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as 'the actuality In the Physics, SUMMARY. Aristotle defines motion of what is potentially, has been times and has countless qua potential' (Phys. 201b5). This definition interpreted At issue today is whether refers to motions been the subject of heated controvery. e*>reAexeia as a process or a state. Accordingly, to refer to a process, if the idea of evTek'extia is believed to mean actualization. If on the other hand it is taken to refer to a state, as meaning a change In the first instance, known as the 'state-view', actuality. as being the state of a changing is defined it is actually F, for some object when potentially a change F1. In the second, or 'process-view', is defined as the actualization of a potentially.2 it is translated it is translated It seems motion that to me that both As as motion. the definition assume in defining views mistakenly that Aristotle succeeded on a presumed a consequence, content the discussion has focused was it the case that Aristotle's does not offer. definition Indeed, were

he in even considering of whether there would the question hardly be any point adequate, as being a state or a process. to regard motion In this paper I examine both had intended from of these views and offer an alternative of my own that differs markedly interpretation a projection I shall show that just as Aristotle's either. Additionally, definition represents of his particular toward nature - so also recent interpretations of his definition attitude represent a projection of the attitudes of modern toward Aristotle's thinker's philosophy. Key words: motion, actuality-potentiality, form-matter, praxis-poesis, process-result.

THE CONCEPT OF MOTION defines motion as 'the actuality of what is potentially, qua potential' as such' (77 tov (Phys. 201b5) or as 'the actuality of what is potentially, The main point 17 tolovtov) Swa/iet, bvros tWeAexeia, (Phys. 201all).3 at issue in the modern to the idea is about how understand controvery of potentiality. to the process-view, is potential when something it is actually According - for that at a given moment the buildable which the process by example, to this view totally The final product is according becomes buildable. irrelevant to the definition of change or motion. If this were so, then Aristotle out of which a building was would have referred to, say, the materials built as the actuality of bricks and stones qua bricks and stones; or as the process of being bricks and stones as such, irrespective of their purpose. Aristotle Change would therefore be the process of this process of being bricks and stones as such. It would therefore be a case of defining the buildable qua buildable - or, as Kosman 'the process by which the puts it, of defining buildable becomes buildable, rather than, as Aristotle has in mind, building, that is, the process by which the buildable becomes built.4 But then the
26: 1-10, 1995. Journal for General Philosophy of Science ? in the Netherlands. Printed 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers.


lose its meaning. distinction would actual-potential Change would be, as it were, the process of this process of being bricks and stones. That is - in to say, motion would be absurdly defined as the motion of motion in terms of actuality, which case potentiality would not be defined and run counter to Aristotle's of these terms. Aristotle this would definition per se cannot exist (cf. Phys. 201 b 33 explicitly suggests that potentiality 202 a 1). The state-view shares assumptions that are similar to these of the process view. Change is defined as the state of the changing object when it is actually F' (which is F, for some F. Therefore being 'only potentially potentially different from being 'actually potentially' F), means being potentially F But this results in a confusion of terms. Actuality and potentially are technical concepts developed for the express by Aristotle potentiality between what is inmotion and what is not, between purpose of distinguishing the incomplete and the complete - where motion betokens incompleteness. to this interpretation, it would defined appear that Aristotle According as the completion motion of the incomplete. However Aristotle explicitly is an absolute and simple rejects this possibility when he denies that motion actuality (cf. Phys. 201b 25-30). was indeed capable assume that Aristotle Both of these interpretations as such, when in fact no such account of arriving at a definition of motion extreme terms, in the most could have been given by him. Formulated then we both views end in absurdity. If motion is taken to be a process, are confronted by a circularity of definition. What is being asserted is that is thereby defined as the actuality of what change is change; and motion is potentially motion qua potential motion. As Kosman has rightly observed, 'to say that motion is the process of actualization by which a potentiality in terms of the very concept is to attempt to define motion is actualized On the other hand, if in question, that of the process of actualization'.5 is that change is defined is regarded as a state, the implication motion is no-motion but rest - which by what does not change, or that motion a contradiction. Thus the controversy over whether hrekexeta ismanifestly means a process or a result boils down to this: in avoiding entanglement one is trapped in a contradiction. And in avoiding the in a tautology, a or one in either of is contradiction, entangled tautology entanglement of argument. and of the state-view of the process-view advocates agree in This is however not is the equivalent of 'change-as-such'. that 'potential' to Aristotle, rather there is no change-as-such; the case. Indeed, according For Aristotle, change is toward something else that is in itself unchangeable. in itself, is the equivalent only of change, and neither has meaning potential some end. The frame of reference for giving an account but only concerning final product. is always the unchangeable of motion to Aristotle, is in is the process that something According potentiality when it has not yet assumed its final form - for example, the process by circularity Modern


refers to which the buildable becomes built. In this instance, potentiality a house whose construction is yet incomplete. The point is that potentiality is as incomprehensible its end being taken into account, per se, without as would be the process of building without taking into account what is being built. we have to begin by To understand Aristotle's theory of motion, The first question the that underlies the theory. considering assumption is definable for itself or concerning is whether motion something else. There is a process or a state, only whether motion is any sense in determining if motion is definable for itself. However, Aristotle maintains that motion else other than itself - or more is definable only concerning something in relation with its opposite, which is rest. And since Aristotle specifically, cannot offer an immanent definition of motion, the whole issue of whether is a process or a state - and therefore the very controversy motion among - is irrelevant to his definition. modern interpreters of motion. This is not to Aristotle offers only a paradoxical definition say that he denies its existence. This would have been the position of the that motion Eleatic school, which Aristotle criticized. Aristotle recognizes or at least difficult, to be grasped.6 exists, but regards it as impossible, The epistemological difficulty lies in the very idea of potentiality. According or potentially to Aristotle, cannot exist qua potential, in itself. something can matter. Matter In this, potentiality is like exist only if it is actual a form. And since to the same thing, if it possesses or, what amounts as as such, it cannot must terms of motion be defined in such potentiality be defined within the framework of Aristotle's of system thinking. Indeed the same problem arises concerning the definition of matter as in the case of motion. Form precedes matter - which is to say that matter is explained by means of form. Matter qua matter exists neither ontologi is pre cally (Metaph. 1029) nor epistemologically (Metaph. 1036). Matter not matter that in other does is which that which words, cisely change; does not exist in itself. Existence is that in which change is given - namely, as either a cannot define motion form (Metaph. 1070-1). Thus Aristotle
process or a state since he gives no consideration to change as such. Change

is the transition of matter from one form to another, and this can be grasped to the actual. But transition per from the potential only as a transition se is undefinable. For to attempt to define it is like trying to define matter without the scope of Aristotle's form; and this is obviously beyond no Aristotle offers of He is only philosophy. change-in-itself. principle as or of form final form transitional form (that either considering capable is, the transition from one form to another), which is an alternative possi nor the state-view takes into account. bility that neither the process-view Stated in the most general terms, actuality precedes potentiality, in that means is of potentiality by actuality explained 1049-50). Rest (Metaph. (that is, the end) therefore precedes motion, the only definition of motion latter.7 Hence and the former explains the offered by Aristotle, taking


is paradoxical. into account the whole corpus of his writings, Let us consider alteration as an instance of motion (cf. Phys. 225 b 10 sense ismotion in of the 226 b 17).What alteration {klvyjol^) {a\\oia>oi<;)T Change means that a being becomes another being. But if this other being were not already present in the original being, we could not properly speak of an alteration having occurred. We could only know that one being has that the new being was already succeeded another. Thus alteration means is therefore something included in the former being. Change impossible to grasp, because here it is asserted that being is within itself different from itself. Hence the transition in which one being becomes another takes the original being. To state the matter in a Hegelian style, place within takes place within being itself. Now, the transition of being to non-being are respectively called 'actuality' and 'potentiality', if being and non-being must be regarded as "the actuality of what is that motion it follows who resolves the Thus Aristotle, qua 201b5). {Phys. potential" potentially, between in being by invoking the opposition of non-being contradiction to conclude that motion is ultimately compelled the actual and the potential, is indeed an actuality - albeit an actuality that is incomplete.9 is constrained What exists potentially must be actually potential. Aristotle terms here, so that he is forced into a contradiction. to join two opposite to refer to a potentiality. he it would be nonsensical Moreover Otherwise and since actuality means is plainly aware of the difficulty, completion means fail to see The interpreters of Aristotle incompletion. potentiality idea of motion. is inherent in the very Aristotelian that the difficulty So, is merely one of that the problem for example, Terry Penner10 maintains in the relation between process and product, and that it ultimately ambiguity the root In my view, however, from of language. the ambiguity derives assertion of an actuality that is its opposite of the problem lies in Aristotle's - a This idea works against actuality or an actual potentiality. potential and the actual that he had laid the potential between the very distinction as something and not actual. down to define motion Indeed, potential sometimes defines motion as "the actuality of what is incomplete" Aristotle as "an incomplete of the fulfillment {De Anima 431 a 6) and sometimes but is rather is not fortuitous, of language The ambiguity movable".11 in Aristotle's attempt to come to grips with the self problematic grounded Aristotle idea of potential actuality and actual potentiality. contradictory to define motion becomes particularly difficult to follow when he undertakes the limitations of his own thought.12 in detail. It is then that he confronts to between process and product Thus the ambiguity of the relationship or rather which Penner refers lies in the very idea of motion. Motion, its product or result. has meaning the process of motion, only regarding it has no rekos. For Aristotle, is thus impossible because Infinite motion since it is not in motion. an end product is something easier to understand is not understandable Whatever lacks motion by means of motion, whereas of its rekos. is understandable is in motion that which only by means


Motion is therefore grasped through its opposite. Aristotle is undoubtedly as conscious of the difficulty is when evident he contends here, implied in this regard that "it is hard to grasp what motion is" (Phys. 201 b 33). as a deficiency - as a potentiality Motion has to be characterized without actuality; so that, like matter without form, it is beyond comprehension. Motion is therefore not definable in its own right, so that there is no definition of motion is not definable in terms of itself, proper. Motion but only by means of its limits - by its terminus ad quo and terminus ad quem\ by what precedes it and comes after it.13 THE ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF MOTION Like all the Aristotelian ontology, Aristotle's ontology of motion originates in the model of human activity. However he is unaware of this. Indeed, he even inverts the relationship. that art is So, for example, he contends an imitation of nature, since it consists in bestowing form on the matter.14 Yet Aristotle conceives nature as oriented toward a goal (Phys. 199). Aristotle as imitating human art. Thus his theory of nature is a construct nature regards from human activity. to the principles of the form-matter and actuality-potentiality According on the one hand, Aristotle between production distinctions, distinguishes and consumption and use on the other. Aristotle is unaware that he has reversed the order of these distinctions. He is also unaware that his distinctions between form and matter, and between actuality and poten between tiality, are an inversion of his basic model. Basically, he distinguishes human production and consumption matter where is the (or use), object of TToi-qois, and form is the object of 7rpafi9. Therefore, to understand Aristotle's of nature in general, and of motion in particular, conception
it is necessary to analyze his conception of men and society.


between two kinds of human activity: irpa^is and distinguishes and the second ismotion noi-qois (Metaph. 1048b). The first is not motion, 1048b, a key passage for understanding (Eth. Nich. 1140b). InMetaphysics the problem of motion, Aristotle contends that while all motion is incom is always complete. Completeness and incompleteness have plete, actuality to do with whether the reAo9 is in the activity itself or in its end; in the latter case, motion to the end. An activity that is in itself is subordinated a re\o9 is called by Aristotle the completeness 7rpaft9. In this passage, of irpaZi9 is set in opposition to motion. For this reason, ttoltjol^ is ethically inferior to 7rpa?i9. Upat; 19 is the model of moral behavior, since in ethics, "doing well is in itself the end" (Eth. Nich. 1140b7). It should be noted that the completeness of npa^is does not mean quietude of being. Quietude of being is rather the correlative of uncompleted motion,15 which attains only when it ceases. Thus quietude of being is already to have completion acquired learning, rather than learning itself; or to have arrived at a place, rather than traveling to it. Aristotle


Ilpaf t9 refers to the end of the activity, and iroLrjoLs refers to the means. Thus the TrpaJjis-TroirjoLS distinction between ends overlaps the distinction and means. is the form of the activity of the consumption and Ilpafis
use of things that are neither made for consumption nor serve as a means

to an end other than themselves. Thus Aristotle cites the example of a as a means On bed of npoL^is {Pol. 1254a). the other hand, productive use requires instruments in kind from those employed that are different to an end other than their in consumption. These instruments are means use - say a shuttle {Pol. 1254a). The distinction between 7rpafi9 and tyoivols is so sharp, that different in one or other of these classes of individuals function characteristically
two activities. Masters, by their very nature, function as consumers, namely,

as subjects of Trpagts while slaves are characteristically subjects of TroLrjoLs.The latter have no independent
only to execute the master's orders, that is, to achieve

that is, producers, existence, they exist

his ends.16 Slaves,

as subjects of Troirjois, that is, as consumers, in the do not participate on as Masters of of the contrary, npalzis activity subjects consumption.17 as consumers, in the activity of do not participate and, consequently, Even when they appear to be doing so, by imparting orders production.18 to the slaves, they are still acting within the framework of 7rpaft9. They are merely using their slaves, and using is a mark of npcx^Ls, not of 77-0177019. within the framework of This strange assertion becomes comprehensible and between motion Aristotle's intention to distinguish perfection, sharply and actuality. The polar distinction between TrolnoLs and npa^ 19,potentiality master and slave is essential for the clear distinction of his own categories. Without ideas of noi-qois and 7rpafi9, potentiality and it, the relational become merely relative and, motion would and perfection, actuality, is trying precisely to avoid this relativization therefore, problematic. Aristotle as such (that is, of potential of motion of his categories. His definition of the relational ideas leads just to such a relativization qua potential) therefore does the very things he sought of actual and potential. Aristotle
to avoid.

between master and slave, Aristotle sharp distinction two of kinds of instruments: instruments between further distinguishes as instruments Aristotle consider slaves 7rpa^t9 and instruments of 77-0177019. acts in relation with his of Trpoi?is and not of 71-0177019,since the master's slave are acts of 7rpaf t9. It is the instruments of the slaves that are instruments states: that is, their activity is productive. Aristotle of 77-0177019, To maintain his
Instruments are of various a sorts. lifeless. In the rudder, living, others a living instrument; for in the arts is an instrument for maintaining too, a possession Thus, a a slave is a living possession, the family, and property Some instruments lookout in the man, are

the pilot of a ship has is a kind of the servant

lifeless, instrument.

of life. So, in the arrangement an instrument For is himself for instruments. of such instruments; and the servant number or anticipating the will of others, if every instrument could accomplish its own work, obeying ... if the shuttle would weave touch the lyre, and the plectrum like the statues of Daedalus


chief workman so called From a bed both a shuttle there would we not want

are instruments is only

as production are different and action in kind, and Further, the instruments which likewise differ in kind. instruments, require they employ must But life is action (Trpa^t?) and not production the slave is the minister (Troi-qois), and therefore ... The master of action is only the master of the slave; he does not belong to him, whereas the slave is not only the slave of his master, but wholly belongs to him {Pol. 1253b28-1254a 14)

get the use.

slaves. Now the instruments servants, nor masters commonly of production whilst a possession is an instrument of action (npalzis). or of else besides the use of it, whereas of a garment something


the point of view of my thesis, the point of interest in the above is that the slave functions, in relation with his master, as a process quotation or motion. Whereas the master the end that imparts purpose represents and meaning to the existence of the slave. As in the case of motion, here too, 'complete' is that who serves its end (the master) or that who achieves his end. 'Incomplete' is the slave, who is not defined in himself but only in relation with his master. also is that which has not yet 'Incomplete' achieved complete

its end, that which is still in the process of production. It becomes or perfect when the process is completed and the object becomes
for consumption or non-productive use.

sharp distinction in Aristotle's distinction,

process and result. Nature


between general
is not


to be


irol-qois is the basis for the of nature, between natural

a natural process as such.

is grasped by virtue of its fruits: you understand a seed by the mature as you into should which it understanding plant develop, understand of the virtue Nature by production (cf. Phys. product 199). is therefore grasped by the idea of TrolrjoLs, that is an idea subordinate to the idea of Trpaizis. Like human beings, nature also uses means to achieve ends. However, the fruit or product of nature, as of human activity, is distinct from the process of production (that is, motion). as dependent on ends has not only theoretical but This view of motion also practical significance. Aristotle based his philosophy upon the general men not of his that do motion but they merely time, assumption generate to Aristotle's make use of it. Motion, basic assumptions, is not according is not definable as such. It iswhat lies between consciously generated. Motion a state where it has not yet come into operation and the state where it to operate. has already ceased the question Therefore raised by the commentators for Aristotle, is a process or a (that is, whether motion, state in itself) ignores this fundamental aspect of Aristotle's philosophy. Their question is motivated by modern physics rather than by Aristotelian to modern the Greeks did not create assumptions. Contrary technology, The Greeks grasped natural motion only in use; it was not as such but only as goal-oriented. Aristotelian cognizable to art and production physics (that is, nature) is ultimately analogous that, are goal-oriented. like motion, Therefore, motion cannot be regarded either therefore
as a process or as a state in itself.





the assertion

of motion

as a process,





8 the generation acknowledge he defines it only in relation result and only as such it as a state, Aristotle would of its result. Modern physics

ODED BALABAN and to define of motion, with its result. Therefore, can be grasped. For the not have defined motion as such. But motion motion is a potential assertion of motion as such but in terms

on to Aristotle's bases its opposition theory of motion of motion. Modern the artificial, produced physics explains production means are of natural since natural laws the motion laws, by conceptual itself. The knowledge we need to produce expression of the mode of motion is not about motion but about the mode of motion. motion of Aristotle's The modern misunderstanding approach derives, I believe, of modern patterns of thoughts to ancient categories. from the application is The process view of Aristotle's is plausible only if motion interpreters rest. not in This is what modern itself and physics through precisely grasped to do, but not so Aristotle. We may therefore assert that has attempted idea of change the process-view interpreters are trying to interpret Aristotle's through the categories of modern physics. Modern physics, unlike Aristotle, rest as such, and therefore defines it in terms of motion: cannot understand on the other hand, defines motion as an equilibrium of forces. Aristotle, in terms of rest. We must therefore try to understand Aristotle's approach to modern physics. Whereas modern physics not through, but in opposition as the primary state of things, Aristotle regards rest as regards motion state and, the primary state of things. Motion he regards as a secondary as such, he seeks to explain it. Aristotle asks what motion is, but explains it only indirectly as a transitory stage whose end is a state of rest. Modern directly and not in terms of physics, on the other hand, explains motion rest. So that, just as modern physics cannot understand rest qua rest, Aristotle
cannot understand motion qua motion.19

the The new idea of motion by modern superseded developed physics idea of being. The classical idea of rest was correlative classical Aristotelian was the end by to the idea of being. Being, in the sense of being-at-rest, the idea of motion for the classicists which motion was explained. Therefore to be was closely related to the idea of place, since to be at rest means are are not at a certain place. For Aristotle, in when motion they things in their natural place. Hence, when they reach their natural place, motion ceases. However, assertion that place is a modern (after Kepler's physics creation of the mind "omnis locatio mentis est opus"20 denies the existence of physical of a natural place for things. It has shifted the explanation criterion to of the This shift from explanatory change of place.11 reality place to explanation in terms in terms of substance is a shift from explanation or in terms of laws. The idea of law has superseded the of functions is a state of imperfection. Aristotelian idea of Reality. For Aristotle, motion is the natural state of things. Modern For modern physics, motion physics some other state (in this case, rest). According does not explain motion by to Aristotle, klptjols can only be grasped through a reXo9 that is not itself


whereas modern physics does not need a reXo9 to explain motion. goes so far as to assert that what is at rest does not even exist.22 in his First Law of Motion, refers to the conservation Similarly, Newton, of motion. This modern cannot be in terms of the approach grasped Aristotelian motion-rest correlation. Motion is not definable by its end.23 one that does not have eternal motion, too, refers to a perpetual, Kepler, rest as its end.24 Kepler explains his own approach as an attack on the Aristotelian idea of final cause. on the other hand, effective cause (motion) is subordinate For Aristotle, to final cause (rest). The distinction between motion and its end pervades all his philosophy and gives it its particular character. Like motion, matter to and defined by form; Troiiqois is subordinate is subordinated to TrpaJjis; servant to master; potentiality to actuality; means to ends. This distinction is based upon the primacy of the result over the process, in the sense that the result explains the process, which is apprehensible only in terms of
its end.


is sustained in different versions and issues by: L. A. Kosman: 1969, 'Aristotle's of Motion', on Modality Phronesis Jaakko Hintikka: 14, 40-62; 1977, 'Aristotle and Determinism', Acta Philosophia Fennica XXIX, 58-77; Mary Louise Gill: 1880, 'Aristotle's in Phys. of Causal Actions Ill 3', Pronesis In the state-view, 129-147. motion XXV, Theory in itself but defines a thing in a state of changing. is not defined 2 The process-view is sustained 1970, 'Verbs and the Identity of Actions', by Terry Penner: in Oscar P. Wood and George Pitcher Garden (Eds.), Ryle: A Collection of Critical Essays, W. D. Ross: Books, pp. 393-460. 1936, Aristotle's City: Anchor Oxford, p. 537. Physics, Edward Zeller: der Griechen, 1921, Philosophie II, 2, 351. James Kostman: 1987, Leipzig, 'Aristotle's Definition of Change', History IV, 3-16. of Philosophy Quarterly 3 Cf. also Phys. 202a6, 251a9, Metaph. 1065b23. 1065bl6, 4 Kosman, op. cit. p. 43. 5 'Aristotle's Definition of Motion', Kosman, p. 41. 6 The knowledge of motion was has a philosophical evolution. At the beginning, motion and therefore it was not something the Eleatic with Afterwards, presupposed, explainable. an object of analysis becomes denied Plato recognized its existence. school, motion although 1 The state-view


went it as an illusion. Aristotle its existence instead of deny forward, and, it, recognized as difficult to be grasped. considered motion 7 For a good account as different of the idea of change from the idea of activity, (motion) see Mary Louise Gill: of Causal Action III 3', Phronesis in Physics 1880, 'Aristotle's Theory XXV, 129-147. 8 This analysis of motion is inspired in Jose Ortega y Gasset's Preface to the Spanish translation de la Philosophie, of Emile Brehier's Histoire Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1942, pp. 42-47. 9 Cf. Phys. 201 b, 257b9, Metaph. 1066a20. 1048b29, 10 - a T. Penner: of actions in the exercise 1970, 'Verbs and the identity philosophical of Aristotle', in O. P. Wood and G. Pitcher interpretation pp. (Eds.), Ryle, Macmillan, 430 ff. 11 Phys. 257 b 8. Cf. Penner, op. cit., 433. 12 L. A. Kosman of defining motion: 'For motion gives a good insight about the impossibility is the actuality of a potentiality is aimed ultimately at an actuality which other than the motion and fatal to it. Motion does not, therefore, just happen to cease, its essential activity


for its whole purpose and project is one

to ceasing. Its being is auto-subversive, is devoted 'Aristotle's Definition of self-annihilation'. Kosman: 13 In De Anima, it seems that Aristotle takes another two opposite ideas of actualization: (a) actualization (b) actualization of potentiality), is not a change, as its conservation. meaning That and a positive since change

p. 57. There he distinguishes between approach. as the destruction of potentiality, and (destruction for instance,

of Motion',

conservation, implies adds 'towards But Aristotle 'progress toward itself or 'on itself as an inner return to actuality. to the end. that is, the reference its end', and therefore he does not change his basic approach, 14 is rational Cf. PA. 639b. Nature aims at the best and noble PA. 645 a 25, 670 b 24; nature 734b 20 735a with art: GA (G.A. 731 a 24, 744 b 15). Cf. also G.A. 760 b 26. Compared

is to say, there is a negative meaning of actualization. Thought, (its conservation) destruction (cf. De Anima 417b); it is rather

does nothing an artisan: G.A. 731 a 20, 730 b 15, 743a 25. Nature 775a20. With 1, 762al5, in vain: PA. 658 a 9, DC2. 15 to speak about since motion In Aristotelian it is redundant imperfect motion, language use to I facilitate the means this of lack expression notwithstanding, already perfection; of the subject. exposition 16 is '... Some men are by nature slaves, and that for these latter slavery free, and others are from Jonathan Barnes translations and right' (Pol. 1255al). English both expedient (Ed.): Princeton. 1984, The Complete Works of Aristotle, 17 to citizenship; but if they are them [the artisans] 'The best form of state will not admit to every citizen, of a citizen will not apply of the excellence then our definition admitted, nor to every free man {Pol. 1278a 5-13). 18 '... the citizens must inimical as not such, lead Neither but the only to those who are freed from necessary services'


to excellence.

that the logic of modern science, especially by asserting between the fails to see the difference is similar to Aristotle's that of biology, logic. Boylan Science the what (the end) and that of modern Aristotelian concerning concerning question in Aristotle's the how (the process). Cf. Michael 1984, 'The Place of Nature Teleology', Boylan: Apeiron XVIII, June. 20 Johann Kepler, Opera Omnia, V. II, 55. 21 The Open Court Press, See Ernst Cassirer: 1923, Einstein's Chicago, Theory of Relativity, p. 362. 22 Galileo 1953, p. 58. Galilei, Dialogo, Berkeley, 23 Naturalis Sir Isaac Newton, 1947, p. 13. (1687), Berkeley Principia Mathematica Philosophiae 24 Gesammelte See De Anima 417b5. J. Kepler, Werke, V. VII, Book IV, part. 3, p. 330. Dept. of Philosophy,

and of excellence the development 19 Michael this point Boylan missed

or tradesmen, for such a life is ignoble both for since leisure is necessary they be farmers, duties' of political the performance (Pol. 1328b37-1329al). life of artisans must

of Haifa, University Mount Carmel, Haifa Israel. 31999,