must be restriction of access to the spill site and other hazardous areas. Experienced emergency coordinators will attest to the validity of this observations.
It has to be kept in mind during planning for the above activities that areas outside established hazard zones will continue to require some degree of police, fire, rescue, ambulance, health care, and public works services.
Consideration is required for identifying sources of video and telephoto equipment that can be used to view particularly hazardous accident sites from a safe distance on a continuous basis at command, control, and media centers, A close-xip view of the site on
a television screen can be extremely helpfui to all parties to the response action in evaluating and choosing the appropriate course of action, as well as satisfy media requests for photo coverage and many of the information needs of government officials on scene. It also enables experts to provide guidance to response personnel approaching the site to undertake fire control, leak plugging, spill containment, and/or spill cleanup efforts.
4.6
EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS- CLUSTER WISE ACTION PLANS
Emergency actions cluster wise for selected hazard scenarios are given in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER - 5
DISTRICT EMERGENCY RESOURCES
The emergency resources available within the district or within the clusters are very important for emergency response. The resources of importance include fire fighting resources, medical resources, police resources, water resources, trained emergency personnel, breathing apparatus resources, fire suits resources and others.
Resources are available either with MAN units {also possibly with non MAH units) and with district authorities such as the fire brigade, district hospitals, police and others. Such resources are a vital link in the entire emergency planning and response process.
5.1 5.1.1
FIRE-FIGHTING RESOURCES Fire Fighting resources with the district administration.
Fire fighting facilities are available with the fire brigade - contact details are given in Annexure III. The fire stations are well spread but and cover the district and well are equipped and staffed for major fire arising out of offsite chemical emergencies.
Nagpur also has the advantage of having the National Fire Services College located in the city- the College has infrastructure for imparting training on techniques for fire prevention, fire fighting, rescue and other related aspects..
5.1.2
Fire Fighting resources with MAH Units
Some large MAH industries such as IOCL Khapri bulk depot, HPCL Khapri bulk depot, BPCL are equipped with fire tenders, and trained personnel with some excess fire fighting resources (that could be spared out through mutual aid). Details of resources available with MAH industries are given in Annex VIII.
5.1.3 Types of Personnel Protective Equipment
Personal Protection Equipment are required to ensure safety of the affected personnel, members of fire fighting and rescue teams at the time of emergencies involving toxic and
flammable material. The equipment should be capable of providing complete protection and simultaneously be comfortable and convenient to wear.
The type of equipment needed depends on a number of factors such as degree of protection required, nature of the substance against which protection is required, the nature of work to be performed and the circumstances likely to be encountered in the event of an emergency, etc. Improvements are constantly being made in the design of devices for personal protection and the management of the works should ensure that the best available are being used.
5.1.3.1 Respiratory Protection
Respiratory protection equipment is available in two main forms viz. breathing Apparatus which enables the user to breath independently of the surrounding atmosphere. Respirator, that enables the user to breath from the surrounding atmosphere, by inhaling through a filtering device. Respirators should not be worn if the oxygen level is below 20% for any reason. Several types are available and their qualities and limitations must be fully realized. The main problem is the leakage of toxic vapours past the face piece. 5.1.3.2 Self Contained Breathing Apparatus The open circuit apparatus carries its own compressed air or oxygen in cylinders. These are connected directly to the face piece through a pressure reducing valve and demand valve. This apparatus gives a fair degree of protection against high concentration of vapour and is recommended when interference with mobility is unacceptable.
5.1.3.3 Canister Respirator
A canister respirator can provide adequate protection against specified gases in open air situations, where there is no oxygen deficiency and the concentration of toxic vapour is low. Care should be taken to ensure that correct canister is fitted and it should be remembered that the absorbing capacity of canisters is limited. The toxic vapours are absorbed on a suitable material, usually activated charcoal, contained in a canister, which may be fitted directly to the face piece or carried elsewhere on the users' body and connected to the facepiece by a tube.
5.1.3.4 Eve Protection The personnel should be encouraged to guard against falling splinters of solids or splashes from injurious liquid for eye protection. Goggles of an approved pattern should be made available to all those who require them for safe operation and emergency management. In some cases, special safety spectacles may provide adequate protection whereas for other conditions a gas-tight goggle may be needed.
5.1.3.5 Head and Face Protection

The wearing of an approved pattern of safety helmet should be encouraged as a regular habit to guard against normal industrial hazards. Hoods designed to drape the shoulders or tuck into working clothes should be available where protection for head and shoulders is required from the hazardous substance. In certain cases, caps and face visors may provide adequate protection.
5.13.6 Hand and Arm Protection Hands and arms exposed to dangerous substances should always be protected by gloves, gauntlets and armlets wherever necessary. Care should be taken to ensure that the dexterity of the operator is not hampered by wearing such equipment. The material used and texture must be adequate to provide the desired protection against penetration of dangerous substances.
5.1.3.7 Protection against Flame and Heat Persons involved in rescue and combat operations may be required to work in the presence of intense heat and flames. For this they require special clothing and equipment. Most materials used in normal garments are combustible and easily catch fire especially when exposed to high intensity radiation or flames. Flame retardant treatment may prevent or probably delay ignition. Thickly knit clothes take a longer time to burn as compared to thin and loosely knit fabrics. The clothing therefore must not only be well designed, it should also be carefully maintained and intelligently used. 5.2 5.2.1 MEDICAL FACILITIES Medical facilities within the district Nagpur is a major city with excellent medftcal infrastructure. The major medical
facilities contact details within the district are given in Annex III. Nagpur has 23 government hospitals and 129 Dispensaries. 5.2.2 Medical facilities with MAH units
There are no companies in the district having their own hospitals in their townships with all round capability (with the exception of Ispat Industries). The number of people likely to be affected during various possible offsite incidents is likely to exceed the capacity of beds and medical facilities in the district. The planning goal must be for the department to be capable of providing first aid and transport facilities to victims for safe transport to hospitals quickly. At a time, it is possible that 10-15 ambulances are required to transport critically injured persons to different hospitals. Resources from private hospitals, Red Cross and other agencies need to be kept up-dated for immediate mobilization on demand.
Specific antidotes for the major chemicals handled in the district are indicated in the RIDS (Response Information Data Sheets) section in Annex IX. As certain antidotes have a limited shelf life, a minimum stock needs to be maintained at each hospital for catering to .the initial rush of victims. They should also maintain a list of agencies from where additional stock can be obtained at short notice. Indicative list of equipment and medicines for 1000 persons is provided inn the next page. The items and-treatment methodologies suggested, need to be approved by the registered medical practitioner before administering the same.
Indicative list of medicines/ equipment to be stocked at treatment center (for 1000 persons) and Antidotes and treatment procedures and suggested emergency treatment with general antidotes are given vide Annex VI.
5.3
ROADS AND VEHICLES
In an emergency, when the need for evacuation arises, quick arrangement of requisite vehicles has to be made. The district transport authorities can be contacted for arranging the requisite number of vehicles which can be ascertained on site depending on the extent of damage which is likely. Almost all MAH units have vehicles available round the clock. Industries like Ispat have their own ambulances.
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Roads: The major roads in Nagpur district are by and large in reasonable condition. Major road works are in progress at various parts, particularly Khapri side, due to the large scale road development and IT infrastructure development taking place across the state. Stoppages near the Khapri area result in long queues of tankers carrying hazardous material with the related hazard. Clearly, even a small leak can lead to a major emergency. 5.4 WARNING & COMMUNICATION
Proper and timely notification of an accident to response agencies and people is absolutely vital. Important issues include: Creating awareness amongst the responders and local population through pamphlets, Video Shows, small advertisements in radio and cable televisions, and conducting training programs with respect to the communication of emergency and related emergency management topics. The LCG must take an active interest in this activity. Evaluating the need for requirement of vehicles fitted with sirens and public address system for warning and notification. Identifying all such vehicles available with different departments. Shortlisting those, which will be free-and can be made use of during an emergency must be an ongoing activity at the LCG.
All MAN units have basic communication systems available which include P&T lines, intercom, fax etc. Larger companies have installed more sophisticated systems such as Public address Systems, wireless communication (Walkie Talkies etc.) and have some communication back up available. Mobile phones are seen with all companies and the network coverage is very good for all the clusters.
5.5
POLICE RESOURCES
The police plays a vital role during chemical emergency- control of traffic, mob control, directing evacuation efforts and other functions can only be accomplished under leadership from the police force. Police stations are well spread out and cover the district
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comprehensively, including the industrial clusters. Details of Police Stations are given in Annex-Ill. 5.6 ESTABLISHMENT OF EMERGENCY CONTROL ROOMS AND (LOCAL) COMMAND POSTS FIELD
An emergency situation would require a tremendous co-ordination effort and loss of coordination is likely to interrupt the successful management of the emergency. For this purpose, it is necessary to establish both a DISTRICT and a LOCAL or FIELD Emergency Control Center or LECC. The LECC would ensure communication with the site, authorities, press, coordinate evacuation / related operations on a district basis, maintain contacts with public and outside government agencies, procure necessary supplies & resources, etc. The LECC site can then focus co-ordination towards combating the hazard in question.
DECC is the District headquarters, namely the DC Office. The' DECC needs to be manned around tfte clock in order to quickly respond to any emergency situation. This location has modem communication facilities round the clock. During an emergency, the DECC will be manned by some key members of DCG / LCG.
The DECC has to have a "Check-in" location requiring all individuals to "sign-in" and "sign-out". The members will be issued special identity cards and/or badges that will authorize them to pass through roadblocks and enter controlled areas if necessary. Colour coded badges or items of clothing or accessories such as jackets or helmets may be used to designate different levels of access and/or on-scene authority.
Following facilities will be required to be established at the DECC :
a) Adequate office furniture i.e., chairs tabie(s) for at least 20 persons {for Chairman and.other members of the District Crisis Group),
b) Office equipment and general items for all the members of DCG such as writing pads, pens/pencils, erasers, photocopier with adequate stock of copying paper, etc.
c) Computer for data retrieval and analysis including relevant software for real-time estimation of damage distances.
d) At least two dedicated external telephone lines. Hotline(s) having link with the telephones of all the members of DCG is preferable for prompt notification of an emergency is preferable e) At least five copies of following information: Name, address, contact numbers (office and after office) of all the members of CCG, SCO, DCG, LCG and alternates, if any. List and contact information of the major hospitals, ambulance services, fire stations, police stations, rehabilitation centers, voluntary organizations, etc. in the district and adjoining areas with capacity . List and contact information regarding the sources of water for fire tenders in the district and adjoining areas List and location of availability of specific antidotes required during emergency with name and contact information of concerned persons List of schools, major shopping areas, tempfes, cinema theatres, etc. where there is a possibility of concentration of population List of sensitive areas such as prisons, hospitals, etc. which require special evacuation arrangements f) Vulnerability templates and corresponding scaled maps of the area
g)
One large maps of the district, showing location of MAH units and resource agencies such as fire brigade, police, hospitals, etc., network of roads, and other relevant areas as mentioned above.
h) Copies of the Off-site Emergency Plan i) j) Copies of the roles and responsibilities of each member of the DCG and the LCG At least two vehicles with flashing lights and warning siren for members who may need to visit the incident site for directing activities
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As described earlier, in addition to the DECC, Local Command Posts (LECCs) are also essential wherever a coordinated, large scale response is necessary due to an emergency. This calls for quick establishment of one or more LECC from where the emergency response can be directed and coordinated.
For establishing the LECCs, the local police station is the best choice. The facilities necessary at the LECC include: Location : Proximity to the possible scene of emergency, cross Communication Facilities : wind (outside vulnerable zone and
threatened areas) Having at least 2 telephone lines one of which should have STD facility Manpower : It should continuously be manned
Office space
It should have an area adequate for housing at least 10 people at the time of emergency.
Additional facilities such as vehicles, PA system, hotline to DC's office, area maps, emergency power such as a DG set, are useful. 5.7 COMMUNITY INFORMATION AND EVACUATION ASPECTS
5.7.1
Overview of "shelter-in-place" concepts
There are essentially two ways to protect the public from the effects of toxic gas or vapour discharges into the atmosphere. One of these methods is evacuation and involves relocation of threatened populations to shelters in safer areas. The other involves giving instructions to people to remain inside their homes or places of business until the danger passes. In other words, it involves telling people to "shelter-in-place."
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Evacuation is clearly safer with respect to the specific hazards posed by a toxic gas or vapour release but has certain limitations and may pose new problems. For example, it is fairly well appreciated that a major evacuation takes time and may not be feasible once large amounts of toxic gases or vapours have actually entered the atmosphere. Indeed, asking people in the path of a toxic cloud or plume to leave their homes may actually cause greater harm than good in some cases. Thus, large-scale evacuations in response to toxic gas or vapour hazards are best considered when : There is a strong potential for a toxic discharge, the discharge has not yet taken place, and there appears to be time available to relocate people.
The discharge has taken place but people are sufficiently far downwind to permit time for evacuation.
People not yet in the direct path of a cloud or plume are threatened by a future shift in the wind direction.
The safety hazards of evacuation are outweighed by benefits of the action, and/or Telling people to shelter-in-place might not fully protect them from serious
consequences.
Much has been written and said over the years pertaining to the merits and demerits of evacuation, but little information has been made available on sheltering-in-place and indeed, far too many people and organizations have come to believe that sheltering-inplace will provide adequate protection to the public under a wide variety of circumstances without actually studying the issue involved. It is therefore the purpose of this text to explain why staying indoors provide some degree of protection, to discuss the degree of protection that might be expected, and to discuss how best to instruct the public to shelter-in-place.
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5.7.1.10utside air entry into buildings If a building or other structure is airtight, i.e like a sealed box, people inside will be completely immune from exposure to any toxic gases or vapours outside its walls. On the other hand, if walls of the upwind and downwind side of the building are missing, these people will be exposed to the same level of concentration "indoors" as they would be if they were in the open. It is easy to understand, therefore, that the exposure of people inside a structure to toxic gases or vapours in the external environment is a function of the "air tightness" of the building and the rate at which outdoor air passes in and out.
There are essentially three main ways in which air can enter (and exit) a structure, these being: Natural ventilation Mechanical ventilation, and Infiltration
Natural ventilation refers to entry of outdoor air into a building through open windows or doors without assistance from fans. Obviously, the more openings in a building, the greater the rate at which outdoor air can pass through. Occupants can generally control this rate by opening and closing various doors and windows.
Mechanical ventilation refers to the use of fans and other equipment to bring air into a building, possibly heat, cool, filter, and/or re-circuiate it several times, and then exhaust it from the structure. This type of system is most often seen in office buildings, other commercial establishments and factories. As above, occupants usually have considerable control over the rate of ventilation.
Infiltration is air leakage into a building through cracks and small openings around windows and doors and through floors and walls. The rate at which air enters a building by this mechanism depends on the type of building, workmanship and material applied during construction, and the condition of the building. Infiltration differs from natural and mechanical ventilation in the sense that the occupants are generally considered to have little effective control over its rate. The total rate at which the outdoor air enters a building, for the purpose of this discussion, can be considered as being the sum of the three types of the ventilation described above.
Rates of outdoor air ventilation are typically expressed in units of air changes per hour (acph), this being the number of building volumes of outdoor air that enter the building in the course of an hour. For example, if a building has an internal volume of 10,000 cubic feet, and 20,000 cubic feet of outdoor air enters the building each hour, its total fresh air ventilation rate is said to be 2.0 acph. If only 5,000 cubic feet of air enters the building in the same span of time, the rate becomes 0.5 acph.
The natural ventilation rate in structures with open windows and doors can vary widely and depends on the area of opening, the wind speed, the orientation of openings with respect to the wind direction, and the building volume. It could be as little as a fraction of 1.0 acph or as high as 80 - 90 acph, and possibly'even more if residents do not mind a strong breeze blowing through the structure on a windy day.
Mechanical ventilation rate in office buildings and the like typically range from 4 to 12 acph with certain exceptions. During pleasant weather, 90 to 100 percent of this air might be from the outdoors. In very cold or very hot weathers, building operators often have the option to reduce heating or cooling costs by lowering the fresh air entry rate to 5-35 percent of the mechanical ventilation rate by re-circulating large volumes of air.
5.7.1.2 Effect of Total Outdoor Air Ventilation Rate on Indoor Exposures The overall subject of how outdoor air pollutants can affect exposures indoors is rather complex and is best discussed using two examples; one for the case when a distinct cloud of airborne contaminants passes a building, and another for the case when the building is engulfed by a plume of vapour or gas for a prolonged period of time. The cloud is assumed to pass in a total time period of 30 minutes, while the plume is assumed to
last 10 hours. Both the cloud and the plume are assumed to have an average contaminant concentration of 100 ppm for the duration of their existence at any outdoor location. Important observations are that:
Indoor concentrations increase steadily until the point in time that the discharge ceases and the last of the airborne contamination passes a building.
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Tight buildings or average buildings in highly favourable weather, with air change rates of 0.1 acph are expected to experience a peak indoor contaminant concentration only 5% of the outdoor average after 30 minutes. Due to the lack of ventilation, however, indoors levels will drop slowly after the cloud has passed.
"Leaky" buildings or average buildings exposed to severe weather conditions, with air change rates of 1.5 - 2.5 acph, may experience 45 to 65 % of outdoor concentration in 30 minutes.
Buildings that have open windows or doors or mechanical ventilation system bringing in outdoor air at high rates will experience contaminant concentrations close to those experienced outdoors.
Peak indoor levels will be lower if the cloud passes in less than 30 minutes and higher if the cloud requires more than 30 minutes to pass.
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5.8
CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF REHABILITATION CENTERS FOR EVACUEES
The following table provides details of the item and criteria for ranking of potential rehabilitation centers:
Sr. No. 1.
2. 3.
Item
Criteria
Location Capacity Food

Potable Water Sanitation Security Facilities for physically handicapped First aid/Medical help Structural Stability
Cross wind, Distance from potential emergency site

500,1000, 1500 persons, No. of rooms, size of each room Proximity to market or areas from where food and refreshments can be made available Availability of potable water in m3 , Number of toilets and wash rooms for every 100 persons
4. 5. 6.
Boundary, fence, security guards, or possibility of deployment' of police personnel Beds, wheel chairs - proximity to areas from where it can be made available at shaft notice. Proximity to hospitals/ nursing homes, chemist shops and provision of doctor at the center. Special consideration should be given in case of explosion hazard potential in the nearby industry.
7.
8.
9.
Potential centers can be gauged based on the above criteria and ranked to get the best suited for particular emergency scenario.
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5.9
TRAINING OF RESPONDERS
All the issues raised above require that personnel involved in emergency preparedness and response be properly trained to execute their respective functions. As emergency planning, preparedness and response involves many responders and activities, training requirements for each of the groups has to be identified and training be an ongoing exercise. The training program for the members of DCG/LCG has to be exhaustive. As per para 10 & 13 of CA Rules, 1996, it is the responsibility of the LCG to:
educate the population likely to be affected in a chemical accident about the remedies and existing preparedness in the area.
respond to all public inquiries on the subject provide information regarding possible chemical accident at a site in the industrial pocket and related information to the public on request, and
assist the MAH units in the industrial pocket in taking appropriate steps to inform persons likely to be affected by a chemical accident
The affected population MUST be involved in these training activities. They need to be made aware about the MAH units, their hazard potential, response required following alarm and notification, etc. This calls for extensive and ongoing. The various methods for imparting relevant training must be taken up and the community awareness raised substantially.
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CHAPTER 6
PRE EMERGENCY PLANNING
An effective offsite disaster management plan must have highly effective and proactive pre-and post emergency planning. Obviously, FAILING TO PLAN IS PLANNING TO FAIL! Each person in charge of a function during emergency must be well aware in advance as to what his/ her role and duties are and exactly what has to be done. It is essential that the response agencies and other emergency personnel are ALWAYS at a high state of alert. The planning phase is also essential to ensure any bottlenecks in the plan (such as Open loops, impractical actions, communication bottlenecks etc.) are ironed out. The next sections discuss the pre emergency planning and preparedness functions for critical functions.
6.1
DISTRICT EMERGENCY AUTHORITY - DISTRICT COLLECTOR (DC)
The DC is nominated as Chairman of the District Crisis Group. He has the overall responsibility of the Offsite emergency management in the District. In case of any emergency, on the request of the LCG, DCG or the officials in charge of the company where the emergency takes place, the District Collector will put the Offsite Plan in action. The DC's responsibilities are: Select (and suitably train) first and second alternate officers to act on his behalf during an emergency situation. These officers must keep the DC updated on their movements and ensure that DC can get in touch whenever required. In addition, they must be available for assisting the DC in case of any emergency.
Ensure roles and responsibilities of DCG and LCG members are well defined and persons are adequately trained for the functions identified.
In association with members of DCG, identify and assess the adequacy of resources available in the district to combat various possible emergency scenarios and prepare a plan to build the resource base to the required level. This point has been covered in chapter 5 in detail.
Being chairman of the DCG, the DC will formulate the response objectives and strategies for various possible off-site emergency scenarios, with assistance from
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all the members of DCG. Detailed response procedures for each accident scenario have been provided in the next chapter. In association with Chairman of LCG, plan and organize public awareness programs to educate the population likely to be affected in a chemical accident about the remedies, existing preparedness in the area, do's and don'ts during emergency, etc. 6.2 MEMBER SECRETARY - ADDTL / JT. DIRECTOR OF FACTORIES
Select and train first and second alternate officers to act on his behalf during an emergency situation.
Define roles and responsibilities of LCG / DCG members and other members of the LCGs from time to time and update the same.
Provide / organize adequate training to Emergency Response personnel and other members.
Use his good knowledge of the industries and their operations and good knowledge of the area with respect to location of resources and facilities, communication and transport network and disseminate this information to other members of the DCG & LCG
Identify, provide and maintain adequate facilities in District Emergency Control Center (DECC) and at Local Command Posts (LCPs)
Organize meeting of DCG every 45 days (as per Chemical Accident rules) Organize for Conduct of mock drills at least once every year and monitor progress, weaknesses etc. Appoint neutral umpires to view and assess individual activities in the Plan.
Forward the report of such trials to State Crisis Group.
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Update the off-site emergency plan in consultation with the members of DCG, as and when required.
6.3 COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR - GM-TELEPHONES
A strong communication network between the personnel responsible for carrying out rescue, control, and other related tasks is very essential, particularly as a number of different agencies or organizations at the local, district, state, and even national level have important roles. The main responsibilities of communications coordinator for emergency planning and preparedness are to:
Define roles and responsibilities of his local representative (Member of LCG) and provide training to him and other staff who may have to be involved in emergency operations.
Identify
and
keep
updated
list
of
all
available
means
of
communication/warning of an emergency such as-fond telephones, cell phones, walkie-talkie, cable TV, radio station, etc. that can be used during an emergency.
Also identify Ham (and equivalent systems) radio operators in the area and assess how they can help during an emergency and formulate a procedure for seeking their help when required
Identify and list all the members of DCG/LCG and other emergency personnel who have walkie-talkie and prepare a list of frequency and address code for contacting them during an emergency. Also prepare a list of members having cell phones so that they can be contacted during an emergency.
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Prepare up to date pocket telephone book of key persons such as the members of DCG, LCG, their nominated alternates, their subordinates who might have to be instructed for carrying out specific tasks during an emergency, representatives of industries and experts. The telephone book should include the name,
designation, emergency designation, organization/department, office and residential address and telephone numbers, cell phone numbers etc.
Ensure that all the members of the DCG/LCG have a copy of the pocket telephone book, so that, irrespective of their location and time of occurrence of an emergency, they can start coordinating response activities before reaching DECC. Ensure the same for the first and second alternates of ail the members.
Provide special telephone lines with unlisted (these telephone numbers should not appear in the public telephone directory) numbers to response agencies wherever a need is felt for the same.
Arrange to establish a system in the telephone exchange to simultaneously contact ail people having telephone connections so that in case of emergency, people residing in the areas likely to be affected can be apprised of the emergency and guided about the actions to be taken by these people.
Prepare and keep update a list of contact information of sensitive areas having large gathering of people at any given time such as educational institutions, cinema halls, hospitals, prisons, etc* which may require urgent notification. The Communication coordinator in association with trie Member Secretary and the Transport coordinator identify sensitive areas along the major transport corridor of the district and provide them with communication facilities (if already not present).
Prepare standard message formats (in English and local language) to be used in radio/television broadcast or outdoor communication through loudspeakers to facilitate and reduce time necessary to alert the public of an emergency and inform them of the protective actions to be taken. Sample instructions for toxic vapour release scenario could be:
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There is a chemical emergency at Name of the Unit/Location. Kindly follow
these instructions: In case of Shelter-in-place: * * Everyone is advised to stay indoors Close all doors, windows and ventilation systems
* *
Please keep your face covered by a wet towel If possible stay under a shower
In case of evacuation: (based on information provided by Evacuation Coordinator)
Everyone is advised to come out of their houses immediately and proceed to

Name of the Assembly Point via Name of the route.
You are advised to bring any prescription, medicines and special personal care
items with you.
Our other team members are taking adequate care of your children at the school
(if applicable).
All vehicle owners are requested to take as many people as possible with them
and reach Name of the Rehabilitation Center, which has been declared as the rehabilitation center.
Following
Names
of transportation
means/
transporters
have
been
arranged for you at Name of the Assembly Point.
Volunteers with Yellow Jackets are there to assist you. Please feel free in telling
them your problems,
Establish and list warning system for different level of emergencies. However it must be noted that the warning system for an emergency does NOT sound like the wailing sounds of siren which are used by Industries to signify beginning /end of shifts. Suggested system for emergency purpose is:
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For accident scenarios having off-site consequences - Long siren of 30 seconds duration followed by short siren of 10 seconds duration at least 10 times.
For All-Clear signal: small sirens of 10 seconds each for two minutes.
The above system should be followed by all industries and vehicles, which are wailing sirens for notifications of an emergency. Announcements with standard
messages may be made by loudspeakers mounted on vehicles, between wailing of sirens, for the benefit of persons not knowing the warning signals.
The warning system thus finalized and approved by the DCG must be publicized so that it becomes common knowledge amongst the members of the public.
Assess the efficiency and identify the bottlenecks in the main and alternate communication system and warning system during mock drills and remove the bottlenecks in the systems where necessary.
6.4 TECHNICAL COORDINATORS - EXPERTS IN INDUSTRIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY
The Technical Coordinators tasks are to:
Define roles and responsibilities of his local representative (Member of LCG) and provide training to him and otl^er staff who may have to be involved in emergency operations
Identify response strategy in consultation with the DC Provide regular training to first responders and support agencies.
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Decide which areas require evacuation and residents of which areas may be advised to take shelter in place.
Assist the Evacuation Coordinator in identifying safe areas to be designated as assembly points and rehabilitation shelters for emergency use and safe routes for their transfer to rehabilitation shelters based on possible wind directions.
Analyse in coordination with the Member Secretary and other members of the DCG, past chemical accidents as regards the extent of damage, place of occurrence, cause of occurrence, frequency of occurrence etc. and assess the actions then taken for mitigation of the emergency. Also to identify and analyse the actions taken by the concerned industry, different emergency personnel, affected public as regards the problems faced by them and ensure removal of the same.
Time is very critical in emergency scenarios that require public evacuation or related protective actions and does not permit lengthy discussions or deliberations as to whether an evacuation is warranted or how large an area should be considered at risk. Predetermined criteria for decision-making will therefore greatly facilitate the process.
Names and contact numbers of experts are provided in Annex III.

6.5 SAFETY COORDINATOR - ENVIRONMENT ENGINEER, STATE POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
The Environmental Engineer of the Pollution Control Board is responsible for ensuring that all Industries and concerned comply with the rules and regulations set forth by the government. The responsibility of the safety coordinator is to:
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Define roles and responsibilities of his local representative (Member of LCG) and provide training to him and other staff who may have to be involved in emergency operations
Regularly obtain and keep a record of meteorological conditions in different areas of the district from IMD and keep a ready reference phone book carrying phone numbers of persons in IMD responsible for providing the information as regards the prevailing and predicted wind direction.
In order to assess the potential for adverse health impacts (which may not become immediately apparent), establish a system for monitoring of contaminant exposures experienced by response personnel and the general public as best possible under emergency conditions.
6.6
FIRE SERVICES COORDINATOR-DISTRICT FIRE OFFICER (DFO)
The responsibilities of DFO are to:
Select and train first and second alternate officers to act on his behatf during an emergency situation.
Ust all the resources available with the District Fire Fighting Department and assess the sufficiency of the same in terms of men and material that may be required during a major chemicai emergency and ensure that the requisite resources are procured
Conduct regular fire drills at fire stations and ensure active participation of the . fire personnel in mock drills
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6.7
*
RESCUE COORDINATOR - COMMANDANT, HOME GUARDS
Based on the possible emergency scenarios, assess the number of men and material that may be required during an emergency.
Establish special rescue squads and train them for rescue of entrapped persons in high hazard zones.
6.8
MEDICAL COORDINATOR- DISTRICT MEDICAL & HEALTH OFFICER
The District Medical and Health Officer is responsible for ensuring that health facilities is available for all in the district. His responsibilities will be to:
Identify and keep updated a list of resources available with the hospitals, dispensaries, clinic, etc. The resources should be assessed for their sufficiency in coping up with the worst possible emergency scenarios leading to large scale damage to life.
This item pertains to those emergency situations, which have the potential to kill or injure dozens, hundreds, or possibly thousands of individuals over a short period of time. Its intent is to ensure that medical care providers can cope with the problem as efficiently and effectively as possible.
Fortunately, many hospitals and clinics across the country already have such plans for non-chemical related emergencies and therefore have the basic elements of a plan that can be expanded to cope with hazardous material emergencies. For this, it is necessary in all chemical exposure situations, to have information readily available on:
toxic effects of the substance(s) of concern by all likely routes of exposure; (Material Safety Data Sheets - MSDS - of commonly used hazardous chemicals in the district is provided at Annex DC"for guidance purpose)
observable symptoms of human exposures; special medical tests (if any) that may be advisable to assess the extent of injury;
need to observe victims for delayed effects; and treatment methods or protocols recommended for various types and levels of exposure.
Public authorities should never assume that physicians or hospitals have this information on hand. Nor should they assume that the basic first aid and health effect data given in typical material safety data sheets would be adequate for all eventualities. It, therefore, is the responsibility of the district medical coordinator to compile the first-aid and comprehensive treatment procedures for each toxic substance handled in the district, which has the capability of affecting a large section of population.
Formulate a system for quick establishment of triage stations
Identify and stock specific antidotes/medicines based on the common chemicals handled in the district. The most common antidotes for
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chemical poisoning and the associated treatment procedure have been detailed already.
Prepare an inventory of specific antidotes/medicines available with different agencies such as hospitals, chemist shops, drug wholesalers and prepare a plan for quick procurement of the same in large numbers during an emergency
6.9
UTILITIES COORDINATOR-SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER, STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD
The Superintending Engineer of the State Electricity Board is the authority responsible for ensuring supply and maintainance of the Electricity in the District. His responsibility will be to:
Prepare and keep updated a list of contact information of utility substations or distribution points, which need to be informed to switch off the power supply in a particular area if required.
Identify agencies, which give portable DG sets on hire, as alternate source of power may be required during an emergency to perform combat activities. Formulate a plan for procurement and quick deployment of such equipment during an emergency.
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Identify and maintain a list of alternate sources of water for fire fighting.
Identify and maintain a list of alternate sources of potable water for general population at residential areas and temporary shelters.
In consultation with the transport coordinator, prepare a plan to provide water from the above sources through tankers, at incident site, residential areas and temporary shelters.
6.10
MATERIAL COORDINATOR - ADDITIONAL OR SUB DIVISIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTRATE
Define roles and responsibilities of his local representative (Member of LCG) and provide training to him and other staff who may have to be involved in if emergency operations.
Procure a list of all the PPEs and other combat material, from the members of DCG that may be required by them during an emergency and compare with the actual stock available.
Compile the above lists to prepare an estimate of different items that will be required by response agencies,
Prepare and keep updated an inventory of above material available with response agencies and industries. Identify the vendors/agencies / stockists from where the additional requirement of such material can be procured at short notice.
Formulate a plan for distribution of PPEs and other material/equipment to response personnel, which they may require during an emergency.
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In addition to the specific PPEs and combat equipment, also identify sources of food, wheel chairs, general medicines, and recreation facilities that may be required at rehabilitation centers during an emergency. Also prepare a plan for procurement of above material at short notice.
6.11
EVACUATION AND REHABILITATION COORDINATOR
In association with the technical & transport coordinators, identify main and alternate assembly points based on different wind directions where people can assemble for getting evacuated
Also identify evacuation routes based on different wind directions through which the assembled population can be taken to temporary shelters.
Based on possible accident scenarios, estimate the number of persons that may need to be evacuated. This can be done from the data provided in Table 3.1.
Based on above information, identify temporary shelters in different wind directions for accommodating the evacuated population.
In consultation with the medical coordinator, prepare a plan for evacuation of patients, for hospitals falling in the hazard zone.
In consultation with the security coordinator, prepare a plan for shifting people in police custody, if a police station is likely to fall in the hazard zone.
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In consultation with the authorities of educational institutions, prepare a plan for evacuation of students, teachers arid other staff members, for such institutions falling under the hazard zone.
Note that the evacuation of people from individual residences who require special notification or assistance (such as senior citizens and physically handicapped) can be facilitated if public officials have compiled a list of those homes requiring personal attention. The local census data can be of great help in compilation of such information.
6.12
TRANSPORT COORDINATOR - REGIONAL TRANSPORT OFFICER
Define roles and responsibilities of his local representative (Member of LCG) and provide training to him and" other staff who may have to be involved in emergency operations
Various vehicles (available with the district administration and police department) are fitted with sirens, Public Address (PA) system and walkie-talkies. Prepare a list of all such vehicles available in the district and shortlist those that can be made use of for warning general population during an emergency.
Establish agreements with public and private bus companies and ambulance services for provision of vehicles and drivers under emergency situation.
Establish agreements with public and private agencies having water tankers for provision of water to residential areas, temporary shelters and for fire fighting under emergency situation.
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Establish procedure with material coordinator for obtaining appropriate protective clothing and equipment for its distribution to personnel who may have prolonged and excessive exposure to toxic contaminants while performing notification or evacuation operations.
Provide training to at least some of the drivers on emergency procedures and on use of SCBA, if entry might be necessary or may unexpectedly occur (due to shift in wind direction or other factors) to zones with toxic air contaminants.
In association with the evacuation and rehabilitation coordinator, identify main and alternate assembly points based on different wind directions where people can assemble for getting evacuated
identify routes for response agencies and alternate routes for evacuation of general public for different wind directions.
6.13
RAIL TRANSPORT COORDINATOR - DIVISIONAL RAILWAY MANAGER
Establish arrangement with oil companies to render technical and resource help during rail transport emergency.
Prepare a plan for flagging trains at up and down stations between vulnerable sections
Provide standard message formats to all Station Masters for gathering the required information to ascertain the nature and location of rail accident.
In association with security coordinator prepare a plan to cordon off locations on rail route
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In association with transport coordinator determine access routes to different sections of the rail route.
6.14
SECURITY COORDINATOR-SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
Assess the requirement of manpower and vehicles under different emergency scenarios in coordination with the Member Secretary, rescue coordinator and assess whether the resources currently available for sufficiency.
Assess the requirement of PPEs that might be required while patrolling the evacuated hazard zones during an emergency and ensure that the police personnel likely to be near the areas likely to be affected are trained in the use of PPEs.
In association with the evacuation and rehabilitation coordinator, prepare a plan for evacuation of prisoners, from prisons or police stations, for such areas, which are likely to fall in the hazard zone.
6.15
PUBLIC WORKS COORDINATOR - EXECUTIVE ENGINEER PUBLIC HEALTH DEPARTMENT
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Compile and keep updated a list of those companies or facilities that draw water from water bodies in the area of concern. Also a list of appropriate contacts and telephone numbers at these facilities should be made and a system devised in coordination with the Communication Coordinator for
notifying them in case of an emergency.
In association with technical coordinators, identify scenarios where wash water from emergency operations should not be allowed to enter rivers or surface water bodies and inform the MAH units accordingly.
Formulate a plan to contain wash water from emergency operation in dykes, tanks, etc., for further treatment before discharge to surface water bodies.
Identify sewer shut-off points for the containment of hazardous materials that may leak or flow into sanitary and storm sewers and assess their potential for the same. Additional shut-off points may be provided if required.
In association with the technical coordinators, formulate plan for containment of hazardous chemicals in case of transport emergency.
Identify the material that may be required for above operation and compile a list of agencies from where it can be procured at short notice during emergency
In
association
with
the
veterinarian
department,
formulate
decontamination plan for domestic livestock and wildlife
ODMP_NAGPUR
Formulate a mass casualty plan for domestic livestock and wildlife

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6,16
LIAISON AND PUBLIC RELATIONS COORDINATOR -DISTRICT PUBLIC RELATION OFFICER
Prepare and keep updated a list of contacts with telephone numbers of media persons who need to be informed of an emergency.
In association with the Communications Coordinator arrange for the preparation of TV messages that may be needed to be broadcast during an emergency.
6.17
COORDINATION WITHIN LOCAL CRISIS GROUP
Since several individuals and agencies are involved in decision making, the coordination amongst members is a vital requirement for the success of the plan. In order to ensure better coordination amongst the members, the following need to be pursued:
ODMP_NAGPUR
Clear and concise communication amongst the members Efficient communication and warning system Sequential decisions flow from the coordinator to the field personnel Team spirit and task orientation Appropriate training and retraining in emergency preparedness Regular and frequent field visits, mock drills, and simulation exercises at MAH units Discussion of observations and feedback Motivation of field personnel
P1-Ch. 1
CHAPTER-7
ACTION PLAN FOR OFF-SITE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
This section deals with accident scenarios, at MAH units at Nagpur district, involving hazardous chemicals leading to TOXIC RELEASE, FIRE AND EXPLOSION.
It is noticed that the largest 'toxic" damage distance (1.4 km downwind) occurs for chlorine release from Kanhan Water works, which, it is estimated, could injure up to 120 people. The largest FIRE/ EXPLOSION incident involves a BLEVE at HPCL, Khapri, that has the potential to injure approximately 1250 persons.
These are discussed separately. The Table indicating the damage distances and expected injuries is given next. Subsequently, the detailed Action Plan for Toxic, BLEVE and Fire incidents are developed.
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Table 7.1
Kanhan
Waterworks
Chlorine (Toxic Hazard)
8X0.9 MT, atm, T, 12-16 barg pr. Chlorin e Tonner
Calastrop NA
Hic
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
1000 (T-1)
1400 (T-2)
20/120
Rupture
Process
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
MA
NA
NA
hazard/
minor
252 (T-3)
463 (T-4)
5/4Q
release
from liquid chlorine
tube
Gas Suvidha Petrochemic als India Ltd. LPG (explosive hazard)
4X25 MT, Catastrop 31S(T-5)
amb.T,
8-12
hie Rupture
445 (T-5)
441 (T-7)
484 (T-8) 542 (T-9)
610(T-9) 136(JF) (T- 199 (JF) NA 6) (T-6)
NA
20/120
barg pr.
Process hazard/
minor pipeline
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
23(JFXT10)
34(JF) (T-10)
NA
NA
OS
Roopsons
LPG (explosive
Petrochemic hazard) als Pvt.ltd.
1X30 MT,
amb.T,
8-12 barq pr. LPG
release Catastrop 315(T-5) hie Rupture
445 (T-5)
441 (T-7)
484
(T-8)
542 (T-9)
610 (T-9)
136 (JF)
(T-6)
199 (JF) (T-6)
NA
NA
25/130
Process transfer hazard/ pipeline minor release pipeline
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
23(JF) (T-10)
34(JF) (T-10)
NA
NA
OS
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P1-Ch. 1
NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN Ispat Industries limited LPG/ Propane (explosive hazard) Propan e:3X 75 MT, amb. T, 10-15 kg/cm2 g pr. LPG:1 X75 MT,2X 50 MT LPG transfer pipeline Gala strop Hic Rupture 505 (T-14) 712 (T-14) 580 (T-13) 871 (T-14) 954 (T-15) 1100 (T-15) 137(JF) (T-12) 2oo (JF) (T-12) NA NA 30/150
LPG/ Propane(explosi on hazard)
Process hazard/ minor pipeline release Catastrap hic Rupture
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
23(JFKT35)
34(JF) (T-35)
NA
NA
OS
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Khapri
4X606 MT, amb.T, 8-12 barq pr. LPG transfer pipeline
1000 (T-17)
1500 (T-17)
453 (J-19)
924 (T-20)
467 (T-21) 620 (T-21)
129(JF) (T-18)
188 (JF) (T-18)
NA
NA
250/1250
Process hazard/ minor pipeline release Catastrop
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
23(JF) (T-17)
34(JF) (T-17)
NA
NA
OS
Bharat Petroleum
LPG (explosive
hazard)
3X150 MT.
Corporation
Ltd.,Butibori
amb.T, 8-12 barq pr. LPG transfer pipeline
hic Rupture
654 (T23)
923 (T23)
440 (T-25)
883 (T-26)
468 (T-27)
6107 (T-27)
127(JF) (T-24)
184 (JF). (T-24)
NA
NA
40/300
Process Hazard/
minor pipeline
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
23(JFXT-
28)
34(JF) (T-28)
NA
NA
OS
release
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P1-Ch. 1
Indo Flame
Petrochemic als Ltd.
2X50 MT.
amb.T,
8-12
Catastrop hic Rupture
461 (T-29)
650 (T29)
430 (T31)
702 (T-32)
456 (T-33)
593 (T-33)
126 (JF) (T-30)
183
(JF) (T-30)
NA
NA
20/70
barq pr LPG transfer pipeline Process

NA NA NA NA NA NA
hazaroV
minor
23(JFXT34)
34(JF) (T-34)
NA
NA
OS
pipeline release
Indian Oil Corporation Limited, MS (fire hazard)
2X740 MT
Catastrop hic
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
42 (T-35)
57 (T35)
NA
NA
OS
Rupture
HSD (fire
2X 2544 MT
Khapri hazard) HSD/MS/SKO

Catastrop hic Rupture Process hazard/ minor
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
42 (T-36)
57 (T36)
NA
NA
OS
Line leak
NA
NA
NA
*
NA
NA
NA
LOCAL
LOCAL
NA
NA
OS
pipeline release
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation MS (fire hazard)
1X703 MT
Catastrop NA
hic Rupture
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
42 (T-37)
57 (T37)
NA
NA
OS
Ltd., Wardha
HSD (fire
hazard)
HSD/MS/SKO
2X 3900 MT
Catastrop NA hic
Rupture Process hazard/ minor
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
42 (T-36)
57 (T36)
LOCA L
NA
NA
OS
Line leak
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
LOCAL
NA
NA
OS
pipeline release
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
Yavalkar
Technical grade
(10MT
Catastrop
hic Rupture Process hazard/
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
LOCAL
Pesticides
pesticides
(in
drums)
LOCA L
LOCA L
LOCA
L
OS
Solvent
pipeline
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
LOCAL
LOCA L
NA
NA
OS
minor
solvent
release Khandelwal Pesticides Pvt. Ltd. Technical grade

pesticides (10MT
(in
drums) Solvent pipeline
Catastrop hic
Rupture
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
LOCAL
LOCA L
LOCA L
LOCA L
OS
Process hazard/
minor solvent release
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
LOCAL
LOCA L
NA
NA
OS
Mahindra & LPG/ Propane (explosive Mahindra hazard)
Propan e:3X 15 X 2 MT LPG transfer pipeline
Catastropic 505 (T-14) 712 Rupture (T-14)
580 (T-13)
871 (T-14)
954 (T-15)
1100 (T-15)
137(JF) (T-12)
2oo (JF) (T-12)
NA
NA
30/150
LPG/ Propane(explosi on hazard)
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
23(JFKT35)
34(JF) (T-35)
NA
NA
OS
Propan Catastropic 505 (T-14) 712 16.75 MT Rupture (T-14)
580 (T-13)
871 (T-14)
954 (T-15)
1100 (T-15)
137(JF) (T-12)
2oo (JF) (T-12)
NA
NA
30/150
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN LPG/ Propane(explosi on hazard) LPG transfer pipeline Process hazard/ minor pipeline release NA NA NA NA NA NA 23(JFKT35) 34(JF) (T-35) NA NA OS
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
7.1
TOXIC HAZARD IN THE AREA

CHLORINE RELEASE FROM A TONNER AT KANHAN WATER WORKS, KAMPTEE
SCENARIO - 1:
Scenario Description Scenario

Failure mode Unit name Contact person Catastrophic failure of tonner Kanhan Water Works, Kamptee Chief Engineer
Tank Details Storage capacity Description 900 Kg Liquid chlorine is stored in pressurized chlorine are They tonners. stored under an approved shed.
Area Affected Maximum downwind hazard distance Area likely to be affected Approximate number of people likely to be affected 1.4 km (Under Class F & wind speed of 1.5 m/s)
Surrounding industries in the down wind direction
120
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
7.1.1
Notification to Off-site Authorities
7.1.1,1 Action: Communication Coordinator of the Unit The site main controller (Chief Engineer, Kanhan Water Works, Kamptee) determines that the consequences of the ongoing emergency may pose threat outside the boundaries of the industry; he will inform the off-site authorities.
The Police station at Kamptee- in case the number is not available, phone the Main Nagpur Police Control No: (100/2532221) and ask them to contact Kamptee) would house the Local Emergency Control Center (LECC). The citizens are more likely to call police if they observe an accident- it is beneficial to use the existing arrangement available instead of establishing a new one to avoid confusion. Therefore, even during such chemical emergencies, police station will serve as the central point for notification of emergency by the unit. It is expected that "hot" line, and/or radio communications links with response agencies, public authorities, arid major industrial units shall be installed at the Police Station for prompt notification and response.
In communicating the accident scenario he will:
Give Industry details, (Name of Industry, Address, Telephone Numbers)
identify himself by name and designation give the location of the emergency within the Industry (Plant, Section, Equipment)
Inform about the chemical involved state briefly the type of emergency i.e. whether fire, explosion, toxic release (specify the direction of gas cloud movement in case of toxic gas release)
State the severity of the incident as given by the Site Main Controller, Wait for instructions (if any)
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
It may not be possible for an ordinary citizen to provide entire information as per the given format. In such case it will be the responsibility of the information receiving officer to call up the affected MAH unit and gather the desired information. 7.1.2 Notification to Response Organizations and Public Authorities
7.1.2.1 Action: Officer receiving Information The LECC Police officer who first receives information about the emergency involving the hazardous chemical release should already be in possession of detailed instructions with respect to who should be notified of the event and/or who should be asked to respond. Minor incidents may simply require dispatch of a fire tender to the scene. More significant events may necessitate call-out of additional forces and notification of local, district and state authorities.
The Officer on receipt of the information shall immediately inform the SDM Nagpur (in charge of Kamptee) (chairman of the LCG) of the incident situation giving all the details received from the unit and the informant caller and apprise him of the actions already initiated by himself according to the Instructions. Chairman of the LCG will select a local command post based on the incident situation and the prevailing wind direction. He will then, through local communication coordinator, inform all the members of LCG about the emergency and the location of Local Command Post selected so that preliminary response can be quickly initiated. The directory of Key Contacts, i.e., members of DCG and expert agencies at district/state and national level, is given in Annex III.
All the members of the DCG on being informed about the Emergency shall rush to the LECC for a brief emergency meeting. The issues to be addressed in this meeting are:
Obtain up to date information of the situation at the emergency site,
Formulation of the response strategy, Identification of the hazardous and threatened areas based on map and templates available,
Collect latest information regarding the prevailing and predicted meteorological conditions,
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
Initiate evacuation of areas likely to be affected, if required Identify the resource requirement and initiate mobilization Identify the routes available to reach the site.
The response strategy will be communicated to the chairman of the LCG and then they may choose to rush to the incident location (or local command post) based on the gravity of the situation.
The members required to be present at the incident site should travel in vehicles such that each vehicle has at least one person carrying a walkie-talkie (these groups may be 34 persons each and made during the periodic Mock-drills). With this arrangement, all the members can get up to date information and simultaneously convey instructions to their local counterparts even while traveling to the incident location. As all members of the DCG may not be required to move to the incident site, the remaining members will continue coordinating operations from the LECC. The off-site emergency response is initiated by the above procedure and will involve specific response functions as discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.
The SDM may keep the DC (in Nagpur} informed on the developments. 7.1.3 Emergency Response
7.1.3.1 District Emergency Authority - District Collector/ SDM In a chemical emergency situation, the District Collector is responsible for
Declaring any emergency as an Offsite Emergency and putting into force the Offsite Disaster Management Plan. Also for declaring the Offsite Emergency as over. He shall also be responsible for keeping the State Crisis Group (SCG) informed of the developments on-site during and on termination of emergency
Deciding who will accompany him to the incident site/ LECC and who will remain at the DECC
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
Monitoring on-site developments and continuously assessing the off-site consequences and to ensure proper deployment of resources and facilities is being done
Overall management of each function through respective members of the DCG and expediting response and arranging resources wherever required
Taking decision in case of conflicting opinions within the group, in case of urgent situations
7.1.3.2 Member Secretary of DCG - Joint Director of Factories
During emergency, the member secretary of the DCG is responsible for: Assisting different members of the DCG in planning the performance of their duties
Providing overall coordination within the DCG and with the member secretary of the LCG
Arranging for complete documentation of proceedings at the incident site Detailed records of what happened and what actions were taken in response can help in:
Attempting to recover response costs and damages from the party responsible for the incident.
Setting the record straight where there are charges of negligence or mismanagement resulting from the incident.
Reviewing the efficiency and effectiveness of response actions.
Preparing for future incident responses.
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
Verifying facts, actions, injuries, equipment used, etc. for the purpose of legal proceedings, insurance claims, budget requests, and public inquiries.
In addition to written documentation of an incident, it is good practice to draw diagrams or sketches of containers, vehicles, structures, streets, containment techniques employed by the response agencies, locations of deployment, etc. Photographs and videotapes should be kept on file for reference purposes.
The Member Secretary of the DCG shall, through Personnel & Administration Manager, arrange to maintain a record of all the developments during an emergency. Wherever it is possible to do so, videotaping of the entire combat and rescue operations may also be arranged. Providing facility for recording all the communication on the telephones can also be of help for future use.
7.1.3.3 Communication Coordinator Depending on the severity of the incident, the communication coordinator may or may not be required to go to the incident site. However, under alf circumstances, the major issues that he has to address are:
a)
Emergency Communication System
With respect to overall use of telephones, special precautions must be taken where an explosion or fire at some critical location may destroy vital communication links or services. Therefore, the primary communication channel for an emergency shall comprise of communication through the walkie-talkie available with the District Administration, Police and Fire Services. Additionally, use will also be made of the cell phones, land telephones and alternate facilities available with the industries..
b) Communication of the emergency to Sensitive Areas such as Schools, Cinemas, Hospitals, Universities, Prisons, etc. When a major incident occurs in a location that threatens schools, hospitals, nursing homes, universities, prisons and 'similar facilities serving large group of people with need for special transportation, protection and handling, it should be ensured that such facilities receive the earliest possible "notification. It is the duty
of communications coordinator to ensure that such institutions are promptly informed and also directed of the future course of action. For this he will need the list and contact numbers (prepared as part of pre emergency activities) of all such agencies to be notified. In case the telephone lines are busy or out of order, the communications coordinator shall dispatch messengers to notify such institutions at the earliest.
c)
Notification to General Population for Evacuation or Shelter-in-Place
Time is critical during an emergency situation and it has been experienced that prompt notification has been a key factor in saving several lives. In such chemical emergencies, where large-scale effect is envisaged on general population, communications coordinator may be required to rush to the incident site. On getting instructions from the DC, communication coordinator will dispatch teams for notifying general public. For this, use can be made of industry/police or fire department vehicles with Public Address (PA) / loudspeaker system, through which, standard message formats prepared in the planning phase can be announced. Additional options available for alerting the public include: It is important to note that all the warning and notification teams should be given the same set of instructions. Dissimilarity in warning signals/notification and instruction can lead to devastating confusion not only among the receptors but also the team members.
Community or industrial facility horns or sirens, Emergency Broadcast by individual radio and television stations (including cable TV), Door-to-door coverage of neighborhood by knocking on the doors, Use of "all-call" system which rings all telephones in the area and repeats a recorded message and Various combinations of the above.
d) items
Warning/Notification to General Population for contamination of food
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
Based on 'the instructions from the DCG, communications coordinator shall be responsible for prevention of the consumption of known or potentially contaminated food or water by people or animals through notifying the public of the likely effects of doing so.
e)
Notification to Next of Kin of Death of Relative(s)
It is important to note that next of kin are promptly notified of fatalities or severe injuries carefully and in a sensitive and supportive fashion.
7.1.3.4 Technical Coordinator The Technical group will address technical issues with respect to the leakage.
a)
Formulation of Response Objectives and Strategy
The technical coordinator shall assess the incident before taking action and formulate realistic response objectives. The assessment shall be based on the following points for which they shall call their local counterparts to obtain first hand information: Pre-incident plans and/or standard operating procedures
Information that has been obtained regarding: Material(s) involved Container(s) involved Vehicle(s) and/or structures involved Atmospheric conditions affecting the incident
Environmental monitoring and sampling data, if available Public protective actions that have or have not been initiated Resource requirements (i.e., trained personnel, specialized protective gear, other equipment, etc.) Hazards and risks posed to humans, animals, property, and the environment.
Upon completion of the incident assessment, they will be in a better position to determine whether their response strategy should be defensive or offensive in nature. In all cases, of course, actions should be initiated to protect the public and environment outside the immediate spill or discharge area and/or to contain the hazard from a safe distance. The
response strategy shall be communicated to the chairman of the LCG for prompt response.
Some important points for chlorine tonner leakage include:
Container handling: Chlorine containers must be handled with care. When not connected, container valve protective housings should be in place. Containers should not be dropped and no object should be allowed to strike them with force. Containers should be secured to prevent them from rolling off while unloading.
Cylinders: should be moved around in a plant area using a properly balanced hand truck/chain pulley block. The truck should have clamps or chains to hold the cylinders in place. Cylinders must not be lifted by the valve protective housing because the neck ring to which the housing is attached is not designed to carry the weight of the cylinder.
Tonners: These are best moved around using a monorail or a crane with lifting beam. They can be rolled on rails or roller conveyors provided for the purpose. If a forklift truck is used then, the ton container must be adequately restrained to prevent it from falling off, particularly when the truck changes direction.
Cylinders and ton containers must be stored in cool, dry, relatively isolated areas, protected from weather and extreme temperature changes. If stored indoors, fire resistant construction is recommended. Also, natural ventilation should be provided, taking into consideration, possible leaks. If stored outside, storage area should be clean so that the accumulated trash does not pose a fire hazard. Cylinders should be secured tightly and kept upright and ton containers should be stored on their sides. They should be placed on rails a few inches above the floor. (to minimize external corrosion, if standing water can collect)
Full and empty containers should not be stored together and all containers should be protected from external heat or steam lines. Chlorine containers should be segregated from combustible, organic or easily oxidisable materials especially isolate from other compressed gas containers and hydrocarbon chemicals. Easy access to all containers is important in the event of a leak.
Containers should not be stored where they can drop or heavy object can fall on them or where vehicles can strike them. Subsurface storage areas should be avoided. Access by unauthorized persons should be controlled.
Chlorine container leaks and emergency measures: Leaks in chlorine should be given prompt attention. If they are not promptly corrected, chlorine leaks always get worse. When a chlorine leak occurs, authorized, trained personnel equipped with suitable respiratory protection, should investigate and take action. Whenever possible, no person should be allowed to work alone on a chlorine leak. All persons should be kept away until the leak has been stopped and in case of extensive leak, all persons in the path of the leak, should be evacuated. Potentially exposed persons should move to a point upwind of the leak. (Because chlorine is heavier than air, higher elevations are preferable. To escape in the shortest time, the persons already in the contaminated area should move crosswind.
Chlorine monitors and wind direction indicators can supply useful information in case of a leak.
Leak identification: If ammonia vapours are directed at leak, a white cloud will form indicating the source of leak. Use plastic squeeze bottles containing aqua ammonia, (commercial 26 o Baume aqua ammonia should be used.) If a leak 'f occurs in the equipment piping, then the chlorine supply should be cut off, the pressure relieved and necessary repairs made. If welding is needed, the system should be purged with dry air or nonreactive gas before processing.
Following specific actions may be taken to contain or reduce leaks: If a container is leaking chlorine, it should be turned, if possible, so that gas instead of liquid escapes. The quantity of chlorine that escapes from a gas leak is about one fifteenth the amount that escapes from a liquid leak through the same size hole. Reduce pressure from the container, by removing the chlorine as gas (and not as liquid) to a process or a disposal system. It may be desirable to move the container to an isolated spot where it will do less harm. Apply appropriate Chlorine emergency kit_device.
P1-Ch. 1
ODMP_NAGPUR
A leaking chlorine container should not be immersed or thrown into a body of water. The leaks will be aggravated and the containers will float when still partially full of liquid chlorine allowing gas evolution at the surface.
It may be best at times to dispose of the chlorine through the regular consuming process or to run a temporary line to the consuming point If the consuming process cannot handle chlorine under emergency conditions, a standby alkali absorption system should be considered.
In case of gas leakage, pass through a reducing agent (e.g. sodium bisulphite, sodium bicarbonate solution) with a trap in the line.
Use vast volumes of concentrated solution of reducing agent (bisulphites or ferrous salts with 3-M sulphuric acid or hypo) Neutralize with soda ash or dilute hydrochloric acid.
Personal protective equipment: Service exposure to chlorine can occur whenever chlorine is handled or used. Suitable protective equipment for emergency use should be available outside of chlorine rooms near the entrance and away from areas of likely contamination.
Respiratory equipment: Every effort must be made to prevent chlorine releases from containers and process equipments. However, since this is not always possible, respiratory protection should be available. Most chlorine releases are at low concentrations where the oxygen content in the air is greater than 19.5 % , then chemical cartridge respirators (upto 10 ppm) or canister gas marks (25 ppm, maximum) would offer adequate protection. However, without chlorine monitoring equipment sampling air in the vicinity of the leak, use of pressure demand self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), with full piece, is required.
Protective clothing is not required for performing routine plant operations but safety glasses or goggles, hard hats and safety shoes should be worn, though not specifically for chlorine.
b)
Identification of Hazard Zone

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ODMP_NAGPUR
The MAH units are adequately prepared for monitoring contaminant concentrations. However, considerable expertise in the area of computer modeling is required for determining real time contaminant concentrations at various distances downwind. Technical coordinators, trained in these aspects shall be responsible for estimating downwind concentrations and feeding the information to DCG and LCG for further response. However, till the time such expertise and facility to perform modeling is established, vulnerability templates for different scenarios given in Annex VII of this report can be made use of (TMP-1 or 2). To estimate the hazard zone in a particular emergency scenario, the technical coordinator shall place the transparency of the vulnerability template with its x-axis along the prevalent wind direction and start point on the source of release on the scaled map (1:50000) of the area. This will give them the extent of the area likely ~ to be affected.
c)
Establishment of Hazard Control Zones at Incident Site
An important component of the emergency response involves establishment of hazard control zones at the incident scene to limit the number of people in the most hazardous areas. The exact size and configuration of these hazard control zones must be determined and visually differentiated at each particular incident based on incidentspecific factors and situations. These shall be determined by the technical coordinator based on the results of hazard analysis and may include the following:
"Hot Zone" - Area of maximum hazard surrounding the damaged container(s) or fire area, which may only be entered by specially equipped and trained response personnel.
"Warm Zone" - Area of moderate hazard outside the Hot Zone in which properly equipped and trained backup crews standby and decontamination takes place. "Cold Zone" - Area outside the Warm Zone that poses minimal or negligible hazards to emergency personnel. The command post, most of the deployed apparatus, and the resource staging area should be located in the Cold Zone.
d)
Suppression of Hazardous Gas or Vapour Releases
In the present scenario, catastrophic failure of vessel has been assumed based on the guidelines of the MoEF. However, catastrophic failure of chlorine tonner is highly unlikely. Gases or vapours may enter the atmosphere directly from broken, ruptured, or punctured containers, or alternatively, from evaporating or boiling pools of liquid that have
been formed due to chemical spill. The procedure for plugging/stopping the leaks have been described in point under the response by fire-fighting /other trained personnel. However, there are several response measures beyond plugging or stopping the leak source that may be used to reduce the rate or amount of airborne contamination.
e)
Selection of PPE
Spill scenarios involving specific toxic chemicals such as chlorine and others would require special chemical resistant suits for the personnel who may be required to enter the hot zone. Personnel in the wqrm zone would require gloves, boots, SCBAs, etc. Ail members of response teams in the downwind side of the spill site would require respiratory devices. Spill scenarios involving the many chemicals may only require suits with thermal protection as they may cause fire/explosion only. Technical coordinators are responsible for guiding the members entering the hot zone on the correct type of PPEs as it is necessary to ensure that the materials from which the clothing is fabricated will not be penetrated by the spilled substance. They shall coordinate with the material coordinator to ensure that the necessary clothing is readily available when needed.
It may not be cost effective for every local industry or industrial association or authority to purchase every possible type of protective clothing that may become necessary. Hence (as suggested in the planning phase) it is advantageous to develop a mutual aid scheme that permits units to draw upon resources from other units.
It is important to note that in hot weather conditions, it may be impossible or difficult, to wear a self-contained breathing unit while driving or riding in many types of vehicles. It is therefore the responsibility of the safety coordinator to guide the drivers and other team members about the selection of appropriate PPEs for a particular use.
f)
Decontamination of Exposed Protective Clothing and other Response
Equipment Clothing and equipment used in a contaminated environment may itself become contaminated. Clothing must be decontaminated before its wearer can safely remove it. Contaminated equipment may need careful decontamination before being safe to touch or use in the aftermath of an incident.
In many instances, it will be sufficient to merely wash the clothing or equipment down with strong water sprays or large amounts of water. Several manufacturers market decontamination showers for wearers of protective clothing, these consist of a framework of water piping with numerous water spray nozzles surrounding an open space the size of a shower stall. Fire hoses and possibly even garden hoses can be used to wash down most equipment as well.
There are two potential complications to be considered.
First of all, it must be realized
that the water and/or other solutions used to decontaminate the clothing or equipment may contain some amount of the contaminant. It therefore is the duty of technical coordinator to decide on a case-by-case basis whether this water should be contained, collected, treated, and/or sent to an appropriate wastewater disposal facility, or whether it can simply be released to the environment. Secondly it must be realized that not all contaminants may be completely washed off by water alone. Final decontamination may require the careful use of various solvents or cleaning compounds. These may range from ordinary soap to specialized chemicals designed to neutralize remaining residues.
Following procedure shall be followed for decontamination of equipment / personnel:
Determine the chemical to which the equipment/person has been exposed Determine whether the equipment/person would require decontamination through neutralizing agents/specialty chemicals, if yes, type and quantity required and its source.
Determine whether wash water would require treatment, if yes, the type and quantity of neutralizing agents required and its source. Take the person or transport the equipment to the designated decontamination area and carry out decontamination After decontamination is over conduct a health check of all the personnel involved in decontamination operation, In addition to the above, the technical coordinators will: Provide guidance to the response team for plugging/ stopping of the spill/leak from the damaged vessel,
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Identify and instruct to isolate other sections of the plant where possibility of cascading exists On successful control of emergency situation, check for possible secondary effects or delayed relapse
7.1.3.5 Safety Coordinator On receiving information about the ongoing emergency, Safety coordinator will rush to the LECC and coordinate efforts for the following activities:
a)
Monitoring of Atmospheric Conditions
The atmospheric stability conditions, wind velocities, and wind directions have a direct impact on the boundaries of downwind areas threatened by a piume or cloud of hazardous vapour or gas. Changes in these conditions over time, particularly in the case of prolonged discharges, can require changes in the boundaries of hazard zones. Consequently, tracking of cloud or plume movements can be greatly facilitated by direct access to a weather station manned by trained meteorologists. Real time data can be obtained from Indian Meteorological local office.
Other atmospheric conditions of possible interest involve temperature, precipitation, and humidity forecasts. Temperatures can affect the physical state, vapour pressure, and other properties of hazard material, and also impacts on the duration a person can safely function inside a fully encapsulating protective suit. Precipitation can impact dispersion of airborne contaminants, lead to runoff of contaminants in water, cause dilution of spilled chemicals, and/or assist fire control efforts. Moisture in the atmosphere may cause either adverse or beneficial chemical reactions involving spilled or discharged materials.
b)
Monitoring of Contaminant Concentrations
Determination of the concentrations of airborne contaminants at various points downwind of a spill site can greatly help in determining the actual boundaries of hazard zones and in deciding when re-entry of these zones is feasible and safe. Similarly, measurements of water or soil contamination can help determine the exact level of contamination of these resources.
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Where potential exists for contamination of food and/or water supplies, safety coordinator is responsible for detection of such contamination via use of the resources available with the Pollution Control Board and the MAH units.
c)
Ensuring Safety of Response Team Members at Incident Scenes
Safe operating procedures to be established and enforced by the Safety Coordinator include but are hot limited to : The use of appropriate protective gear and equipment
Limiting the number of personnel in the "Hot" and "Warm" hazard control zones. Utilizing the most experienced personnel for the most hazardous tasks. Positioning a backup team in the "Warm Zone" in case it is needed to assist or rescue personnel in the "Hot Zone".
Monitoring (visually and through communications) the welfare of personnel operating within the "Hot" and "Warm" Zones.
Ensuring that all personnel understand their assignments. Ensuring that responders do not ingest contaminants through eating, drinking, or smoking.
Enforcing a "No Smoking" policy at incidents involving flammable or combustible materials.
Replacing fatigued personnel with "fresh" personnel. Adjusting hazard control zones to reflect changing conditions.
7.1.3.6 Fire Services Coordinator On receiving the information about the chemical emergency, the fire chief will instruct his team members to rush to the scene of emergency with necessary equipment and PPEs for initiating response. Fire department will be the first responder to any chemical
emergency incident and their role therefore is by far the most important in controlling and containing the extent of damage. The major activities that the fire team will undertake are:
a)
On-scene Assessment
The first fire vehicle to reach the site will immediately contact the site controller and collect the necessary information regarding the chemical spill/leak, the actions taken and the current status. The driver will park the vehicle in a manner to prevent exposure to airbome chemical contaminants. Each crewmember will wear necessary PPEs before entering the "Hot Zone". The crewmembers should work in pairs, taking care of each other.
b)
Plugging/Stopping of Leaks
Small leaks left unattended for extended periods of time can cause large losses of chemicals to the environment and have much more severe effects than would occur if the leak were somehow completely or partially plugged on a prompt basis. There are great benefits, therefore, in having access to one or more individuals with the basic tools and knowledge needed to limit losses from punctured or leaking tanks or pipelines.
The most widely available means for plugging holes or leaks in equipment involves use of conical, cylindrical, square or wedge shaped pieces of wood, rubber or metal sheets, inflatable pipe plugs, pneumatic leak sealing "bandages", special patching compounds, clamps of various types, and a number of other items. The plugs alone, if available in a variety of sizes, can be jammed into holes and greatly reduce the open area from which the contents of the tank or pipeline can escape; assuming, of course, that it is safe for individuals to approach the leak area. Several vendors market special leak plugging and patching kits. Innovative response personnel may be able to fashion their own devices. Many incidents are brought to a rapid end simply by having the proper common tools available to close a valve or tighten some bolts. It is the responsibility of fire personnel to plug/stop leaks based on guidance obtained from technical coordinators. CHLORINE KITS AVAILABLE AT THE WATER WORKS MUST BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE
7.1.3.7 Medical Coordinator On receipt of information from the LECC/ DECC, the 'district medical coordinator shall dispatch his medical teams to the incident site. Following are the major activities of emergency medical teams reaching the emergency site :
a)
Establishment of Triage Stations
Mass casualty situations will require establishment of field hospitals to take care for the injured and to identify, stabilize, and transport more serious cases to hospitals. Medical team will establish triage stations near the affected installation and will be required to evaluate and colour code the victims. The following code is proposed:
Red for- critical, such victims should to be sent to the hospital in the first available ambulance. Medical Officer manning the triage station will maintain a checklist for the number of victims sent to a particular hospital so as to know when the capacity is reached and further victims may be refused admission.
Yellow for stable, such victims need to be sent to the hospital when there is room available in an ambulance after all the critical victims have been sent
Green for walking wounded, to be provided with first aid and treatment for shock and trauma
Medical coordinator shall, from the list of the proposed rehabilitation centers, identify such areas to which the public can be directed in the aftermath of a spill emergency where this action is warranted. Outside and local medical care personnel shall be informed by the district medical coordinator of their responsibilities in staffing and equipping such facilities quickly. Such field hospitals shall maintain a record of all the patients (as far as possible) so as to enable accounting of personnel and their destinations after triage. The on-scene medical command post shall be under the direction of the local medical coordinator. Local Medical coordinator shall also be responsible for formulating a mass casualty plan for the local hospitals. The list of main hospitals is given in Annex-III.
b)
Medical support for Response Personnel
Where deemed necessary, properly equipped medical personnel and one or more ambulances shall be made available to check and (if necessary) treat injured or contaminated response personnel as necessary. These personnel shall check the vital signs and general health of all personnel who will don specialized protective gear and enter "Hot" and 'Warm" Zones, particularly where fully encapsulating protective suits are being used. The health of potentially exposed response workers shall be rechecked upon completion of their duties.
c)
Medical support at Temporary Shelters
Once the evacuees are at the shelter, it is the responsibility of local Medical coordinator to ensure their well being. For this, the medical coordinator will assign team(s) to take care of people who become ill during evacuation or later. The doctors assigned this work should be aware of the signs and symptoms of exposure to toxic material(s) so that they can easily identify victims and provide them with necessary treatment & care. Contaminated individuals (those having contaminant residue on their person or clothing) should be segregated from unexposed people until adequately decontaminated. It is pertinent to note that significant contamination is unlikely to be of concern except where highly toxic aerosols, mists or dusts have entered the atmosphere or where individuals were in the immediate vicinity of the spill or discharge. Facilities should also be available for care of the handicapped and elderly.
7.1.3.8 Rescue Coordinator There are a variety of scenarios under which workers at chemical facilities or members of the public near or downwind of a hazardous material released may be exposed to toxic vapours or gases, high levels of thermal radiation, or injured due to the effects of an explosion. Fire departments are usually well prepared and experienced in rescuing people from fire and explosion situations, and will in many cases not require any new or additional planning to meet these responsibilities. The situation can be quite different, however, where toxic or corrosive chemicals may have been released into the environment or continue to be released.
Some chemicals can be readily absorbed- through the skin to cause toxic effects while others can have a corrosive action on body tissues^, A problem arises when : such materials are on the ground, must be walked through to reach victims, and are incompatible with the usual footwear of rescue personnel, thus possibly allowing contamination of the feet; or high concentrations of such substances in air can penetrate the normal clothing of rescue personnel. In either case, rescue workers may need special chemical protective clothing and footwear, together with a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), to carry out their mission without themselves falling victim.
There are benefits, therefore, in assigning these unusual rescue missions to special teams that are trained and properly equipped for the duty.
For this, it is suggested that the members of rescue team(s) should carry spare SCBAs. The purpose of suggesting the availability of spare SCBA units is actually two-fold. Not only might people trapped in hazardous area require them to escape, rescue workers may need extra air supplies to accomplish prolonged rescues. Even the best SCBA units rarely provide air to the wearer for more than 30-60 minutes. Heavy exertion while wearing these units can significantly shorten the duration of effective operation.
Rescue coordinator shall be responsible for deputing rescue teams to enter the hazardous areas and rescue injured or trapped individuals.
Rescue teams operating in hazardous environments should work at least in pairs. This is a common safety practice, as is the practice of having a backup team ready for action, should a problem develop.
The rescue coordinator will contact the material coordinator for quickly obtaining the necessary protective gear so that the teams can commence search and rescue operations promptly.
7.1.3.9 Evacuation and Rehabilitation Coordinator
a)
Identification of people to be evacuated
Once it is established that the concentration of toxic substance released into the atmosphere is such that shelter-in-place can provide protection only to people residing in pucca houses, evacuation exercise for the remaining population becomes necessary. Under such circumstances, places having high population density are the most vulnerable. All such areas may not require evacuation and the decision will largely depend upon the quantity/rate of release, type of building and the prevailing wind velocity. Additionally, residential areas also require special attention. Whereas healthy persons can understand the warning and respond to the accident warning signal quickly, senior citizens, handicapped and children may need help and assistance form the rescue personnel. Census record of the area can be of great help in identifying the part of population that may require special care.
AS SUCH, KANHAN WATER WORKS SURROUNDINGS ARE REMOTE WITH LIMITED POPULATION IN THE VICINITY.
b)
Evacuation of General Population
The local evacuation coordinator on receipt of instruction from DCG shall immediately mobilize his team(s) for initiating evacuation of the areas expected to be exposed/threatened by an approaching emergency.
He will also ensure that all his team members involved in alerting and support are equipped with appropriate PPEs and are well aware of the procedures to be followed. The team members will carry a supply of chalk or colourful tags that can be used to mark door-steps or place on the door-knob to indicate that the place has indeed been evacuated.
He will direct his team to carry out rescue operation in association with the rescue coordinator. He wilt designate in charge of rehabilitation center(s), and keep in touch with them for regular, head-count, care of evacuees and availability of essential supplies at such centers.
As an evacuation progresses, police, fire public works and/or other government employees (depending on who might be most readily available and free of other important duties at the time) may have to go door-to-door to ensure that all residents have been alerted and also to provide assistance to the elderly, physically handicapped or hearing impaired.
c) Evacuation Routes and Assembly Points
In the overall planning process it is essential to define evacuation routes well in advance. The routes should be clearly spelt out in the warning signals as also the location of shelters to where the people with automobiles should proceed and people without automobiles should gather for pick-up by buses/trucks or vans. In designating evacuation routes, it has to be kept in mind that major roads are the most desirable, although are seldom available. Visit to the area has revealed that the state highway, in all likelihood, will not be available as it will either be affected by the accident and/or be dedicated to other important functions such as, for access by police, fire, public works, medical and other such emergency operation vehicles.
Since the wind direction at the time of accidental release of hazardous substance cannot be predetermined and since it may even change with time, emergency personnel will require more than one option for any given hazard zone. As soon as an evacuation has been declared, police and auxiliary personnel should be prepared to control traffic on evacuation routes, to keep non-evacuation related traffic off the roads and to remove any vehicle(s) that breaks down and causes a slowdown/ obstruction of traffic. These activities will in turn require availability of tow-trucks and portable roadblock material (barricades, cones, signs, etc.).
d)
Shelter & Care of Evacuees
This aspect is an important function of the overall evacuation exercise. It calls for providing safe and comfortable shelter for relocated population.
Once the evacuees reach the shelters, they would want to report "missing" persons or to determine if their family members, friends, or neighbours are "lost" or are in other shelters. Response to these queries, as well as identification of persons genuinely missing will require registration of people upon entry and communication between shelters. If the evacuation is be prolonged and vehicles are available for use after the primary evacuation has been completed, a mechanism should be established that can provide a mutual support system under adverse circumstances, for reunion of separated families, relatives and close friends.
Care has also to be taken of any pets brought along by the evacuees. Human service personnel/volunteers may be required to render counseling, recreational and other needs of confined population. Quite obviously, shelters will require initial and periodic supplies of food, water and sanitary facilities for the inhabitants.
7.1.3.10
Transport Coordinator
Performing transport functions requires planning for the availability of buses/ trucks/vans/ambulances and other vehicles to transport school children, residents of hospitals/nursing homes and general members of the public who do not own vehicles to safe shelters. For this the prime responsibility rests with the local transport coordinator
who, on receipt of information about the emergency from LECC/ DECC, will direct the fleet (drivers) and coordinate the following transport activities during an emergency.
During the emergency, he will work in close liaison with the communication and evacuation coordinators.
On getting instructions from the DCG, he will effect the warning/instruction/ notification operation,
Arrange for the fleet of vehicles at a pre-designated location so that they can transport the affected population to safer areas (rehabilitation centers),
Make coordinating efforts with vulnerable areas such as schools, hospitals, nursing homes, cinema halls, shopping malls, etc. for evacuation of people to safer places.
He will also be responsible for ensuring that any needed response equipment, material and personnel are arranged promptly to the scene of an accident and for ensuring an adequate state of operational readiness thus consolidating the management of all transport related activities.
Through mutual aid and other services, he shall be responsible for arranging ambulances at the incident site. Emergency transport and ambulance facilities available with the industries are listed in the report.
He shall also, be responsible for arranging the protective equipment, clothing, devices, and any decontamination and/or treatment supplies that may be required by ambulance personnel in an actual emergency.
7.1.3.11
Utilities Coordinator
a)
Identification of Water Sources in Rural Areas
The main and largest source of water may be tapped form the nearest intake point or from the industries themselves with other sources being the bore-wells and tube-wells in the adjoining villages and agricultural fields.
Utilities coordinator is responsible for ensuring uninterrupted supply of water for firefighting to all the brigades in operation. He shall coordinate with the transport coordinator for replenishing the depleted stock of firewater at the incident site through water tankers.
b)
Notification and Shutdown of Electric Utilities
Major explosions may be caused by breaking of power lines and an electrocution hazard to those who might make contact with any "downed" lines. In such a case, there may be circumstances in which it is desired to shutdown electric power systems rapidly in an area.
Based on information and instructions obtained from the-accident site and the DC, the Executive Engineer (SEE), shall, through his own communication channel, instruct the concerned officers of Sate Electricity Board to shut down the power supply to the identified area.
c)
Provisioning Backup Power during Emergency
Once it is instructed to shut down the electric utilities in the area, power will still be required by the response teams, emergency control center and hospitals involved in treatment of victims during an emergency. For this the utilities coordinator will be responsible for providing back-up or alternate source of uninterrupted power for smooth operations. For this he will arrange portable DG sets from the agencies involved in providing such equipment on hire.
7.1.3.12
Material Coordinator
a)
Availability of Respiratory Protective Devices
Fire departments in India generally do not have sufficient number of self-contained breathing supply units and refilling systems to meet the initial needs of their own personnel in chemical related emergencies. Only some of the MAH units have i SCBAs. The PPEs currently available with the MAH units and Fire department may :not be sufficient for large scale response. It is therefore the responsibility of district material coordinator to assess and make available adequate (a few surplus are always desirable) number of personal protective clothing and equipment for members of the emergency teams. These PPE may be kept at a convenient point.
b)
Availability of Special Protective Clothing
The normal turnout clothing of fire service personnel may be adequate to protect these individuals in a wide variety of fire and/or spill situations. But there may also be cases where rescue teams or individuals who desire to enter the immediate spill area for leak plugging or spill containment purpose might be exposed to corrosive substances or toxic substances that might be absorbed through the skin, Such situations may require more complete protection of the body by clothing that is resistant to the damaging effects of the spilled substance. The clothing itself may range from boots, gloves, or disposable suits made of chemical resistant materials to air-tight fully encapsulating "astronaut" suits made for protection of the body from spilled substances on the ground or in high concentrations in the air. Where fires may occur, appropriate thermal protection may be additionally necessary.
c)
Requirement of Protective Gear for Medical Response Teams
There have been cases where medical personnel have had to decontaminate victims and have needed protective clothing (at least gloves and masks) to protect themselves from potential toxic exposures. It is therefore the duty of the material coordinator to make available adequate number of appropriate protective clothing for the medical response team.
d)
Support Services for Field Response Forces
Several situations can be envisioned in which response personnel in the field may be required or needed at the site of an accident for more than a day. These personnel will require rest areas and food to be able to continue to function, particularly if they are in a remote area or a region that has otherwise been evacuated. Sources of assistance for planning in this area include the Red Cross, Local NGOs, etc. The latter organizations in particular may be able to provide tents, cots, lights, etc. Additionally, there will be representatives from the local, state and central agencies together with the media, industry and other personnel involved in the overall emergency response. The total number of people requiring food and rest areas may actually be substantial. It is therefore the duty of the material coordinator to arrange food, rest areas, and other equipment and supplies necessary to sustain field response forces. The items needed would include canteen services, accommodation, electrical power, portable toilets, washing facilities, etc.
e)
Maintenance of Apparatus and Equipment
During long-duration incidents, apparatus and equipment (e.g., vehicles, generators, pumps, etc.) may require on-scene refueling and minor maintenance to enable uninterrupted operation. On-scene services of this nature are beneficial in that they eliminate the need to remove deployed apparatus and equipment from the incident scene. By refueling in-place, operations can continue uninterrupted and the need to replace chemically exposed equipment with uncontaminated items Is eliminated, thus, reducing the number of units potentially requiring decontamination. It is necessary that operations must be conducted safely and in such a manner that will prevent the spread of contaminants from response vehicles and equipment to maintenance vehicles and refueling tanks. Furthermore, maintenance personnel must wear appropriate body and respiratory protective gear when operating in hazardous environments. Providing of refueling and maintenance services may not be prudent in particularly hazardous locations. For example, fire department apparatus positioned near a fire should not be refueled where ignition of fuel vapours is possible. One step that may possibly eliminate the need to refuel apparatus and equipment is to fill fuel tanks to capacity prior to deployment.
The unit's maintenance coordinator together with the material coordinator is responsible for carrying out the aforementioned operations.
7.1.3.13___Security Coordinator On receiving information about the emergency, the Police chief would, through his chain of command instruct his team members to rush to the scene of emergency. The teams will be equipped with necessary PPEs and will coordinate in the following activities: Control of traffic and curious onlookers near the affected areas Ensuring law and order at the incident site during emergency Ensure law and order at the assembly points and evacuation routes Provide security in the evacuated areas Hazardous areas when evacuated also become vulnerable to theft, burglary, etc. In such events, it becomes the responsibility of the local security coordinator to ensure that' unauthorized individuals do not enter hazard zones so that private and public property is safeguarded during evacuation.
Ensuring law and order in the rehabilitation centers during emergency Restoration of law and order in evacuated areas on termination of emergency.
7.1.3.14
Public Works Coordinator
On receiving notification of the emergency situation, the Public works coordinator will rush to the LECC and instruct his team members to stand-by for rendering assistance in the following activities:
Besides the possible need for organizing a cremation area (should the need arise), the public works coordinator shall be responsible for planning and providing such services when the need arises
Initiating sewer shut-off to prevent contaminated water from entering water bodies (NOT a problem for CHLORINE, as It has limited water solubility),
Evacuation and care of livestock from the hazard zone when need arises. This aspect is likely to be most applicable in rural areas with large population of valuable animals and relatively few people.
7.1.3.14___Liaison & Public Relations Coordinator The public needs to be informed accurately and rapidly as to what is happening during an emergency situation. Significant incidents may result in a large number of reporters arriving on scene and attempting to interview anybody and everybody. The Public Relations coordinator shall undertake the following tasks to help reduce confusion, facilitate information transfer, reduce problems that might be otherwise caused by a lack of organization, and reduce the incidence of unfounded rumours. Designate one specific individual and an alternate press officer to join the team of press officers that may be formed from representatives of all major parties to an emergency response operation (be they from local, state or central government agencies or the company responsible for the accident).
Compile a list of telephone numbers of local radio and television station personnel who can initiate special "on air" announcements.
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Provide designated press officers with secretarial support, photocopy machines, and a means of communications with the overall command of the response operation.
Select a site, preferably but not necessarily near the central emergency operations center, where the press can convene and be briefed by the press officer team. This site should ideally have telephones, electrical outlets, restrooms, and other facilities that media personnel may require.
Establish a firm policy among all local officials and response personnel as to who should or should not speak to media personnel.
Ensure that key emergency response personnel understand the need to relay upto-date "status reports" to press officers on a regular basis.
THINGS TO DO:
Accommodate the media as much as possible; make the news available to them.
Schedule news conferences and avoid written releases. Be direct and specific. Always, always tell the truth. Send a press representative to the command post. Ensure that the team of press officers is in contact with the command post at all times.
If safety permits, allow the media to take pictures of the accident site.
THINGS NOT TO DO:
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Do not permit arguments among public officials or press officers from different organizations in front of the press. Do, however, permit statements of dissenting opinions.
Avoid giving gut opinions or conjecturing. Do not be evasive. If the answer to a question is not known, refer the question to someone who has the appropriate answer. Do not be critical in a personal manner; i.e., avoid personal remarks about other people at the accident scene. Do not be philosophical These kinds of discussions are extremely susceptible to being quoted out of context. Do not make off-the-record comments. They may end up in print with later retractions buried in the back pages. Avoid friendly chats with media people. Casual comments may appear in print. Avoid bad or foul language. Do not hide from the media. They can sense this and form an unfavorable opinion of the press officer(s) as a credible source of new Do not answer questions beyond personal knowledge or expertise. Do not permit media persons to attend emergency response team meetings. These are likely to be technical meetings with lively discussions that may last forever if people are performing rather than dealing with the problem at hand.
Reasons for planning for and controlling statements made during a severe emergency go beyond a simple desire to ensure orderly and accurate dissemination of information. One of the groups showing up more frequently at hazardous materials accidents is of lawyers representing a wide variety of interests. It should be remembered that good lawyers will remember everything they see and hear. A thoughtless comment or statement can surface months later in a courtroom. Placements of blame, criticisms of response actions, airing of dirty laundry in public, and similar statements can result in lengthy and messy legal battles over comments or charges made in the heat of a very hectic moment.
Immediate emergency response would, be required to contain the damage, rescue the trapped/injured people, provide medical help to the affected population, evacuate the affected/threatened areas, control of traffic and curious onlookers, etc. The chain of events following such accidents is discussed in subsequent paragraphs.
7.2
BLEVE / EXPLOSION EVENTS (HPCL LPG BOTTLING PLANT, KHAPRI, BPCL
LPG BOTTLING PLANT, BUTIBORI) LPG BLEVE incidents at HPCL Khapri have the potential to injure up to 2000 persons- the sequence of actions and administrative details are similar to those described under section 7.1- however, clearly the emergency actions for LPG are different and are described below:
Immediate action is the most important factor in emergency control because the first few seconds count, as LPG fires develop and spread very quickly unless prompt and efficient action is taken. In the event of fire/ gas leak within LPG Plant the following action shall be taken as quickly as possible:
Take immediate steps to stop LPG leakage/ fire and raise alarm simultaneously.
Initiate action as per Fire Organisation Plan or Disaster Management Plan, based on gravity of the emergency.
Stop all operations and ensure closure of all concerned ROVs and isolation valves.
Ail out effort should be made to contain the spread of leakage/fire.
Saving of human life shall get priority in comparison to stocks/ assets.
Plant personnel without specific duties should assemble at the nominated place.
All vehicles except those required for emergency use should be moved away from the operating area, in an orderly manner at pre-nominated route.
Electrical system except for control supplies, utilities, lighting and fire fighting system, should be isolated.
If the feed to the fire cannot be cut off, the fire must be controlled and not extinguished.
Start water spray system at areas involved in or exposed to fire risks.
In case of leakage of LPG without fire and inability to stop the flow, take all precautions to avoid source of ignition.
Block all roads in the adjacent area and enlist Police support for the purpose if warranted.
Fire fighting Enlist support of local fire brigade and neighbouring industries.
If escaping vapour cannot be stopped, jets of water should be directed at the point of leakage to assist controlled release of vapour and in between water fog. should be used for dilution and rapid dispersion of vapour cloud.
Fire Fighting personnel working in or dose to un-ignited vapour clouds or close to fire must wear protective clothing and equipment including safety harness and manned life line. They must be protected continuously by water sprays. Water protection for fire fighters should never be shut off even though the flames appear to have been extinguished until all personnel are safely out of the danger area.
Exercise care to ensure that static charge is not generated in LPG vapour cloud. For this purpose solid jets of water must be avoided, instead fog nozzles should b& used. Fire fighters should advance towards a fire down wind if possible.
Cylinder fire should be approached using proper barricades/ protection to avoid direct hit from flying cylinders.
If the only valve that can be used to stop the leakage is surrounded by fire, it may be possible to close it manually. The attempt should be directed by trained persons only. The person attempting the closure should be continuously protected by means of water spraying (through fog nozzles), fire entry suit, water jel blanket or any other approved equipment. The person must be equipped with a safety harness and manned life line.
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Any rapid increase in pressure or noise level of product discharged through safety relief valve of the vessel/pipeline should be treated as a warning of over pressurisation. In such cases all personnel should be evacuated immediately.
As in case of any emergency situation, it is of paramount importance to avoid endangering human life in the event of fire involving or seriously exposing LPG equipment or serious leakage of LPG without the fire.
Action in the event of LPG leakage without fire:
Take basic action as detailed above.
If escaping LPG is not on fire, close any valve which will stop the flow.
In some cases like the leakage from a pressure vessel without a fire (such as leak from tank truck bullet or overturning) it may be desirable to move the vessel to some remote area such as block of isolated roadway or open field where it can be allowed to leak safely without a source of ignition nearby. However, if this is to be done, the vessel must be moved in an upright position. Never drag the . vessel in a manner which might damage valve or pipeline. Any attempt to turn a vessel back upright to move it to some remote location should be done carefully to avoid damage to valve and pipelines. Action in the event of LPG fire
Take basic action as detailed above.
Extinguishing Fires - A small fire at the point of leakage should be extinguished by enveloping with a water spray or a suitable smoothening agent such as carbon dioxide or dry chemical powder. However, it is again stressed that LPG fire should not; except in special circumstances explained earlier; be extinguished until the escape of product has been stopped.
Fire fighting procedure - Fire fighting procedures would vary depending upon various factors such as nature, sources, size, location, etc. of fire. Basic fire fighting techniques
have been explained earlier in section 13.2.2, However, for the purpose of guidelines, fire fighting techniques for few common cases are as follows:
Cylinder Fire: If a filled cylinder is involved in fire, internal pressure may start rising and if not relieved the built up pressure could rise above 70 kgf/cm2g and ultimately rupture the container. Ignition of the escaping gas would aggravate the fire but the release of pressure would reduce the possibility of rupture of the container. No attempt should be made to extinguish the burning gas. Bus the container and other containers in the vicinity should be kept cool by water sprays until the contents of the container have burnt away. If the gas leakage does not ignite, the container should be approached from upwind (if in the open air) and be removed to a place of safety remote from sources of ignition. Cylinders not directly involved in the fire should be moved away from heat exposure, while applying cooling water sprays on cylinders directly involved.
Fire on storage vessel If a pressure vessel is exposed to radiant heat from external fire, it should be kept cool by water sprays to prevent excessive pressure rise in the vessel. Cooling water sprays must be applied without delay to the heat affected area using fixed water sprinkler system or equivalent spray water coverage, through fixed monitors or other equipment Cooling the vessel with water sprays reduces the heat input to the vessel and thereby reduces the pressure, thus, reducing the rate of discharge from the relief valves. Leakage of LPG burning at the outlet of a cylinder valve: Extinguish the fire by means of a portable fire extinguisher, or smoothening with a thick non-synthetic cloth (preferably wet) or sand/ earth etc.
Fix safety cap on the valve to prevent further leakage.
After the fire is extinguished, if the leakage cannot be stopped the cylinder should be moved carefully to a safe location to" vent out the contents under controlled conditions. Fire of LPG vapour escaping from a damaged vessel fitting (flame not playing on vesse)
Allow fire to continue till exhaustion.

Spray vessel with water to cool it, if vessel is being heated by radiation from the flame or if flame is endangering other plant equipment.
Cool adjacent vessels and structures.
Fire in Oil storage area adjacent to LPG storage: Start water sprays only on those LPG vessels exposed to fire/heat.
Isolate affected vessels and run out fire water hoses in case hose stream cooling becomes necessary.
If LPG vessel's SRVs have started blowing vapour, take no further action (apart from cooling) unless vessel pressure continues to rise.
If fire enters LPG storage area, concentrate available cooling water on LPG vessels, most affected.
Do not try to empty LPG vessels exposed to fire. They become more vulnerable to overheating as their liquid content decreases. 7.3 FIRE INCIDENTS AT OIL DEPOTS (IOCL / HPCL KHAPRI)
Pool fires from the HPCL and IOCL oil depots have limited offsite damage potential- it is expected that under 20 persons are expected to get affected.
Emergency actions for oil fires are given next.
Fire in petroleum tank/container Fire in a refined oil tank will bum quietly until it is extinguished or until the oil is consumed completely. Water applied on the surface of the burning oil will not do any harm. However note that too much water will raise the liquid level and the tank will overflow. This must be avoided. Call for help immediately from all available employees and also local fire brigade in accordance with the existing instructions should also be given.
Wet the outside of the shells of the burning tank with water to cool it and to prevent it from melting down and allow the oil to cool as much as possible.
Wet down with water the sides and roofs of the warehouses, pump houses and other structures which are close-by. The tanks not on fire should be wet down with water when the tank paint starts to blister. Cooli.ng reduces tank pressure and also the volume of the escaping vapors.
Work to keep the fire from spreading. Lubricating oil fires and some oil tank fires can sometimes be extinguished by sweeping a fine spray of water fog back and forth over the surface of the oil.
Where space is available to take the oil from the burning tank, pump out the oil from the tank to the other tanks. DO not attempt this until your efforts to extinguish the fire are definitely of no use or unless plenty of help is available.
The heat from a nearby fire beating on tanks will vaporize the material so as to cause a positive stream of vapour to flow from the tank vents and this stream of vapour may catch fire. As long as the heat of the outside fire continues to beat on the other tanks, this stream of vapour will continue to come out through the vent and in almost all cases will burn harmlessly. It is usually best to let it burn until the outside fire is extinguished because if this vapour fire is extinguished sooner, the vapour may spread along the ground and cause a serious flash when it catches fire there.
In most cases, ground or spill fires are responsible for the spread of most tank field fires. Fight ground or spill fires with water fog or dry chemical extinguisher. Keep adjacent tanks cool through the use of water but only when the paint blisters. Please note that the roof of a tank must be blown off or lifted before a fire can occur in a tank.
Fire in tank truck Call for help immediately from all available employees and also outside help in accordance with the existing instructions. When truck is out on road, it will be necessary to call for whatever help is available and have word sent over to depot or terminal. Work to prevent fire from spreading to surrounding property. Be sure internal valves are closed. When the oil is burning under the truck and the tank is not leaking, move the truck away from fire, if possible or cover the oil with sand. Use water to cool the tank and float the oil away from under the truck and also ensure that the oil
is floated away to a safe place without endangering surrounding property. Use foam or sand to fight fire around the engine. Raise the hood and direct the stream of fluid at the base of the fire. Use water or foam to fight fire in the cab. Use water to fight fire on tyres. Where there is a leak in the tank which cannot be shutoff, it is often better to move the truck to a location where the oil would be run off without endangering property where it can burn harmlessly. Where the leak is near the bottom of tank, try to fill water into the tank so that the oil level will be above the leak. In case of dome fires, the filling operator should close the dome cover immediately. This will extinguish the fire. While delivering a product at a service station, should there a fire at the vent point or filling point, the fire can be extinguished by closing off the delivery valve on the tank truck. Fire around large break in pipeline Call for help immediately from all available employees and also outside help in accordance with the existing instructions Work to keep the fire from spreading. Shut valves in lines each side of break to shut off flow of oil to fire. Stop pumping operation. Cover oil pool by sand and build up the pile of sand so as to cover the leak. Put foam on the burning oil pool. Apply the foam gently so as not to scatter the burning oil. Build earth dykes around the oil pool to prevent spread of burning oil or direct the oil to points where it will not endanger the structures and surrounding property. Cover with sand or dirt pipelines exposed to fire or fill these lines with water, if water connections can be made. If the pipeline cannot be covered or filled with water, drain out the contents at a safe point as product trapped between closed valves gets heated and may burst the pipeline /valve and spill out spreading the fire. Wet down with water all adjoining structures except tanks exposed to the heat from the fire.
Water fog can be used to extinguish burning oils but water streams must be used with great care to see the water does not float away burning oil to a point where it may spread the fire.
Fire at small leak In pipeline a fire at a small leak in pipeline must be attacked promptly with nearest available fire extinguisher before it has a chance to spread-and get out of control. Call for help from all the available employees at the same time. Work to keep the fire from spreading. Shut off flow of oil in line by closing valves and by stopping pumping. Cover the oil pool by sand and build up the pile of sand so as to cover the leak. Put foam on the burning oil pool. Apply the foam gently so as not to scatter the burning oil. Build earth dykes around the oil pool to prevent spreading of burning oil. Do not leave oil trapped in short lengths of pipe exposed to fire between the closed valves, since, oil so trapped and heated often bursts the pipe and spills out spreading the fire. Wet down adjacent structures to keep them coot.
Fire in structures adjoining areas. Call for help from all available staff Work to keep fire from spreading. Cooperate as far as possible with the fire fighters to prevent the spread of fire. Clear away barrels and packages from the points endangered by the fire. If tank truck filling/drum filling are in progress, suspend alt filling operations and drive tank truck away t a safe point. If burning pieces are falling inside your premises, beat out flames with wet sacks or throw sand or dirt on them. If there are pipelines close to the fire, cover them up with sand or dirt or empty the contents if possible. Wet down with water, structures inside and which are close to the fire. . Do not use the foam equipment but hold| them in reserve for oil fires which might be started by adjacent fire.
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
CHAPTER-8
POST EMERGENCY ACTIVITIES
As mentioned earlier, an emergency has pre planning and post emergency phases. Restoration of normalcy following an incident is a very important activity and confidence building measures with the community post accident are extremely vital in overcoming the demoralization that occurs due to an incident of large proportion.
Once the situation at site has been brought under control and it is ensured that there is no emission of vapours to the atmosphere, no possibility of re-ignition etc. and an ALL CLEAR indication is available; post emergency actions come into effect. 8.1 STRUCTURAL INSPECTIONS AFTER FIRES OR EXPLOSIONS Action: Technical Coordinator A major explosion could damage or destroy numerous buildings and any nearby bridges, structures and other objects. In the same way, large fires can have major effects over a vast area. In either case, residents of partially damaged buildings will want to know if the structures are safe to occupy while they await repairs. Questions pertaining to the safety of highway or railway bridges must be resolved quickly to avoid traffic complications.
It is important to note that inspection personnel may require special precautions (i.e., chemical protective gear) in addition to normal safety equipment in those cases where the structure may still be contaminated by hazardous residues.
Fire and safety coordinators shall be responsible for inspecting the structural integrity of damaged buildings, bridges, or other structures in the aftermath of a fire or explosion. 8.2 POST-INCIDENT TESTING FOR CONTAMINATION Action: Safety Coordinator This covers sampling and analysis post incident. The State Pollution Control Board representatives shall undertake to check crops, ground surfaces, homes, stored foods, and animals that may become part of the human food chain for
possible chemical contamination- the check to perform would depend upon the chemicals in question and their environmental fate. Help may be sought from the industries having capabilities for monitoring/ testing of specific contaminants or Government labs utilized.
8.3
WASTE DISPOSAL Action : Safety Coordinator It may become necessary for public authorities to undertake disposal of hazardous wastes. This requires knowledge of Hazardous Waste {Management & Handling) Rules, 1989 of the Ministry of Environment & Forests, Govt. of India, the location of approved and authorized disposal sites and the proper procedures for transporting and transferring wastes to these sites. Local governments should seek assistance from the state department of environment. These departments will have considered such problems in their own statewide or regional emergency response plans. The items unfit for human consumption will also form part of the Hazardous waste, which needs to be disposed off in accordance with the above mentioned rules. The Regional Officer of the should decide the strategy.
8.4
CLEANUP OF DEAD OR CONTAMINATED LIVESTOCK OR WILDLIFE Action : Public Works Coordinator/ Medical Coordinator Contaminated animals must be sent to veterinary hospital for decontamination & treatment. A large number of animal carcasses can pose a variety of health hazards to the public at large. Where oil or chemical spills may contaminate waterfowl, consideration might be given to the formation of work crews to collect, dean, and care for the animals under the direction of experienced personnel. State and local public works agencies can provide assistance in planning for this activity. Local veterinarians and animal conservation groups may also be helpful, but in all cases, it is the responsibility of medical coordinator to ensure that personnel will not be placed at risk of adverse safety or health impacts by their actions.
8.5
PROVISION OF ALTERNATE WATER SUPPLIES Action : Transport Coordinator
There are a number of circumstances under which a potable water supply may become unfit for human consumption for a time and require replacement. This is most commonly
accomplished by bringing in supplies of bottled water and/or tankers/trailers capable of carrying water from the Municipal Corporation. It is the responsibility of transport coordinator in association with the Social workers for arranging potable water for consumption of personnel engaged at the incident site. The potential sources of potable water are alternate sources in nearby districts and major towns such as wells, ground water etc. 8.6 RE-ENTRY INTO EVACUATED AREAS Action : Members of DCG Based on the assessment of the situation at the site, the DCG would take a technical decision on the termination of emergency and the declaration of the ALL CLEAR. Before this, however, several issues need to be resolved by the members of LCG. Re-entry is a complex topic and requires the respective coordinators to perform their functions such as transportation of evacuees back to their respective residential areas, restoration of electricity, gas, water supplies, post-accident monitoring of concentration, etc. The issues/activities thus required are listed below in order of priority. However, as some of these are parallel activities, the decision should be taken based on actual site conditions.
The activities listed in the following Table 8 are essential for restoration of
normalcy. Table - 8 Post Emergency Activities Activity Check the industrial unit for possible secondary effect of delayed relapse. Responsibility Technical experts
Provide notification at the shelters of termination Communications Coordinator of emergency Restoration of water, electricity and gas supplies Utilities coordinator Arrange for transportation of evacuees back to residence Restoration of law and order in the affected areas Establish grievance cell Hold press conference Transportation coordinator Security coordinator Liaison & PR coordinator and chairperson of LCG Public Relations Coordinator
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
Hold public meetings for answering their queries PR coordinator in association with officials of the concerned MAH unit Arrange for providing interim relief to the affected District Collector people Undertake accident investigation and documentation Arrange further relief to the affected people based on claim applications Plan updating, if so required Provide training to community and staff Technical coordinator District Collector DCG/LCG DCG/LCG
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
ANNEXURE I
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
Important Acts covering emergency plan issues;The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 The Public Liability Insurance Act 1991 amend. 1992 The Factories Act, 1948, as amend. 1976 and 1987 The National Environment Tribunal Act, 1995
Rules:The Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules (MSiHC), 1989, amend. 1994 Chemical Accidents (Emergency, Preparedness, Planning and Response) Rules, 1996 The Public Liability Insurance Rules. 1991 amend. 1992. Model Rules under the Factories Act, 1948 amend. 1987
The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, (E (P) A, 1986) amended in 1991
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 amended in 1991 is an act to provide for the protection and improvement of environment and for matters connected therewith. The specific provisions related to accident prevention and hazardous chemicals are given below:
Section 3 (2) (vi) provides power to the Central Government for laying down procedures and safeguards for the prevention of accidents which may cause environmental pollution and remedial measures for such accidents.
Section 6 (2) (d) provides power to the Central Government to make rules relating to the prohibition and restrictions on the handling of hazardous substances in different areas; Section 6 (2) (f) provides power to the Central Government to make rules relating to the procedures and safeguards for the prevention of accidents which may cause environmental pollution and remedial measures for such accidents;
Section 8 directs persons handling hazardous substances to comply with procedural safeguards; The Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules 1989 (MSIHC Rules) amended in 2000, under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, amended in 1991 are notified under the EP Act and are discussed next.
Provisions In the Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules 1989 (MSIHC Rules) amended in 2000, under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, amended in 1991
The MSIHC rules are in effect industrial accident prevention and preparedness regulations. The rule 13 of these rules requires the occupier to prepare and keep up-todate on site emergency plan for dealing with possible major accidents. This provision applies to hazardous chemical installations, which include both industrial processes and isolated storages, handing hazardous chemicals in quantities laid down in the rules and indicated as threshold planning quantities (TPQ). Rule 14 of these rules, requires the district Emergency Authority or the District collector in the state to prepare an off-site emergency plan for the District incorporating details made available by the hazardous installations and the transport authorities.
Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical Rules 1989, amended in 2000, under EPA 1986, are primarily aimed at providing procedures and safeguards for handling of hazardous chemicals at a site (industry, isolated storage, pipeline) and lays down requirements for the industry and authorities to manage chemical emergencies.
Rule 13 of MSIHC Rules requires an On Site Emergency Plan to be prepared by the MAH units and rule 14 requires preparation of an Off Site Emergency Plan by the district authority.
As per Schedule - 5 of these rules, responsibility of the preparation of an off-site emergency plan for chemical disasters under Rule 14 rests with the District Collector or District Emergency Authority designated by the State Government.
Schedule - 11 of MSIHC Rules provides guidelines for the preparation of an On Site Emergency Plan and schedule - 12 provides the details to be included in the Off Site Emergency Plan. Schedule - 12 is reproduced below :ODMP_NAGPUR P1-Ch. 1
Schedule -12- MSIHC Rules
Details to be furnished in the off Site Emergency Plan 1. The type of accidents and release to be taken into account. 2. Organizations involved including key personnel and responsibilities
and liaison arrangements between them. 3. Information about the site including likely locations of dangerous substances, and plant. 4. Technical information such as chemical and physical characteristics and dangers of the substances and plant. 5. Identify the facilities and transport routes, 6. Contact for further advice e.g. meteorological information, transport, temporary food and accommodation, first aid and hospital services water and agricultural authorities. 7. Communication links including telephones, radios and standby methods. 8. Special equipment including fire fighting materials, damage control and repair items. 9. Details of emergency response procedures. 10. Notify the public. 11. Evacuation arrangements. 12. Arrangements for dealing with the press and other media interests. 13. Long term cleanup.
Provisions in Chemical Accidents (Emergency Planning, Preparedness and Response) Rules'1996 (CAEPPR Rules) under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, amended in 1991
The Government of India published the Chemical Accidents (Emergency Planning, Preparedness and Response) Rules 1996 (CA(EPPR) Rules). They came into force from 1stAug'1996. The CA (EPPR) Rules are aimed at providing administrative structure at different levels (central, state, district and local) for effective planning, preparedness and response to chemical accidents. Crisis groups at such levels have been defined with their composition and functions under these rules.
Constitution of Crisis Groups Following groups have been formed at the central, state district and local level to deal with chemical accidents and emergency management: Central Crisis Group - Chairman - Secretary, Govt. of India, Ministry of Environment Forests, State Crisis Group - Chairman - Chief Secretary, State Government. District Crisis Group - Chairman - District Collector of the District. Local Crisis Group - Chairman - SDM & Dy. Collector of the District.
These rules provide a statutory back-up for setting up of a Crisis group in districts and states which have a major Accident Hazardous Installation (MAH) and provide information to the public. The rules define the major accident hazard installation which includes industrial activity, transport and isolated storages at a site handling hazardous chemicals in quantities specified. As per rules, .the Government of India is to constitute a Central Crisis Group (CCG) for the management of chemical accident and set up an alert system within 30 days of the notification. The Chief Secretaries of the area constitute State Crisis Group (SCG) to plan and respond to chemical accident in the State and notify the same in gazette within 45 days. The district collector shall not only constitute a District Crisis Group (DCG) but also constitute a Local Crisis group (LCG) for every industrial pocket In the district within 60 days. The CCG shall be the apex body in the country to deal with and provide expert guidance for planning1 and handling of major chemical accidents in the country. The CCG shall continuously monitor the post-accident situation and suggest measures for prevention of reoccurrence of such accidents. It shall meet every six months and respond to inquiries from the SCG and DCG. The SCG will be chaired by the state Chief Secretary and shall be apex body in the state, consisting of Government officials, technical experts and industry representatives and will deliberate on planning, preparedness and mitigation of chemical accident with a view to reduce the extent of loss of file, property and ill-health. The SCG will review the entire district off-site Emergency plan for its adequacy. The guidance for which is available in the amendments of October 1994 to Manufacture, storage and import of Hazardous Chemical Rufes in Schedule -12. The district collector shall be the Chairman of the DCG and the DCG will serve as the apex body at the district level and shall meet every 45 days. This group shall review all on-site Emergency plan prepared by the occupiers of the major accident Hazard installations for preparation of a district off-site Emergency plan, which shall also include hazards due the transportation of hazardous chemicals both by road and by
pipeline. The district Chairperson shall conduct at least one full-scale mock-drill of the District Off-site Emergency plan each year. Power under section 10-and 11 of the Environment (protection) Act for entry and inspection are to be made available to the Central/State and District level Crisis Groups members. As per these Rules, the Ministry of Environment and Forest will publish a state wise list of experts and concerned officials and the yearly accident details. Provisions in the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 and Rules As per this Act, every owner handling hazardous substances in quantities notified shall take out one or more insurance policies before starting his activity. The insurance policy will help to pay immediate relief in case of death or injury to any person (other then workmen) or damage to any property in case of an accident involving a hazardous substance. This relief shall be paid on "principle of on fault" i.e. the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death injury or damage was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default. The money provided under the act is an interim relief and ultimate liability to pay total compensation to the victims is that of the owner. This Act, apart from assuring financial assistance to the victim makes it obligatory on the part of the owner to prevent accidents and prepare for emergencies. The Act thus, has given impetus to enhancement of safety. The enforcement of the Act has been left to the state governments without the mention of specific authorities. The compliance, therefore, has been left to individual units. Provisions in the Factories Act and Rules The Factories Act, 1948 was conceived as a welfare Act. Only in 1987, the Act was amended to introduce a chapter dealing with hazardous processes. Chapter IV A, Section 41 (B) of the Factories Act Amended in 1987 requires the drawing up of an on-site emergency plan and detailed disaster control measures with the approval of the chief inspector The provision applies to all hazardous process industries listed in the first schedule of the amended Act irrespective of hazardous chemicals being handled or not.
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
ANNEXURE II
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION SET UP (UP TO TALUKA LEVEL)
DISTRICT COLLECTOR
NAGPUR SD NAGPUR CITY TALUKA NAGPUR RURAL TALUKA KAMPTEE TALUKA HINGANA TALUKA
UMRED SD UMRED TALUKA
SAONER SD
RAMTEK SD
KATOL SD KATOL TALUKA NARKHED TALUKA
SAONER TALUKA KALMESHWAR TALUKA
TAMTEK TALUKA MOUDA TALUKA PARSHIONI TALUKA
BHIWAPUR TALUKA KUHI TALUKA
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
ANNEX-III
TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF KEY DISTRICT OFFICIALS AND RESPONSE/ OTHER AGENCIES KEY CONTACT NUMBERS Name of the Officer STD Code
0712
Office
2564973
Residence
Mobile
District Collector Collector (Control Room) Collectorate EPABX Police Control Room Municipal Commissioner, NMC Nagpur Directorate of Industrial Safety and Health Dy. Director of Health services (Mayo Hospital) Chief Controller Explosives, Nagpur MPCB, Nagpur Government Medical College, Nagpur
KRIMS Hospital, Nagpur
2561755
9423688760
0712 0712 0712
2562668 2562972 2564333 2564334 2531222 2567001

2564545
0712
012
0712 0712 0712 0712
2725421 2726126 2510103/2510579/25102 48 2565308

2749311/2744671/274854 2 2451188
2526355/2533545
of
0712
POLICE STATION CHART: POLICE CONTROL ROOM: 0712-2560200
Zone-I DCP ACP Sitabuldi Main Police Statons Sitabuldi Dhantoli Sonegaon Ajni Ambazari Rana Pratap Nagar Zone II DCP ACP Sadar Other Police Stations at
MIDC Wadi Sadar Panchpaoli Zone III DCP ACP Ganeshpeth ACP Kotwali Other Police Stations Kalamana Lakadganj Tehsil Kotwali Ganeshpeth Imambada Sakkardara
Traffic Branch DCP Traffic ACP Traffic (West) 2534550 2522470
HOSPITALS , CHEMISTS AND BLOOD BANKS: STD code: 0712

Blood Banks
Daga Hospital Govt. Med. College

Dr. Hedgewar
Shri Sainath Dr. Wankar's Dr. Radhakrrshna Hospital Mayo Hospital Orange City Hospital Ayush Blood Bank
National Bank Madhva Eye Padhi (EYE BANK)
ODMP_NAGPUR
2729202 2744671 2701109 2528292 2548151, 2552035

238431, 2780144, 2780582 2728622 2726126 2238431 2523902, 2543663
6618777 6618666 2440236

2522422 2522410, 252401 1
P1-Ch. 1
Hospitals Mayo Hospital

2726127 2533270
Mure Memorial Jasleen Hospital Gandhi Children's Avanti Inst. Of Cardiology Suretech Apollo Shat Ayu KRIMS Hospital Orange City Hospital Dr. Radhakrishna Hospital
2523779 2521340 2522408, 2552809

2544855, 2544882 2534041 , 2547162 2451188, 2550400
238431 - 34 2780144, 2780582
Dr. Dalvi Memorial Hospital Nagrik Sahakati Rugnalaya Suraj Eye Clinic Kunal Hospital Shanti-Prabha Chemists (24 Hours)
2525508, 2534044
2527799, 2537896 2583727, 2583587
2554613
Panchsheel Medicals 2537998

Yash Medicals Shree Medicals
2552583 2545996
Ambulance
Govt. Medical College Mayo Hospital Lata Mangeshkar CIIMS
KRIMS 2744671 to 76, 2744695 to 97 2701109 2728621 to 27 2726126
2530347, 2523302/03 2236441 2233381
Nagrik Sahakari. Sushrusha Care Hearse Van

ODMP_NAGPUR
6614564 6614565 2551188 2525508 2537244, 2535311
P1-Ch. 1
Dr Dalvi Memorial Hospital
2766414, 2768277
FIRE STATIONS CONTACT DETAILS AND RESOURCES MAIN FIRE EXCHANGE CHIEF FIRE OFFICER, NAGPUR: 0712101/2567777Fire Brigade 0712101, 2533333 Fire Station, Sakkardara 0712-2745354 0712 2703829 Chief Fire officer, Nagpur 0712(Municipal Control Room) 101/2567777
Fire Exchange
KEY CONTACT DETAILS OF FIRE STATIONS IN NAGPUR

Sr. No.
01 Name of Fire Service
In charge of Location Fire Service Chief Fire Officer Nagpur Municipal Corporation's Fire Service Municipal Council's Fire Service Municipal Council's Fire Service Municipal Council's Fire Service Municipal Council's Fire Service Municipal Council's Fire Service Municipal Council's Fire Service Municipal Council's Fire Service Municipal Council's Fire Service Municipal Council's Fire Service
P1-Ch. 1
S.T.D. Code 0712
Telephone
Nagpur Municipal Corporation's Fire Service Municipal Council, Kamathi - Nagpur

Municipal Council, Umred - Nagpur
2567777
02
Chief Officer Chief Officer Chief Officer Chief Officer Chief Officer
Chief Officer Chief Officer
07109
282262
03
07116
242007
04
Municipal Council, Ramtek -Nagpur Municipal Council, Khapa -Nagpur Municipal Council, Kalmeshwar-Nagpur Municipal Council, Mowad - Nagpur Municipal Council, Savner - Nagpur Municipal Council, Kato! - Naqpur Municipal Council, Narkhed - Nagpur
07114
252132
05
07113
286125
06
07118
2713233
07
07105
236123
08
07113
232490
09
Chief Officer Chief Officer
07112
222101
10
07105
232338
ODMP_NAGPUR
11
Municipal Council, Mohapa - Nagpur
Chief Officer
Municipal Council's Fjre Service
07118
237127
KEY RESOURCES DATA FOR FIRE STATIONS IN NAGPUR

Sr. No. Particulars Nagpur Kamthl Umred Ramtek Khapa
Kalmeshwar No
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
24
Fire Station Water Tender Foam Tender DCP Tender

Rescue Tender
8 27 1
1
1 1
1
No
Fire Service
Fire
Service
3 1
Hydraulic Platform Aerial Ladder Water Browser
Ambulance
Water Tanker
3 1 18
B.A. Set Car Jeep C.F.O.

Dy. C.F.O.
5 1
D.O.
A.D.O. Station Officer Sub Officer 6 15 15 45 56
196 1 2 2 1 2
Sr. Leading Fireman Leading Fireman

Driver Operator Fireman Others
2 4
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
NAGPUR MUNICIPAL CORPORATION: STD code: 0712

NMC
Civil Line Office PBX Mayor Deputy Mayor Municipal Comm. Deputy MC Exe. Eng. Water Works
Exe. Eng. Electrical
2531552, 2524444 2567000 2567400 2567013
2564973
2533793
2522513 2531551
Health Officer(Sani.) Health Officer(Disp's) Octroi Superintendent
2520423 2533832 2724404
OTHER IMPORTANT NUMBERS: STD code: 0712 Indian Railways Railway Enquiry Manual Recorded Reservation: Manual IVRS Central Railway: Div. Railway Manager
139 139 139 139
2612896
Sr. Divl Comm!. 2560045 Manager 2532597 Station Manager South Eastern Railway:
Divl. Railway Manager
2761821
2773027/26 Divl. Comml. Manager Private Bus Operators Prasanna Indore Royal, Baidyanath Sq
2751349 2420818
2749282 238712 2721741
Royal, Chhatrapati Ng. Hindustan Sabharwal
2535122, 2556899
P1-Ch. 1
ODMP_NAGPUR
Sai Sangam
Jackson Travel Doordarshan Station Director Station Engineer Duty Room/Studio Administration Transmitter Programming Postal Information Postal Enquiry Pin Code Enquiry Telegrams Central Telegraphic Office (C.T.O.)
Speed Post Centre, G.P.O,
2722092, 2721092 2721795, 2724467
2510136 2512658 2534506 2536143

2534841
2536143
2547159 2532440 2690802 2524335

2533575
2524079 Fax G.P.O. Important Government Offices Amdar Nivas All India Radio Income Tax Maharashtra Industries Devpt. Corp. (M1DC) Maharashtra Small Industries Devpt. Corp. Ravibhavan
2531 521 / 22
2565221 2510725 2525654 2542623

2523825
2531297, 2534447, 2534484, 522054 2642279 2533935
Coal Mines Television
News Papers Loksatta
2706997
2423527 2284001
Lokmat Navabharat The Hitavada Tarunbharat
6636200
2426440
Roadways
M.S.R.T.C.
2726221
P1-Ch. 1
Ganeshpeth
ODMP_NAGPUR
Tekadi Road, Opposite Ganesh Temple

Mor Bhavan Cinema Theatres Panchsheel Variety Regent
2240178
2522334
2534327 25.22300 2522400 2522000
Regal Janki Laxrnt Vijay Jayshree Nursing Amardeep Natraj Rajvilas Kamal Chitra Sangam Krishna Alankar Aashirwad Liberty Smuriti Jaswant
2523145 2524000 2725108 2728900

2724500 2769742 2762700 2720500 2640398
2760400 2745356 2720700 2523402

2749100 2533400 2526500 2640531
SELECTED NON GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS/ASSOCIATIONS
Lions Club Mahesh Yuva Sanghetan, Tekdi Road Maratha Vidva Prasarak Samai. Sakkardara Road Swami Vivekanand Medical Mission, Samartha Nagar Shri Agrasen Mandal, Ravinagar MIDC Industries Association. Hinona Nagour Chamber of Commerce. Gandhibaug Vidharba Industries Association, Civil Lines All India Naopur transport Sanoh, Itwari
9422102270 2540395 2742534 2226824. 2224380 2724400. 2522318 2235048 2720164 252251 1 2730157
Industrial Experts
Shrikant Deshpande Dnyanesh Mase
9850300765 9881724840
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
CONTROLLER OF EXPLOSIVES
MR K N GHOSH Chief Controller of Explosive Petroleum of Explosives Safety Organisation A - Block, 5th Floor, CGO Complexs Seminary Hills Nagpur440006 aiainigam@explosives.gov.in
0712-2510579
Joint Chief Controller of Explosives Petroleum of Explosives Safety Organisation A - Block, 5th Floor, CGO Complexs Seminary Hills Nagpur440006 trthomas@explosives.gov.in
0712-2510389
Joint Chief Controller of Explosives Petroleum of Explosives Safety Organisation A - Block, 5th Floor, CGO Complexs Seminary Hills Nagpur440006 pbvedla@explosives.gov.in
0712-2512094
Deputy Chief Controller of Explosives Petroleum of Explosives Safety Organisation A - Block, 5th Floor, CGO Complexs Seminary Hills Nagpur440006 pcsrivastava@explosives.gov.in
0712-2510139
MIDC Regional Officer MIDC, fifth floor, Udyog Bhawan, Civil Lines Nagpur-440 001 Telephone No:(0712) 2542623,
Chief Co-ordination Officer Single Point Scheme, MIDC Office Building, Butibori industrial Area, Butibori.Tah.Hingana, Distt.Nagpur,(Maharastra) Telephone No:(07104) 65448
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
Butibori Manufacturers Association 245, Hill Road, Gandhinagar, Nagpur-440010 Telephone No :(0712) 536620
Vidarbha Industries Association 1st Floor, Udyog Bhavan , Civil Lines Nagpur-440 001. Telephone No: (0712) 545190 , 522511 eMail: vianqp(S)iqindia.com
MIDC Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation "Udyog Sarathi", Mahakali Caves Road, Andheri (East), Mumbai 400 093 Phone:022-8325451-54 Fax:022-8221587 Email: reach@midcindia.org website: http://www.midcindia.com
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EMERGENCY ACTION GROUP FIRE

Annexure IV a
Deputy Commandant Fire Service
Fire Officers of all Fire Stations
Fire Officers of MAH units
Mutul-aid Scheme Members
Voluntary Organizations
Fire Fighters
Fire Fighters
Rescuers
Rescuers
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EMERGENCY ACTION GROUP TRANSPORT

Annexure IV b
Transporters of Hazardous Chemicals
Transporters of Coordinator RTO
Divisional Railway Manager
Depot Manager State Transport Corporation
SDM/SDM
Private Transportation/Vehicles Available with Industries
City Service Vehicle of Govt. Departments Corporate / Autonomous bodies Vehicles
District/ State Service

EMERGENCY ACTION GROUP MEDICAL

Annexure IV c
MEDICAL Coordinator Chief Medical & Health Officer
MS of all Major Hospital
Voluntary Organizations
Industrial Medical Officers
Primary health Centers/ Other Private Hospitals
City Service
Dispensary
Para Medical Staff
Ambulances
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EMERGENCY ACTION GROUP TECHNICAL

Annexure IV d
Technical Coordinators (As nominated by the DC)
MAH Units
MPCB Lab
IMD
Technical Expert Group
R&D
Environment Expert
Chemical Analyst
Toxicologist
Industry
Epidemiologist
Academicians
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State/National Agencies
Occupational Health Expert
EMERGENCY ACTION GROUP SECURITY

Annexure IV e
Security Coordinators Supdt. Of Police
MS of all Major Hospital
Home Guards & Civil Defense
CRPF
CISF Commandant
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EMERGENCY ACTION GROUP COMMUNICATIONS

Annexure IV f
Liaison & Public Relatons Coordinator
Communication Coordinators GM Telecom
Telecommunication Department
Media
Press
HAM Radio Operators
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Radio
Television
Cable TV
EMERGENCY ACTION GROUP WELFARE

Annexure IV g
Community Leader/Serpanch/ Villiage Pradhan
Evacuation Coordinator Representative of Nalgonda Municipal Corporation
Medical, Transport, Public Works, Rehabilitation, Food & Civil Supplies, Coordinators
Officers of PHD
Welfare Officers of MAH Units
Officers of Food & Civil Supplies Dept.
NGOs & Voluntary Organizations
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EMERGENCY ACTION GROUP RESCUE & COMBAT

Annexure IV h
ADM/ SDM
Fire Services, Safety, Materials, Technical & Communications Coordinators
Fire Fighting Team
Rescue Teams of MAH units
Field Medical & First-aid Staff
Mutual Aid from other Units
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ANNEXURE V DISTRICT EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

The main Emergency Control Centre is the District Collector's Office at District Headquarters District Collector's Office Emergency Control Centre (ECC) (Telephone, Wireless)
District Crisis Group (Meeting at DC's Office) (Telephone, Mobile, Doordarshan, Radio, Cable)
Revenue Division Officer's Office (Emergency Control Centre/Secondary ECC) (Telephone, Mobile, Jeep with loudspeaker, Doordarshan, Radio, Cable)
Local Crisis Group (Meeting at RDO's Office) (Telephone, Mobile, Doordarshan, Radio, Cable)
Local Crisis Group (Meeting at RDO's Office) (Telephone, Mobile, Doordarshan, Radio, Cable)
Police Station (Field Command Post) Telephone, Mobile, Jeep with Loudspeaker
First Responders (Police/Fire/Medical) (Emergency Response Team)
Concerned Industry In-charge
Public in General
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ANNEX-XIII FIRST AID GUIDELINES

Indicative List of Medicines/Equipment Medicines to be stocked at Treatment Center (per 1000 persons)
ITEM QUANTITY
ITEM
QUANTITY
General Medicines Methyl Cellulose Eye Drops, 5 ml. Surgical Spirit Normal Saline Fluid, 540 ml. Vinegar Vaseline Tincture Iodine Savlon Liquid Ointment Atropine (Eye) Neosporin Dusting Powder 500 bottles Injection Tetanus Toxoid, multidose 10 bottles 5% GNS IV Fluid, 540 ml. 250 Vials
100 bottles 100 bottles 5 bottles 5 bottles 20 bottles 100 tubes 50 bottles 25 bottles 50 tubes
100 bottles Sterile Distilled Water, 500 ml. 5 1 tin 5 bottles 25 bottles 50 tubes 100 tubes Liquid Paraffin Tincture Benzoin Tincture Cetrimide Ointment Soframycin Atropine Eye Drops Pilocarpine Eye Drops Ointment Gentamycin (Eye)
Acriflavin Gauze with Plastic Jar 5 noe. Gentamycin Eye Drops Injectables (Ampoules/Vials) Decadron Coramine Adrenaline Mephentine Atropine Sulphate Lasix Lignocaine Hydrochloride Perinorm Ampicillin Clampose 100 100 100 50 1000 200 70 25 25 100 50 bottles
Deriphyline Calcium Glutonate Dopamine Hydrochloride Sodium Bicarbonate Aminophyline Vitamin K Salbutamol Pethidine Hydrochloride Avii Morphine Sulphate
500 100 25 500 100

20 10 5 50 10
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ITEM
QUANTITY ITEM
QUANTITY
Surgical Items Eye Plastic Undine Bandage 2", 4", 6" Oxygen Cylinders Polyethylene Masks (Surgical) Disposable Syringes (2, 5 & 10 ml.) Suture Needles Cur. Cutting (Different sizes) , Catgut Plain Operation Scissors. Tracheotomy Set Forceps Artery, Cur Plaster of Paris Bandage (10 & 15cm) Forceps Cheatles Boyels Apparatus Laryngoscope (Adult/child) IV Set, Disposable Elastic Bandage
50 100-rolls 50 1000 150
Absorbant Cotton Wool Adhesive Plasters (Different sizes)

Mackintosh (Rubber Sheet 3' x 6')
100 rolls
100 rolls 20 rolls 50 pairs 100 boxes
Pathology Gloves (Misc. sizes) Catgut Chromic
100
Suture Needles Str. Cutting (4, 6, 100 each 8 mm)

100 reels 5 50 50 5 123 each 2 each 25 100 5 10 5 5 4
100 boxes BB Silk 5 10 50 50 rolls each 4 1 1 each 100 100
Operation Scissors, Cur. Forceps Artery, Str. Forceps Mosquito Forceps Dissecting (Toothed & Non-toothed) Jhomas Splints (arm/hip) Respirator Bear (Adult/child) Endotracheal Tubes (Diff sizes) Wooden Splints Electric Sterliser SS Tray with Lid (rectangular) El Jar, (12") Basins (1 8" dia) Loup (Eye Examination) Others
Water
Hypodermic Needles(diff. Sizes) 100 El Jar, (5") Scissors shop Kidney Tray
G N S IV Fluid
10 2 10
100 bottles 100 pairs 60 100
100 bottles 50 10 50 10
Plasma Miscellaneous Items Overshoes Torch Cells Mattress
Oxygen Cylinders Torchlight (3 Cells) Stretchers Wheel Chairs
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Antidotes & Treatment Procedures
ANTIDOTES
An antidote is an agent that removes or prevents the absorption of poison, changes its toxic properties or counteracts its physiological effects. There are three general types of antidotes:
Mechanical : Removes a poison or prevents its absorption, e.g., gastric levage, surface washing or cathartic types and activated animal charcoal. Chemical: Acts chemically to form a non-toxic or a less toxic compound by formation of insoluble products by oxidation, e.g., tannin, calcium compounds, dilute potassium permanganate.
Physiological : Action is opposite to that of the poison, e.g., barbiturates (for convulsions), atropine (parathion and other para-smpathomimic poisons).
Other Specifics : Disodium calcium salt of ethylene diamine tetra acetic acid (EDTA), Versene, Edathamil for lead, Dimercaprol (BAL) for arsenic or mercury and Nallylnormorphine hydrochloride (Nalline) for morphine and derivatives. Suggested Emergency Treatment with General Antidotes
1.
Immediate action is necessary
2.
First possibility of poisoning is determined by history, signs, symptoms, residue in glasses or bottles or any other related information
3.
Prompt removal of toxic substances from stomach by tube or emetic unless otherwise contra-indicated as in case where kerosene or other petroleum products, acids, alkalies, or other corrosive, or strychnine (strong convulsions) are suspected. Removal is not easily possible if the patient is in coma. Milk may serve as a dilutant, demulcent and percipient. It also assists vomiting (for patients 1-5
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years old : 1 - 2 cups , for patients 5 years and older: upto 1 quart). During lavage or emesis every possibility of determining the toxic agent is taken.
4.
All vomitus and gastric lavage is saved for analysis. Urine collected. Every effort should be made to identify the poison.
5.
Emetics used if not contra-indicated by cardiac diseases, late pregnancy, kerosene or other petroleum products, acids/alkalies or other corrosives. Avoid emetics if patient is comatose, markedly depressed or in convulsions. Emptying the stomach even several hours later may still be worth the effort. It can be accomplished by tickling the back of the throat by a finger or spoon.
6.
Demulcents given for corrosive action : Flour paste, crushed bananas, cream of milk, egg white, gelatin solution, acacia solution, butter, eleo, lard, mineral or olive oil. Fats and oils are contra-indicated when poison is oil soluble as with acetone, aniline, aspidium, BHC, cresols, CTC, chloroform, chlorodane, dethmore, DFD, ODD, DOT, HETP, kerosene, Lsol, phenol, phosphorous, parathion. Pyrethrum, rotenone, TEPP, Toxaphene, turpentine and xylene.
I.
As a general rule, the patient should be given saline cathartic (a purgative), unless contra-indicated. Following are some examples of common purgatives :
a. Sodium sulphate: 1 Tablespoonfu! in a glass of warm water b. Magnesium Oxide : 1 Teaspoonful in a glass of warm water c. Citrate of Masgnesia : 200 cc ( 6 oz) d. Castor oil: 1 Tablespoonful e. Enema
II.
If the specific poison is unknown or if the antidote for the specific poison is unknown or not available, the following general "universal antidote" is recommended : 2 parts of activated animal charcoal 1 part of tannin 1 part of magnesium oxide
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Dose : 1 heaping table spoon in half glass of water, this preparation is stable when prepared and stored in a tightly stoppered dry bottle.
If this preparation is not available, very strong tea and milk of magnesia may be substituted. Milk may also be very useful. 9. For inhaled gases, patient should be immediately removed to fresh air (carried horizontally), minimising exertion. Artificial respiration and/or oxygen therapy should be given as required. Cardiac and/or respiration stimulants may also be administered if so required.
Great caution must be exercised before administering a specific antidote. Some antidotes are capable of producing harmful effects themselves if the poison for which they are given are not actually present in the body. It would be well to correlate symptoms, history, analysis of vomits, gastric lavage and other findings and then treatment proceeded with prudence and close-observation. 10. Once the nature of poison is known, the treatment may begin with more certainty. Specific antidotes, if available, may now be used safely. However,
general symptomatic treatment is equally important to ensure survival and should not be underestimated. General measures adopted are : a. Removal of poison by gastric lavage, emesis or cathartics,
unless contraindicated b. Rendering the poison inactive by precipitation, neutralisation, absorption, or by oxidation c. Providing physiological antagonism such as hypnotics for
excitation or convulsions and stimulants for depression. d. e. Maintaining body heat, fluids, electrolytes and acid/base balance Preventing or correcting circulatory and respiratory difficulties.
f. Preventing superimposed infections with antibiotics g. Relieving pain as well as urinary and bowel retention
Specific Antidotes
These are not without danger and death has resulted by their indiscriminate use, especially in the absence of the suspected poisoning agents.
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There are only few specific antidotes. The following list shows some poisons and their specific antidotes:
No. a)
Irritant Lead Salts
b) c) d) e)
Morphine & Derivatives Parathion and Esters Arsenic, Mercury & Gold, etc. Barbiturates
Antidote Calcium salt of Ethylene diamine tetra acetic acid (CaEDTA or CaVersenate), 1 to 2 gm intravenous (IV) daily for 5 days. Also Demerol and Methadone : N- Allylnormorphin (Nalline), 5 mg IV carefully and slowly. Atropine, 1 to 2 mg every 2 to- 3 hours upto 20 mg per 24 hours BAL 3 mg/kg every 4 hours for 2 days; 3 mg twice daily Bismuth, Antimony for next 5 days or penicillamine Ritaline, megamide (bemegride). Emavin or doxapram only if there is respiratory difficulty. Treatment with Picorotoxin or Metrazo! may be dangerous. Drugs forming methemoglobin such as nitrites Ammonium Hydroxide - Methamine 1%MethyleneBlue Proteins or Tannin to precipitate Sodium thiosulphate or starch Weak acid (Vinegar or fruit juices) Weak bases which do not produce carbon dioxide such as MgO. Antacids like Cremalin or Ampho-jel Copper sulphate solution
f) 9) h) i) j) k) l) m)
Cyanides Formaldehyde Methemoglobin Heavy Metals Iodine Caustic alkali Strong Acids Phosphorous
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ANNEXURE VII VULNERABILITY TEMPLATES
TEMPLATE
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-1Q T-11 T-1 2 T-1 3 T-1 4 T-1 5 T-1 6 T-1 7 T-1 8 T-1 9 T-20 T-21 T-22 T-23 T-24 T-25 T-26 T-27 T-28 T-29 T-30 T-31
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SCENARIO
KANHAN WATER WORKS, CHLQRINE TQNNER CATASTROPHIC LEAK, / TOXIC DISPERSION, D,3 M/S KANHAN WATER WORKS: CHLORINE TONNER CATASTROPHIC LEAK, TOXIC DISPERSION, F, 1.5 M/ KANHAN WATER WORKS PROCESS HAZARD- MINOR / MEDIUM LEAK, LIQUID CHLORINE TUBE FAILURE, D, 3 M/S KANHAN WATER WORKS, PROCESS HAZARD- MINOR / MEDIUM LEAK, LIQUID CHLORINE TUBE FAILURE, F, 1.5 M/S GAS SUVIDHA AND ROOPSONS PETROCHEMICALS, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, BLEVE GAS SUVIDHA AND ROOPSONS PETROCHEMICALS, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, JET FIRE GAS SUVIDHA AND ROOPSONS PETROCHEMICALS, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, DIST. TO LEL, D,3 M/S QAS SUVIDHA AND ROOPSONS PETROCHEMICALS, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, DIST. TO LEL, F.1.5 M/S GAS SUVIDHA AND ROOPSONS PETROCHEMICALS, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION
PAGE NO.
(ANN-VII) 3 5 7 9 11
12
13
14
15
GAS SUVIDHA AND ROOPSONS PETROCHEMICALS, PROCESS HAZARDS, 16 SMALL/ MEDIUM LEAK FROM LPG PIPELINE FROM STORAGE TO PLANT-JET FIRE ISPAT INDUSTRIES, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, BLEVE 17 ISPAT INDUSTRIES. LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, JET FIRE ISPAT INDUSTRIES, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, DIST. TO LEL. D,3 M/S ' * ISPAT INDUSTRIES, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, DIST. TO LEL, F.1.5M/S ISPAT .INDUSTRIES, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION ISPAT INDUSTRIES, PROCESS HAZARDS, SMALL/ MEDIUM LEAK FROM LPG PIPELINE FROM STORAGE TO PLANT- JET FIRE HPCL, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, BLEVE HPCL, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, JET FIRE HPCL, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, DIST. TO LEL, D,3 M/S HPCL. LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, DIST. TO LEL, F.1.5 M/S HPCL, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION HPCL, PROCESS HAZARDS, SMALL/ MEDIUM LEAK FROM LPG PIPELINE FROM STORAGE TO PLANT- JET FIRE BPCL, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, BLEVE BPCL, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, JET FIRE BPCL, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, DIST. TO LEL, D,3 M/S BPCL, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, DIST. TO LEL, F,1.5 M/S BPCL, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION BPCL, PROCESS HAZARDS, SMALL/ MEDIUM LEAK FROM LPG PIPELINE FROM STORAGE TO PLANT- JET FIRE INDO FLAME, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, BLEVE INDO FLAME, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, JET FIRE INDO FLAME. LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, DIST. TO LEL, D,3 M/S 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37
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T-32 T-33 T-34 T-35 T-36 T-37 T-38
INDO FLAME, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, DIST. TO LEL, F.1.5 M/S INDO FLAME, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION INDO FLAME, PROCESS HAZARDS, SMALL/ MEDIUM LEAK FROM LPG PIPELINE FROM STORAGE TO PLANT- JET FIRE IOCL, KHAPRI DEPOT MS TANK LEAK AND POOL FIRE IOCL, KHAPRI DEPOT, HSD TANK LEAK AND POOL FIRE HPCL WARDHA DEPOT, MS TANK LEAK AND POOL FIRE HPCL, WARDHA DEPOT, HSD TANK LEAK AND POOL FIRE
38 39 40 41 42 43 44
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T-1
KANHAN WATER WORKS, CHLORINE TONNER CATASTROPHIC LEAK, TOXIC DISPERSION, D,3 M/S-
Chemical Name: CHLORINE Molecular Weight: 70.91 g/mol IDLH: 10 ppm Carcinogenic risk - see CAMEO Ambient Boiling Point : -34.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0%
THREAT ZONE 1.0 KMIDLH-10 PPM
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T-2
KANHAN WATER WORKS: CHLORINE TONNER CATASTROPHIC LEAK, TOXIC DISPERSION, F, 1.5 MIS Chemical Name: CHLORINE Molecular Weight: 70.91 g/mol IDLH: 10 ppm Carcinogenic risk - see CAMEO Ambient Boiling Point: -34.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE 1.4 KMIDLH-10 PPM
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T-3
KANHAN WATER WORKS PROCESS HAZARD- MINOR / MEDIUM LEAK, LIQUID CHLORINE TUBE FAILURE, D, 3 M/S Chemical Name: CHLORINE Molecular Weight: 70.91 g/mol IDLH: 10 ppm Carcinogenic risk - see CAMEO Ambient Boiling Point: -34.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atrn Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE 2 KMIDLH- 10 PPM
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T-4
KANHAN WATER WORKS, PROCESS HAZARD- MINOR / MEDIUM LEAK, LIQUID CHLORINE TUBE FAILURE, F, 1.5 M/S Chemical Name: CHLORINE Molecular Weight: 70.91 g/mol IDLH: 10 ppm Carcinogenic risk - see CAMEO Ambient Boiling Point: -34.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE 2.6 KMIDLH- 1j PPM
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T-5
GAS SUVIOHA AND ROOPSONS PETROCHEMICALS, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, BLEVE CHEMICAL DATA:=Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol TEEL-1:2100ppm TEEL-2: 2100 ppm TEEL-3: 2100 ppm IDLH: 2100 ppm LEL: 20000 ppm UEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 aim Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from fireball Red : 315 meters (10.0 kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec) Orange: 445 meters (5.0 kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns within 60 sec) Fireball Diameter: 143 meters Burn Duration: 10,seconds
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T-6
GAS SUVIDHA AND ROOPSONS PETROCHEMICALS, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, JET FIRE Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol IDLH:2100ppm LEL: 20000 ppm UEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from jet fire; DURATION: Red : 136 meters (10.0 kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec) Orange: 199 meters (5.0 kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns within 60 sec) Max Flame Length: 89 meters Burn Duration: 44 seconds Max Bum Rate: 364 kilograms/sec
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T-7
GAS SUVIDHA AND ROOPSONS PETROCHEMICALS, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, DIST. TO LEL, D,3 M/S Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol IDLH:2100ppm LEL: 20000 ppm UEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud Model Run: Heavy Gas Red : 441 meters (20000 ppm = LEL)
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T-8
GAS SUVIDHA AND ROOPSONS PETROCHEMICALS, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, DIST TO LEL, F,1 5 M/S
CHEMICAL DATA: Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol TEEL-1:2100ppm TEEL-2: 2100 ppm TEEL-3: 2100 ppm IDLH:2100ppm LEL: 20000 ppm UEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0%
THREAT ZONE:
Threat Modeled: Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud Model Run: Heavy Gas Red : 484 meters (20000 ppm = LEL)
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T-9
GAS SUVIDHA AND ROOPSONS PETROCHEMICALS, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION CHEMICAL DATA: Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol TEEL-1:2100ppm TEEL-2: 2100 ppm TEEL-3: 2100 ppm IDLH: 2100 ppm LEL: 20000 ppm UEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosion Type of Ignition: ignited by detonation Model Run: Heavy Gas Red : 542 meters (8.0 psi = destruction of buildings) Orange: 610 meters (3.5 psi = serious injury likely) Yellow: 998 meters (1.0 psi = shatters glass)
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T-10
GAS SUVIDHA AND ROOPSONS PETROCHEMICALS, PROCESS HAZARDS, SMALL/ MEDIUM LEAK FROM LPG PIPELINE FROM STORAGE TO PLANT- JET FIRE CHEMICAL DATA: Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol TEEL-1:2100ppm TEEL-2: 2100 ppm TEEL-3: 2100 ppm IDLH:2100ppm LEL: 20000 pprfi UEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% SOURCE Flammable gas is burning as it escapes from pipe Unbroken end of the pipe is connected to an infinite source Pipe Press: 10 atmospheres Pipe Temperature: 35 C Max Flame Length: 14 meters Burn Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour Max Bum Rate: 1,160 kilograms/min THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from jet fire Red : 23 meters (10.0 kW/(sqm) = potentially lethal within 60 sec) Orange: 34 meters (5.0 kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree bums within 60 sec)
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T-11
ISPAT INDUSTRIES, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, BLEVE CHEMICAL DATA: Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol TEEL-1:2100ppm TEEL-2: 2100 ppm TEEL-3: 2100 ppm IDLH: 2100 ppm LEL: 20000 ppm UEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 aim Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE: Fireball Diameter. 235 meters Burn Duration: 14 seconds Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from fireball Red : 505 meters (10.0 kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec) Orange: 712 meters (5.0 kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns within 60 sec)
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T-12
ISPAT INDUSTRIES, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, JET FIRE Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol IDLH:2100ppm LEL: 20000 ppm UEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE: Max Flame Length: 90 meters Burn Duration: 3 minutes Max Bum Rate: 21,900 kilograms/min Total Amount Burned: 66,224 kilograms Note: The chemical escaped from the tank and burned as a Jet fire. Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from jet fire Red : 137 meters (10.0 kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec) Orange: 200 meters (5.0 kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns within 60 sec)
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T-13
ISPAT INDUSTRIES, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, DIST. TO LEL, D,3 M/S
Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol IDLH: 2100 ppm LEL: 20000 ppm DEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud Model Run: Heavy Gas Red : 580 meters (20000 ppm = LEL)
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T-14
ISPAT INDUSTRIES, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, DIST. TO LEL, F.1.5 M/S
CHEMICAL DATA: Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight 44.10 g/mol TEEL-1: 2100 ppm TEEL-2: 2100 ppm TEEL-3: 2100 ppm IDLH: 2100 ppm LEL: 20000 ppm UEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud Model Run: Heavy Gas Red : 871 meters (20000 ppm = LEL)
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T-15
ISPAT INDUSTRIES, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION
CHEMICAL DATA: Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol TEEL-1:2100ppm TEEL-2: 2100 ppm TEEL-3: 2100 ppm IDLH: 2100 ppm LEL: 20000 ppm UEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosion Type of Ignition: ignited by detonation Model Run: Heavy Gas Red : 954 meters (8.0 psi = destruction of buildings) Orange: 1.1 kilometers (3.5 psi = serious injury likely)
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
T-16
ISPAT INDUSTRIES, PROCESS HAZARDS, SMALL/ MEDIUM LEAK FROM LPG PIPELINE FROM STORAGE TO PLANT-JET FIRE
CHEMICAL DATA: Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol TEEL-1:2100ppm TEEL-2: 2100 ppm TEEL-3: 2100 ppm IDLH: 2100 ppm LEL: 20000 ppm UEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% SOURCE Flammable gas is burning as it escapes from pipe Unbroken end of the pipe is connected to an infinite source Pipe Press: 10 atmospheres Pipe Temperature: 35 C Max Flame Length: 14 meters Bum Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour Max Burn Rate: 1,160 kilograms/min THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from jet fire Red : 23 meters (10.0 kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec)
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
T-17
HPCL, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, BLEVE
CHEMICAL DATA:=Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol TEEL-1:2100ppm TEEL-2: 2100 ppm TEEL-3: 2100 ppm IDLH: 2100 ppm LEL: 20000 ppm DEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% HREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from fireball Red : 1.0 kilometers (10.0 kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec) Orange: 1.5 kilometers (5.0 kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns within 60 sec)
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
T-18
HPCL, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, JET FIRE
Chemical Name: PROPANE

IDLH:2100ppm LEL: 20000 ppm
Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol

UEL: 95000 ppm
Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from jet fire Red : 129 meters (10.0 kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec) Orange: 188 meters (5.0 kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns within 60 sec)
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
T-19
HPCL, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, DIST. TO LEL, D,3 M/S
Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol IDLH: 2100 ppm LEL: 20000 ppm UEL: 95000 ppm Ambient BoiHng Point -42.0" C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud Model Run: Heavy Gas Red : 453 meters (20000 ppm = LEL)
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
T-20
HPCL, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, DIST. TO LEL, F.1.5 M/S
CHEMICAL DATA: Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol TEEL-1:2100ppm TEEL-2: 2100 ppm TEEL-3: 2100 ppm IDLH: 2100 ppm LEL: 20000 ppm DEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0" C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud Model Run: Heavy Gas Red : 924 meters (20000 ppm = LEL)
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
T-21
HPCL, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION
CHEMICAL DATA: Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight 44.10 g/mol TEEL-1: 2100 ppm TEEL-2: 2100 ppm TEEL-3: 2100 ppm IDLH: 2100 ppm LEL: 20000 ppm UEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREATZONE: Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosion
Type of Ignition: ignited by detonation

Model Run: Heavy Gas
Red : 467 meters (8.0 psi = destruction of buildings) Orange: 620 meters (3.5 psi = serious injury likely)
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
T-22
HPCL, PROCESS HAZARDS, SMALL/ MEDIUM LEAK FROM LPG PIPELINE FROM STORAGE TO PLANT- JET FIRE
CHEMICAL DATA: Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mo! TEEL-1:2100ppm TEEL-2: 2100 ppm TEEL-3: 2100 ppm IDLH: 2100 ppm LEL: 20000 ppm UEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% SOURCE Flammable gas is burning as it escapes from pipe Unbroken end of the pipe is connected to an infinite source Pipe Press: 10 atmospheres Pipe Temperature: 35 C Max Flame Length: 14 meters Burn Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour Max Bum Rate: 1,160 kilograms/mm THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from jet fire Red : 23 meters (10.0 kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec) Orange: 34 meters (5.0 kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree bums within 60 sec)
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
T-23
BPCL, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, BLCVE
CHEMICAL DATA:=
Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol TEEL-1:2100ppm TEEL-2: 2100 ppm TEEL-3: 2100 ppm IDLH: 2100 ppm LEL: 20000 ppm UEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from fireball Red : 654 meters (10.0 kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec) Orange: 923 meters (5.0 kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns within 60 sec)
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
T-24
BPCL, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, JET FIRE
Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol IDLH: 2100 ppm LEU 20000 ppm UEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from jet fire Red : 127 meters (10.0 kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec) Orange: 184 meters (5.0 kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree bums within 60 sec)
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
T-25
BPCL, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, DIST. TO LEL, D,3 MIS
Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol IDLH:2100ppm LEL: 20000 ppm UEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud Model Run: Heavy Gas Red : 440 meters (20000 ppm = LEL)
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
T-26
BPCL, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, DIST. TO LEL, F.1.5 M/S CHEMICAL DATA: Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol TEEL-1:2100ppm TEEL-2: 2100 ppm TEEL-3: 2100 ppm IDLH: 2100 ppm LEL: 20000 ppm DEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud Model Run: Heavy Gas
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
T-27
BPCL, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION
CHEMICAL DATA: Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol TEEL-1:2100ppm TEEL-2: 2100 ppm TEEL-3: 2100 ppm IDLH: 2100 ppm LEL: 20000 ppm DEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 aim Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosion Type of Ignition: ignited by detonation Model Run: Heavy Gas Red : 468 meters (8.0 psi = destruction of buildings) Orange: 607 meters (3.5 psi = serious injury likely)
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
T-28
BPCL, PROCESS HAZARDS, SMALU MEDIUM LEAK FROM LPG PIPELINE FROM STORAGE TO PLANT- JET FIRE CHEMICAL DATA:
Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight 44.10g/mol TEEL-1:2100ppm TEEL-2: 2100 ppm TEEL-3: 2100 ppm IDLH: 2100 ppm LEL: 20000 ppm UEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% SOURCE Flammable gas is burning as it escapes from pipe Unbroken end of the pipe is connected to an infinite source Pipe Press: 10 atmospheres Pipe Temperature: 35 C Max Flame Length: 14 meters Bum Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour Max Bum Rate: 1,160 kilograms/min THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from jet fire Red : 23 meters (10.0 kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec) Orange: 34 meters (5.0 kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree bums within 60 sec)
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
T-29
INDO FLAME, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, BLEVE CHEMICAL DATA:=-
Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol TEEL-1:2100ppm TEEL-2: 2100 ppm TEEL-3: 2100 ppm IDLH: 2100 ppm LEL: 20000 ppm DEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from fireball Red : 461 meters (10.0 kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec) Orange: 650 meters (5.0 kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns within 60 sec)
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
T-30
INDO FLAME, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, JET FIRE
Chemical Name: PROPANE

IDLH: 2100 ppm LEL: 20000 ppm
Molecular Weight 44.10 g/mol

UEL: 95000 ppm
Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0" C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0%
THREATZONE:
Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from jet fire Red : 126 meters (10.0 kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec) Orange: 183 meters (5.0 kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns within 60 sec)
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
T-31
INDO FLAME, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, DIST. TO LEL, D,3 M/S
Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol IDLH: 2100 ppm LEL: 20000 ppm UEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 aim Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud Model Run: Heavy Gas Red : 430 meters (20000 ppm = LEL)
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P1-Ch. 1
T-32
INDO FLAME, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, DIST. TO LEL, F.1.5 M/S
CHEMICAL DATA: Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol TEEL-1:2100ppm TEEL-2: 2100 ppm TEEL-3: 2100 ppm IDLH: 2100 ppm LEL: 20000 ppm UEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud Model Run: Heavy Gas Red : 702 meters (20000 ppm = LEL)
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
T-33
INDO FLAME, LPG BULLET CATASTROPHIC LEAK, VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION
CHEMICAL DATA: Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol TEEL-1:2100ppm TEEL-2: 2100 ppm TEEL-3: 2100 ppm IDLH: 2100 ppm LEL: 20000 ppm UEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0" C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 aim Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosion Type of Ignition: ignited by detonation Model Run: Heavy Gas Red : 456 meters (8.0 psi = destruction of buildings) Orange: 593 meters (3.5 psi = serious injury likely)
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
T-34
INDO FLAME, PROCESS HAZARDS, SMALL/ MEDIUM LEAK FROM LPG PIPELINE FROM STORAGE TO PLANT-JET FIRE
CHEMICAL DATA: Chemical Name: PROPANE Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol TEEL-1:2100ppm TEEL-2: 2100 ppm TEEL-3: 2100 ppm IDLH: 2100 ppm LEL: 20000 ppm UEL: 95000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -42.0" C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 aim Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% SOURCE Flammable gas is burning as it escapes from pipe Unbroken end of the pipe is connected to an infinite source Pipe Press: 10 atmospheres Pipe Temperature: 35 C Max Flame Length: 14 meters Bum Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour Max Bum Rate: 1,160 kilograms/min THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from jet fire Red : 23 meters (10.0 kW/(sqm) = potentially lethal within 60 sec) Orange: 34 meters (5.0 kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns within 60 sec)
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
T-35
IOCL, KHAPRI DEPOT, MS TANK LEAK AND POOL FIRE
Chemical Name: MOTOR SPIRIT/ GASOLINE LEL: 10000 ppm UEL: 70000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: 98.3 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: 0.017 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 16,635 ppm or 1.66% THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from pool fire Red : 42 meters (10.0 kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec) Orange: 57 meters (5.0 kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns within 60 sec)
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
T-36
IOCL, KHAPRI DEPOT. HSD TANK LEAK AND POOL FIRE
Chemical Name: HIGH SPEED DIESEL IDLH: 1000 ppm LEL: 8000 ppm UEL: 65000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: 125.6 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: 0.0043 aim Ambient Saturation Concentration: 4,348 ppm or 0.43%THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from pool fire Red : 42 meters (10.0 kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec) Orange: 57 meters (5.0 kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree bums within 60 sec)
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
T-37
HPCL WARDH A DEPOT, MS TANK LEAK AND POOL FIRE
Chemical Name: MOTOR SPIRIT/ GASOLINE LEL: 10000 ppm DEL: 70000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: 98.3 C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: 0.017 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 16,635 ppm or 1.66% THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from pool fire Red : 42 meters (10.0 kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec) Orange: 57 meters (5.0 kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns within 60 sec)
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
T-38
HPCL, WARDHA DEPOT, HSD TANK LEAK AND POOL FIRE
Chemical Name: HIGH SPEED DIESEL DLH: 1000 ppm LEL: 8000 ppm UEL: 65000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: 125.6' C Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: 0.0043 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 4,348 ppm or 0.43%THREAT ZONE: Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from pool fire Red : 42 meters (10.0 kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec) Orange: 57 meters (5.0 kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns within 60 sec)
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ANNEXURE VIII MAH INDUSTRIES DATA AND RESOURCES
s.
No.
Name of the Unit
Address
Activity
Key Person Contact No.
MAH Chemical Resources
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Khapri LPG Bottling Plant Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
Near Khapri Railway station, Wardha Road
LPG Bottling Plant Manager
07103275537/43/261460,
LPG
Ambulances Fire Firewater SCBA Vehicles Tender (M3) 7200 1 6 1 0
Near Khapri Railway station, Wardha Road Indian Oil Near Khapri Corporation Railway Limited station, Wardha Road Ispat Industries A-10/1 limited MIDC, Kalmeshwar
POL Depot
Depot Manager
07103275542/9822198012
k
MS/SKO/HSD 0
2160
POL Depot
Depot Manager
9422804620
MS/SKO/HSD/ 0 ATF
5540
Cold Safety Rolling, Officer Galvanizing and colour coating activities
07118-2714016/9923458556
LPG/ Propane
2900
12
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s. No.
Name of the Unit
Address
Activity
MAH Chemical Resources
Ambulances 5 Kanhan Water Works near Kanhan Water River, behind treatment Cantonment, Kamptee Chief Engineer Chlorine 0
Fire Firewater SCBA Vehicles Tender (M3) 0 0 1 1
Yavalkar Pesticides
51-59, Pesticides Uppalwadi formulation Industrial estate, Kamptee Road Roopsons Patgowari, LPG Bottling Petrochemicals Mahuli Road, Pvt. Ltd. Mansar Taluka, Ramtek
Plant in charge
071 032640330/2233797
Various Pesticides (Technical Grades)
Plant in charge
07103-
LPG
50
Gas Suvidha 30th LPG Bottling Plant in Petroleum Ltd. Milestone, charge village Utty, Umred Road Indo Flame Ringnabodi, LPG Bottling Plant in Petrochemicals P.O. Shiva, charge Ltd. Tehsil Katol Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. D-1 Butibori MIDC, Taluka Hingna
071O3-
LPG
400
071 O3-
LPG
980
10
LPG Bottling Territory 071 04-2801 00/280051 Coordinator
LPG
54468
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s.
No.
Name of the Unit
Address
Activity
MAH Chemical
Resources
11
12
13
Khandelwal C-11.MIDC, Pesticides Pesticides Pvt. Hingna formulation Ltd. Road, Nagpur Morarjee G-2, MIDC, Textile Textiles Ltd. Post fabric Salaidhaba, via HingnaButibori Mahindra & MIDC Tractor Mahindra Hingna plant Limited Hindalco Industries Limited Murli Industries Limited Bhandara Road Mauda Bhandara Road
Plant Manager
9373 1 2441 9/9420569685
Methyl Parathion
Ambulances Fire Firewater SCBA Vehicles Tender (M3) 7.5 0 0 0 0
Chief Controller
07104-265514
LPG
354
12
Plant Manager
07104-660757, 58
Propane
643
14
Alluminium Plant foil Manager
07115 281255, 58
Propane
300
15
Plant Manager
Chlorine
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ANNEX IX MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEETS (MSDS)/ RESPONSE INFORMATION DATA SHEETS (RIDS) S.NO 1 2 3 4 5 5 7 CHEMICAL DIESEL KEROSENE LPG MOTOR SPIRIT MONOCROTOPHOS ENDOSULPHAN CHLORINE Page no. 2 5 8 13 17 21 25
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MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET - DIESEL

Material Safety Data Sheet : Diesel Fuel (Red Dyed)
Section 1 : Identificaton Name: Diesel Fuel (Red Dyed) Synonyms : Straight Run, Middle Distillate, Off-road diesel, High Sulfur Diesel 68476-43-6
Classification : Formula :
Petroleum Hydrocarbon Distillate

CH - CM
CAS No. :
UN No. :
Section 2 : Regulated Information Shipping Name : Diesel Fuel, 3,NA 1993, ffl Codes / Label :
HazChem Code : Hazardous Waste ID :
Section 3 : Physical Chemical Data Component Mixture CAS No. 64741-44-2 Boiling Point : Chemical Name Straight Run Middle Distillate Physical State: Melting/FreezingPoint : Vapour Density : Solubility in Others : Appearance : Heat of Combustion: Density : Boiling Temperature : 6 Liquid %(By Volume) 100%
330 - 675degC
Vapour Pressure : 0.1 pound Odour : Diesel Fuel Solubility in Water Negligible Specific Gravity : PH: Heat of Vapourisation : Liquid Heat Capacity : 0.8 to 0.9 275218 2183
Dyed with red color 48100000 6.8 447
Section 4 : Fire / Explosion Hazard Data TDG Flammability LEL: 0.7 LEL Flash Point : 130 Autoignition Temperature : Explosion sensitivity to Static Electricity : 490 degC
UEL:
UEL Flash Point : Explosion sensitivity to impact : Hazardous Combustion Incomplete combustion can Products : yield carbon monoxide and various hydrocarbons. Flammable Material : Flammable
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Combustible Liquid :
Yes
Explosive Material : Pyrophoric Material :
Explosive NA
Hazardous Ploymerization : , Oxidiser : NA Organic Peroxide NA Section 5 : Reactivity Data Chemical Stability Incompatibility with other materials : Section 6 : Health Hazard Data Toxicity : Effects of Exposure / Symptoms : Emergency Treatments : Toxic
Corrosive Material : Others :
NA
Reactivity : Hazardous Reaction Products :
Inhalation, Skin contact, Eye contact, Ingestion. May cause eye inition, headache, light headedness, nausea,vomiting, heartburn, weakness, numbness, tingling in the extremities, chest tightness and wheezing. Cough and labored breathing have been reported in garage workers without adequate ventilation (air circulation) in the garage. Inhalation: Move exposed person to fresh air. If breathing has stopped, perform artificial respiration. Get medical attention as soon as possible. Skin: If clothing soaked, immediately remove clothing and wash skin with soap and water. Launder clothing before wearing. Get medical attention promptly. Eyes: Immediately flush eyes with water for a minimum of 15 minutes, occasionally lifting the lower and upper lids. Get medical attention promptly. Swallowing Ingestion: Call a physician immediately, ONLY induce vomiting at the instruction of a physcian. Never give anything by mouth to an unconscious person. 64000 (ppm) 3 (mg/m ) (ppm) (ppm) 88320 (mg/m ) (mg/m )
1 3
[Routes of Entry :
LC50: Permissible Exposure Limit : TLV (ACGIH) :
IDLH: Odour Threshold :
6000 (ppm) 3 (mg/m ) (ppm)
7650 (mg/m ) 0 0
3
NFPA Hazard Signals : Health : Flammability , Reactivity : Special :
Section 7 : Preventive Measures Personal Protective Equipment : Up to 4000 ppm. half-mask organic vapor respirator. Up to 20,000 ppm, full-face orgamic vapor respirator of full-face supplied airrespirator. Greater than 20,000 ppm, fire righting, or unknown concentration, self-contained breathing apparatus with positive pressure. Ventilation: Maintain localor dilition to keep air concentration below 400 ppm. Loading, unloading, tank gauging, etc., remain upwind. Request assistance of safely and industrial hygiene personnel to determine air concentrations. Eye: safety glasses, chemical goggles or face shield as appropriate. Skin: Gloves: Nitrile, neoprene or other material resistant
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to distillate. Handling & Storage Precautions : Do not store with strong oxidizers. Store as OSHA Class II combustible liquid.
Section 8 : Emergency / First Aid Measures Fire Extinguishing Carbon dioxide, dry chemical, or foam. Water stream may spread fire, use water Media: spray only to cool continers exposed to fire. If leak or spill has noit ignited, use water spray to disperse the vapours. Special Procedure : Unusual Hazards Exposure : First Aid Measures Antidotes / Dosages Spills : Steps to be taken Notify emergency responce personnel. Evacuate area and remove ignition source. Build dike to contain flow. Remove free liquid, do not flush to sewer or open water. Pick up with inert absorbent and place in closed container for disposal. Waste Disposal Method : Utilize licensed waste disposal company. Consider recycling or incineration. Utilize permitted hazardous waste disposal site or industrial waste disposal site as appropriate.
Additional Information The following chemicals are subject to the reporting requrements of section 313 of Title III of the Superfund Amendments and reaulhorization Act of 1986 and 40 CFR Part 372. Manufacture / Suppliers Data Disclaimer Information contained in this material safety data sheet is believed to be reliable but no representation, guarantee or warranties of any kind are made as to its accuracy, suitability for a particular application or results to be obtained from them. It is up to the user/distributor to ensure that the information contained in the material safety data sheet is relevant to the product manufactured/ handled or sold by him as the case may be. Government makes no warranties, expressed or implied, in respect of the adequacy of this document for any particular purpose.
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MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET KEROSENE Material Safety Data Sheet : Kerosene (SKO) Section 1 : Identificaton Same: Kerosene (SKO) Synonyms : CAS No. :
Classification :
Petroleum Hydrocarbon Mixture 1223
Petroleum Oil, Fuel Oil Formula : No 5, Residual Oil no 5 8008-20-6 UN No. :
Section 2 : Regulated Information Shipping Name : Superior Kerosene Oil HazChem Code : (SKO) Codes /Label: Flammable Liquid, Hazardous Waste ID : Class 3 Section 3 : Physical Chemical Data Component Mixture CAS No. %(By Volume) 8008-20-6 Kerosene (SKO) Boiling Point: Vapour Pressure Odour : 170-325C 1 .8 mm Hg Chemical Name
3Y 17
' 100 Liquid -25 to 25C 0.8
Physical State: Melting/FreezingPoint Vapour Density : Solubility in Others : Appearance : Beat ofCombustion: Density : Boiling Temperature :
Characteristic, kerosene-like Solubility in Water insoluble Specific Gravity pH: Heat of Vapourisation : Liquid Heat Capacity : 0.80-0.85 Not Pertinent
Transparent, colorless.
Section 4 : Fire / Explosion Hazard Data TDG Flammability UEL: LEL: LEL Flash Point Autoignition Temperature : Explosion sensitivity to Static Electricity :
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5 50
0.7 35 210degC
UEL Flash Point :
Explosion sensitivity to impact : Hazardous Combustion Toxic gases/vapour Products Flammable Material : Flammable
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Combustible Liquid :
Yes
Explosive Material :
Explosive
Hazardous Ploymerization :
Does not occur
Pyrophoric Material : Corrosive Material : Others :
No No
Oxidise r : Yes Organic Peroxide Yes : Section S : Reactivity Data Chemical Stability Stable Incompatibility with other materials : Oxidising Agents
No reaction with common materials
Section 6 : Health Hazard Data Toxicity : Toxic Effects of Exposure / Symptoms :
Routes of Entry :
lnhalation
Skin, Dizziness headache and nausea. Higher concentration leads to depression/anaesthetic effect. Continued inhalation produces visual and auditory hallucinations, delirum and mania Also symptoms of fatigue, sommolence, staggering gait, loss of memory. Ingestion: Spontaneous vomiting, lowto moderate oral toxicity. Irritation of mouth, throat & gastro intestinal tract, nausea, weakness, dizziness, slow and shallow respiration, convulsions, unconsciousness. Contact: Irritation, prolonged contact can result in drying of skin, dematitis and eye irritation. Inhalation: Remove victim to fresh air, give artificial respiration if breathing has stopped. Oxygen if breathing is laboured. Ingestion: Give conscious victim water to drink. Do not induce vomiting. Liquid parafin, olive oil or some vegetable oil is to be given orally to retard absorption. Gastric lavage and induction of vomiting are not advisable. (ppm) (ppm) (mg/m ) 3 (mg/m )
3 3
Emergency Treatments :
LC50: Permissible Exposure Limit : TLV (ACGIH) :
IDLH : Odour Threshold :
(ppm) 1 (ppm)
(mg/m ) 3 (mg/m )
500 (ppm)
(mg/m )
NFPA Hazard Signals : Health : Flammability Reactivity : Special :
0 2 0
Section 7 : Preventive Measures Personal Goggles/face sheilds for eyes. Self contained breathing apparatus for Protective containment/clean up operation. Rubber hand gloves and rubber clothing. Equipment :
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Handling & Storage Precautions :
Kerosene should be stored in well ventilated, properly labeled and approved containers. Sniffing, siphoning and use of a solvent and cleaning agent should be avoided. Do not transfer to unlabeled, unsuitabe or incorrectly labelled containers. All containers should be
kept out of reach of children and kept.
Section 8 : Emergency / First Aid Measures Fire Extinguishing Foam, CO2, Dry Chemical Powder Media: Special Procedure If a leak or spill has not ignited, use water spray to disperse the vapours : and to provide for men attempting to stop a leak. Water spray may be used to flush spills away from exposure. Unusual Hazards : Exposure : First Aid Measures Inhalation: Remove victim to fresh air, give artificial respiration if breathing has stopped. Ingestion: Give water to conscious victim to drink. Do not induce vomiting. Liquidparafin. olive oil or some vegetable oil is to be given orally to retard absorption of kerosene. Contact: Remove contaminated clothing. Wash affected part (skin/eyes) with plenty of water. Move victim out of spill area to fresh air. Antidotes /Dosages Spills : Steps to be taken : Avoid spillage. Should they occur, sand or earth are useful means of containment and absorption. Waste Disposal Method : Additional Information .. Gastric lavage shoud be done after endotracheaUntubation, in view of risk of aspiration which cann cause chemical pneumonitis for which antibiotic and corticosteroid therapy may be indicated. , ' " Manufacture / Suppliers Data
Disclaimer Information contained in this material safety data sheet is believed to be reliable but no representation, guarantee or warranties of any kind are made as to its accuracy, suitability for a particular application or results to be obtained from them. It is upto the user/distributor to ensure that the information contained in the material safety data sheet is relevant to the product manufactured/ handled or sold by him as the case may be. Goverment makes no warranties, expressed or implied, in respect of the adequacy of this document for any particular purpose.
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET LPG Material Safety Data Sheet : LPG Section 1 : Identificaton Name : LPG Synonyms : Liquified Petroleum Gas CAS No. : 68476-85-7 Section 2 ; Regulated Information Shipping Name : Petroleum Oases, Liquefied, Codes / Label : 3,013382.1
Classification : Formula : UN No. :
Mixture 1075
HszChem Code ;
Hazardous Waste ID:
Section 3 : Physical Chemical Data Component Mixture CAS No. Chemical Name 74-98-6 Propane 106-97-8 n-Butane 74-84-0 Ethane 75-28-5 2-Methylpropane 115-07-1 Propylene Boiling Point : -89 deg C Vapour Pressure 1000 Odour : None or Mercaptan Solubility in Water : Negligible Specific Gravity pH: Heat of Vapourisation : Liquid Heat Capacity :
%(By Mass) 90 2.5 5 2.5 5 Physical State: Melting/FreezingPoint Vapour Density : Solubility in Others : Appearance : Heat of Combustion: Density : Boiling Temperature :
Liquefied Gas -187degC 1.6
NA 424778 2484
Liquefied Gas 49900000 4.233 231
Section 4 : Fire / Explosion Hazard Data TDG Flammable Flammability : LEL: 2

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UEL: UEL Flash Point :

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9.5
LEL Flash Point Autoignition Temperature : Explosion sensitivity to
to 410degC
Explosion sensitivity to impact : Hazardous Combustion Products Flammable Material : Flammable
Static Electricity Combustible Yes Liquid : Hazardous Will not occur Ploymerization : Oxldiser : Yes Organic Peroxide No Explosive Material : Pyrophoric Material : Corrosive Material : Others : Explosive No No
Section 5 : Reactivity Data Chemical Stable Stability : Incompatibility Strong Oxidizers with other materials :
Section 6 : Health Hazard Data Toxicity : Toxic Routes of Entry : Effects of Exposure / Symptoms :
Skin contact, Eye contact, Inhalation, Ingestion Can cause irritation or freeze burns if contact with compresed liquid occurs. This product is an asphyxiant. Symptoms include respiratory, irritation, diziness, nausea and loss of consciousness, [n addition, exposure to concentrations above 20% may cause a general central nervous system (CNS) depression typical of anesthetic gases or intoxicants. Continued exposure to odorized gas may reduce for eliminate ability to smell the odorant. People with imparted ability to detect odor due to colds, allergies, injuries, etc. must be especially "cautions. Odor must not be used exclusively as a safety measure. Proper respiratory protection and fire/explosion precautions should be utilized When odor is first detected. Keep away from heat, sparks, and flame. Avoid all personal contact. Avoid breathing gas. Keep container closed. Use only with adequate ventilation. Do not depend on odor to detect presence of gas. if inhaled, immediately remove from further exposure. Get immediate medical assistance. Give supplemental oxygen, if available. If breathing has stopped, assist ventilation with a mechanical device or use mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. If frostbite occurs, immerse involved area in warm water (between 1 OOF/3 8C and 1 10F/43C) for 20 to 40 minutes. Get medical attention.
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ODMP_NAGPUR
LC50: (ppm) Permissible (ppm) Exposure Limit : TLV (ACGffl) :
(mg/m ) 1 (mg/m )
3
EDLH: 2000 (ppm)2450 (mg/m ) 3 Odour Threshold : (ppm) (mg/m ) NFPA Hazard Signals Health : 1
1000 (ppm) (mg/m )
Flammability Reactivity : Special :
4 0
Section 7 : Preventive Measures Personal Ventilation: Ventilation equipment must be explosion proof. Protective Respiratory Protection: Use supplied air breathing apparatus in Equipment: oxygen deficient atmospheres, or if petroleum gas concentration exceeds rating or capacity of air purifying respirator cartridge/filter. Eye Protection: If eye contact is likely, safety glasses with side shields or chemical type goggles should be worn. Skin Protection: No special requirements under ordinary conditions of use. Thermally Protective gloves and long sleeves must be worn when handling liquid. Good personal hygiene practices should always be followed. Handling & Handling: Avoid all personal contact. Can cause irritationn or freeze Storage bums if contact with compressed liquid occurs. Ethyl mercaptan is Precautions: added to gas as an odorant to aid in the detection of the gas in case of leak or accidental discharge. Since ethyl mercaptan is reactive, a reduction in its effectiveness may occur during shipping and storage of the odorized gas. Therefore, odor must not be used exclusively as a safety -measure. Handle gas with strict adherence to established safety procedures. Storage: Store away from all ignition sources in a cool area equipped with an automatic sprinkling system. Outside or detached stroage preferred. Storage containers should be grounded and bonded. Special Precautions: To prevent and minimize fire or explosion risk from static accumulation and discharge, effectively bond and/or ground product transfer system. Electrical equipment and fittings must comply with local fire prevention regulations for this class of product. Use the correct grounding procedures. Refer to national or local regulations covering safety at petroleum handling and storage areas for this product. Empty Container Warning: Empty containers retain residue (liquid and/or vapor) and can be dangerous. DO NOT PRESSURIZE, CUT, WELD, BRAZE, SOLDER, DRILL, GRIND OR EXPOSE SUCH CONTAINERS TO HEAT, FLAME, SPARKS, STATIC ELECTRICITY, OR OTHER IGNITION; THEY MAY EXPLODE AND CAUSE INJURY OR DEATH. Do not atempt to refill or clean container since residue is difficult to remove. Empty drums should be completely drained, properly bunged and promptly returned to a drum reconditioner. All containers should be disposed of inn an environmentally safe manner and in acordance
with governmental regulations.
Section 8 : Emergency / First Aid Measures Fire Extinguishing Media: Special Procedure : Carbon dioxide, dry chemical and water fog.
Let fire bum; shut off gas supply. Water should be used to keep fireexposed containers cool. Stop flow of material. Use water to keep fire exposed containers cool and to protect personnel effecting shutoff. If a leak or spill has not ignited, use water spray to disperse the vapors and to protect personnel attempting to stop leak. Prevent runoff from fire control or dilution from entering streams, sewers, or drinking water supply. Extremely flammable. Vapor accumulation could flash and/or explode if in contact with open flame. Pressurized containers may explode if exposed to open flames or high temperatures.
Unusual Hazards Exposure : First Aid Measures :
Eye Contact: Flush thoroughly with water. If irritation occurs, call a physician. Skin Contact: If frostbite occurs, immerse involved area in warm water (between 100F/38C and 1 10F/43C, not exceeding 1 12F/44C). Keep the immersed for 20 to 40 minutes. Seek medical assistance. Inhalation: Immediately remove from further exposure. Get immediate medical assistance. For those providing assistance, avoid exposure to yourself or others. Use adequate respiratory protection. Give supplemental oxygen, if available. If breathing has stopped, assist ventilation with a mechanical device or use mouthto-mouth resuscitation. Ingestion: Not excepted to occur in normal industrial use.
Antidotes / Dosages : Spills : Steps to be taken Land Spill: Eliminate sources of ignition. Warn occupants in downwind areas of fire and explosion hazard. Shut off source taking normal safety precautions. Water Spill: Eliminate sources of ignition. Advise occupants and ships in the vicinity in downwind areas of fire and explosion hazard and warn them to stay clear. Notify port and other relevant authorities. Do not confine in area of leakage.
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Waste Disposal Method :
Waste Disposal: Product is suitable for burning in an enclosed, controlled burner for fuel value. Such burning may be limited pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. In addition, the product is suitable for processing by an approved recycling facility or can be disposed of at an appropriate government waste disposal facility. Use of these methods is subject to user compliance with applicable laws and regulations and consideration of product characteristics at time of disposal.
Additional Information Health studies have shown that many hydrocarbons pose potential human health risks which may vary from person to person. Information provided on this MSDS reflects intended use. This product should not be used for other applications. In any case, the following advice should be considered: INJECTION INJURY WARNING: If product is injected into or under the skin, or into any part of the body, regardless of the appearance of the wound or its size, the individual should be evaluated immediately by a physician as a surgical emergency. Even though initial symptoms from high pressure injection may be minimal or absent, early surgical treatment within the first few hours may significantly reduce the ultimate extent of injury. Manufacture / Supplier Data
Disclaimer Information contained in this material safety data sheet is believed to be reliable but no representation, guarantee or warranties of any kind are made as to its accuracy, suitability for a particular application or results to be obtained from them. It is up to the user/distributor to ensure that the information contained in the material safety data sheet is relevant to the product manufactured/ handled or sold by him as the case may be. Government makes no warranties, expressed or implied, in respect of the adequacy of this document for any particular purpose.
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MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET - MOTOR SPIRIT
Material Safety Data Sheet : Motor spirit
Section 1 : Identification Name : Motor spirit Synonyms : CAS No. : Petrol, Gasoline 86290-81-5
Petroleum hydrocarbon C-4-Cio 1203
Section 2 : Regulated Information Shipping Name : Motor spirit Codes / Label : 3.3b,Flammable
Haz Chem Code : Hazardous Waste ID :
3/Y/E
Section 3 : Physical Chemical Data Component Mixture CASNo. 8030-30-6 71-43-2 Boiling Point : Chemical Name Naptha Benzene Physical State: Melting/Freezing Point : Vapour Density : Solubility in Others : Appearance : Heat of-Combustion: Density : Boiling Temperature : 0.71 -0.78 %(By Volume) 1 1 Liquid
Approx. 35 -220
Vapour Pressure : 0.5-1.25 Odour : petroleum Solubility in Water Specific Gravity : pH: Heat of Vaporization : Liquid Heat Capacity :
ODMP_NAGPUR
NA 300513 2198
Pale yellow fluid 47800000 5.89 398.7
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Section 4 : Fire / Explosion Hazard Data TOG Flammability LEL: 1 LEL Flash Point : -40degC Auto ignition Temperature :
UEL: UEL Flash Point :
7.4
Explosion sensitivity to Static Electricity : Combustible Yes Liquid :
Explosion sensitivity to impact : Hazardous Combustion Thermal decomposition Products : may lead to the formation of a multiplicity of Hazardous compounds Flammable Material : Flammable
Explosive Material :
Explosive
Hazardous May occur Polymerization : Oxidiser : Yes Organic Peroxide : NA Section 5 : Reactivity Data Chemical Stability Stable incompatibility with other materials : Section 6 : Health Hazard Data Toxicity : Toxic
Pyrophoric Material : Corrosive Material : Others :
NA NA
Effects of Exposure / Symptoms :
Skin contact. Inhalation, Ingestion, Eye contact Ingestion- The swallowing of small amounts may cause nausea and diarrhoea; larger amounts may cause irritation and drowsiness and vomiting. Skin- Unlikely to cause irritation on single contact Prolonged or repeated contact may cause short term irritation, de-fatting of the skin and could result in dermatitis Eyes- May cause short term irritation with redness and stinging. Inhalation- High vapor concentrations can cause irritation to eyes and mucous membranes, and drowsiness leading to loss of consciousness. Ingestion Wash mouth out with water and give water to drink (milk if available) -get medical advice. DO NOT INDUCE VOMITING BECAUSE OF THE DANGER OF ASPIRATION. Skin Wash skin as soon as possible with soap and water. Change contaminated clothing and launder before reuse. Get medical advice if irritation persists. Eyes wash out thoroughly with large amounts of water. If redness and/ or irritation continues get medical advice. Inhalation If inhalation of vapour causes irritation or drowsiness remove to fresh air. Get medical advice if the symptoms continue (ppm) (mg/m )
3
Routes of Entry :
LC50:
ODMP_NAGPUR
IDLH:
P1-Ch. 1
(ppm)
(mg/m )
Permissible Exposure Limit : TLV (ACGEH) :
(ppm)
(mg/rn )
Odour Threshold :
(ppm)
(mg/m )
1 300 (ppm) 900 (mg/m ) NFPA Hazard Signals : Health :
Flammability Reactivity : Special :
Section 7 : Preventive Measures Personal Where prolonged or repeated exposure is likely PROTECTIVE Protective CLOTHING must be worn including impervious GLOVES and EYE Equipment ; PROTECTION.
Handling & Storage Precautions :
Handling Where exposure is likely PROTECTIVE CLOTHING must be worn including impervious GLOVES and EYE PROTECTION. Ensure good ventilation at all times. Storage Transport, handle and store in accordance with applicable local regulations and only in labelled containers designed for this product. Ground and bond shipping container, transfer line and receiving container. Keep away from sparks, flame and other sources of ignition. Protect containers against static electricity, lightning and physical damage. Hot work (e.g. Cutting and welding) must not be carried out on or near any container used for storage of this product unless it has been made safe by purging or other suitable means. Drums should be stored on their sides on racks preferably under cover, out of direct sunlight, in well ventilated conditions. Other types of containers should be stored under cover out of direct sunlight, in well ventilated conditions. Care should be taken to avoid over-stacking.
Section 8 : Emergency / First Aid Measures Fire Extinguishing Extinguish with agents approved for Class B hazards (e. g. Dry Media : Powder, Foam or Carbon Dioxide). For small fires use CO2, Dry Powder, sand, earth. Special Procedure : Fires in closed or confined spaces should be tackled by trained personnel who should wear breathing apparatus. Do not use water jets; the use of water fog should be left to experienced personnel. Unusual Hazards : Exposure : First Aid Measures Where prolonged or repeated exposure is likely PROTECTIVE CLOTHING must be worn including impervious GLOVES and EYE PROTECTION. Antidotes / Dosages Spill* :
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Steps to be taken :
Treat any spillage as a major fire hazard. Explosive mixtures can be formed particularly where there is poor ventilation. Vapour heavier than air and can collect in sumps and drainage systems. Contain spillage do not wash spillage down drain. Absorb using absorbent clay, diatomaceous clay or other suitable absorbent. May cause damage to surfaces, making them slippery. Disposal should be carried out by incineration or as required under Local Authority Regulations. Under no circumstances should motor spirit be discharged into the public drainage system, or marine and inland waterways.
Waste Disposal Method :
Additional Information Toxicity following a single exposure to high levels (oral, dermal, inhalation) is of a low
order. Motor spirits are classified category 2 carcinogens due to their benzene content. Lead, which can accumulate in the body, is present in the BS 4040 grade. Adherence to the recommended hygiene measures will reduce any risks, which under normal conditions of use will be minimal. Manufacture / Supplier Data
Disclaimer Information contained in this material safety data sheet is believed to be reliable but no representation, guarantee or warranties of any kind are made as to its accuracy, suitability for a particular application or results to be obtained from them. It is upto the user/distributor to ensure that the information contained in the material safety data sheet is relevant to the product manufactured/ handled or sold by him as the case may be. Government makes no warranties, expressed or implied, in respect of the adequacy of this document for any particular purpose.
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RESPONSE INFORMATION DATA SHEET :
MONOCROTOPHOS
General Description:
Colorless crystals with a mild ester odor, commercial product is a reddish-brown solid. This material is a fast acting insecticide with both systemic and contact action used against a wide range of pests on cotton, sugar cane, tobacco, potatoes, peanuts, tomatoes, and ornamentals. (ERA, 1998)
Properties of Chemical:
Flash Point: Above 200F (EPA, 1998) Melting Point: 129 to 131 F crystals 77 to 86 F commercial product (EPA, 1998) Vapor Pressure: 7e-06 mm at 68 F (EPA, 1998) Boiling Point: 257 F at 0.0005 mm (EPA, 1998) Molecular Weight: 223.16 (EPA, 1998) TLVTWA: 0.25 mg/m3 (ACGIH, 1999) Water Solubility: Miscible (NIOSH, 1997)
Fire & Explosion Hazards :

Wear positive pressure breathing apparatus arid full protective clothing. Container may explode in heat of fire. Toxic fumes evolved when heated to decomposition. Incompatible with alkaline compounds. Unstable in aqueous solution above pH 7.0; in
low molecular weight alcohols and glycols. Stable in ketones and higher molecular weight alcohols and glycols. Stable when stored in glass or polyethylene containers. Relatively stable in sunlight. Keep away from temperatures above 80F; do' not store below 70F. Corrosive to black iron, drum steel, stainless steel 304 and brass, but not to glass, aluminum, or stainless steel 316. (EPA, 1998)
Fire Fighting measure & modes:

Like other organophosphorus pesticides, move container from fire area if you can do so without risk. Fight fire from maximum distance. Dike fire control water for later disposal; do not scatter the material. Like other organophosphorus pesticides, extinguish with dry chemical, carbon dioxide, water spray, fog, or foam. (EPA, 1998)
Non-fire response during spills : As with other organophosphorus pesticides, do not touch spilled material; s leak if you can do it without risk. Use water spray to reduce vapors. Small spills: take up with sand or other noncombustible absorbent material and place into containers for later disposal. Small dry spills: with clean shovel place material into clean, dry container and cover; move containers from spill area. Large spills: dike far ahead of spill for later disposal. Keep unnecessary people away; isolate hazard area and deny entry. Stay upwind; keep out of low areas. Ventilate closed spaces before entering them. Remove and isolate contaminated clothing at the site. (ERA, 1998) Health Hazards: Monocrotophos is an organophosphorus pesticide. It is a cholinesterase inhibitor and acts on the nervous system. Extremely toxic; probable oral lethal dose to humans 5-50 mg/kg or between 7 drops and 1 teaspoon for a 70 kg (150 Ib.) person. Repeated inhalation or skin contact with this material may, without symptoms, progressively increase susceptibility to poisoning. (ERA, 1998) First Aid Measures: Note: Monocrotophos is a cholinesterase inhibitor. Signs and Symptoms of Acute Monocrotophos Exposure: Acute exposure to monocrotophos may result in the following signs and symptoms: pinpoint pupils, blurred vision, headache, dizziness, muscle spasms, and profound weakness. Vomiting, diarrhea, abdominal pain, seizures, and coma may also occur. The heart rate may decrease following oral exposure or increase following dermal exposure. Hypotension (low blood pressure) may occur, although hypertension (high blood pressure) is not uncommon. Chest pain may be noted. Dyspnea (shortness of breath) may lead to respiratory collapse. Giddiness is common.
Emergency Life-Support Procedures: Acute exposure to monocrotophos may require decontamination and life support for the victims. Emergency personnel should wear protective clothing appropriate to the type and degree of contamination. Air-purifying or supplied-air respiratory equipment should also be worn, as necessary. Rescue vehicles should carry supplies such as plastic sheeting and disposable plastic bags to assist in preventing spread of contamination. Inhalation Exposure: 1. Move victims to fresh air. Emergency personnel should avoid self-exposure to monocrotophos. 2. Evaluate vital signs including pulse and respiratory rate, and note any trauma. If no pulse is detected, provide CPR. If not breathing, provide artificial respiration. If breathing is labored, administer oxygen or other respiratory support 3. Obtain authorization and/or further instructions from the local hospital for administration of an antidote or performance of other invasive procedures. 4. Transport to a health care facility
Dermal/Eye Exposure: 1. Remove victims from exposure. Emergency personnel should avoid self- exposure to monocrotophos. 2. Evaluate vital signs including pulse and respiratory rate, and note any trauma. If no pulse is detected, provide CPR. If not breathing, provide artificial respiration. If breathing is labored, administer oxygen or other respiratory support. 3. Remove contaminated clothing as soon as possible. 4. If eye exposure has occurred, eyes must be flushed with lukewarm water for at least 15 minutes. 5. Wash exposed skin areas three times with soap and water. 6. Obtain authorization and/or further instructions from the local hospital for administration of an antidote or performance of other invasive procedures. 7. Transport to a health care facility. Ingestion Exposure: 1. Evaluate vital signs including pulse and respiratory rate, and note any trauma. If no pulse is detected, provide CPR. If not breathing, provide artificial respiration. If breathing is labored, administer oxygen or other respiratory support. 2. Obtain authorization and/or further instructions from the local hospital for administration of an antidote or performance of other invasive procedures.
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3. Vomiting may be induced with syrup of Ipecac. If elapsed time since ingestion of monocrotophos is unknown or suspected to be greater than 30 minutes, do not induce vomiting and proceed to Step 4. Ipecac should not be administered to children under 6 months of age. Warning: Ingestion of monocrotophos may result in sudden onset of seizures or loss of consciousness. Syrup of Ipecac should be administered only if victims are alert, have an active gag-reflex, and show no signs of impending seizure or coma. If ANY uncertainty exists, proceed to Step 4. The following dosages of Ipecac are recommended: children up to 1 year old, 10 mL (1/3 oz); children 1 to 12 years old, 15 mL (1/2 oz); adults, 30 ml (1 oz). Ambulate (walk) the victims and give large quantities of water. If vomiting has not occurred after 15 minutes, Ipecac may be re-administered. Continue to ambulate and give water to the victims. If vomiting has not occurred within 15 minutes after second administration of Ipecac, administer activated charcoal. 4. Activated charcoal may be administered if victims are conscious and alert. Use 15 to 30 g (1/2 to 1 oz) for children, 50 to 100 g (1-3/4 to 3-1/2 oz) for adults, with 125 to 250 ml (1/2 to 1 cup) of water.
5. Promote excretion by administering a saline cathartic or sorbitol to conscious and alert victims. Children require 15 to 30 g (1/2 to 1 oz) of cathartic; 50 to 100 g (1-3/4 to 3-1/2 oz) is recommended for adults. 6. Transport to a health care facility. (ERA, 1998) Reactivity This compound is incompatible with the following: Metals, low molecular weight alcohols & glycols [Note: Corrosive to black iron, drum steel, stainless steel 304 & brass. Should be stored at 70-80F.] (NIOSH. 1997).
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RESPONSE INFORMATION DATA SHEET : General Description
ENDOSULPHAN
A brown or colorless crystalline solid with a pungent odor. More dense than water and nearly insoluble in water. Toxic by inhalation, skin absorption, or ingestion. Used as a pesticide, fungicide or herbicide (AAR, 1999).
Properties of Chemical
Melting Point: 158 to 212 F Range of values given is for a mixture of isomers (a isomer 228.7 F; b isomer 415.9 F). (EPA, 1998)
Vapor Pressure: .00001 mm Hg at 77 F (EPA, 1998) Specific Gravity: 1.745 at 68 F (EPA, 1998) Boiling Point: Decomposes (NIOSH, 1997) Molecular Weight: 406.95 (EPA, 1998) TLVTWA: 0.1 mg/m3 (ACGIH, 2001) Skin. Not Classifiable As a Human Carcinogen.
TEEL1: 0.3mg/m3 (TEELS, 2001) TEEL2: 0.8 mg/m3 (TEELS, 2001) TEELS: 35 mg/m3 (TEELS, 2001)
Water Solubility: <1 mg/mLat73F (NTP, 1992)

Fire & Explosion Hazards
Container may explode in heat of fire. Fire or run off from fire control water may release irritating or poisonous gases. Slowly oxidizes in air. Do not store at temperature below 20F. (EPA, 1998)
Fire Fighting Measures & Modes

Keep unnecessary people away; isolate hazard area and deny entry. Stay upwind; keep out of low areas. Ventilate closed spaces before entering them. Wear positive pressure breathing apparatus and special protective clothing. Remove and isolate contaminated clothing at the site. Extinguish fire using agent suitable for type of surrounding fire. (Material itself does not burn or bums with difficulty.) Use water in flooding quantities as fog. Use alcohol foam, carbon dioxide or dry chemical. (EPA, 1998)
Non Fire Response During Spills Keep sparks, flames, and other sources of ignition away. Keep material out of water sources and sewers. Attempt to stop leak if without undue personnel hazard. Use water spray to knock-down vapors. Land spill: Dig a pit, pond, lagoon, holding area to contain liquid or solid material. Dike surface flow using soil, sapd bags, foamed polyurethane, or foamed concrete. Absorb bulk liquid with fly ash or cement powder. Water spill: If dissolved, in region of 10 ppm or greater concentration, apply activated carbon at ten times the spilled amount. Use mechanical dredges or lifts to remove immobilized masses of pollutants and precipitates. (AAR, 1999) Health Hazards It is very toxic. The probable oral lethal dose is 50 to 500 mg/kg, or 1 teaspoonful to 1 ounce for a 150 Ib. person. (ERA, 1998) First Aid Measures Signs and Symptoms of Acute Endosulfan Exposure: Ingestion of endosulfan may result in nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. Dizziness, agitation, nervousness, tremor, in coordination, and convulsions may also occur. Central nervous system depression may terminate in respiratory failure. Contact with endosulfan may irritate or bum the skin, eyes, and mucous membranes. Emergency Life-Support Procedures: Acute exposure to endosulfan may require decontamination and life support for the victims. Emergency personnel should wear protective clothing appropriate to the type and degree of contamination. Air-purifying or supplied-air respiratory equipment should also be worn, as necessary. Rescue vehicles should carry supplies such as plastic sheeting and disposable plastic bags to assist in preventing spread of contamination. Inhalation Exposure: 1. Move victims to fresh air. Emergency personnel should avoid self-exposure to endosulfan.
2. Evaluate vital signs including pulse and respiratory rate, and note any trauma. If no pulse is detected, provide CPR. If not breathing, provide artificial respiration. If breathing is labored, administer oxygen or other respiratory support. 3. Obtain authorization and/or further instructions from the local hospital for administration of an antidote or performance of other invasive procedures. 4. Transport to a health care facility. Dermal/Eye Exposure: 1. Remove victims from exposure. Emergency personnel should avoid self- exposure to endosulfan. 2. Evaluate vital signs including pulse and respiratory rate, and note any trauma. If no pulse is detected, provide CPR. If not breathing, provide artificial respiration. If breathing is labored, administer oxygen or other respiratory support. 3. Remove contaminated clothing as soon as possible. 4.. If eye exposure has occurred, eyes must be flushed with lukewarm water for at least 15 minutes. 5. Wash exposed skin areas three times. An initial soap and water wash should be followed by an alcohol wash. The third wash should again be with soap and water. 6. Obtain authorization and/or further instructions from the local hospital for administration of an antidote or performance of other invasive procedures. 7. Transport to a health care facility.
Ingestion Exposure: 1. Evaluate vital signs including pulse and respiratory rate, and note any trauma. If no pulse is detected, provide CPR. If not breathing, provide artificial respiration. If breathing is labored, administer oxygen or other respiratory support. 2. Obtain authorization and/or further instructions from the local hospital for administration of an antidote or performance of other invasive procedures. 3. Vomiting may be induced with syrup of Ipecac. If elapsed time since ingestion of endosulfan is unknown or suspected to be greater than 30 minutes, do not induce vomiting and proceed to Step 4.Ipecac should not be administered to children under 6 months of age. Warning: Ingestion of endosulfan may result in sudden onset of seizures or loss of consciousness. Syrup of Ipecac should be administered only if victims are alert, have an active gag-reflex, and show no signs of impending seizure or coma. If ANY uncertainty exists, proceed to Step 4.The following dosages of Ipecac are recommended: children up to 1 year old, 10 mL (1/3 oz); children 1 to 12 years old, 15 mL (1/2 oz); adults, 30 mL (1 oz). Ambulate (walk) the victims and give large quantities of water. If vomiting has not occurred after 15 minutes, Ipecac may be readministered. Continue to ambulate and give water to the victims. If vomiting has not occurred within 15 minutes after second administration of Ipecac, administer activated charcoal. 4. Activated charcoal may be administered if victims are conscious and alert. Use 15 to 30 g (1/2 to 1 oz) for children, 50 to 100 g (1-3/4 to 3-1/2 oz) for adults, with 125 to 250 mL (1/2 to 1 cup) of water. 5. Promote excretion by administering a saline cathartic or sorbitol to conscious and alert victims. Children require 15 to 30 g (1/2 to 1 oz) of cathartic; 50 to 100 g (1-3/4 to 3-1/2 oz) is recommended for adults. 6. Transport to a health care facility. (ERA, 1998) Reactivity AIR AND WATER REACTIONS: Slightly soluble in water. Slowly hydrolyzes to form sulfur dioxide and a diol; hydrolyzes
more rapidly under basic or acidic conditions. CHEMICAL PROFILE: ENDOSULFAN is an organochlorine, cyclodiene derivative. It is also a sulfite ester. Halogenated aliphatic or cyclic alkane compounds are moderately or very reactive. Reactivity generally decreases with increased degree of substitution of halogen for hydrogen atoms. As endosulfan is rather highly substituted it may be resistant to reaction. However, materials in this group are incompatible with strong oxidizing and reducing agents. Also, they may be incompatible with many amines, nitrides, azo/diazo compounds, alkali metals, and epoxides. As an ester, it will hydrolyze to form sulfur dioxide and diol ; reaction is more rapid under basic conditions.
REACTIVE GROUPS:
Esters, Halogenated Organic Compounds, Hydrocarbons, Aliphatic Unsaturated (Reactivity, 2001) Protective Clothing Skin: Wear appropriate personal protective clothing to prevent skin contact. Eyes: Wear appropriate eye protection to prevent eye contact. Wash skin: The worker should immediately wash the skin when it becomes contaminated. Remove: Work clothing that becomes wet or significantly contaminated should be removed and replaced. Change: Workers whose clothing may have become contaminated should change into uncontaminated clothing before leaving the work premise. Provide: Eyewash, Quick drench (NIOSH, 1997) ************
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET : CHLORINE Material Safety Data Sheet : Chlorine Section 1 : Identlflcaton Name : Chlorine Synonyms : Chlorine CAS No. : 7782-50-5 Section 2 : Regulated Information Shipping Name : Chlorine Codes / Label : Non Flammable Gas. Poison, Class 2 Section 3 ; Physical Chemical Data Boiling Point -34 degC Vapour Pressure : Odour : Irritating, choking Solubility in Water 30 Specific Gravity : PH: Heat of Vapourisation :
ODMP_NAGPUR
Aromatic hydrocarbon C12 1017
HazChem Code : Hazardous Waste ID :
2XE 17
Physical State: Liquefied Gas Melting/Freezing Point : -101..OdegC Vapour Density : Solubility in Others : Appearance : Heat of Combustion: Density :
P1-Ch. 1
2.49 Soluble in Alkalies Colourless 28500000 3.04
1.47 287790
Liquid Heat Capacity :
471.42
Boiling Temperature :
238
Section 4 : Fire / Explosion Hazard Data TDG Flammability LEL: LEL Flash Point : Autoignition Temperature : Explosion sensitivity to Static Electricity : Combustible Liquid : Hazardous Ploymerization : Oxidiser : Organic Peroxide Stable
. '' UEL: UEL Flash Point : Explosion sensitivity to Stable impact : Hazardous Combustion Toxic products are Products : generated when combustibles burn in C12 Flammable Material : No
NO Will not occur Yes . No
Expletive Material : Pyrophoric Material : Corrosive Material : Others :
Ne No Corrosive
Section 5 : Reactivity Data Chemical Stability Stable
Reactivity :
Violent reaction with alcohol, explosive reaction with metals; potentially dangerous reaction with Sulfides, Trialkyl borances. At normal temperatures dry chlorine does not attack steel, copper, bronze etc. Moist chlorine is corrosive Toxic products are generated when combustibles bum in C12
Incompatibility with other materials :
Combustible substances, finely divided metals
Hazardous Reaction Products :
Section 6 : Health Hazard Data Toxicity : Highly Toxic Effects of Exposure / Symptoms : Emergency Treatments :
lnhalation, Ingestion, Skin Causes are irritation, sneezing, copious salivation, general excitement, restlessness. High concentration causes respiratory distress and violent coughing, often with retching. Death may result from suffocation. Inhalation: remove the victim to fresh air area, support respiration, give oxygen, if necessary, Eyes: Flush withh large amounts of water for ate least 15 min. Seek medical aid immediately.
P1-Ch. 1
Routes of Entry :
ODMP_NAGPUR
LC50:
147 (ppm) 425(mg/m ) EDLH: 3 (mg/m ) 30

3
10 (ppm)
29 (mg/m ) 10.9 3 0 0
Permissible 1 (ppm) Exposure Limit : TLV (ACGffl) : 1 (ppm) 3 (mg/m )
Odour Threshold :
3.5 (ppm) 3 (mg/m ) NFPA Hazard Signals : Health : Flammability Reactivity : Special :
Section 7 : Preventive Measures Personal Avoid Contact with liquid and vapour. Provide PVC Gloves, gum boots, Protective rubber overcoat, head mask, self contained breathing appratus. Equipment : Handling & Store in a relatively cool, dry, relatively isolated, well ventilated space. Store Storage in cylinders, pressure vessels, or pipelines Precautions : Section 8 : Emergency / First Aid Measures Fire Not Combustible Extinguishing Media : Special Keep the containers cool by spraying water if exposed to heat or Procedure: flame. Unusual Hazard : Poisonous gases are produced in fire. Exposure: First Aid Measures If inhaled move me victim to the fresh air area. If chlorine comes in contact with eyes or skin, wash with plenty of water under quick opening safety shower and eye wash fountain. Seek medical aid immediately.
Antidotes / Dosages Spills: Steps to be taken : Shut off leaks if without risk. Contain leaking liquid on sand or earth. Prevent liquid from entering into sewer. Vapours Create toxic atmosphere, knock down vapours with water spray. Waste Disposal Method: Neutralize small liquid spillage with soda ash & drain with abundant water, Cover pool with protein foam, so that the release of vapour to atmosphere is low under control.
Additional Information In case of large gas escapes, the presence of could can be marked with ammonia with which it will turn into a most. Run away from the gas clouds in a direction perpendicular to the wind direction, Avoid liquid chlorine from leaking and body contact. Persons with pulmonary diseases should avoid the exposure, A concentration of 3.5 ppm produces a detectable odour; 15ppm causes immediate irritation of the throat, Cones, of SOppm are dangerous for even short exposures. 1000 ppm is fatal. Can react to cause fires / explosion on contact with Turpentine, illuminating gas, Polypropylene, Rubber, Sulfamic acid, Acetaldehyde, Alcohol.
Bring the leaking portion of the cylinder to the uppermost position, so that only the gas escaped and not the liquid. Manufacture / Supplier Data Disclaimer Information contained in this material safety data sheet is believed to be reliable but no representation, guarantee or warranties of any kind are made as to its accuracy, suitability for a particular application or results to be obtained from them. It is up to the user/distributor to ensure that the information contained in the material safety data sheet is relevant to the product manufactured/ handled or sold by him as the case may be. Government makes no warranties, expressed or implied, in respect of the adequacy of this document for any particular purpose.
ODMP_NAGPUR
P1-Ch. 1

Nagpur District Offsite Emergency Plan PDF

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NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

OFFSITE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR NAGPUR MAHARASHTRA

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

Directorate of Industrial Safety and Health Nagpur

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

TABLE OF CONTENTS NAGPUR OFFSITE DMP TABLE OF CONTENTS

P1-Ch. 3 P9-Ch. 3 P9-Ch. 3

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS AND ROLES

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

PAGE NO. - CH. No. P1-Ch. 4

5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

PAGE NO. - CH. No. P1-Ch. 6 P2-Ch. 6

6.9 6,10 6.11

P10-Ch. 6 P11-Ch. 6 P12-Ch. 6

6.12 6.13 6.14 6.15 6.16

P13-Ch. 6 P14-Ch. 6 P14-Ch. 6

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

CLEANUP OF DEAD OR CONTAMINATED LIVESTOCK OR WILDLIFE

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

NAGPUR OFFSITE DMP PAGE NO. -CH. No.

STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION SET UP (UP TO TALUKA LEVEL)

P1 to 6,Annex-6 P1 to 41, Annex-7 P1 to 3,Annex-8 P1 to 27,Annex-9

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

BASIS OF THE PLAN

the district administration in combating major Qffsite emergency situations. As

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

SCOPE OF PLAN AND MICRO-METHODOLOGY

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

1.3.1.4 Liquid Pool Fires

There are two types of explosions possible:

1.3.2.1 Thermal explosions

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

2.2.3 Fire Brigade

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

Public Works Department (PWD- Roads)

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

Food and Civil Supplies

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

MAH UNITS AND CLUSTERS IN THE DISTRICT- THE HAZARD POTENTIAL

Important cluster MAH units information is provided in Annex III.

3.1 CLUSTERS IN THE DISTRICT

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

FIGURE-3.1 OVERALL MAP OF NAGPUR SHOWING MAH UNITS

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

FIGURE-3.1A BPCL, LPG BOTTLING PLANT, BUTIBORI AND SURROUNDINGS

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

FIGURE-3.1B HPCL, LPG BOTTLING PLANT, BUTIBORI AND SURROUNDINGS

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

FIGURE-3.1C HPCL, POL DEPOT, KHAPRI AND SURROUNDINGS

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

FIGURE-3.1D IOCL, POL DEPOT, KHAPRI AND SURROUNDINGS

NAGPUR OFFSITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

FIGURE-3.1E ISPAT INDUSTRIES, KALMESHWAR AND SURROUNDINGS