SABILI vs COMELEC RULE 64 FACTS:

a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, was filed in the SC, seeking to annul the Resolutions dated 26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which denied due course to and canceled the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Meynardo Sabili (petitioner) for the position of Mayor of Lipa City for the May 2010 elections When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months Its undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas. Private respondent filed a Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification against him before the COMELEC private respondent alleged that petitioner made material misrepresentations of fact in the latters COC and likewise failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code both petitioner and respondent presented evidence as to prove their argument the COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition of private respondent, declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa City Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC, during the pendency of which the 10 May 2010 local elections were held. The next day, he was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Lipa City after garnering the highest number of votes cast for the said position the COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner. Although he was able to receive his copy of the Resolution, no prior notice setting the date of promulgation of the said Resolution was received by him petitioner filed with this Court a Petition (Petition for Certiorari with Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and for the Conduct of a Special Raffle of this Case the COMELEC Order dated 4 May 2010 suspended Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 by ordering that all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation in view of the proximity of the Automated National and Local Elections and lack of material time.

ISSUE: 1. Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it failed to promulgate its Resolution dated 17 August 2010 in accordance with its own Rules of Procedure? 2. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials?

RULING:

Petitioner claims that he did not receive notice of the said suspension of Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696. Thus, his right to due process was still violated. o the COMELEC claims that it has the power to suspend its own rules of procedure and invokes Section 6, Article IX-A of the Constitution, which gives it the power to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices. (SC AGREE) o The COMELECs Order did not affect the right of the parties to due process. They were still furnished a copy of the COMELEC Decision and were able to reckon the period for perfecting an appeal. In fact, petitioner was able to timely lodge a Petition with this Court. petitioner has alleged and shown the COMELECs use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding the issue of whether petitioner made a material misrepresentation of his residency qualification in his COC as to order its cancellation Petitioner bewails that the COMELEC required more evidence to show the change in his residence, notwithstanding the various pieces of evidence he presented and the fact that under the law, the quantum of evidence required in these cases is merely substantial evidence and not clear and convincing evidence o As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions thereto have been established, including when the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so grossly unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction o grave abuse of discretion - capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility (Mitra vs COMELEC) o under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. Substantial evidence is that degree of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. o Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction petitioner claims that he abandoned his domicile of origin and established his domicile of choice in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, thereby making him qualified to run for Lipa City mayor o To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of the intention to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode. PETITION GRANTED

** Sec. 6. Promulgation. The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served upon the parties or their attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax or thru the fastest means of communication. Let all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation. [G. R. No. 156982. September 8, 2004] NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, FACTS: Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on March 25, 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officio members.[1][6] ISSUE: Whether honoraria may be validly granted to the representatives of ex-officio members HELD: No. The COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria or any allowance whatsoever to the NAC ex officio members official representatives. The Constitution mandates the Commission on Audit to ensure that the funds and properties of the government are validly, efficiently and conscientiously used. Thus, Article IX-D of the Constitution ordains the COA to exercise exclusive and broad auditing powers over all government entities or trustees, without any exceptionSection 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government, which are required by law of the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special preaudit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto. (2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and

regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, inexpensive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.Section 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. (Emphasis supplied). The representatives cannot be considered de facto officers because they were not appointed but were merely designated to act as such. Furthermore, they are not entitled to something their own principals are prohibited from receiving. Neither can they claim good faith, given the express prohibition of the Constitution and the finality of our decision in Civil Liberties Union prior to their receipt of such allowances. WHEREFORE the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

PKSMMN versus Executive Secretary, GR 147036-37 FACTS: These are consolidated petitions to declare unconstitutional certain presidential decrees and executive orders of the martial law era relating to the raising and use of coco-levy funds In 1971, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 62601 that established a Coconut Investment Fund (CI Fund) for the development of the coconut industry through capital financing. . For this purpose, the law imposed a levy of P0.55 on the coconut farmers first domestic sale of every 100 kilograms of copra, or its equivalent, for which levy he was to get a receipt convertible into CIC shares of stock A year later or on November 14, 1974 President Marcos issued P.D. 582,8 creating a permanent fund called the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CID Fund) to channel for the ultimate direct benefit of coconut farmers part of the levies that they were already paying In 1975 President Marcos enacted P.D. 75512 which approved the acquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of the coconut farmers to enable such bank to promptly and efficiently realize the industrys credit policy On July 14, 1976 President Marcos enacted P.D. 961,16 the Coconut Industry Code, which consolidated and codified existing laws relating to the coconut industry. In November 2000 then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.) 312,25 establishing a Sagip Niyugan Program which sought to provide immediate income supplement to coconut farmers and encourage the creation of a sustainable local market demand for coconut oil and other coconut products At about the same time, President Estrada issued E.O. 313,30 which created an irrevocable trust fund known as the Coconut Trust Fund (the Trust Fund). This aimed to provide financial assistance to coconut farmers, to the coconut industry, and to other agri-related programs On January 26, 2001, however, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the suspension of E.O.s 312 and 313 on March 1, 2001 petitioner organizations and individuals brought the present action in G.R. 147036-37 to declare E.O.s 312 and 313 as well as Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 unconstitutional. On April 24, 2001 the other sets of petitioner organizations and individuals

instituted G.R. 147811 to nullify Section 2 of P.D. 755 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468 also for being unconstitutional. UCPB questions the propriety of the present petitions for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 on the ground that there are no ongoing proceedings in any tribunal or board or before a government official exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions.37 UCPB insists that the Court exercises appellate jurisdiction with respect to issues of constitutionality or validity of laws and presidential orders

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners special civil actions of certiorari under Rule 65 constituted the proper remedy for their actions RULING: where there are serious allegations that a law has infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but the duty of the Court to look into such allegations and, when warranted, uphold the supremacy of the Constitution.39 Moreover, where the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, as in this case, the Court has the discretion to brush aside technicalities of procedure The Court has to uphold petitioners right to institute these petitions. The petitioner organizations in these cases represent coconut farmers on whom the burden of the cocolevies attaches. It is also primarily for their benefit that the levies were imposed. The individual petitioners, on the other hand, join the petitions as taxpayers

Atty. Marietta Zamoranos versus People of the Philippines FACTS: These are three (3) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 dated July 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam. Subsequently, on July 30, 1982, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites before the RTC, Quezon City on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was confirmed by the Sharia Circuit District Court, 1st Circuit, 3rd District, Isabela, Basilan, which issued a Decree of Divorce on June 18, 1992 On December 20, 1989, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she worked Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and, in 1998, the two were de facto separated Pacasum contracted a second marriage with Catherine Ang Dignos on July 18, 2004

the Office of the City Prosecutor, issued a resolution dated February 2, 2005, finding prima facie evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy On April 29, 2005, the City Prosecutor of Ozamis City, the acting City Prosecutor of Iligan City at the time, issued a resolution granting Zamoranos motion for reconsideration and dismissing the charge of Bigamy against Zamoranos Pacasum filed a Petition for Review before the Office of the Secretary of Justice, assailing the dismissal of his criminal complaint for Bigamy against Zamoranos Zamoranos second motion for reconsideration was likewise denied RTC renedered in favor of Zamoranos since they were muslim when they contracted marriage "In the light of the foregoing findings, the Court is of the considered view and so hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the above-entitled case for annulment of marriage entered into under PD 1083, x x x. It is the Sharia Circuit Court that has the exclusive original jurisdiction." Upon motion of Pacasum, RTC reversed their decision On, Dec 21, 2009, Zamoranos filed a motion to quash the information/reconsideration which were both denied Zamoranos filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification and reversal of the December 21, 2009 Order of the RTC which the CA denied

ISSUE: Whether the CA correctly dismissed Zamoranos petition for certiorari? RULING: A petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an extraordinary remedy. As such, it is confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior court is wholly void. The aim of certiorari is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to a court on the basis alone of an alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. To prosper, a petition for certiorari must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction We found nothing that may constitute as grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. The Order dated December 21, 2009, which first denied [Zamoranos] [M]otion to [Q]uash Information meticulously explained the factual and legal basis for the denial of the issues raised by [Zamoranos] in said motion\ certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and

(3) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law The denial of a motion to quash, as in the case at bar, is not appealable. It is an interlocutory order which cannot be the subject of an appeal it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law certiorari is considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order, specifically the denial of a motion to quash. We have recognized the propriety of the following exceptions: (a) when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief; (c) in the interest of a "more enlightened and substantial justice"; (d) to promote public welfare and public policy; and (e) when the cases "have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof." The first four of the foregoing exceptions occur in this instance.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS RODOLFO LEGASPI FACTS: In December 1978, respondent Rosalina Libo-on (Rosalina) accomplished a letter of intent signifying her willingness to sell her lot in Iloilo a Deed of Definite Sale was executed by the parties whereby Rosalina, with the conformity of her then tenant, Vicente Libo-on, sold the subject parcel in favor of UPV for the stated consideration of P56,479.50 On 4 January 1980, however, Rosalina wrote a letter, informing UPV that she was rescinding the sale of the subject parcel on the ground that she was no longer the owner of the property in view of her 5 September 1978 conveyance thereof by way of barter or exchange in favor of respondents Rodolfo Legaspi, Sr., Querobin Legaspi Petitioner alleged, among other matters, that the subject parcel is within the approved and delineated campus of the UPV which had well-established its presence in the area by building its laboratories, classrooms, faculty and student centers, among other facilities; and, that it had been constrained to resort to expropriation in view of the failure of its efforts to negotiate with respondents for the retention of the property on which it constructed considerable improvements already being used for academic purposes the RTC issued an order granting petitioners motion to allow UPV to continue its possession of the subject parcel

Respondents averred that petitioners right of expropriation should only be limited to the three lots petitioner moved for the continuation of the condemnation proceedings insofar as the remaining seven lots were concerned RTC further issued the herein assailed condemnation order of the same date, upholding petitioners authority to expropriate the remaining seven lots except the lot of the Villa Beach Resort petitioner and UPV filed motions for reconsideration of the foregoing order on the ground that the exclusion of the Villa Marina Beach Resort area from the condemned lots is bereft of legal basis and contrary to the evidence presented in the case which showed that the same is an integral part of the UPVs developmental plan for research and educational use MR was denied by RTC petitioner filed on 16 August 2004 the Rule 65 petition for certiorari and mandamus on the ground that grave abuse of discretion attended the denial of the expropriation of the subject lots after the right to expropriate the same was earlier upheld in the likewise assailed order dated 17 November 2003 On 26 April 2007, the CAs then Eighteenth Division rendered the herein assailed decision denying the petition on the ground that, under Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the proper remedy from said assailed orders was an ordinary appeal which, once lost, cannot be substituted by a Rule 65 petition for certiorari and mandamus the CA ruled that the RTCs issuance of said assailed orders was well within its power and duty to review, amend or reverse its findings and conclusions if it deems it necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction

ISSUE: WoN the CA erred in denying the petition for certiorari and affirming the order of the RTC which did not state the facts and the law on which it is based? RULING: (YES) Expropriation or the exercise of the power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state and of those entities to which the power has been lawfully delegated to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation Governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings therefor consist of two (2) stages: (a) the condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use; and, (b) the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners RTC upheld the right of UPV to expropriate due to the lack of opposition but the Villa Resort lot is said to be the business of Legaspi which cannot be exproriated The order of denial of UPVs right to expropriate is final in nature and not merely interlocutory instead of perfecting an appeal from said order, petitioner filed the Rule 65 petition for certiorari on the ground that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the

expropriation of the subject lots after its right to expropriate the same had been earlier determined a petition for certiorari is, concededly, intended to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and lies only when there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Hence, the CA denied the petition filed by petitioner on the principle that certiorari cannot be used as substitute for an appeal that has been lost the CA lost sight of the fact, however, that the rule had been relaxed on a number of occasions, where its rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice Petitioner has more than amply demonstrated that the RTCs issuance of the assailed orders dated 17 November 2003 and 31 May 2004 was attended with grave abuse of discretion. In the context of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction To our mind, the grave abuse of discretion imputable against the RTC was manifest as early in the assailed 17 November 2003 order where, without giving any rationale therefor, and while it upheld petitioners right of expropriation over other lots, it excluded the area occupied by the Villa Marina Beach Resort owned and operated by respondent Rodolfo Legaspi, Sr. Since it is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court, the rule is settled that a decision that does not conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution and the law is void and deemed legally inexistent The fact that said lots are being utilized by respondents Legaspis for their own private purposes is, consequently, not a valid reason to deny exercise of the right of expropriation, for as long as the taking is for a public purpose and just compensation is paid.

ONGSUCO vs MALONES FACTS: Petitioners are stall holders at the Maasin Public Market, which had just been newly renovated The Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin approved Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, entitled The Municipal Revised Revenue Code. The Code contained a provision for increased rentals for the stalls and the imposition of goodwill fees The same Code authorized respondent to enter into lease contracts over the said market stalls,[5] and incorporated a standard contract of lease for the stall holders at the municipal public market respondent wrote a letter to petitioners informing them that they were occupying stalls in the newly renovated municipal public market without any lease contract, as a consequence of which, the stalls were considered vacant and open for qualified and interested applicants This prompted petitioners, together with other similarly situated stall holders at the municipal public market, to file before the RTC on 25 June 1999 a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus,

with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, against respondent Petitioners argued that public hearing was mandatory in the imposition of goodwill fees as provided in Section 186 of the Local Government Code of 1991 Petitioners prayed that respondent be enjoined from imposing the goodwill fees pending the determination of the reasonableness thereof, and from barring petitioners from occupying the stalls at the municipal public market and continuing with the operation of their businesses Respondent maintained that Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 is valid. Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 imposed goodwill fees to raise income to pay for the loan obtained by the Municipality of Maasin for the renovation of its public market RTC dismissed the petition The RTC found that petitioners could not avail themselves of the remedy of mandamus or prohibition. mandamus would not lie in this case where petitioners failed to show a clear legal right to the use of the market stalls without paying the goodwill fees imposed by the municipal government. Prohibition likewise would not apply to the present case where respondents acts, sought to be enjoined, did not involve the exercise of judicial or quasi judicial functions. The RTC also dismissed the Petition on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Petitioners failure to question the legality of Municipal Ordinance No. 98 -01 before the Secretary of Justice, as provided under Section 187 of the Local Government Code, rendered the Petition raising the very same issue before the RTC premature. Petitioner filed an appeal in CA but was dismissed The Court of Appeals declared that the goodwill fee was a form of revenue measure, which the Municipality of Maasin was empowered to impose under Section 186 of the Local Government Code The Court of Appeals additionally held that even if respondent acted in grave abuse of discretion, petitioners resort to a petition for prohibition was improper, since respondents acts in question herein did not involve the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, as required under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. the filing by petitioners of the Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus before the RTC was premature, as they failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior thereto

ISSUE: WoN petition for prohibition/mandamus was the proper remedy filed by the petitioner? RULING: (YES) It is true that the general rule is that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Thus, a case where the issue raised is a purely legal question, well within the competence; and the jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency, would clearly constitute an exception The sole issue petitioners raised before the RTC was whether Municipal Ordinance No. 9801 was valid and enforceable despite the absence, prior to its enactment, of a public hearing held in accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code. This is undoubtedly a pure question of law, within the competence and jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve.

In some cases, the Court has affirmed the jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve questions of constitutionality and validity of laws (deemed to include local ordinances) in the first instance, without deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy. SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law , a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent. (Emphases ours.) In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person -- whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions -- who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner prays that judgment be rendered, commanding the respondent to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter specified in the petition. On the other hand, the remedy of mandamus lies to compel performance of a ministerial duty. The petitioner for such a writ should have a welldefined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act, and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done. In this case, petitioners primary intention is to prevent respondent from implementing Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 Obviously, the writ petitioners seek is more in the nature of prohibition (commanding desistance), rather than mandamus (compelling performance) For a writ of prohibition, the requisites are: (1) the impugned act must be that of a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions; and (2) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

QUIZON vs COMELEC FACTS: Petitioner Quizon and private respondent Puno were congressional candidates during the May 14, 2007 national and local elections. Petitioner filed for the disqualification of respondent for failure to meet the residency requirement prior to the day of election; and that Punos claim in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) that he is a resident Antipolo City for four years and six months before May 14, 2007 constitutes a material misrepresentation since he was in fact a resident of Quezon City.

Quizon filed a Supplement to the petition claiming that Puno cannot validly be a candidate for a congressional seat in the First District of Antipolo City since he indicated in his COC that he was running in the First District of the Province of Rizal which is a different legislative district Quizon filed this Petition for Mandamus alleging that the COMELEC had not rendered a judgment on the above-mentioned petitions and that the unreasonable delay in rendering judgment deprived him of his right to be declared as the winner and assume the position of member of the House of Representatives COMELEC Second division dismissed the petition of Quizon Puno argues that the petition for mandamus was mooted by the July 31, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division in which the OSG agrees Quizon filed a petition for mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction seeks to compel the (COMELEC) Second Division to resolve the petition and supplemental petition for disqualification and cancellation of certificate of candidacy filed by Florante S. Quizon

ISSUE: WoN the petition of Mandamus filed by Quizon be granted? RULING: (NO) The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate pending resolution of the instant petition for mandamus, the COMELEC issued its Resolution on the petition for disqualification rendering the instant case moot. the petition failed to meet the requisites for mandamus. the writ of mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. When the act sought to be performed involves the exercise of discretion, the respondent may only be directed by Mandamus to act but not to act in one way or the other The denial of due course or cancellation of ones certificate of candidacy is not within the administrative powers of the Commission, but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Hence, the Court may only compel COMELEC to exercise such discretion and resolve the matter but it may not control the manner of exercising such discretion. Petitioner has other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. After a resolution on the petition for disqualification, a motion for reconsideration may be filed before the COMELEC En Banc as what was done by petitioner. Only then can petitioner come before this Court via a petition for certiorari