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Iran already has the necessary technological capability to produce at least one nuclear bomb. Iran is actually a short way from the red line, and crossing it is a matter of deciding. Under current geostrategic conditions, it does not appear that Iran intends to give up its nuclear activity; instead, it is waiting for the right moment to break out. Iran is positioning itself as a leading regional actor and emphasizes its lack of dependence on external actors in energy, military, economic, and other areas. As Iran assesses that, given the regional changes, the traditional tools (terror, subversion, export of the revolution) will no longer suffice to promote its goals of regional hegemony and guaranteeing its survival, Iran is drawing closer to a decision on going nuclear. It draws encouragement from the stance of Russia, which, as a member of the Security Council and hence of the 5+1 group, helps Iran by thwarting any unified Western position on either the nuclear or Syrian issues. For Iran, the passage of time means there will no longer be a need for negotiations. Iran will continue its foot-dragging tactics, hinting to the West that it has to wait until the election results, and the formation of a new government, before continuing the nuclear talks (even though the government has no real say on the nuclear issue). The West, for its part, will apparently go along and wait for another last opportunity, and the futile dance that has gone on for a decade will continue without any Western successes and with Iranian technological accomplishments that bring it ever closer to its goal.
full range of its strategic political considerations, which are a main component of the decision-making process in Tehran especially in light of the changes in the geostrategic environment and its assessments of threats and opportunities.
to be a member of the NPT, and the Majlis can review this matter.We cannot be indifferent to the pressure the Iranian nation is facing; of course, this is a strategic decision that the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) must adopt, but the Majlis will use all of its abilities to defend the rights of the nation.7
program is meant for peaceful purposes, while the West is not really seeking to solve the nuclear issue but instead wants to leave it open so that it can continue its struggle against Iran and leave the sanctions in place. Shriatmadari adds that this situation in effect, a closing of the nuclear file actually constitutes an acknowledgment of Irans victory and steadfast position over the years. In conclusion, Shriatmadari proposes increasing the media presence at the talks so as to highlight the real intentions of the West.9
A
Growing
Awareness
The
West,
and
especially
the
United
States,
is
aware
of
Irans
gradual
progress
toward
a
military
nuclear
capability
despite
the
sanctions
and
the
price
they
are
exacting.
American
spokespersons
have
emphasized
this
capability
in
hearings
before
the
Senate
Intelligence
Committee.
Particularly
notable
is
the
testimony
of
National
Intelligence
Director
James
R.
Clapper,
who
on
March
1210
and
again
on
April
18
addressed
the
status
of
Irans
nuclear
program
and
its
regional
aspirations:
Iran
continues
to
develop
technical
expertise
in
uranium
enrichment,
nuclear
reactors,
weaponization
and
ballistic
missiles,
from
which
it
could
draw
if
it
decides
to
build
missile-deliverable
weapons,
nuclear
weapons.
Clearly,
Tehran
has
the
scientific,
technical
and
industrial
capacity
to
produce
them,
so
the
central
issue
is
its
political
will
to
do
so.
Such
a
decision,
we
believe,
will
be
made
by
the
Supreme
Leader,
and
at
this
point
we
dont
know
if
hell
eventually
decide
to
build
nuclear
weapons.
In
Iran,
leaders
are
exploiting
the
unrest
in
the
Arab
world
to
spread
influence
and
to
undermine
the
United
States
and
our
allies.
But
Tehran
also
faces
a
worsening
financial
outlook
in
the
fall
of
the
Assad
regime
and
Syria
would
be
a
huge
strategic
loss
for
Iran.Russia
will
continue
to
resist
putting
more
international
pressure
on
Syria
or
Iran.11
more advanced generations of centrifuges. These could enable Iran to enrich uranium at the nuclear- weapon level in a shorter time span. Abbasi likewise pointed to the ongoing preparations to activate the 40-megawatt heavy-water reactor that will also enable Iran to progress in its military nuclear program along the plutonium track.16 In interviews he gave subsequently, Abassi reemphasized that at present Iran indeed does not have plans to enrich uranium to a level above 20 percent. But if such a need arose in the future, for example, for ships and submarines, if our researchers need to have a stronger underwater presence, we will have to make small engines that should be fueled by 45% to 56% enriched uranium.In that case, we might need this [highly enriched] fuel.17 In a closed meeting, Abassi also updated the Majlis on the latest nuclear developments.18
Under
current
geostrategic
conditions,
it
does
not
appear
that
Iran
intends
to
give
up
its
nuclear
activity;
instead,
it
is
waiting
for
the
right
moment
to
break
out.
Iran
has
already
made
clear
to
the
West
that
crossing
the
threshold
is
no
longer
a
technological
problem,
just
an
issue
of
weighing
considerations
and
reaching
a
decision.
Iran
is
positioning
itself
as
a
leading
regional
actor
and
emphasizes
its
lack
of
dependence
on
external
actors
in
energy,
military,
economic,
and
other
areas.
Moreover,
in
the
new
Middle
Eastern
reality
that
is
taking
shape,
Iran
has
a
message
for
Arab
states
that
are
undergoing
change:
to
follow
the
model
of
its
own
steadfast
resilience
against
Western
pressure
since
the
outbreak
of
the
revolution.
It
draws
encouragement
from
the
stance
of
Russia,
which,
as
a
member
of
the
Security
Council
and
hence
of
the
5+1
group,
helps
Iran
by
thwarting
any
unified
Western
position
on
either
the
nuclear
or
Syrian
issues.
In
the
window
of
time
that
remains
until
Irans
presidential
elections,
it
does
not
appear
that
a
breakthrough
will
occur
in
the
negotiations.
For
Iran,
the
passage
of
time
means
there
will
no
longer
be
a
need
for
such
negotiations.
Iran
will
continue
its
foot-dragging
tactics,
hinting
to
the
West
that
it
has
to
wait
until
the
election
results,
and
the
formation
of
a
new
government,
before
continuing
the
nuclear
talks
(even
though
the
government
has
no
real
say
on
the
nuclear
issue).
The
West,
for
its
part,
will
apparently
go
along
and
wait
for
another
last
opportunity,
and
the
futile
dance
that
has
gone
on
for
a
decade
will
continue
without
any
Western
successes
and
with
Iranian
technological
accomplishments
that
bring
it
ever
closer
to
its
goal.
In
the
environment
taking
shape
in
the
overall
Middle
East
after
the
upheavals
of
the
Arab
Spring,
Iran
is
trying
to
position
itself
as
the
main
power
broker
that
can
affect
the
course
of
events
and
reduce
American
influence
and
involvement
in
the
region
via
Washingtons
allies
among
the
Gulf
states,
particularly
Qatar
and
Saudi
Arabia.
Those
two,
especially
Irans
bitter
Sunni
rival
Saudi
Arabia,
are
gradually,
with
Western
assistance,
weakening
Irans
position
in
Syria,
with
all
that
entails
for
Irans
continued
ability
to
influence
the
Syrian-Lebanese
arena
and,
from
it,
to
project
force
toward
Israel.
Moreover,
the
strengthening
of
Islamist
Sunni
actors
in
the
area
adds
more
fuel
to
the
Sunni-Shiite
conflict,
with
Irans
creation
Hizbullah
already
deeply
involved
in
the
crisis
on
Syrian
soil
and
suffering
losses.
In
addition,
Iran
regards
the
growing
Western
military
aid,
particularly
the
missile-defense
umbrellas
for
the
Gulf
States
and
Israel,
and
possibly
also
Turkey,
as
a
mounting
threat.
Iran
perceives
both
external
and
domestic
threats
affecting
the
regimes
survivability,
while
also
seeing
a
range
of
opportunities
opened
by
the
Arab
Spring
or
Islamic
awakening,
as
Iran
calls
it.
Thus,
Iran
keeps
developing
its
military
nuclear
program,
bringing
it
close
to
the
point
where
it
would
be
able
to
assemble
a
nuclear
bomb
in
a
very
short
time
despite
Western
pressure
and
sanctions.
Both
American
and
Iranian
interests
in
the
Persian
Gulf
and
the
Middle
East,
in
general,
are
undergoing
processes
of
change
that
put
them
on
a
collision
course.
One
sides
perceived
threat
is
the
other
sides
perceived
opportunity.
In
Irans
view,
leaving
the
nuclear
file
open
is
part
of
the
U.S.
strategy
to
contain
Irans
influence
in
the
region,
and
Washington
has
no
real
interest
in
reaching
a
settlement.
As
that
outlook
gains
strength
in
Iran,
along
with
the
assessment
that,
given
the
present
circumstances
and
regional
changes,
the
traditional
tools
(terror,
subversion,
export
of
the
revolution)
will
no
longer
suffice
to
promote
its
goals
of
regional
hegemony
and
guaranteeing
its
survival,
Iran
is
drawing
closer
to
a
decision
on
going
nuclear.
*
*
*
Notes
1.
http://www.farsnews.com/plarg.php?nn=375832&st=758527
2.
http://www.mehrnews.com/detail/News/2030259
3.
http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9107163350
4.
Ibid.
5.
NPT
Treaty,
Article
6:
Each
of
the
Parties
to
the
Treaty
undertakes
to
pursue
negotiations
in
good
faith
on
effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt2.htm 6. NPT Treaty, Article 4: Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty. http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt2.htm 7. http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920118001351 8. http://www.jomhourieslami.com/1392/13920119/13920119_01_jomhori_islami_sar_magaleh_0001.html 9. http://h-shariatmadari.blogfa.com/post-267.aspx 10. http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/130312/clapper.pdf 11. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence%20Reports/SASC%20WWTA%20Remarks%20as%20delivered%2018% 20April%202013.pdf 12. http://president.ir/fa/46774 13. http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920120000052; http://news.irib.ir/NewsPage.aspx?newsid=28851 14. http://tinyurl.com/ceb3v62 15. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/03/04/291818/iran-building-3000-highend-centrifuges/ 16. http://tinyurl.com/bqzgz6g (ISNA) 17. http://tinyurl.com/ceb3v62 (ISNA) 18. http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920121000113 19. http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920129000221; http://www.mehrnews.com/detail/News/2035213; http://www.resalat-news.com/fa/?code=136943; http://www.kayhan.ir/920114/3.htm#other300; http://www.leader.ir/langs/fa/index.php?p=bayanat&id=10497 20. http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920128001005 21. http://khabaronline.ir/detail/285775/politics/nuclear 22. http://www.rahesabz.net/story/68499/