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TEAM #2
WORKPLAN FOR MANAGEMENT

This memorandum sets forth a workplan for Team #2's investigation of the
management of the Intelligence Community. The workplan has two objectives: (1) to
produce the definitive account of the facts and circumstances related to the IC's
management related to the September 11th attacks and their immediate aftermath, and
(2) to make recommendations (if any) for improving the IC's management in order to
prevent future terrorist attacks.

Section I discussed the need to understand the IC's overall management in order
to provide a comprehensive assessment of the IC's counterterrorism management.
Section II outlines a series of questions to be answered regarding the IC's management in
general and concerning counterterrorism in particular. Section III provides a temporal
plan for answering the questions in section II.

I. Understanding The IC's Management Of Counterterrorism Activities Requires

Comprehending The IC's Overall Management Landscape.

This workplan is founded upon the hypothesis that producing the definitive
account of the IC's management related to the September 11th attacks and recommending
management improvements to prevent future attacks requires a broad understanding of
the IC's management beyond the details of the IC's counterterrorism functions. Merely
focusing on counterterrorism-related management without initially establishing the
backdrop of the IC's overall management risks crippling the September 1 lth-related
inquiry by ignoring any systemic management problems in the 1C that played a key role
in the IC's failure to prevent the September 111 attacks and that might hinder the 1C in
preventing future attacks. For example, understanding the ranking of counterterrorism
among the IC's priorities necessitates analyzing the process by which all 1C priorities are
established - including which policymakers are involved and their relative formal and
informal authorities.

Accordingly, the analytical approach outlined in section II below includes the

following broad subject areas which must be analyzed in order to set the stage for
understanding the IC's management related to counterterrorism:
• Legal authorities underpinning the 1C and empowering the IC's senior officials;
• The IC's organizational structure, including its chain of command;
• Formal relationships within the intelligence community;
• Informal relations within the intelligence community;
• Policies and procedures governing management of the intelligence community as
a whole and each agency relevant to the September 11th attacks;
• Culture and practices within the 1C;

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• The Executive Branch's conduct of covert action, including the decisionmaking
of senior Executive Branch officials and the implementation of such decisions by
the CIA and other agencies;
• Executive Branch leadership and oversight of the 1C; and
• Congressional oversight of the 1C.

II. Questions Regarding 1C Management In General And Concerning

Counterterrorism In Particular.

This section outlines general questions concerning 1C management that are

necessary to understand the IC's management related to counterterrorism. Included
within the outline are questions that narrow the general management issues to focus
specifically on counterterrorism.

A. 1C Management.

1. What is "intelligence?"
2. What is the "intelligence community?" How has it changed over time?
3. What is the IC's mission(s)? Has there been change over time?
4. What statutes, Executive Orders, regulations, policies, and procedures
govern the IC's management (e.g., the DCI's authorities)?
5. What is the history of the IC's organizational structure?
6. What are the major themes of the IC's management history, e.g., risk
perception, successes and failures, denial and deception, and reform
proposals?
^ How did any of these themes impact the IC's ability to conduct
counterterrorism activities?
7. What is the history of reform proposals? Have any been implemented,
and if so, how?
> Why was the CTC established?
8. What is the current state of 1C management, including basic responsibility,
authority, and accountability?
> What are the respective roles of the DCI, DDCI, DDCI/CM,
ADCI/Collection, and ADCI/A&P in the conduct of the IC's
counterterrorism programs and in management?
> How was their management direction implemented and reviewed?
9. Who sets priorities for the 1C, and how are they set?
> How did the 1C respond to terrorism's placement in tier 1 of PDD-
35?
> How often did the NSC Deputies Committee or Principals'
Committees review and update PDD-35? What policy or
management recommendations did they make to the DCI regarding
counterterrorism?

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> What were the conclusions of the 1995 DCI "hard target" study on
terrorism? Who performed the study? Who was responsible for
implementing its recommendations and taking specific action?
What follow-up was performed?
^ What was the result of the DCI's "declaration of war" on terrorism?
10. Does the 1C have a process for raising its alert status, akin to the DEFCON
protocol for DOD?
11. Is the 1C organized in order to learn from mistakes?
> To what extent did the 1C learn from each of the successive
terrorist attacks in the 1990s and apply those lessons learned to
improving its activities?
• WTC/1993
• FBI arrest of eight individuals threatening to attack NYC
landmarks
• Khobar Towers bombing
• UBL call for jihad against the U.S.
• Nairobi and Dar es Salaam embassy bombings
• 9/11
12. What was the effect of secrecy on the IC's ability to perform effectively?
>• How did secrecy impact the IC's ability to conduct
counter-terrorism effectively/
12. What lessons can be learned from governmental and private sector
experiences regarding how the 1C should be managed?
13. What alternatives exist for managing the 1C?

B. Executive Branch Leadership and Oversight.

1. How is Executive Branch leadership and oversight of the 1C conducted?

2. What are the roles of the President, NSC, National Security Advisor, NSC
staff, OVP, PFIAB, IOB, and OMB, regarding intelligence?
> What were their roles regarding intelligence collection, analysis,
and other activities concerning terrorism?
3. What is the process by which covert action is authorized?
> What covert actions were authorized for counterterrorism purposes?
^ What were the directions given by Executive Branch
decisionmakers to the agencies that would implement the covert
action?

C. CIA.

Cl. CIA Management.

1. How is the CIA organized?

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2. How successful has the CIA Director been in asserting control over the
CIA?
3. What is the relationship between the DO and the DI?
4. What internal mechanisms for oversight does the CIA Director have?
5. What is the role of the CIA-IG?

C2. Covert Action.

1. What is the history of the CIA's performance of covert action?

> How did the CIA implement any covert action authorized by senior
Executive Branch officials concerning counterterrorism?

D. NSA.

E. DIA.

F. POD.

1. What are the roles of senior DOD officials (e.g., SecDef, DepSecDef,
ASDI/C3I, ASD/SOLIC, DOD-IG) regarding intelligence?
>• What are their roles regarding counterterrorism?
2. What is the history of DOD's performance of covert action?
> How did DOD implement any covert action authorized by senior
Executive Branch officials concerning counterterrorism?

G. INR.

H. DOJ.

I. Dept. of Homeland Security.

J. Congressional Oversight.

1. How does Congress conduct oversight of the 1C? Did Congress utilize its
full legal authority to conduct oversight?
> How did the 1C keep Congress aware of terrorist threats to the U.S.,
and how did Congress respond?
> How was warning intelligence provided to senior Congressional
leadership, and what actions resulted?
2. What is the process that Congressional committees employ to determine
the IC's budget and policy priorities?
^ What priority did Congressional leadership give to
counterterrorism?

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> What priority did the eight Congressional oversight committees
give to counter terrorism activities in the 1C? How was this
priority manifested in program direction in their report language
(including classified annexes) and in their budget marks?
3. What is the process that Congressional committees employed to determine
the NFIP's responsiveness to Congress's priorities?
>• If Congress established counterterrorism priorities for the 1C, then
how did Congress confirm that the NFIP responded to Congress's
concerns?
> Was there any report language from 1992-2001 that directed the 1C
to take specific actions to developing capabilities to respond to
terrorism? What did the 1C do in response to such language?
> What role did GAO play?
4. What was the process by which Congressional oversight committees
determined whether 1C planning and operations addressed the DCI's
priorities effectively, and was that process effective?
5. What factors might limit Congress's ability to conduct effective oversight
(eg, security, turnover)?
6. How effective were the House and Senate intelligence committees in
overseeing the 1C? Has Congressional oversight led to better performance
in the 1C?
^ What findings and recommendations resulted from Congressional
investigations into the IC's counterterrorism efforts prior to the
Joint Inquiry's investigation? How were such recommendations
implemented?

III. Temporal Strategy.

The strategy set forth below is based upon the assumption that team members will
not receive the requisite clearances until mid-June 2003.

A. June 2003.

1. Conduct open source reading

2. Read Joint Inquiry report.
3. File requests for information interviews with 1C agencies.

B. July 2003.

1. Receive informational briefings.

2. Submit document requests to 1C agencies.
3. Meet with academics and other private-sector individuals to discuss
research objectives.

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C. August 2003.

1. Review documents produced.

2. File requests for interviews.
3. Make preparations for travel.

D. September 2003.

1. Review documents produced.

2. Submit new document requests as needed.
3. Interview lower-level current and former officials.
4. Travel.

E. October 2003.

1. Review documents produced.

2. Interview lower/mid-level current and former officials.
3. Travel.

F. November 2003.

1. Interview mid/senior-level current and former officials.

2. Ascertain whether any gaps in facts and circumstances of 9/11 need to be
filled.

G. December 2003.

1. Interview senior current and former officials.

2. Begin drafting.

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